Text

Testimony of G Thompson,Rl Goble & J Beyea on Behalf of Atty General for Commonwealth of Ma on Contentions Re Adequacy of Seabrook Plan for Commonwealth of Ma Communities.*
	ML20235M906
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Site:	Seabrook
Issue date:	02/21/1989
From:	Beyea J, Goble R, Goble R, Thompson G; CLARK UNIV., WORCESTER, MA, INSTITUTE FOR RESOURCE & SECURITY STUDIES, MASSACHUSETTS, COMMONWEALTH OF, NATIONAL AUDUBON SOCIETY
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l, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

'Before Administrative Judges:

Ivan W. Smith, Chairperson Dr. Richard F. Cole Kenneth A. McCollum r_

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In-the Matter of ) Docket Nos.

) 50-443-444-OL PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF ) (Off-site EP)

NEW HAMPSHIRE, ET AL. )

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(Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2) ) February 21,.1989

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TESTIMONY OF DR. GORDON THOMPSON, DR. ROBERT L. GOBLE, AND DR. JAN BEYEA ON BEHALF OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS ON CONTENTIONS REGARDING THE ADEOUACY OF THE SPMC Department of the Attorney General i One Ashburton Place Boston, MA. 02108-1698 ,

(617) 727-2200 ;

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1 8902280492 890221 PDR ADOCK 05000443 T PDR_

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION-l Before Administrative Judges:

! Ivan W. Smith, Chairperson l Dr. Richard F. Cole Kenneth A. McCollum-

)

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In the Matter of ) Docket Nos.

! ) 50-443-444-OL l PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF ) (Off-site EP)

NEW HAMPSHIRE, ET AL. )

) l (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2) ) February 21, 1989 j

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TESTIMONY OF DR. GORDON THOMPSON, DR. ROBERT L. GOBLE, AND DR. JAN BEYEA ON BEHALF OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 4 FOR THE COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS ON CONTENTIONS '

REGARDING THE ADEOUACY OF THE SPMC I. IDENTIFICATION OF WITNESSES Q. Please. state your names, positions, and business addresses.

A. (Thompson) My name is Dr. Gordon Thompson. I am Executive Director of the Institute for Resource and Security Studies in Cambridge, Massachusetts.

A. (Goble) My name is Dr. Robert Goble. I am a Research Associate Professor at Clark University in Worcester, Massachusetts.

A. (Beyea) My name is Dr. Jan Beyea. I am the Senior l Energy Scientist for the National Audubon Society in New York j City.

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. i Q. Briefly summarize your experience and professional qualifications.

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(Thompson) I received a ph.D in applied mathematics from Oxford University in 1973. Since then I have worked as a consulting =hcientist on a variety of energy, environment, and

. international security issues. My experience has included technical analysis and presentation of expert testimony on issues related to the safety of nuclear power facilities.

In 1977, I presented testimony before the Windscale public Inquiry in Britain, addressing safety aspects of nuclear fuel reprocessing. During 1978 and 1979, I participated in an international scientific review of the proposed Gorleben nuclear fuel center in West Germany, a review sponsored by the government of Lower Saxony.

Between 1982'and 1984, I coordinated an investigation of safety issues relevant to the proposed nuclear plant at Sizewell, England. This plant will have many similarities to the Seabrook plant. The investigation was sponsored by a group of local governments in Britain, under the aegis of the Town l and Country planning Association. This investigation formed the basis for testimony before the Sizewell public Inquiry by myself and two other witnesses.

l From 1980 to 1985, first as a staff scientist and later as a consultant, I was associated with the Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS), at their head office in Cambridge, MA. On l

behalf of UCS, I presented testimony in 1983 before a licensing l board of the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), concerning l

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the marits of a system of filtored venting at the' Indian Point nuclear plants. Also, I undertook an extensive review of NRC research on the reactor accident " source term" issue, and was co-author of a major report publisned by UCS on this subject in 1986.

- Since early 1987, I have been one of the principal investigators for an emergency planning study based at Clark University, Worcester, MA. The object of the study was to develop a model emergency plan for the Three Mile Island nuclear plant. Within this effort, one of my primary responsibilities has been to address the characteristics of severe reactor accidents.

My other research interests include: the efficient use of energy; the supply of energy from renewable sources; radioactive waste management; the restraint of nuclear weapons proliferation; and nuclear and conventional arms control. I have written and made public presentations in each of these areas.

At present, I am Executive Director of the Institute for Resource and Security Studies, Cambridge, MA. This organization is devoted to research and public education on t'he efficient use of natural resources, protection of the environment, and the furtherance of international peace and security.

A detailed resume is included in the attachments to this testimony.

A. (Goble) I received a Ph.D. in physics from the University of Wisconsin in 1967, specializing in high energy elementary particle physics. Since then I have held combined

p research and teaching posts at Yale University, the University of Minnesota, the University of Utah, Montana State University,

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and Clark University. My present position at Clark is Research Associate Professcr of Physics where I am a member of the program on' Environment, Technology, and Society, and part of the Hazards Assessment Group of the Center for Technology, Environment, and Development [CENTED).

I have taught a wide range of physics courses at both the l undergraduate and graduate level and a number of courses dealing with the relationships between technologies and society.

My current research interests are: (1) emergency planning for nuclear reactor accidents (I have been one of the principal researchers in a Clark University project to write an emergency response plan for the TMI nuclear reactor); (2) risk assessment (I am conducting research on risks from radon exposures in indoor air, and am working with other CENTED group members on reviewing risk assessments for a potential radioactive waste repository in Nevada); (3) air pollution dispersal (I am continuing work on both short and long range pollutant dispersal, including applications to the acid rain problem, as well as the transport of radionuclides from nuclear accidents). A complete resume is included in the attachments to this testimony.

(Beyea). I received my doctorate in nuclear physics from Columbia University in 1968. Since then I have served as an Assistent Professor of physics at Holy Cross College in Worcester, MA; as a member for four years of the research staff of the Cantor for Energy and Environmental Studies at Princeton University; and, as of May 1980, as the Senior Energy Scientist for the National Audubon Society.

While at Princeton University, I worked with Dr. Frank von Hippel to ' prepare a critical quantitative analysis of attempts

. to model reactor accident sequences. The lessons learned from this general study of nuclear accidents and the computer codes written to model radioactivity releases I then applied to specific problems at the request of governmental and non-governmental bodies around the world. I have written major reports on the safety of specific nuclear facilities for the President's Council on Environmental Quality (TMI reactor), for the New York State Attorney General's Office (Indian point), j for the Swedish Energy Commission (Barsebeck reactor), and the state of Lower Saxony (Gorleben Waste Disposal Site). I have also examined safety aspects of specific sites for.the California Energy and Resources Commission, the Massachusetts Attorney General's Office and the New York City Council.

Also while at Princeton, I wrote a computer program, useful for reactor emergency planning, for the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection.

After joining the National Audubon Society, I continued to work as an 'ndependent consultant on nuclear safety issues. I participated in a study, directed by the Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS) at the request of the Governor of Pennsylvania, concerning the proposed venting of krypton gas at Three Mile Island. The UCS study, for which I made the

radiation dose calculations, was the major reason the Governor gave for_ approving the venting.

I participated in the international exercise on consequence modeling (Benchmark Study) coordinated by the. Organization for Economic CBDperation & Development (O.E.C.D.). Scientists and

engineers f rom fourteen countries around the world used their own consequence models to calculate radiation doses following hypothetical " benchmark" releases. Other participants from the United States included groups from Sandia Laboratories, Lawrence Livermore Laboratory, Batelle Pacific-Northwest, and Pickard, Lowe and Garrick, Inc. I also served as a consultant from the environmental community to the N.R.C. in connection with their development of " Safety Goals for Nuclear Power plants."

At the request of the Three Mile Island Public Health Fund, I. supervised a major review of radiation doses from the Three Mile Island accident. This report, "A Review of Dose !

Assessments at Three Mile Island and Recommendations for Future Research," was released in August of 1984. Subsequently, I l organized a workshop on TMI Dosimetry, the proceedings of which l

j were' published in early 1986.

l In 1986, I developed new dose models for the Epidemiology Department of Columbia University. These models are being used to assess whether or not the TMI accident is correlated with excess health effects in the local population. The new computer models account for complex terrain, as well as time varying meteorology (including changes in wind direction).

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, s In addition to reports written about specific nuclear facilities, an article of mine on resolving conflict at the Indian Point reactor' site, an article on emergency planning for reactor accidents, and a joint paper with Frank von Hippel of Princeton 6 Diversity on failure modes of reactor containment

- systems have appeared in The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists.

I have also prepared risk studies covering sulfur emissions from coal-burning energy facilities, and I have managed a project that analyzed the side effects of renewable energy sources.

I regularly testify before congressional committees on energy issues and have served on several advisory boards set up by the Congressional Office of Technology Assessment.

I currently participate in a number of ongoing efforts aimed at promoting dialogue between environmental organizations and industry.

A complete resume is included in the attachments to this testimony.

II. OVERVIEW OF TESTIMONY Q. To what Contentions does your testimony refer?

A. Our testimony refers to Contentions JI 17, JI 18, JI 19.

Q. Please summarize your testimony.

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A. (All) Our testimony demonstrates that the SPMC does not meet applicable standards and does not take appropriate account of relevant knowledge about the characteristics of nuclear plant accidents and the potential for mitigating the effects of khose accidents through emergency responses at the

Seabrook site.

We identify deficiencies in the SPMC which are relevant to its application to all potentially affected populations.

Furthermore, we identify deficiencies which are relevant to the application of the SPMC to the beach populations.. In the latter case, we illustrate the deficiencies by calculations which are specific to the Seabrook site.

In regard to the SPMC's application to all populations, we identify two major deficiencies. 1) the SPMC does not provide an appropriate range of emergency response strategies. 2) the decision criteria in the SPMC do not take account of all relevant information and, as a result, may fail to generate the most appropriate emergency response. The combined effect of these two deficiencies may be an unnecessary level of radiation exposure to affected populations.

In regard to the SPMC's application to the beach populations, we identify three major deficiencies. 3) when the beaches are heavily occupied, the SPMC will not be significantly more effective than strategies involving unplanned emergency l

response. 4) the SPMC does not have an adequate basis for !

rejecting sheltering as a planned emergency response measure.

5) the SPMC will be significantly less effective than emergency responses to accidents at generic nuclear plant accidents.

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Q. Are the deficiencies in the SpMC attributable to the nature of the Seabrook site?

A. (All) It is c ear that the site presents a particular challenge for emergency planning. The most notable part of that challenge is the presence of a large beach population near

'. to the plant during parts of each year. However, of the five raajor deficiencies mentioned above, only one, #5, directly arises from the presence of the beach population. The other four deficiencies represent a failure of the SpMC to adequately respond to the site's challenge. Notwithstanding that challenge, an emergency planning effort considerably more rigorous than is represented by the SpMC could have been performed.

Q. Do your criticisms of the SpMC rest upon a comparison of the effectiveness of emergency planning at the Seabrook site with the effectiveness of planning at a generic plant?

A. (All) In our view, it would be appropriate to make such a comparison. Nevertheless, this testimony primarily rests upon comparisons among alternative emergency response i

strategies at the Seabrook site.

In ruling upon the adequacy of emergency planning in New Hampshire, this Board has accepted testimony by FEMA witness j Joseph Keller. Keller's testimony relies upon his opinion, I

unsupported by any site-specific analysis, that generic emergency planning lessons are applicable to the Seabrook l site. We demonstrate that generic lessons are not applicable,

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l and to that end we compare relative effectiveness across a range l

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of emorgency response strategies, including those with parameters representative of a generic site and others with parameters representative of the Seabrook site. )

While conducting calculations to assess the relative i effectiveness of. emergency response strategies at the Seabrook

. site, we were also unavoidably driven to the conclusion that the SpMC will be significantly less effective in protecting the Massachusetts beach population than will a generic emergency response to a nuclear plant accident. 'This is one of the five major deficiencies of the SpMC which we address here.

Q. Does your testimony rely upon information about the potential characteristics of accidents specific to the Seabrook plant?

A. (All) In our view, it would be appropriate for this Board to accept testimony which relied upon such information.

Nevertheless, we have not used any Seabrook-specific information except for reactor power, about potential accident characteristics.

Where information about potential accident characteristics is used here, that information is generally drawn from the same sources as were used in establishing the basis for the present emergency planning regulations. To a limited degree, we also

' draw upon other generic literature.

Q. Does your testimony cover the same ground as the rejected Commonwealth of Massachusetts Testimony of Sholly, et al , regarding the NHRERp?

'A. (All) No. Our present testimony does not contain estimates of radiation doses although these would be needed for

determining medical resource needs, etc., and it does not assume any particular accident scenario. Instead, the

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testimony addresses the relative effectiveness of emergency l response strategies across a range of potential accident conditions 7 The sarue issue has been addressed in the June 10,

' 1 1988 FEMA Testimony of Keller and Cumming, althougn in tnat case without supporting analysis.

III. STRUCTURE OF THIS TESTIMONY j Q. please describe the structure of your testimony.

A. (All) The remainder of our testimony consists of I eight parts. First, we discuss appropriate objectives for emergency planning, and the translation of those objectives into criteria which can be used to evaluate a particular emergency plan. Second, we examine the emergency planning i

issues which arise in the case of Seabrook. Third, we assess the approach taken in the SpMC in the light of our preceding discussion of objectives and criteria. Fourth, we describe an analytic approach which supplements that assessment by calculating the relative effectiveness of various emergency response strategies for the beach population. Fifth, we describe the protective stategies used in our analysis, explaining their relevance to the emergency planning problems at Seabrook. Sixth, we summarize the findings of our analysis. Seventh, we discuss implications of these findings for Massachusetts residents in the EpZ. Eighth, we summarize our conclusions.

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IV. EMERGENCY PLANNING OBJECTIVES AND CRITERIA FOR EVALUATION OF SPECIFIC PLANS Q. Why is it important to be clear about emergency planning objectives?

A. (Kil) Emergency response to a nuclear accident

, requires a great deal of advance planning, both in establishing the resources needed to respond in a crisis and in establishing procedures for dealing with important contingencies which, if they occur, must be responded to very quickly. The establishment and use of clear planning objectives is necessary for the coherent organization of these activities. Planning objectives are not guarantees that under all circumstances the use of the plan will mean no loss of life or no doses in excess of Protective Action Guides ("PAGs"). They are a mechanism for keeping track of what needs to be done and what are the priorities in making decisions; they also should represent reasonable aspirations for the successful use of a plan.

