ML20235R875

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Applicants Objection in Nature of Motion in Limine to Admission Into Evidence of Commonwealth of Ma Testimony of Sc Sholly on Technical Basis for NRC Emergency Planning Rules,J Beyea on Potential....* Related Correspondence
ML20235R875
Person / Time
Site: Seabrook  NextEra Energy icon.png
Issue date: 10/01/1987
From: Dignan T
PUBLIC SERVICE CO. OF NEW HAMPSHIRE, ROPES & GRAY
To:
Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel
Shared Package
ML20235R605 List:
References
OL, NUDOCS 8710080213
Download: ML20235R875 (7)
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! October 1, 1987 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION before the ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD

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In the Matter of )

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PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY ) Docket Nos. 50-443-OL l OF NEW HAMPSHIRE, ET AL. ) 50-444-OL i

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(Seabrook Station, Units 1 ) (Offsite Emergency j and 2) ) Planning Issu es)  !

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APPLICANTS' OILTECTION IN THE NATURE OF A MOTION '

IN LIMINE TO THE ADMISSION INTO EVIDENCE OF COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS TESTIMONY OF l STEVEN C. SHOLLY ON TECHNICAL BASIS FOR THE NRC {

EMERGENCY PLANNING RULES, DR. JAN BEYEA ON POTENTIAL i RADIATION DOSAGE CONSEQUENCES OF THE ACCIDENTS THAT FORM )

THE BASIS FOR THE NRC EMERGENCY PLANNING RULES, DR. GORDON THOMPSON ON POTENTIAL RADIATION RELEASE SEQUENCES, AND DR. JENNIFER LEANING ON THE HEALTH EFFECTS OF THOSE DOSES The Attarney General of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts (Mass AG) has filed certain proposed testimony entitled: " Commonwealth of Massachusetts Testimony of Steven C. Sholly on Technical Basis for the NRC Emeraency Plannina Rules. Dr. Jan Bevea on Potential Radiation Dosace Consequences of the Accidents That Form the Basis for the NRC Emeraency Plannino Rules. Dr. Gordon Thomoson on Potential Radiation Release Secuences, and Dr. Jennifer Leanina on the l

Health Effects of Those Doses" (the Testimony). The i Applicants object to the admission of the Testimony into 8710080213 871001 PDR ADOCK 05000443 T PDR i l

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evidence for the reasons set forth below.1 DESCRIPTION OF THE TESTIMONY  !

J As is described in summary form therein, Test. at 12 -

15, the Testimony is in four distinct parts. The first part is a piece sponsored by Witness Sholly, Test. at 15 - 28, p L

wherein he " describes the technical basis for the current NRC emergency planning rules." Test. at 12. The second part is sponsored by Witness Beyea, Test. at 29 - 75, who describes his testimony as follows: "In order to determine the extent of protection afforded the summer beach population by current emergency plans, we have modelled the radiation doses to the population that would follow releases of radioactivity from the Seabrook plant." Test at 13. The third member of the panel, Witness Thompson, gives testimony, Test. at 75 - 77, which he describes as addressing:

"(1) The potential for an atmospheric release similar to that designated PWR1 in the Reactor Safety Study, to occur from a steam explosion or high-pressure melt ejection event.

"(2) The range of variation of two parameters which effect plume rise during a 'PWR1-type' release, specifically the location of containment breach and the thermal energy release rate for the plume.

"(3) The potential for 'PWRl-type' 1 This objection is being presented in written form in the nature of a Motion in Limine prior to the actual offer of the testimony in order to give the Board and parties notice of the position of the Applicants in this matter. In addition, the motion seeks a ruling of the Board on the objection prior to the time that the testimony would be offered in the normal course, so as to simplify the issues and enable all parties to plan better their future actions.

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releases to contain greater amounts of certain isotopes, such as_those of ruthenium, than'other categories of releases." Test. at 15.

The final piece by Witness Leaning, Test 77 - 107, is described by her as a discussion "of what is known about the acute and'long-term health consequences that can be expected to befall human beings exposed to ionizing radiation in the range of dose levels that might eventuate from a nuclear.

power plant accident such as described in the testimony of Mr. Sholly, Dr. Beyea and Dr. Thompson. I describe the kinds of injuries that would be received by the population in both the short and long term." T331 at 15. A review of the entire testimony reveals that the foregoing descriptions, by the witnesses themselves, constitute an accurate summary of the testimony. In short, the testimony begins with Mr.

Sholly's exposition as to what the contents of various documents are leading to the conclusion that core melt accidents are within the spectrum of accidents to be considered in emergency planning,2 and that the accidents Dr.

Beyea testifies about are within that spectrum, and then is followed by Dr. Beyea's piece'which purports to model certain accidents at Seabrook and show that there is a potential for large doses to be received by the public if such events occur

-2 In addition to the relevance objection pressed herein with respect to the entire Testimony, the Sholly portion thereof is objected to and should be excluded on the grounds that the documents he is describing and commenting upon, if otherwise f admissible, speak for themselves.

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1 at certain times, a piece by Dr. Thompson purporting to show the contents of the source term causing these doses, and finally Dr. Leaning's conclusion that given the circumstances posited by the Beyea and Thompson analyses, a large number of persons would be sick and more difficult to evacuate.3 THE TESTIMONY IS IRRELEVANT TO ANY CONTENTION IN THE CASE The Testimony represents an effort on the part of Mass AG to reintroduce into this proceeding a contention which was long ago excluded by this Board. On February 21, 1986, Mass AG refiled a contention in this proceeding which he had originally filed on September 9, 1983, which read as follows:

"The draft radiological emergency response plans for the Towns of Seabrook, Hampton, North Hampton, and Rye do not provide reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency at the Seabrook Station, as J

required by 10 CFR 550.47 (a) (1) , because in the event of a severe accident on a summer weekend some or all of the beach area transient populations within those l communities cannot under many plausible {

meterological conditions be protected by j means of evacuation even from early death  !

and because there are not adequate plans or provisions for sheltering the beach area transients within those communities." Contention of Attorney General Francis X. Bellotti Relative to Emeraency Plannina for the New Hampshire Beach Communities, Exh. A at 2.

