Text

Decision ALAB-653,restricted.Applicant Security Plan Conforms to Atomic Energy Act & Commission Security Regulations.Physical Protection Sys & Security Organization Are Adequate.Details Withheld (Ref 10CFR2.790)
	ML20058A413
Person / Time
Site:	Diablo Canyon
Issue date:	09/09/1981
From:	Thompkins B; NRC ATOMIC SAFETY & LICENSING APPEAL PANEL (ASLAP)
To:	;
References
	ALAB-653, ISSUANCES-OL, NUDOCS 8109140189
	Download: ML20058A413 (161)
	v • d • e

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9 UNITED STA 35 OF AMERICA NCCLEAR REGULACCP% COMMISSICN ACCMIC SAFE *Y AND LICINSING AP?!AL 3 CARD Administrative Judges:

Thc=as S. Mcore, Chai a=

Dr. W. Reed Jchasen

)

n the Ma :s of

)

PACIFIC GAS AND ?"'CTRIC CCMPANY

) Cocket Nes. 50-275 CL

)

50-323 CL (Diablo Canyon Nuclea: ?coe: Plant,)

Units 1 and 2)

)

i DECISICN Septa =har 9, 1981 (ALA3-653) e l

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.'2 1M An v.

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UNITED STATIS CF AMERICA l

NUCLEAR RIGULATCRY,CCMMISSICN ACCMIC SAFITY AND LI G SING APPEAL 3 CARD Administrative Judges:

Thc=as S. Mccre, Chairman Dr. W. Reed Jchasen

)

In the Mattar of

)

PAC FIC GAS AND ELICTRIC COMPANY

)

Occhet Ncs. 50-275 CL

)

50-323 CL (Diahic Canycn Nuclea: Pcwer Plant, )

Units 1 and 2)

)

Messrs. 3:uca Nc: ten and Ar_hur C. Gahr, Phcenix, A:::ena, and Malecim H.

Fur =usn and Philip A.

Crane, Jr., San Francisco, California, fc

he applicant, Pacific Gas and Ilactric Campany.

Messrs. He-t:ert H. 3:cwn, Lawrence C. Langher and Ch s: ener 3.

ii a n = a c k, Wasn ng On, D. C., and i

Sy===

S.

Gec ::cu, Sacramento, California, fc Gcverno: Edmunc 3:0Vn, Jr. cf the Staza of CalifcInia.

Messrs. Harrr M. Willis and W.

t Andrew 3aldw h, San a:ancascc, C a.i.1 2 c : n z a, f: =e.;.nzarveno:, 5an Luis Cbispo Mothers,for Peace.

l Messrs. Nilliam J. Cl= stead and Charles 3arth and Mrs..ce:.nda Lew swar : ::: the Nuclear Regular :7 C :::.ss cn s=r :.

- r a-.nN a-.

Septa =he:

9, 1981 (ALAB-653) 6 6

t TABLE OF CCT"ENTS Pace I.

PRCCEDURAL EISTCRE 2

II.

REGULATORY SCHIME FOR PHYSICAL PRC-TIC"'ICN OF COMMERCIAL REAC*cas 5

III.

3E DESIGN 3 ASIS 53 EAT 10 A.

Sice of the External Assault Force 10 Denial of Petit $cn For Exception 3.

Tc Design 3 asis Threat 34 c.

Cther Challenges to the Genersl Per-

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42 fc:mance Chjectire and Requirements IV.

FAC"UAL F 2iDING3 48 A.

Int cduction 48 3.

Adequacy, Implementacien and Review of Safeguards Centingency Plan (ccuselidated Issues 2 and 3) 53 C.

Establishment, P.anagement, Training, Equipment, and Qualification of a Physical Security Organicaticn (Ccnsc11 dated Issue 4) 60 D.

Ccnmunicaticas System (Ccssolidated 7

Issue 5) 78 3.

E_isen Wich Lccal Law Enforcement -

Authorities (Consclidatad Issue 6) 88 F.

Detection and Sur7eillance Sysuems (Ccnsclidatad Issue 7) 101.

1 I

9 Pace I

c.

Identificatics of Vital Areas Whers Radiologica.1 Sabotage Is Possible 113 (Consolidated Issue 8)

E.

Ccmpensato:rf Measures For Ccmpressor Building Int =usion Isto Isciation %cne 113 (censolidated Issus 9)

I.

Imergency Vehicle Exception To Accass

@ ement (Consolidated Issue 10) 121 J.

Sufficiency of Applicant's Safep:ards 123 System (Consolidated Issue 1) 140 X.

Staff Reductics in the Nt=nbar og A::ned Responde=s <

130 7.

CONC:,0SICN APPI:tDIX

.ee~'

J-e e

l

, 1 4

1 1

1, aw

2-Chis decisien centains our findings of fact and con-clusicus of law on the centested security plan issues in the Diabic Canycn operating license preceeding.

As such, the decisien necessarily centains numercus details of the

=

facility security plan.

Consequently, the decisica, like the security plan and in camera hearing transcripts, must be treated as protected informaticn.

It may not be publicly disclosed.

The decisica"will be made available to counsel for the Gcverscr cf Califernia and intervener San Luis chispo Mcthers for Peace who previcusly executed affidavits of non-discicsure.

It will be placed in the sec=a facilities pre-vided by the NRC staff and applicant for examina:icn cd protected inf==mation.

I.

Procedural Histcry 1/

In ALA3-580- we overtur=ed the Licensing 3 card's fi r*4ng that the security plan f== the applicant's two-unit Diabic Canyon nuclear facilitI c=mplied with the C=mmissien's 2/

regulatiens.-

Ne did this after disecvering that the security plan was not part of the hearing rec =rd below and 3/

ascertaining frem the Licensing 3 card's response' ~ tc cur 1/

Pacific Gas and Electric Ccmcany (Diabic Canycn Nuclear Pcwer Plan:, Gn:.ca 1 anc 2), ALA3-580, 11 NRC 2I7 (1980).

2/

See Pacific Gas and Electric Ccmeanv (Diable Canyen Nuclear Pcwer Plant, Un :s 1 anc 2), L37-79-25, 10 NRC 453, 507 (1979).

3/

See Licensing scard =emerandum dated February 11, 1980 (unpublished).

3-4 /

i:9tirI tha it had sever lecked at the ciablo Ca= yen security plan.

These circu=s ances, ce=hined wi d the sparsity of the hearing record en de adequacy of the pla=, led us to conclude that the Licensing Sca:d's findi g was "sc ::ruch waste ink" because * (s]c cenceivable gecd is sa=ved by =aking empty fd"Ad gs is the absence of essential evidencs.

11 $RC at 230.

We then vacated the security plan pettica of the sca=d's partial isi-d='

decision and anncunced that we would consider the adeq=acy of the applicant's security plan de new.

11 NRC at 231.

The San Luis Chispo Mothers fc= Peacs (SM)- was allowed to pa:ticipate as an intervenor isJaccc: dance wi_h 5/

the to=ms of ALA3-410 whe=s, over two years bef=re, we

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cutli=ed de st:ict==ss f=r litigating the adequacy of applicans's sec==ity pla=.

S4

'3-17, we ;e=mi,.ted the Gove:-.c= cf the State of '" ' 'c=sia to pa~3-5=te as the 6/

represen'atire of an interested stats.. - After :ssciving all disputas over the scope and centent of the affidavit of 9

4 6,.980 (u= published).

1 4/

See cur _ amer'-d" of Teh

-=--r 5/

Pacific Gas and F.lectric C w anv (Diabic Canycn Nuclear pcwer Plans, Unr.:s 1 anc 2), A.T Aa-410, 5 N2C 1398,

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review denied, m-TT-23, 6 N2C 4f5 (1977).

6/

See Pacific Gas and loc ric C =ca.Tr (Diahic Canyc=

Nuclea: Plant, C=/ s 1 anc i), AIAS-600, 12 NRC 2,

""~

8 (1980).

7 /

non-disclosure incorporated ints our p ctactive c dar,-

we granted counsel fc i=te:venc: and Gcver=c: 3 cwn (and their respective qualified expert witnesses) access to applicant'ssecurityplan.U The i=terveco: filed amended contenticas and Gove==c: 3rewn filed a stata=ent of issues en which he wished to participate.

We entertai=ed chjections to the interve=c 's c=ntentiens and Gove==c: 3 cwn's state-ment of issues and recast. these that-we accepted - plus two 9/

matters raised sua sconte - into ten consolidated issues.-

1Q/

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Cpen completien of discoverf, all parties profiled thei:

direct testimony.

We then overruled interve=c='s chjectica 11 /

=c hciding the security hearing en applicant's premises-7/

Seer First'? rehearing

Conference C dar dated (Fe.hruary 25,1980, at 4-5 (unpublished)); Pacific Gas and Electric Com=any (Diabic Canycn Nuclea: Plant, Untcs 1 and 2),

AIAa-592, 11 NRC 746, 74 8-49, mcdified and reminded, C.I-80-24, 11 NRC 775, en remanc, u -ovu,

.4

.w 2,

4-7 (1980); ed-d 7:ahear ug Confer uce Crder dated August 4, 1980 at 3-4 (unpublished).

J/

See ALA3-592, su=ra, '_1 NRC at 7 51-75 6 ; ALA3-60 0, su=ra, 11 NRC at 9-13; P4-d Prahaiari=q Ccnference C dar datec August 4, 1980 at 4-6 (unpublished) ; Four h ? rehearing Conference C dar dated. August S, 1980 at 2-4 (unpublished).

9/

See C dar Ruling c: Cc=tentiens dated September 13, 1980 (unpublished) ; see also C dar dated Ncve=her 4, 1980

(== published).

g See C da Ruli=g c= Discovery.Mctions dated Cet=he: 10, 1980 at 4-24 (unpublished) ; C dar dated Oc =her 17, 1980 (2 pp., unpublished).

11/

See C dar datad Cc =her 17, 1980 a: 5-12 C.3 pp., unpublished),

rev.aw denied,,C dar of the Cc==issien daced Ncve=he:

6, 1980 (unpublished).

m

,s and, beg -

g November 10, 1980, we held six days of d

jg], camers hearings at -la applicant's headquartars is San F:sacisco, Califc=sia.

Afta the close of the hearing, all pa==ias filed proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law.

II.

Regulatory Schens fc= Phys-ical p=ctaction of Commercial Reacto,=s 13/

Section 73.55 of the F-d== ion's :sgulaticss sets f==th the physical p=ctactica requirements fc safeguarding c=mmar=ial n" 'sc: pcwer :sact==s against *:adiological sabotage."

This tars,is defined as a deliberata act agai=st a plant er plant comycnann which could direc ly c indirse:17 14 /

endanger the 'public health and safety by exposurs t= radiation 7 Ra-le: than pr=Wd *g a blua-; int fc= an entire security system, the C=mmission's =squiations y== pound an ove=all 12/

We subsequently ruled on a moti=n :ngardd'g complianca with the ta=:ns of our protac ive c= der.

See. Memorandum

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l and C= der dated December 30, 1980 (sealed and unpublished);

l aff'd on :sview hv Commissien sua s;cate, en dssics c de:

dated, b.sary 2.0, 1980.:tunpubicsnec, w.21: editad versien of our' December 30, 1980 memorandum and c de: at v' ed).

g/

10*CF2 573.53 g

10 CFR 173.2(p).

The off-sita doses set forth in-lO C71 8100 11 are rua Commissien's :sference values fc:

daua_* 4 g radia*d n expcsurss in emergencies which -

anrmnger -le pubIlc health and safsef.

8 t

1

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s-general perfc:mance objective and a design basis threat

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which the physical p ctactica system must be designed to

neet.

Se regulations then address the component parts of a security system and prescribe :ncre specific require-ments fc each system subpart.

ne flexibility of this regulate:f scheme allcws each applicant censiderable latitude in designing a sadeguards system to protect its nuclear power facility f cm radiological sahetage.

Sec~ dan 73.55(a) mandates that a react =r security system be planned so as to protect agal=st the ' design basis -" eat of radiciogical sabotage."

nat malevolent

- sa. is defined is section 73.1(a) (1) as:

(i)

A dete i ed v-1clant external assault, attack by stealth, or deceptive actions, of several persons with the fc11owing attributes, assis-tance and equipment:

(A) Well-traised (including military traising a=d skills) and dedicated individuals, (3) inside assistance which may include a k=cwledgeable individual who atta= pts to participate is a passive role (e.c., p cvide informati=n), an active =cle (e.e.7 !acilitate entrance and exit, disable ala_: ins and communi-caricas, participate is vicient attack),.c both, (C) suitable weapons, up to and including band-held automatic weapons, equipped with silencers and having effec.ive icng-range accuracy, (D) hand-carried equipment, includi"g incapacita ' g agents and explosives for use as t=cis of entry c: fc ctherwise des-cying reacec, facility, transporter, c: contai=e integrity c features of the safeguards system, and (ii) An inter =al *Weat of an insider, inc1:Ad g an empicyee (in a=y positi=n).

. Se general perf===ance chjective is also sated in Sec

mn 73.55 (a) and requirss da the :sacec: security systen p:cvide "high assurance dat activities involving 4"'

i c= 1 to the c=mmen de-specisi nuclear caterial are not i

fanse and security, and do not constitnte an u==sasenahic 15/

risk to de public health and safety."-

A1 2cugh newhers defined, the "high assu=a=ce" chjective '"is deemed to be comparable m the degree of assurance contemplated by the ccmmission in its safety review for pr=tecan against seve=s postulatad accidents having pctantial ecusegances sd d'=-

to the pctantial consequences f_=m sacec: sahetage.*: j

,S Under the squistory scheme, the general perfo-=~c a chjective is generally satisfied once the detailed =sq"d sments fc=

the various components of a secc.=isf system set fc :h in Secticus 73.55 (b)-(h) ars met.

Icwever, the :sgulaticus

scogad a that thers may be spec:.a1 cire=mstances whi=h lead the N hsien to impose addiad-*=t security measures se that a particula: system meets the general perfc=mancs chjective.

In ad4*' dan, the squia'd-n= pe mit the use ef security l

measu=ss other than *'-ase p=ecisely see**"g the sq"* sments l

15/

Se =sgula dans define sp

' mi nucisar matarial of icw strategic si-*'"icance to encompass power reac== fuel:

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"10,000 grams er mers cf u 2=ium-235 contained in uranium enriched abcve natural but less than 10 per-csun in the U-235 iset=pe. "

10 c:ra 572.2 (y),

M/

44 Fed. Reg. 63134, 63135 (Ncve=her 23, 1979).

8 --

cf Sections 73.55 (h)-(h) if such =easures p cvide aquivalent

- 17/

p:ccaetion. ~

ne specific requirements for the six subparts of a security system are spelled cut is Secticas 73.55(b)-

(g).

Subsectics (b) directs the licensee to ess=blish a security c:ganization - including a:med guards who must he. rained, equipped, qualified and annually requalified -

and a management system 4hich must develcy, implement and enferce all necessary security p =cedures.

Subsection (c) dictates that the safeguards system inec:perate various 4

1 physical barriers, enes and ligh-d g requirements t= aid in detecting, delaying and resisting unauthori.ed entry isse the facility.

Subsec*'~n (d) spells. cut e.he various j

requirements for cont cIling access to the faci.lity and l

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for' identifying and evaluating persensel and r. ysical items

=cving into the facility as well as movi=g f:=m one area to a=cther withis che facilicI.

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Os requirements for detecting unauthcri=ed istrusiens into the facility are cutlined in subsec_1== (e).

h ng j

l cther thi=gs, this part requires that all ala:s equipment i

_17/

10 c?R 373.55 (a)., see 42 Fed. Reg. 10836 (February 24, 1977).

9 be self checking and ta=per indica ** g and dat ala==s assu=ciate in two c=n 3 ucusly m ed ala:s stat -*s indi-i cating the tfpe =ad 1ccation of the ala:m.

The c=mmunication reqnd ements of subsection (f) direct that all facility guards have the capabilitf of c=n+3 ucus communication with heth ala:m stations and that the m'= - stati=ns have c=n ren '-*=

telephone as well as 5= % emergency pcwered ta-way radic c

mic:= wave voice dcatien with local law enf=== ament authc=ities.

Subsecti=n (g) establishes the tes** g and maistenance schedules f== the va icus system ccmponents and =a= dates an annual isdependent secu=itI audit of the safeguards systam.

Fisally, subsection (h) details certain responsibilities

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of the securitI c g=ad -= tion:

to execute a contingency plan; em establish a liasen with Iccal law enf=== ament agencies; e

to p cvide that ten a=med and t=aised sec.2=ity persennel

= h = 1 1-be available at all times to respcud to sadequard i=cidents unless the e-=nnd *sion de*=-4'es othe= visa (but that = unbar may never he reduced.to less than 5 guards) ;

and, to assure that in. the event of a securi:f emergency, the threat be effectively assessed and then saut:211:ed by the depicyment of a:med respense personnel between vi-=1 areas and,the in ~ ders.

