ML20235K717
| ML20235K717 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Seabrook  |
| Issue date: | 02/21/1989 |
| From: | Sikich G LAVENTHOL & HOWATH, MASSACHUSETTS, COMMONWEALTH OF |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20235K640 | List: |
| References | |
| OL, NUDOCS 8902270219 | |
| Download: ML20235K717 (52) | |
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UNITED STATES ~OF' AMERICA -l
> NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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ATOMIC SAFETY-AND LICENSING BOARD-
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Before Administrative Judges:
Ivan W. Smith, Chairperson-
... Richard F. Cole F Kenneth A. McCollom
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In the Matter of ) Docket Nos.
) 50-443-OL UI PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF ) 50-444-OL NEW HAMPSHIRE,.ET AL. ) (OFF-Site EP)
, (Seabrook' Station, Units 1 and 2 )
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COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS' TESTIMONY OF 4
GEARY W. SIKICH ON THE. INADEQUACIES OF THE SPMC AS IT PERTAINS TO SPECIAL POPULATIONS IN THE EMERGENCY PLANNING ZONE i
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H .Q. Please 1 tate your.name, position and' business address;forL V +' ,
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A. My name is Geary.W.JSikich, I am the Managing Director-of Laventhol.and Howath's Emergency and Environmental Advisofy Services. My business address is 300 South Riverside Plaza, Chicago, Illinois, 60606. I I Q. How long have you worked at Laventhol.& Horwath?-
A. I've been with the company approximately one-year.
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- . Please state briefly what you will testify on! !
.A: I will; testify as an expert witness on the inadequacies of the SPMC as they pertain to the Special' Needs Population in- ,
a the Ep2. .The Special Needs Population includes persons in schools and day care centers, persons-in hospitals, persons-in.otherfSpecial Facilities, and the! Resident Special Needs Population being those persons who have a' mental, physical, ;
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or emotional. impairment'or who otherwise will need j assistance'in the. event of,a radiological emergency. I ]
will specifically addressLinadequacies of'the.SPMC as th'ey-are raised in JI Contentions 45, 46,-47, 48, 49, 50 and
- 51. I will also testify on flaws in the SPMC that pertain j to the American Red Cross and Congregate Care Centers and emergency communications. Specifically, I will address the i
issues raised in JI Contentions 54 and 30.
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In.brief, I will testify that I disagree with the FEMA (
~ l findings of adequacy on evaluation criteria that pertain to j the Special Needs population and the Congregate Care facilities that will purportedly be set up and staffed by.
.the'American' Red Cross. I will testify that there are inadequate personnel to carry out liaison functions and.
that reliance on commercial telephones as.a primary system of communication during an emergency situation is fundamentally flawed because of foreseeable line overload.
I will also. testify that from a planning perspective, ;
discussions pertaining to protective action recommendations-for public schools be directed to the superintendents of
.t the various schools in the first instance as opposed to the principals. I will testify the plan does not provide adequate support and assistance to the Special Needs population in that it does not provide for enough personnel or resources to assist and support that population. I will testify that the procedure for distributing KI is inadequate. I will testify that from a planning perspective the SpMC's generic plans are not sufficiently tailored to the various institutions they are designed for to be of any meaningful use because they do not address the
! specific realities they will be confronted by thosa t institutions in the event of a radiological emergency. I l
will testify that the SpMC's provisions for those congregate centers are inadequate under the relevant r
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l evaluation criteria because there is, inadequate advance P'
j planning for those facilities and inadequate staff and resources-for.the contemplated use.of those centers.
I will also testify that the-mechanism for providing second-shift staffing for ORO's evacuation-specific positions provides no reasonable assurance that these-workers will be adequately trained to perform their assigned job functions. These evacuation-specific positions include the drivers of the manned-vehicles. This testimony will'be submitted in support of Contentions JI 11 and 12.
Q. Can you briefly state what your past professional experience and education is?
A. Yes. prior to joining Laventhol, I was employed by another firm by the name of pannell Kerr Forster. I was Supervisor for the Environmental and Energy Management Group. I was assigned to begin a business consulting practice in the area of environmental and energy' management, focusing on i emergency planning, regulatory compliance, training and ,
information services. "
i I was with pannell Kerr Forster for approximately 11 months i
before joining Laventhol & Horwath. I was recruited by Laventhol to build the emergency and environmental advisory services practice. l
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s O f Prior t those two firms, I was self-employed from October of '84 until about April of '87. I consulted to the nuclear power industry. In general I was responsible for
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j developing a training program for emergency preparedness .
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on-site at the Shearon Harris Plant and at the H.B.
Robinson Plant. I also developed their emergency operations facility management procedures. I was -
contracted to Georgia Power for their Vogtle Plant, and was responsible for developing off-site emergency planning. I also developed a commitment tracking system for their emergency planning with regard to the Vogtle Nuclear ,
Plant. I also outlined a similar system for Georgia Power's Plant Hatch.
Prior to that I was a consultant with a Impell Corporation. I worked with them from May of '83 until October of '84 and was involved with consulting to Commonwealth Edison and Texas Utilities, in the areas of on-site and off-site emergency preparedness planning, training, developing job descriptions, and working on '
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9 Prior to that, I was employed by Detroit Edison as a senior g' training specialist and was responsible for developing the h
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FERMI 2, Nuclear Power Plant's initial emergency preparedness training program as well as subsequent training programs that were developed for the facility. l
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ll b prior ~to that I was with Science Applications, Inc., as a L'
?i . research scientist.
This was from March of 1979.to August-of 1981, I was responsible for doing some work with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission on job'and task analysis for l
L plant security personnel and security systems.
i, In conjunction with that contract, we were on the 1
peripheral aspect of the Three Mile Island Nuclear plant issue from a standpoint of being involved from the initial contract we had on security. personnel and plant security systems. prior to that I was a military officer with intelligence functions in the Army from July of 1973 to 7 March, 1979.
Q. Have you in the course of your professional experience worked directly on planning issues as they relate to radiological emergency plans?
A. Yes. At Detroit Edison I was responsible'for developing the nuclear emergency preparedness training program for the-staff, both the on-site and off-site Detroit Edison' personnel. We developed a program for staff personnel from the off-site group, who were people who did normal utility functions from a non-nuclear standpoint and trained-them on how to do radiological emergency monitoring and the communication function of reporting that information. I developed that program and moved form there to Impell Corporation. I was involved briefly with the Byron Nuclear
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- j. . plant for aboutLone' month doing some off-site emergency V
preparedness work'and then was shifted to the Texas Utilities Comanche peak plan for a period of approximately seven months. .In that period I was assisting our head person on the site to develop an emergency preparedness program consisting of the site plan, the implementing procedures, the on-site training program, as well as conducting the~ drills, exercises and the graded Nuclear Regulatory Commission exercise. We did the first exercise
- in December.of '83 in which they came out best in'their region as far as near term operating plants. I'went back to Chicago from the exercise work in Texas, spent three an,d a half months in the Chicago office working on the LaSalle and Dresden plants for off-site emergency planning. I was, involved in doing evacuation studies as vell as revising some of the off-site emergency plans that had been developed m, the State of' Illinois and Commonwealth Edison. We upgraded those plans with regards to special populations anti the overall off-site planning.
