ML20235H473
| ML20235H473 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Fort Saint Vrain  |
| Issue date: | 09/11/1987 |
| From: | PUBLIC SERVICE CO. OF COLORADO |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20235H443 | List: |
| References | |
| TAC-65992, NUDOCS 8710010065 | |
| Download: ML20235H473 (128) | |
Text
{{#Wiki_filter:.c ; Sk Hac 'ri ns tof 1[. PRELIMINARY REPORT OF HELIUM CIRCbLATOR S/N C-2101 DAMAGE AND JUSTIFICATION FOR RETURNING TO POWER OPERATION . I September 11, 1987 j l
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FORT ST. VRAIN ' NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION Public Service Company of Colorado , i i 8710010045 87CFM21 Ei ' EDR A0(M44 05CKND267, 4 PDR[ _- - ._. ~
1 . PSC. acknowledges the seriousness of the current event; Sowever, after reviewing all of its implications, PSC considers that operation of Fort St. Vrain in accordance with the Technical Specifications and FSAR is justified. This justification is based on the assumption that the root cause of the current parts failure is generic to all machines. PSC is developing a comprehensive program of monitoring, inspections and fastener replacements to ensure that the failures 1 that occurred in circulator C-2101 do not occur again. l
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t r l CONTENTS 1 1.0 PURPOSE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
'2.0. TRIP AND POST-TRIP SCENARIO. . . . . . ... . . . . . . . I 1
3.0 REMOVAL AND INITIAL INSPECTION OF 4 1 C I RCU LATOR S / N C-2_101. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.1 ONSITE INSPECTION AND' FINDINGS. . . . . . . . . . . 4
. . . . 6 3.2 OFFSITE' INITIAL INSPECTION AND FINDINGS J l
3.2.1 Parts;Still Assembled at the lower End t of the Bearing Assembly . . .........6 3.2.2 Parts Disassembled from the Lower End 12 of the Bearing Assembly . . . . . . . . . . 3.2.3 Interspace Seal and.8ellows Leak Tests .. . 22 ; 4.0 PRELIMINARY METALLURGICAL OBSERVATIONS OF PARTS 23 l RECOVERED FROM CIRCULATOR C-2101 . . . . . . . . . . . , S.0 PLANNED COMPLETE DISASSEMBLY AND INSPECTION OF CIRCULATOR C-2101. ..........25 26 l 6.0 HISTORICAL REVIEW 0F HELIUM CIRCULATORS. . . . . . . . 6.1 ORIGINAL DESIGN / DEVELOPMENT PHILOSOPHY, CRITERI A AND ANALYSIS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 6.1.1 Total Machine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26 i 6.1.2 Insulation / Labyrinth Seal Area of Circulator Steam End. . . . . . . . . . . . 28 31 6.2 SPEED / WOBBLE MEASUREMENT SYSTEM . . . . . . . . . 6.2.1 General Information . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 ( 6.2.2 Functional Information. . . . . . . . . . . 31 6.2.3 Interpretational Information. . . . . . . . 32 6.2.4 Wobble Monitor System . . . . . . . . . . . 33 6.3 CIRCULATOR OPERATIONAL-SERVICE HISTORY. . . . . . 33 6.4
SUMMARY
OF PREVIOUS PROBLEMS, REPAIRS AND REFURBISHMENT. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 6.4.1 Replacement History of Steam Ducting ' Bolts (3/4-16x3) and Labyrinth Seal Mounting. ' 36 Bolts (1/4-20xS/8) . . . . . . . . . . . .
f a 6.4.2 Distorted Insulation Cover Found on 36 l Circulator C-2102 in 1979 . . . . . . . . . 6.4.3 Failed Labyrinth Seal Mounting Bolt Found on Circulator C-2104 in 1984. . . . . . . . .39 6.4.4 Speed Probe Bolt Failure on Circulator 40 C-2104 in 1985. . . . . ....... ... 6.4.5 Replacement of Helium-End Stainless 40 Steel Bolts on All Machines in 1985 . . . . 6.4.6 Fretting Identified in GA Inspection Report GA-C15847 for Circulator C-2102 41 in 1980 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.4.7 Cracking of Turbine Water Orain Bellows . . 43 6.5 CIRCULATOR RELIABILITY BASED ON HISTORICAL REVIEW .43 7.0 JUSTIFICATION FOR RETURNING TO POWER OPERATION . . . . .46 46
7.1 INTRODUCTION
7.2 LICENSING BASIS FOR HELIUM CIRCULATOR OPERABILITY .47 48 7.3 OBSERVED FAILURES SIGNIFICANCE. . . . . . . . . . 49 7.4 PREVENTION OF RECURRENCE. . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.5 IMPACT OF CIRCULATOR C-2101 TRIP ON PLANT OPERATION. ..... ... ....... .49 ATTACHMENTS . . . . . . ... .. . ........... .52
t a Page 1 of 52 l l 1.0 PURPOSE The purpose of this report is to provide preliminary l information relative to the damage incurred in helium circulator S/N C-2101 during July,1987, and justification for returning to power operation. 2.0 TRIP AND POST-TRIP SCENARIO 1 Prior to the "C" Circulater trip, the plant was in a stable l condition at approximately 70% power with all four helium ! circulators operating on steam turbine drive. "C" l circulator was operating at a slightly higher speed than "0" circulator. For an hour preceding the trip event, no alarms l occurred. Due to an apparent control system problem, "C" and "D" circulators started ramping up in speed, causing "C" l circulator to trip at 0012 hours on July 22, 1987. "C" I circulator had tripped on low feedwater flow relative to 1 circulator speed (i .e., circulator speed to feedwater flow mismatch). Meanwhile, "0" circulator continued to ramp up l in speed to compensate for the loss of "C" circulator as the I program speed setpoint of "D" circulator automatically ; increased. The controller for "D" circulator was then placed in manual due to sagging main steam temperature and the main turbine load was dropped manually. The plant was stabilized at 50% power. Subsequently, power was reduced to below 30% to recover "C" circulator. The trip of "C" l circulator was reset at 0253 hours. 1 At about 0300 hours (same day), "C" circulator was rolled on I steam. Hot reheat temperature fluctuations and erratic "C" I circulator speeds were experienced. "C" circulator was maintained at approximately 800 rpm, "0" circulator at approximately 8600 rpm and the plant conditions restabilized. l l l Apparently due to misoperation of "C" circulator steam / water drain controls, the steam cavity of "C" circulator had become filled with bearing water. This water was not drained before attempting to roll "C" circulator on steam at 0300 hours. This is believed to be the reason for the attemperation of the reheat steam (temperature fluctuations) and the erratic speed experienced by "C" circulator upon initiating steam drive at 0300 hours.
"C" circulator was self-turbining and "0" circulator was running at about 9200 rpm in local set when "D" circulator tripped on PPS overspeed (high fixed speed) at 0516 hours (about 2 hours after the reheat attemperation caused by "C" circulator). Due to the loss of primary coolant flow in Loop 2, the main turbine was manually tripped, Loop 2 i
isolated and reactor pcwer reduced to below 2', to recover. w_-__- _ _ _ _ _ _ -
t a Page 2 of 52 i On July 22 and 23, troubleshooting took place to try to determine why "C" circulator started ramping in speed prior !' to its trip at 0012 hours, July 22. A functional test and calibration of the circulator speed control instruments on loop 2 was performed and no deficiencies found. With certain data logger information available and through a logical analysis of the control system, the suspect , components were narrowed to a few switches. Tnese switches l were replaced even though no deficiencies were found in the ! original switches. Increased data acquisition has been l initiated to allow for more thorough data analysis should l l the event reoccur. Loop 2 was returned to service at 2230 hours, July 23, and s I reactor power was increased above 2%. At 0600 hours, July 24, with the reactor operating at 2.5% power, "D" circulator was brought up to about 4400 rpm on steam turbine drive and balanced with "A" circulator. Reactor power was increased i to about 5% by 0900 hours. "D" ci rculator speed reached l 5025 rpm, 6030 rpm and its peak 6405 rpm by 1000 hours,1100 hours and 1208 hours, respectively. Due to erratic speed indication on "D" circulator at 1227 hours, Results was prompted to check the speed modules. Results reported an indication of excessively high wobble and therefore the circulator was reduced to less than 800 rpm at 1238 hours, July 24. "C" circulator was brought up to 6600 rpm to compensate for the loss of "D" circulator. Engineering (NED) subsequently became involved in an attempt to assess the continued operability of "D" circulator. Due to i unacceptable wobble indication, Operations was advised not j to operate "D circulator above self-turbining speed except ) for diagnostic purposes (speed was limited to 2000 rpm or l less for this purpose). By 1345 hours, July 24, "D" 3 circulator speed was reduced to abou 400 rpm on self-turbining. Rise to power continued on the three , remaining circulators. l l On July 26, power operation was resumed, sta:llizing at 45% i and approximately 615 psia PCRV pressure. During power i operation, about 2000 hours, July 27, an excessively high l pressure was observed in the turbine water drain tank l (TWDT). The source of this high pressure was found to be ! purified helium. The most likely source of this helium was from the water-turbine piping of "D" circ.ilator possibly indicative of a penetration interspace leak. A surveillance 3 (SR 5.2.16a-0) which determines PCRV closure leakage was then performed and resulted in a computed r.aximum. leakage I through the secondary penetration seal of "D" circulator of approximately 915 pounds of helium per day. This was in l excess of the 400 pounds / day allowed by Technical f' Specification LC0 4.2.9. The 24-hour grace period of LCO l 4.2.9 was entered at 1055 hours on July 28. An orderly l l reactor shutdown was initiated at 2145 hours and one-hour l notification of plant shutdown as required tj LC0 4.2.9 was i l I
Page 3 of 52 made at 2230 hours, July 28. Shutdown was completed at 1026 hours, July 29. Subsequently, PCRV depressurization to below 100 psia was completed at'2108 hours, July 29. During investigation of this event, a de'iciency of the pressurization gas flow monitoring and alarm system was identified. The purified helium header flow instrumentation measures instantaneous flow in the purified relium header. Flow through the purified helium header is constantly fluctuating due to several factors including changes in PCRV pressure and the identified leakage in the Loop 2 steam i generator penetration interspace. These fluctuations cause intermittent actuations of the high flow alarm that are not indicative of unidentified penetration interspace leakage. These intermittent alarms could potentially mask an actual i penetration interspace leakage problem. An action request has been initiated to evaluate the indication circuitry for l modifications that would reduce the frequency of intermittent alarm actuations. Until this evaluation is ! complete and modifications made, operators will log the ! pressurization gas flow once per shift to ensure LCO 4.2.9 l compliance. (
Reference:
LER 87-018-00 submitted under i P-87300). Further "0" circulator wobble measurements were collected under NED supervision on July 27 and 28. Evaluation of i j these wobble values resulted in an indicated wobble at the lower circulator bearing of more than twice the available I bearing clearance. However, the wobble versus shaf t speed j relationship was not representative of an unbalance j condition. Also, if bearing clearances anywhere within the l cartridge had in fact increased, then one would expect cartridge bearing water delta pressure to decrease for . normal flow of 165 gpm. The fact is that the bearing water ! flow / delta pressure relationship was observed by NED 1 personnel to be normal at 165 gpm and 650 psid. This fact made the validity of the wobble indication at least on the lower bearing suspect. These apparent incongruities are yet to be fully explained.
"D" circulator therefore came t.o be considered inoperable on two counts: (1) interspace leak in excess of the LCO 4.2.9 limit and (2) indicated wobble magnitude g-eater than that permitted by the circulator operation and maintenance (0&M) manual for continued operation. On July 31, 1987, the decision was finally made to remove "D" circulator (S/N C-2101) for inspection and replace it with an available refurbished spare (C-2104).
It has been postulated that the interspace leakage may be associated with the high wobble indication; however, at this point in the evaluation there is no direct evidence to indicate that the high wobble and the inters: ace leak on "D" circulator are interrelated.
