ML20206K111
| ML20206K111 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Fort Saint Vrain  |
| Issue date: | 11/21/1988 |
| From: | Bates G PUBLIC SERVICE CO. OF COLORADO |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20206K094 | List: |
| References | |
| EE-93-0007, EE-93-0007-R-A, EE-93-7, EE-93-7-R-A, TAC-69264, NUDOCS 8811290272 | |
| Download: ML20206K111 (31) | |
Text
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I EE-93-0007 '! ,
Engineering Evaluation I Of The Interaction and Effects i Of The !
PPS and SLRDIS Systems i
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i EE-93-0007
1.0 PURPOSE
The purpose of this Engineering Evaluation is to document an overview of the evaluations that were performed during the nultiple phases of design of the Steam Line Rupture Detection / Isolation Uystem (SLRDIS) to support the Fort St. Vrain Environmental Qualifiertion (EQ) Program.
While the results of these evaluations were documented only in general statement forrt throughout the EQ program documents, no retrievable compilation in a single document of the detailed design results existed.
2.0
SUMMARY
This Engineering Evaluation evaluates PPS (Plant Protective System),
SLRDIS, and normal control system interactions against General Design Criteria 19, 20, 21, and 22 of Appendix C of the FSAR, and concludes that these design criteria are met. A detailed Failure Modes and . :
Effects Analysis was done as part of this Evaluation to reach thase conclusions.
3.0 SCOPE
This Engineering Evaluation discusses SLRDIS design compliance with IEEE 279-1971, PPS design with IEEE 279-1968, and additional standards as delineated in FSAR Section 7.3.10.2. It discusses the interaction between SLRDIS and the PPS, as well as interactions between SLRDIS and normal control systems. i 1
- This Engineering Evaluation's scope includes the effects of any postu- l 1 lated hot shorts, open circuit failures, or shorts to ground in the PPS/SLRDIS trip circuits to initiate valve closu es.
! i
4.0 PROCEDURE
i i See Attachment 8.1.
5.0 EVALUAT:0N: !
) See Attachment 8.1.
6.0 CONCLUSION
i See Attachment 8.1. ,
i !
(continued...) l l
c O e l
1 EE-93-0007 i
i
7.0 REFERENCES
7.1 Fort St. Vrain FSAR (Revision 6) 7.2 IEEE Standard 279-1968 and IEEE 279-1971 7.3 tiRC letter G-88393. Heitner to Williams, dated September 20, ,
1988.
7.4 FSAR Appendix C. General Plant Design Criterions 19, 20, 21, 22,
8.0 ATTACHMENTS
8.1 "Engineering Evaluation of the Interaction and Effects of the PPS and SLRDIS Systems," Revision B.
G W G S e e e h
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e FORT ST. VRAIN NUCLEAD GENERATING STATION O PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF COLORADO CHECK LIST OF DESIGN VERIFICATION
-C-N N- 9 3 M BY bue4ched PAGE QUESTIONS FOR DESIGN REVIEW METHOD YES NO N/A bl 1. Were the inputs correctly selected and incorporated into design?
g] 2. Are assumptions necessary to perform the design activity adequately descrioed and reasonable?
Where necessary, are the assumptions identified for subsequent re-verifications when the detailed design activities are completed?
hU 3. Are the appropriate quality and quality assurance requirements specified?
g[ 4. Are the applicable codes, standards and regulatory requirements including issue and addenda properly identified and are their requirements for design met?
b 5. Have applicable construction and operating experience been considered?
% 6. Have the design interface requirements been satisfied?
hUU 7. Was an sopropriate design method used?
b 8. Is the output reasonable compared to inputs?
$ 9. Are the specified parts, equipment, and processes suitable for the required application?
g[ 10. Are the specified materials r:ompatible with each other and the design environmental conditions to which the material will be exposed? -
b 11. Have adequate maintenance features and requirements been specified?
[ 12. Are accessibility and other design provisions adequate for performance of needed maintenance and repair <
g 13. Has adequate accessibility been provided to perform the in service inspection expected to be required during the plant life?
U b 14. Has the design properly considered radiation exposure to the public and plant personnef ?
[g 15. Are the acceptance criteria incorporated in the design documents sufficient to allow verification that design rNuirements have been satisfactorily accomplished?
[g 16. Have adequate pre operational and subsequent periodic test requirements been appropriately specified?
U b 17. Are adequate handling, storage, cleaning and shipping requirements specified?
h 18. Are adequate identification requirements specified?