After approximately three and a half months of working on ]
that project, I was assigned back to the Texas Utilities Comanche peak plant to do a complete upgrade on their emergency preparedness procedures and the emergency plan.
We literally rewrote the procedures for that plan. I was charged with writing most of the management procedures with
L regards-to.non-technical nuclear issues for.the emergency managers. I was charged with writing and making'them more task-9,riented procedures focusing on the ability of ther
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individual to operate on a checklist-type of basis so.that
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he/she could become more focused on the task at hand in contrast to the educational type procedures currently in
. place. This is where the procedure is written in the third person to educate the individual as to his/her responsibility.
We did a complete re-write and upgraded the procedures so that emergency response personnel could accomplish these .,
tasks, duties, and functions in a more efficient manner.
After concluding that assignment I went back to the Chicago area and became self-employed. I was contracted to Carolina Power & Light and spent a year at the Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant. I was responsible for developing their emergency preparedness training program for the facility.
When I got to the facility, I was moved from the training group to a temporary assignment to work on their first exercise. I worked with consultants from several companies and basically marshalled the setup of drills, exercises, and their overall final exercise into a program that the i
p utility.was able to implement fairly. easily. I then returned to the training role that I was originally assigned.
In conjunction with that contract, I was assigned on a special basis at the request of one of Carolina Power &
Light's vice presidents to rewrite the H.B. Robinson Plant's emergency operations facility procedures for the people who would man that facility during an emergency.
This was part of CP&L's preparations for an annual graded exercise at H.B. Robinson.
1 Upon completion of the contract I had with Caroline Power &
Light. I went to Georgia Power under contract to work on the off-site emergency plans for plant Vogtle. At the Vogtle Plant I was involved with some of the licensing issues regarding the off-site emergency plans and their adequacy.
At the Vogtle Plant, we were successful in, one, putting together the off-site emergency plans, two, identifying problems and having them taken care of internally and to the satisfaction of the outside observers. I was, also, responsible for implementing an off-site training program in crisis communications that dealt with transmitting information from the plant to off-site response personnel.
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This training program pertained to how to transfer techni, cal.information to people-with non-technical backgrounds.
My contract was extended and I was asked to assemble an-emergency. preparedness. commitment tracking system for the Vogtle' Plant. The tracking system was. based upon an analysis of approximately nine essential elements. Those were administration, organization, facilities, equipment,
' training, off-site coordination, communications, organization, drills and exercise. .
The purpose of the commitment tracking system was to identify all of the commitments that Georgia Power had made with regards to the plant for emergency preparedness over a course'of approximately-eight years of construction. We ended up identifying over 4,000 commitments of which 458 were determined to be continuing commitments. The ongoing-commitments were subsequently put into a scheduling program.
As a result of this, I developed COMTRAX which is a very simplified data base commitment tracking program. We use it to catalog commitment tracking issues for facilities that are affected under: 1) nuclear criteria; and 2) of environmental issues, under the Superfund Amendments l
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Reauth&rization_Act (SARA)..also known as the Emergency Planning Community Right To Know Act. In addition there are:several other environmental laws that impact on companies that roquire commitments to beftracked and properly' documented.
I, also, was responsible for developing a program called AUDITRAK, which is an emergency preparedness compliance assessment program based on NUREG 0654 and SARA Title'III.
.The focus of AUDITRAK is to take the requirements of the original FEMA and NUREG-0654 guidance and SARA Title III and put-it into a computerized work paper form. It t-functions by looking at the essential elements of analysis I cited earlier. AUDITRAK provides a set criteria for
. plants similar to'the grading used by.the Nuclear Regulatory Commission eith 10 CFR 50.54T criteria.
A prototype version of this system, was used at Texas Utilities' Comanche Peak plant. The result was a comment by NRC's inspection team that they could do their job in a more timely fashion because all the documentation was close at hand. The NRC staff actually said that it was the first weekend break that they had had in this type of inspection, because the information was well-organised, and in a form j l
that was easil/ understandable, validated, and cross-referer.ced to the regulations and site documentation.
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s I'have developed a program' called CRISIS MANAGER which is an automated emergency plan consisting of nine tontenL sections that deal with the key . element , of: analysis:
- administration of the plan, the organizational structure and concept'of operations, communications, emergency.
classification, protective action recommendations, reentry and. recovery, training, drills, exercises, evaluation and a cross-reference:between the emergency plan to specificL regulatory guidance and commitments.
I went'back to:the Chicago area in 1987 and merged.my .,
practice into'Pannell Kerr Forster. I was recruited by1
' Laventhol &LHorwath to develop their emergency and environmental advisory services / practice. Since coming lto Laventhol'& Horwath I developed another program dealing primarily with emergency preparedness and environmental assessment issues called HAZVAL. HAZVAL is designed to assess general site information, identification, collection, storage and disbursement of hazardous materials, 3
recordkeeping, training and other required documentation. -I The program is currently being used to assess compliance with SARA Title III issues in terms of emergency planning.
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Currenhly,Jat Laventhol, I've.been involved with setting up l
l-their' emergency._and environmental advisory services practice. This practice is focused on four areas, regulatory compliance,' emergency planning, training and' development, and information management. Attached isLa l copy of my resume ~and capability brochure.
l With regards to publications and. papers, I wrote the Radiological. Emergency Response preparedness Training Instruction Manual for Detroit Edison'in-1982. I:have conducted a series of workshops on emergency planning which include topics such as an overview of emergency planning,.,
emergency planning and preparedness, the' planning function; and how to evaluate compliance. I.am working with the National Safety Council.on a series of articles about emergency preparedness. I'am also negotiating the publication of a book I wrote on emergency planning and preparedness. I recently had an article published in Eqsplail Materials Manaaement about environmental laws and how to hold hospitals liable for wastes. I have written and published articles on real estate issues and environmental risks. I am currently speaking in March of this year before th^ American Society of Mechanical Engineers on SARA Title III and its emergency planning requirements. In April I will talk before the Chicago Bar Association on emergency planning and how their clients are 1
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, affected by emergency planning issues. I will also be conducting a one-day workshop.on emergency planning at HAZWASTE EXPO, Atlanta, ' 8 9 , . cn1 emergency planning.
I also will talk about-crisis communications, crisis communications planning, and working with the off-site community.
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-In addition to that one-day seminar, I will be presenting a one-hour discussion of regulatory compliance issues.
I have'also, developed federally-mandated hazardous materials response plans for clients-in Indiana and Illinois. The-Indiana plan is currently being used and ,
recommended by state officials as a model plan for all hazardous materials, response planning for local emergency planning committees.