Q. How do you interpret the objectives set out in NUREG-06547 A. (All) NUREG-0654 adopts the planning basis set out in NUREG-0396, yielding the following statement of objectives:

"The overall objective of emergency response plans is to provide dose savings (and in some cases immediate life saving) for a spectrum of accidents that could produce offsite doses in excess of Protective Action Guides (PAGs). No single specific accident sequence should be isolated as the one for which to plan because each accident could have different consequences, both in nature and degree. 1 (NUREG-0654, page 6)

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This formulation is vague as to the relative importance of

" dose savings" and "immediate life saving".

However, since NUREG-0654 rests upon NUREG-0396, further guidance can be obtained from Appendix I of the latter document, which provides the rationdie for the recommended planning basis. In 5

considering " Class 9" accidents, particularly those with a large release of radioactivity, that appendix states:

"These very severe accidents have the potential for causing serious injuries and deaths. Therefore, emergency response for these conditions must have as its first priority the reduction of early severe health effects. Studies have been performed which indicate that if emergency actions such as sheltering or evacuation were taken within about 10 miles of a power plant, there would be significant savings of early injuries and deaths from even the most " severe" atmospheric releases."

(NUREG-0396, page I-7) l It can reasonably be inferred that NUREG-0654 accepts that the highest priority in emergency planning is to reduce the I incidence of "early severe health effects", with " dose savings" 1

as a parallel but less compelling objective. As indicated below, such an interpretation is consistent with the nature of 1

the nuclear plant emergency planning problem and with other j l

l literature in the field. !

Q. How do planning objectives relate to the health I l

effects of radiation exposure?

A. (All) A large release of radioactive material can cause radiation exposure. If the exposures are high enough, I l

the exposed person will suffer prompt damage to tissues, become sick, and if sufficiently damaged, die. Lower exposures, which ;

are not intense enough to cause obvious tissue damage, may

still affect cellular reproductive systems and'thus cause cancers to d,evelop much later on. The likelihood of cancers developing in tLis fashion is sometimes considered to be proportional to thc-magnitude of the exposure-(the linear model). FOT the case of acute consequences, the objective is

thus to keep people's exposures well below levels at which tissue damage becomes significant. For the case of cancers, for which (at least if cancer incidence is' proportional to exposure) the objective will be to minimize the total dose to the population. A further concern is that the cancer risks should not be concentrated too highly in particular people.

Then the third objective is to prevent individuals from receiving high exposures, for example, PAG s . . These three objectives may be considered to be embodied in the above-quoted phrase from NUREG-0654: "The overall objectives of emergenef response plans is to provide dose savings (and in some cases immediate life saving) for a spectrum of accidents that could produce offsite doses in excess of protective Action Guides (pAGs)." Two other concerns are implicit in the NUREG 0654 regulations. A number of special populations will be particularly vulnerable because of their lack of mobility, -

disabilities, institutional placement, etc. Special provisions are needed to provide protection to such populations. Finally, an accident and the response to it will generate a number of secondary needs.

These considerations suggest to us the following hierarchy of emergency response objectives:

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1) Avoid acuta cxposures lcading to loss of lifo and injuries;

2) Keep individual doses below PAGs;

3) Reduce collective doses as much as feasible;

4) Protect vulnerable subpopulations; and j

5) Address ancillary problems including housing of

., evacuees, medical treatment and screening, public anxiety, etc.

Such a hierarchy is implicitly or explicitly endorsed at various places in the emergency planning literature. For example, the International Commission on Radiological l Protection has stated:

"The principles which emerge for planning intervention in the event of an accident are the following:

(a) Serious nonstochastic effects should be avoided by the introduction of countermeasures to limit individual dose levels below the thresholds for these effects.

(b) The risk from stochastic effects should be limited by introducing countermeasures which achieve a positive net benefit to the individuals involved.

This can be accomplished by comparing the reduction in individual dose, and therefore individual risk, that would follow the introduction of a countermeasure with the increase in individual risk resulting from the introduction of that countermeasure.

(c) The overall incidence of stochastic effects should be limited, as far as reasonably practicable, by reducing the collective dose equivalent. ,

l This source-related assessment may be carried out by cost-benefit analysis techniques and would be similar to a process of optimization in that the cost of a decrease in the health detriment in the affected population is balanced against the cost of further countermeasures."

(ICRP Publication 40, page 2) l L___-__-_-_.

l Accordingly, we do notiaccept that the objective of an emergency pl,an for the Seabrook plant, or for any other nuclear plant, should be simply to achieve an unspecified level of

" dose savings".

Q. Hdw should broad planning objectives be translated into criteria for evaluating specific plans?-

A. (All) A planner seeking to develop effective emergency plans needs criteria to tell how well he or she is doing. These are " practical criteria" and are an essential component of planning. The regulatory process also contains

" legal-criteria" for evaluating the adequacy of plans. These

" legal criteria" will, one hopes, be closely related to the

" practical criteria". planners are using to try to make good plans, but they cannot be exactly the same. The legal criteria will not be site-specific, but instead will be requirements intended to ensure that effective planning takes place at each site and to promote general improvement of emergency planning.

Given the diversity of nuclear power plant sites and the complexity of the task of preparing for serious nuclear accidents, effective planning cannot be accomplished through generic planning requirements alone. The main creative effort of planning must come from those expecting to implement the plans, who must specifically address the particular characteristics and needs of the local population and environment, public regulatory review must assess the overall quality of this effort as well as how well it meets specific regulatory requirements.

L NUREG-0654 provides much. guidance for evaluating planning-

efforts,in{thecontextofpracticalplanning'andinthelegal-context. The guidance encompasses four types of~ consideration

1) Excected performance of the olans. How well will the plik meet *theiobjectives'across the; spectrum of:

accident circumstances?. NUREG-0654 does not define

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specific criteria for such assessment,.but does imply that.

Lthere is a distinction between adequate and inadequate performance..

2)L Effectiveness of the olan. .How does the plan compare with no plan or with-alternative' planning possibilities for the site? It is clear from NUREG-0654 (see pages 9'and 10)~ that, allowing for. uncertainties and.

the fact that not all conditions can'be anticipated in advance, emergency plans are expected to accomplish something and.to provide projections to the public. They are not only expected to be adequate, but should provide the most effective actions to protect the public.

NUREG-0654 does not suggest comparison between the protection which plans afford at different sites. Ne interpret this gap as stemming from concerns that emergency planning is necessarily site-specific, and that the use of comparisons might encourage planners to neglect specific problems at their location. While we share these concerns, such comparisons are warranted, in our view, by the following considerations: i) A great deal of the research and analysis on emergency planning has been generic.

Comparisons are therefore essential to assuring that generic pnalyses are only applied when they match situations appropriate to the specific site in question, ii). Comparisons provide a set of benchmarks showing what can be hone, at least in some circumstances, and may

. encourage plan improvement through building on previous experience, and iii) The regulatory process should be self-monitoring to see that the evolut.#on of aggregate emergency planning capability over time should be toward improved rather then poorer capabilities.

3) Scoce of the olannina effort. Was the spectrum of accident conditions properly addressed? Were all of the important features of the particular site taken into account? Were'all of the necessary planning provisions made? NUREG-0654 gees into considerable detail defining the planning basis and specifying needs for planning provisions. The importance of site characteristics is obvious.

4) Ouality of the olannina effort. Were the major emergency planning problems for the site identified? Were all appropriate alternatives considered? Was the needed l empirical and analytical work of good quality and subjected to careful public review? NUREG-0654 does not specifically assert that planning should be done well, but surely that i

goes without saying. NUREG-0654 does demand that many j i

l planning bases be. evaluated (a notable example is !

evaluation criterion "m" on page 64, which requires that the choice of recommended sheltering or evacuation strategies be justified).

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... g Q., Does the SpMC ind'icat'e that all the above-stated consideration a were taken into account in it's preparation?

A. .(All) As will-become clear, the remaindcr of our testimony,Lthe SpMC'is serviously defective when. evaluated-according lo each of the four considerations. '

V. SEABROOK EMERGENCY PLANNING ISSUES Q.. please summarize the major'emetgency planning issues for the.Seabrook site.

A. (All)Despite the intense litigation-surrounding these. issues, the parties have. reached some broad agreements, as follows:

1) Resident and Transient Populations. Although the specific numbers are still under litigation, the range has been: narrowed for each of these categories for Massachusetts and New Hampshire.

2). Evacuation Time Estimates.. ETEs depend on the population estimates together with a choice of model and a set of modeling assumptions for.the roadways.

All of the'modeling for'this proceeding is~being done with the IDYNEV model, and the range of time' estimates under assorted circumstances has been narrowed.

3) Shelterina characteristics of local buildinas.- Beach dwellings, and most though not all of the commerical structures at the beaches are relatively light in

-construction'and provide only limited protection.

permanent houses in the Massachusetts towns are winterized, and many have basements. These houses generally provide more protection than beach dwellings.

4) Accident soectrum to be olanned for. There is general agreement that it is appropriate to plan for the accident spectrum specified in NUREG-0654 and NUREG-0396. This includes at one end accidents with characteristics like pWR l-5 of the Reactor Safety Studey, and at the other end, the more serious Design Basis' Accidents.

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5). Consequence modeling. Although Ssabrook-spacific consequence modeling has not yet been permitted into the: legal record; there is both general acceptance of and.use of consequence modeling as performed for the Reactor Safety Study, NUREG-0396, and NUREG-1210.

Such modeling has been performed with the various generations of the CRAC codes and their descendent, the MACCS code.

Based on these agreed upon parameter ranges and analytic methods, the major planning problems at Seabrook are simply defined. The most acute problems occur when the summer beaches are heavily occupied. Evacuation times in this case are longer than the warning times and expected duration of major releases !

for the most dangerous portion of the planning basis accident spectrum. Ef fer.tive sheltering would be very dif ficult to arrange for the beach population.

Q. How should emergency planners respond to these challenges?

A. (All) planners should begin with a systematic investigation of how these various problems may be alleviated. Can warning times be lengthened for more types of accidents? Are there measures which would improve evacuation times? What can be done to provide shelter? How can the planning for permanent residents be integrated so that they can effectively use their opportunities to find shelter?

Q. What approach is evident from NHRERp and the SpMC7 A. (All) There is no evidence that a systematic investigation of the above-stated kind has been conducted.

Instead, a simple approach has been taken.

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If the accident unfolds slowly enough to define an Alert (NHRERP) or Site Area Emergency (SPMC) condition, the beaches.will be closed, thus beginning the evacuation of the transient beach population. If and when the accident proceeds tocoreme5k,(GeneralEmergency), an evacuation of the nearby

towns may also be ordered to an extent determined by the build l l

up of radioactivity in the containment building, as measured by l the " Post-LOCA Monitor". Sheltering or evacuation ma~ be ordered further out, depending on wind direction and containment radiation level. i If a release occurs simultaneously with the declaration of

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General Emergency, then the decision whether to recommend sheltering or evacuation of the resident population will be based, nominally, on a comparison of dose projections for the two strategies, performed according to a worksheet and by the METPAC model run by the plant operators. However, from the NH litigation, there is reason to believe that evacuation would be automatically ordered if the release was large.

VI. SPMC PLANNING APPROACH Q. How does the SPMC compare with the planning objectives and criteria described earlier in this testimony?

A. (All) The SPMC is not based on a careful analysis, f but instead takes a simple approach, with unwarranted inferences from generic studies. These deficiencies are particularly evident in four instances. First, there has been no evaluation of the feasibility and potential benefits of implementing sheltering for some or all of the beach i

populations. Second, based on unsound-decision criteria,

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residents are systematically steered away from the potential benefits of sheltering in their houses. Third, there is no discrimination of the appropriate protective action strategies for reside s in cases where large beach populations are, or

'are not, present. Fourth, the decision criteria for protective response in a General Emergency fail to take account of available knowledge of severe accident behavior.

The first of these deficiencies is illustrated by calculations described hereafter. Similar calculations could be done to illustrate the other deficiencies, and we discuss in section IX what'could be expected for the second and third issues. The absence of such calculations on the part of the applicant is indicative of their simplistic approach.

Q. please explain the weaknesses in the SpMC's decision criteria under a General Emergency.

A. (All) A General Emergency refers to a situation in which substantial core degradation or melting is either actual or imminent. Under such conditions, it is inappropriate to base emergency response decisions on containment radiation levels. The possible modes of release of radioactivity are such that this indicator is inadequate by itself.

First, a release may occur without a high containment radiation level. Second, containment radiation level is a poor 1

indicator of the imminence or magnitude of containment failure (See, for instance, the Reactor Risk Reference Document, NUREG

( 1150 (1981), M. Silverberg, et al. Reassessment of The !

Technical Bases for Assessino the Source Terms, NUREG 0956 l l l

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(1986), . Reviews of Modern Physics, V.57 #3; part III (1985),

and S. Sholly and G. ' Thompson, The Source Term Debate, Union of )

Concerned Scientists (1986)].

A particularly important point is that core melt accident sequencesUillproceedthrougha"crisisphase",whichis.the

period beginning with the onset of core . melting and ending~ with the molten core resting on the containment floor. If a.large release does not occur during this phase,'it: is relatively unlikely for the subsequent few hours. Accordingly, if evacuation is inhibited by factors such as traffic jams, it may often be appropriate to shelter potentially exposed populations

.until the crisis phase is over.

Q. How should one accommodate uncertainty in the development of a severe accident?

A. (All) The SpMC is driven by the simple idea that one should evacuate in the face of such uncertainty. Indeed, that idea was endorsed by this Board in its decision on the NHRERP.

However, this idea can be inappropriate for situations, such as may occur.for Seabrook, where evacuation may be severely I inhibited. The analysis which we begin in the next section shows the inadequacy of this idea since it indicates that evacuation is unt the best strategy, when averaaed over a broad range of uncertain accident conditions.

A better approach would be to observe a number of plant parameters and to correlate these observations with the results of plant-specific severe accident analysis, so as to provide an estimate of the further development of the accident sequence. l 4

The.most important items of.information to be estimated areJthe H times of onset and completion'of.the crisis phase. Such in-plant information should then be combined with information

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on' weather conditions.and anticipated evacuation times, to

-generate appropriate emergency _ response strategies.for affected j- populations.