1 Page 4 of 52 l It has been determined that no primary seal leakage existed. This was verified by isolating the interspace from the purified helium header and monitoring the interspace pressure. The interspace pressure decayed below PCRV pressure when isolated from the header, and no activity was observed in the TWDT. Primary seal leakage would have resulted in the interspace pressure equalizing with PCRV pressure, while a combination of primary and secondary seal i leakage would have resulted in an increase in activity in the TWDT. Since purified helium was discovered in the TWDT, the most i probable interspace secondary seal leak paths were initially narrowed down to three locations: (1) the double metal ; 0-ring series (Items 101 and 102, Dwg. R1100-100, Sheet 5) located in the joint between the expansion joint bellows i ring (Item 66, F.P. 91-M-19-9) and.the steam outlet piping i (Item 81, R1100-100, Sheet 5); (2) the expansion joint bellows itself (Item 64, F.P. 91-M-19-9); and (3) the metal 0-ring (Item 33, C2101-300) providing seal between the circulator bearing assembly (Item 26, C2101-300) and the steam ducting (Item 23, C2101-300). (A fourth possible leak path was identified later during disassembly: puncture or ' l crack through the steam ducting weldment (C2101-431)). However, a means exists for monitoring leakage between the Item 101 and 102 (R1100-100) 0-rings while the circulator is installed. No leakage was in ev!dence between these l 0-rings, which seems to eliminate that as the leak path. l Also, a failure of the expansion joint bellows (Item 64, !' T.P. 91-M-19-9) is unlikely in that no previous such failures to date have been experienced. The metal 0-ring (Item 33, C2101-300) is also considered unlikely because ] there have been no known leaks in this area to date. l However, the 0-ring must be considered due to possible distortion of the seal resulting from the forces involved i i during the exiting of the failed parts (described in Sections 3.1 and 3.2) through relatively small clearances and/or possible relaxation of the sealing force due to , failure of three steam ducting mounting bolts (described in l Section 3.2). (However, rough calculations assuming a' rigid flange have shown that the loss of the three bolts would not j be expected to allow leakage.) 3.0 REMOVAL AND INITIAL INSPECTION OF CIRCULATOR S/N C-2101 Removal of circulator S/N C-2101 from "D" penetration and shipment of the circulator to GA Technologies in San Diego for disassembly was completed by August 14, 1987. 3.1 ONSITE INSPECTION AND FINDINGS During removal operations of C-2101 from the PCRV, some f ailed circulator barcnare pieces were disc:vered lying on - _ - _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - . _ _ _ _ _ _ . A
a , Page 5 of 52 i i the top surface of the special weld neck flange (Item 9, 3 F.P. 91-M-19-1) of the steam inlet and water piping assembly l (F.P. 91-M-19-1) (this flange surface exists in the circulator steam outlet area). The pieces were initially and tentatively identified by configuration as being from at least three different circulator stationary parts located above the steam turbine rotor (Item 24, C2101-300): (1) j insulation cover (Item 11, C2101-300), (2) labyrinth seal l (Item 28, C2101-300 and (3) labyrinth spacer (Item 27 C2101-300). The pieces found ranged in size from large (~7" X 3/4" X 3/16") to small (1" X 1" X 1/16"), to particle sizes of 1/16" to 1/4" diameter. Visual indications on the pieces suggest prolonged and severe rubbing, as the pieces were drastically distorted. Most of the fracture surfaces , exhibited corrosion. In addition to the above parts, some l 1/32" lockwire and a portion of a 1/4-20 bolt were found, i l This area of the steam end of the circulator was not l directly accessible at this stage of disassembly for confirmation of the identity of'these parts. j Three representative sample pieces were chemically analyzed > and all found to be standard type 430 ferritic stainless l steel which agreed with the drawing specified material for each of the above three parts. The discovery of these broken parts and their accurate identity mostly assured led to the postulation that an erroneous overspeed signal and resulting trip of "D" circulator on July 22 may have been a result of these pieces exiting and/or becoming trapped in the clearance between the steam turbine rotor (Item 24, C2101-300) and the steam l ducting (Item 23,C2101-300) causing suf ficient circulator I shaft displacement to affect the measured speed signal (i.e., give a false indication of higher speed). This may also be supported by the fact that a few seconds prior to "D" circulator trip on July 22 the circulator speed controller signal increased (speed valve opening), but I actual "0" circulator speed did not increase (i.e., more steam was admitted but no actual increase in speed resulted). If the parts failure is associated with the overspeed trip of "D" circulator, then it would indicate that "D" circulator was still able to operate up to at least 6400 rpm on July 24 af ter the damage was incurred (i.e., "D" l circulator may have been able to perform its safety function l even though high shaft wobble was indicated). l Additionally, metal to metal contact between stationary and rotating parts may have magnetized the circulator shaft which may also have an adverse effect on speed and wobble sensing. After removal of the steam inlet and water piping assembly ( F.P .91-M-19-1) , a rough inspection of the pelton wheel (Item 13, C2101-300), steam turbine stator (Item 25,
1 1 Page'6 of 52 C2101-300) and steam ducting weldment (C2101-431) became possible. Nothing unusual was __ observed with the pelton-wheel'and steam. turbine stator.. Lodged in'the flow path of
.the steamLducting weldment.were more pieces appearing to'be ;
from the labyrinth seal (Item 28, C2101-300) . and labyrinth spacer (Item 27,_C2101-300). However,-at this time these pieces could not be removed ~for further examination.
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This concluded the relevant inspections =and . findings prior j to shipment of the circulator to San Diego for further disassembly by GA Technologies. l 3.2 ~0FFSITE INITIAL INSPECTION AND FINDINGS 1 On August 14, 1987, . initial disassembly of the steam-end components on circulator lS/N C-2101 took place at GA Technologies. Upon disassembly PSC representatives were on ' hand to witness the inspection. The following discussion with pictorial aids documents the ! included j visual observations made. Attachments 1 and 2 are to show the location of the C2101-300 parts. identified. ; Attachments 3, 4, 5 and 6 show the assembly of interest in greater detail. 3.2.1 Parts Still Assembled at the Lower End of the Bearing Assembly (Item 26, C2101-300)
- 1. Lower Labyrinth (Item 11, C2101-500) (Material: 422 SST per ASTM A565, Gr. 616)
R The area around the bayonet locking tabs (for locking the I.D. of the insulation cover (Item 11, C2101-300)). and the locking tabs themselves_had damage around the ~! edges. Only a small portion of each -locking tab remained (approximately 1/32" to 1/16"). There was no noticeable damage to the labyrinth teeth _and no damage , to the curvic ' coupling on the circulator shaft l (C2101-521).. l 4
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- 2. Steam Ducting Bolt with Pressure Tap (Item 52, i C2101-300) (Bolt Material: A-286 per AMS 5737) !
The pressure tap bolt was broken off. The fracture ' looked fresh. There remained approximately 1 inch of the threaded portion of the bolt in the hole. G '/.
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- 3. Steam Ducting Bolts (Item 45, C2101-300) (Bolt Material: A-286 per AMS 5737)
Bolt No. 10 (Note: Hole No. 9 is for pressure tap bolt) was broken approximately 0.6 inch from the bottom surface of the hole counterbore. The bolt fracture surface had scale on it, with some smooth rub marks. The heads of the remaining bolts (Nos. 1-8, 11-15) were j ground roughly flush to the surface of the steam ducting (Item 23, C2101-300). In the case of bolt No. 1, some bolt material was jammed between the bolt head i and the hole counterbore. All of the bolt lockwiring (Item 81, C2101-300) (Material: Inconel 600) was missing, with the bolt heads ground below the lockwire l holes. i e I
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- 4. Steam . Ducting Weldment (C2101-431) (Material: Inconel l 718 per AMS 5663, forging)
Large bolt hole No. 9 for the pressure tap bolt (Item- ' 52,C2101-300) look slightly distorted. There were two hairline _. fractures visible approximately 180' apart around the bolt hole. The depth of the cracks could ) not be' verified. The uppermost cract (see photo) j j extended radially approximately 3/4 inch ;p the' outer face of the : steam ducting weldment and down into the bolt hole.- The lower crack exterded radially approximately 1/4 inch down thc outer surface adjacent .I to the bolt hole. There was no damage fcand arour.d the bolt hole (No. 10) of the fractured solid bolt 3 1 (Item 45, C2101-300). The outer surface (where labyrinth seal (Item 28, C2101-300) tttached) on. the steam ducting weldment (0.D. surface in photo) .had circumferential grooves ! with the deepest about 0.04. inch. These grooves were i located about 0.6 inch radially from the bolt hole counterbore. Two dowel pins originally existed 180' apart to locate the labyrinth seal on the steam du: ting weldment I surface. One dowel hole (small hole No. 9) was empty and clean. The other (hole No. 2) had part of the dowel pin still in it. Originally there existed twelve 1/4"-20 capscrews (Item l 46, C2101-300) (Material: 410 SST per ASTM A193, Gr. l B6) attaching the labyrinth seal to the steam ducting weldment. Small holes Nos.12,13, and 15 for these screws were empty with clean, undamaged threads. The l remaining holes (Nos. 1,3-8,10,14) had screws broken off in them. Most of these breaks were located about one thread below the surface with the remainder flush with the surface with a rubbed appearance. Originally there existed one. spring plunger (Item 53, C2101-300) (Material: carbon steel) in small. hole No.
- 11. The spring plunger was used for locking the insulation cover (Item 11, C2101-300) irto place once I it was mated and rotated into the cam locks of the I
labyrinth seal. This spring plunger was broken off with a portion of the plunger body lef t in the' hole. Io
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1 3.2.2 Parts Disassembled from the Lower End of the Bearing Assembly (Examined on the bench) l 1 Insulation Cover (Item 11, C2101-300) (Material: 430 , ferritic stainless steel per ASTM A479) Remnants of the insulation cover were pressed into the rim towards the: outer circumference of the steam turbine rotor (Item 24, C2101-300). The 9/16-inch 1 outer axial projection of,the cover was either grossly l bent 90' into thel plane:~of ,the disc or completely 1 missing. About 30% of the cover flat surface was gone. Remnants. of the cover showed much evidence of 1 deformation, rubbing, . metal tearing and cracking. ! There was a circumferential indentation in the cover j surface where it appeared that the .large bolt heads l (Item 45, C2101-300)- had rubbed. The face of the turbine steam rotor disc had circumferential scoring marks with an exceptionally deep score mark
-(approximately.0.12 in, wide X 0.06-in. deep) located on a 6-1/4-in._ diameter.' A portion of'a large bolt head (Item' 45 or_-52, C2101-300) .was found lodged between the insulation cover and turbine disc. The six 3/8-inch holes used for installation of:the insulation !
cover. were mushroomed and distorted around the edges. There was one large-(approximately- 1/2-inch diameter) "
' ding at the outer circumference of the cover. l
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- 2. Labyrinth Seal (Item 28, C2101-300) (Material: 430 ferritic stainless steel)
Two large fragments of the labyrinth seal were found in the steam return bend of the steam ducting weldment , (C2101-431). One was about 11-1/4 inches long and the l o*her about 13-1/2 inches long, with both having 1/2 to 1 1 inch width. This accounts for all but about 18 inches of the total seal circumference. The 0.650-inch l axial projection at the outer circumference was mostly gone and/or severely distorted. The pieces showed heavy score and rub marks. The inner locking tabs were rubbed smooth. Part of a mounting bolt (Item 46, C2101-300) was stuck in one of the mounting holes.
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- 3. Labyrinth Spacer (Item 27, C2101-300) (Material: 430 ferritic stainless steel)
Two large fragments of the labyrinth spacer were found in the steam return bend of the steam ducting weldment (C2101-431). One was about 14-1/4 inches and the other about 21-1/4 inches long accounting for all but about 5-3/4 inches of the total spacer circumference. There were heavy rub marks on the 1.0, surface and the pieces were flattened and distorted somewhat.
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l f., , s i a' l 1 4 Labyrinth Seal Mounting Bolts (Item 46,C2101-300) (Material: 410 SST per ASTM A193, Gr. B6) i The only part of the bolts found were the pieces referred to earlier remaining in the steam ducting weldment and the portion found stuck in the labyrinth seal.
- 5. Lock Washer (Item 29, C2101-300) (Material: 430 ferritic stainless steel)
There was no evidence of the labyrinth seal mounting bolt lock washer found during disassembly at GA (some of the small pieces found on site during circulator removal may be part of the lockwasher).