III.

The Design Basis Threat

~

A.

Size of the External Assault Ferce 3ecause a number of the contested issues before us l

challenge the adequacy of various aspects of the applicant's security plan to protect against the design basis threat of Section 73.1(a) (1), many of our. findings are to some extent dependent on the-numerical size of the exta=nal malevolent force characterized in the design basis threat.by the words "several persons." g We must initially confront this legal question, which the parties briefed fully, before resolving the contested issues.

1.

The parties disagree ~on how the word "several" i

should be construed.

In essence, Governo Brown and ST OMF; contend that the Commission intended the word to be an indefinite ter:n without any specific numerical limitation.

They argue that their interpreta+ 4n would permit site specific flexibility in designing reactor protection systems for the threats associated with each particular facility.

They further argue that here the record establishes that the likely threat to Diablo Canyon is up to twelve attackers, a 1_8/

See o.

6,'su=ra.

n_.,

,,e_,-

,n

,,--n,.-

.s.

i A

. number which they believe is encompassed by the ta=m "several "

The staff and applicant, on the othe

hand, assert that the Commission intended the "several persons" of the design basis threat unifornly to denote a -mav

mum i

threat of attackers.

I Governor Brown asserts that we must :nject the position of the staff and, applicant as contra =y to the plain meaning of "several" which, by dictionary defini' don, is an indefi-nite ta=m.

He contends that a limi'4"g meaning can be con-side =ed only if the regulation is ambiguous; since*it is

=ot, the customary meaning cont cis and no cisterpretation of the regulatory language is permissible. Br. at 9-10.

19/ -

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The Governor also points to several congressional hearings

.as well as agency reports and studd es 'to-support his conten*'-n that, in response to a generai concern that existing security was inadequate, the c 4=sion adepted section 73.55 to upgrade reactor protection.

Ne then argues it would be a=cmalous for the Commissica to have reduced the si=a of 19/

See Subcommittee on Energy and the Environment of the House Ccamittee on Interior and Insular Affairs, 94th Congress., 2d Sess., Safequards in the Domestic Nuclear Industry (C=mmittee Print No. 17, 1976); cversight Hearings on Nuclea= Energy - safeguards in the Demesuic Nuclear Indust =f Before the sube==mittee on E=argy and "Je Envi-

=nment of the House Committee on 'Iitarier and Insula:

Affairs, 94th Congress, 2d Sess. (1976).

l

l t the threat c= c=17 attackers when, during the pendency of the reactor security ::ule=a'<ing, the agency staff reviewed the adequacy of licensee security plans 20 /

under guidelines-empicying a larger threat. 3. at 4-6;

.11.

Finally, Gcve==c: Br=wn relies on the press c=nference 4

21 /

smarks and congressional testimonf cf hwe senic: staff members to argue that the Commission intended to creats an indefinite design basis th: at in the reactor security rule.

3.

at 6-9.

The stadf primarily :s11es en four inte==al agen,cf memoranda to support its positica that the ccamissics intended the design basis threat of "several persens" to be limited to no mere than attackers.

T'.ese memcranda purport to document the develcyment of the final reac u r physical protaction :squiation after the publicatics f==

22/

comment of a p cpesed rule. -

Indeed, the staff cc= cades 1

2G/

In this regard Gove==c: 3 cwn relies en Regulatcrf Guide 1.17, "?:ctacticn of Nuclear Power Plants Against Industrial Sabc: age" (June 1973) and Regulatorf Guide 5.43, "?lant Security For=a Cuties" (Janua:7 1975).

21/

See Cversight Hearings en Nuclear Reac.c Security Against Sabc:sge 3efore the Subcc=mittee en Isergy and the Invironment of the Ecuse Ccmmittee en ~n ario:

and Insula Affairs, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977)

(statement of F.dsen G. Case).

22/

The contents of these staff dccuments are discussed a: pp. 19-30, 8 " a.

- L3 -

is its h iaf, as it did at the hearing, dat it sed only *M * = s preta:icn of de :sgulati=n is its :sview of the Diabic c' ycn securitf plan. 3. at 3.

C e staff suppcrts its argument by ccmparing the exter=al attack c=mponent of the design basis.th sats applicable t:

< ~ - - = ~

2.7 24/

cial pcwer :saccors and fuel cycle facilities. ~

ne

~

+ sats a:s identical except the C. %.,sion characteri=ed da th sac f== the theft c dive = sics of special =uclear material as "a small g cup" with *the abilitf to operata as two c: =cre taams";

and the staff asserts tha* the caission c: the team critaria f =m the *' sat f== c=mmer=ial

nact= s indicates that the C=mmission ista5 dad "seversi pe=sens" t= be a number

- the mW -mm 2V number whi.:= can act as two teams. 3. at 7. ~

2.

As its delevata, our task is to ascertal the c -

mission's istant when it used is de regulati=n the wc ds

seve=al persons" to cha: acta:i=a the si=a cf the desig= basis i

th= sat.

We are =ce f=se tc ista:dect our preferenca as if we i

1 1

I

~-

g See 10 CTR 373.1(a) (1).

g See 10 CTR 573.1(a) (2).

.1Y SE-g Applicant's a. rents f=11=w de sa=e c=urse as the staff's and 5 cG"?'s a:s =arsly a : shut al of appli-l ca==.'s arg:=ne=:3.

. were the regulation's au cer.

But we a:s nce cons rained by a purpersed canon of cons ::ctics to cicsa cur eyes := role-vant administra-J.ve hist =rf, as Governc Stewn advccatas. 3r.

at 9-10.

As the Supreme Court has warned, words are inexact t=cis at best and fer that reason there is wisely sc rule of law for-bidding rescrt to explanatcrf legislative histerf sc matter how

clear the wcrds nay appear on 'superfi=ial examinatien'*. y/

Thersfere we must icok to the entire':sgulation, its subse-quant amendments and any other relevant regulaterf hist =rf to discern de Commissien's meaning.

Here, as we shall see, the available aids to c=ns.:=ction everwheNi gly supper a

limi '"y definition of the werd "several."

Wa are persuaded that the Commissics intended the design basic threat in Sectica 73.l(a) (1) to c=nstitute a

-=v N-cf _

- attackers.

In 1974 the Ccmmissien h:uhlished for c = ment a pr=pesed rule to amend its regulaticus for the physical protectica cf 2V

act:rs.

At that time, the regulaticus :nquired : act=r licensees to submit to the agency sec==ity plans f== pr:tec-29/

tien against industrial sabotage.

But the requistiens did 27/

Har-isen v. Ner.hern T:ns: C=.,

317 U.S.

476, 479 (1943),

quc-- g Unitec S stas v.

American T:.:ckine Ass 'n., 310 U.S.

534, 544 (1940s.

eet the general mandata cf Appendix C and that they are available a: Diabic Canyen efere issuing applicant a

isthdDirect:r'sre-cperating license.,similar?.ly, it spensibility to see t= it tr.at applicant has adequately and p:=perly t:sined the app =priate persennel to respend to the safeguar 5 in=idsnta ser. cc: in applicant's plan.

1913, pp. 7-8.

See gen's mIly' Charles I. Gaskin., fel. C:.

We are satisfied had applicant's centingency plan is in conic ity with Appendix C.

Applicant's plan centains

= =any A s dlar situatien is presented with respect i -

39/

c her regula: cry requ.:e=enes as well.

See, e 5,.,

pp. 75, 77, 94-95, infra.

_90 /

See pp. n. 125, infrs.

d

.n.

57 -

all neesssary catageries of infc:=atics and each ed de fcu: parts of the plan (i_.e_., backg: und sectica, generic plannisq hase, licensee plannt,q hase and respensibility matrix) seats the criteria spelled cut is the regulaticas.

App. Ex. 5-63.

I= deed, applicant's plan is a virtual copy of the f===at and substance of the sa=ple plan c== aised i=.

Regulate:*I Guide 5.54

(. Mar =h 1973).

Staff Ex. 3-5, pp. 5.54-7 et sec.

For example, applicant's generic plann4ng base is chapter two delineates the c=n-d"gencies f== which there are plans and fc each event states the chjective to be ac=cmplished, the sequence cf necessa:-r decisions and acticns to be u= der aken if that event oc===s, and the l

=

set of app =priate data to facilitate =aki5g these de-cisicas and taking those acticas.

App. Ex. 5-63, pp. 5-25;

?G&I Panel, fol. T. 1534, p. 10.,Ac=ce '" gly, the pla d

adequatsly defines the criteria fc= inicia '"g and to=mi-na-3 q prescribed resyc=ses to specific threats and p =perly t

indicsk:es the decisicas, actions, p :cadures and suppc ing i=fc:=atien to 5 ing abcut these resycnses.

Je a:s also satisfied, en the basis cf he rac= d

'-- "a bef==s us, that applican: has adagesta'.y p:=~ridad future i=plementatien, revision and maintanance of the

s;.

x

\\

s Diable Canycn safaguards censingency plan.

With de sub-

. nissien of the censingency plan, the applicant indicated its general intentien := cc= ply 912 secticas 73.40 (c) and (d) cf the reyulations.

s ta 'f r.x'.

5-14, Attach =en:

A.

Our findings en the adequacy of applicant's security

sining are set forth in respect to Consclidated :ssue 4 (pp. 60-77,, infra) and will act he repeatad here.

We acte, hcwever, that the applicant inst:.:c.s the security and cperating perscnnel who have safeguards censingency respens"di4-3 as in the applicable p::cedures for each cf the events set for h in the plan.

?G&I Innel, fel. T.

1534, pp. 11, 22.

The cenpany also intands to conduct practical drills for its security personnellinvciving the plan's contingencies.

Lar:y C. Fisher, Tr. 1379-81.

Tur-her, as we state in cur findings en C:nsclidated Issue

.m 6 rugarding applicant's 11asen wi:5 1ccal law enf :cament, PG&I al:aady has taken steps t

'=~i'

a the law a=f= ce-agencies wi h Diable Canycn and in: ands future prac-i

=en:

1 =T d-' ' 's involving such agencies.

PG&I Panel, fol.

T:. 1584, p.

10; D e..an,' T. 1655, 1579-81.

These usasuras will ensure tha: the Diablo Canycn security-f:::e can :L=e'.T Lden:Liy 'and adec:a,c L7 assesa sadaguards h

e 9-thrsans and take e.e necessary sspensite acticas.=

cautrali:e them.

.s additien, PG&I will annually :sview its centin-gancf p =cedures and prac ices to test the safeguard.s system and verify its local law enforcement :sspense ecmmit:nen s.

This :sview will also include an audit of the testing and maintenance p cgram fc the security system.

"e =sview will be done by :ne=hers of the ?GrI securitf Capar :nen: (i_.e, the Security Representative) c= the Steam Generatic: Depart =ent who are independen bcth of sec.: itf pregram manage =ent and of persenne;. who have direct sspensibility fc: implementatics of the seenrity p cgram.

?Gaz Panale fol. ::. 1334, p. 11e App. Ex.

5-62, p. 14-1.

4 e

e O

,i

. C.

Es tah *.ish=ent. Manacement, "-=i d e, Ecut.:=ent, and Cualificat:.cn of a Physical Securacy Crean :a:Len (Consci:.ca:ac Issue 4) pursuant to 10 C7R 373. 55 (b) C. ), a licensee =usu establish a securitf c:ganizatics to p ctact its facility against radic1cgical sabotage.

A: least one full-ti:te me=her of hat c:ganizaticn who has de authority to direc: physical p:ctacuien activities must he ensite at all ti=es.

10 Cn 573.55 (h) (2).

The licensee =ust have a =anagement sfstem to provide for the develcpment, revision, i=ple=entatien and anic cement of its security p:=cedures.

That systec mus:

include (1) writuen security p ccedures dccu=enting the s-ucture and responsibilities of the sacurity c ganizaticn:

and ( 2) p cvisien 20: writtenappcvaloft5csepOcedures and any subsequent revisicas of them by a persen whc has cverall responsibility fc securi:y functicas.

10 Cn 173. 55 (b) (3).

Secticn 73.55 (h).(4) p cvides that ne=hers of the sec=ity r

c gani:sti=n must be trained, acuipped, and qualified to perfc:

their assigned security du~ies in accc dance with de criteria of Appendix 3 cf Paru 73.

Appendix 3 centains de detailed and extensive recti:=-=n s fc: the selection,

sining, equipping, testing and qualifica:icn cf security t

l e

l

e perscnnel.

n additics, licensees =ust sub=ri: a.:si=ing and ge.alificatic=s plan cut'i~i g thei: ;; cedures f:: ::=p'iance with Appendix 3 and generally mst begi f=11: wing the plan withis 60 days after it is app cved by the staff.

Completics of the tra "d

g and qualification of security persc==e1 is i

i req"d ad, hcwever, until two years after EC app:= val of

=

the pla: is g ssted.

10 C72 373.55 (b) (4 ).

The applicane has established a

m::and struc:==a f== its securief c gani:stien which ensures that a qualified o

individual is always c= site to direct the activities of

-he sect."_rf forca.

Respcnsibilief f== genersi super-v si:n of ac iv_:ies at applicant's facilief resides is

he pla== superistendent.I w

l

~e sacu=ief shift supervisc s, li:<a their super:.c s, ara J

l l

l 6

s

52 -

full-ti=e PG&I a=picyees, and all have the training and e 'a..ce ~~ -=c

~'.e ssc

'.v..'. - e d" '..c. " c '. - u - *.. e exr 1.. A.

~~4

- s s c ~r - = --....

a-d'-'-'-~., ' '~. e -. ra..v...as "ac e-individuals currently a=picyed in the cc pc:sta security depar.=ent who are fully qual:.fied as security shift super-c visers (and a: the ti=a of the hearing w.as trainine. a thirdt

:: vide a subs.antial back;=. cac. ability fc: these posi ic=s should the $eed arise.

App. Ex. S-64, pp. 1-1 to 1-2; ? GEE e..et..e0t.

3:

13

- 34,.e.

.i(i t t e., e, t....

19 ' ' a c

2' 74.

.a

r..

l

{

arr. :.x.

- n.,

.c.

1-2.

he security "c ce sergeanu and all other =e=hers of

.. z --.. ----- -s-u.._a, u

.n z,

a

~

.e

..._..-,.c a-.

.c. =,a..--

= c.

= r1 v==s,-

.e-

~.ev a e

'<e..... sec"_' ~. e "-'-....-

.>e-r l

I 1

91/

c==_ ac: := the c==pany.

"'ha Pi=ks: =n persc=el, h= waver,

a:n f:117 : r.ined by the c== pani.

R:nald G. T:dar=, T.

2394-95.

In:_her, the applicant has established an adequate canagement systam t= p:= vide f== the devel=pment, :svisi=n, implementati=n, and enf=== ament of its securief p:=ceduras.

."..e plant Staff Review C=mmittee will review all plant p:=-

caduras, includd g sec=ity p:=ceduras, at least once every O

two years.

? e C=:perate Security capartment wi n perd==s a yearly audit of the entire security p:= gram and submit detailed written : sports of its fd-d' qs and,rsc===endati=ns.

s additien, the securitf supervisc: win he c=n*' uany l

l i

91/

The C==missien's :squiati=ns require that when a licansee s=p1=ys a c=nt=act guard f===s, the written t

ag:sement between de licensee"and==ntrac_== shall

'cisarly show that

1) the licensee :smains sspensi-ble f== =aistaining security is ac== dance with the regulaticus and -licensee's securitf plan; 2) the NRC has de right

= inspect, c=py and rameve an sec=ity

sports and dccuments; 3) the centract sec=ity per-sc=e1 nust be capable cf perf=. d g all their assigned dueles and :sspensibilities is es::ying cut licensee's security plan and the :ngulati=ns; and 4) the c=n-

,.rac== will neu assign any perscnnel := the site who have =ct been nade awars of these :sspens-i t 3 -' as.

10 v.s 573.35 (b) (1).

Ne par y challenged -le ; =-

vist=ns cf d e c=nt=act between de appli= ant and

?i=kerten and that cent =act is'=ct part cf the sc==d of this ; =caedg.

1 l

l

l t

sspensible f : the design, imple=entatien, and review of security p :ced :ss.

A number of changes := the security plan have al sady been made in :sspense to the staff's h

i concerns c: the applicant's internal audits.

PG&z Panel

.ma.s.

3.:34 e.. 49 13. we.is

<t

- - -... I g _n_,..