Q. What analysis should be performed to evaluate emergency response strategies?

A. (All) The next section of this. testimony. illustrates-the kind of anlysis which emergency planners should' perform.

Our analysis is specific to the beach populations.

VII. AN ANALYTIC APPROACH TO ASSESS THE SPMC'S VALUE TO THE BEACH POPULATIONS

-Q. _ please explain your analytic approach.

A. (All) We follow in the footsteps of the authors of NUREG-0396, which provides the planning basis for current emergency planning. Appendix I of NUREG-0396, which provides the rationale for that planning basis, includes a discussion of the emergency planning implications of the Reactor Safety Study (WASH-1400). Within that discussion, the results of technical analyses are presented, partly without attribution and partly with attribution to the report NUREG/CR-ll31.1/ Where attribution to NUREG/CR-1131 is made, the analytic results 1/ Reference (6).in Appendix I of NUREG-0396 is currently available as: D.C. Aldrich et al., Examination of Offsite Radiological Emercency Protective Measures for Nuclear Reactor '

Accidents Involvina Core Melt, NUREG/CR-1131, October 1979.

drawn from that document pertain in part to the relative effectiveness of various emergency response strategies.

NUREG/CR-ll31 itself contains a more elaborate treatment of the relative effectiveness' issue.

Our approach is similar in principle to.that of

' NUREG/CR-ll31, except that we do not present estimates of actual radiation doses or the number of people suffering adverse health effects. Thus, our analysis is strictly confined to the issue of relative effectiveness. In addition, some details of our analytic approach differ from those of NUREG/CR-1131, as explained later in this testimony.

Q. What are the major elements of your analysis?

A. (All) First, we identify a set of emergency response strategies which collectively represent the spectrum of sheltering and evacuation actions potentially available to the beach. populations. Second, we select parameters which represent the potential application of these strategies.

Third, we select, following NUREG/CR-1131, a set of parameter combinations to represent the spectrum of potential accidents at the Seabrook plant. Fourth, we estimate, in part using the MACCS computer program, the relative effectiveness of each emergency response strategy.

VIII. EMERGENCY RESPONSE STRATEGIES Q. please outline the set of emergency response strategies which you have identified.

A. (All) We have identified four evacuation strategies and four she,1tering strategies. Collectively, these represent the spectrum of sheltering and evacuation actions which might in principle be available to protect the general' beach population.__

Of the four evacuation strategies, the.first (El) 1 represents evacuation performed without benefit of prior planning. The second (E2) corresponds to the evacuation-currently envisioned in the SPMC. The tinrd (E3) respresents evacuation conducted with a rapidity typical of that anticipated at a generic plant site. The fourth (E4) represents evacuation situations in which plume arrival overlaps evacuation but there is no entrapment of the population. These strategies are hereafter referred to as

" unplanned evacuation," "SPMC evacuation," " generic evacuation and " generic evacuation with difficulties", respectively.

The SpMC does not contemplate the possibility of sheltering j the general beach population. Thus, our first sheltering strategy (S1) represents sheltering carried out without benefit of prior planning; we hereafter refer to this as "ad hoc ,

i shelter." Our second sheltering strategy (S2) represents a type of sheltering which might be contemplated if the SPMC were !

modified to provide for implementing this kind of response.

Since much of the currently available shelter space at beach areas is in wood-frame buildings without basements, we ;

hereafter refer to this strategy as " shelter equivalent to wood frame buildings without basements." Some of the buildings in

the-beach area are so insubstantial that they do not meet the specifications we have assumed for this str*tegy.

a Our third and-fourth sheltering strategies may be considered the

" generic" sheltering strategies. The third strategy (S3)

~

represents the degree of sheltering which is achievable in the

basements of typical houses in the. Northeast region including much residential housing in the Massachusetts EPZ. Hereafter, we refer to this as our "she]t - equivalent to wood frame buildings with basements" stta egy. Our fourth strategy.(S4) represents a better quality of yaelter, achievable in medium-sized-office apartment or industrial buildings of masonry construction. This strategy is hereafter referred to as the " good shelter" case.

Q. Are all these options available to the beach population?

A. (All) Clearly, the El and E2 strategies are readily available. Also, existing structures would allow the S1 and S2 strategies to be available to at least a large part of the general beach population. Execution of the S2 strategy would require a substantial advance planning effort. The remaining strategies would only be available at the beaches if additional preparations were made.

Preparation for implementing strategies equivalent to E3 and E4 would involve increasing the mobility of the beach population. Increased mobility could be achieved through measures such as the building of new roads, or by limiting the l number of people who are permitted to visit the beaches. It is i

~ il not our purpose here to propose or to assess the merits of any i particular measure for achieving faster evacuation but simply l

to compare the relative effectiveness of various potential '

strategies.

The S3 and S4 strategies could be made available by the

construction of special-purpose shelters or the improvement of existing structures. Alternatively, access to the beach could be limited so that the beach population never exceeded the capacity of existing shelter space in the relevant category.

Q. Why did you include in-your analysis protective strategies not readily'available to the beach population?

A. We included these strategies partly in response to FEMA's analysis of the adequacy of the NHRERp's provisions for the beach population. FEMA's conclusion that the NHRERp's provisionc for the beach population are " adequate in concept" (FEMA Testimony at p. 8) was based on a generic assessment of the relative dose savings to be achieved from evacuation and sheltering in the evont of a serious accident, and not on any site-specific analysis of the situation at the Seabrook site.A# One of the purposes of our testimony is to j demonstrate that this generic analysis is not applicable to the Seabrook site. By introducing the E3 and E4 cases, we are able to show how generic evacuations differ from evacuations at the Seabrook site. The E4 case, although it accounts for 1

2/ Tr. at 14192-14193; 14230; 14233; 14250.

I

. o difficulties which might be experienced during evacuation, nevertheless represents a faster rate of evacuation than is envisioned for the Seabrook beach population.

Similarly, the S3 strategy represents sheltering of a type which could readily be achieved at a " generic" site in this

~

Northeast region where, according to 1970 U.S. census data, 87%

of the year-round housing units have basements.A# By contrast, the S1 and S2 strategies, which employ shelters of a type currently available in the beach area near Seabrook, ,

i provide the sheltered population even less shielding from I

radiation than Aldrich at al. have assumed would be provided to populations at other nuclear power plant sites even if nn protective actions were recommended.A# Thus one objective was to demonstrate that generic analyses can generate erroneous conclusions for Seabrook. A second objective was to draw attention to broader possibilities for emergency planning at this site. Given the difficulties with the Seabrook site, the emergency planners have taken too narrow an approach by not evaluating the feasibility and cost effectiveness of a variety of measures for lowering risks by increasing mobility or improving access to shelters.

Q. Please describe how you have selected parameters to describe the four evacuation strategies.

2/ D.C. Aldrich at al., Public Protection Stratecies for Potential Nuclear Reactor Accidents: Shelterina Concepts with Existina Public and Private Structures, Sandia National Laboratory, SAND 77-1725, February 1978 [ hereinafter "Aldrich at al., SAND 77-1725"].

1/ D.C. Aldrich at al., SAND 77-1725 at 14.

3

a

~

A. (All) The most important parameter here is the evacuation time. For the E2 case, we use times estimated by Dr. Thomas Adler, l'

using methods described by him in separate testimony in this proceeding. (Eng Testimony of Adler, dated February 21, 1989)

Adler's calculations indicate that 4000 to 5000 vehicles will leave (

. i

the beach area in an initial relatively rapid movement, before traffic jams become established. We assume that half of these vehicles belong to residents, while the remaining half belong to members of the beach population.

The characterization of an " unplanned evacuation" (strategy El) l is necessarily speculative. Two considerations are noteworthy for the case of Seabrook. The first concerns the efficiency of notification. Because the evacuation network in the beach areas freezes into traffic jams very quickly (see Adler Testimony in the NHRERP hearings), delays in notifying even a substantial portion of the beach population will have negligible effect on the evacuation times. The second consideration is planning for enhancing traffic flow. Here the major proposal in the NHRERP is a capacity-enhancing traffic control point (TCP) at the junction of I-95 and Route 51.

[Adler, April 25 Testimony), and the major proposals in the SPMC are two traffic control positions Salisbury and Amesbury. We have based our estimated times on two runs by Adler (February 21 Testimony] using stipulations to contentions JI-l and JI-2; one run with staffing for the TCPs; the other without.

l The E3 case represents evacuation with a rapidity typical of a 1 generic nuclear plant site. As indicated above, such a site would have a very small population within 2-3 miles. Thus, the evacuation time will reflect only the time required to notify people, and the time required for vehicles to leave the affected area.

In some' instances, evacuation times will be prolonged by factors such.as a high population density. Our E4 case represents evacuation where such factors are operative -- hence our use of the designation " generic evacuation with difficulties." In

~

selecting an evacuation time for strategy E4, we were guided by

evacuation time estimates made for several nuclear plant sites with a high density surrounding population. For most sites, it is estimated that the population within two miles could be evacuated out to ten miles within two hours. Of these fourteen sites, the San Onofre site provides a pertinent comparison with Seabrook, in that people frequent the beach near the San Onofre plant on summer weekends. Evacuation time estimates by Wilbur Smith and Associates indicate that the summer weekend population.

within 2 miles of San Onofre can be completely evacuated in 2.25 hours2.893519e-4 days 0.00694 hours 4.133598e-5 weeks 9.5125e-6 months , while the population within 5 miles can be completely evacuated in 3.50 hours5.787037e-4 days 0.0139 hours 8.267196e-5 weeks 1.9025e-5 months , assuming a balanced North-South routing of evacuees.E# presumably it would take less time for an evacuation just to three miles.

An important point to note about our E4 case is that it reflects an overlap of evacuation with plume passage, but without entrapment of the evacuating population. Such a situation could easily arise at a typical site where factors 5/ Wilbur Smith and Associates, Analysis of Time Recuired to l

Evacuate Transient and Permanent Population From Various Areas Within the Plume Ercosure Pathway Emeroency Plannina Zone: San Onofre Nuclear Generatino Station, November 1985.

7mm- - -- , q

.C .. I hindering evacuation are operative or where evacuation orders are delayed. We have chosen evacuation times which illustrate l the resulting effects.

l l

Q. What are the conventions associated with.your selection

~

of evacuat on times? $

A. (All) First, we selected evacuation times both for the 50th percentile and for the 90th percentile members of the beach population. In this instance, the 50th percentile member is that person who, when successfully evacuated, has been preceded by 50 percent of the initial beach population.

Likewise, the 90th percentile member is that person-who, when successfully evacuated, has been preceded by 90 percent of the initial beach population.

Second, we have defined " successful evacuation" as departure from the beach area or, more precisely, as moving beyond a 3-mile radius from the.Seabrook plant. We chose a 3-mile radius because for most accident sequences that encompasses the area wherein people are at greatest risk of receiving doses that could result in early fatalities and severe health effects. (Sag, e.g., NUREG-1210, Vol. 4, at pp.

12-14, 28, 41). In fact, the generic protective action strategy that is advocated in NUREG-1210 (within 3 miles of the j plant: early evacuation; beyond 3 miles: sheltering and selective expeditious evacuation after monitoring to locate hotspots) is based on their conclusion that "even for the worst possible accident, virtually all early fatalities can be

prcvented if tho area near the plant (2 to 3 miles) is evacuated before or shortly after a release . . . .

"E' The three mile radius includes roughly a third of Salisbury beach.

Adler's February 21 testimony provides time for clearing the l entire Sallsbury beach area as well. These times are longer l

- 1 for the SpMC evacuation, though, curiously, shorter for the j

" unplanned" evacuation.

I Third, our selected evacuation times begin at the time when J plant conditions yield a signal that a release is imminent.

This point precedes the commencement of the release by a time interval hereafter designated as the " warning time." With this convention, the term " evacuation time" actually covers a number of sequential actions. It includes sequential time intervals during which utility officials notify state authorities, those authorities make the decision to evacuate, notification of the beach population occurs, and that population moves to its 3 vehicles. Throughout this testimony, for both evacuation and sheltering cases, a composite notification time of 0.5 hours5.787037e-5 days 0.00139 hours 8.267196e-6 weeks 1.9025e-6 months is assumed. That is, the sequence of emergency response actions

(

taken by a member of the public is assumed to begin at a point 0.5 hours5.787037e-5 days 0.00139 hours 8.267196e-6 weeks 1.9025e-6 months after the release is known to be imminent.

l Q. What evacuation times do you use?

A. (All) For the E2 ("SpMC evacuation") case, we use evacuation times of 3.75 hours8.680556e-4 days 0.0208 hours 1.240079e-4 weeks 2.85375e-5 months and 6.0 hours0 days 0 hours 0 weeks 0 months for the 50th l

l percentile and 90th percentile population members, respectively. In the El (" unplanned evacuation") case, we use evacuation times of 4.25 hours2.893519e-4 days 0.00694 hours 4.133598e-5 weeks 9.5125e-6 months and 6.75 hours8.680556e-4 days 0.0208 hours 1.240079e-4 weeks 2.85375e-5 months for these two 5/ NUREG-1210, Vol. 4, at 41.

?

population members. For-the E3 (" generic evacuation") case we use evacuation times of 0.9 and 1.4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months , while for the E4

(" generic evacuation with difficulties") case, we use j i

evacuation times of 1.5 and 2.5 hours5.787037e-5 days 0.00139 hours 8.267196e-6 weeks 1.9025e-6 months , based on an assumed )

i clearance Time of 2 hours2.314815e-5 days 5.555556e-4 hours 3.306878e-6 weeks 7.61e-7 months after notification. l I

. Q. What assumptions do you make about radiation exposure during evacuation?

A. (All) We assume that people are located inside cars ,

with the windows open. (We assume windows are open because on a hot. summer beach' day it is highly unlikely that people could stay in their cars.for any reasonable length of time with the windows closed and the use of air-conditioning systems under the evacuation conditions expected in the Seabrook beach area may cause cars to overheat.) A shielding factor of 1.0 is assumed for exposure to the radioactive cloud and 0.7 is assumed for exposure to contaminated ground. In addition, we account for deposition of radioactivity on the outer and inner surfaces of each car and on the people inside each car. This is done by increasing the effective shielding factor for !

exposure to contaminated ground from 0.7 to 1.0. Appendix A provides a technical justification for these factors.