- 6. Spring Plunger (Item 53, C2101-300) (Material: carbon steel)
There was no evidence of the spring plunger used to lock the insulation cover into place other than the portion found remaining in the steam ducting weldment (referred to earlier). (The spring plunger shown in the photograph is new.)
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- 7. Insulation, Bearing Side and Turbine Side (Items 20 and
- 32. C2101-300) (Material: 430 ferritic stainless steel
(" felt metal")) There was no evidence of the " felt metal" insulation found (some of the small pieces found on site during circulator removal may be part of the insulation), j e M.D s s't '-.~'.-~. -
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- 8. Backing Plate (Item 31, C2101-300) (Material: 430 ferritic stainless steel)
There was no evidence found of the 24 gage backing plate placed under the " felt metal" insulation (Item 32, C2101-300) (some of the small pieces found on site during circulator removal may be part of the backing ; plate), j l
- 9. Steam Turbine Rotor (Item 24, C2101-300) (Material:
Disc - 422 SST per ASTM A565, Gr. 616; Blades - Alloy Greek Ascoloy per AMS 5616) The steam turbine rotor had circumferential grooves cut in the insulation cover side face. There was some distortion and material removed at the rim just inside the turbine blade mounting area (it was under this rim , that the insulation cover was lodged). . Reverse side of l disc was normal. The trailing edge of all turbine blades showed evidence l of rubbing with small burrs and slightly rolled metal, as if the trailing edge had been scraped against a foreign piece of metal while rotating. The leading j edge of most of the blades had small dings located at approximately the same circumference around the rotor. 7
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- 10. Steam Turbine Stator (Item 25, C2101-300) (Material:
Blade Ring - chrome-moly steel per ASTM A473, Type 501A annealed) l The inlet side of the stator showed no damage. The trailing edge of each blade showed dings, indentation and some bending as if a metal fragment had been trapped between the rotor and stator blades. i
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Page 22 of 52
- 11. Pelton Wheel (Item 13, C2101-300)
There was no evidence of abnormal damage to the pelton wheel. The flowstream splitter located down the middle of each bucket exhibited some erosion and cavitation damage, but nothing beyond normal expected wear after years of service. l 2. r,~ r . h.. .-[h n gg. h , Maa . . . _ 1., . agu gy, m. , _ s 3.2.3 Interspace Seal and Bellows Leak Tests Two leak tests were performed at GA Technologies in an , attempt to find the massive interspace leak (reported to be i as large as 915 pounds of helium per day). The first was a coarse leak test (using air, then helium) of the metal ! 0-ring (Item 33, C2101-300) and the crack discovered in the steam ducting weldment (C2101-431). A special test fixture was used and pressure applied to 20 psig. No leak was heard; however, the test fixture may have the effect of helping to seal a loose seal. A refined leak test of this i area is not possible as it was necessary to remove the I damaged steam ducting bolts (Item 45, C2101-300) prior to uprighting the assembly (uprighting the assembly would have been necessary for accessibility to effect a tighter seal j for the refined leak test). Additionally, it is not i possible to pressurize the seal from the interspace side l (top side) without the aid of the interspace penetration. I Later in the disassembly of the circulator it will be l possible to examine the crack in the steam ducting weldment l I I
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1 j
Page 23 of 52 i more thoroughly to determine if it has penetrated the l weldment completely. The other leak test was performed on the expansion joint . bellows (Item 64, F.P. 91-M-19-9) using air. Pressure for ! this test was limited to 5 psig due to the strength of the available blind flange used to blank off the steam pipe. Pressure was held for at least 20 minutes with no pressure drop observed (no leakage was heard either). Later in the disassembly of the circulator it will be possible to access the bellows for a more thorough inspection. i While the machine is removed from its penetration it is not possible to test the double metal 0-ring seal (Items 101 and 102, R1100-100, Sht. 5) located in the joint between the expansion joint bellows ring and the steam outlet piping. j 4.0 PRELIMINARY METALLURGICAL OBSERVATIONS OF PARTS RECOVERED l Tif0M CIRCULATOR C-2101 l Following the failure of C-2101 a metallurgical investigation was initiated. Several components have been examined. The specific items examined are C2101-300-52 j l (pressure tap bolts), C2101-300-45 (steam ducting to bearing ) assembly bolts), C2101-300-46 (labyrinth seal mounting i bolts), C2101-300-53 (spring plunger), C2101-300-11 l l (insulation cover), C2101-300-28 (labyrinth seal) and C2101-300-27 (labyrinth spacer). The investigation is not L complete and the following are preliminary findings: l 4 l
- Bolt C2101-300-52 which was in hole #9 (Ref. Section l 3.2.1) and had fractured was examined. The bolt is a i precipitation hardening austenitic stainless steel per AMS 1 5737, Type A286. The bolt had fractured above the first i thread in the shank. The fractured surf ace was covered with !
oxidation products. EDAX analysis found no indication of l contaminants (e.g., C1,Na,etc.). Secondary cracking was l observed on the fractured surface. Metallographic examination found stress corrosion cracks propagating from l the fractured surface along the longitudinal axis. 1
- Five bolts, C2101-300-45, were examined, also A286 k i
material. The bolt from hole #8 (Ref. Section 3.2.1) was found to be cracked almost through the entire cross section. ; l The bolt was found to have a precracked area which initiated ) I by fatigue. The cause of the f atigue crack has not been 1 determined at this time. Transgranular cracking was found j in two of the other four bolts examined. The cracks were ' l propagating normal to the applied load and initiated at the roots of the first three threads below the shank. The cracks are likely due to stress corrosion cracking, i a Six C2101-300-46 bolts (hole locations known) and two sections of the same bolts (hole locations unknown) we re I l i
o e Page 24 of 52 l i examined. The bolts are a martensitic stainless steel per I ASTM A193B6 (AISI Type 410). The fracture surfaces appearance indicated a brittle or progressive type of failure typical of stress corrosion cracking (SCC). The fractured surfaces were covered with oxidation products. No contaminants were found from EDAX analysis. The six bolts and two bolt sections all exhibited cracking at the root of the threads. The cracks were propagating normal to the applied load and some cracks initiated at pits. Several cracks exhibited branching typical of stress corrosion cracks. The hardness of the bolts, RC 22-26, would normally indicate a 410 SST material which is not susceptible to SCC, l as published data indicates that RC 25 is generally an accepted lower threshold for SCC to occur.
+ The spring plunger, C2101-300-53, was examined. Only a portion of the plunger body was left. The plunger body material is carbon steel. The plunger body threaded area was found to be heavily corroded and pitted. E0AX analysis-found no evidence of contaminants. Transgranular cracking at the root of the threads was observed. It is likely that these cracks are due to SCC even though SCC in carbon steel is normally intergranular. Further investigation will be performed.
- Examination of 7 samples from the insulation cover (C2101-300-11) was performed. Significant post-service rubbing damage was observed. The cover met the chemical requirements of 430 ferritic stainless steel, with a hardness of Rockwell-B 83.5. Fractographic examination revealed a brittle fracture surface, with significant oxidation of the surface. All fractures occurred at machined notches or holes, typical of the very notch sensitive 430 ferritic stainless steel. Meta 11ographic analysis revealed extensive transgranular secondary cracking, with branching observed. EDAX analysis revealed no evidence of contamination within the oxides of the fracture surface and secondary cracks. While some of the cracks were typical of stress corrosion cracking (SCC), SCC has very rarely been observed in ferritic stainless steel, and the majority of test data reviewed indicates that SCC will not occur in ferritic stainless. When SCC has been referenced, it has almost always been intergranular. The forged and annealed microstructure observed censisted of coarse grain boundary chromium carbides, partially lamellar carbides, and fine, equiaxed recrystallized ferrite grains, in coarse delta ferrite. The coarse grain boundary carbides intensify the inherent brittleness of this material. The possibility of frictional heating producing the structure is considered unlikely because the initial temperature would have to be above 1600 F for at least 30 minutes.
Transformation would then occur at 1100 F (15 hours)-1300 F (2 hours). If this had occurred, microstructural transformation of other circulator c: ponents (i.e.
e i l Page 25 of 52 I spheroidization of the carbon steel plunger) would have been observed.
- Examination of 3 samples from the labyrinth seal- !
(C2101-300-28) was performed. Significant rubbing damage was observed. The seal also met the chemical requirements of 430 stainless steel, with a hardness of HRB 88.5. 3 Fractographic examination also revealed a brittle, transgranular cleavage fracture surface. Oxidation - of the f racture surf ace was observed, and EDAX analysis revealed no evidence of contaminants. Some secondary crackirig .was observed, however no branching was observed. The microstructure observed was typical of that of the cover.
- Examination of 2 samples from the labyrinth spacer (C2101-300-27) was performed. Very little rubbing damage j j
was observed. The spacer met the chemical requirements of 430 ferritic stainless steel, with a hardness of HRB 81. ] Fractographic examination revealed a brittle fracture i surface, with oxidation present. No secondary cracking was , observed. The microstructure of the spacer was considered i more typical of a uniform forging structure, with a more ! uniform grain size distribution, slightly elongated grains, j and a finer distribution of matrix and grain boundary l carbides. Further metallurgical investigations to be performed include:
- Analysis of other available components from C-2101 for evidence of SCC and corrosion,
- Identification of contaminants in corrosion products,
- Determination of source of contaminants,
- Research literature for environments which can cause l SCC in specific components being analyzed,
- Identification of resistant replacement material (s).
5.0 PLANNED COMPLETE DISASSEMBLY AND INSPECTION OF CIRCULATOR C-2101 Upon receipt and thorough review of a disassembly and inspection work plan from GA Technologies, remaining disassembly and inspection of the C-2101 machine' will commence. It is expected that the total machine will be inspected for any damage resulting from the current f ailure of the insulation cover assembly parts in the steam end. j Of particular interest will be a thorough inspection of the steam ducting weldment (C2101-431) for evidence that the crack observed on the lower side i.as extended to the upper i 1
i
'3 4.
- age 26 of 52 side (possible interspace leak path). Also of interest will be the bearing and shaf t surf aces for_ signs of damage due to i the indicated high wobble. Possible magnetization of the l shaft will be investigated. Any further clues as to the l' positive identification of a contaminant causing the stress corrosion cracking of fasteners will also be searched for.