@ 19. Are requirements for record preparation review, approval, retention, etc., adequately specified?
NOTE: If the answer to any question is no, provide additionalinformation and resolution below.
RESOLUTION OF DESIGN DEFICIENCIES UNCOVERED OURING THE DESIGN VERIFICATION PROCESS H w o m % s n e n n a c. e n s nur n su s. t vm y n sMc7o* v' .
^
. Attachment 8.1 EE 007 ENGINEERING EVALUATION OF THE INTERACTION AND EFFECTS OF THE PPS AND SLRDIS SYSTEMS REVISION 8 PREPARED BY ;
PROTO-POWER CORPORATION 591 POQUONNOCK ROAD GROTON, CONNECTICUT 06340 i
,7 Nf & /If/fka H.W. Parkhurst Date ttll$fd9 R.J. Atkisson Date
(
Revision A Originallssue 11/14/88 Revision B Incorporated PSC IDV Comments 11/18/88
TABLE OF CONTENTS SECTION TITLE gq[
I.
Overview of the SLRDIS and PPS . . .. 1 II. PPS Design Features . . . . . . . .. 3 III. SLRDIS Interface with PPS . . . . .. 3 Design Features IV. SLRDIS Outside of PPS . .. . . . .. 4 Design Features V. Failure Modes and Effects . . . . .. 4 Analysis (FMEA)
VI. Conclusion / Summary . . . . .. . . .. 6 Attachment A-1 FSAR Figure 7.3-19 SLRDIS and PPS Relationship Attachment A-2 FSAR Table 7 3-3 valves Closed by SLRDIS and (Sheets 1 & 2) Associated Reset Actions Attachment A-3 FSAR Figure 7 3-25 FSV Secondary Coolant and Power Conversion System Postulated Pipe Rupture Locations Attachment A-4 FSAR Figure 7.3-18 Steamline Rupture Detection Isolation Instrumentation Attachment A-5 FSAR Figure 7 3-24 SLRDIS Outputs to Circulator (Sheets 1 & 2) Trip Logic A in PPS for Loops 1&2 Attachment B-1 SLRDIS Failure Analysis B-2 Summary Sheet for B-3 HV-2201 Attachment B-4 SLRDIS Failure Analysis B-5 Summary Sheet for B-6 HV-2292 Attachment B-7 SLRDIS Failure Analysis B-8 Summary Sheet for B-9 PV-2229 Attachment B-10 SLRDIS Failure Analysis i B-11 Summary Sheet for
! B-12 PCV-5213 I
i l _ -
1
e
- 7 4 !
1 ENGINEERING EVALUATION OF THE INTERACTION AND EFFECTS I
< 0F THE PPS AND SLRDIS I 4
i This Engineering Evaluation (EE) was i j
prepared in response to ,
questions / concerns raised by the NRC during a follow-up review of LER 87-020 (TAC NO 69264) as documented in letter G-88398. This EE '
represents an overview and compilation of the results of the Design Analysis and Accident Analyses prepared to :
support the FSV program. EQl ('
- I.
i OVERVIEW OF THE SLRDIS AND PPS l i t
! L The PPS is designed in conformance with the requirements of l
- IEEE Std. 279 August 1968 as discussed in Section 7.1 of the l updated FSAR (Revision 6). The SLRDIS is designed to meet !
! the requirements of IEEE Std. 279-1971 and additional i standards ao delineated in FSAR Section ('
i 7 3.10.2. The j
interface of SLRDIS with the PPS and valve control circuits is designed to meet the existing plant design standards. A
! simplified diagram depicting the relationship of the SLRDIS and PPS is shown in FSAR Figure 7 3-19 (Attachment A-1).
i i
The SLRDTS objective is to automatically isolate High Energy f Line Breaks so as to limit the resultant building '
f temperatures to an acceptable level for tne environmental :
qualification of Safety Related Equipment.
- (
j The SLRDIS valves listed in FSAR Table 7.3-3 (Attachment A-
) 2) and shown diagramatically in FSAR Figure 7 3-25 i
(Attachment A-3) are actuated closed by circuitry which falls into one af the three following categnries: l 3
(FSAR l t Table 7.3-3 is annotated to correlate category to valve f i
number). I t
l 1
A. Existing PPS Circulator Trip Logic. !
i i B. SLRDIS relay contact inputs from new XCRs (Relay i Driver) and Relays in I-9310 which bypass and i i override existing PPS relay logic circuitry for valves actuated by PPS which were not actuated by l l*
l circulator trip logic.
l '
i Page 1 of 6 f
r C. SLRDIS relay contact inputs from new XCRs and Relays in I-9310 for valvou not previously actuated by PPS logic.