I have also developed emergency preparedness training programs for. industry. Specific programs dealt with the Illinois Chemical Safety Act which parallels the Emergency planning Community Right to Know Act and portions of 10 CFR
- 50. I am currently negotiating contracts for emergency planning, training, and information systems development, with' numerous clients in the utility industry, the refining and oil industry, steel industry, health care industry and the public sector.
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,1 Q. Are you., familiar with the planning standards and criteria established.for radiological emergency planning? .l
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'A . Yes, in particlar I am familiar with NUREG-0654 and 10 CFR I 50.
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Have you had a chance to review the provisions of the SPMC
, in connection with those various standards?
A. .'Yes. I reviewed, the SPMC, and its procedures.
Q. Have'you, also, had an opportunity to review the various appendices that.have been put together by New Hampshire !
Yankee in connection with SPMC7 )
A. Yes.
Q. Have you had a' chance to look at and consider the Review and Evaluation of the Seabrook Plan for Massachusetts-Communities' issued by the. Federal Emergency Management Agency in Decemb'erLof.1988 in connection with.various provisions of the'aforesaid plan?
A. JI'have reviewed the FEMA report with regards to the plan a's it applies to provisions for the Special Needs Population in the Massachusetts EPZ.
Q. Now, directing your attention to page 18 of that report, under the heading Evaluation Criteria, C.5, have you had a-chance to review that evaluation criteria set forth there and the finding of the Federal Emergency Management Agency in connection with that evaluation criteria?
A. Yes.
- " Q. What evaluation was made of that planning criteria by FEMA?
A.. The Federal Emergency Management Agency said that evaluation criteria under C. 5 was adequate.
Q. Do you agree with that evaluation?
A. Based upon my review of the SPMC plan and my understanding of the various aspects or functions that personnel will perform with regards to off-site liaison, no, I cannot agree with that evaluation.
Q. Can you.tell me the reasons why you disagree with that evaluation?
A. primarily.the reasons why I disagree-with that evaluation are based on f act that the stcf fing for the of f-site
., response organization appears to be lacking in that the staffing contains inadequate numbers of people The
-response organization that's been created appears to be lacking in that area with'regards to adequate staffing in terms of numbers of people. The other aspects would be that the communication links between those liaison personnel and the special facilities that are identified appear to be lacking in terms of their adequacy with regards to number of lines, and there appears to be in the plan some problematic issues with regards to the guidance.
in terms of sheltering evacuation issues.
Q. Why do you think that the number of personnel identified as liaison personnel are inadequate?
A. I do not think there are enough of them to accomplish the number of calls that they are going to make to schools and facilities in emergency situations.
Q. What is your understanding as to how many school liaison !
and special population liaison positions there are within :
the SpMC?
A. Currently my understanding is that there are six school liaisons and six special population liaisons who report to a coordinator for each one of those areas.
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Q.. Now, why/do you think that'there is. inadequate staffing for those six people to do those. job functions?
A. Based upon what I have seen in the plan and the annexes in
' terms of the number of schools and special population
, facilities that they will be contacting, I do not believe they can do'their job in an adequate time frame because: 1) it is going to be difficult for them'to get.through to-those special populations because of the limited access to phone lines that is available; 2) once they begin to call those facilities, 4. hey, in all probability, will not be able to stick strictly to a prescribed protective action message because their initial warning. message is going to l 1
elicit a series of questions from the recipient which will' force them to get into a dialogue.
Q. Why'do you believe that it would be difficult for the school liaisons and special population liaisons to stick to' their-prescripted messages and get through the series of phone calls that they are assigned to do under Appendix-M?-
A. I have taken into consideration the statements contained in the Testimony of Investigator Kathryn Barnicle obtained from the school principals and administrators of special.
. facilities as well as writings by authorities in the area such as George O. Rogers and John H. Sorensen of Oak Ridge National Laboratory.
1 My opinion based upon that testimony and authorities is !
that , upon receipt of this initial notification, the c.
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school > principals and administrators of facilities are L going to'want.to'know further information. They are not.
Lgoing{tobesatisfiedwithaprescriptedmessagethatdoes not'give them' answers to specific questions such'as where a bus is going to be coming from, who is going to be driving C 4 the buses and how do I know those, in fact, are the buses that will be assigned to my facility.
Also, as I see from looking at the plans, there is no system:in place that upon this initial call the school principal or special facility administrator could confirm that, in fact,-a Seabrook representative is the person .,
calling.other than executing a confirmation call back.
With a limitation on communication lines into the schools and special facilities and back to the Seabrook facility, it would appear that a significant number of communication lines will be tied up at a critical time.
In regards to sticking to the script, people are going to ask and seek for more information. While, you may be able
- to cut them off and say that more information will follow, that will only serve to provide more anxiety on the part of the individuals who received the message. On the next call their need for information will be even greater.
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The lack.of' communication lines and the. lack of ORO's ability once they get on the phone.with.the schools =and n
specia1 facilities to break the communication and. move to the next call, is going to delay their' ability 1to get' j through the list. That is not to say that they are not. !
going to be able to conclude the call' list but to conclude the list in a timely fashion.
One has to look at the type of incident that they.are going 1
to be faced with. It could be a fast-moving incident where- !
you' jump from an alert to a general emergency; it could.be a slow-moving-incident in which the general' notification. ,
times run to roughly a two-and-a-half-hour time frame to alert all people. That ic where I see the lack, or the breakdown in this particular instance, in how to.
stick to that prescripted messages in conjunction with the' lack of communication lines to all those facilities.
I think'that you are going to run into a situation, where once it becomes apparent that there is a problem at the Seabrook plant, the public will begin to seek more i information. people who have children in schools are going to be concerned about whether their children are being appropriately taken care of and are going to tie up those limited lines into the schools and special facilities.
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In. summary, one of the, primary concerns that-I have is'that the principals and special facility administrators would, j l
inefact, be= seeking further information from the special
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n population 11iaison and school liaison. That would take additional time:in terms of individual conversations conducted by the school liaison and special population liaison.
J In the limited time that is available'to the liaisons, in making.a call, they are-going to be taxed to the maximum trying to input a tremendous amount of information that could potentially be of a technical nature that the , i recipient, the school. principal, would~not have a clear understanding of. From experience with the nuclear power industry and doing communications to off-site response agencies, one of the problems that we have encountered and consistently encounter is the use of the terminology that the nuclear power industry uses. That impacts that area.
Q. Have you had a chance to review various statements from principals of schools and special facility administrators in the Massachusetts EPZ?