6.0 HISTORICAL _ _ REVIEW OF HELIUM CIRCULATORS As a result of the damage to circulator C-2101, a historical i review including original design criteria and operational { and refurbishment / repair history was performed in an effort to make a general evaluation of the reliability of the circulators. This historical review is presented.below. 6.1 ORIGINAL DESIGN / DEVELOPMENT PHILOSOPHY, CRITERIA AND ANALYSIS I 6.1.1 Total Machine 6.1.1.1 Design Criteria The design of the circulator was based on Secticn III of the l ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code for its pressure ) retaining parts, and on current turbomachinery practice for its turbomachine components. An important objective was a 30 year inspection- and maintenance-free lifetime. To achieve this objective, larger design margins than usual were adopted with respect to stresses and functional capability; in particular, the circulator is capable of indefinite operation at any speed up to 40*4 cverspeed. In addition, a wear-f ree design philosophy was pursued; .no sliding or rubbing parts are included in the circulator. Protection of the prima ry coolant system against any conceivable failure dictated the introduction of'a disk catcher in order to contain any missiles trat might be generated by compressor rotor failure. 6.1.1.2 Development Sequence l The overall helium circulator design ef fort has progressed I through three phases: a water bearing test rig, a prototype test machine, and the final' production circulator configuration. Most of the testing has been accomplished ' within a specially-constructed test f acili ty located adjacent to the Public Service Company of Colcrado Valmont Power Station near Boulder, Colorado. The test site was selected early in the development program mainly because of the availability of steam ' required for tFe full scale prototype and production circulator testing. l The Phase I program, using the bearing test rig (also referred to as the rotor inertia simulator), consisted primarily of the prototype rotating asserol) with special
Page 27 of 52 ) 1 disks to simulate the mass and inertia of the compressor and turbine wheels. Power was supplied by the.pelton turbine. The Phase I test established the initial dynamic rotor performance and facilitated developmental evaluation of the bearings, seals and rotor dynamics prior to full scale I aerodynamic testing of the prototype machine. The Phase 11 program included two parts. First, the aerodynamic performance of the compressor, compressor inlet and diffuser was evaluated in air using the pelton turbine , as a power source. Next, the prototype assembly was tested l' under simulated reactor conditions with the steam turbine driving the compressor in helium. , i The phase III program included the operation of the-production circulator at simulated design- conditions, a comprehensive series of transient tests, and a final check-out of each production machine prior to installation into the Fort St. Vrain PCRV. The series of transient tests was carried out using the first available Fort St. Vrain production circulator. The objective of these transient tests was to determine the operational capabilities of the circulator when subjected to normal and abnormal transients which could conceivably occur during reactor operation. The tests included hot' restart test, thermal shock test, circulator overspeed test,' and rapid depressurization test. The rigorous tests the overall machine was subjected to' encompassed a broad range of plant operating conditions to-indicate that all the components of. the machine satisfied the expected operating requirements. 6.1.1.3 Fatigue Analysis The parts of the circulator that were subjected to a fatigue analysis were the blading (rotors and stators) and the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code parts. The code parts were evaluated per the requirements of Section III of the ASME ! code. The analysis was performed on the basis of 20,000 i reactor plant cycles between 25% and 100% power and 600 transients. 6.1.1.4 Acoustics and Vibration An acoustics test. program determined the noise level and frequency generated by the compressor. Tests were performed in air as well as helium atmospheres. The noise levels , generated were found to be acceptable. No acoustic testing was done on the steam turbine. There is no indication that it was even considered. In any case, it is not presently considered to be an issue because of the extremely small free space available for the propagation of sound waves in the area bounded by the steam seal. ; i
Page 28 of 52 A vibration test program evaluated the natural frequencies '] and blade stresses of the steam turbine blades as well as 1 the compressor blades at various operating conditions. All stresses were found to'be sufficiently low to meet a 40 year y life design objective. l l 6.1.2 Insulation / Labyrinth Seal Area of Circulator Steam End 6.1.2.1 Purpose of Insulation and Labyrinth Seal The insulation and insulation cover at the lower end of the bearing cartridge are. provided to reduce the temperature of the lower end of the bearing cartridge and thus provide a i more uniform temperature in the cartridge. This is desirable because:
- 1) Clearances at the lower labyrinth are easier to control,
- 2) Steam / water drain performance . is less susceptible to )
changes in the steam temperature,
- 3) Temperatures of the bearings are more uniform and bearing performance is therefore not adversely affected by changes in bearing clearances (bearing temperatures are less dependent on steam conditions as well as being more uniform from one bearing to another),
l
- 4) Lower temperatures afford more flexibility in selection I of materials in the bearing cartridge.
The labyrinth seal is provided for two reasons: J
- 1) The shape at the 0.D. provides a relatively smooth flow path for the steam, thus minimizing turbulence,
- 2) A seal clearance of 0.130" +/- 0.010" is accomplished by machining the seal ring at assembly to the machine.
This clearance minimizes steam flow into the area below the bearing cartridge, thus reducing turbulence and reducing the severity of the requirements on the steam / water drain design. 6.1.2.2 Original Design of Failed Parts The design and analysis of the components of the helium circulators was at three levels: (1)ASME Section 111 Code , parts, (2)non-Code critical parts and (3)"non-critical" support components. Of the components that have failed or been damaged during the incident, only the 3/4-inch steam ducting bolts (Items 45 and 52, C2101-300) were included in the analysis performed in accordance with the ASME Code (except for fatigue analysis). The analysis for all Code
Page 29.of 52 parts is included in the Design Report'(GADR-13) for the circulators. The 3/4-inch bolts were analyzed in conjunction with the ASME Section III analysis performed on the turbine ~ casing and primary closure cone. Code allowables of less than 2 times stress intensity for initial boltup and less than 3 times stress intensity for . maximum membrane plus bending stress at the worst design conditions were' used. Changes i made subsequent to the original analysis were an increase in bolt torque for improved interspace sealing and the drilling of a hole through the axis of one of the . fifteen (15) 3/4-inch bolts to. allow sensing of turbine steam- outlet pressure. A Code re-analysis as a result of.the increased torque cannot be-located at this time. A preliminary re-evaluation of the bolts using stress output from the old finite element programs for various load ' conditions shows that stresses are all 'still within Code allowables and that the bolts are good from a cyclic-fatigue standpoint. However, this evaluation includes only the C2101-300-45 bolts and does not include the single C2101-300-52 bolt with the 1/4-in. pressure-tap hole drilled through its axis; a separate evaluation is required for this bolt. For the remaining f ailed parts (insulation cover, labyrinth - seal, labyrinth spacer, labyrinth seal mounting bolts, etc.), all were considered to be "non-critical" support components. Sound engineering practices were used for the design. and development of these parts. The actual design analysis and calculations were not retained -from the original design period (circa 1968). No specific developmental tests were performed regarding the "non-critical" support components now under evaluation. However, as stated earlier, the rigorous tests the overall machine 1 was subjected to encompassed a broad range of plant i operating conditions to indicate that all the components of the machine satisfied the expected operating requirements. No fatigue analysis was performed on the lower-end "non- ; critical" components now under evaluation because they were lightly loaded. The Code parts were evaluated for fatigue per the requirements of Section III of the ASME Code; however, the 3/4-inch bolts were not included in this original analysis. A seismic evaluation for the steam ducting struts was performed and is documented in the original Design Report ! (GADR-13). Assuming that the 3/4-inch bolts instead of the steam ducting struts will take- the seismic loading the struts were designed for, a rough hand calculation shows that a highly conservative seismic loading on the bolts is significantly less than the bolt preload.
o - Page 30 of S2 A hand calculation on the 1/4-inch labyrinth seal mounting l bolts (Item 46, C-2101-300) also shows that the seismic loading on these bolts is insignificant relative to the bolt ' preload. , 1 Provided in the table below is a summary of the materials j used for the lower-end components now under evaluation- I C2101-300- Description Material j j 11 Insulation cover AISI 430 SST ! 20,32 Insulation AISI 430 SST j 46 1/4-20 bolts A193B6 (410 SST) l 45,52 3/4-16 bolts A286 SST (AMS 5737) ; 28 Labyrinth seal AISI 430 SST l 31 Backing plate AISI 430 SST 27 Labyrinth spacer AISI 430 SST 53 Spring plunger Carbon steel l 29 Lockwasher AISI 430 SST 81 Lockwire Inconel 600 i The rationale behind the selection of the materials for the l above parts, for which no detailed design report exists j (except for the 3/4-16 bolts), is as below: J Major criteria that influenced materials selection at the time of circulator component design were:
- 1) Appropriate mechanical properties,
- 2) Ability to survive the circulator " hot soak" condition,
- 3) Adequate general corrosion resistance to avoid rusting and degradation during operation, handling and storage, ,
- 4) Resistance to stress corrosion under expected operating conditions (i.e. cold reheat steam from feedwater meeting the steam generator feedwater requirements).
After a brief review of the materials selection for the parts listed in the above table it is noted that, with only one exception, the above criteria are clearly met. The 400-series stainless steels have appropriate mechanical and corrosion properties and were used in heat treatment conditions designed to minimize stress corrosion risks. The 410 SST parts, for example, were required to be given an additional temper for 2 hours at 1150 F to maximize stress corrosion resistance. The A286 and Inconel 600 and 718 parts were believed, at the time of design, to be. very resistant to stress corrosion in expected environments. In this context it is noted that GA was very concerned to assure goad stress corrosion resistance during FSV design as
4 a- o Page 31 of 52 a result of adverse stress corrosion experience encountered at the Peach Bottom I. Reactor.during late 1966. In the years subsequent to the design of FSV, industrial experience has shown that A286 and certain of the Inconels can suffer stress. corrosion under some conditions-- particularly when 'high oxygenated, high temperature water or caustic are present. At this point,_it has not been possible to reconstruct the-rationale behind the selection of carbon steel for the t spring plunger (Item 53, C2101-300). This part_ was apparently available in carbon steel and - stainless steel. If the stainless steel available were 300-series SST, it also would have been undesirable. 6.2 SPEED / WOBBLE MEASUREMENT SYSTEM 6.2.1 General Information As the name implies, the . helium: circulator shaft-speed / wobble measurement system measures both shaft speed , ar.d wobble. Shaf t speed is the nu.cer of shaf t revolutions i per unit' time. Shaf t wobble is the displacement or movement of the shaft surface toward or away from fixed points defined by the installed location of speed elements _(SE's). 6.2.2 Functional Information The system is comprised of reluctance-type detector probes referred to as speed elements- (SE's) ' connected to an electronics system. The SE's are' comprised of two. identical coils of which one senses the gap between it and the. shaft surface while the other senses a fixed reference gap. These-coils are inputs to a bridge circuit in the electronics system. .The output of this bridge: circuit is proportional to the ratio of inductance between the two input coils which is in turn proportional to the ratio of the measured and reference gap. Shaft movement away_from the SE causes an increase of output voltage from the electronics. Shaft movement toward the SE causes a decrease of output voltage. Precision machined slots cut into the shaf t surface provide timing pulses for measuring shaft speed. These same slots provide short . intervals of known displacement of the shaft surface for the purpose of calibrating system gain. One mil (.001") change in the gap between the shaf t surf ace and the SE will produce a 495' millivolt- change in syttem output. The system . output can be displayed on an oscilloscope' for quantification and interpretation. The system output can also be input into an automatic wobble monitor system. The wobble monitor system, though 'not operational at this time, will be briefly described in a
Page 32 of 52 separate paragraph. 6.2.3 Interpretational Information The shaft . displacement measured by the SE's is much less than the displacement at- the bearings. This- occurs because the SE's are physically located a significant distance inboard of the bearings. The out-of phase relationship of l upper versus lower displacements also ' influences 'the. displacement at the bearings, with the worst condition being 180" out of phase. At the worst out-of phase condition a 0.5-mil (.0005") displacement at a lower-end SE (turbine end) represents a 2-mil- ( 002") displacement at the lower i I journal bearing while the same 0.5-mil displacement at an upper SE (compressor end) represents a 1.1-mil displacement at the upper journal. The available radial clearance at the lower journal is 2.25 mils; the available radial clearance at the upper journal is 3.25 mils. Conservatively, a displacement at either an upper or lower SE of 0.5 mils above a "zero-wobble baseline" is suf ficient cause to reduce t shaft speed to self-turbining. A 0.3-mil wobble is l sufficient cause to initiate diagnostic procedures defined in the circulator operations and maintenance (0&M) manual. The term "zero wobble baseline" denotes an initial displacement value not recognized as displacement due to imbalance. It is obtained immediately subsequent to machine refurbishment wherein the assembly of rotating components does not exceed 0.2 inch-ounce imbalance. It is a value that includes shaf t surface irregularities such as runout, pits and scratches which remain relatively constant until the next refurbishment. Consequently, the "zero wobble baseline" value is subtracted from any subsequent displacement values for wobble magnitude determination. Note that displacements' are generally read as peak-to peak values, however, only 1/2 peak-to peak values are used for wobble determination because limiting clearances are radial and not diametral. To illustrate: Present P-P my minus intitial P-P mv / 495 my per mil 2 (P-P means peak-to peak displacement indication less any superimposed noise component.) The physical fact that shaf t displacement due to imbalance varies as the square of speed is an. aid in evaluating significant increases in wobble magnitude. 6.2.4 Wobble Monitor System Much difficulty has been experienced in maintaining the Wobble Monitor System because of' parts unavailability and system complexity. The wobble monitor system when operational utilizes a minicomputer and a display panel to
Page 33 of 52 compute the actual bearing clearance based upon the phase relationship between upper and lower displacements and displays the resulting values on Instrument Panel I-05 in the Control Room. The system also sounds an alarm when , wobble limits have been exceeded. A telety:e records the , same infccmation for later review. 6.3 CIRCULATCR OPERATIONAL-SERVICE HISTORY The tables in Attachment 7 provide, among other information to be discussed later, a summary of the follewing service-related historical data for each circulator by serial number (C-2101 through C-2105): a) Time period and number of mor.ths in which penetration, or " spare" period (during which refurbishment / repair work was done), b) Hours of operation on water and steam drive for each time period between " spare" periods, c) Number of thermal cycles experienced during each time period between " spare" periods. Attachments 8 and 9 summarize in bar chart fccm the tabular information of Attachment 7. l l The definitions used for hours of operation and thermal cycles a*d the method by which this information was gathered is described below. An intensive search effort was performed between August 28 and September 1, 1987, to determine cumulative circulator duty for Fort St. Vrain. The parameters of interest were total run hours, both on water and steam, anc total thermal l cycles. A thermal cycle was defined as one startup on steam plus the following shutdown. The data was accumulated separately for each machine serial number (C-2101 through C-2105) in each penetration in which it has been installed. l It is believed that the final results are accurate to about 10 percent.. Data logger data was used where available, with data manually extracted from old operator narrative logs used where necessary. As with any other measured quantity, the proolem existed of defining exactly what is being measured. In this tabulation, all startups to self-turbining conditions and time spent self-turbining were ignored. The principal reason for this choice is that meaningful data for these conditions is not available from the data logger tapes. When reading through the old operator legs, water-turbine time and steam-turbine time were sirely computed from the information written there. If an ope-ator missed logging a start or a stop, or did not give a time (as was of ten the case in the :ldest set of
Page 34 of 52 l J logs), the reviewer had no choice but to enter his best guess based on what information was available. The data _ logger data presented different problems. Aside-from the gaps in this data, which were filled by means of the- tedious, labor-intensive process of narrative log review, some arbitrary decisions had to be made to define what exactly was to be considered circulator operation, and also what was to be considered operation on water and operation on steam. This determination could be made easily. ; by an experienced person observing all the relevant data, I but there simply- weren't enough experienced people and enough hours to apply this method to some 300,000 records of data logger history. What was finally decided was that'a circulator was considered operating on steam if the associated cold reheat loop temperature was 250 F. or greater. If this temperature was below 250 F, then' the circulator was considered to be operating on-water, if it was operating at all. In addition, a thermal cycle was defined to be a start on steam (speed increased through 700 ; rpm while cold reheat temperature is 250 F . or greater) l provided that the interval since it was last run on steam is greater than four hours. The rationale for the four-hour l I interval is that a machine that has been running on steam l may be restarted on steam without a prewarming period if it has been shutdown for no greater than four hours. The totals provided in the tables in Attachment 7 for each l i circulator are summarized below:
g Page 35 of 52 i Circulator. Total Time Number of Months In Hours of Operation Thermal Serial No. Period Penetration Spare Water Steam Total Cycles
-C'-2101 12/71-8/87 165 23 22,802. 41,091 63,893 136 fi C-2102 12/71-8/87 126 62 11,934' 26,073 '38,007 108
.C-2303 12/71-8/87 155 33 13,862 35,341 49,203 99
'C-2104- 12/71-8/87 131 57 14,116; 34.921 49,037 124
.12/71-8/87 160 28 18.770 34,985 53,755 116 C-2105 .