The statement of basis which accompanied the proposed 3It may be that it will be argued that this very last point of the very last witness makes this testimony relevant. However, there is no contention in this case as to the effect of radiological injuries on times for evacuation.

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A contention was, in scope, a capsule version of the Testimony.

Id. at 2 - 13.

This Board rejected this contention for litigation in this proceeding in a Memorandum and Order issued April 29, l

1986. This Board stated:

"The Commonwealth's interpretation of l emergency planning is not in accord with the Commission's Statement of

. Considerations, Emergency Planning, 45 End. Ess. 55402 (August 19, 1980). There the Commission, after the TMI event adopted emergency planning regulations with the avowed purpose of bolstering the {

siting and engineered design features by requiring protective measures to be taken in the course of the accident. It was the Commission's intent, as the Board understands these regulations, that the Commission wants to ensure that the means and procedures will be in place or will be within a reasonable time, to assess the course of an accident and its potential severity, " . . . that appropriate authorities will be notified promptly and protective actions in response to actual or anticipated condition can and will be taken." There are two protective actions that can be taken: shelter or evacuate. Some combination of these two actions is also an option depending upon conditions.

"The Commission has nowhere required a zero risk standard. Indeed one of the basic principles of NRC regulations is to promote emergency plans that have flexibility to ensure response to a wide spectrum of accidents. Massachusetts would have each of the responses within the range of protective responses provide absolute assurance that protective measures can and will be taken. Rather, we believe that the Commission's intent for emergency planning is to provide that any one or combination of responses within the range of protective responses will provide reasonable assurance that protective measures can and will be 5

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e ** l "As the' Staff maintained, particular postulated accidents are inappropriate

-for-litigation under our regulations. We quote, with approval, the Staff's statement in its response of March.14,

~1986 that 'the basic goal of emergency planning is achievement of maximum dose savinas in a radiological emeroency.

Towards this and the Commission requires that reasonable estimates be provided as oto the time in which an evacuation may be accomplished'under different conditions, for.use by responsible authorities in formulating their protective action recommendations. . There is no regulatory basis, however, to support the Massachusetts Attorney General's apparent belief that protective actions must be developed which assure that any particular level of radiological dose

. consequences do not occur in the event of

.an accident.' Staff Response, March 14, 1986, at 3 - 4; citing Cincinnati Gas &

Electric Co. (William Zimmer Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 1), ALAB-727, 17 NRC 760, 770 (1983)." MEMORANDUM AND ORDER (Ruling on Contentions and Establishing Date and Location for Hearing) (Apr. 29, 1986) at 43 - 45.

Some three months after this Board's decision quoted above, the commission, writing in the Shoreham proceeding, confirmed the correctness of the position taken by this Board:

"Our emergency planning requirements do not require that an adequate plan achieve a preset minimum radiation dose saving or a minimum evacuation time for the plume exposure pathway emergency planning zone in the event of a serious accident.

! Rather, they attemot to achieve I reasonable and feasible dose reduction h

under the circumstances; wbbt may be reasonable or feasible for one olant site 6

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nav not be for another." Lona Island Lichtina Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), CLI-86-13, 24 NRC 22, 30 (1986). (Emphasis added)

Some nine months later the Commission reiterated this position:

"The existing omergency planning (regulation) does not require that plans achieve any preestablished minimum dose savings in the event of an accident. For example, approved emergency plans with full State and local governmental cooperation have highly variable evacuation time estimates ranging from several hours to over ten hours and the projected dose savings for such plans would vary widely. Thus the regulation is inherently variable _in effect and there are no bright line mandatory minimum projected dose savings or evacuation time limits which could be viewed as performance standards for emergency plans in the existing regulations. Moreover the dose savings achieved by implementation of an emergency plan under adverse conditions, e.a., during or following heavy snow, could be substantially less-than under perfect conditions. This variability is consistent with a concept or approach to emergency planning and preparedness that is flexible rather than rigid."

Licensing of Nuclear Power Plants Where State and/or Local Governments Decline To Cooperate in Offaite Emergency Planning (Proposed Rule), 52 Fed. Reg. 6980, 6982 (March 6, 1987).

There-is nothing new in this concept. Over four years ago, the Commission observed, "The Commission presumes as does FEMA that offsite individuals in the EPZ may, as a result of a nuclear plant accident, either become externally L contaminated with radioactive materials or become exposed to dangerous levels of radiation, or both." Southern California 7

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Edison Com (San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 and 3), CLI-83-10, 17 NRC 528, 534-35 (1983). )

1 The teaching from all of the foregoing is that evidence I such as the Testimony here at issue is irrelevant in an NRC 4 proceeding on Emergency Planning. The standard which must be met by an Emergency Plan is that it is designed to achieve reasonable and feasible dose savings given the circumstances of the site in question. Whether these dose savings will be high or low in absolute terms at a particular site in the circumstances of a given accident or class of accidents is irrelevant.

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l CONCLUSION

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! For the same' reasons it rejected the Mass AG contention in April of 1986, the Board should sustain this objection and exclude from admission into evidence the Testimony.

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a mas T, . Dg, Jr.

George H. Lewald Kathryn A. Selleck Ropes & Gray 225 Franklin Street Boston, MA 02110 (617) 423-6100 Counsel for'Acolicants I

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