A. Yes.
Q. Did any of those statements contribute to your opinion and, if so, in what way?
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A. Yes. There were comments by some school principals about questions that they would have based upon the scripted message. They indicated that receipt of the message would I i
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- n. lead them to.ask questions such as'where the buses are coming from. By virtue of.the fact that the individuals
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who may be assigned to liaison' positions are not necessarily completely famil'iar with the Seabrook Plant nor i 1
the operation of the SPMC,.they might not be able to answer f the questions. Those questions being unanswered would further compound the issue by. making the principals want to ask more questions to-try to get at.least some sort of an answer such as "what's going on" and "what type of emergency are they faced with". '
People in a crisis. situation want'information and they wany to have an ability to' trust the source that the information comes from. If they can not trust the source because'it cannot provide answers to their questions, they are going to further tie up the communication links by trying to get to a source where they can trust.
In addition, there are a very limited number of lines that lead into the schools and special facilities. The statements from the school principals and special facility administrators leads me to conclude that during normal operations getting in touch with the schools is at times somewhat difficult. The majority of the principals indicates that in an unusual event such as a snow storm, the phone lines are completely jammed.
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Besides seeking to receive information , principles would also'be looking to convey it to parents or other concerned parties. .The Procedures indicate that the liasons will ask
! if there~is any EBS message the principal wants to send.
1 Severs 1 principals have indicates they probably wouldLhave such messages to send. The relay of those messages would-lengthen the liasons conversations.
During an emergency situation like this, .that.would' further compound the accessibility of the lines either,by the ORO member who is trying to call the school or b'y the school who is trying to get back to the ORO liaison. Thisi will cause the-liaison who has a series of contacts to make to be delayed in each step of the process. So that by.the-time that he has concluded his list the information that.he initially gave may no longer be valid and he has to restart that whole process again. Each restart which would lead to- ,
i delays upon delays. The liason personnel are not adequate to the task, i
Q. In connection with a parallel issue, have you had an opportunity to review Evaluation Criteria F.2 in the FEMA finding?
A. Yes, j Q. Have you had a chance to review the evaluation of that criteria in that same finding?
A. Yes, and they evaluated it as adequate.
Q. Do you agree with that evaluation?
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A. .I would have.to disagree with that. adequacy evaluation.
-Q. Why do you disagree.with the evaluation of adequacy?
A. In reviewing; the SpMC, there appears to be limited
- , communication links with hospitals and ambulance companies. Looking at emergency situations, an outflow'of information could'cause the hospital phone lines, which are limited in number, to become clogged with calls to the hospital from the general public to check on relatives who are patients'and other people.
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Q. Did you have a, chance to review the statements of the hospitals as to the demographic distribution of the families of the patients?
A. Yes', and from that review it appears that most of the '
hospital patients have relatives and or friends who live within the Emergency Planning Zone. I would assume they would be concerned over the welfare of a relative in the hospital in an emergency situation.
Q. Do you have any opinion as to what that would lead to?
A. Given the fact that there would probably be a tremendous amount of uncertainty with regards to what the seriousness of the incident, I would opine that the reaction of the affected families and relatives, would be to check and see how secute that patient is in the hospital. That means j they would call to the hospital and tie up the lines.
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To further take'this issue one step further, it appears that under certain circumstances at the alert stage, a beach evacuation may be ordered. That would lead me to be concerned over the amount of information available to the public. Under those circumstances, a snowball effect of movement of people off beaches into the populated areas would occur. That process would start a chain reaction with regards to the communication flow. That would result
'i in many people seeking information on dependents and relatives.
Q. Have you.had an opportunity to review the provisions of the.
plan in connection with hospitals?
A. Yes.
O. Have you formed any opinion as to.the adequacy'of those provisions?
A. Yes, I have.
Q. Okay. What is that opinion?
A. There appears to be a lack of adequacy in the way the plans and procedures are written and in the ability of the ORO to handle the communications with the hospitals, an aspect which we have talked about earlier. There appears to be a lack of follow-through by the Seabrook ORO with regard to private health care institutions to whom they have sent their generic plan. ORO has not gone.back to them to tailor-the plan to that particular facility and add items that would focus in on the facility's needs.
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Also, i-t appears from the data that I have seen and the j L documentation I have been able to look at, that the availability of beds by transferring individuals'who~are' 1
hospital patients in the EpZ to host hospitals is inadequate. The SpMC has not' correctly assessed the number of people that would be coming from the EpZ in relation-to the occupancy levels of the hospitals currently slated to-receive them. Also, it appears that there's no direct transfer of nursing home patients associated to any specific hospital facility or nursing home facilities. So , .
you have compounded the whole issue ty having hospital i
patients and nursing home patients potentially approaching, and vying for the same bed space. ]
The other aspect I have looked at is the suitability of hospitals for sheltering when you cannot evacuate people out of the hospital or when sheltering is recommended. It appears to me that there's a very grave lack of information as how to implement sheltering within the hospitals.
In conjunction with that, the staffing levels that are available at the hospitals are inadequate in many evacuation situations. If you are evacuating patients, a certain number of staff is going to be going with those patients during transit. That will limit the ability of the staff that is left behind to care for persons who can
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be evacuated and t'o shelter them.- That in combination'with-
.i 1- the lack of information SpMC contains on what to do for !
E- effective sheltering, posesLa significant' planning inadequacy.
L Another problem is.that if an' emergency were to occur.
during an evening shift, it appears that there are less than-the normal staffing levels. A. night-shift' level that would be responsible.for.the' movement of a large number of-i people out.offthe hospital. There does not appear to bs .j adequate staff in the hospitals to do that and the-SpMC ')
does'not provide-for. personnel or'other resources"to assigt in such a' situation.
I also see the availability of the appropriate-equipment to H
transfer patients from rooms transportation for evacuation or to.a more protected area in the hospital for sheltering as being a problem. Apparently, the hospitals.do not have enough wheelchairs to move all non-ambulatory. patients at-one time.
I think another problem one has'to look at is the availability of specialty vehicles such as ambulances and wheelchair vans that would be needed to move the hospital's '
population and residents of nursing homes and other i i
special care facilities. There appears to be a lack of j adequate vehicles available. l 1
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There also appears to be a lack of' adequate staffing for the specialty vehicles.
Use of a school bus, for instance, l . .would require that you have approximately three or four l *,
staff, to assist the patients from the hospitals onto the vehicle. Then, th'ere are the problems of not being able to leave a vulnerable individual' alone for any great length of l
time and how to control'that whole population'in movement from the hospital to the reception facility. There is a problem, I think, with a lack of a sufficient number of people to accompany evacuees to either a reception facility-or to work-with them in a host facility. .,-
'Q. Have you had an opportunity to review the FEMA finding that pertains to: Evaluation Criterion J.10.e?-
A. Yes.
Q. Do you agree with that finding?
A'. No, I do not agree with FEMA's finding of adequacy. The ORO is too thinly staffed to provide the required assistance and support to hospitals. Also, the SpMC appears to be flawed in'its procedures for.the distribution of potassium iodide. From statements I have seen, personnel from hospitals and other special facilities including nursing homes, do not have an understanding of what potassium iodide is. Under the plan, potassium iodide will only be distributed to hospitals and other special needs facil'ities if it is requested. So there is no
f reasonable assurance of any kind of distribution because if-personnel at special facilities in the Massachusetts EpZ do not know what it is, how are they going to ask for the l stuff. I also see a problem with the actual method for the distribution of potassium iodide. It is my understanding that a runner from the facility, the Seabrook facility, will.go to the hospital or facility that potassium iodide is to be distributed at and drop off the package of potassium. iodide and leave.