The following provides a description of the SLRDIS actuation circuitry for each of the above cr.tegories.
A. The SLRDIS provides isolated "A" and "B" Logic inputs into the existing PPS "A" and "B" Logic for a Loop 1 and Loop 2 Circulator Trip. This is accomplished by the use of eight (8) independent and isolated SLRDIS contacts. One (1) contact is utilized to input a trip signal to a single PPS Logic (A or B) Circulater Steam and Water Turbine trip logic for an ladividual circulator in a loop.
A SLEDIS actuation results in the simultaneous tripping of all four circulators, and the prohibiting of an auto water turbine re-start for all four circulators. The circulator trip signals r result in Loop Trouble Trip signals which combine to generate a Two Loop Trouble Trip signal which i immediately results in a Reactor Scram. This Logic results in the Category "A" valves going to the closed position upon SLRDIS actuation.
B. The SLRDIS provides isolated "A" and "B" Logic inputs into new XCRs in I-9310. The XCRs drive !
, relays which provide isolated contact inputs into I the valve control circuits which override all the PPS and normal control circuit functions and result in the valves going to the closed position upon SLRDIS actuation.
C. The SLRDIS provides isolated "A" and "B" Logic inputs into new XCRs in I-9310. The XCRs drive relays which provide isolated contact irputs into the valve control circuits which override all the normal control circuit functions. The result is !
the valves going closed upon SLRDIS actuation. :
Page 2 of 6 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
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II. i PPS DESIGN FEATURES l The PPS is designed in conformance with the requirements of !
)
I IEEE Std. 279 August 1968 and the applicable AEC General l Design Criteria as delineated in FSAR Section 7.1.1. '
l 1
] The conformance to the above design criterion and ;
g I
specifically AEC General Design Criterion Number 19, 20, 21 i and and 22 is provided in FSAR Section 7.1.1.2. The introduction of the SLRDIS funution into the PPS and valve control circuits is commensurate with the PPS design requirements. i Section V of this report and Attachment B !
j provide a detailed Failure Modes and Effects Analysis for
) the valve circuits which contain only SLRDIS and contain [
] both PPS and SLRDIS inputs. A review of this analysis j j indicates that no new failure modes were introduced into PPS !
! as a result of the SLRDIS. The PPS is depicted in FSAR !
I Figun. ; 7.1-14, 7.1-15 and 7.1-16. The SLRDIS system j outputs, including the outputs to PPS, are depicted in FSAR Figure 7.1-7. l t l j i
j III. SLRDIS INTERFACE WITH PPS - DESIGN FEA'URES !
l I
- As discussed previously, the SLRDIS is designed to meet the f 2
requirements of those standards delineated in FSAR Sectic- I
- 7 3 10.2. This includes the requirements of AEC General Design Criterion 19, 20, 21 and 22. [
]
i The SLRDIS is depicted ;
in FSAR Figure 7 3-18 (Attachment A-4) and Figure 7 3-24 (Attachment A-5). The SLRrIS will fulfill its safety Related Function assuming an active single failure of any !
a component or device since there are two independent and !
isolated Logic trains of SLRDIS. In addition, any failure j
resulting in the failure to close any one SLRDIS valve will f j not impact fulfillment of the SLRDIS objective since the j building temperature curves were generated assuming a single I valve did not actuate closed.Section V provides a detailed l Failure Modes and Effects Analysis for a ircuit which i
contains both a PPS and SLRDIS function. A review of this
! analysis indicates that no single failure results in the l !
loss of the SLRDIS function nor does the single failure i adversely affect the function of PPS.
[
j Page 3 of 6
(
I t
IV. SLRDIS OUTSIDE OF PPS - DESIGN FEATURES i
l Reference the FSAR Sections and Attachments indicated in Section III. The SLRDIS design features indicated in Section III apply for all SLRDIS valves. including those !
which have circuits totally independent of the PPS. Section l V provides a detailed Failure Modes and Effects Analysis for l a circuit which contains only the SLRDIS input. A review of !