2x.

At the ti=a of the security hearing in Neve her.

1980, the =atter of the relection, t' = ing, equipment and qualification of the security force at Diablo Canyen was is a state of transiti:n.

The applicant had already suh=itted to the staff in July 1980 its training and c.ualificati==.=lan f:: c==c.iv.ing wi h A:=.endix 3 and was 92/-

awai:ing staff app = val. ~

Shortly after securing that app : val, applicant wculd he chligated := hegin i=plement-ing its plan and wculd he allcwed yac years to achieve full c=mpliance with Appendix 3, as pr=vided in the :squ12-icnr.

7.n the incarim, hcwever, the regulaticas still required applicant to train.he me=hers of its security f:::s se that thav. wculd he capable of.::: acting Diahic Canv.en 92/

The applicant's training and qualifica:ica plan was nct effared into evidence by the c =pany.

The s:sff states in its 9:=pesed findings of fac: that en January 1, 1981, it app =ved the applicant's plan.

Staff Pr=pcsed Findd gs at 20, n. 22.

1 1

1

4

.. against radiclegical sahetage.

see 10 Cr2 373.55(a), (b) (3),

and _ (b) ( 4).

The p:cgran fc= persc=nal selection, t==#

dag, equip-

tent, a=d qualification presented i= applicant's profiled dirsc: :ssti=cny and seu f== h i= its securic? plan (a=d which had p =vided the basis fc= the stadf's approval of that plan) was =ct based,cn~ Appendix 3 but rather on the 93/

requirements of Regulate y Guide 5.20.~

App. Ix. 5-62, pp. 1-4 to 1-10; App. Ex. 5-64, pp. 1-6 to 1-9; PG&Z Panel, fel. Tr. 1584, p. 14 ;.vd T ier, fol. Tr. 1911, p. 27; Gaski=,

fel. T. 1313, p. 9.

That guide was issue 6'i= 1374, l==g hefers the C==missicn's adoptien of 10 CrR 873.55.

It sus::marily sets cut general criteria which the staff c=n-sidered.ac=speable unde the then'i=plicable :sgula==f requira-

=ents f== traisi=g, equipping a=d qualiffi=g quards and wa==h-t I

=en f== the physical.p:=tection of plants a=d =aterial.

See pp. 14-1f, s-@ra.

93/

Regulan==f Guide 5.20, "Traisi=g, Equipping, a=d Cualif-l ing of Guards a=d Jat=hman (January 1374).

This :squ f-a la===y guide is staff I;chibit S-4.

_ App. Ex. S-62, pp. 1-3 to 1-4; App. Ex. S-64, pp. 1-3 to 1-4; Todaro, Tr.

2892-94; Mill'er, ' Tr. - 2109-10. I J

.~

l

.Dettman, Tr. 1656-t

.s..--.

7.

Securitf. guards must also meet the minimum mental and physical qualifications of Regulatory. Guide 5.20.

App. Exs.

S-62, pp. 1-4 to 1-5; App. Ex. 5-64, pp. 1-4 to 1-5; Staff Ex. S-4, p. 5.20-2.

The Diablo Canyon security officers are equipped with unifc =s, firear.s, cc==unication devices, and other security equipment e

Ex. S-62, p. 1-9; App. Ex. S-64, p. 1-9; App. Exs. S-34, S-35; Dettman, T=.

1490-91; Lunsford, T. 1718.

94/

We reject the suggestien of SLOMF?'s witness that

~

security perscnnel at Diablo Canyon should be "requali-fied" by means of mcnthly polygraph examinations to test their Icyalty.

Taylor, fol.Tr. 2213, pp. 11-12.

Besides the fact that this procedure would violate Califcznia statutes, frequent exa=inations would be i= practical, detrimental to =crale, and unreliable.

Cett: an, Tr. 2983-92.

See Calif. Labcr Code 3432.2 (App. Ex. 5-65 for identification).

1

c

- 67 Applicant's security plan also p cvides fc basic train-ing censisting of an,80-hour sequence of class:ccm instruc-l tien and exami,ation that includes the folicwing topics:

security plan everview; emergency plan overview; general plant overview; radiological safety; c 4 + al law; search and sei u=e; report writing; persennel identificatien; access cent =c1; package controI; vehicle cont =ol; fire control; bcmb recognition and sea =ch; e ie'mii::a1 a. gents; first aid; self -

, defense; c:cwd and mcb cont dl; security c' :=runicaticas and c

alarms; ala==L =esponse; operational emergencies; fireL.ms; and p =cedu=es.

There is also a m4 4-== of,. 4 0 hours0 days <br />0 hours <br />0 weeks <br />0 months <br /> of on-the-job t== d-4"g.

Further, fi=ea:ms ' training ' includes range o

~

practice and. guards : mast be requalified seminannually'.'

special-i:ed followup training and requalification are conducted on' a quarterly basis and i'nclude such f.cpics as records'and reports, ala:m systems, routine precedures, emergency pro-cadu=es, law of arrest, and threat sit.:ations.

App. F.x.'S-62,

.pp. 1-6 to 1-10 ; App. Fx. s-64, pp. 1-6 to 1-9.

Governer 3:cwn's expe_-t witnesses put a great deal of emphasis on. the need for guard force training.

The gisi of their testimeny was that, in orfer to meet.and over-ceme the design basis threat, the security force shculd be M.

O

m y

sa -

ained t: function as a tea:t and shculd engage in frequent and realistic meck exercisas; this, training should involve cec:dinatica with iceal law enforcement agencies as well.

White, fel. Tr. 2346, pp. 4-8; Giuffrida, fol. W. 2412, pp. 3-14.

In his p =pesed findings of fact, Gcve=cr 3 wn takes -le position that the cu==snt level ed training is inadequate and that the 9: posed future t:mLmi ig discussed au the hearing is also inadequate.

Gov. ? =pcsed Findings 95/

at 47-52.-

In this rrngard, Gcve=c: 3: wn's p Opcsed findings igncre the fact dat under the regulations, the applicant's training progru will he su=erseded in the future by the p visicas e f Appendi c 3 cf P.ar: 73.

PG&E Panel, fel. Tr. If 34, p. 13; Miller, fel. Tr. 1911, pp.

26-28.

Significantly, the-Gcve=c

's witnesses did net effar any cpinica cf the adequacy of the training called fer under dat Appendix.

When it adopted the reacter security requiatiens in 1977, the C mmissic ncted that it had under censideraticn 96/

a regula:icn cance=ing qu'.:d training and qualificati ns.-

n pr:=ulgating the Appendi:c 3 training requirsnants in 1978, -la C m=issica stated "that the upgrading cf 95/

5:.0MF?'s pr: posed findings cf fae: =ake nc =entien of security f :ce training.

M/

42 Fed. Reg. 10536, 10837 (Tehrtary 24, 1377).

i

. 9/

licensee guar:i qualitf was =ecessa=f -

e C==sissi=n also cc::rpared the c=ntant and sc=pe of licensees' ::sining p== grams wd~k "' e p = visions of Regula:= / Guide 5.20 and c=ncluded "that present t==#"d'; p== grams f== new guards wculd not 3:= duce the qualitf needed t= assn =s de effectira p =tectics of special nuclea: :natorials, facilities, c:

98/

shipments.*-

The C=mmissics the=sf=:s believed hat the training p =vimiens of Appendix 3, which, inter alia, were a

. designed t= :neet the design basis " sat of 10 u.s 373. l(a) (1),

wculd tend t= pr-ince a better qualified and c s off ac_ive

. guard f====

han was present at facilitis.: whers guards had been trained in ac== dance with 'Regula:::f Guide 5.20.

A comparison of the :squirements cf Appendix 3 with these of Regc.:.at==f Guide 5.20 :sveals he additi=n cf a n-her of areas of training in the f===e: that have =c 99/

c=unterpart in Regulat=ry Guide 5.20. -

Ameng these

{/

43 Fed. Reg. 27421, 37424 (Acqus: 23, 1978).

98/

Id.

99/

pm : 73, App. 3 SID lists the an= arcus arsas is which ::2d 4 g is :sq"' ad 1smeng the requirs=ents f== pcwer :sact=:s f:: which thers appears t= be no c=unterpart in Regulan=rf Guide 5.20 are he f=11: wing:

9.

Adversary g==up opera-d ns.

10.

.Mc ivati== and ebjectives of adversa:f===ups (ICCT.fC"I COh_.ius a CN NI~C"' PAGE)

. 130/

items, many are direc:ad : wards ::aining the respense force in tea = respense tactics -- cne'cf the necessary training elements =cs: st:sssed by Gcvernc: 3 :wn's expert witnesses, Colonel Giuffrida and Mr. White.

4 g/'

( FCC"".IC"'I CONCP-72CM PRI*T CCS PAGE) 11.

"'actics and fc ce that =ight be used by adversary 7:=ups to achieve their objectives.

12.

Recoquitica of sabotage : slated devices and equipment that might he used against the licensee's facility or shipment vehicle.

33.

Response force c vanization.

34.

Respense fc ce mission.

35.

Response f : e operation.

36.

Response force engagement.

38.

5ec=rity cc and and cent:01 sys a= during centingency operation.

55.

Contingency ressense te confi:=ed int nsien c

atta=pted intrusion.

56.

Seenrity systa= cperatien after cc=penant fail e.

58.

Security cec:dinatien with local law enfc :e=ent agencias.

60.

Contingency duties.

62.

Use of and defenses against incapacitating agents.

64 C=ntingency precedures.

67.

Sasic armed and una:=ed defensive tactics.

68.

Respcsse for,e depicy=ent.

69.

Security alert precedures.

71.

Respcase f=

e tactical neve=ent.

72.

Response fc e withdrawal.

73.

Respcase fer:e use of support fire.

78.

Site specidin a =ed tactical pr:cmduras and cperation.

100/ See, e.c., n. 99, su=ra, ite=s 34, 25, 36, 38, 68, 69, 7I~,^72 and 73.

l l

l

_ 71 101/

Giuffrida Tr. 2793 ; Whits fol. Tr. 234 6, pp.

4-5.

Several 102/

ether cf the Appe= dix 3 ;=visic=s 43 sc_1y add:ssa the type of a=ed assault 'which the des'ign hasis th sa: cf 103/

Section 73.1(a) (1) characterices. -

2: centrast, the 101/

Governe: 3:=wn's witsess White aisc exp:sssed his c=n-dd"q the abi'i y of the security fc_ce to t

ce= regar fu=ction is the event that their field radies failed.

We acte that N E G-0464, " Site Security persensel T =4"ing Manual" '(1978), which was published for comment at the same time as Appendix 3, c=stal=s a saction en respcase fc=ce engagement.

(See n. 99, item 36, su=ra).

The tr'd ~4"q cn that subjec-includes methcds ci command and cent =ci using voice and a:s hand signals.

N E G-0464, p. II~-61.

102/

See,

.s. e., n. 99, su=ra, items 9, 10, 11 a:d 12.

103/

Is its sbuttal testimeny the applicant desc=ibed the t==t"4"g p cgram that it was presently using to t: min the securief force at Diabic Canycn.

This p:cgram involved g= cup exercises, conti=gency drills, and exercises in which persc==e1 play the

=cle of the is = 2 der.

T=.

2943-56.

While it was never explicitly stated, it appears that applica==

was in fact usisg, at least is part, its p cposed App =ed*

3 t:misi=g and qualificatien plas ;= gram fer c ::ent t:*i-ing rather than the p= gram de-scribed in the security plan.

See."'Tler, fel. T.

1911, p. 2S.

Fc: example, the cur:ent ;= gram described is applicant's :sbuttal testi=cny ccvered a two-menth period (Teda:e Tr. 2943, 294 6), while the ;= gram se* "~' i.s the security pla= covered a thrse-week period.

App. Iz. S-62, pp. 1-6 to 1-7.

i 1 th:sa: which the tra.ining in Regula c:7 Guide 5.20 is de-signed to =eet is considerably less pctant than the design i

104/

basis threat set forth in 10 Cn 373.l(a) (1).

si=ilarly,

-le "high assurance" ebje tive of 10 Cn 173.55(a) fe c

= eating de design basis threat is not sharad by Regula-tory Guide 5.20.

cur :sview of applicant's security plan training pre-gram based en Regulate y Guide 5.20 leads us to conclude, w

as did the Commissien before us when it p cmulgated Appendix 3, that the training complying with est guide is inadecuate to p spara the security fr ce := neat the design basis threat 104/

Appendix A cf Reguh tery Guide 5.20 states the threat that the trai=ing p= gram should add:ssa as fc110ws:

1 a.

Lcne int.viduals familiar with the con-s :ucticn and cperation of the facility.

b.

A g cup of several icdividuals, seme of whcur =ay be armed with weapcns such as rifles, side arms, and explosives, A g= cup cf unarmed individuals engaged c.

in disc darly c=nducu c meb activities.

These these individual threats ara significantly less severs than the naximum th sa: ex; sssed in 373.1 0f several well armed, well t='d ed, dedicated individuals, aided by an active insider (see p. 6, su=rs).

Sy.1:s cwn terms, the guard training' and quahf caticn pro-gram of Appendix 3 was established to assure that security persennel wculd be capable of :sspending to that thrsa: set foruh in 173.1.

l

' cf 10 C?2173.1(a) (1) - a ch: sat which applicas:'s aec=ity fc::e is recuired to ceu= ar.

In particular, it dces act address the need fc: team sevement and tactics by the respense force, ser dcas it offer a focus en the types cf assault that the fc ce might he called upon to meet.

i Se ci_. ::tstances of this case, hcwever, have chviated any need en cu part to determise precisely what t==4 3 g heyend that based en 'Regulatc=y Guide 5.20 is reW ad.

Se applicant has announced its istentien to i=plement its gdard training and qualificatics plan to meet the sed:sments of 10 CF2 173. f 5 (h) ( 4) (i.e., Appendix 3 traisisg) by es lats:

TOT /

/

than Janua f 1, 1982.

The staff agrees with tha p:c-106/

pcsed schedule.

As a practical matter, the applicant's p cycsal amcunts to a cc-- 3tment to ecmplete the Appendix 3

4 *ng and qualificatics pric: tc':sceipt of a f:11 pcwer 10f/

Letter to Frank J. Miraglia, Chief, *.icensing 3:a=ch Nc.

3, Divisics of Li,censisg, offica of N22, f:cm Philip A. C=ane, Jr., ?G&Z ccunsel, dated July 15, 1981.

106/

Latter to Malecim E. Furmush, ?G&I Vice-?:ssident and General Ccussel, f:cm ? a=k J. Miraglia, Chiaf, Licensi=g 3:anch No. 3, Divisics of Licensi=g, office cf N32, dated August 31, 1981.

e

74 -

i 107/

cperating license.

de ag:se with the applicant's i=-

plicit assessmen that its guard training and qualifica-tien plan shculd be

=mpletaly imple=ented pric: to full gewer operation and believe -Jat the cperating license 108/

shculd he c=nditi=ned ace :dingly.

4 We find that, upcn successful ccmpletics cf the Appen-dix 3 requirements, the applicant will have adequately demon-strated that its security c:ganization is capable of respend-ing to design basis threats in sufficient time to prevent sabetage c: sabetage atta= pts inimical to the publi= health and safety c

= the c==en defense and security.

In par -

ticular, security persen:el will have been required to 107/

Acc=: ding to the 1.::est NRC esti=ata, the licensing p ccess for Diable Canycn Units 1 and 2 cm-c; he c==pleted hefere January 1932';

U.S. Nuclear Reculaterv Cc=m.," Regulate:7 Licersing Status Summa:Y Repci.t' (In ~

1 ternal Wc king copy, M.27 29, 1981).

108/

Pursuant to 10 CTR 373. 55 (5) ( 4 ), the training and quali-ficaticus plan also includes detailed requirements==n-carning the security equipment that =ust he car-ind by available to me=bers of the security for:e.

We as-c sume that, upcn i=plementaticn of the applicant's l

training and qualifica:icas plan, all of the required i

eq,.ipment sc: new included in the security plan will have been p =vided.

~4a leave d-

-'e Direct== cf l

NRR := ensure,ha: this is the case.

Zn this :egard, we nc:a that the equipment cutrently used by the ciahic Canyen security fc:ce (see p. 66, su= a-)

is substantially the same as tha: set fcr:n := Appendix 3.

See Part 73, App. 3 EV.

i

de=cnst:sta the required k=cwledge, skill, and abilirl _=

perfo:s a =yriad of securitI tasks, includdag c==:i=gency sspenses t= cc di:=ed c attempted in :usic=,and taam tactical p ccedures and operatien.