Total Cumulative Hours (5 machines): 81,484 172,411 253,895 l' Per the FSAR, Section 4.1.6, the full-temperature . design operational life of primary coolant system components is at least 210,000 hours. Conservatively, assuming that actual full temperature operation of each circulator equals total hours on steam plus water . drive, the actual hours of
. operation versus end-of-life design full-temperature hours is summarized below:
1 Actual Total Maximum I Circulator Hours of Operation End-of-Life Design % of Design Serial No. (Water & Steam) Hours of Operation Life Used Up C-2101 63,891 210,000 30% C-2102 38,003 210,000 18%
'C-2103 49,202 210,000 23%
C-2104 49,037 210,000 23% C-2105 53,753 210,000 26% The analysis. of the ASME Code parts per Section III of the Code was' performed on the basis of 20,000 reactor plant cycles between 25% and 100% power and 600 transients with a minimum factor of safety of four. The , definition of a transient for the original fatigue analysis is any event ~ causing abnormal or emergency operating conditions. From a design standpoint a transient would be a.' event causing worst case conditions / stresses on the material / component (e.g. , thermal shock / gradients, pressure gradients). For the historical review, the transient thermal cycles versus thermal cycles based on 1%/ minute power changes were not evaluated independently. However, the maximum number of thermal cycles reported, 136 for C-2101, is significantly less than the 600 worst-case transients upon which the circulator was designed. 6.4
SUMMARY
OF PREVIOUS PROBLEMS, REPAIRS AND REPJRBISHMENTS A review of refurbishment and design. change documents ! related to the circulators was performed- to determine the. L extent- of each refurbishment required and to make a general evaluation of the reliability of the circulators.
0 'q > Page 36 of 52 The tables in Attachment 7 provide a complete summary for each problem, .if known, and the repair or corrective action taken.' With . regard to the current damage to circulator C-2101, several historical issues are worth reviewing in more detail. 3 6.4.1 Replacement History of Steam Ducting , Bolts (3/4-16) and Labyrinth Seal Mounting Bolts (1/4-20) A review of circulator refurbishment -docum'entation was performed by PSC and GA to determine the replacement history l of the steam ducting 3/4-16 bolts (Items 45 and 52, C2101-l 300) and.the labyrinth seal 1/4-20 mounting bolts (Item 46, C2101-300) since 'these bolts- were found failed and were 'C-identified with stress corrosion cracks on circulator 2101. This. review shows that except for circulator' C-2104 just installed in 'O' penetration replacing C-2101, none of the above bolts have been replaced since at.least August,1972. On. circulator C-2104, all twelve (12) 1/4-20 bolts (Item 46)
- were replaced during the latest refurbishment.
Although not specifically reviewed, GA' has informed PSC'that oftentimes the carbon steel spring plunger (Item 53, C2101-300), also identified with corrosion and pitting, does.get replaced becaused it becomes necessary to break it to remove ,I the insulation cover. 6.4.2 Distorted Insulation Cover Found on Circulator C-2102 in 1979. . j During. review of the 1980 inspection report (GA Report GA ' 9 C15847) for the 1979 ISI inspection required by Technical Specification SR 5.2.18 of circulator C-2102, it was discovered that a distorted (dished) insulation -cover was found during disassembly operations (see photo below). The dishing was upward (inward) in a direction away' from the steam turbine disc. Some of the insulation, bearing side (Item 20, C2102-300), was also found 'to be deteri_ orated. ; This insulation was replaced. In the report, the cause of distortion of the cover was assumed to be due to' a thermal mechanism; however, no specific analysis-was performed. The - cover was deemed functionally acceptable and reused. i l l, ' l i
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i l 1 l I In light of the currcnt damage on circulator C-2101, it was postulated that if the dishing had occurred in the downward (outward) direction it could possibly have made contact with the steam turbine rotor. Therefore, a rough analysis was i undertaken to theorize a cause of the inward dishing and to determine if the cover could dish outward from a similar mechanism. This analysis is provided below, Bowing of Insulation Cover Plate The insulation cover plate of circulator C-2102 was noted to be permanently bowed in the upward direction with a maximum displacement of 0.23 in. The bowing appears totally axisymmetric. Hand calculations with regard to certain
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! i Page 38 of 52 l l
I pressure differential and thermal effects were performed to I ascertain the possible cause of the bowing, j
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Pressure Differential Mechanism ) i A pressure differential of the order of 200 psi across an unrestrained cover plate (positive on the lower side and I negative on the upper side) could cause the observed bowing. l To compress the three insulation disks 0.23 in. would l require an additional pressure load of about 200 psi. A pressure differential of near this magnitude could be caused by a sudden quench of the cover plate cavity. However, the l scenario requirec almost total sealing of the cavity behind l the cover plate to develop the required pressure l differential. ] Sealing might be achieved between the cover plate at its i outer radius and the steam scroll. The contact here is between two machined pieces, and as a slight pressure differential develops, it will seal further. Sealing at the l l inner surface is questionable. Here, the skirt at the inner radius contacts with the fibrous insulation pads, which are porous to both a vapor and liquid flow. (See Attachments 3 and 4.) l It appears sufficient sealing of the cavity is not available to develop the required pressure differential to distort the cover plate. Thermal Mechanism Several thermal mechanisms for producing the observed bowing were also evaluated and one mechanism is hypothesized. The proposed mechanism matches the observed behavior and hand calculations indicate it is marginally feasible.. The hand calculations do not prove the mechanism as the cause of the bowing. Examination of photographs of the bowed cover plate and evaluation of several potential causes indicated that the phenomena involved are quite complex. A verification of the hypothesized mechanism would require a computer thermo/ stress analysis incorporating plasticity, large deformations and post buckling behavior. The mechanism assumes steady operation has heated the cover plate to approximately 600*F. A bearing water leak then quenches the face of the cover plate while the outer ring 1 and outer skirt of the cover plate remain hot. This preferential quenching can occur because the face is thinner l then the outer ring (0.09375 in, wall versus 0.25 in, wall ! plus skirt) and the face cools more rapidly. The j preferential quenching of the face may also result from total vaporization of the bearing water as it flows radially outward (for small leak rates) or film boiling (with a low I heat transfer coefficient) occurring along the outer radial I
1 6 . .) Page 39 of 52 l
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l locations of the face, while. liquid forced. convection or 1 nucleate boiling occurs along the inner radial locations'. l Either scenario with vapor generation could result in j cooling the face of the cover plate prior to cooling the ' l outer ring. j With the outer ring hot,' a quench of the f ace of the cover plate by 100*F.would cause it to yield as its outer radius l is held by the stiffer outer ring. Further cooling down to 4 100-200'F causes permanent plastic membrane' distertion of the face. The inward force on the outer ring due to the face contraction may rotate the outer ring slightly and' i initiate an upward (or inward) bow in the face, l As the outer ring now cools, it contracts and puts the f ace ! in compression or enoves its outer radius. inward to cause l further bowing. Cooling of the outer ring by approximately. ] 400-600'F would create sufficient radial inward movement to l bow the face the observed 0.23 in. ] It is further noted that the presence' of the insulation oisks may prevent complete bowing of the face while the cover plate is in place. Only partial bowing of the face ; may occur in place, with the face remaining in a compressed j l buckling mode. The total deformation of the f ace may then 1 occur only when the plate is removed. (The reverse say have j been experienc61 when the bowed cover plate was re- J assembled--part of the bow was removed by the lateral forces ' l of the insulation disks.) With the above mechanism there is a definite preference for J l the face of the cover plate to bow upward (or inward). The' ) l initial inward force on the outer' ring and- any axial j temperature gradient across the outer ring generated by ring i cooling provide a rotation of the ring that initiates the j face to bow upward. ; i 6.4.3 Failed Labyrinth Seal Mounting Bolt Found on Circulator C- : 2104 in 1984 1 Ouring disassembly of the circulator C-2104 steam end during , the latest refurbishrrent (1984-85) one of ~the twelve 1/4-20x5/8 hex head labyrinth seal mounting bolts (Item 46, C2101-300) was found broken in place and trapped behind the i flange on the insulation cover (Item 11, C2101-300) (see Attachments 2-5). The remainder of the bolt was still in i the threaded hole. A nonconformance report was initiated . and the disposition was to replace the bolt and turn' the ! failed bolt over to Materials Engineering. Further review l L indicates that all twelve (12) (Item 46) bolts were replaced. ) No report of analysis of the broken bolt could be located, l however. The broken bolt itself could also not now be : located -for analysis. Circulator C-2104 (with the new Item i l l' l
Page 40 of 52 46 bolts) was installed in 'D' penetration in August, 1987, replacing C-2101. . i 6.4.4 Speed Probe Bolt Failure.on Circulator C-2104 in 1985 l During reassembly of circulator C-2104 during the latest ') refurbishment (1984-85), a 1/4-20x1-1/4 speed probe mounting
' bolt (Item 51,C2101-500) broke during installation. This E
bolt is AISI 410 SST, quenched and tempered, and. is torqued to 7.5 ft-lb. New C2101-500-51 bolts were installed. No 1 1985 analysis of the failure could be located; however, the broken . bolt itself was located. . A recent metallurgical analysis . revealed stress corrosion cracks exist, cause i unknown. The normal operating environment for these bolts ! is bearing water. Circulator C-2104 (with the new Item .51 l bolts) was installed in 'D' penetration in August, 1987, j replacing C-2101. 6.4.5 Replacement of Helium-End Stainless Steel Bolts on All Machines in 1985 ] Helium circulator C-2102 (presently installed in 'A' slot) was sent to GA Technologies in 1985 originally for repair of a leak in the bearing water supply line. This leak was caused by a failed bolt (Item 42, C2101-300) at the water line connection .to the bearing cartridge. The failure , mechanism was a result of a manufacturing defect. i l While installing the 24 3/4-in. bolts (Item 40, C2101-300) securing the bearing assembly of the compressor rotor to the helium circulator unit (primary closure), one of'the bolts failed before reaching the installation' torque value of 450 ft-lbs. , i Meta 11ographic examination performed on the failed bolt l showed the cause of failure to be stress corrosion cracking. ; Another bolt from the 24 was also selected randomly for metallographic analysis and it also showed stress corrosion ! cracks in the roots of the threads. Two similar bolts off ; C-2104 (spare) were taken for a comparative examination. .i Results of the metallographic examination revealed no ' cracking. It also stated.that the microstructure of the bolts off of C-2104 was identical to that found in the cracked bolts off C-2102. The C2101-300-40 primary enclosure bolts were a chrome-moly-vanadium steel (H11 per AMS 6487). A chloride leach analysis was performed on the cracked bolts off C-2102 and the spare C-2104 Chloride and sulfate levels present on the cracked bolts were at a level (13 /cm 9 ) where stress 8 corrosion cracking of that type material becomes possible. ' The chloride level on the cracked- bolts was four times i higher than those on the spare; the sulfate levels were three times higher, i