Q. Please describe how you have selected parameters to i describe the four sheltering strategies. !

A. (All) For our illustrative analysis, four parameters are important: the time it takes people to get into shelters; the quality of the shelter; the time during which sheltering occurs; and the time required for successful subsequent evacuation.

{- i

1 As our testimony evaluating the NHRERp's provisions for sheltering indicates, without any plans in place for 1

implementing a shelter strategy in the beach area the task of getting people into shelter could be a considerable problem at the Seabrook sits.7# Our S1 ("ad hoc shelter") case assumes

that people are still in the open, seeking shelter, at times when the radioactive plume may have arrived. In our remaining three sheltering cases, it is assumed that the relevant population is sheltered prior to plume arrival. It will be noted that' careful planning would be necessary to achieve that result, and we do not imply that such planning would necessarily be successful.

l Earlier in this testimony we have outlined the types of l l

shelter which would characterize each sheltering strategy. Our choice of specific parameters to describe those shelter types is described later.

For all four sheltering cases, we assume that a portion of the population who are instructed to shelter will instead choose to evacuate. These evacuees, who do not shelter, are assumed to account for 50 percent of the resident and employee population within the EpZ, together with 25 percent of the beach population. We further assume that people who do shelter will be instructed to leave shelter only after the roads have cleared of the initial evacuees. Based on Adler's testimony, 2/ See Testimony of Goble, Renn, Eckert and Evdokimoff, dated April 25, 1988.

I

we assuma'that the roads will be cleared of the initial evacuees within 3.25-hours. Allowing 0.5 hours5.787037e-5 days 0.00139 hours 8.267196e-6 weeks 1.9025e-6 months for'this ;

information to be communicated to the sheltering population, this means that everyone in shelter (from the remaining-resident p'opulation in the beach area and the remaining beach

population) is assumed to leave shelter at a point 3.75 hours8.680556e-4 days 0.0208 hours 1.240079e-4 weeks 2.85375e-5 months !

after a. release is known to be imminent.

We assume'that post-sheltering evacuation will be j qualitatively similar to a direct evacuation, except that the ,

evacuating population will be smaller (since an initial group is assumed to evacuate instead of seeking shelter). In selecting post-sheltering evacuation times, we employ Adler's calculations, adjusted for the smaller population. This approach ignores any special behavioral effects which might arise as populations evacuate areas known to be contaminated.

In introducing the S3 and S4 strategies, we pointed out that sheltering of this quality might be obtainable at Seabrook if access to the beach were limited so that the beach population never exceeded the capacity of existing space in the relevant category. If such an approach were taken, the I post-sheltering evacuation times would be smaller than assumed here. This point could be pursued through further analysis if l appropriate.

Q. What conventions do you employ in describing the sheltering strategies? i A. (All) As with the evacuation strategies, we selected I

sheltering and evacuation times for the 50th percentile and I

f 90th_ percentile members of the initial beach population, as previously dpfined. Here also, " successful evacuation" is defined as moving beyond a 3-mile radius from the Seabrook plant.

As mentioned above, our sheltering cases assume that 25 percent of the beach population will evacuate immediately, without seeking shelter. In some instances, people in this group will accrue greater radiation doses than many in the sheltering population. The capturing of this effect would require a more elaborate analysis than we have conducted so far, and would involve ranking the beach population by dose rather than by precedence in achieving successful evacuation.

We do not expect that such an analysis would lead to change in our overall conclusions.

As for evacuation, the time at which sheltering sequences commence is defined here as the point when plant conditions signal that a release is imminent, a point which precedes commencement of the release by a time interval known as

" warning time." However, unlike evacuation strategies, sheltering strategies involve three phases: the time interval during which shelter is sought; the sheltering interval; and the subsequent evacuation interval.

Q. What time intervals did you select?

A. (All). As mentioned earlier, we assumed that, in the S2, S3 and S4 cases, people reach shelter before the plume arrives. In these cases, the pre-sheltering interval is thus effectively zero.

r - , -

For the-S1 case our assumptions are based on our analyses of the situation at Hampton Beach. The results will apply only qualifications to Salisbury Beach. We assume that the 50th percentile person will enter shelters after 1.4 hours4.62963e-5 days 0.00111 hours 6.613757e-6 weeks 1.522e-6 months , while the 90th percentile person enters shelter after 3.1 hours1.157407e-5 days 2.777778e-4 hours 1.653439e-6 weeks 3.805e-7 months .

These times are derived by adding a 0.5 hour5.787037e-5 days 0.00139 hours 8.267196e-6 weeks 1.9025e-6 months notification interval to time estimates made by Ortwin Renn in testimony before this Board.E#

As mentioned above, for each sheltering strategy we assume that people begin post-sheltering evacuation at a point 3.75 hours8.680556e-4 days 0.0208 hours 1.240079e-4 weeks 2.85375e-5 months after a release is known to be imminent. For the S2, S3, and S4 cases, we select post-sheltering evacuation times of 2.0 hours0 days 0 hours 0 weeks 0 months and 4.0 hours0 days 0 hours 0 weeks 0 months for the 50th percentile and 90th percentile person, respectively. In the S1 case, we are interested in the averaae post-sheltering evacuation time, which we assume to be 3.0 hours0 days 0 hours 0 weeks 0 months . The 50th percentile and 90th percentile persons are distinguished under the S1 strategy by the difference in their pre-sheltering intervals.

Q. What shielding factors did you select to represent shelter quality? !

A. (All) For sheltering in the S1 and S2 cases, we were guided by the SPMC, whose decision criteria for sheltering assume a shielding factor of 0.9 for cloud shielding, and 2 air H/ See Testimony of Goble, Renn, Eckert and Evdokimoff, dated April 25, 1988. At page 78, a median estimate of 2.6 hours6.944444e-5 days 0.00167 hours 9.920635e-6 weeks 2.283e-6 months is shown for the pre-shelter interval for the 90th percentile person.

Under cross-examination on May 9, 1988 (see Transcript, page 11108), Renn estimated the pre-shelter interval for the 50th percentile person at 55-60 minutes. We assume an interval of 0.9 hours1.041667e-4 days 0.0025 hours 1.488095e-5 weeks 3.4245e-6 months for this person.

i

\

changes per hour. For a structure of this kind, an appropriate l

shielding factor for radionuclides deposited on the ground is 0.5.E# In the S1 case, it is also necessary to account for deposition of radioactive material on people who are exposed to theplume)"riortoenteringshelter. We account for this by

increasing the ground shielding factor in proportion to the ;

i fraction of the duration of plume passage during which the person is exposed prior to sheltering, up to a maximum ground shielding factor of 0.8. Appendix A provides supporting information.

As mentioned above, the S3 strategy is equivalent to sheltering in the basements of typical New England houses. For this type of shelter, cloud and ground shielding factors of 0.5 and 0.08, respectively, are appropriate.1E# We assume 1 air change per hour.

The S4 strategy is equivalent to sheltering in a medium-sized office apartment or industrial building. Here, clotid and ground shielding f actors of 0.2 and 0.02, j respectively, are typical.11' We assume 0.5 air changes per hour.

Q. What assumptions do you make about radiation exposure' prior to sheltering and during post-shelter evacuation?

1/ Aldrich et al., SAND 77-1725, Tables 1 and 2. We use values from the upper end of the range reported in Table 2.

1H/ Aldrich at al, SAND 77-175, Tables 1 and 2.

11/ Aldrich at al, SAND 77-175, Tables 1 and 2.

A. (All) The S1 case is the only one in'which pre-sheltering radiation exposure must be considered. Here, we assume a cloud shielding factor of 1.0 and a ground shielding factor of 1.0. The latter factor reflects the deposition of radioactivity on exposed people. For post-sheltering

.. evacuation under case S1, we also assume a cloud shielding factor of'l.0, but assume a variable ground shielding' factor.

To account for deposition both on cars and on people, we assume that the ground shielding factor ranges from 0.9 to 1.2, in proportion to the fraction of the duration of plume passage during which the person is exposed prior to sheltering. For j post-sheltering evacuation in the S2, S3 and S4 cases, we assume a shielding factor of 1.0 for exposure to the i radioactive cloud. However, we employ an effective shielding factor for exposure to contaminated ground of 0.9, instead of the factor of 1.0 used in the direct evacuation case. The difference is based on our expectation that less radioactivity will be deposited on the skin. Appendix A provides a justification for this assumption.

Q. please summarize the parameters selected for each strategy.

A. (All) Table 1 shows the exposure times selected for each strategy, while Table 2 shows the shielding factors.

Tables 1-3 now completely characterize the eight emergency response strategies.

Q. How do you analyze the relationship between air change in buildings and inhalation exposure?

-_ - - _ _ _ __ _____-_-_-_- __ _ _ _ _ _ _ A

A.- (Goble) We have assumed continuous exchange of indoor air with'ait outside and have compared the average concentration indoors with the concentration outdoors assuming the outdoor concentration is constant for the duration of the release (as specified for each accident category in WASH-1400, Table VI-

2-1) . The indoor average is calculated only for the period of plume passage except that, in agreement with the NHRERP, we use the 1-hour average for releases of less than an hour duration.

We do not assume that the building provides any filtering. The values we have used for various durations of release and air exchange rates are shown in Table 3.

Q. How did you select parameters to represent a range of accident conditions?

A. (All) In the spirit of NUREG/CR-ll31, we selected the parameters estimated in WASH-1400 for the accident release categories PWR 1 through PWR 9. These release categories encompass the spectrum of potential accidents. WASH-1400, Appendix VI, Table VI 2-1 provides a complete characterization of these release categories, including their estimated probabilities of occurrence.

We actually go beyond NUREG/CR-ll31, in that the more limited set of release categories PWR1 through PWR5 was used in NUREG/CR-1131 as a basis for comparative analysis of the effectiveness of emergency response strategies. Through its reference to that analysis, and through presentation of results from related analyses, NUREG-0396 clearly regards these five release categories as playing an important role in defining the

emergency planning basis. However, our points are made even-more forcefuJ1y by considering the entire spectrum of potential accidents.

Q. Do you endorse the WASH-1400 estimates of the probability and other characteristics of severe core' damage accidents?

A. (All) Not necessarily. Our purpose here is to create an analogue to the analytic procedure which underlies NUREG/CR-1131 and, through its reference to that document, NUREG-0396.

Q. please explain the relationship between accident release characteristics and the effectiveness of precautionary emergency responses.

A. (All) The " warning time", as defined above, provides a time interval during which emergency responses can be initiated. If the warning time is long enough, it may be possible to evacuate people before they are exposed to the radioactive piume, with an obvious public health advantage.

Q. How have you handled the issue of warning time?

A. (All) Following the planning basis in NUREG-0396, we have analyzed the relative effectiveness of emergency response strategies across the range of release categories PWR1 through i

PWR9. The warning times for these release categories are provided by WASH-1400.

IX. ANALYTIC FINDINGS Q. Please outline the analytic procedure you employ to assess the relative effectiveness of emergency response strategies.

A. (All) Wo use.three measures of relative effectiveness.

L First, we use the total exposure of a relevant individual over the time interval until successful evacuation is completed, i

relative to the exposure of the 50th percentile individual in the "unplaRhed evacuation" (El) case. Here, " exposure" is physically equivalent to the collective dose to the red bone marrow of the exposed population, which is in turn similar to the collective whole body dose.

Second, we use the probability of an individual suffering early death, again relative to the 50th percentile individual in the " unplanned evacuation" (El) case. Finally, we use the probability of an individual suffering prodromal vomiting, relative to the same 50th percentile individual.

i A single measure of effectiveness such as " dose savings" is not adequate to characterize emergency preparedness. That is because the goals of emergency planning include the avoidance of early death and injuries (see our discussin in Section IV) as well as dose reduction, and those early health effects have thresholds. A protective response strategy that is primarily directed toward reducing the aggregate dose to a large population (such as the ordering of a prompt evacuation over'a large region) might be quite ineffective at preventing injuries and deaths to a population close to the plant. We, therefore, consider dose reduction, reduction in the number of deaths, and reduction in one representative early injury to be three independent measures for judging the effectiveness of a response.

~

For~eachl ofLthe release categories PWR 1 through PWR 9, we estimate-the radiation exposure and the probabilities of early health effects for each emergency response strategy, both for the 50th. percentile and 90th percentile individuals. We use the MACCS computer code for this. purpose, assuming a wind-speed of 12' miles per hour (20 km/hr) and Class C (moderately unstable) stability. These meteorological conditions are intended as representative fair weather conditions. They are neither favorable conditions for emergency response, nor are they " worst case" conditions. They are conditions under which the model can be expected to function reasonably well.

These results are combined over the release categories PWR 1 through PWR 9 by weignted averaging, where the weights correspond to the probabilities of occurrence of each release category, as estimated in WASH-1400. In this respect, we employ a more sophisticated procedure than NUREG/CR-ll31, which merely combines the release categories.into one composite i

category. Our procedure provides an analytic base for ascertaining the effect of uncertainty, since accidents together with the effect of each response strategy contribute according to their probability.

)

Q. Please summarize your results.

A. (All) Tables 4 through 6 and Figures 1 through 3

]

summarize the results of our assessment. Because of the late timing of the stipulation on ETEs, some of these numbers are interpolations from our sensitivity runs. These numbers )

presently appearing in the Tables, should be accurate to within I a few percent.

l h-_______--_____..___ _A ______-_______u-.

I I

.- . J Our interpretation of tho' summarized results depends onitwo' e sets of' observations: one is the. relative magnitude of the' i, Lr j

entries in the tables; the second is the sensitivity of these; h entries ~to particular' assumptions in the modeling.

The mighitudes in.the tables and figures show:- 1) The "SpMC evacuation"-(E2) case is only marginally more effective-than is the " unplanned evacuation" (El) case according'to all three measures of effectiveness; 2) The " generic evacuation"-

-(E3) and the S3 and 54 sheltering cases are substantially more effective than either the El or the E2 cases. Thus, protective responses which are available at most nuclear power plant sites provide significant reduction in exposure to radiation and in early deaths and injuries as compared with emergency responses envisioned for Seabrook; 3) The E4 and S2 (shelter equivalent' to wood frame buildings without basements) cases appear to have some significant effectiveness, with E4 appearing generally better according to these measures; 4) The "ad hoc shelter" (S1) case is not an effective response.

The quoted results are potentially sensitive to a wide range of uncertainties in the modeling, including details of accident characteristics and meteorological conditions. Of most interest in interpreting the results are the effects of possible variation in warning times and duration of release.