Sus, they will have c mpleted the-tIpe of t==4 4,g and rehearsal which we find is essential and that Gcve==c 3:=wn 's 4t=es ses deemed necessary to an adequate defense of the Diabic 1

Canycn facilitI.

We,must. leave it to the Direct== cf Nuclear Reacter Regulation to datam4ne before authcrimi=,g 1

full pcwer cperation that the applicant has satisfied all

=

the criteria of Appendix 3.

Finally, we acte that en July 17, 1981,*the Licensi=g scard issued a partial initial decisien which, ec=ti=genh cpen rescic icn of the securitf issue, wculd authorize.

~

the issua=ce of a license to pe-md fuel Icadg and icw pcwer testi=g at Diahic Canycn..

I.3F-31-21, 13 NRC t

S e Scard regarded iE decision as i=ccmpleta withcut security fi=d' qs and fcuni that it had no basis to rule en that sub-j ect. h. at (slip opi=i=n at 5,

61).

i e

76 -

This situation de= ands cur attencien.

Presu=a'ly the c

p:cycsed fuel icading and icw-;cwer tasting, if authoriced by the ccumission, =ay take place.befe a Januacy 1,1382, de date by which applicant has cc=mit:sd itself to mee:

'the full regairements of Appe= dix 3.

Thersfers,the adegaacy cf security p ctaction pric: to that date ceuld be called into ques-& n (see ;p. 72-73, su=ra).

We believe two chserva-tions are pertinent in sgard to this matter.

First, it appears that as icng age as Nove=he: 1980, the applicant was p chably engaged in Appendix 3 training (see n. 103, sup:2).

In any event, that

=i U g 'had te be 109/

initiated in early March of 1381.

If PG&I is to =eet its chligati=n to fully i=plement Appendix 3 'hy January 1, 1982, and given the time squired to ar' minister de additional training, c. significant pc :ica of applicant's guard fc:ca will l.aa at eady :scaived de training that Appendix 3 requires ever and aheve.the 2:cvisicas of Regulatory Guide 5.20.

Second,.he Licensing Scard has fcund that "the risks f=cm fuel lead and icw-power testing are considerably reduced i

f:cm that of full-pewer opera'* n of the Diabic Canyon :sact=rs.'

lo c/

Section 73.55 (b) (4) : squires' that the applicant hagin t= follow Appendix 3 within 60 days of the app cval. cf its plan by the NRC.

PG&E received staff app cval of :' :s Appendix 3 piam en January 1,1981 (see n. 92, supra).

1 i

i l

77 -

132-31-21,.su=ra, at J.sli: c=.ision a 5G).

It'hased his c==clusica en several fact =:s, includi=g the 1:wer fissi:=-p:=ducu i ventary present, de grease a=cu=

of

-d e available for operators to to d-ate c= :nitigate an accident, and the reduced likelihcod of occu==ence of events leadi=g to a rad.ic1cgical elease.

Id,_.

We have =ct had the c==.crt- *t.r to review 2e' actice record which underlies the 3 card's ep'

'en, but cu reading of that opinica and pertions of the record, as well as our cwn earlier deliberaticas en c1csely related 110/

o

. sabotage issues. f== this ve=y plast 7 give us =c reascn' to questi=n the validity of the Scard's factual findi.dgs.

In these ci =umstances, we fi=d dat the training level

~

of the Diable Canyen Md f===a (semewhere hetween ca:

specified by Regulate:f Guide 5.20 and that of Appendix 3) is adeq= ate to pr-Mde high assurs=ce agai=st acts of radd a-Icgical sahetage duri=g the period of fuel 1=adi=g and icw-I pcwer tes

- g.. We = cts here is passi=g hat de Directs:

of Reac c: Regulation himself must also be assured =f the adequacf cf the security c gani=atics t 3 d g bef=:e issui=g the 1:w-pcwer license.

.am.r./

Pacific Gas and II.*::tric C m=anv (Diabic Ca=ycn Nuclea:

tin

?cwer plant, Unr.=s Nos. 1 and 2), AI.A3-334, 3 BGC 309, 321 et seq. (1976).

I

- i-d

cpi =ics, we sec ed the Licensi=e 3 card's c=nclusi=n that =uclear fuel c=uld be st=:sd at the Diabic Ca= yen plant withcut creating an unreasc=able risk of publi: ha=::1.

Ameng d e scurces Of risk censidered were the acticus of a g =up of saheteurs who were ass==ed

= have==i:=peded ac=ess c tha fresh =u= lear fuel en the n

l site. 2 at s

l

. U-C===unicarices s*/s:s= (censelifaced Issue 5)

Subsection (f) cf section 73.55.:squiras that every en-duty = ember of the security fc ce he capable of =aintaining centinuous cc==unication wi-d the cpera = s of the cant:21 alarm statien (CAS) and the secondary alars statics (SAS).

The alarm sta-%n cperators in turn =ust he capable cf calling other securitf force =e=~ ers and local law enfe ce-c

=ent authcrities f== assista=ce.

lo u.s 873. 55 (f) (1).

In additics to conventic=al telephcne service, each ala:s

\\

station =ust have the capability of continuous twc -way voice cc==unicatics, either di: set'.y c through an inta =ediary, wi h 1ccal law enforcement authcrities by means of radic c:

=ic cwave.

10 CTR 873.,55 (f) (2) and ( 3 ).

All nc=-portable I

communications equipment equired by the :ssniations nust he pcwerad hv. a :sdundant indec. ende.nt scurce.

10 C?R 373.55

( f ) '. 4 ).

Finally, Sectics 73.55 (g), which deals with testing and =aintanance of security systams, : squires that the equip-

\\

=ent for ensite c===unicaricas he tasted at the beginning l

cf each wc k shift and that equipment fc offsite c=== uni-cati =ns he testad a: least once a day.

10 CFR 873. 55 (g) ( 3).

l l

~

l

- 79 Regula-talephone serrica is p:=vided by a 3 ell Sysam I

affiliata,.he Pacific 'Talephone and Tslegraph C:mpany.

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To comply with the requirements of. Appendix C t= 10 CFR Part 7'3, the applicant has established detailed operating i

prccedures for the Diablo. Canyon security ecmmunicati=ns equipment.

PG&E Panel, f=1. Tr. 1584, p. 17.

Althouc'. thase p ccedures are not before us, we note that the Directe of' NRR must be satisfied that the ccmpu.y's security per:On'nel are trained to implement them before issuing applicant, a license.

The applicant also has established a p ccedurs for testing its c=mmunications equi;iment.

Bd.

I s

A G

e h e l.,

. = _ _ - __.

t

]

App. Ex. 5-64, pp. 12-2 to 12-3.

We have already set forth I

in respect to consolidated Issue 4 our findings en the adequacy of applicants ' security training (pp. 60-67, supra) and will not repeat them here.

Shffice it to note 1

that the applicant has f=4liarized and trained the mem-bers of its security organizatics with the Diablo Canyen ecmmunicaticas systems and has developed contingency plans

.o addressing the loss gf offsite cw

= leations and the neces-sary ecmpensatory measures which the security o sani =ation

'must take.

PG&E Panel, fol.

T=.

1584, pp. 11, 22; App.

".:.x.

5-64, pp. 1-6 to 1-7; App. Ex; 3-63,_,pp. 18-13,97-101.

Further, as we state in our findings.on Consblidated Issue l

6 regarding applicant's liaisen._ with._lce=1 1=Eenforcement l

(p. 97, infra),

.......a

. APP-Ex. 5-63, pp. 3 5-3 6. -

We are satisfied that the applicant's extensive ecmmu-nicatiens equipment, systems and procedures confor:n to the C

d.ssien's regulatiens and are sufficient to enable the Diablo Canyon security organi=atien to neat the design basis threat.'

m

,m_ _ - -. -..

I I.

Liaisen dith Lceal Law ?.nferce=en:

Auenc :::.es (C =scladated 'ssue 6)

Sectica 73.55(h) (2) ; :vides that a licensee "shall establish and document liaisen with Iccal law enforcement authorities. "

Che respense requirements l

cf.subsectica (h) (4) then p:: vide that once a threat is detected and assessed, ths licensee must c=ncurrently act to neutrali:e it by (1) inter;cs,ing the plant so-curity fc==a between the adversary and vital areas and (2) *(i!=f : ming Iccal law enfer:ement. agencies cf the

~'- aat and requesting assistance."

10 C72 573. 55 (h) (4).

A;;endix C, which sets f::th the criteria f== safeguards c=ntingency.:lans, requires that the plan shcw the =ain i

and alta==ative en.=y =utes t: the facilitf S : law enf== e=ent assistance f:::es and the cent :1 peints fe:

marshalling and c erdinating respc5se activities.

Par 73 A;;. C, 83h.

The plan must.alsc list the available local law enfor:ement agencies

(" n), chei respense capabilities and critaria f== res;cese,as well as p:= vide "a discussion cf wc king agreements c: a ange=ents f== c==municating with these ageneiss.*

Part 72, A;;.

C, 32d.

Finally, Secti n

73. 4 0 (d) req H es that. a licensee, as par: cf its annual l

6

- 39 l

c== tings==y pla

sview, verify the :sspense c=

' =es:s f = " n.

Cncs again,111/:na=y cf Gcve=c 3 =vn's p = posed

" f am,..*<,

1 " findings en *?GE's Liaisen and C=c di=a-3 s with L= cal Law Agencies $ la:s, i: :sality, legal ary:-

=a=:s about the nat :s and' secpe of the C= missi=='s regulations.*

For example, Gove==c= 3:=wn pcsits f'-d' gs dat applicant's security system is ' fatally flawed because R

(=ic : neck exe==ises have been c=nducted by ?GE and L;7.A s identiff and rescive chvices c=c=d' ati=n p =blems which can only be werked-cut by meaningful practica

==da

salistic c=nditicas."

Gcv. ?:=pese[ Tisdi= s at

!a.

?st de C=:mnissi=n's regulatiens dc =ct =sq-d s that appl:.;an and LLI.A engage is such tas:s a=d. drills.

_s 1977 when the t-dasica published Appe= dix C is p:=pesed f= m, it==ntal=ed a fi=al secti=n entitled 113 /

ave'.c; ment and Mai=tana=ce of the Plas. "

Ameng the requirements of that secti=n was c=e s.a d g = hat " (;I eri= die d

is c tests ud

he :nada to ensura that sadaquards 111/ See ?p. 42-47, s==ra_.

112/ G=v. Pr=pesed Fi=dd gs at 53-62.

113 / 42 Fed. Reg. 25744, 25747 (May 19, 1977).

90 -

=ncingency responses !=11:w these set f ::h in the plan. "

ndus :7 ce==en ars===plained tha: it was inequi.ahle to held licensees responsible f== testing the acticas of entities not under their cent:cl.

In the final rule adopting Appendix C, the C:= mission deleted this prevision and explained in c

its ac===panying s a cement of c=nsiderations:

Cha Cecaissien recog=1:es the inapprc~

priateness ed hciding licensees respcusible ic: acticas of persens n'et subject te licensee cent:cl.

arafers, licenses respensibility during pericdic. drills er tests has been clarified to ex=1ude responsibility f==

testing the reaction of ss nce under his cent==1.116 / pense f ::ss-In view cf the Commissi:n's having intenticnally d:=pped

-dis express joint-exercise p:cvisien, a simila require-

=ent cannet. reascnably be i= plied as par. of its other regulate:7 previsicas.

.Moreover, the required c=c:dination between the appli-and local law en3=:ce=ent authcrities is different bc.a can

~

in type and in degree f :m that suggested by Governe: 3 =wn.

Gov. ?:cpesed Findi=gs at 53-55; see c=unsel's argn=ent,

- 4/ -'

=.

115/ 42 Fed. Reg. 11962

(. March 23, 1973).

116/ M. a: 11363.

i T:. 1551-52.

Secti:n 73. 55 (h) (2) requires that applica=-

i

" establish and document liaisen" with 1ccal auth=rities.

= t!.is c=ntext, the plais meani=g' of 'liaisen* is si= ply a c=mmunicatien to establish mutual u=ders mding..a'.a'n.7/

Where the C =missica istands licensees to establish a greats: degree of c=cedi=ation tha: *11aisc=* with local law enf=== ament audorities, it says se expressly.

The pa_allel p =visica of Sectica 73.4 6(.h) (2) requires that licansees.cf fuel reprocessisg facilities " establish and dec.=ne== restense arrancements that have been made wi h local law enf=== ament audherities" (emphasis supplied).

This difference is levels of cec:dinatien with L::ZA f:: fuel 113/

C7 ele facilities a=d ccamer=ial pcwer react==s is em=-

sistent with he e-= 4ssion's positics that the potential c=nsequences of react== sabotage are less tha= the ax reme c=nseque=ces =ade possible by the theft of f===ula quanti-

=aterial. _119/

ties of s::stegic special nuclea:

Ac===di= gly, Sectic51 73. 55 (h) ( 2) requires only that applim : clearly c==---Icase w"ith the appr=priata lecal law ent :=e====

117/

See Webster's ".*..ird :Tew *= tar =sti:nal Dic-icna:f,

p. 1202 (1971).

113/

See-also 10 CF2 573.50 (g) (2), where fuel s::: age facilities are treated is the sa=a =a==e as gewer reac = s with regard to licenses liaisen wi h *m.

119/

See, e.g 42 Ted. Reg. 10336 (Ish:: arf 24, 1977).

.. _. 9 2 ~ - -'

t auchorities so that any misunderstanding concerning when the applicant w"'

-aquest assistance and when the local agency will respend are avoided.

? earranged, detailed

~

plans fo ~ interfacing applican 's security force and the LLIA response force so they =ay together respond to a myriad of security contingencies are not required by the regulations.

We are satisfied that the applicant's coordinatien with 1ccal law enforc'e=ent authorities ec= plies with the Cc= mission's regulaticas.

Many =easures which the applicant i

has already taken or, at the time of the hea=ing, intended

~

presently to implement go substantially beyond the...inimum regulatory requirements.

Such steps as the ec=pany a familiari:ation p cgra= for local law. enforce =ent a..thori-ties (pp. 9 8.-99, infra), and. planned training e.iercises.at Diablo Canyon with lau enforcement personnel (p. 99, infra) should

~

ensure effective working arrangements with local authcrities.

Because the Diabic Canycn facility is located in an i

unincorporated area of San Luis Obispo County, has primary law enforcement responsibility for the plant.

Under the California Emergency Cperations Plan,

_,is also the area law the

4 93 -

anic== ament c=c dinat== with the authority t: = chill =a other law enforce =ent agencias should the =aed arise.

In the event of a need f== additional assistance at Diable Canycn,e e

e j App.

, __.-.. _ m _ __

,_ _. z _.

Ex. 5-63, p. 35; App. Ex. 5-64,.p. 1-14.)

e e

e W

g

120/

Id.

At the time of the hearing these written response ecmmi:=ents were several ye'rs old.

a The applicant subsequently veraally confirmed them and be-lieves that they are accurate and up-to-d$te.

Moreover,,

the applicant has a continuous and ongoing relationship with the 1ccal law enforcemen authorities.

Dettman,~Tr.

1832-33; Lunsfc d, Tr. 2957.

Although we would p sfer that l

applicant had shown,,g= eater initiative and introduced into the record current written LLIA response capability cc-itments, the existing enes, ccmbined with their subsequent verbal con-firmation to the applicant, are sufficient dec =entation to satisfy the regulations.

4e ncte, hcwever, that the Directe 120/ A discussion of LLIA respense times appears at 99 146-48, infra.

l 33 of Nuclear Reactor Regulatics must be satisfied at the time he issues applicant an operating license that the LI21 com=itments re:nain valid.

of' c=urse, once applicant has sceived a lice =se, these ccz::=itments must be verified each year as part of applicamb's annual contingency plan audit.

N '

1 122/

See pp. 85-86, su=ra.

~

122/

See P. 87, su=ra.

e. e M6 e

1

=

. 9.5 L..

i l

The applicant's safeguards contingency plan identifies the PG&E personnel authorized to request LLIA assistance.

App. Ex. S-63, p. 29.

at 36;. App. Ex. S-64, p. 1-15.

The contingancy plan also O

identifies those security contingencies for which offsite assistance is to be called and applicant trains its se-curity personnel in the necessary procedures for such inci.

dents.

App. Ex. S-63, pp. 5-24,39-124; PG&E Panel, fol..

Tr. 1584, p. 22.

Id. a,,,,

6.,..

..-...n,.--

We are satisfied, therefore, that the applicant's security persennel are adequately t::ained about when, how and which local law enforcement agencies are to be called for as-sistance.

Both the applicant's centingency plan and security plan detail the ent:f routes to the plant available to

' - - ^

i p

o 97 -

iccal law enforca=ent authorities.

