ML20072B265

Comment Supporting Proposed Rule 10CFR26 Re FFD Requirements Concerning Random Drug Testing

ML20072B265
Person / Time
Site:	Diablo Canyon
Issue date:	08/09/1994
From:	Sylvia B NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORP.
To:	Chilk S NRC OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY (SECY)
References
FRN-59FR24373, RULE-PR-26 59FR24373-00015, 59FR24373-15, NMPIL-0847, NMPIL-847, NUDOCS 9408160068
Download: ML20072B265 (2)

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ts Y NIAGARA N u MOHAWK (57 FR ;2M373) ggD NI AGARA MOHAWK PowEn CoRPoRAT1oN/NINE MLE PolNT, P.O BOX 63, LYCOMING, NY 13093/ TELEPHONE (315) 349-25 e

yo ce President August 9,1994 Nucles' NMP1L 0843 y g y,.

A DOLF iq Mr. Samuel J. Chilk Secretary U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 Attn: Docketing and Services Branch

Subject:

Considemtion of Changes to Fitness-For-Duty (FFD) Requirernents, 10 CFR Part 26, 59 Fed. Reg. 24373 (May 11,1991) Requen for litfonnation and Comments

Dear Mr. Chilk:

9 On May 11,1994, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission published in the Federal Register a request or information and comments regarding the scope of random drug testing f

requirements contained in the Fitness-For-Duty Rule,10 CFR Part 26. This request was triggered by comments contained in a recent Court of Appeals decision in International Ilrotherhood_o1ElectricallVgkers v. NRC,966 F.2d. 521 (9th Cir.,1992). In that decision, the court, whib declining to reducc the current scope of random testing at Diablo ranyon, speculated that a blaaket inclusion of all workers with access into plant protected areas in random drug testing programs "may in some cases be overkill." Id. @ 526.

Ilowever, because of the importance of this matter, we are also submitting brief comments herewith.

It is Niagara Mohawk's strongly held view that the existing random drug testing scope shoald be maintained. We believe that all workers, whether or not allowed access to vital areas, should be subject to random testing if their activities require them to have even occasional access to the protected area of the plant. It is beyond question that unescorted access into the protected area by any drug impaired or otherwise unreliable person, regardless of that person's work assignment, appreciably increases the likelihood of an inadvertent or deliberate act that could adversely impact the safety of the plant.

It is cicar that the court i1 the Diablo Canyon case failed to understand the significance of access mto the protected area of the plant by drug-impaired individuals The philosophy of the NRC and the nuclear industry has always been to provide a ' defense in depth," i.e.,

multiple and redundant systems, to address all possible safety risks. By allowing potentially unreliable individuals to bypass security measures in place to safeguard the protected area, we substantially increase the likelihood that a drug impaired individual will willfully or inadvertently harm the plant. That the vital areas of the plant are behind locked doors does

.not render protected area security measures superf,,us. It is only common sense to QByo6B940809 g

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t Page 2 concludc that the more security barriers we can place between unreliable individuals an plant equipment the safer the plant will be.

Industry wide, Fitness-For-Duty Programs have been a success story. Nuclear utilit been remarkably successful in establishing and maintaining a drug-free work place. In o view, random testing has been the single most important factor in that success. Changes the program that eliminare er single out segments of workers or alter the type of set the stage for casual use of drugs and alcohol by workers who are not challenged with random testing Further, it opens the door for persons inclined to deal in the sale of drugs and related paraphernalia to hold positions on site without being subject to random testing The Nuclear Regulately Commission has directed nuclear power facilities to establish programs to ensure that all " individuals granted unescorted access [into prot areas] are trustworthy and reliable, and do not constitute an unreasonable risk to th and safety of the public...." 10 CFR 573,56. To accomplish this objective, nuclear are required to utilize background investigations, criminal history checks, psychologi testing.and behavioral observation, as well as random drug and alcohol screening. A these measures involve some limited impairment of personal freedom and all are subjec challenge in the same way as random drug testing; but together these programs have achieved the NRC's objective of assuring that nuclear plant workers are evaluated and monitcred against high standards of personal behavior before being allowed access t facilities, thereby assuring trustworthiness and reliability. We should not now abandon o substantially diminish a program that has had, a key role in the achievement of this For the foregoing reasons, Niagara Mohawr urges the Nuclear Regulatory Commission continue the random drug testing program in its current form.

Very truly yours,

t. -

B. Ralph Sylvia Executive Vice President - Nuclear

/Imc xc:

D. K. Greene G. W. Krueger M. L McCormick G. D. Wilson L. F. Storz