The results for the El and E2 cases are quite insensitive to moderate changes in warning time and duration of release. The three sheltering cases, S2, S3 and S4 are insensitive to warning time, until it becomes short enough that a significant fraction of the population remains outdoors at the time of

'l

plumn arrival.>.The effectiveness of shaltering, especially.

poor _ sheltering, decreases moderately with increased duration e .,

of release, because' larger inhalation exposures may be anticipated. The~E4 case is most sensitive to changes'in warning tiWes and duration of release (since it represents an evacuation.which overlaps with plume passage, but does not have, a trapped population).

Increases in warning time and_ release.

duration-provide substantial increases in effectiveness, a decrease in warning time reduces the effectiveness.

These results lead directly to conclusions both about generic emergency response and about the SpMC plans for Seabrook. First of all, our analysis _ confirms the. generic argument presented in NUREG 1210 and elsewhere that evacuation is generally to be preferred in severe nuclear accidents.

Response strategy E3 is better than any of the sheltering strategies. When evacuation is somewhat delayed, however, as in response strategy E4, the difference between evacuation and good sheltering is not totally clear cut; however, both strategies accomplish considerable savings in doses and early deaths _and injuries. One could argue that given the substantial uncertainties, it is plausible in such a' situation to try to complete an evacuation as quickly as possible. It is based on such analyses that planners who have not made a detailed analysis of the situation at Seabrook sometimes conclude that the best thing to do in a severe accident is get the people out of there.

l l

1 I

o .

The situation at Seabrook under the SPMC plan is quite different. pur results show with reasonable robustness that:

i

1) As a response to the spectrum of potential accidents, including those used in the NRC planning basis, the SPMC appears to be only marginally more effect!Je in reducing exposures and early health effects for the transient beach population within 3 miles than an unplanned evacuation. The

~

SPMC wil1 actually increase exposures for beach visitors further out on Salisbury Beach since the beach clears more rapidly in the unplanned case than in the SPMC evacuation. The situation would be characterized by " entrapment" of the population, exposing them potentially to the major portion of the release while they are immobile and without shelter; 2) The relative effectiveness of the SPMC is much poorer for the spectrum of accidents than the effectiveness expected for emergency response at most nuclear power plant sites where sheltering and more rapid evacuation are provided; 3) Even with poor sheltering capability, there are clear potential benefits to be obtained from a shelter first, evacuate later strategy. These benefits derive from three factors: i) the modest shielding the shelters provide against cloud exposure and the somewhat larger protection provided against inhalation during plume passage when the individual would otherwise be essentially unprotected; ii) the avoidance of a significant portion of skin deposition; iii) significantly reduced exposures to groundshine. Our analysis is not adequate to fully quantify the benefits of such a strategy in the absence of information about the range of sheltering available and l

possibilities for. directing traffic away from' heavily contaminated areas. Howeveri in view of the ineffectiveness of

'the SpMC response strategy, it is clear that a full evaluation of such strategies is called for, and that New Hampshire Yankee has no bas [I for rejecting these possibilities in the SpMC.

It is important to bear in mind that these strategies require a substantial planning effort. The bad results of the Ad Hoc sheltering example illustrate the kind of harm that can result from trying to implement such a strategy without thorough planning. Necessary to such an effort are reliable surveys of shelter availability and characteristics and a detailed analysis of problems to be anticipated in implementation, possible solutions to those problems, and estimates of the times required for people to reach adequate shelter. Little or none of this analytic work has been performed.

X. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE RESIDENT POPULATION Q. What new considerations would enter into an analysis of the problems of emergency planning for the Massachusetts i

residents near Seabrook.

A. (All) protecting the resident population near the reactor site poses a different though related set of emergency planning problems. Residents are present whether or not the beaches are heavily loaded so evacuation times can vary significantly for them. They generlly have immediate access to shelter which in many cases is substantially better than the 1

shelter available to people on the beach. The SPMC and NHRERP are organized to make it likely that a protecive action recommendation for a beach closing - in effect an order to evacuate the beaches - would be made with no simultaneous protective' Recommendation for the resident population.

Q. Can you draw conclusions from your analysis about the effectiveness of the SPMC in protecting Massachusetts residents near Seabrook?

A. We have four observations:

1. The structure of recommendations leading to beach closings needs re-examination; at the time beaches are closed, residents need to be told something, if only to be given a reason why they will be safer if they wait to evacuate at the same time that people on the beach need to evacuate.

2. A detailed comparison of protective response strategies for residents along the lines of'our analysis of the beach population is needed. The analysis should take into f account differing levels of beach occupancy with the

{

corresponding differences in evacuation times, and should attempt to develop integrated strategies, which coordinate what is recommended to the residents with what is going on with the beach populations. The analysis should also be based on a good study of the availability of shelters.

l 3. When a large beach population is present, our 1

analysis of the three sheltering strategies and especially S3 makes it quite clear that there are large potential benefits to be derived from such a strategy for Massachusetts residents, l

1

1 l

who would otherwise be locked in the traffic jam caused by evacuating beach visitors.

4. Under the present SPMC decision criteria, nearby 1

residents are not offered these benefits. The immediate decisionchiteriabasedonradiationmonitorsautomatically recommend evacuation when large amounts of radiation are present. And the protective action recommendation worksheet (IP 2.5 attachment 3) does not P3e realistic shielding factors for New England homes, and does not give credit for the projections against groundshine afforded by sheltering.

To summarize: it is likely that the conclusions from our analysis of the effectiveness of the plans for the summer beach population apply even more strongly to the nearby resident population at times of high beach occupancy.

XI. ASSESSMENT OF THE SPMC Q. Please summarize your overall assessment of the SPMC.

A. (All) In section IV of our testimony we enumerated four guidelines drawn from NUREG 0654 for evaluating emergency plans. We summarize our observations under each of these guidelines:

Excected performance of the olans. When a large beach population is present, the plans offer very little protection to the thousands of people who would be exposed to threat of radiation-induced death and injury that can be anticipated from a severe nuclear accident at Seabrook.

l l

1

Relative effectiveness of the SPMC olannino strateay. The q protection offered by this plan to the beach population is very little better than that offered by an unplanned evacuation and for portions of Salisbury Beach it is actually worse. It is noticeably'Iess effective than the protection that could be expected from a shelter first evacuate later strategy. And it is far less effective than the protection expected at a generic reactor site. Similar conclusions probably hold even more strongly for the nearby resident population at times when there is a large beach population present.

Scooe of the olans. The plans fail to consider or to offer a full range of response strategies, particularly strategies involving sheltering. They do not adequately cover the full spectrum of accidents in the planning basis, particularly large early accidents (the decision criteria, for example, neglect groundshine). They do not focus on the specific emergency planning problems at the Seabrook site.

Quality of the olannina effort. There has been no modeling or other comparative evaluation of response strategies. There is little reliable data on shelter capacity and characteristics. There has been no study of the feasibility and problems of implementing sheltering and no estimates of times for implementation. The decision criteria are defective. New Hampshire Yankee has not sought a public review of the SpMC to discover problems before requesting an operating license.

1 1

This planning effort does not provide reasonable assurance i

that adequat,e protective measures will be taken in the event of '

L a nuclear accident at Seabrook.

L Q. Is there anything else you.wish~to add 7 A. (kil) We would like to make one final observation

. based on our years of work in the fields,of energy policy and the management of hazards of technology. In addition to the potential harm done to the people near Seabrook if these plans are approved, there may be broader consequences as well. The quality of emergency planning at other reactor sites may well deteriorate if an "anything goes" attitude is sanctioned. And public confidence in nuclear power, already seriously eroded, will be further damaged.

i

_- _-_____ _ -__ _ _ _ ~

t s' s i

. TABLE 1 j 1

POTENTIAL EXPOSURE TIMES FOR EACH STRATEGY TIME IN THE j OPEN BEFORE

. TIME IN TIME ON SHELTERING SHELTERL THE ROAD 1

STRATEGY (hours) (hours) (hours)

(A) Evacuation Stratecies El.' Unplanned Evacuation 0, 0 0, 0 4.25, 7.25 E2. SPMC Evacuation 0, 0 0, 0 3.75, 6.5 E3. Generic-Evacuation 0, 0 0, 0 0.9 , 1.4 E4 Generic Evacuation with Difficulties 0, 0 0, 0 1.5 , 2.5

'(B) Shelterina-Stratecies S1. Ad Hoc Shelter 1.4, 3.1 2.95, 1.55 3.0., 3.0 S2. Shelter Equivalent to Wood Frame 0, 0 3.75, 3.75 2.0 , 4.0 Buildings Without Basements S3. Shelter Equivalent 0, 0 3.75, 3.75 2.0 , 4.0 to Wood Frame Buildings With Basements S4.. Good Shelter 0, 0 3.75, 4.25 2.0 , 4.0 NOTES:

1. The. entries x, y indicate times for the 50th percentile and 90th percentile population members, respectively.

2. Sequences of protective action begin when plant conditions l signal that a release is imminent. The three time periods shown across each row are consecutive.

3. " Time on the road" terminates when people move beyond a 3-mile radius from the Seabrook Plant.

No O. o. . . . .

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. TABLE 3 FRACTION OF EXTERNAL INHALATION EXPOSUBE THAT WOQLD OCCUR INDOORS

~ Number Of Air Chances Per Hour Durati.an_of Release 2 1 .5

.5 hour5.787037e-5 days 0.00139 hours 8.267196e-6 weeks 1.9025e-6 months .5 .35 .22 1.5 hours5.787037e-5 days 0.00139 hours 8.267196e-6 weeks 1.9025e-6 months .65 .45 .29 3.0 hours0 days 0 hours 0 weeks 0 months .85 .65 .45 4.0 hours0 days 0 hours 0 weeks 0 months .9 .75 .55 l

i.

. TABLE 4 I

RELATIVE' EXPOSURE FOR EACH STRATEGY 50th PERCENTILE 90th PERCENTILE EIRAIEGX PERSON PERSDN (A) Evacuation Strateaies El. Unplanned Evacuation 1.0 1.24.

E2. NHRERP Evacuation 0.95 1.16 E3. Generic Evacuation 0 0.33 E4. Generic Evacuation 0.46 0.70 With Difficulties (B) Shelterina Strateales Sl. Ad. Hoc Shelter 0.97 1.43 S2. -Shelter Equivalent to 0.71 0.88 )

Wood Frame. Buildings Without Basements S3. Shelter Equivalent to 0.49 0.66 Wood Frame Buildings With Basements

54. Good Shelter 0.38 0.55 NOTES:

1. The entry for the 50th percentile person for the " Unplanned Evacuation" strategy is arbitrarily set at unity.

2. Here, " exposure" is physically equivalent to red marrow dose.

)

l

l Figure 1: Relative Effectiveness of Response in Reducing Expected Doses 2

8 8

E 2

1- E Dose 90%ile k E Dose 50 %ile 0 i i i i i E1 E2 E3 E4 S1 S2 S3 S4 STRATEGY (See text for description)

3

~. TABLE 5 RELATIVE PROBABILITY OF EARLY DEATH FOR EACH STRATEGY-

=

50th-PERCENTILE 90th PERCENTILE fiTRATEGY. PERSON PERSON (A) EyAcuation Stratecies El. Unplanned Evacuation 1.0 6.55 E2. NHRERP Evacuation 0.84

'3.45 E3. Generic Evacuation 0 0.0005 E4. Generic Evacuation 0.004 0.27 With Difficulties (B) Sheltering Strate 2i21-S1. Ad Hoc Shelter 1.26 47.1 S2. Shelter Equivalent to 0.09 1.76 Wood Frame Buildings Without Basements S3. Shelter Equivalent to 0 0.042 Wood Frame Buildings With Basements S4. Good Shelter 0 0.013 NOTE:

The entry for the.50th percentile person for the " Unplanned Evacuation" strategy is arbitrarily set at unity.

Figure 2:

, Relative Effectiveness of Response in Reducing Early Deaths 10 5 8 E

o b

E Lu g 6 E 90 %ile

@ E 50 %ile 2

E 4 2

=

2 e

2 0 i i i i i i i E1 E2 E3 E4 S1 S2 S3 S4 STRATEGY (See Text for Description) l l

l

1 )

y ~; TABLE'6

-RELATIVE PROBABILITY'OF PRODROMAL VOMITING FQL EACH STRATE.GX 50th-PERCENTILE 90th PERCENTILE STRATEGX _EERSON _ EERS.ON '

(A) EYitcuatioJ1_ Sir _a_t;_02iR9.

E1. Unplanned Evacuation -1.0 2.08 i E2. NHRERP Evacuation 0.80 1.92 E3. Generic Evacuation 0 0.016 E4. Generic-Evacuation 0.056 0.24.

With Difficulties (B) Sh.lterina e Stratecies Sl. Ad Hoc Shelter 1.5.2 2.32 S2. Shelter Equivalent to 0.81 1.73 Wood Frame Buildings Without Basements S3. Shelter Equivalent to 0.24 0.88 Wood Frame Buildings With Basements S4. Good Shelter 0.12 0.63 ND_TE:

The entry for the 50th percentile person for the " Unplanned Evacuation" strategy is arbitrarily set at unity. t

_ _ - - - _ ._ __ _ _ _ - - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - _ _ - - - - ._-______-_-___-_______-____-__L

FigurFS:

Relative Effectiveness of Response

., in Reducing Prodromal Vomiting 3

3 E vomiting 90%ile j E Vomiting 50%il E

cz:

E1 E2 E3 uE4 S1 S2 lB S3 04 STRATEGY (See text for description)

fu p

. APPENDIX A-SHIELDING FACTORS DURING EVACUATION BY AUTOMOBILE:

=-

TECHNICAL DISCUSSION Due to_the,relatively lightweight structure in the. upper

.part ofcan automobile, and the-presence of windows, the shielding factor 1for exposure of a vehicle occupant'to.a radioactive cloud is effectively 1.0. That is, a person inside' an automobile gains no protection against cloudshine.