1 , 1 l Page 41 of 52 l 1 1 A study by GA was then performed on the 31 different types of fasteners used on the circulators for susceptibility to chloride stress corrosion cracking, of which four were considered susceptible: C2101-300-40,. -380-10, -340-9, - 310-4. All four. types are found in the helium environment -l (besides the primary enclosure bolts, the other three sets i of bolts /capscrews were stainless ( A-286)), l It was recommended by GA to replace these bolts with a more ; stress corrosion resistant material such .as Inconel 718 provided the lower mechanical properties were acceptable. All threaded fasteners are lubricated with Molykote-Z or Cerac SP-111 (molybdenum disulfide). .There is no mention of the lubricant in the GA. failure analysis report. i pSC Change . Notice (CN) No. 1976.was initiated to allow the j changeout of the fcur sets of bolts recommended by GA to an Inconel 718 material. Along with increased stress corrosion resistance the mechanical strength of the Inconel was found j to be. acceptable for the' preload plus other mechanical l loading. The bolts were changed in all five circulators. It was evaluated in the GA report that the consequences of failure of any of the four bolt types found to 'be susceptible to stress corrosion cracking would not create an adverse impact on public health and safety. Failure of the i fasteners would not cause a breach in the primary coolant J boundary, but it may cause functional failure of the circulator. It can be concluded from the GA report that the environment in which the bolts were exposed (primary coolant) was the primary cause of the stress corrosion failure. Since all other circulator. fasteners are not in the helium environment, it was- not- deemed necessary to replace any other fasteners. It is important to note that i the stress-corrosion problem was from excessive chloride 'l l which is not present in significant concer,* ration level on the steam side. t l 6.4.6 Fretting Identified in GA Inspection Report GA-C15847 for i j Circulator C-2102 in 1980. Circulator C-2102 was removed from 'C' penetration in March, l l 1979, in order to comply with Technical Specification Surveillance SR 5.2.17 and 5.2.18. These are as follows-5.2.17: One circulator pelton wheel removed from service i at first turbine generator overhaul to be examined for ! a) cavitation damage, b) bucket and bucket to hub integrity, c) curvic coupling integrity. ! 5.2.18: At first turbine generator overhaul one circulator to be removed and thoroughly inspected for wear and degradation. _-___A
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. l Page 42 of 52 l Results of this . inspection were reported in GA Report GA-C15847. Upon removal of the support cone from C-2102, l' dif ficulty was _ encountered in' separating thel support' cone from the. penetration piping assembly. Jacking screws {
normally used for separation were ineffective. To separate 1 l the pieces the support cone was slowly heated to 480 F and during cooldown a constant force 'was- applied with the jack-screws which finally' separated the parts. Initially, rust was thought to be the cause of dif ficulty in separating the parts since rust was found on the.outside surfaces. of- the support- cone and on the mating . flange face of the ! penetration assembly; but it was finally determined that fretting was the real cause. Fretting between the support cone register and. Its male counterpart on the piping : penetration assembly-resulted in localized self-welding. 1 Fretting is a wear phenomenon that occurs between two mating surf aces; it 's adhesive in nature and vibration is its main cause facte It occurs between two tight-fitting surfaces that are subjected to a cyclic, relative motion of extremely i small amplitude. Fretting occurs at contacting surfaces l that are intended to be " fixed" in relation to each other. The " slight" movement prevents the formation of, or i destroys, protective oxide film. This creates true metal- I to-metal contact. ] There are eight 5/8"-11 socket head bolts used to attach the penetration assembly flange to the support . cone. Per GA Report GA-C15847 there is sufficient clearance in the boltholes so that relative movement during heatup and cooldown could have allowed the f retting. j 1 The GA report concluded that the difficulty in separating ! the interfaces did not affect the circulator function, r,o r ; the capability of removing the circulator from its penetration. Since the interfaces were intenced to be fixed in relation to each other and movements (to.cause fretting) ; are extremely small, no corrective action other than 1 cleaning of the surfaces was necessary. (Note: Normally these two parts are not separated except for major ; disassembly.) Fretting- is common between bolted machined parts that are j subject to small relative movements. Localized wear and L removal of material by fretting usually is not deleterious to the structural integrity of the mated parts. The mating surfaces are intended to be fixed in relation to each other, ; therefore the function of. the joint was maintained. Also, GA Report GA-C15847 concluded no detrimental effect on the circulator function would result f rom the f retting. 6.4.7 Cracking of Turbine Water Drain Bellows 1 I L__-_----___-_-_-_______-_-____
.o -
Page 43 of 52 In 1983, cracks were found in the turbine water drain bellows (Item 27, F.P. 91-M-19-1) in the steam inlet and water. piping assembly (S/N 2000) which had been installed with circulator C-2105 in 'B' penetration until 1981.. Both PSC and GA performed a failure analysis on the Inconel 600 bellows. The results showed that the f ailure was due to stress corrosion cracking with caustic being the most probable ca'use. A change notice (CN-1819) was written to replace the Inconel 600 bellows with a straight,' sliding sleeve design that would be more resistant to stress corrosion cracking. The steam / water piping assembly (S/N 2000) was subsequently installed in 'C' penetration in June, 1985, with circulator C-2103, where it currently resides. l GA performed a review of the operability of the circulators with the cracked bellows. This review did not determine any operability issues (
Reference:
GP-1987). The same report l I also states that a similar failure had been detected earlier in another piping assembly (S/N 2004). In this case, the bellows was replaced with another bellows. This piping assembly was subsequently installed in 'A' penetration in May, 1985, with circulator C-2102, where it currently exists. In 1985, cracks were discovered in the same bellows in the steam / water piping assembly (S/N 2003) which had been installed with circulator C-2103 in 'C' penetration until i June, 1985. This bellows was replaced with a . split sleeve i design per CN-2179A instead of the solid sleeve used in.CN-1819. This steam / water piping assembly was subsequently installed with circulator. C-2104 in 'O' penetration. in August, 1987, replacing the currently. damaged C-2101 circulator. To summarize, steam /weter piping asserblies S/N 2004 (currertly' with circulator C-2102 in ' A' . penetration), S/N 2002 (with C-2105 in 'B') and S/N 2001 (out with C-2101 from
'O' penetration in August, 1987) still have bellows.
Steam / water piping assembly S/N 2000 (with C-2103 in 'C') has a solid sleeve in lieu of the bellows, and piping assembly S/N 2003 (with C-2104 in 'O') has a split' sleeve in place of the bellows. 6.5 Circulator Reliability Based on Historical Review The circulator assembly is a conservatively designed machine with proven integrity. The circulators have been incorrectly identified with a significant fraction of the plant down time. Much of the time attributed to the circulators has in fact been a result of problems with the circulator auxiliaries, e.g. , the bearing .and seal water supply system. These problems were characterized by water ingress .into the primary coolant system. The circulator machines have been much more reliable than perceived;
Q 4 Sage 44 of 52 I moreover, the mechanical integrity of the circulator has been excellent. Wh',le accumulating approximately 250,000 total combined (f've machines) operating hours (based on water plus steam drive) out of 1,050,000 hours full-temperature design operational life, approximately fourteen separate incidents have required one or more circulators to be removed for l repair, and one design modification was incorporated in-situ. These incidents are summarized in Table 6.5-1. The failure incidents are categorized in the last three coluens of Table 6.5-1 headed " Design or Manufacturing Defect", " Random Failure" and " External or Other". As indicated in the table, of the fourteen failure incidents there have been tentatively eleven design or manufacturing defect failures of circulators. One failure is considered a i random failure and the remaining three are not attributable to the circulator design (i.e., the " External Problems / Inspections" category under the " Incident Problem" heading). Of the eleven design or manufacturing defect failures tentatively attributed to the circulators, three are more I directly related to external auxiliary system failures for ! which modifications corrected the problem. (The three auxiliary system modifications are the improved pressure i control for the shutdown seal bellows, the improved control ) of the brake / seal sequencing to prevent seal actuation while l the rotor is turning, and the pressurization of the pelton I wheel water cavity to prevent cavitation.) Thus, only approximately eight incidents are clearly attributable to design or manufacturing defects in the I circulator machine. 1 1 l
T XR EO Y R O G E E T MR A OU C Dl X Nl E AA R RF O L I A F G N RI ) OR ? UT ( NTC X X GCE XX XxX X X X X I AF SFE
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O D I C ooqa ggg rppspg r e a * 'g s i rtt oia cnw gs un oi 'g g g n a gr no af b e A N erre n r r h h o iL l L I lem I RMMD i W M C C T A U J Gt l l C T N 5 10 TF 8 DI 45 5601 2 4 4 / 6 1 1 9 4 Y I A 7f 7188 7 8/ 6 6 7 8 7 7 8 t l CH // //// / / / - / / / / / A N 77 8426 8 2 2 5 9 8 8 3 1 M I 1 1 8 M / u 1 n R Rl t Of TM 1 5 1 252 2 3 1 4 2 4 AU 00 0000 l l 0 l 0 0 0 0 0 LN 1 1 1 1 1 1 l l 1 l 1 1 t 1 1 U 22 2222 A A 2 A 2 2 ? 2 2 CL CC CCCC C C C C C C RA I I CR E S s n i o t c e k e g a p n a e a s o m L s e r n r i a rt I e t D s k n e ol A / n c w a o n o k s e e M o e t n i nB a L o e r ee e m iar p s v E l L l o l L s l kkk ei n id L vr l t n a B l e eaaa Pt o r sn ou b S I v O a B neee a t s e oE l Cl o R e k a Ll L rt l k t r a i r ru c e P S da L ai ec a rr e na P er e g r ee ywww sss ev P ra W oo S iof tu p T n rL l a Cs y l al S a N E w o ut e l ooo cC pl l l u rC a g n se s r ts at a n Wi a h h c D d pc pl l l Nl el i sr a l r r ql c s I t ua ueee - e l e r ep m ua et r e i C u RF SBDB ee ce 3 rm i sP i f T D N h rh uh ic t o r n x J s Pw NW l SC P I E l! l l' l
1 Page 46 of 52
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Other problems have subjected the machin'es to severe operating conditions that were not anticipated during the design phase,. but the circulators have demonstrated their ruggedness by operating through these incidents. During both the test period at Valmont and service in the plant, debris (e.g., nuts, bolts, filter screens, etc.) has inadvertently passed through the compressor and steam turbine.blading. Damage to the blades was cbserved, but none of these incidents prevented a circulator from being used to circulate' helium to the core;- i.e., no loss of cooling capability-resulted from the damage. The current incident on C-2101 is especially an indication l of the ruggedness of the machine. Despite extensive damage to the steam end, the circulator continued to operate, and, had it been necessary, it could have been used to cool down j the core. Manufactured 'to high quality standards, the rotor assembly has not experienced any seizures that resulted in loss of i ability to circulate helium. Even when damage has been l incurred to the bearing surfaces, the observed rotor wobble ! l did not cause any damage outside of the bearing cartridge. l l In closing, the circulator machine is extrercely rugged and ! i its integrity has been proven in many hours of reactor service. No catastrophic disc, blade or shaft (i.e., rotating parts) failures have occurred. Of paramount i importance is the fact that no shaft seizure problems have i been experienced, and in all cases of component failures the circulators have continued to operate and would have ensured safe shutdown of the reactor. l l 7.0 JUSTIFICATION FOR RETURNING TO POWER OPERATip
7.1 INTRODUCTION
The trip of helium circulator S/N C-2101 on July 22, 1987, and the failures that were observed during the ensuing investigation have been described in considerable detail in the previous sections of this report. PSC acknowledges the seriousness of this event, and after reviewing all of its implications, PSC considers that operation of Fort St. Vrain in accordance with the Technical Specifications and FSAR is justified. This discussion evaluates the licensing basis requirements , for circulator operability, reviews the significance of the observed f ailures, examines the program PSC is developing to prevent a recurrence of the observed f ailures, and explains why plant operation at this time continues to be justified.