App. Ex. 5-63, pp. 31, 33; App. 5-64, Appendix 3.

These ecmmand a==angements have been discussed by the ccmpany with IIIA cfficials and, cf I

course, the applicant cannet establish the respense er l

l

. =..

6.. O g g Me 9

~

cc==and coliev of the _,_. __.

PG&E Panel, fol. T. 1584, p. 23; Dett=an, Tr. 1654.

The applicant p cvides a yearly six-hour fa=ilari=ation course at the Diablo Canyon site for me=bers of thi._..

_... The course is for all = embers of the local law enforcement agencias who hold the rant of sergeant t

t or above and is designed to p = vide them with a general 0

understanding and knowledge of applicant's site and secu-rity plan.

App. Ex. S-64, p. 1-14; PG&E Panel, fol'. Tr.

1584, p. 23; Dett=an, T. 1655.

A=eng other thin s, the course includes classroom instruction on the plan".'s cperatien,._ emergency plan, security. plan and fede al reactor security regulaticns.

It.also provides a descrip-tion of the applicant'.s site and an' overview of the Diablo

~

canyon security organization including such things as the size, training, capabilities and structure of the force.

The classroom instruction is augmented by a tour of the site and facility which focuses en the ala. n and ccm-munication systems, access cent:cl and badging p ccedures and such physical features as the p ctacted area perimeter, l

access points, and vital areas.

App. :x. S-64, Appendix i

(

_gg-4 3; PG&Z Panel fol. Tr. 1584, pp. 23-24.

At the time of the hearing, the applicant was in the process of upda*4g a

' manual containing basic. plant infor: nation to be provided on a restricted basis to the local law enforceme'st authori-ties.

App. Ex. 5-64, p. 1-15; Dett: nan, Tr. 1646, 1649.

In addition to the LLIA personnel who have attended the applicant's fami14 =rimation course, both the.g-

~........

.-~. - -.-....--.

have visited the site on seve=al occasions;

~ ~ ~ ~ ~~

~

the applicant intends to conduct future joint training exercises and drills with these special LL5A units as well as with regular local law enforcement officers.

The appli-cant also intends to continue its yearly f=47 is-ization p cgram to ensure that, newly premeted LLZA pe sennel w"1

~

be capable of responding to security emergencias at Diablo Canyon.

Lunsford,.T=. 1792-93, 2957; Todaro, Tr. 2956; App.

Ex. S-64, p. 1-14.

Recogni=ing that the applicant cannot estah-

~

lish the command policy of the responding 'm, we are satisfied

~

that the applicant's,ar:angements with local law enforcemen authorities provida for suitable c= isis :nanagement and an adequate chain of command (both prior to and after the ar:5. val of offsite assis' ace) to deal with security con-tingencies at Dishic Canycn.

e

,,-,--.,,--,,--,.--c--

I l

- 100 -

Tinally, it is i=pertant to place in p: Ope: perspec:1ye the cle local law enforcement authorities will play in answering applicant.'s call fe assistance in respending to a securicy contingency at Diabic Canycs.

In par because of the isolated locatics of the ciable Canyen facility, the applicant depends en *.JZA. assistance te the mhl=u= exten possible to p ctact the plant against adversary action.

App. Ex. 5-63, p. 3 6.. The initial re' pense to neutralize any s

attempt of radiological sahatage will be =ade by applicanc's securitv fer=e. 'Id. at 5.

In our view the applicant's respense force atic, c==hined with all the other ce=penants of the Diabic Canyen security system, reduce the significa=ce of the respense ti=es of the local las enf= ce=2nt authorities.

Indeed, i= app cving the applicant's security and centingency plans, the staff gave

~

ne credit for the a :ival 'and assistance of the ?; and viewed the ??";'s cle as one of apprehending any int =uders.

Gaskin, fel.

5. 1913, p. 14; Miller,Tr. 2132-33.

l l

l g,

- 101 -

i

?.

Detaccion a:id Surveillance Svstems (Cansa1.: ca:ac :ssua 1) 1 i

5dsectics (a) of Sec ic: 73.55 add tsses the :squiat==y :n-quirs=ents fc desaction aids i: :sactor security systams.

It p=-

vidas d at all ala:ms mst annunciata i= two separata cen~u-cusly ma==ed ala:s staticus, cua ed which =ust he 1ccated wt-' d' de p stected area.

Se casita cant =al ala=m station must he censidered a vital area; its walls, doors, calling, flec, and l

any wisdcws mst he hullet ssis ' g and it mat he located i,

wi-% d, a building _such that de istari== cf the statics is =ct visible f cm effsita.

10 C2R 373.55 (e) (1).

A' ala== cc-~ * -

catic=s is che ala:m statics = cat i=dicata de type and 1cca-tion of the ala:n.

Furce=, all ala:n devices, as well as the c:ansmissic lines to annunciators, ars req.tirad to be tamper indica 3 g and self chec.V' g; i.e., de s must be as au =ma ic

~ indica:ica cd a fsilure c'd the alarm sys,.am c: c=mpenest, c:

wh'en de systam is on standby pcwer.

10 u.r 573.55 (e) (2).

Finally, subsection (e) (3) requires d at all emergency exits wi-M - the p ctactad and @.a1 a:aas he ala==ed.

t Under ee C :nmissicn's :sgulat==y schame fc

nac== securitf systa=s, a c=mplaca physical p : actic= plan c=nsists ed ever-lapping parts.

Serefers, t= scme extant, all of the subsectic=s of sectic= 73.55 play a.part i:L the detac ic and surve#*Ta=ca 1

~-

- 102 -

f=cticas of de security system.

Mes: directly releva=: :=

dese functicas, hewever, are de additional regulate:7 requira-

=ents set f :th is the subsections (c), (d), and (f) dealing wie barriers,. access, and response to istrusiens.

Ic: exa=ple, in addition to the physical barrier requirs=ests, Sec ics 73.55 (c) also : squires cat all exteric: areas wi21: d e pr::actad area : e.s: be periodically inspecend to de act de prese=co cf unaud.cri ed perscus,. vehicles c: materials.

10 CIR 873.55 (c)

(4).

All extari== areas vidis the p= tac ad arma =us: alsc ba suffician ly illuminatad se dat the isclati== ::=es adjacent

= the p ctacted area may he' mc=itered for intruders.

10 CIR 2 73.55 (c) (5).

S.e accass req ~4 ements of Section 73.55 (d) serve a vital detec ics func 1cn by ex=csing pc escial creataning activities.

I l

All peines of persc==al and vehicle ac= ass ista p =cected armas must he pcsitively con _=11ad.

At the pei== cf en.:7 inic a p:::ac.ad area, all pe:sc=s must he identified a=d searched f::

1 firmar=s, ex;1=sives, incendia:7 devicas c: other ita=s which c=uld be used t.c c=mmit radic1cgical sahetage.

10 C72 573.55 (d) (,1).

All hand carried packages, =atarial for delivery, and vehi=las en.aring the p:::actad area =ust be s ' -- larly s e ar=hed and all sen-Licensee vehicles esc==:ad.

10 C72 373. 55 (d) (2),

I (3) and (4).

S.e persennel badging and esc=== req. ire =ents cd 1

.m_.

a 103 -

Secti : 73.55 (d) (5) and (5) arm specifically desip=ad, t=

aid in 1

i da ac d g t=au-2cri:ad i dividuals widi: de p:::acund area.

i As wie ac= ass t= p =tactad armas, licensees =cs: pcsitively c=nt =1 all points of persennel and vehicle ac= ass t= vital a aas.

Only -icse i=dividuals who raq..i a acesss t= vital equip-

=e:: t= pe-f=== dei d==ies ara==uti= sly pe==ittad i

= vi_al

a. eas and day.= cst he specially hadged.

All unce== pied vital areas scat he Icekad and ala=ned.

10 C71 873.55 (d) (7).

Ac= ass

= the reace== c=ntai=nent must he th = ugh dec=s c hat =hways which are locked and ala= sed; whenever f=mquant ac= ass is necessa=7, positive ac= ass c== :=1 by a guard c: wat+ m is required :=

assura da: cnly au-2= i:ad persc==e1 and satarial s= tar de c= = tai =mant.

10 CTR 873.35 (d) ( 8).

Fi= ally, the raspc=se requirements of Sectic: 73.55 (h) (6) require a capability f==,chservi=g de isciation :=nes and p==-

tacted araa perimetr (prafarably by closed circ =it talevisics) wMd A ' Nits de expcsu' a of :sspending perscenal t= attack.

Alecugh da purycsa cf this chservaticn capability is

= fa-cilita:a assess =ent =f a thmaat a=d any subsequent response, it serves a= i=ge::a== survei ance ancL desactic: f..crien as well.

-~

i l

l l

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a-a i=

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m.

O e

104 -

G G

me I

p T*

- 105 -

A: Diabic Canyc=, a da:ac=ica system s - -- as da oca p=-

pcsad by i= a=va c: 5.0.5 ? (Taylce, f=1. T. 2213, pp. 3-10),

esc== passing a vibratic: c= st_ais systa= at the p:ctactad arma he==dary, would not ="'-mnca sac = ity and dcas =ct faverabl1 ccm-

~.

i

. ara l Such a detectics sys e inc==pera:as c

ai der a devica affixed dirac-dy to a fanca em datact s=all vi-i bra-'mns c: a davica' that can detact cha=ges is the tansics of ena c

xsra wi_as st:stched alena the fe:ca.

3cth devicas a:s capable of detac ' g the prasance of an individual c-h' g c:

c== d g th:cugh a fancs.

Resa, fel. 02. 139 3, p. 19.

Vibra-tien c st:ais devicas have. hi:;h falsa ala== =atas, a:s easily

t

- 106 -

seen and ci =u::: vented, and are incapable of datac ing an indi-vidual going over :: under a fanca if the fanca is no: :=uched.

M.

To: these :sascas, the staff disecurages their use is :n-ac c securitf systan:s.

Rese, T. 2183.

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- ics -

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l 123/

Operators of CAS and SAS are trained in securiev and a' pr:cedures us:.ng both alar:n station censoles.

"c s _u__3.a~ a

~

1 82o; = todaro, Tr. 2948.

The a:Olicant has c de-=A extra console for training in th'a 'fiture.

Medcal2,~9 2

294S-49.

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1 i

124/ See p.122, infra.

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?.x. S-64, pp. 1-2 to 1-3; Rcher. Pattarsen, James 3. Shiffar, 126/

and Medcalf, Tr. 1795-97.

We are satisfied that the applicant's extensive de-taccion and su=veillance equipment and p ccedn=es are in conic:=tity with the regulaticas and that they are suf-ficient to p cvide an effective warning of threatened malavelent activities.

h m

s.

126/

See'also p.

53, supra.

t 1

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- 113 -

G.

Ida..:if t:2ti== cf vital A sas m:ers Rad: =Lo c:. cal Sa=c 1cs :.s.= css:.:Le (CO:sciJ.'.'a".Sc 7.ssut ~i)

~

The C==missics's :squiatic=s defi=a a "v-ital arsa" as any area which contai=s vital agai;=ent; a=d the lat.:e:

as the equipment, devices, = ate ials c systa=s which c=uld i

di se.ly c i=dirse:17 e= danger the publi health and safety by expcsu=a t= radiation if they fail c: a:s re-leased c= dest==yed.

If vital equipment should fail== he released c des==cyect, the equipment'c systems which = cat functic: to protect the public health and sadety also are c==sidered vital.

10 CFR 573.2(h) and (1).

All vi'tal equip-

=e== =us: he sit a:ed wi9.i: a vital area sa that access te

~

it is -' cugh at least tse ha==iers ic=a cf which must he l

physically separate f==s the p =tectad area peri =eter).

"he barriers =us he of sufficient s::s=gth that, is c===i-l

=ati== with -u ether c=mpc=e= s of'the security system, the perf===ance s?*d aments of Sec.i=s 73.55 (a) a:a met.

10 CTR 573.55 (c) (1) a=d (2).

l "he staff has further divided vi_al armas ist= tm 127/

categoria's, Class a=d Class -.

" :e f==ser a n v-ase arsas===-M- *- g systems c: c==;.c=ents th's f,412:s c

dest =nctics of which :.ssulta in 2.J' se

alease 12-/

Staff 7.x. 5-6,

"::e" '

d--

cf vitsi A sas, Rev_si:n 1 -

Review Guideli=s No.

17."

v-w

w W

P 1

- 116 -

cf radiation.

The latter areas are these con _si.i..x. sv.ste=s c: ce=pecents the failurs c destruction of which would result in the Islease of radiatica only in ecajunction with additional sahetage in at least ene c: hor separate vital area.

Rcy A.

Eaa an, fol. T. 1917, p.

3: Rese, fel. T.

1393, p. 20 ; S taf f Ex. 5-6, pp.

2-3.

n i.s security plan, the appliennt has identified the vital sJscams and equipment at Diabic Canycn and,then described ths vital areas in which such equipment is located as either Class I :: Class ::

arsas.

App. Ex. 5-64, pp. 5-1 to 5-2.

Ce ailed drawings

~

in th.a security plan specify the precise loca:icns of the vital areas.

Id at Apc.endix D; Ar=.. Exs. 1-30 through 5-61.

The security plan also details the ec=pesitian cf the plant's vi:a1 area barriers, which descriptica attar. :s to the sub-stan ial strength cf all such barriers.

App. Ex. 5-64, p.

-3.

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I 1

117 -

Se applicans 's inver.::=y of vital equi;=en: and v_tal a:sas has bee independently verified by an engi: sering team f cm the Los Alames Scientific Laboratory.

"'h at team syntamatically 4=alytad the Diahic Ca= yen facility using a c=mputer cede applying graphic fault trae logic for the thcusands of ecmbi=atic=s of events and locatices capable of leading tb radiological sabotage.

Li'ce the applicant, the review : sam compiled its invent==y of vital areas usi:q the ass==ption that the." undesired geal" was a release of radiation :ssu1**"g is doses is excess of these set, forth is 10 CI?.1100.11.

Ha m mn_, f=1. T. 1917, p. -: App. Ex.

3-64, p. 5-1.

"" '

same type of :sview has* heen applied to app =ximat=17 40 c-der light water reacters this c===

y.

Tc avoid p sjudici=g the cuteese, the enti:n

sview was c== ducted withcut rafarasca to the applicant's securitf pla: u=til -la fi=a*. stap, when the enview taam 's

~.

ssults were c=mparaf with the'securitf plan.

"'he sview c==.*immed that PG&I had p =perly identified is its sec.=itf plan all vital armas whern acts of radiological sabetage c=uld cc===.

Zam---an, fol.

. 1917, pp. 3-4, 6.

D l

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1 1

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113 -

'4e find, hersfc s, that the applican: has adecuarely specified the vital a:sas at Diablo Canycn whers acts of radicl=gical sahetage within the neaning of 10 C?R 173.2 (p) ceuld cccur; and we a:s satisfied that the c:=pany has ecmplied with the requia: cry requirements regarding vital area barriers.

In additien, the p =per specificati n cf vital areas, ccubined with all the ether ccmpone=:s of the Diabic Canycn securitf system and crianization, will en-sura an adequate and ti=ely respense by applicant's security forca to any design basis threat cf radi:1cgical sahctage.

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- 113 E.

Cc==ensat==_r Measuras 70: C = ::ssse: Eti'. dine In :ss:.cn sto Iscla c==. Ic=e (Conschda:sc Issue 9)

The physical har=ie: 3 cvisi=ns of sectics 73.55 (c)

squire, amcas o ther * * "gs, isciation menes adjacent ts

_he physical '..arrie: cf a facility's pr:tacted a:na.

Such z=nes==st he clear of all chjects which could cenesal c:

shield an iEdividual and must he of sufficient size so that pacyle en either side of 'tha ha=ria: can bd seen, in the eve =

3 of its penetration.

10 CTR 573. 55 (c) (3) ; i.0 C72 373.2 (k).

A: Diahic Canycn, an air.c=mpresse: h" ding (wid.a==cf height cf app =xi=ately ten feet) is located just cutside and adjacent to the perimeter fence en the u:::theast sile of de facility.

"a regulaticas,..cwever, permit the au '-~-

riza ics of seenrity measures in lieu ed any specific :39:1a-

7 req"4 sment as 1:ng as the substiente =essures pr vide

~

an equivalen 1evel of p =tectics.

10 CTR 873.55 (a).

s "3

t

[

l cir= mstanca led es to ing"* a ahcut the efficacI of appli-cant's security seasu=ns 6 ccmpe=sats f:

the 1 ca ics cd de c==pressc: huildi=g in da isolati:n ene.

S6 5

-u

I

- 120 -

l Cat==an, '". 19 2 4 - 2 6.