I For. exposure to contaminated ground, neglecting deposition cof radioactivity ~on the' automobile or on the exposed person, the' shielding factor for a vehicle occupant can be calculated to have a range of 0.53-0.78. This range represents an updating of the 0.4-0.7 shielding factor range used in the-Reactor Safety Study (WASH-1400). Cars are lighter today (and will be more so in the future) compared to the 1975 vehicles analyzed in.the Reactor Safety Study. Assuming that vehicles involved in an evacuation will be 30% lighter than 1975 vehiclec,1! the appropriate shielding factor range turns 1/ Due'especially_t'o the. decrease in the amount of steel used in U.S.-built cars, the material weight of U.S. cars dropped 15% between 1975 and 1991 and was projected to drop another 15%

by'1985. (Table 4.3, p. 122, Transportation Energy Data Book, edition 6, G. Kulp, M.C. Holcomb, ORNL-5883 (special), Noyes Data Corporation.)

i

]

out to'be-0.6.3-0.78.1! Now, the relative contributions of doses-from deposited material, accounting for deposition on'the ground,.on or'in the automobile, or on people, can be obtained as follows:

Dose per unit time (Relative to dose from a flat, contaminated plane):1!

A) c to person road, ete:standing 1.0 x Sgon_4/ contaminated beach, parking lot, B) Dose i Sc 5/ nside car from contaminated ground: 1.0 x 2/ Shieldin Thus-(.4) 7 g= varies 0.53; (.7) exponentially 7 = 0.78. with mass per unit area.

'3/ 'In the absence of detailed calculations, we assume that absorption effects in air can be handled by-neglecting all absorption at distances less than 100 meters and by treating absorption beyond 100 meters as total. Thus, we replace the exact problem of a contaminated plane of infinite extent by a finite circular surface of radius 100 meters. Since'the integral over the disk turns out to be. logarithmic with radial distance, the total dose is insensitive to the cutoff distance chosen. These calculations are conservative since they ignore ground-scattering effects which increase relative doses from deposition close to the receptor.

Deposition is assumed to proceed uniformly on any external.

surface regardless of the surface's orientation. Thus, a square centimeter of ground'is assumed to receive the same contamination as a square centimeter of skin.

4/ Shielding. factor, Sg = 0.47-0.85. See WASH-1400, Append!x VI.

5/ Shielding factor, Sc = 0.53-0.78. See WASH-1400, Appendix VI.

l-

m- .

c Dose inside car.from radioactivity deposited on C)

~

L outside of. vehicle: .22 x Sc 1/

D) . Dose inside car from. radioactivity deposited on inside ofivehicle'with open-windows: .04 .2 2/

E) f, Dose

.35 9/ from skin contaminated while outside vehicles:

l 6/ Based on' numerical integration over an idealized automobile, deposition is assumed to take place on the

.undersideiof the vehicle as well as on the top surface.

7/ This case would occur: (1) if windows had been left open, or.(;2) if' evacuees reached their vehicles and opened' windows before plume passage were complete. ;

The' low number corresponds to-low wind speeds; the high number corresponds to high wind speeds.

'8/ An estimateaof.the relative contribution of skin contamination to the total dose can be obtained by replacing the complex shape of the human body with a set of bounding geometric surfaces:

1) sphere: .the dose rate at-the center of a sphere 1 Contaminated with N curies of radioactivity per square ;

centimeter is 43% of the dose. rate 1 meter above a !

circle'of 100 meter radius that has also been contaminated with N curies per unit area.

Although a cylindrical model would'be more. accurate, I the results will not differ by a large amount, as shown below.

2) right circular cylinder: numerical integration in the' case of a cylinder with radius 1/10th of the length indicates that the average centerline dose is ;

approximately 17% greater than the sphere center dose !

discussed previously. For a cylinder with radius 1/Sth of the length, the average centerline dose is slightly less than the sphere case.

L The results of these rough calculations suggest that direct contamination of people must make a significant contribution to j-the total dose. We take the numerical relationship to be 35%,

that is,-the skin contribution is assumed to be 35% of the' dose from contaminated ground.

1 I

n F)

Dose.'f open

~

windows:rom skin.17 contaminated 9/ while inside vehicles with For-our illustrative analysis, we assume that the basic shielding l' actor without deposition on the car or on people -- . .

,that is, the factor Sc -- is 0.7.

During direct evacuation, we assume that car windows will-be open during passage-of the radioactive plume. Thus, people inside cars will be exposed to dose elements B, C and D from the above list. This yields an effective ground shielding f actor-:in the range 0.89-1.05.

In addition, people will be exposed to doses from radioactive material deposited'on their skin or clothes -- that is, to dose elements E or F from the above list.

Considering.all these dose contributions, we assume an overall effective ground shielding factor of 1.0 for the direct.

evacuation case.

For post-sheltering evacuation, it is likely that many cars will have been left with their windows closed, and will not have oeenl internally contaminated during plume passage. In addition, people will have been protected from deposition of radioactive material on their bodies, to an extent dependent on the rate of shelter. However, people will be at risk of being contaminated after leaving shelter, through brushing against 9/ We take this dose to be half of the value for a person standing in the open, assumina that half of a person's surface area is pressed against a seat and, therefore, not subject to deposition.

contaminated". buildings or vehicles or from passage through 1

clouds of resuspended material. We account for all these considerate _ons by assuming an overall effective ground shielding factor of 0.9 for the post-shelter evacuation case.

1

_ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ I

i

, . l i

l

~.

May 1988 ROBERT L. GOBLE Center forTechnoloh, 137 Gardner Road Environment, and Development Brookline, MA 02146 and Department of Physics 617-566-4574 Clark University Worcester, MA 01610 617-793-7683 Present Position Research Associate Professor of Environment, Technology, and Society, and Adjunct Associate Professor of Physics, Clark University.

Educatica B.A. (Honors), Physics Swarthmore College, June 1962 I Ph.D., Physics, University of Wisconsin, January 1967 Previous Employment 1984 85 Princeton University, Center for Energy and Environmental Studies and Department of Philosophy: Hewlett Fellow 1976 - Clark University, Physics Department and Program on Science, Technology, and Society: Visiting Assistant Professor, Research Associate Professor (on leave 1984-85) !

1974 -76 Montana State University, Physics Department: Assistant Professor, Adjunct Assistant Professor 1972 - 74 University of Utah, Physics Department: Research Associate /

Associate Instuctor 1969 72 University of Minnesota, Physics Department: Research Associate 1966 - 69 Yale University, Physics Department: Research Staff, Instructor 1962 - 66 University of Wisconsin, Physics Department: NSF Cooperative Fellow, Research Assistant Current Research Air Quality / Acid Deposition: . Assessments and Reviews Tracer and Transport Studies Local Air Quality Risk Assessment / Hazard Mangementr Comparing Hazards and Hazard j Assessment. Methodologies Ethical Issues in Hazard Management Planning Issues for Waste Disposal Radon Exposure and Health Effects Emergency Planning for Nuclear Power Plants

l 4

l Recent Research Activities

]

1983 - Emerge _ncy Planning for Nuclear Power Plants (Consultant to New Hampshire Attomey General's office Three Mile Island Public Health Fund Massachusetts Attomey General's Office, Ontario Nuclear Safety Review Board) Reviews, Testimony, Consequence Analysis. Major Planning Project at TMI.

1985 - Risk Assessment and Socio Economic Impacts in Radioactive Waste Management (Consultant to State of Mississippi, Citizens Against Nuclear Trash, and State of Nevada / Mountain West Inc.) Several reports, testimony.

1977 - Ethical issues in Hazard Management (supponed by NSF-EVIST, Hewlett Foundation, Principal Investigator and Co-Principal Investigator). Book in progress; anicles on radioactive waste, occupational and environmental hazards comparison, susceptible workers.

1983 -86 Acid Deposition Assessment,(Consultant, U.S. EPA). Co-author, Acid Deposition and its Effects: Critical Assessment Document,1985. Section Author,1985 Assessment section on Sulfur Mass Balance.

1982 - 83 Implementation of the Occupational Lead Standard. Supported by OTA:

(Principal Investigator, four researchers). Repon published as attachment to OTA Repon: Preventine Illness and Iniury in the Workolace.

1977 - 82 Nuclear Power Plant Performance, (supported in part by DOE, Principal Investigator, three researchers). Anicles relating nuclear power plant performance to general plant characteristics, 1976 - 83 Demonstration of a Grid-Connected Cogeneration System at Clark University; technical advisor and coordinator for Clark University. The program resulted in the construction of a S2.5 million National Demonstration Power Plant, based on a gas-fired 1.8 MW diesel engine with heat recovery from the exhaust and jacket. The plant began operation in Summer 1982: it supplies approximately half Clark's thermal energy needs and enough excess electricity so that half the output will be sold to the utility.

Teaching and Student Research Supervision Dissenation Advisor for M. Yersel, May 1984 Ph.D.

Atmospheric Turbulence and Diffusion in an Urban Environment.

Student Research Projects:

Supervision of more than 20 graduate and undergraduate students in energy, air pollution, and physics: High Energy Cosmic Ray Showers: Clark Energy Use Profiles and Models: Environmental Tradeoffs in Cogeneration: Cogeneration Road Map for Colleges and Universities: Measurements of Worcester Weather: Pollutant Dispersal in Urban Areas:

Effects of Buildings on Pollutant Dispersal: Cogeneration System Monitoring: Radon in Indoor Air; Radon - Induced Health Effects: AIDS and Health Care Programs in Zaire:

2

-. c.

~

Environment Technology.and Society:

'. Introductory Case Studies on Population and Food: Special Topics in Altemative Energy:

Cogeneration: Alternative Energy Systems Laboratory, Graduate Core Course: Limits of the l Earth. Science Writing Seminar.

Physics for Non-Science Student:

FJnstein's ideasi Cultural Astronomy; College Physics: Particle Physics (an honors course with laboratory): Urban Meteorology Undergraduate Physics:

Electricity and Magnetism: Classical Physics Gracuate Physics:

Quantum Mechanics: Advanced Quantum Mechanics: Mathematical Methods Professional Societies American Association for the Advancement of Science American Physical Society: Forum on Science and Society: Division of Particles and Fields Sigma Xi Society forRisk Analysis Air Pollution Control Association Service 1976- 83 City of Worcester Energy Task Force 1977 - Clark Science Technology, and Society, Program Committee 1978 - 80 Altemate, Clark Graduate Board 1978 - Clark Energy Task Force 1981 -84 Faculty Lounge Committee (installation and operation of new faculty dining room) 1983 - CENTED Steering Committee Recent Individual Awards and Honors National Science Foundation / National Endowment for the Humanities:

Individual Incentive Award (Jan.1984-Jan.1986)

Princeton University: Hewiett Fellow (Sept.1984-June 1985)

American Association for the Advacement of Science: Summer Fellowship in Environmental Science (Summer 1982)

Other Activities Consulting Agreements:

1986 - 88 Massachusetts Attomey General's Office, Sheltering in the Emergency Plans for the Seabrook Nuclear Reactor.

3

' 1986 - 87: Rhode I and Dept. of Environmental Management. Risk Assessment Methods forToxic Substances in Seafood.

1986 - 88 ' State of Nevada / Mountain West Inc., Risk Analysis for Radioactive Waste Disposel-

1986 Citizens Against Nuclear Trash Socio Economic Impacts of Radioactive Waste Disposal.

1985 Mississippi Health and Safety Office -Radioactive Waste Risk Analysis. !

1983 New Hampshire Attomey General - Nuclear Emergency Planning.

1982 - 86 U.S. EPA: Acid Deposition Assessment.

1986 Lecturer, Harvard School of Public Health, Short Course on Risk Assessment and Occupational Health.

1981 Lecturer, Depanment of Engineering and Applied Science, University of Wisconsin-Extension Program on Industrial Facility Cogeneration.

GRANTS AND AWARDS University Grants Demonstration of a Grid-Connected Integrated Community Energy System DATE TITLE AMOUNT 1982 - 84 Mass Electric Company / Colt Industries / 20,000 Mass Electric Construction. Grants for Cogeneration Monitonng 1981 83 Mass Energy Office / DOE Energy Conser- 104,000 vation Measures in Schools and Hospitals, 2 matching grants for cogeneration heat recovery equipment co-authored with J.

l Collins and B. Kimball) !

DE-FG41-81R 113973 '

DE-FG41-82R 143391 13,750 L- 1980 -82 HUD: Loan for Plant Construction 1,200,000 (co-authored with J. Collins, B. Kimball)

1980 - 82 DOE Phase III: Construction: grid connec. 330,000 l tion and construction management costs (co-authored with J. Collins) 4 {

l

m r

. . .L . , _

4 4. I ..8-I 1'

, '1977 - 78 ' DdE Phase II: Detailed Feasibility and 206,000 Preliminary Design (co-authon:d with .

' C. Hohenemser -

~

1977- BOE Phase I: Preliminary Feasibility 149,000-Study (co-authored with C. Hohenemser) p 'Other Grants and Grant Support Received DATE: TITLE AMOUNT 1987.- 88 ' Ontario Nuclear Safety Review' Board - Modelling 12,160-Consequences of Reactor Accidents (PrincipalInvestigator) 1987- 88 Rhode Island / EPA " Risk Assessment Methodology ~ 10,000

~ for Contaminated Seafood (Co-Principal

Investigator with H. Bmwn) 1984 -86 NSF/NEH-InterdisciplinaryIncentive Award 45,800

~ Ethical Issues in Hazard Management (Princi-

. palInvestigator Individual Award) 1983 - 85 NSF- Sensitive Workers Ethical Issues and . 170,500 Differential Sensitivity to Workplace Hazard (Co-Principal Investigator with R. Kasperson) .

RII 8217297

- 1983 - 84. Clark University-Elemental Analysis of Par- 1,500 ticulates (Jointly with C. Hohenemser Faculty Development Award)

' 1982 - 83 .

OTA -Implementation of Occupational Lead 29,000 Studard (Principal Investigator) Contract

233-7040.0 1982 DOE - Nuclear Power Plant Performance 9,000 (Principal Investigator) Purchase Order

DE-AP0182 El19625 1982. AAAS - Summer Fellowship in Environmental 5,800 Sciences (for work on Acid Rain in EPA's Office of Strategy Assessment and Long Range Planning) 5

1980 - 82 NSF-Labor / Laity: Comparison of Worker 240.000

& Public Protection fmm Technological Hazards (Co-Principal Investigator with R. Kasperson)

' 9 0SS 79 24516 J 979 - 80 Association of Physical Plant Administration - 4,000 Preparation of a Cogeneration Reference Manual for Colleges and Universities (Principal Investigator) 1979 Argonne Laboratories - Testing Computer 5,240 Models for Cogeneration System Design (Principal Investigator)

Univ. #98456-01 1977- 80 NSF- Equity Issues in Radioactive Waste 190,000 Management #oss 77-16564 (Co-principal Investigator with Roger Kasperson)

PUBLICATIONS Articles (Energy / Hazards / Air Quality) 1988 "The Social Amplification of Risk: A Conceptual Framework" (with R.E. Kasperson, O.