The statements from the hospitals and other special facilities reflect a concern that since they do not know 3 about potassium iodide, they will not give it to patients .j or-residents, because they do not know enough about its ,
i possible side effects and how it will interact with other 'l medications the patients or residents are on.
I suggest that that shows a need for some trained medical l personnel to act as distribution agents for potassium j iodide so that they can explain the medical aspects of j potassium iodide to hospital and special facility personnel )
and the possible side effects that it may have on a patient.
Q. Have you had an opportunity to review provisions of the plan, the procedures thereunder, the appendixes connected thereto for schools in'the Massachusetts EpZ7 A. Yes.
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- Q. Have you had a chance to review the FEMA findingJin connection with evaluation criteria J.10.d?
A '. Yes.
Q. Have you had an opportunity to review the FEMA finding that was made with respect to that evaluation criteria?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you agree with that evaluation?
A. Based on my review and analysis of the plan procedures and-comments within the FEMA evaluation, no, I do not agree l
with the evaluation of adequacy, j
Q. With respect to the FEMA finding as it pertains to the schools., why do you' disagree with that finding?
A. To reflect on a previous portion of.the testimony with' regards to special. populations, we discussed in the i hospital area lack of communication lines and in particular a lack of phone lines to the facilities. The material that I have reviewed thus far and statements by the principals indicate that a similar situation exists in terms of the availability of communication and telephone lines to schools. There is a lack of telephone lines -- incoming lines to the schools. Most schools have only two or three L
lines that will hinder the notification process by virtue. 1 of the fact that they are often completely full during i
normal days and with unusual events, like snow storms, L
jammed. In the same way that parents call in on snow days to find out what is happening at the schools, it is 1
foreseeable they will call the schools in the event of a !
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.(x, Q. With re5pect to the support and assistance that ORO would, provide to schools, have you made any conclusions in- ;
connection with the adequacy of those provisions?
A. Regarding the staffing that ORO is providing, they have six school, liaisons who are to contact a number of schools and 1
'begin a sequence of communications with the schools. As I
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have previously noted I fee 1 there is an inadequacy there --
with regards to that staffing.
To my knowledge, they do not send any staff to.the school j 1
facility other than to provide transportation. So there is no provision for traffic control or access control at the schools. Also, there seems to be no provision for i assistance'in interpreting protective action recommendations as they apply to the particular schools.
The schools may well need a person trained.in sheltering factor evaluation to properly implement sheltering. This would be particularly true for schools without basements or windowless rooms.
l There is also some confusion in the alert notification procedure in that they are providing notification to the schools in the emergency planning zone again with a scripted message but also providing the same notification to schools outside the emergency planning zone for students .
1 who live within the planning zone, i
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. I With the apparent situation as it is structured, I would I
opine_, there could be a potential for a significant amount ~
of confusion with the schools outside of the planning zone with regard to receipt of the message and misunderstanding of communication.
Q. -You mentioned that you saw'a problem with'providing staffs to the schools. In particular you mentioned difficulty with access control. Why do you see'that as being problematic?
A. Two reasons. One, with regard to traffic and access control, there is no planning. parameter that has been provided to handle the issue of parents coming to the .,.
school to retrieve their children. That gets you into an extremely volatile situation of being unable to account for the school population and being able to monitor the withdrawal of students on a piece-meal basis by someone who says that they are the parent for that student.
In the second instance most of the school principals are concerned over the issue of a lack of adult supervision on the buses. That is something NHY ORO should provide to assist in the movement of children.
Q. You also mentioned that you saw a problem with the lack of availability of staff from ORO to assist with PAR recommendations made to the schools. What kind of problem do you see with that?
p ,1 A. Again, referring back to some of the comments of the i
principals and some of the issues dealing with the adequacy of the schools for in-place shelteri'ng, there appears to be a design issue that some schools'are not equipped to o .
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provide in-place sheltering simply by the nature of their design either being on a cement base with no basement or not having an internal area away from windows to provide shelter for the students. Several principals even after hearing t.he sheltering instructions on the protective action message indicated that they were concerned they-would not be able to implement effective sheltering measures.
t Q. With respect to staffing to respond to a sheltering recommendation, what kinds of actions would you suggest the additional staff from ORO to perform in connection with the schools?
i A. Additional staff from the ORO should be available'at the I
schools to assist the school principals either with interpreting a special protective action recommendation for those schools, and should evacuati.on be ruled.out entirely, they should assist them with regards to implementing a q
l make-shift sheltering to the best of their abilities with J l
resources at the schools. Such personnel should be able to assess the material available at the school that could be set up as boundary materials and and recommend the implementation of on the spot sheltering procedures such as closing the curtains and having students stay away from the l
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-windows. 'To 'someone' knowledgeable in radiological sheltering some of the equipment the school has on hand may be ab1e'to provide,a make shift barrier to potential plume-exposure't'o the students.
Q. In connection with the support to be afforded to the school in'the event of evacuation, do-you see any. problem with the support provisions in the plan?
A. They are providing a generic school plan in which many of the principals have already alluded to the factfthat they,
- 1) have never~ received the plan; 2) would not know how to implement the plan; and 3) are very concerned because it's not specificienough to their facilities.
Q. Do you see any other problems with the SPMC provisions.for' the schools?
A. A^ review of'the current provisions for buses, makestme concerned whether-there are enough buses to adequately meet the needs of'the school population. While NHY has identified numerous bus agreements in the plans and claim to have sufficient amount of buses available, in fact, many of those buses will be used for other purposes such as evacuating special facilities.
I think you have to look at the agreements that have a-provision "to provide up to so many buses". Some of the bus managers have been interviewed and stated that that does not mean the total number of buses manager has will be available at any given time because of previous contractual
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e agreements they have to meet. So the number of the buses actually available will impact the overall evacuation.
Another point of concern.is how many of those vehicles will malfunction and is there a sufficient backup for those buses. There does not appear to be any factual basis for NHY ORO's choice of surplusage percentage.
I also see a problem with the' procedures for making those buses available to the schools.
It is my understanding that currently as the plan for the ORO is structured, the school liaisons directly contact the l
principals at the schools. In some instances they should be talking to the superintendents at the schools. Those are the individuals responsible for the 1:
transportation-related issues at the schools.