Accc ding'.7, we find that the c==pensate::7 security =easuras e=picyed by applicant prcvida p=ctaction equivalan: te-%: p cvided by the isclatien :ene.

Mc sever, we note that it is the ec=pany's intentica to ':s=cve the cc=pressc: building ence all =ajer c=nst:1.ctics at the site is ec= plated.

?G&I Panel fel.

5.

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I=e:gency vehicle Ixcacti n To Access Recu :smen: (C=nsoir ca:ac.. Issue.10 }....

=he regulaticas require that the licensee c=nt==1 all poi = s of perscnnel and vehicle access into a pr:tacted arsa.

10 CTR 573.55(d) (1).

All persc=s entering a p:=-

tacted area =nst fi.:st he iden idied and then sear =hed, either physically c with,the use of. equipment capable of detecti=g firea:ms, explosives,and i=cendia:y devices.

M.

All hand-carried packages must he searded in de same

= = -- a and, with certais exceptiens, all matarial f== de-liverf inte a p ctacted area must he identi'd.ed and den searded.

10 CTR 173.55(d) (2)_ anE-(3).

S 8 --* 7 arly, all vehicles entering a pr=tected area, "except u=dar ene:-

ge=cy c=nditi=ns," =ust he sear =hed and, wd-'-

~' e ex=aptics ed designated licenses vehicles, then esc = ted by a== "e:

ef licansse's. security c gani=ati=n.'

10 CTR 373.55 (d) (4).

=

These individuals who are. authorized entry iste a p ::ac.ed area widcut esc==t==st display a pir:ure badge, while all others authori:ed ent:y must he esc = tad and d*

play a badge d-d' mting that they :sq d s an esc = t.

10 CTR 572.55 (d) (5) and ( 6).

Because the. agulaticus raq~' e eme gancI vehiclas

= he esec:.ed but exempt such vehiclas f_ m cther ac= ass

122 -

sTe. ire =ents, we raised the issue cf h:w _ne applicant's securirl fores confi_ s, befera pe==it:in en :f of a vehicle withect search, that an emergency in fact exists and the vehicle seeking entrf is 1sgiti=a:21*/ :sspending to the emergency.

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Sufficianc r cf A=ulica= 's Safac. ards Systa= (c==sc1.catec Issue i)

As established is ou:

d tial discussic= cf the secu=ity regula-d

s, the ge=eral perf===a=ce cbjective of Secui=

73.55(a) f=r sadeguards systems - t= p : vide high assura=ce cf pr tec.i== aga "u radi:1=gical sahcrage - is =c.-Ry i

sa isfied c=ce the detailed require =e=ts of Secti==s 73.53(h)

-" = ugh (h) a s =st.

See ;. 7, su=ra.

C==sclidated Issue 1, c==sisti=g of subissues (a) -' = ugh (d), is a= exta=sive o

sea a=e== cf asserted challe=ges t= the sufficie=cI of appli-ca= 's sadegnards systam.

We have sviewed the var'icus c==-

pc=ents of hat system and, f== the =csu pad:, have f=u=d the=

t= he adequate.

Ne have aisc c==sidered a su=her of legal

~

argn=ents about de p =per charactari=aci== cf the desig=

basis

' eat.

See pp. 10-34 a=d 42-47, su ::a.

Sus, we have

~

already dealt with =a=y of the =at ars raised *=y subissue (c).

and=eed=ct:speatcurfi=dingsheEs.

Itams still :smai=i=g c= he c==sidered c=mprise. these t= pics :

first, Chapes: 11 cf the Securief Pla (subissues (a) a=d (b 3 ; sac==d, the "i= sider" i

element of de desig: hasis -' sat ( s-dissues (c) (iii) and (v3: and

-k'-d.

the appli-e t's p = cad =:e f== ;.=suage situa-' =s (suh-issue (d)).

We add ess each

=pic in :::=.

t I

i

12s -

1.

Chapter 11 of the Security Plan is entitled "Overall Security Plan Ps formance."

The introductory portion of the

~

chapter declares its pu_- pese to be a demonstration of hcw the design bases threat of 10 CFR 573.1(a) (1) will be met at Diablo Canycn in order to p cvide high assurance of protection against successful sabotage.

This is followed by a general descriptien of the site and the security system, with e=phasis on those aspects of the system designed to detect and assess threats.

The final part 'of

' chapter 11 is an ou'tline of three pcstulated scenarios in-vciving an intruding force, characterised by applicant as "worsu case."

In each case, the scenario is followed with time sequences to a conc,1usion in which the armed responding force has " neutralized" the intruders either before a suc-cessful act of sabotage is cc=mitted, er in time to allcw planc operators to prevent an intruder-initiated chain of I

131 /

~~

events f:cm having radiological consequences.

131/

In applicant's terms, "neutralizatien" of an intruder means rendering the int:,:dar incapable of cc=mitting

-)

radic1cgical sabotage.

Medcalf, T. 1643.

,g e

M 4

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- 127..

s 132/,.The cases appearing in Chapter 1.1 use a ecde to refer to varicus vital systens and' equipment.

The above exposition of these scenarios 6till:es port-1.cns of the record transcript to augment tha descriptien f=und in Chapter 11.

See T. 1500-62; TES4-1724, 1748-62; App. Ex. 5-64, Chapter 11.

e r--

- 123 -

Case 3 l

l subissue (a) cf Consolidated Issue 1 challenges the type a=d =agnitude of the - eats ;cr::ayed in Chapte:,11, and subissue (b) Toasticns the adequacy cf applicant's threa:

analysis.

Gover=== 3 =w='s p =pesed fiadings, like the asticeny of his expert witnesses at ete hearing, parti-culari:e the alleged inadecuacias of arglicant's Chapter 11 scenarics.

In essence, -hese find,ings state that the charac-taristics and attributes of the potential in_:nders and the assaults te ha'expectad f =m them wculd be =cre i=agi=ative and severe E.an those presented by applicant.

The findings are also critical of the details prese -ad

- e Chapter 11 d-O l

- 129 -

133/

s=snaries.

Al= cst widcut ex=sprien, hcwever, Gove====

3:=wn's p:=pesed fi=di=gs either ex= sed de fasig: basis d= sat c: =isapprehend de purpose of Chapter 11.

Unlike these sec icas of the securitf Plan c==ce

4., g specific c=mponents of de applicant's sect itf rfstam, Chapts: 11 is act M actly tied to a specific regula==r requirement. ~Rather, it is a stadd-imposed exe==ise istanded a

to de=enstrate that the c=mponent parts of de security systam are capable of f ~-+daning in an istag=ated fashics in the event of an attack.

Rose, f=1. p. 1393, pp. 3-4 ;

.w d ' ' er,, '"=. 2 0 2 4.

As such, it is a logical extansi=n of the sgelat==y app =ach tha: the general perf===a=ca chjective f== tida safecuards ristem is =c mally satisfied once the de. ailed squirements f==

its j

c=mpe=en: par s have been met.

Chaptar 11 is the applicant's resyc=se to sq d aments l

i=plisd in the staff's " Security Plas'Ivalcanics Repc t

}

133/

SI,0MTP filed no p =pos'ad fi= dings c= subissues I(a) a=d 1(b)=== 3 In add:sssing the suhissues c=da:

1(c), hcwever, ista rener argues that de Chapta 11 de :--'er cf in-scanaries arm un=salistic in dat t :ds s censiderad is

=c small and that de cases

= ssented thers a:s =ct the "wc st" cases.

is is sc because they dc =ct ** 'ude variati=ns on'the attack scacarios which c=uld c=mplicata the respense and de

sc=very sequence, c attacks which c=uld he scra easily meu= ed buu which might have less severs ;ctan-31 c==sequencas.

ST.: MF? ?:=pesed 71=* rs at 3-6.

'd

- 130 -

134/

Workbeck. "

Rcse, fol. Tr. 1393, pp.

3-4.

That doc =ent indicates hcw a staff rev awer night assess the adercacy of Cha=. e 11 hv. confi

g that the securit.r sv.sta= had heen evaluated using "ccmputer mcdels such as IA5I, T5C, c:

. manual quantitative techniques."

staff Ix. 5-2,

p. 11-1.

The staff used the IASI analysis as a check of applicant.'s. manual te* ique.

IASI is a simplistic "p ch-abilistic model that cor. bines alar n p chabilities, delays of attackers, and response fc =e times to esti= ate the p:=habilitf that the respense force can intercept ce 135/

attackers."

Rose, fel. W.

1393, p. 3.

It is cencarned cnly with the ti=a required to intercept the intruders; it does =ct take into acccunt tactics c: the"hu=an characteris-tics of ei-ler the attackers c: the respenders, no dcas it address the questien of "who wi-s the bat-J.e" ence -he in-136/

t=uds:s a:s inter =spted.

Id.; Tr. 1956-61, 2169-72.

The 134/

NURIG-0416 (January 1973). Chapter 11 cf NCRIG-0415 is staff Ex. 5-2.

135/

See generally Staff Ix. 5-3 ("Cser's Guide fc:

Ivaluati=g Physical security Capabili ies cf Nuclaar Facilities by the IA5; M.e:hed," :TC2IG-0134 (June 13 77) ).

136/

The applicant assumes in 1:s analysis that the respen-ders would win because of their nu=arical supericrisy ever the in :nders.

F.edcalf, 0:. 1574, 1733.

l

I l

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- 131 -

staff c==siders Chapta: 11 c play a small rela is.ha

=1.i=ats spp val of the sec=ity Plan a d is dsts_ d 3 g the adequacy of the safeguards systsm t= p:= tact the appli-cast's facility agains: radic1cgical sabotage.

.t:se, fol.

T=. 189 2, p. 4 : Min er, T=.

2024; Gaski=, T. 2175..

This is f= der shewn by the fac cat Chapter n is =c even =entiened is the staff's sec=ity Plan Ivaluatics Repc=t fc Diabic Canyes.

See Staff Ex. 5-1.

137/

Is his p =pesed fi=di=gs, Gcve==c: 3:=wn statas that applicant's ista=tica for Chapte: E was to "ds=cas ats that its secu=ity a :angements 'p:cvide high assu=ance of p:ctactics agai=st the desig=

basis -* eat."

Gov. ?:cycsed Findirigs a-20.

I= deed, one of the pu= csas of Chapts: 11 s atad in NUP.EG-0416 (n. 134,. su=ra) is "to de=cas. rate dat the physical securt:y sys.am shall satisfy.

the gene:21 perfor=ancs requirement."

"". s,

3 =wn's ists preta '+n cf the geal cf Gcverno:

Chapts: 11 and,henca, the great i=pc=-= es he places c= its adequacy, a:s.not en irely -- sasen-able.

We have seen, hcwever, that NCREG-0416 gces en to specify =t the istant of the chapts: =ay be satisfied by the use of a si=ple a:aly 4-

n " 4gua (p. 130, sucra), and that the staff elaced such as IASI little a=phasis en Cha=:a= 11 is its :sview cf th's sec=ity plan.

Thi's is entirely c=nsistant wie he p:cvisicus.of 5ac d en 72.55 (a), which i=dicata da:

the gener.41 perfor=ancs obj ective for sec=itf systams ef sec den is =c:= ally sr.tisfiad encs the :sq"* s=ent

73. 55 (b) - = ugh (h) ars =et.

Gcvern=

3 wn's ists:-

11 es-="lis::es p statics of the pu=pese of Chapts:

a much higher s-'M=-d of accq ability f== dat pc_ '":

cf t..e Secu=ity Plan, and wculd seem to require ex s=-

5 sive " war ga=ing" bef=:s the plan==uld he app mved by de staff.

l

- 122 -

We conclude that the purpcse of Chapter 11 is := shcw that the va-icus individual parts of the system wculd functic:

c-gather c= der at ack ccM t icss.

It felicws therefere tha-the applicant, preparing chapter 11 en the stadf's instructi=ns with this undersanding of its purpose, need not draft a set of scenaric analyses detailed and exhaustive encugh to p cvide the type of demcastration Governer 3 cwn and the utervenc seek.

It aisc folicws that perceived inadequacies in the Chapter 11 cases and their analysis by the applicant cannet neesssarily be

anslated into inadequacies in the security system.

Ic exa=pla, Governce 3:cwn and S~0MI? suggest findings that

~

the scenaries portrayed in Chapter 11 are net "werse" cases.

These parties are apparently applying the mcdifie: "wc s " tc the nature of the external

eat itself.

Gov. ?:cycsad Findings at 23-29; SI.OMI? ? cycsed Tindings at' 4-5.

It is clear, howevar, that in preparing Chapter 11, applicant censidered the "wc st" that ccul'd happen at the plant f:cm the standycin cf the pctential consequences of*:adiolegical sahecage.

Shidfer, Tr. 1499, 1764-5;

?G&I Panel, fel. T:. 1534, pp. 1-2.

d

133 -

See pp. 127-23, su=ra.

We

== cinde tha: this c=ndi-'Ss is indeed a wc:s: case as fa as radiological sabotage is concm:=ed.

Additicnal f4-dd gs ; cycsed by Gcversc: 3=cwn ;:cvide a list of pessible dist=rtiens that might he added to the assault scenaries to =ake them vc se than ecse===sidered by de appli-cas (e.g., dihersicna=y tactics, sniper fire, blockiss the access road, and sahetage of other';1 ant c==;cnests).

other fi-d3 gs state that de response for:e is set impeded by fai1==es and break-dcwns that shculd he expectad is any real lif a syste:n.

Gcv. 7:c-

csed Find' qs at 23-29.

We ag se that these fac ::s a:d pessibly l

=any others, could enhance the severity of an assanit.

3ct the assault scanaries described-in-chapter 11 permit. de ist uders to 138/

=cve d' ectly to d eir pri=ary targe: P = each case, the ch==c-Icgical seque=ce of the ist:nzien begins after the attackers have sagetiated the ;:ctacted area fasce withect detection a=d have 7.

iggered the Assess =ent of the -* eat is

~~

W 9

l l

- 124 -

1 1

l 5"-31a:1y, s.,::M7?'s p cycsed findi. ;s are cri:ical cg the fact that

' e of day and weather cer.ditic.r.s were net taken ists acccunt.

S:.0.T P cpesed Findings 2: 7-a,

= actuality, these facters play se part in the resper.se to the Chapter 11 scenar.cs.

i I

Failures of huma s and equipment surely will ecc :, but they have not been p cvided f : cn either side is Chapter 11.

Given t

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the :ed=dancy cf de cc=="

ations and in si== ala==

=etwc ks (see,cy.

73-37, 101-114, su=ra), the guards' ::ais-ing, a=d ceir "at hc=s" advan age (Taylcr, T=.

2233), it j

wculd appear that ra dem fai1=es, if included is the analyses, would favc= the ressense f==== rather das the ist=.ders.

s4 d'a:1y, the ist :dars are =de=taking a cre c lex s==

cf tasks than the responde=s.

The only "real-lide" fact==

which squa:ely favors the ist==de=s under the *m of the desig basis sat is that of su=;= se, fc they k=cw when and hcw they wi' ' attack, a=d the respenders of course d=

cc t.

But, i= Light of the-2iahic ca= yen surv=i" =-ce systems, the is== dars c=uld set c== fide =tly rely en.u-k' aviss sur,=ise.

See pp. 106-107, 113, st==1.

We ccnclude that chapte: 11 dcas illes = ate de i=tegrated functicni=g of the sec=ity systa= under attack c=ndi-d

=s, and the=ef=re serves its ista=ded =.urecse.

We also f3-d that the scenaries p=esented there, w'3ta =either perfectly realis-ti= =c exhaustive is their.c== sideration of ecssible attack varia icus, de set. reveal any systematic wea'casses is the i

l i=:sg a ed f=c 'm=i=g of the sec==1:f sys:sm c as '-=-ility

~

cf -2.at system t= p:= vide high assurance cf ;==tsc ics aga'-*:

the design basis th sat.

ww

- - - -, - - - - - - - + -

4 i

.s

- 136 -

2.

Suhissues 1(c) (iii) and (v) challenge the range of threats pesed by an insider and questions whether appli-cant's analysis of those threats is adequate.

Like the external threat, the internal threat is delineated by 10 CFR 973.l(a) (1).

The design basis insider threat is li ited to one empicyee, although that person is presumed to be knowledgeable about plant activities and may either active 3.y or passively participate in any sabotage atta=pt.

The applicant's initial pectacticn against an insider is the co=pany's employee screening process applicable to all PG&E operating personnel.

That program is designed to ensure that only qualified persons who are physically and mentally suited to work in a nuclear power plant are employed at Diablo Canyon.

In addition, all operating personnel receive ongoing performance evaluations consistent with accepted indust:f standards.