Renn. P. Slovic, H.S. Brown, J.E. Emel, J.X. Kasperson, and S. Ratick) Rid Analysis (to be published).

" Methodology for Assessing Hazards of Contaminants in Seafood" (with H.S. Bauwn, and L.

Teitelbaum) Regulatory Toxicolory and Pharmacolorv. 8:76 - 101 (1988).

1986

" Turbulence Parameters in an Urban Environment" (with M. Yersel), Boundarv Laver Meteoroforv. V. 37, #3 p.271 (1986).

" Methods for Analyzing and Comparing Technological Hazards: Definitions and Factor l Structures" (with C. Hohenemser, J. Kasperson, R. Kasperson, R. Kates, P. Collins, P. Slovic, B. Fischoff, S. Liechtenstein and T. Layman.) In Risk Evaluations and Manarernent, V. Covello, J. Menkes and Y. Mumpower, eds. Plenum Press, New York,1986.

1985

" Protecting Workers, Protecting Publics: The Ethics of Differential Protection" (with P.

Derr, R. Kasperson, R. Kates) in V.T. Covello (ed.) Risk Analysis in the Private Sector.

Plenum Press, New York,1985.

6

,y . ei '

4 a.'s .

i. p..

a -

- 1983

" Time Scales in the Radioactive Waste Problem" Ecuity Issues in Radioactive Waste

' Mannaement, R. Kasperson, Ed. Oelgeschlager Gunn, Hain, Cambridge 1983 Chapter 6, p.

139-174. -,_

"Short Distance Diffusion in an Urban Atmosphere" (with M. Yersel, J. Morrill),

ktmosoberic Environment. V.17, No. 2,275 (1983).'

i

" Responding to the Double Standard of Worker /Public Pmtection (with P. Derr, R.

Kasperson, R. Kates), Environment V, 25, No. 6, 6 (1983).

1982 i

"Airbome Lead: A Clear-cut Case of Differential Protection," (with D.Hattis and N.

Ashford), Environment V. 24, No.1,14 (1982).

I

" Technological Risk Perception and Nuclear Power Costs: The Quantification of Uncertainty" (with D. Shakow) Technological Forecasting and Social Change. V. 21 No. 3, '

185 (1982).

1981'

" Worker /Public Protection: The Double Standard" (with P. Derr, R. Kasperson, R. Kates),

Environment..V. 23, No. 7, 6 (1981).

1979-

" Nuclear Power Plant Performance: An Update," (with C. Hohenemser) Environment V. 21, No. 8,32 (1979).~

1978

" Power Plant Performance" (with C. Hohenemser), Environment V. 20, No.3,25, (1978).

Technical Monographs l-1988 i

Potential Retrieval of Radioactive Waste at Prooosed Yucca Mountain Renository: A L Review of Risk Issues (with D. Golding, R. Kasperson)(1988) 17 p.

l, Postclosure Risk at the Prooosed Yucca Mountain Renository: A Review of Methodological and Technical Issues (with J. Emel, R.E. Kasperson, and O. Renn) (1987) 53 p.

7

I i

1987- q

\

Methodology for A=wssine Hmeds of Contaminants in Seafood. (with H. Brown, aM L.

Teitelbaum), for the Naragansen Bay Project, U.S. EPA and Rhode Island Department of Environmental Management 47 p.

,i Preclosure Risks at the Pronosed Yucca Mountain Renository. (with R.E.Kasperson, J. Emel, J.X. Kasperson, and O. Renn), f 1987) 40 p.

Nuclear Waste System Risks at the Procosed Yucca Mountain Recository. (with J. Emel, J.X.

Kasperson, R.E. Kasperson, and O. Renn), (1987) 116 p.

1986 Evaluation of the Radtran III MMel: Usefulness and Practicability. (with O.Renn), CENTED, Clark University.

Site. Characterization Risks at the Yucca Mountain Site: A Preliminary Review. (with J.

Emel, R. Kasperson, O. Renn), CENTED, Clark University.

The crocosed Sebaco Lake nuc!!arwaste reoository area: A preliminary assessment of selected risk and social imoact considerations. (with J. Emel, J. Kasperson, and R.

Kasperson.) Worcester, MA: Hazard Assessment Group, CENTED, Clark University.

1985 Risk Issues Associated with a Sif t-dome Recository at Richton. Mississippi. (with H. Brown, J. Emel, J. Kasperson, and R. Kasperson.) New York: Social Impact Assessment Network.

1983 Methods for Analyzine and Comoarine Technological Hazards: Definitions and Factor 4

Structures, (with C. Hohenemser, J. Kasperson, R. Kasperson, R. Kates, P. Collins, A. I Goldman, P. Slovic, B. Fischoff. S. Liechtenstein, and M. Layman), CENTED Research Report

3, October 1983.

1982 Atmospheric Prneaews Affectine Acid Decosition: Assessine the Assessments and Successions for Furt.her Research. AAAS, Fall 1982.

1980 Cogeneration: A Camous Ootion. (with W. Goble) Association of Physical Plant Administrators, Washington,1980).

8

q 1

L'

.f 1

-1978 Statistical Analvsin of Nuclear and Coal Power Plant Performance. (with C. Hohenemser)

Scientists Institute for Public Information. New York,1978.

Government Papers 1985 implementation of the Occupational Lead Standard,(with D. Hattis, M. Ballew, D. Thurston),

CENTED Working Paper HAG /WP 83-1, October 1983; in Preventine Illness and iniury in the Workolace. Vol. 2, NTIS. Office of Technology Assessment, Washington, Spring,1985.

Ths Acid De2+ qsition Phenomenon and Its Effects Critic 2l Assessment Document Co-authors D. Bennett, R. Linthurst) U.S. EPA, EPA /60018-851001. August 1985.

1977 78

" Grid-Connected Integrated Community Energy System. Clark University":

Phase I, Preliminary Feasibility Study, v.1: Executive Summary, DOE Repon #C00-4211-1/1 (NTIS,1977) v.2: Final Repon, DOE Report #C00-4211 1/2 (NTIS,1977).

Phase II, Detailed Feasibility and Preliminary Design Preliminary Repc rt, DOE Report #C00-4211-2 (NTIS,1978).

v.1: Final Report, DOE Report #C00-4211 3/1 (NTIS,1978).

v.2: Appendices, DOE Report #C00-4211-3/2 (NTIS,1978).

(These reports were produced by the Clark Demonstration Team and consultants. I wrote the main text and edited each volume.) -

Conference Proceedings (Energy, Hazards, Air Quality).

1987 Estimation of Economic Consequences of a Severe Accident at the Pickering Nuclear Power Station, (with S. Lonergan, C. Corcoraton). Brief Presented to Ontario Nuclear Safety Review Board, September 24-26,1987.

Radioactive Wastes and the Social Amplification of Risk. (with R.E. Kasperson, J. Emel, C.

Hohenemser, J.X. Kasperson, and O. Renn). In R.G. Post (ed.) Waste Manacement '87.

Tucson, AZ: Arizona Board of Regents (1987).

9

~

Can Risk Assessment be Transplanted to Developing Countries? (with H. Bmwn) Invited paper for the Fourth Tallories Seminar on Intemational Development Entitled " Managing Environmental Risk in the Economic Development of Newly Industrializing Countries" May 12-14,1987. Tufts University Tallories European Center, France.

" Potential use of 21hb as a Biological Marker of Exposure to Radon, "First Intemational 6,ymposium on Environmental Health," Pittsburgh, PA, June 1987.

1985 "The Variation in Worker Response to Occupational Hazards"in Symposium on Managing High Risk Workers, Society for Risk Analysis, October 1985.

1984

" Acid Rain." Invited talk presented at American Institute of Hydrology Conference, Future issues in Hydrology, May 31,1984.

1983 "Short Range Dispersion from a Point Source in an Urban Area," (with M. Yersel),

Proceedings of the 6th Symposium on Turbulence and Diffusion American Meteorological Society, Boston (1983).

1981 "A Participatory Approach to Undergraduate Energy Education: the Case of Clark Universiy" (with D. Ducsik) Proceedings of the Intemational Conference on Energy Education Providence, Rhode Islarid,1981.

" Clark University's Grid Connected Cogeneration Plant,"(with J. Rodousakis. J. Cook),

District Heating, V. 67. No.1,4 (1981).

1979 "A Micrometeorological Study in the Worcester Area" (with A. Molod, M. Yersel),

Proceedings of the Conference on the Meteorology of Nonhem New England and the Maritime Provinces, Gorham, ME (1979).

1978

" Grid-Connected Cogeneration at Clark University: The Effect of Terms of Utility Interconnection: (with S.E. Nydick), Proceedings of the Intemational Conference on -

Energy Use Management, Tucson (1978).

1977 10

4

' Energy Profiles at Clark University: Implications for Cogeneration" (with R. Collins, A.

Gottlieb), Proceedings fo the First Nadonal Conference on Technology for Energy Conservation, Washington, D.C. (1977).

testimony 1988 Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Before :he Atomic Safety Licensing Board: Sheltering in the New Hampshire Radiological Emergec y Response Plans for the Seabrook Reactor-Concord, N.H. May 1988.

1986 Before Department of Energy, Office of Civilian Radioactive Wastes Management: .

Social and Economic Consequences of a Proposec Sebago Lake Repository - Naples, Maine. April 1986.

Articles (Particle Physics) 1975 0

" Determination of the A++. A Mass Diference (with J.S. Ball), Phys. Rev. D 11,1971 (1975).

1973 "Two Pion Intermediate States in Decay KS O - 27 ." Phys. Rev. D 4,931 (1973).

1972

" Soft Pion Production in Electron-Positron Collisions" (with J.L. Rosner), Phys. Rev. D 5 2345 (1972).

1971

" Current Algebra and Analyticity:' Bootstrapping the p and a with the Pion Decay Constant Setting the Scale" (with (L.S. Brown), Phys. Rev. D 4 723 (1971).

l 11

.m ,

l.

w.; .

.;4

~.

1968

" Pion Pion Scattering, Curn:nt Algebra, Unitarity, and the Width of the Rho Meson"(with L.S. B rown), Phys.,Rev. Lett. 20 346 (1968).

" Soft Photons and the Classical Limit"(with L.S. Brown), Phys. Rev. 173, 1505 (1968).

1965

" Cross Section for the Production of a Possible Bound Cascade Nucleon System"(with M.E.

Ebel) Phys. Rev. B 140 1675 (1965).

Conference Proceedings (Particle Physics) 1988

" Pion Pair Procudion b / Two Photons at Low Energy," Proceedings from the VIII International Workshop on Photon Photon Collisions (Isa j,1988).

1973

" Pion Form Factor and inelastic n - n Scattering," Proceedings of the International Conference on n - n Scattering (Tallahassee,1973).

12

1 Resume for Gordon Thompson

,, August 1988 Professional Expertise Consulting scientist on energy, environment, and international security issues.

Education

PhD in Applied Mathematics, Oxford University,1973.

BE in Mechanical Engineering, University of New South Wales, Sydney, ;

Australla,1967.

BS in Mathematics and Physics, University of New South Wales,1966.

Current Accointments

Executive Director, Institute for Resource & Security Studies ( IRSS ),

Cambridge, MA.

Coordinator, Proliferation Reform Project ( an IRSS project ). l

Principal Investigator (I of 3), Three Mile Island Emergency Planning Study, Center for Technology, Environment and Development, Clark University, Worcester, MA.

Principal investigator (1 of 3), NATO Options Study (a joint project of IRSS and the Institute for Peace and international Security).

Treasurer, Center for Atomic Radiation Studies, Arlington, MA.

Member, Board of Directors, Political Ecology Research Group, Oxford, UK.

Member, Advisory Board, Gruppe Okologie, Hannover, FRG.

Consulting Exoertence ( selected )

Ontario Nuclear Safety Review, Toronto, Ontario,1987: review of safety aspects of CANDU reactors.

Washington Department of Ecology, Olympia, WA,1987: analysis of ri3k aspects of a proposed radioactive waste repository at Hanford.

,

Natural Resources Defense Council, Washington, DC, 1986-1987 : preparation I of testimony on hazards of the Savannah River Plant.

Lakes Environmental Association, Bridgton, ME,1986 : analysis of federal regulations foe disposal of radioactive waste.

2

~

Greenpeace, Hamburg, FRG,1986 : participation in an international study on the hazards of nuclear power plants.

Three Mlle f.sland Public Health Fund, Philadelphia, PA,1983-present :

studies relatDd to the Three Mlle Island nuclear plant.

.,

Attorney General, Commonwealth of Massachusetts, Boston, MA,1984-present : analyses of the safety of the Seabrook nuclear plant.

Union of Concerned Scientists, Cambridge, MA, 1980-1985 : studies on energy demand and supply, nuclear arms control, and the safety of nuclear installations.

Conservation Law Foundation of New England, Boston, MA,1985 :

preparation of testimony on cogeneration potential at the Maine facilities of Great Northern Paper Company.

Town & Country Planning Association, London, UK, 1982-1984 : coordination and conduct of a study on safety and radioactive waste implications of the proposed Sizewell nuclear plant.

US Environmental Protection Agency, Washington, DC, 1980-1981 assessment of the cleanup of Three Mile Island Unit 2 nuclear plant.

Center for Energy & Environmental Studies, Princeton University, Princeton, H),1979-1980 : studies on the potentials of various renewable energy sources.

Government of Lower Saxony, Hannover, FRG, 1978-1979 : coordination and conduct of studies on safety aspects of the proposed Gorleben nuclear fuel center, Other Exoerience ( selected )

Co-leadership ( with Paul Walker ) of a study group on nuclear weapons proliferation, institute of Politics, Harvard University,1981.

Foundatio? i with others ) of an ecological political movement in Oxford, UK, '

which cordsted the 1979 Parliamentary election.

Conduct of cross-examination and presentation of evidence, on behalf of the Political Ecology Research Group, at the 1977 Public inquiry into proposed

) expansion of the reprocessing plant at Windscale, UK.

!

Conduct of research on plasma theory ( while a PhD candidate ), as an associate staff member, Culham Laboratory, UK Atomic Energy Authority, 1969-1973.

l

Service as a design engineer on coal plants, New South Wales Electricity l

Commission, Syoney, Australia,1968.