In regard to the bus issue in particular, the review I had of the bus managers' procedure would lead one to believe that the bus drivers are not going to be looked upon to l have a second shift or alternate shift for that position.
l So you are going to have to look at an availability of a l fresh body to be able to drive the bus. The individual 1
drivers could have been on duty for twelve hours or more l during an emergency.
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Q. To go back one step, do you see any problem with their plan ,
to coordinate buses with the principals rather than the superintendents' office in connection with any particular situation?
A. I think it adds to the confusion of the situation with regards to the transportation issue. Statements from the schools show that they normally release the older school population before the younger school population because of working parents. Apparently in some families the older school children are looked to to care for the younger school children. Additional linkage would be required from a principal to the school superintendent to determine particular busing requirements and then to get back to the school liaison in this regard. It would put an already strained system to further burden.
The communication links as we've discussed earlier are certainly limited already.
Q. llave you had a chance to review the provisions of the plan in connection with whether there are any provisions dealing with children that walk or drive themselves to school in the event of an evacuation?
A. Based on a review of the SpMC materials, there appears to be no reasonable assurance that once released from the school those populations that r ormally either walk to school or have their own transportation are going to be either returning to their home or moving to a reception center.
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! So'there is really a lack of any planning for' control of i L the p.opulation'with regards to those students that may be
-released in this manner..
Q. In connection with the fact that there's been no site specific assessment of the' schools-but rather that only a. .l genetic plan has been issued in connection 1with them, do- !
you see any problem with actually being able to either contact or provide appropriate resources to the school: l during the time that the schools would be open? I
'I A. X think the' issue has got to be addressed from a facility perspective, each school.being a different facility. One l must look at.the normal hours of operation that the. school l actually has, they may'not be the same as the officin1 , ] e school hours with students.usually being let out at 3:30.
The-focus may go beyond that.
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That issue should be looked at on a site specific basis, j
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Site-specific-planning means looking beyond the normal j j
school hours and considering after-hours-activities such as
'i sports'that may be happening at the schools.
Q. Have you had an opportunity to review the provisions of the plan that exist for resident special need population? j A. Yes. By resident special need population, I'm referring to those persons who reside in their own homes but may have special needs of assistance in terms of any radiological emergency. In other words, the non-institutionalized members of the population who have disabilities or impairments.
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L Q. Have.you seen any provision in the plan for notifying or !
' communicating with the resident special need~ population in the event of-a radiological emergency if they are not on 1 the list resulting from mail in card survey?
A.. No. This' appears to be a significant lack of planning !
forethought. I refer you to'the testimony of Guy.Daines ;
i for a full explication of what-problems will arise in'the event of an evacuation with this lack of planning. In 1 l
short, an adequate plan will put aside adequate resources l to deal with those members of the special needs population l
was were not-pre-identified.
O. With respect to the provisions that exist in the SpMC for !
support and assistance to the resident special needs . -j population, do you agree with the FEMA finding that those* ;
provisions are adequate?
A. No. Absolutely not. As far as I can see, the only resources allocated for this segment of the population =are the obtaining and dispatching of special vehicles set out in IP 1.10. I think that Ms. Moriearty, in her testimony 4
on JI 49 makes it very clear that the needs of this segment of the population will not be adequately addressed by the ,
dispatch of special vehicles. I agree with her on this.
Q. From a planner's perspective, how would you deal with this omission.
A. First, I would change the actual language of the plan. It is incredibly narrow. For example, IP 1.10 (5.2.4) at page 7 describes Appendix M as being " Emergency Resource Manual to identity . . . the non-institutionalized hearing-impaired
7_-
and' medic 611y homebound in your community." I am no expert on varying' levels of disability but anyone knows that " hearing impaired" ,and " medically-homebound" are not at all representative of the varying types of disabilities present in a.given community. There is not even a mention of other types of impairments or disabilities.
Q. What is the effect of that?
A Well, the obvious effect, is to only address the needs that hearing impaired individuals and " homebound" individuals might have. For example, you tell me they have agreed to buy TDDs - there's one down. And, apparently the dispatch of vehicles will take care of the " homebound". As far as' the letter of the Plan, some would argue that it's been complied with. Of course, .it is transparent that'what has nnt been complied with is the need to provide for the non-institutionalized special needs individuals.
The FEMA finding of adequacy on this point (J.10.d) reflects the narrow and limiting language of the Plan.
FEMA made it's finding of adequacy essentially by finding that these vehicles were to be dispatched.
Q. As a planner, how would you deal with provisions for this segment of the population?
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A. I would ensure that notification, support and assistance was afforded to those members of the population who had
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been identified as needing special assistance. In addition, there would be available trained staff ready to assist those who had not been identified but whc had been estimated as part of the population and provisions for special equipment as needed. Again, I refer you to the Guy Daines testimony I mentioned earlier.
Q. How would you define such notification, assistance and support?
A. It would be relative to the particular special needs that had to be addressed. The key is really in the trained staff and trained contact people that could be available to assist in evacuation and sheltering. Please refer t'o Ms.
t Morierity's testimony, she discusses importance of appropriate and relative needs assessment.
Q. Are you familiar with the pro-written shelter message in the SPMC7 A. Yes.
Q. What is you opinion of this " Shelter Message" A. In my opinion, it is inadequate. It isn't clear who would receive the message, and the contents of the message clearly don't take into consideration the fact that some disabled individuals can't perform or understand the protective actions.
Q. The special vehicles we spoke about earlier are to be used j in an evacuation. How do you find the SPMC with respect to special needs residents if there were a protective action to shelter?
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1 4 A. Totally inadeq'uate. I. find no-provision'in the plan that-adequately addresses thisLmatter. On that point, FEMAL doesn'*t = address it at. all ..
Apparently, thesSpecial population Liaison will call.thoseR who have' pre-identified-and 'or1whom vehicular transport is
'being verified. 'Again, this is extremely-limited.- There-are no affirmative' steps taken regarding assistanceLin.
s he l t e r i ng '. .If'an individual.has an impairment that.
.preventsLhim from taking the necessary sheltering precautions or from.actually.taking shelter,c a' tremendous problem would arise because there is no SpMC provision'andt no staff to deal with this.
In sum,.I would say that there, appear to be serious omissi'ns o in the SpMC with respect to the special needs--
residents and.the FEMA finding.of adequacy with respect to this population is incorrect.
- Q. How would you deal with this from a planning perspective?
A. Again, I think you have to look at the population that has l
been identified and plan appropriate assistance. You also 1
- take into consideration that portion of the estimated l- target population that has not been identified and you p~ allow' resources and planning to cover them. As a practical l
point, I would not rely on the unplanned assistance of 1
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i neighbors and friends without.first finding out.what kind a of' assistance would be' reg'uired and'then verifying-the !
avail. ability of'such assistance.
Q. Have you had an' opportunity to review the provisions of.the SPMC as well as it's appendizes and procedures and the FEMA finding as it relates to those provisions for special needs populations located in special facilities?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you agree with FEMA's finding of adequacy in connectioq with that population?