Page 47 of 52 7.2 LICENSING BASIS FOR HELIUM CIRCULATOR OPERABILITY The helium circulators are the driving force for assuring forced circulation of primary coolant. As -such, they are required to function under various accident scenarios to l ensure that fuel temperatures remain within acceptable limits. These~ accident scenarios and their circulator performance requirements are summarized as follows:
- 1. Safe Shutdown and Appendix R. Cooling use firewater, i
assisted by an emergency water booster pump, to. drive a l circulator via its water turbine (Pelton wheel), i Primary coolant must be driven at 3.8 percent of- rated I flow, and any one circulator is capable of this. This is the safety-related, seismically qualified shutdown model which is relied upon in the Safety Analyses (FSAR 9.12.5.3 and 10.3.9). In the event forced circulation is lost f rom power levels up to 83.2 percent, if it is - restored within 90 minutes, fuel ~ . temperatures will remain below conservative limiting values. Single failure protection is required. for Safe Shutdown Cooling functions, and this is achieved with two operable circulators. (FSAR 10.3.10 and 14.4.2.2).
'2. Cooldown with a depressurized PCRV requires a higher circulator speed to account for the reduced primary coolant density and lower heat transfer rate. Analysis for a PCRV depressurization accident at a maximum ;
credible rate, the Marinum Credible Accident (MCA) (FSAR 14.8), shows that a circulator speed of 8000 rpm is required to achieve acceptable primary coolant flow , at fully depressurized conditions. One circulator is sufficient for the MCA while two circulators operating simultaneously at 8000 rpm are required in the highly unlikely event of a rapid depressurization which is the Design Basis Accident No. 2 (DBA-2). This high speed is achievable with feedwater supplied to the Pelton ; wheels and provides acceptable cooling from initial power levels up to 105 percent. Due to the low likelihood of DBA-2 (probability of occurrence less than IE-07 per - year), single failure protection for this incident is not a feature of the. FSV design and ;
^
therefore two operable circulators provide sufficient cooldown capability. (FSAR Sections 14.11, 14.4.3.2).
- 3. Although the FSV Technical Specifications require two operable circulators during all power operation above 2 percent rated thermal power (LCO 4.2.1), analysis has shown that a loss of forced circulation at power levels of 35 percent rated thermal power and below will not result in significant damage to any fission product barriers, since the PCRV liner cooling system is capable of removing all decay heat generated from that power level . ( FSAR D.4. ).
L--------_-_-_-_-_.____..._._---_ _ - - _ - _ _ . _ _ _ _ . - _ _ _
1 1 Page 48 of 52 ; i 7.3 OBSERVED FAILURES SIGNIFICANCE The root cause for the stress corrosion and fatigue cracking l identified previously in this report has not yet been i determined. PSC is pursuing all possibilities. The most significant feature of the observed stress corrosion cracking is that it is most likely a generic problem. PSC is not aware of any special materials, , lubricants, assembly methods, or operating history that ! would lead to the conclusion that the failures in circulator C-2101 are unique to that machine. Therefore it is highly likely that there are bolts with similar cracking, to . varying degrees, in any or all of the helium circulators I currently installed in the PCRV. While this condition is I recognized, it is also important to realize that a single bolt failure in and of itself will not produce the damage l observed in C-2101. There are twelve 1/4" bolts that hold ' the labyrinth steam seal assembly away from the turbine wheel and there are fif teen 3/4" bolts that secure the steam ducting to the bearing assembly. There have been no significant rnanifestations of difficulty to self-turbine or l other performance anomalies that would cause PSC to suspect that any of the currently installed helium circulators have experienced bolt failure to the extent that circulator ' i operability is compromised. The damage to circulator C-2101 has attached a new significance to the observation of difficulties in self-turbining. There are various known reasons for not self-turbining, and PSC has established a policy that if a circulator will not start on simulated boosted firewater, it will be declared inoperable. Other motive forces up to and including steam may then be used to start rotation, and various diagnostic procedures may be used to clear bearing water passages, but the circulator must be shown capable of starting on simulated boosted firewater before it can be considered operable. The ejection of failed parts from circulator C-2101 did not and could not credibly have adversely affected the operation of any downstream equipment. The discharge pipirig is configured such that an ef fective trap is created before any valves could be reached. Also, strainers protect the steam generatur reheaters so that any of the smaller, lighter fragments could not cause damage even if they did become entrained in the steam flow. (For a more detailed discussion of the impact of ejected parts on downstream components, see Attachment 10). 7.4 PREVENTION OF RECURRENCE PSC is developing a comprehensive program of monitoring, inspections, and fastener replacements to ersure that the E--______________-- - - - - - - - . _ _ _ _ _ - - - - . _ _ _ _ - . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
Page 49 of 52 I failures that occurred in circulator C-2101 do not occur again. The major features cf this program are as follows:
- 1. PSC will replace the fasteners that experienced stress corrosion cracking on C-2101 with all new fasteners, on all circulators installed in the PCRV. Any other '
l corre:tive action deemed appropriate as a result of the final evaluation of C-2101 will also be taken. These i' tasks will be undertaken as soon as the evaluation of C-2101 is completed, the correct replacement material type is determined or verified, suf ficient replacement bolts become available, and a refurbished spare helium j circulator is available. This would most likely occur i in spring of 1088.
- 2. A wobble monitoring program will be implemented. The wobble is an indication of rotating element balance, ;
and any change in this balance is evidence of material l gain, loss or displacement, or other conditions that 1 warrant investigation. The circulator operation and maintenance (0&M) manual identifies appropriate actions to be taken for different wobble values, up to and including shutting the machine down. As soon as equipment can be selected, procured, and installed, PSC will utilize a continuous monitoring system that will have alarm and cata storage capabilities. Until that i I time, the short term monitoring system will prov4e for wobble analysis on a daily basis and subsequent to l every significant speed change (800 rpm or more). Thir program provides an accurate record of changes in circulator performance and balance condition. (For a more detailed discussion of the wobble monitoring program, see Attachment 11).
- 3. PSC will revise its existing inspection program of the circulators based upon the results of the current investigation. This program will be submitted to the NRC as a Technical Specification Amendment Request to SR 5,2.18, 75 IMPACT OF CIRCULATOR C-2101 TRIP DN PLANT OPERATION PSC has investigated the trip of circulator C-2101 and the f ailures distcvered following that trip. Although the cause of those f ailures is as yet undetermined, and although the extent of similar degradation or f ailures in the installed circulators is not known, PSC considers that Fort St. Vrain operation continues to be justified for the following reasons:
- 1. If an emergency had occurred, it is most likely C-2101, in its actual degraded condition, could have been operated on either its steam turbine drive or its water turbine drive (albeit, with high wobble indication), as l
1 Page 50 of 52 l demonstrated by its operation up to approximately 6000 rpm on July 24, 1987, subsequent to its trip on July 22, 1987. A preliminary analysis was also perforced which showed that f rom 83.2 percent power only 3-1/2 tours of forced circulation, using a single circulator at 1100 rpm, is needed for Safe Shutdown or Appendix R Cooling (assuming a 90-minute delay) to' assure a subsequent liner cooldown that would be bounded by previous liner cooling analyses from an initial 35 percent equilibrium: power level. These analyses' concluded that a liner cooldown would maintain the integrity of fisson product barriers, j i i 2. Simultaneous loss of all four' installed helium l circulators, such that Safe Shutdown and Appendix .R Cooling capabilities would be lost, is incredible. The
]
circulator that was recently installed in "0" penetration, S/N C-2104, was.recently refurbished and twelve new labyrinth seal retaining f asteners (1 tem 46, l C2101-300) were installed. The remainder of the circulators have various service histories and it is inconceivable that they would all experience 1 incapacitating failures at the same time, j notwithstanding the fact that the failure mechanism may not occur over a predictable tire i nte rval . This is i also supported by the fact that circulator seizure has l never been experienced by any machine. As long as one , I helium ' circulator is operable, Safe Shutdown and I l Appendix R Cooling is assured for every case. Common-l mode failures and DBA-2 are addressed next. . I
- 3. There is no single external event that could develop a sufficient forcing function on any helium circulator such that the suspect bolting, even in a degraded condition, would catastrophically fail, thereby damaging the steam-end assembly. of the circulator.
Connecting piping assemblies are isolated by bellows assemblies, flanged joints, 90- and 180-degree bends, and by about fif teen feet of piping in the penetration , so that any pressure pulses, water hammer, or other forces would not be translated to the suspect bolting. The vertical acceleration from the FSV operating basis - earthquake is not significant when the relatively light weight of the insulation / labyrinth seal assembly is considered. Therefore, neither a seismic event, HELB, DBA-2, fire, SLRDIS actuation, nor any other credible event could conceivably result in a corren-mode failure of the helium circulators in the manner observed in C-2101. 4 The failure of any steam end part of a circulator, in the manner observed in C-2101, would tot affect the
c < Page 51 of 52 operability of any other circulator. Piping assemblies are sufficiently isolated to preclude any interrelated effects.
- 5. The operability of all installed circulators will be demonstrated prior to exceeding 35 percent power. PSC will ensure that all circulators can develop 3.8 percent primary coolant flow using simulated boosted firewater or an equivalent primary coolant flow using condensate; develop 8000 rpm equivalent to atmospheric pressure; and be able to re-start on simulated boosted firewater af ter having been shut down without bearing water and with the brake and seal set for 90 minutes.
During the performance of_ these tests, various parameters will be monitored and verified to be within expected ranges. These include shaf t wobble, bearing temperature, and bearing cartridge di f ferential pressure.
- 6. PSC will not operate FSV above 35 percent power unless all four circulators are operating. This commitment applies until our investigation is completed and associated corrective actions are implemented. This provides maximum assurance of forced circulation and Safe Shutdown and Appendix R Cooling capability.