App. Ex. 5-64, p. 1-2 and Appendia.E.

The applicant also carefully screens all security force me=hers.

We have previcusly described that screening program and need

~

not repeat it.

See pp. 65-66, supra.

Because no screening program can be totally effective,

~

applicant's security system is designed to minimize the opportunities available to any plant employee to commit radio-

\\

M e

e g,

e a

- 137 logical sabotage or effectively assist any such sabotage attempts by external i=t uders.

~

i

_.--m.-_.

.=.-.:_~. ----:-.-.

--.c:..---.-

(see pp.111-112, "st=ra).all reduce the poss-lhility that a lone insider or ene working in concert with exte==al int =uders may suc=essfully commit radiological sabotage.

Finally, all members of the operating c=ew as well as security force 1

members are trained to be alert to such things as unautherized access to plant areas.

Patterson, Tr. 1795-96.

Thus, these ccmponents of the applicant's security system, cc=hined with all the other parts of the system, ensure aP. equate p=ctactics against the pessil.a range of insider activities at Diablo 139/

Canyon.

' See also n. 125/ suura.

3.

Subissue 1(d),' challenges t5e adequacy of applicant's preparation to deal with situatiens khare individuals are l

taken hostage by persons threatening the facility.

Inte:iener 1

SI,cMF? 's p cpesed f3"M'gs 'of fact, felicwing its witness's 139/

Although the scenarios employin fan inside: set forth.

by applicant in Chapter 11 of the security plan do not enec= pass all possible insider actions, these scenaries are representative of the actions of both a kncwledgeable passive insider without access to vital areas and the actions of a knowledgeable active insider with access to vital areas assisting the external attackars.

App.

?.x. 5-64, pp. 11-4 to 11-7.

t

- 138 -

ssti=cny a the hearing, state tha: ?G&Z *..as

enu= cia ad a specific hcstage policy of ncn-negotiation a: ::iabic Can en.

Such a pclicy is i=pertant to put pr=spectite in :nders en notice of what they =ay a:cpect and a el' 3 ass respcase to hcstage situa-*m s based en a=ctional censidera-tiens.

Tayle fel.==. 2213, pp. 15-17.

Appli-et's p ccadura f== dealing wi h hostage situations, S?-613 ( S), was =arked for identification at the hearing.

140/-

2741 4

g l

l i

140/

See Gcv. I:c.

S-7.

I

13 9 -

t Je cenclude that applicant's sec =ity precedu=s, 141/

al-lcugh =ct ex; sssed i= the see =ity pla itself,

f===s as eff,ective and ramenable policy f== the hcstage situatics.

6 e

4 9

e e

O 9

e e

- 140 K.

St= "

da the ::c=her of Ar=ed ?.aspc=cers

~

section 73.55 th) (3) of the Cc==ission's regulations states that

.[tlhe total nu=her of guards, and armed, trained person =e1 i= mediately available the facility... shall nominally be at ten (10), unless specifically required otherwise en a case by case basis by the Cc= mission; hcwever, this nu=her =ay not he reduced to less than five (5) guards.

In the stata=ent of censiderations acce=panying the regula-tiens, the Cc==ission explained that it would evaluate a nurber of fac_c s in detegnining whether a particular security force wculd be required to tave =cre c: less than the nc=inal nu=her of ten guards; and these fac:crs represent one instance in the secur cy regulatiens where site specific features are to, he taken into account.

The Cc==ission then listed the folicwing eleven items:

(a) selection, t:aining and =ctivation of response fc ce; (b) availability and cen-struction of defensive positicas; (c) avail-ability and knowledge of weapons and other equipment; (d) individual sica considerations, including size, topography, configuratics, geography, weather, and n"=ber of nuclear pcwer plant units; (e) iccation and reliability of initial detecticn devices; (f) consideration of Local Law Infc ce=ent Agencies responsa; (g) vital area hardening, including plant design, location of and access cent ci te vital areas; (h) design and constru=:ica cf p:ctacted area i

l I

{

j

- 141 -

harriers; (i) redusdaney of securi:7 systems; (j) initial clearance and c=ncinuing reliability assessment of persensel; and (k) sec = ity and c=ntingency proced =es.

142 /

In other words, the regulatic=s :na=date ten a==ed respenders is every case unless a staff evaluatien applyi=g these eleve=

facuers to a plant and its sect:ity system and organi=atics affir: natively establishes that a lesser nt=her is adequate c:

a greate su=ber is n'ecess'a=y.

Gover:cr 3 cwn posits proposed findings that the staff armed respe=ders at Diablo Ca= yen is u= warranted c the present record.

Gov. 7:=pesed Findings at 63-69.

'The staff's p cycsed fi=dinis gloss over this issue and assert that the question of the si=a of the armed respc=se force at Diabic Canyon is beyond the scope of any of the consclidated issues.

Staff 7:cpesed Findisgs at 12, n.

7.

Interesti= gly, hew-ever, the staff t=ck the opposite pcsition at the hearing.

There the staff ist cduced direct testimeny on Cc=sclidated Issue 1(c) (i) attempting to a==ed :espenders at applicant's

'.- L

.=f-_,

..... 7.

142 /

42 Fed _. Rec. 10836,.10837 (Februa:7 24, 1377).

A 142 -

facility.

Miller, f=1. T. 1911, p. 10-11. g /

C:ntrary to the staff's asse.icn in its p::pesed fi= dings, che size of the a:med respcase force at Olatic_

Canyen is a' vital part of the'" safeguard systa=s* as da I

to:s is used is consolidated 2ssue 1(c).

Ace==dingly, the armed roependers at applicant's facility is squarely within the scope of that issue.

Because 10 CFR 573.55 (h) (3) reserves to the Ccamissien the decision, en a case by case basis, to increase c= decrease t.he number of ar=ed res= enders as a pc2er reac:==, the staff (as the C:==issien's delegate initially exer =ising this judg=ent) had the herden of geing f==vard ence the issue was :sised by censc1'idated Issue 1(c)ui/

Here, hosever, the evidence of record is inadequate to justify

\\

143/

The.stadd's stated purpose for this pertion of the direct' test'-any was.o demenstrate that de applicant had prepared t= meet the design basis threat by meeting the requirements of 10 C73 a73.55 (b)-Ch) cr, alterna-tiveJ y,, by p =viding equivalent p:::ection where any particula: requirement was not f=11cwed.

The s aff iden.ified its armed respenders as one area where applicant did not =eet the regulato:y requirements and then scught y := justify this :sduc-icn.

Miller, fel. T. IS ',1, pp. 3-11.

e staff's sancti ning of _

a==ed' s-spenders was explcred en c :ss examinati n =f ths s.aff's wi-ess by both intervenc: 57.,CMF? and Gcverne 3 :wn without cbj ec_ien by the staff.

T.

2040-42, 2110-15.

14 0 The applicant p =pesed ne findings of fact -en this-issue and even i.,ncred it in respending

Governe:

3: wn's findings.

s.

.s N

~

__________m______.__

- 140 the s aff's au hcri:sti = cd a. ' - -.

ar=ed :ss c=se f===s.

= its dirsc testi=cny,the staff sought a_=ed respe=ders is c==si-daratics of c=17 f=ur of d e fac =:s citad by de C:==issi=n:

"the : gged terrai=, the exceptional :sspense ~d-e of the c=-site respcase fc==a t= =sach, any positi=n i= the p =tacted a:na, the reliability of the detectics systabs and de t=ai=-

ing received by.the :ssponse f===s, including their k=cwledge of the pla=: laycut

Miller, fcl.

T=.

1911, pp' 10-11.

The recitation cf these fac==s, wiccut =cre explanatics, is =ct zudficient to appli-cast's a =e.d :sspense f===e.

Cnca a design basis assault en the facili:f is u=dar-(

vay, c e ter:ain would'have little parti =ence t.o the ability

~

of -Je a==ed :sspenders tm :spel the at_ack.

Miller, T:.

2.

cn d e c hor hand, the hilly terrais, especially that d*

ect'y t=

the east of the. facility, sight p cve advantageous

=

pcten ial adversarias by pr=vidi=g the classic

' d -* f high

3. usd as ws11 as an excat*ent intellign=cs gathari=g vantage pei==.

Giuffrida, Tr. 2432-33, 2755-57.

7::ther, we 2===

gise such credenee t= the stadf's pcsitics that the ::cky tar==3-at the sita perimata handicaps i::: dars because it is *is:f l

l l

- 144 easy :

= an ankle in that type natorial; wherein de guard force would not he ec=ing over tha: type material.'

.v_4, t. e.,.

2 _,, _3 S.e staff re'.ied en the excepticnal respense ti=e of the applicant's security fc ce

= reach any portica of the p c-tect*i area, but was unable to a:cylain why the respense ti=e-at Diabic Canyen was any better -J an at any other nuclea:

facilitf and thus exceptic=al.

Miller, Tr. 2041-42.

..cru-

~

cver, the staff's 311ance en :ssponse times makes nc =entien cf the fact that dare are i Gi. ahic 4

canyon.

Similarly, we are left to spe:ulate why the staff cited the i

l reliability cf the detectica systa=s a: Oiahic Canyen.

Al-thcugh drs,,, _

.netwc k and the ether systems augmenting t

it mest the staff's regulate 7 guide standards and were speci-fi= ally selected by applicant f== their icw false ala = rates

(?G&E Panel, fol. T. If34, p. 25), we have act been i=fc:=ed of anythine exceptional ahcut the applicant's systa= ralasive

=

he detec icn systes at c her facilities.

The staff's reliance en the ::aining of applicant's security fc:ce is aise tenucus.

A: the ti=e of the hearing

,.,e the staff had c=nsidered cnly d e applicant's Regulat==y Ccide 5. 20 ::aising p = gram -- a p:=g s= which we have f=und inadequate 1: de face of de design basis th= eat cf 10 Cn 173.1(a) (1).

See p. 72-73, su;;a.

Sns, at tha" traising level, we ca==ct accept the s aff's depe=dence en t:a'-4 g _c appli-cast's sspense for=e.

The staff also effer,ed into evidence its see==ity Plas Ival=aadan Report ( 571.N for Diablo Canycn.

Staff F.x. 5-1.

Cat report states de staff's c==clusion dat 1 j, a==ed responders are* sufficient to p = vide hig'h assur-

& ace

ctaction.

_I_d.. at 5-6.

sstead of a.=alv.:i:T arPli-cant's facility is light of the eleven fac_= s identified by de C::nmissien, however, the 57n =e=ely lists ta= ch 145/

~

the eleven fact =rs.

It then states that a

" review of the factors above and pri=cipa15y, the size of de site,

~

the c==s er.ctics of the vital areas, and the ressense capa-bilit r of ::.:: cal Law E=f=== ament Agencias.

led the 146/

staif :o a==ed resycnda:s.

f. at 6. ~

l 145/

Se SPn maJces =c mentics of the sec==d fac== listed by de e-

*sien (see p. L25, su=ra) c= ce_ i=g avai*

ilit_r and c=ns2 c.c dan c: ce:ensive pcsi 4 ns.

l

~

l

- 146 -

l l

The s? n dces act explain hev any cf the ten fac.crs influenced the staff's da:ar=inaticas.

We are not inic:=ed hcw the sica cf the applicant's sica weighed h the suff's judg=ent, but note that the large uninhabited area of the plant site and beyond wculd seem te give rise to the possi-bility of an.adversarial force gathering nea: the site widcut being detecte'd.

Gciffrida, Or. 2553-54.

S'-flarly, we :nus:

Tanss as te what vital arina ccast=uction features the saff relied upon sc reach its judgment, and why thcse fe.atures are i=portant.

There is little in the racerd to suggest that there is any-hing unique abcut the const::cticn cf ciah'.c Canyon chat wculd effer an unusual advantage c the armed respcnder fe ce, and the staff has certainly not p:inted to any such evid' nce.

e The

':d factor mentioned.a the 57E?. is the respense i

capahi?.ity of.he local law enforcei:en agencies.

Again, thers is no explanatics of hcw 7~ZA'respense wculd wa rant i

i a redue ics in guard force size.

We have found the respense i

===mi aents of m* to be adequate.

See pp. 92, 99, su=ra. The fac remains, hcwever, that he Diablo Canyen plant is seven 147 /

d'as f.cm the nearest cou=ty = cad at Avila Gata and f:cm

-%: gate it is at least as far again.= che nearest t M 147/

App. Ex. 5-62, p. 2-1.

1 l

l

- 147 143/

facility.

Appli-*-t has given the isi ial --eA respe=se si=e to be,

._._ a value we believe is ep

'=:ic based on d e gecgraphy cf the area'and de fpe of :: ads l

149/

i=volved. - Also, this estimate takes =c ace =u== cd adverse weather conditions.

Lunsferd, T. 1563-70.

Fi= ally, the racced

=a.%es clea: dat it is the guard f===a cat =cs: = set a:d

=eut ali:e any int =ndisg fc ce and that the staff gives =c c= edit fer assista=ce by.the LLIA is ;=ctacting agaisst acts of sabotage.

See p. 100, su==a.

Given these fac a,-

tcgether with the isciated location of the plast, we fail

= see hcw the LLIA respcnse fac== faverably i=fluenced.

the saff's decisica j

a:med respe=se e

148/

App. Ex. 5-62, Appendix 3.

149/'

. A=. =..

- -it 5-62, 7.

. Appendix 3...--. No act a1 tests of -lis respcase have been made by applicant. L=sfc=d, Med=alf and Det~an,

Tr. 1331-32.

2 deed, the c=:m:any alAq._:sc=gi.:_e.s. d. e c=. d 'stic

=a==re of this L i== is i:s

=asual.preparac fd: d ' * - - D ~c " n

' L* d p e = s c = = e 1 it sta:es:

""".e respense " e f== persc==e1 f==~s -le w

varf, depard' g c= the '.cca:1cs qcf -de unt:s, htih is se case shculd ex= sed f :n the time the call is pisced = i1 -ley are c=

site.*

Gov. Ex. 5-1, P:sface.

l l

(

l

- 1C -

,_.e t

150/

force.

As the Co=missien's delegate, the staff has the authority to change the size of the' armed responder force,"up or down, from the nominal value of 10.

This must be done after an analysis of the applicant's facility in light of the factors identified by the Commission.

Although two different sets of factors h' ave been, cited by the staff as providing justifi-cation for requiring-armed responders at Diablo

\\

ApF. ' 55c".~ 5262, p. 1-12.. With the exception of the last,. applicant's justifications are the same as those given by the staff and therefore would provide no support for the staff's decision.

The applicant's

~

reliance on its safeguards contingency procedures would not, strnding alone, provide a armed respon-ders from the nominal ten'.

In any event, the staff did not and.could not point to this factor in in the Diablo Canyon response force.

Because the applicant's detailed procedures are not submitted to the staff as part of the contingency plan, the staff witnesses at the hearing repeatedly indicated it was the responsibility of the Inspection and Enforcement Division staff to ensure the adequacy of such procedures.

It would have been anomalous for the NRR staff, on the one hand, to have disclaimed responsibility for reviewing such procedures and, on the other, relied upon such procedures to support its determination applicant's armed response force.

(FCCTNCTE CONTINUED CN MIXT PAGE) t i

-si i i J

.o o

149 -

Canyon, the record analysis in support of these facters t

is insufficient.

It may well be that a feree ofi arma'd responders"is adequate, but the staff simply has.not made a case for such Until such time as the staff can adequately and convincingly demonstrate to the

~

Director of Nuclear Reactor Regulation that the sica of the armed respense force at'Diablo Canyon should he' 1517 must be required.

~

150/

(FCOTNOTE " CONTINUED FROM PREWOUS PAGE)

Risvision 10 of applicant's security plan does not *

~'

reiterate the justification set forth in Revision 9 for emplcying response force personnel.

151/

Inasmuch as the additional trained ar:ned responders may not be available immediately, during the pendencf of the fuel loading and low power testing license (i.e.,. prior to full power op_eration) the applicant may operate with a-response force if it j

can provide, th=ough alternative measu:;es acceptable to the Director, a fc ce equivalent to _,,

trained armed respenders.

l i

{

l

[

l i

1 150 -

V.

CCNCLOSICN 3ased en our review of the entire record in this pro-caeding and upon the foregoing factual and legal dete:minatiens, and subject to the conditicds and exceptions noted herein, l

we' cenclude that the applicant's security plan conforms with all applicable provisic'ns of the Atemic F.nergy Act of 1954, as amended, 'nd the Commissien's security regulaticas.

a Specifically, the applicant's physical protection system and security organication are adequate to meet the design basis threat of radiologigal sabotage and p cvide high as-surance that activities involving special nuclear =aterial Diablo Canyon will not be in m'dal to the ce==on defense' i

a:

and security and will not* constitute'an unreisonable' risk to the public health and safety.