A. No. I think the SPMC is inadequate with respect to notification, assistance, and support for special facilities.
n Q. What problems with the SPMC's notification procedures. exist for special facilities?
A. The notification procedures as they currently depend on special population liaisons are problematic. I would go back to my earlier comments regarding the schools and the resident populations. You have a limited number of personnel assigned in the ORO to conduct notifications of a large population. There are too many phone calls to get through under the circumstances and given the limited I
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[ eL number tf lines going into many facilities. There appears to be aLpresumption on the part of NHY-ORO regarding twenty-four hour manning of.those facilities. That is not.
always the case.
NHY.ORO looks primarily to:the. telephone. system as-being the primary system'for alerting. In somo' instances because a particular facility may not man the phone onLa twenty-four hour basis, there is the possibility that a-message regarding sheltering, evacuation or an emergency situation at Seabrook may not be received by.the population.
t Another problem is there seems to be a dependence'upon'the person who answers the phone getting.the message out to the population in the special facility. This population may be disbursed in cluster housing far from the office as is the case with Newbury Housing Authority facility. So lack of a central switchboard and dependence on non-existent 24-hour staffing of the facility leads me to believe that the special population liaisons people, trying to conduct the notification, are going to have problems getting through to, the people who need the assistance.
Q. In connection with the provisions of the plan addressing support and assistance to special facilities, do you see any. problems existing?
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Yes.. There-appear to be no provisions for support A..
assistance.to.those' facilities other than'providing transportation to the' facility. ,
Again, previously on the
, . transportation issue,_I'noted that there appears to be l
somewhat of a p'lan bias towards identifying a large. amount of vehicles for transportation but not fully looking at the possibility that all;of those vehicles may not be available.
What appears to be contemplated in the SpMC is a simultaneous, or one wave, evacuation of hospitals, schoolr the special facili'ies that are identified in Appendix M, and those resident special need individuals whp have notified ORO that they need assistance in some way. I think the transportation system seems to be potentially
~
taxed with regard to its availability.
Another. problem'to look at'is the SpMC procedures which are-to be used by.NHY ORO. The liaison procedures appear to be lacking in consistency in that'they are more process oriented in that listings for the individual responsibilities of different positions are all lumped together. Then you as a liaison, have to find what other' pages your particular functions are on at different stages in the crisis situation. I think that that is going to cause a problem with regards to how that organization
7 j. i u operate 3~and their' efficiency in a crisis situation. AsLI pointed out, the efficiency of time management'is a real concern of mine.
'. Q. With respect 'to the provisions of the SpMC for providing assistance, do you see any problem in connection with the special facilities that are in the EpZ?
A. From materials that I have reviewed, the lack ofLORO staffing to provide individuals to assist the special care facilities with moving people could be a significant problem. CertainLof the populations could become disruptive in one way or another either by causing a violent type of disruption because of an inability to associate with large groups of people at reception centers' or the Shriner's Arena. By virtue of physical impairments,
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.a portion of the special needs pooulation will require ,
l additional personnel to assist the staff of the facility to j ensure the movement of the evacuees in a timely fashion.
One has to consider that for many special facilities there is a lack of, or a greatly reduced, evening, night, and weekend staff. There will be inadequate staff at the facility to move their resident population for sheltering i
or evacuating. The ORO will have to provide some sort of l assistance with staff to assist the permanent staff at the facilities in moving their residents or patients for ,
sheltering or evacuation.
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Q.. Have.you'had an opportunity to review provisions of the plan,.the procedures thereunder, the. appendices connected thereto in relation to the distribution of potassium iodide
! in the Massachusetts EpZ?
A. Yes..
l-.
L Q. Have you had-a chance to review the FEMA finding.in J
connection with evaluation criteria'J.10.e?
A. Yes.
Q. Have you had an opportunity to review finding that was made by FEMA with respect to that evaluation criteria?
A. Yes.
Q. Do you agree with that evaluation?
A. Based on my review and analysis . of the plan procedures and' comments within the FEMA evaluation, no, I do not agree with the evaluation of being adequate.
Q. With respect to the FEMA finding that distribution of radioprotective drugs to those' persons whose evacuation may be infeasible or very difficult, why do you disagree with that finding?
A. Based'upon the materials I have reviewed, it appears that many special facilities that might be difficult to evacuate lack of knowledge of what potassium iodide is. Under the SpNs the procedures basically state that ORO will only distribute potassium iodide if it is requested. The fact that'many special facilities do not know that it is available, would not know to request it, and would not know what to do with it when they got it presents a perceptible l 1
problem.
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0-If..the special facilities have the wear. withal to request.
. potassium iodide, a runner from the Seabrook facility will take the potassium. iodide to the facility. 'This.does not' mean the runner will be adequately prepared to discuss the
-medical side effects of taking potassium iodide or be'able
.to discuss how-to administer potassium iodide. -
Therefore, I view the evaluation criteria as not being satisfied, and the provision of the SpMC as inadequate.
Q. Have you had a chance to review the provisions for the special host facility for special needs population?
A. Yes. .
-t Q. Do you find the provisions that the plan makes for host' facility to be-adequate?
A. Not from the perspective of the type of populations that will be coming into that facility. I find it to be inadequate.
Q. In connection with the special host facility which has been identified as the Aleppo Temple Shrine, or.Shriners Auditorium, what problems exist under the provisions of the SpMC7 A. With regards to my understanding of the Red Cross provision of its services to the Shriners Auditorium, that is limited to the Red Cross's normal type of cots and other supplies l
l that it would furnish to a regular congregate care center.
l As I understand it, the Red Cross will not supply Shriners l Auditorium with any kind of medical support other than I
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, , ' general.first and nor will they provide resources such as trained'staffsto handle members of the special needs populations needing special~ medical attention, special equipment such as' bed rails, or bed: pans. Those type of' -
things-will be needed by a substantial portion of the special needs~ population-who are evacuated into the ShEiners Auditorium. There is no provision for either.
providing the special needs population with special equipment or trained' staff. There also appears to be a significant problem with'the facility in that it is contemplated that all spectrums of the vulnerable special needs population will be housed together in one huge 3 facility. This appears to show not only an. insensitivity-to'the primary needs of a portion of the population who'has significant personal care requirements but also ,
l demonstrates a total lack of forethought as to whether such a facility could possibly provide for the mental and j emotional needs of that population. As a couple of the ,
I statements from the Special Facilities reflect, their ,
populations are such that they could not, and at least in one case, would not stay at the facility. Dr. DiMauro :j i
predicted that the emotionally disabled adolescents of the l Harbor Schools would run away from such a place. Other portions of its population such as the residents of the M.R. Residences might become aggresive or otherwise disruptive if placed in a hugh anonymous crowd. That will !
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dis'rupt"the everyday operations of the facility.