- 7. An enhanced monitoring program, to include improved l wobble monitoring and which may also utilize such parameters as speed coast-down time, bearing water flow versus cartridge bearing pressure drop , compressor performance data, and steam turbine performance data, and such instruments as accelerometers and acoustical sensors, will allow PSC to trend circulator performance l in an ef fort to detect signs of degradation or f ailures i before significant damage would occur. PSC considers j it highly unlikely that a single circulator could l experience degradation without detection before the l circulator is damaged to the extent that it seizes. l
- 8. Even in the incredible event that all four circulators should fail and forced circulation capability would be '
lost, the PCRV liner cooling system is capable at any thermal power level of removing cufficient decay beat so that the integrity of the PCRV is assured. This , event has been analyzed in the FSAR as the Design Basis Accident No. 1 (DBA-1), with acceptable of f site dose consequences well below the 10CFR100 guidelines. l \
Page 52 of 52 j ATTACHMENTS Number Description 1 Assembly Isometric of Dwg. C2101-300 Assembly 1 2 Drawing C2101-300: Circulator Machine Assembly 3 Blow-Up of Steam End of C2101-300 Circulator Machine Assembly 4 Insulation Cover Assembly -- Half Cross-Section 5 Insulation Cover Assembly -- Cross-Section Detail Showing a 1/4-20x5/8 Labyrinth Seal Mounting Bolt 6 Insulation Cover Assembly -- Cross-Section Detail Showing the Spring Plunger 7 Helium Circulator Historical Review Summary 8 Helium Circulator History -- Time in Penetration, ! Hours of Operation, Thermal Cycles (Bar Chart plus Table) 9 Helium Circulator History -- Hours of Operation (BarChart) l 10 Impact of Ejected Parts on Downstream Components ! (Discussion) 11 Wobble Monitoring Program Plans (Discussion)
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I Attachment 10 Page 1 of 3 IMPACT OF EJECTED PARTS ON 00WNSTR:.AM COMPONENTS ! The steam flow path, and possibly that of any ejected parts, from the
'O' helium circulator steam turbine would be as follows: down the circulator steam outlet plenum /anuulus to the circulator steam outlet !
pipe at the bottom end of the circulator and out through the ! circulator steam outlet nozzle to the cold reheat (CRH) steam piping; through CRH piping and the 16-in. circulator steam outlet isolation I valve (HV-2252); up to the 90' wye connection shared by the 'C' ] circulator outlet; from the wye connection to the Loop 2 reheater ! inlet header; from the header in parallel to the CRH steam ! desuperheaters (5-2213, typical); and finally to the reheater inlet i protective filters (M-2215, typical). This path is similar to all ; ci rcul ato rs. ( Any ejected parts, or pieces thereof, from the circulator are most likely to stop and be trapped in the circulator steam outlet pipe. Parts or pieces ejected from the steam turbine would be thrown out against the steam outlet annulus wall and flow down with the steam to the bottom of the steam outlet pipe some 23 feet below. The steam flow direction then must change in order to exit through the 14-in. diameter steam outlet nozzle, the centerline of which is , approximately 19 in. above the bottom of the steam outlet pipe. The I 14-in. steam outlet nozzle is a 90 elbow which is attached in such a ; manner to direct steam flow out and up at a 45 angle. This upward I exiting piping configuration results in an approximate four-foot elevation increase from the outlet nozzle to the CRH piping in about a five-foot run. This overall steam outlet piping configuration is l comparable to particulate collection equipment such as cyclone - separators. The principal of operation of such equipment is based on the tendency of entrained particles, due to their inertia, to continue to move in a straight line when the direction of the gas , stream is changed. Therefore, it seems reasonable to assume then l that most, if not all, of the ejected parts would be trapped in the bottom of the steam cutlet piping. This assumption is supported by i I the fact that many various size parts / pieces were found in the bottom of the steam outlet pipe when it was removed from 'D' circulator. No pieces were found in the 14-in, steam outlet nozzle / elbow. The pieces found ranged in size from large (7"x3/4"x3/16"), to small (1"x1"x1/16"), to particle sizes of 1/16" to 1/4" diameter (including 1/32" diameter lock wire). Accounting of the pieces found in the steam outlet piping and the damaged pieces found during the circulator steam-end disassembly also provides reasonable assurance that all the ejected parts were collected in the circulator steam outlet pipe. However, if an ejected part/ piece was carried into the CRH piping, the components in its flow path are, as stated previously, the circulator steam outlet isolation valve HV-2252 (and possibly the C- ; circulator outlet valve HV-2250, depending on steam flow from C- { circulator), the CRH steam desuperheaters (S-2213, typical), and the ) reheater inlet protective filters (M-2215, typical). (See Figure 1, j attached.) . l l
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Attachment 10 Page 2 of 3 The circulator steam outlet isolation valves-(HV-2252 and HV-2250) are 16-in., 45' Y-configuration globe valves. These valves are not likely to trap parts, pieces or particles _ due to their near straight- l through design and the tight' clearances (approximately 0.015" radial) j between the disk ^ assembly and the body - guide ' ribs. Any small particles / pieces'that might become lodged in- the. 0.015" clearances would probably not affect valve _ operation due to the large static hydraulic actuator force applied to the valve stem (at leat- 170,000 lb. closing force greater than the steam pressure force . tending to j open the valve). ! It does not seem likely that any parts / pieces have been trapped in or have damaged these isolation' valves in any significant manner. . This statement is supported by the fact that ' subsequent isolation and operation of the 'C' and 'D' circulators after the overspeed trip of-
'D circulator on 7-22-87 at 0516 hours has effectively stroked HV-2252 and HV-2250 closed and open at least a. couple of times each. 'No reports of inoperability of these valves have been noted. Also, during testing of the ability to seal 'D' circulator on. 7-31-87 due .to its interspace leakage problem, the steam outlet. isolation valve HV-2252 was closed .and appeared to be capable- of sealing approximately 80 psig helium pressure. This indicates' that no significant damage could have been done to the valve disk or seat.
The CRH steam desuperheaters _(5-2213, typical) are basically a 2-in. diameter pipe inserted normal to flow in the 10-in. CRH piping. A water spray nozzle is installed at the end of'the 2-in pipe, with direction of spray the same as that of the CRH steam, i.e., toward the reheater inlet. Any parts that may be free flcwing in the CRH pipe would strike the back side of the 2-in. pipe or the back side of the nozzle, and therefore would not damage. the water spray function of the nozzle. The nozzle and supply pipe are of. sufficient size to not be damaged by any free flowing parts. The reheater inlet protective' filters (M-2215, typical) will collect 1 any parts, pieces or particles that may reach 'the reheater inlet- i piping. These filter elements are rigidly constructed, and are designed to trap loose particles as small as 0.048 in. l
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Attachment 11 Page 1 of 3 WOBBLE MONITORING PROGRAM PLMS Existing Speed / Wobble Computer The speed / wobble signal that is generated by the speed element 3 (SE)/ speed module' (SM) electronic assembly combination has been raade 1 available for.-general . diagnostic equipment (i .e., oscilloscopes) ! through a buf fer amplifier contained in the SM. Additionally 'this same output was routec to en instrumentation rack'in the Auxiliary Electric Room where a " contin'uous" speed / wobble monitorin'g system is installed. This system was - designed to provide nearly continuous monitnring, indication and alarm functions., and consisted of these main components: a Digital Equipment Corporation (DEC) PDP-11/10 computar; a DEC LPS-11 analog-to-digital. ( A/0) converter module; a. j teletype; and a remote selection / alarm / indication subpanel in the. I Control Room. A brief discussion of how this system was designed to operate follows. T h.1 input signal from the SM is routed to a patch penel where the signal can be teed so that both an oscilloscope.and the speed / wobble ; computer system could be used to analyze the wobble. From this. patch i panel, cables were installed to the speed / wobble instrumentation rack I and cunnected to the A/O converter module. Interconnections between the A/D ' nodule; computer, teletype and remote -inoication/ control subpanel completes the hardware interconnects. Besides,the hardware, l a real-time ooerating system (ROS) and . s';p po rt subprograms were i created to contrcl A/D module setup and input / output (1/0) functions, j data analysis, alert / alarm functions and Operttor .1/0 functions. This system, however, is not operational anc' the vintege of the ' hardware is making repair of this system difficult with -minimal , chance of success. l Short Term Solution 4 After reviewing. the existing system and considering' that the probability that the existing system can be made operational is low, it was decided that a newer and more serviceable system was necessary. An investigation into whst equipment is available and lead times associated with new equipment has lead ta the conclusion i that a continuously recording speed / wobble monitoring system is not viable in the short term. Although no short term continuous system is available, it does not mean that there is not a system that can be installed to monitor wobble on a periodic basis until a continuous system can be designed, aquired and installed. With this in mind, the short term solution.'that is the most viable is the installation of four(4) dual-trace digital storage oscilloscopes and connecting the scopes .in place of the existing DEC LPS-11 A/D converter module. In reviewing the available scope types, the ability to store waveforms, re-display- the stored waveterms, and transfer the stored waveforms to a computer system. were the- items considered essential. By including these key features, data gathered by the scopes and transferred to the computer system could be re-displayed 'and compared with " base-line" values for changes in wobble values. Additionally, if the data is gathered on a daily basis, 'all
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Attachment 11 Page 2 of 3 of the wobble traces gathered and saved can be used for trending the circulator performance. This system, however, has several drawbacks that only a continuous monitoring system can overcome. The first drawback is that no automatic alert or alarm function is available since the shaft wobble must be calculated by hand. Secondly, integration into .the Control Room automatic wobble readout cannot be accomplished for the same reason. Finally, since the monitoring is not continuous, changes in wobble that last only for a brief period would not be observed unless the wobble change happens while aquiring the " snapshot". Although this system is not continuous, the analyzing of wobble on a daily basis and subsequent to every significant speed change (800 rpm or more) provides an acceptable method for monitoring changes in circulator performance and can be implemented prior to plant re- , I start. l.o_n3 Term Solution In order to provide a continuous wobble monitoring system that provides useful circulator performance degradation trend data, a basic set of requirements that this system must meet were developed. This list was developed by reviewing the circulator C&M manual, the existing speed / wobble monitoring system manuals, and some of the past circulator operating history. At the conclusion of this review, the following parameters were found to be the most critical design parameters of this system: The ability to continuously monitor shaf t wobble. The ability to display the shaft wobble on either a local or remote display. The ability to remotely provide alarm of both wobble limits ! (i.e.,the 0.3-mil diagnostic and the 0.5-mil shutdown l wobble values). The ability to store wobble values that occurred both prior
- to and after an alarm condition has occurred for further i analysis.
With the basic list and the SM output signal characteristics, vendors are being contacted regarding what equpment they may have that can l provide the desired functions. Since this activity cannot be ! l completed prior to startup, a schedule for installing the new j monitoring system is presented instead. The proposed tentative schedule for designing, procurring and j installing the new speed / wobble system is as follows: l 1 l Contact vendors and solicit available equipment and ! l estimated delivery dates for this equipment. (To be i completed by 10-9-1987)
)
, 4 Attachment 11 Page 3 of 3 Review proposed :ystems and resolve conflicts / design philosophy discrepancies. (To be completed by 11-6-1987)
Prepare Change Notice (CN) package and procure parts. (To be completed by 1-4-1988)
- Prepare Controlled Work Procedure (CWP) and install system.
(To be completed by 3-1-1987) It must be noted that this tentative schedule may be affected by the delivery dates of the selected vendor since PSC will have minimal control over these delivery dates. l l l
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Attachment 2 Attendees at 9/11/87 PSC/NRC Meeting On Circulator, failure and Recovery i j Name Title and Organization ~l J. P. Jaudon Chief, PSA, RIV NRC J.~E. Gagliardo Chief, Reactor Project Branch NRC R. E. Farrell Sr. Resident Inspector, R-IV NRC ; R. E. Ireland Chief, Eng. Sect. R-IV NRC l l F. B. Litton NRR Mat. Eng. Branch NRC j E. B. Tomlinson NRR - Project Manager NRC- , P. F. Tomlinson Mgr. QA PSC. R. L Stewart Reactor Inspector NRC P. S. Check Dep. Reg. Administrative IV NRC V. J. Barbat Mfg. Eng. Manager GA R. T. Maxwell Project Engr. - QA GA Tech. Inc. J. R. Reesy Staff Assistant PSC-R. L. Hellner Materials Eng. Coord. QA PSC-Don Warembourg Mgr. Nuc. Engrg PSC , M. H. Holmes Nuclear Licensing Mgr. PSC H. L. Brey Mgr. Nuc. Lic. & Fuel PSC M. E. Niehoff Nuclear Design Mgr. PSC_ ; R. L. Craun Nuclear Site Eng. Mgr. PSC-C. H. Fuller Station Manager PSC R. O. Williams, Jr. V. P. Nuclear Operations PSC Jim Eggebroten Supt. Technical Services Engrg. PSC Tom Erlewine Engineer PSC J. M. Gramling supervisor, Nuclear Licensing- PSC Operations (The following persons attended this meeting via a telephone hookup) K. L. Heitner NRC/NRR/PD-IV J. A Ctivo NRC/NRR/PD-IV C. D. Sellars NRC/NRR/ DEST-W. Hazelton NRC/NRR/ DEST I. Bukulmez IAEA _ 1 _- i____
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