The applicant must complete its Appendix 3 training and qualification plan pr,ior to full pcwer operation and _ts

~

operating license must be conditicned accordingly.

See pp.

73-77, supra.

In. addition, applicant must employ armed respenders at Diablo Canycn unless or until the staff ade-quately justifies to the Director of Nuclear Reacter Regula-152/

tien a reduction in that.nu=ber.

See pp. 148-49, supra.

l 152/

Finally, we wish to' reiterate cur recommendations that applican: clarify its security plan concerning escar s for vehicles entering the protected area (sse 2.

130, supra) and develop precedures to utilize the assessment capa=ilities of its ce=puter sys em to p cvide additional l

protection against the insider threat (see n.

125, supra).

i

a

- 151 A=y p cpesed fi= dings of fact or conclusicas of law not adopted herein are eithe:==jected or are i==aterial to

~

our decisicn.

Withis 15 days after service of this decisics, any party may file a petiition for review with the Commissien pursuant to 10 CFR 12.'786(b).

Any other parb may, withis f

l 10 days after service of a. petitics for review, file an answer oppes sg Commission review.

Effectiveness of this decisien. will be deter:sined by the r*

4ssica pursuant to 10 CIR 52.764 is; conjunction with its effectiveness revie'w 153/

of L3P-81-21, 13 NBC (J.uly 17, 1981).

It is so CRDERID.

FCR '1".3.I AP?!AL 3 CARD j

_]

L,12h.-

Barmara A. Tompk:.ss' Secretary to the Appeal Board 153/

See the Commission's order of July 22, 1981.

I

~ _. - -. -,

aP w. _. n.,..,,

1 C nselidated Issues f: the Diabic Can ren iec : :r pan ieA:

q ::::n C:6a: Ru

..q en Centen. =s da:ed se= a.=e: J. 5, 1330 c e f=11cving issues a:s a'd=itted f== de pus.,csas of the hearing c= the adeq:acy cf da physical securi:f pla= f:: the ciablo Ca=yc= facility.

S ey shall he sferred t=

in fili =gs i

lieu cf the c==ta= tic =s and stata===ts filed by de i=tarve=c:

and the Gove==c, and =ay he citad as "Cc=sclidated ssue _. "

1.

Whsder ce applica t ha es'=5 lished saf aguar:'.s s esta=s sufficies: t= p ::act agai=st acts of radi=1:Nealsahetagaa:d de' -left cf s=. ecial nuclear = ate--ial in ace==dancs w-ath Sac i==

73.1.

Specific ita=s t he addressed ars:

(a)

What e: the s=ee~

ases ins = ihed La Chazza:

11, at e. agas 11-4

~5

=u3h 11-7 i cf d a sac :irf piz:

adequatalv. idactif.r de t.=a a:d =ag=iteds of themats

..,..'a. _ _r.-

(5)

Wha ha: da applica t has raalisticall-r char-I ac ari:ad a:d analy:ad da specifi: casas sa: f==.h in Chapes: 11 and taka: p==per ac====t =f cir --= = =ss ca:

va:.r wi d the ti=a of day. 'a.d d e weathar.

A-2

iha dar, is c=da: to p=cvida high ass.::anca' l

(c) r tsa-ius safaguard systams p=stset = malis.ically against the desig= basis threats described in Sectic: 73.1, the appli=s=t has charactari=ad, a=aly:ad and p=apared f==

(i) da =a=ga of viola =t ex.a==al. as-saults, at*=^= hy staalth, and decaptiva actic=s to be a=ti=ipated at the pla=t (see Secti== 73.1(a) (1) (i) ).

(ii) the =u=ba= cf pacyle who =ig.t act is ce= cart to pose a *^ sat to the fa=ilit-r (see Sectic: 73.1(a) (1) (i) ).

(333) tha =assa of ista==al

'- sa_s pesad hv. a= "i=sida=" at da, far3 '1:-r- (see Sectic..

73.1 (a) (i) 13) ).

(iv) the @3

i's,

t== 3 3 g, dadicati==, a=d oths aia=a==s of the p=cfila of ths "sevarmi parsc=s" who we=1d executa de

- mats ag=3-*.

the fac# ty (see Sectic: 73.1(a) (1) (i) (A) ).

I

A-3 (v) te s ratagy, ta=:ics, kn=vledge, dedi=a ic=, a:d othe: par ins:: ela===ts =f the p:= fila of the insida: who we=id assist, actively c passively, the "saveral persc=s" pesing the thraats c==ta= plated by Sec i==

73.1 (see Secti== 73.1(a) (1) (1) (3) ).

(yi) c=ustaring the wea;c=s, equip =ast, stratagy a=d tactics that =ight ha used agai=st the facility, c==sistant vi h 6.e

'- aats das=rihed is secti== 73.1.

(,d)

Whetha: the applicant has adaggataly pla= ed a:d

aparad

= daal with sit:atier.s whers i=dividuals arm tata:

h= stage by persc=s thraata=ing the facility.

2.

Whetha: the pe==aived da=ger, pl=- '- g base, respensi-hility =a:=ix, p:= cad =as, a='d safaguards capabilities specified i: ?C&I's safeguards c== 3 gn==y pla: are adaT.ataly charactari=ad____

a:d asa y=ad, and wheths: the legistical s=d ad d 'stra ive

=s-sc===es f== this p :pesa are av= sie and f =cti==al, as =aT d ad

A-4 by Secci== 73. 40 (c) (1) a=d Appe= dix C t= Pa=- 73.

Spa its=s

== ha addressed a (a)

Whether ?G&I's y== cad==as a=d t== 8 # g cf per-se==al a:s adaq=ata t= p== vide =aquisita ass==a==a that i

- satz w " ha ti=aly ida= # died a=d adeq=ately assessed, d

and that all =acassary =aspensira acti==s (i=c1P'ag as-tah11shi=g aff actira ve=.V' g =alati== ships with i= cal a=d other law enf===a=a=t eff* c =is) will be taka= t=.

3

=act=ali=a =ha th=sats.

(7.ada===ca secti==s 73. 4 0 (c) (3),

73. 53 (h) (4).)

(h)

Whacher the applicz= 's safaguardsle==~'.gn=cy pla= adequataly defin'as the crita=ia for i=itia # g a=d ta 3 a i=g prascribed =asyc=sas t= the - sats c==sids=ad i= the pla a=d p =parly specifies the decisi==s, ac*' - =,

~

pi=d:ad==as a=d st.,,,

3 g i=f===ati== =acassa=y t= h:i=g 1

l abcut ~~~ase rasyc=sas, wi3-the ~==-#*g of sec-# m 2 cf App =* 4 3

C t= P a=t 73.

3.

~4ha-2.a= ?G&Z '..as adaq=ataly p==vidad f== i=gle=a==a 3-7,=4 avisi==, a=d a #-ta=a=ca ed i=s sadeguards c== ge=cy i

l pla=, as =aq-irad by Sac 73.40 (d).

ad--

l t

1

\\

l A.

4.

Whacher the applica=: has es:Eblished a sec=ity c gami:ati = capa.hls of p:=tecding the facility f := the -'- sats ecsta= plated by Par: 73, i=cluding whether that c ga:i=a.ics is capable of efficia=t =asage=a t is

-3 as of crisis as well as d=i=g =cuti=e operatic =, as =sgeired by secti== 73.55 (b) (1).

To be add:sssed are ths fc11cwi=g:

(a)

P ather the applicant has provided that at Isas: c:a f--ti=a s=her of its sec=ity c ;a isa-ti== has he clear au hcrity a:d trai=i=g to direct ths =hv.si=al r:::actics a= ivities of he sec= itf c:ga i:ati==, during heth crisis a d ::uti e =pera-ti==s, a=d is ce sita at all

'd es, as requi: ad by '

Secti== 73. 55 (b) (2).

cather the applicant has established as (b) n adeT:ata =ana.c.e=a t sv.sta= to.::= vide f== devele=. mans, revisics, implamastati== a:d enf===ame=t of its se-c =ity p:= cad =as ( sfers==a 5actics 73. 55 (b) (3) ).

T' 3 = subject i=cludes the adegracy of the proced=ms I

~'- = = =ersc==al==s: f = 1 1 : w i s c a _ _.-r i = =. cut n-4 a a:d crisis manage =en assie==e::s.

(c)

Whetha: the applicant has adegaately sels=ted tesised, eg ipped, testad, ad Taalified its sec=ity i

O

A-4

ga=icati== persc==e1 i= acc==:danca with Sec,.i

73.55 (b) (4) a=d Appe= dix 3 t= Pa:- 73 (t= d e ex=a==

that it is appli=able) a=d wha d e PG&I adesataly p:=vidas f== =eci- = lifi=ati== cf its sac==ity pe=sc=-

=al a=d f== a pari =di: =aview cf their s alidi=a*#--*

a=d e=p1=y===t s=i 'k# 1 # t r.

(d) 7cade= the az. H-=-t has adec.=atsi.r de=c=-

strated that its sac =ity c=gani=atics is capabla cf rasyc=d# g t= design basis th=sats is sufficia=t ti=a t=.p= ave =t sabetage c sabetage atta= pts

#=a2. t=

~

de public health a=d safaty c= t= Se c===c= dafa=se a=d sec=ity (rada===ca secti==s 73. 55 (h) (4), 73.55 (a),

a=d Appa-d** 3 t= Part 73) ~

Tender the a: lic'-t's sec=itv. =e=sc=al ha re ade-5.

e gaa-

--icati==s egip=ent, s;s.a=s, a=d p== cad =as t= p==-

tact agai=st the 'thraats established by Sectic= 73.1(a), i=clud-idg c

'-=_ti==s systa=s f== usa d==i=g =risis cpe=ati==s, a=d whed a: adesata c===~~#:a'#-=s exist with de local a=d =the:

law a=f== =m=~t age =cias dat are c==ta== lated t= assist to applica=

d=_:g s-- '- c=ises.

(Rafars=ca-Secti==s 73 55 (f) a=d (h). )

6.

hcader the applica=t has ade=aly ; =vided affac_ive w==ki=g a==a=ge= ants f== =h*

g the assista==a ed 1=ca' a=d

,a, c da:

aw enf===a=ent agencias.

Specifi: ita=s t= he addressed a a:

-(a) hcada: the appli=2 t's persc= al are ada-quataly t== # ad ahcut whas, hcw a:d which 1= cal sad e-la: law enf=== ament age:cias a d c: ca.i=atic=s a:n tm.ha called upc f== assista:ca.

(h) h'..athar the applica=:'s a :a=-= e===ts vid 1= cal and other law enf=== ament age cias p:=vida f==

effi=' inst c= isis =anagement, i=cludi=g a= affective chain cf c -=-a, heth pri== t: and afta= the a :ival cf assista:ca. (7.af aranca:

Secti==s 7 3. 4 0.(=) (2)'-(3),

7 3.55 (f), 73. 55 (h) and Ap-2. dix C := ?ar: 73.)

(c)

dhather the s =aquihad f== 1= cal law a:-

f= ce=as: aga:cy persc==al t: :sspe=d t= sita amar-ga:cias has hee: realisti= ally assessed (e.e., Seen-rity pla=, p, 11-6).

7.

hhatha: the apElica:t's datacti== systams a=d related aq=ipment at Diabic Ca=yc= ar's effective t= p =vida early war- ' g cf draata=i=g ac ivities, includi g clandesti=e epara i==s, a=d wha.ha: en s silla=en d :ias a=d f=11=w-up-activitias =f sa-c==it.i =ersc==al a s affactiie.

(7afa=a==a:

5acti== 73.54(e).)

pa:ticular sh=uld de pari =etar ala== system. i=clude a vih=a-I l

ti== se ai: system t: detac. in.:=dars.

I i

l I

l l

l

)

A-3 3.

Whs:har the appli=a=t's securitf plan e.=d safsgua_"_s c== '-ea==I pla: adsquatsly specify whars a=:s =f radi=1=gi=al sa=s widi= de =sa=i=g cf 173.1 c=uld ec-saic: age c: c:ha:

c==

c= de

=sa=t== sits, a=d wha _her tha descrip i==s cd - sa:

1cca_i==s, sana i=s, a=d =mspc=sas a:s suffi=iast:

(a) t= guida sac :ity pe=sc==al 1= :sspe=d3 g to

'- sats; a=d t.

(b)== all=w f== as aval:ati== cf the sspe=sa cf see. ity persc==al, pa=-'-ularly with regard t= the ti=a :squi=sd f== that =ssyc=sa.

9.

The :sgulati==s esq= ira "ise'='d-- -- as" adjace=t t=

de physical ha==ia: cf a facility's p:=tsetad a:sa of suffi=iant si=a se that pecple c= sida: side ci that barria: ca he sans is the ava=t cf its pe=a =a-# --.

10 c.r.R.- 173;$3 CcTT3j.~ The stad2 I

a=d de appt3-=~2 shall (a=d th'a etha: partiss =ay) add sss (a) l wha har the locati== cf the Air c5=p 'ssse: 3=ild' g is c==sistan:

w-id dat =sq d s=a=t a=d (b) the affi=a=y cf the e _ ensa:==f

=aas==ss at p. 3-2 of the sac==ity "lan.

p 10.

5acti== 73.55 (d) (4) ed' 10' C.7. R.

sq=iras all va%3=las t= be i=spectsd a=d saa==had haf==s a=tari=g p:=tactsd armas,

axempt u=da: a=amgn==y e d3 Cs :ai= v=b3 *as a=s a.w a

f==m dose ac=sss c==t==1s wha:

asyc=dd g t= pla== a===gn==ias.

O ei 2

s-

~

A_g

- - _.._ _a, _. _ _,,,

a

,a. e._. _...,,,,_.. _ _,,,..

n_. y

.u,_s a.a..,. e_s _ s.,

a

.n _, n s

h=v d=es de sactri f f ::s cc fi:=, bef::s [a

f. g act:f ed a vehi:la wi b.=:: a search, (a) that se smarge cf i 'fac: exis:s and (b) dat da vehicle seeking a=::f is legiti=ataly :sspcmd-L g to d at a=e:gascy.

_v.

1.

The f=:ag=ing ::li gs have sjactsd a :--ka: cf ec:-

tacti==s a:d recast and c==scl= tad eths:s to clarify a:d si=pliff the issues fc= trial.

The cima f== fill q any ch-jecti: s t= these =uli=gs is geve==ed by 10 C.F.P..

3 2. 75 2 (=),

ex=ep: dat in de istarsst =f expe:iitics da s add shall be all wed da sa=a ci=a as the eds parties f== doing so --

five dav.s.

2.

Ou: c da: cf August 23, 1930 p::vidas (at p. 15) dat all dirsc: writta: tas

~ sy cf all wit = esses is to ha file:i 20 days afts: cc: : lings== ccatanti==s.

3acausa oc::bar 13d falls c= a Sats day, dat tas-#

=y =ay be deliversd to the

~'

Secreta:f cf dis 3 card hf Menday, C=t=he: 20, 1930.

de==~ # -d the parties that cur.ea:11a c:dars call f:: testi=c=y s he cast is euss ic: a:S answer f :m. - _: addities, aa=h witness shenid specify de *:: sclidated issue c issues add:sssad by his tes #

=y.

6 r--

~

.,l A-10 3.

3af==s suh=i= # g w=it.a=, =as'# c=y, tha pa=.iss sh==1d c==f a= aben; stipulati=g =alava=

facts a=d the athasticity cf dec==ests.

See 10 C.7.3,.

22.753.

Esta=i g ista such stipula-tie =s c=" ch-ricusly save the pa= ties - A ;=apa=atics ti:na as wall, as she s= the t=ial, a=d we a=c===sga dei = d=isg so.

Staff coussal shall take the lead is datar 3

'*g what =atta=s can be stipulated a=d = ape =t t= the 3ca=d by cc--ka: 10th a=7 s===ess is

'#s =aga=d.

Sa fm==al stipulatic-* =ay.ac=c=pa=y the g 414,g cf w=itta= tas-3

- y.

=

O j

e 1

5

?

.-L.

g

-y..

p

-.

ML20058A413

Contents

Text

eet the general mandata cf Appendix C and that they are available a: Diabic Canyen efere issuing applicant a

=

s, the ge=eral perf===a=ce cbjective of Secui=

ga=icati== persc==e1 i= acc==:danca with Sec,.i

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ML20058A413

Text

eet the general mandata cf Appendix C and that they are available a: Diabic Canyen efere issuing applicant a

=

s, the ge=eral perf===a=ce cbjective of Secui=

ga=icati== persc==e1 i= acc==:danca with Sec,.i

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