Individuals from nursing-home populations could potentially ,
i have.a significant deterioration of their ability.to
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sustain themselves. That could also cause problems at the L
facility. The matter-of the non-institutionalized special l
.needs residents is another problem. To assume that-this segment of the population housed at Shriner's will not need-medical services is inadequate. To assume'that staff from.the facilities can expand their role is risky. .p eople 1 with disabilities will most likely be more vulnerable ~
a during a crisis and, to the extent that plans are {
inadequate or non-ezistent, this likliness increases. .
Q. From a planning point of view, what recommendations would you have in connection with making provisions for host facilities for special populations?
A. I think that the populations need to be moved to facilities that are fully handicap accessible. At the present time, I understand the Shriners Auditorium to be only partially handicap accessible. Second, one should simply identify. 1 1
facilities that are-facilities like those that are being evacuated and make arrangements to move the resident i populations to those facilities. You would really have to ~ !
look at the capacity of the host facilities to absorb the i
populations and be able to maintain their current level of operation.
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i i But'frdra.a pure planning' perspective, I;think the significant-issue-would be to. identify the population being-evacuated,--associate them as near as can be found-to;a like-type facility _that could accommodate their needs-in"a-more humane' fashion.
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G ERY W. SIRICM 1646 cardinal Drive Munster, Indiana 46321 (219) 924-4865 PROFESSIONAL EXPERIRWCE Laventhol -( Morvath (Lt.N)
Responsible for establishing and managin LeM's Emergency and Environmental Advisory services practice. gThe practice provides management advisory services to the private and public sector. The practice consists et four integrated strategic business units:
Regulatory Compliance Services Baergency Planning Servicae Training Services Information services Pannell Xerr Forster (PKF)
Established and managed Environment.a1 and Energy Management consulting services Group. The Group provided environmental and emergency transportationpreparedness entities. consulting services to energy, chemical, and t
Logical Management Systems (uts)
Initiated the startup of Logical Management Systems. Consulted to several start-up firms in the area of business and strategic planning.
Designed an energency preparedness commitment tracking system for a major southern utility, consulted to large nuclear engineering concerns in the areas of emergency planning, training, litigation support and plant licensing. Facilitated the design, and implementation of emergency response management program for a major southeastern management andutility.
r Developed computerized programs for crisis training program.egulatory complianoe. Developed time management '
Impe11 Corporation nanagement emergency consult to two major Midwestern utilities. Developed personnelh+ preparedness and plant licensing programs. Developed job descriptions and selection criteria. Represented utility management as liaison to community and regulatory groups.
The Detroit Edison Company Designed and implemented emergency preparedness training program. ,
Developed department strategy, schedules and budget. Evaluated corporate in management, crisis management.
public officials and response organizations ;
conducted pre-licensing anergency preparedness exercise and audit / appraisal programs. i i
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=
- i GEARY W. SIKICH
.Page 2 '
w Science Applications, Inc.
Responsible for the design and initial testing of the U.S. Army National Training Center. Developed data analysis methods to 3*.**[510' th' *fM*pa"O'a'n's i l
- e*R*rtc"/*r%18th'M4 r DIN f Commission.Designedasupervised-on-The-Job-Trainingpro@ g senior staff of the Royal Saudi Navy. for U.S. Army (of ficer) !
served in supervisory functions, planning, data analysis, information systems structuring and data acquisition. conducted concept testing of information collection and processing centers. }
Investigated feasibility of U.S. Army National Training center.
Provided strategic studies of lines of communications,
{
telecommunications, transportation and l political /moonomic infrastructure for the highest level executive decision-makers. ,
EDUCATION i 3 i M.A., Management:
Central Michigan University (graduate studies) k l
M.Ed.,
Educational Psychology: University of Texast 1981 8.5.,
Criminology: Indiana State Universitys 1973 i
p.,
e l
l
m GEARY W. SIRICH
- 1648 Cardinal Drive Munster, Indiana 44321 CAREER MIGMLIGNTS a- <
Initiated and inergy theAdvisory start-up services of IAventhol & Norwath's Environmental practice.
Developed NAZvAL" an envircosantal compliance program.
Initiated the start-up of Pannell Kerr Forster's Environmental and Energy Management Consulting services..
Initiated the start-up of Logical Management systems.
Developed CONTINGENCY MANAGENINT TEMPLATE' a crisis managem program.
e covelePes averemAN' ..
- w.wr pumperwuriwww auais program.
Power Company. Developed CONTRAX' a constitaaet tracking sy i
Established a record of " Seat in the Region", for initial Emergency Preparedness exercise for Detroit Edison's FERNI 2 Plant, Texas Utilities CONMNINE PBAE Plant, Caroline Power &
Light's sHEARON MARRIs Plant.
Senior Staff of the Royal Saudi Navy. Developed a s Sucesssfully National conducted Training Canter. initial testing of the U.S. Army SELECTED PUBLICATIONS / PAPERS Sikich, Military Intelligence Magazine, 1978. Gear'y N.FIRE ; NATTONAL EXERCISES; TRAIN Sikich, Seary N.; NATIONAL TRAINING CENTER Military $htelligence Magazine, 1979.
PHASE I COMPLETION; Sikich, (cave), eu.a.
s ry N.; ROYAL s vens, SAUDI NAVY SUPERVISED-ON-THE-Jos TRAININ A,w..
Sikich, Geary W.; RADIOLOGICAL CNERGENCY RESPONSE FMEPAREDN TRAINING INSTRUCTION MANUAL, 1942.
Sikich, Geary W. r ASPECTS OF STRATEGIC / MANAGERIAL PIANNING 1983 .
Sikich, Geary W.;
DEVE14 PING A STRATEGIC PLAN FoR EMERGENCY PIANNING AT IMPELL CORPORATION.
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Sikiah, Geeiry W. i SURVIVING IN A COMPETITIVE ENVIRONMENT: THE NEED FOR STRAT5GIC COMPANIES, 19s4.PLANNING IN SMALL AND MEDIUM-SIZED OIL AND GAS '
l a sikich, i Geary W.; OVERVIEW of ENERGENCY PLANNING, Planning workshop, october 5, Emergency 8, 1987.
Sikich, Geary W. ; EMERGENCY P1ANNING and PREPAREDNESS THE P!.ANNING FUNCTION, Emergency Planning Workshop, October 5, 6, 1987
- sikich, W.;
Geary EVALUATING CQNM.I ANCE; worxahop, October 5, 6, 19s7. Energency Planning sikich osary W WMAT IF..... f% w een n ,c - ehdiL6v =ad anarenbider Right. s: ; The shareholders, March 19s8 Impact of Environmental Legislation on
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Sikich, Geary CRISIS C000R1NICATIONS PLANNING, Emergency Planning 1988. and Chemistry for the Non-Chemist Workshop, August 11,12,
- sikich, caery W.i WHAT IP...., The Impact of Environmental Legislation on the Health Care Industry, Management, october 19as. Hospital Materials
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