^

3

- Publications ( selected )

,*" Verifying a Halt to the Nuclear Arms Race", in F. Barnaby (ed), Verification Handbook. MacMillan Press, UK (in press).

" Verification of a Cutof f in the Production of Fissile Material", in F. Bar. aby

. (ed), Verification Handbook. MacMillan Press, UK (in press).

" Severe Accident Potential of CANDU Reactors", Consultant's Report in The Safety of Ontario's Nuclear Power Reactors. Ontario Nuclear Safety Review, Toronto, February 1988.

Nuclear-Free Zones ( edited with David Pitt ), Croom Helm Ltd, Beckenham, UK,1987.

Risk Assessment Review For the Socioeconomic Imoact Assessment of the Prooosed High-Level Nuclear Waste Recository at Hanford Site. Washinaton-(edited; written with five other authors), prepared for the Washington ;

Department of Ecology, December 1987.

The Nuclear Freeze Revisited ( written with Andrew Haines ),

Nuclear Freeze and Arms Control Research Project, Bristol, UK, November 1986. Variants of the same paper have appeared: as Working Paper No.18, Peace Research Centre, Australian National University, Canberra, February 1987; and in ADIU Reoort.Jan/Feb 1987, pp 6-9, University of Sussex, Brighton, UK.

International Nuclear Reactor Hazard Study ( written with fif teen other

. authors ), Greenpeace, Hamburg, FRG ( 2 volumes ), September 1986.

"What happened at Reactor Four" ( the Chernobyl reactor accident ), Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. August / September 1986, pp 26-31.

The' Source Term Debate : A Reoort by the Union of Concerned Scientists

( written with Steven Sholly ), Union of Concerned Scientists, Cambridge, MA, January 1986.

" Checks on the spread" ( a review of three books on nuclear proliferation ),

Nature.14 November 198S, pp 127-128.

Editing of Perspectives on Proliferation. Volume I, August 1985, published by the Proliferation Reform Project, Institute for Resource and Security Studies, Cambridge, MA.

d "A Turning Point for the NPT ?", ADIU Reoort. Nov/Dec 1984, pp 1-4, University of Sussex, Brighton, UK.

" Energy Economics", in J Dennis (ed), The Nuclear Almanac. Addison-Wesley, Reading, MA,1984.

"The Genesis of Nuclear Power", in J Tirman (ed), The Militarization of Hiah Technoloav. Ballinger, Cambridge, MA,1984.

fy f

4 3

A Second Chance : New Hamoshire's Electricity Future as a Model for the Nation ( written with Linzee Weld ), Union of Concerned Scientists, lH Cambridge, MA,1983.

Safety and Waste Management implications of the Sizewell PWR ( prepared

. with the help of 6 consultants ), a report to the Town & Country Planning Association, London, UK,1983,

Utilltv-Scale Electrical Storage in the USA : The Prosoects of Pumoed Hydro.

Comoressed Air. and Batteries. Princeton University report' PU/ CEES *120, .

1981.

The Prosoects for Wind and Wave Power in North America. Princeton University report PU/ CEES

117,1981.

Hydroelectric Power in the USA : Evolving to Meet New Needs. Princeton'.

University report PU/ CEES

115,1981. '

Editing and part authorship of " Potential Accidents & Their Ef fects", Chapter ill of Reoort of the Gorleben International Review. Dublished in German by the Government of Lower Saxony, FRG,1979 -- Chapter lil available in y L English from the Political Ecology Research Group, Oxford, UK.

A Study of the Consequences to the Public of a Severe Accident at a

' Commercial FBR located at Kalkar. West Germany. Political Ecology Research Group report RR-1,1978.

I e L Exoert Testimony ( selected )

International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War,6th and 7th Annual Congresses, Koln, FRG,1986 and Moscow, USSR,1987: Relationships between nuclear power and the threat of nuclear war.

County Council, Richland County, SC,1987 : Implications of Severe Reactor Accidents at the Savannah River Plant.

Maine Land Use Regulation Commission,1985 : Cogeneration potential at facilities of Great Northern Paper Company.

Interf aith Hearings on Nuclear issues, Toronto, Ontario,1984 : Options f or Canada's nuclear trade and Canada's involvement in nuclear arms control.

Sizewell Public inquiry, UK,1984 : Safety and radioactive waste

< implications of the proposed Sizewell nuclear plant.

New Hampshire Public Utilities Commission,1983 Electricity demand and supply options for New Hampshire.

Atomic Safety & L(censing Board, Dockets 50-247-SP & S0-286-SP, US Nuclear Regulatory Commission,1983 : Use of filtered venting at the indian Point nuclear plants.

US National Advisory Committee on Oceans and Atmosphere,1982 :

Implications of ocean disposal of radioactive waste.

i... .

S

Environmental & Energy Study Conference, US Congress,1982 : Implications- !

of radioactive' waste management.

Miscellaneous

Australian citizen.

Married, two children.

Resident of USA,1979 to present; of UK, 1969-1979.

Extensive experience of public speaking before professional and lay _

audiences.

Author of numerous newspaper, newsletter, and magazine articles and book reviews.

Has received many interviews from print and electronic media.

1

. o Resume for Jan Beyea

. July 1986 l

EDUCATICN:

1 Ph.D., Col _umbia University,1968 (Physics) .

B.A., Anherst College,1962.

EWLOYMENT HIS'IVRY:

1980 to date, Senior Staff Scientist and, as of 1985, Director of the Environmental Policy Analysis Department, National Audubon Society, 950 Third Avenue, NY, NY 10022.

1976 to 1980, Research Staff, Center for Energy and Environmental Studies Princeton University.

1970 to 1976, Assistant Professor of Physics, Holy Cross College.

1968 to 1970, Research Associate, Columbia University Physics Department.

CONSULTING WORK:

Consultant on nuclear energy to the Office of Technology Assessnent, the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection; the Offices of the Attorney General in New York State and the Commonwealth of Massachusetts; the State of lower Saxony in West Germany; the Swedish Energy Comission; the Three Mile Island Public Health Fund; and various citizens' groups in the United States.

PUBLICATIONS CONCERNING ENEMY CONSERVATION, ENEBGY POLICY, AND ENEBGY PlSKS:

I Articles:

" Oil and Gas Resources on Federal Lands: Wilderness and Wildlife Refuges," Stege and be ea, Annual Review of Enercy (to be published, October <

1986). [An earlier version appeared as National Audubon Society Report, EPAD No. 28, June 1985.]

"U.S. Appliance Efficiency Standards," Pollin and Beyea, Eneray Policy, M , p. 425 (1985).

" Computer Mooeling for Energy Pelicy Analysis," Medsker, Peyea, and Lyons, Proceedings of the 15th Annual Modeling and Simulatien Conference, Pittsburgh, PA,15, part 3, p.1111 (1984 ) .

" Containment of a Peactor Meltdown," (with Frank von Hippel), Bulletin cf the Atorric Scientists, 38,, p. 52 (August / September 1982).

"Second Thoughts (about Nuclear Safety)," in Nuclear Power: Both Sides, I W. W. Norton and Co. (New York, 1982).

" Indoor Air Pollution," Bull. At. Scientists, y , p. 63 (Feb. 1981)

I i

E__________ - - - . -

l

_ Articles (Con't)

"Drergency Planning for Reactor Accidents," Bulletin of the Atorric' Scientists, 35-p. 40 (December 1980). (An earlier version of the article appeared in German as chapter 3 in Im Ernstfall hilflos?, E. R. Koch, Fritz Gahrenholt, editors, Keipenheuer & Witsch, Cologne, 1980.) ,

" Dispute at Indian Point," Bull. At. Scientists, 36,6 p. 63, (May 1980). i

" Locating and Eliminating Obscure but Major Energy Losses in Residential Housing," Harrje, Dutt, and Beyea, ASHRAE Transactions, 85, Part II (1979).

(Winner of A9fPAE outstanding paper award.)

" Attic Heat Loss and Conservation Policy." Dutt, Beyea, and Sinden. ASME Technology and Society Division Paper 78-TS-5, Houston, Texas,1978.

" Critical Significance of Attics and Basements in the Enercy Balance of Twin Fivers Townhouses," Beyea et al., Energy and Buildings, Vol. I (1977),

Page 261. Also Chapter 3 of Saving Enercy in the Home, Ballinger,1978.

"The Two-Resistance Podel for Attic Heat Flow: Irtplications for Corr servation Policy," Woteki, Dutt, Beyea, Enercy--The Intl. Journal, 3_, 657(1978)

Published Debates:

Proceedings of the Workshop on Three Mile Island Dosimetry, %ree Mile Island Public Health Fund,1622 Locust Street, Phila., Pa., Dec.1985 i

" Land Use Issues and the Pedia," Ctr. for Ccmunication, NYC, Oct.1984.

Nuclear Peactors: How Safe Are hey?, panel discussion sponsored by the Academy Forum of the National Acaderry of Sciences, Wash., D.C., May 5,1980.

The Crisis of Nuclear Energy, Subject No. 367 on William Buckley's Firing Line, P.E.S. Television. Transcript printed by Southern Education Comuni-cations Assoc., 928 Woodrow Street, P. O. Box 5966, Columbia, S.C.,1979.

Reports:

The Audubon Enercy Plan, Beyea et al., 2nd Ed., July 1984 (1st Ed., 3981)

[See also, Intro. to Special Issue on Legal Issues Arising Frort %e Audubon Energy Plan 1984, Columbia Journal of Environmental Law, M, p.251, (1986))

A Peview of Dose Assessrrents at tree Mile Island and Pecormendetions fer Future Research, Pepcrt to the t ree Mile Island Public Health Fund, August 1984. [See aise, " Author Challenges Review," Health Physics Newsletter,

(

March,1985, and "TMI-Six Years Later," Nuclear Medicine, M, p. 1345 (1985).]

Reports (Con't)

" Implications for Mortality of Weakening the Clean Air Act," (with G.

Steve Jordan), National Audubon Society, EPAD Report No.18, May 1982.

1 "Some Long-Term Consequences of Hypothetical Major Peleases of '

Radioactivity to the Atomosphere from nree Mile Island," Peport to the President's Council on Environmental Quality, Decerber 1980.

i

" Decontamination of Krypton 85 fror t ree Mile Island Nuclear Plant," 1 (with Kendall, et al.), Report of the Union of Concerned Scientists to the '

Governor of Pennsylvania, May 15, 1980.

"Some Comments on Consequences of Hypothetical Peactor Accidents at the Philippines Nuclear Power Plant" (with Gordon % ompson), National Audubon Society, EPAD Peport No. 3g April 1980.

" Nuclear Reactor Accidents: The Value of Improved Containment," (with Frank von Hippel), Center for Energy and Environmental Studies Report PU/ CEES 94, Princeton University, January 1980.

"The Effects of Peleases to the Atmosphere of Radioactivity from Hyrcthetical Large-Scale Accidents at the Proposed Gorleben Waste Treatment Facility," report to the Government of lower Saxony, Federal Republic of Germany, as part of the "Gorleben International Review," February 1979.

" Reactor Safety Research at the Large Consequence End of the Risk Spectrum," presented to the Experts' Meeting on Reactor Safety Pesearch in the Federal Republic of Germany, Bonn, September 1,1978.

A Study of Some of the Consequences of Hypothetical Peactor Accidents at Parseback, report to the Swedish Energy Com., Stockholm, DS I 1978:5, 1978.

Testimony:

" Responses to the Chernobyl Accident," before the Senate Com.ittee on Energy and Natural Resources, U. S. Senate, June 19, 1986.

" Dealing with Uncertainties in Projections of Electricity Consumption,"

tefere the Comp. on Energy and Natural Pesources, U. S. Senate, July 25, 1985.

"Some Consequences of Catastrophic Accidents at Indian Point and Their Implications for Emergency Planning," testimony and cross-examination before the Nuclear Pegulatory Comrission's Atoric Safety and Licensing Board, on behalf of the New York State Attorney General and others, July 1982.

l

.~

A'

(- .

~

l Testimony (Con'tt l

"In the Matter of A; plication of Orange and Rockland Counties, Inc. for Coriversim to Coal of Lovett Units 4 and 5 " testimony and cross-examination on the health impacts of eliminating scrubbers as a requirement for conversion to coal; Department of Environmental Resources, State of N.Y., Nov. 5,1981.

" Future Prospects for Cormercial Nuclear Power in the United States,"

before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, U. S. House of Representatives, October 23, 1981.

"Coments on Energy Forecasting," material submitted for the record at Hearings before the Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversights of the House i Comittee on Science and Technology; Comittee Print No.14, June 1-2,1983. '

" Stockpiling of Potassium Iodide for the General Public as a Condition for Restart of TV.I Unit No.1," testimony and cross-examination before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board on behalf of the Anti-Nuclear Group Representing York, April 1981. i

" Advice and Recoreendations Concerning Changes in Peactor Design and Safety Analysis which should be Required in Light of the Accident at 'Ihree P.ile Island," statement to the Nuclear Regulatory Comission concerning the propcsed ruleraking hearing on degraded cores, December 29, 1980.

" Alternatives to the Indian Point Nuclear Reactors," statement before the EnvirorJoental Protection Comittee cf the New Ycrk City Council, December 14, 1979. Also before the Comittee, "The Impact on New York City of Reactor Accidents at Indian Point, June il, 1979. Also " Consequences of a Catastrophic Reactor Accident," statenent to the New York City Board of Health, August 12, 1976 (with Frank von Hippel). ~

"Energency Planning for a Catastrophic Reactor Accident," testimony before the California Energy Resources and Developtrent Corrission, Energency Peconse and Evacuation Plans Hearings, November 4,1978, Page 171.

"Comrents on the Proposed PTC Trade Regulation Rule on Labeling and Advertising of 'Ihermal Insulation," Beyea and Dutt, before the pit,1978.

" Consequences of Catastrophic Accidents at Jaresport," testimony before the N.Y. State Pcard on Electric Generation Siting and the Envirenrent in the Vatter of Long Island Lighting Co. (Jamesport Nuclear Pcwer Station), Pay 1977.

"Short-Terr Effects of Catastrophic Accidents on CorJrunities Surrounding the Sundesert Nuclear Installation," testirony before the California Fnergy Resources and Developtrent Corrission, Decerber 3,1976.

ML20235M906

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