- this analysis indicates that no single failure results in !
the loss of the SLRDIS function.
f V. FAILURE MODES AND EFFECTS ANALYSIS (FMEA) i i
- 1. The circuit modifications accomplished by the addition of ;
SLRDIS circuitry to existing control logic has been !
analyzed to insure that no single failure in SLRDIS. PPS !
or the normal control logic will prevent the SLRDIS !
system from providing its required function or create any l undesirable iriterac tion with the PPS or normal control system. {
[
- 2. The analysis consists of four different types 1
of conditions that exist in the various control systems as follows:
(A) The addition of SLRDIS relay contacts to existing circuitry in addition to existing PPS contacts to energize an existing solenoid to close a control valve.
(B) The addition of SLRDIS relay contacts to existing circuitry in addition to existing PPS contacts to de-energize an existing solenoid to islose a control valve.
(C) The addition o, SLRDIS relay contacts to provide a zero input to the valve position card to close the control valve.
(D} The addition of new solenoids actuated by SLBDIS contacts to close the control valve.
Page 4 of 6
O
- 3. The analysis for Paragraph 2A was performed by Attachments B1 thru B3 on valve HV-2201, Feedwater Block i Valve. The following valves would be similars (A) HV-2253 (E-1203, P390 ' 409)
(B) HV-2254 (E '.03, P391 & 410)
(C) HV-2241 ..
.203 P403)
(D) HV-2242 (E-1203, P404)
(E) HV-2202 (E-1203 P451)
(F) FV-2205 (E-1203, P454)
(G) FV-2206 (E-1203, P455) 4 The analysis for Paragraph 2B was performed by Attachments B4 thru B6 on valve HV-2292 Steam Bypass Block Valve. The following valves would be similar:
(A) HV-2293 (E-1203, P434) *
(B) HV.2203 (E-1203, P450 .
(C) HV-2204 (E-1203, P453) l
- 5. The analysis for Paragraph 2C was performed by Attachments B7 thru B9 on valve PV-2229 Superheater Steam Bypass Valve. The following valves would be similar:
(A) PV-2230 (E-1203, P1915) ,
(B) PV-2243 (E-1203, P1921)
(C) PV-2244 (E-1203, P1922) l h
- 6. The analysis for Paragraph 2D was performed by l Attachments B10 thru B12 on valve PCV-5213 Auxiliary Steam to Cold Reheat Header. l The following valves would ;
be similar: '
(A) PCV-5214-1 (E-1203, P2272) ,
(B) PCV-5214-2 (E-1203, P2272) i (C) PCV-5214-3 (E-1203, P2274) l (D) PCV-5201 (E-1203, P2274)
(E) PCV-5305 (E-1203, P2274) l Page 5 of 6
L VI. CONCLUSION /
SUMMARY
The objective of the SLRDIS system is to automatically ;
isolate High Energy Line breaks so as to limit the building temperatures to an acceptable level for environmental qualification of Safety Related Equipment. The SLRDIS [
objective is completed for the case of a single valve or component failure since the valves actuated by SLRDIS are actuated by both SLRDIS Loops and/or are in series with
- l another valve actuated by the other SLRDIS Loop. (General Design Criterion 21)
SLRDIS is designed to override the normal control and PPS functions within the particular control circuit.
A failure of a SLRDIS contact within any valve control circuit will either cause the valve to go to the closed position (SLRDIS actuated mode) or not actuate the i
particular valve or SLRDIS Loop on tila t valve. Upon a SLRDIS actuation, the first case will close the valve and therefore is acceptable from both the normal plant operation and SLRDIS perspective. In the second case, as discussed above, a redundant means exists to fulfill the SLRDIS '
i objective. Therefore, any failure of a SLRDIS component (contact to loop) will not adversely impact the fulfillment of the SLRDIS objective. (General Design Criterion 20).
The control circuits which contain the SLRDIS contacts cannot, by design. override the SLRDIS function. The SLRDIS i contact will bypass the function of the normal control circuit and the function of PPS upon actuation. A failure in any control circuit will not propagate back to the SLRDIS or PPS. since the contacts which provide these two protection functions are isolated contacts. l All credible failures in a control circuit will only cause the functional ;
loss of that valve or component and will not affect the t
! overall SLRDIS and/or PPS function. (General Dealgn (
- Criterion 22) L The SLR)IS is designed for a high degree of reliability by i use of sedundant microprocessor-based control logic, the use of quality components and modules, and built-in provisions for mai nainability and in-operation testing. (General l Design C.'iterior 19).
Page 6 of 6
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! UPDATED FSAR- !
! Revision 5 i l i l l I
l :
t I
i IfiPUTS FROM INPUTS FROM l EXISTING SLRD!5 !
INSTRUMENTATION INSTRUMEllTAT!0!i !
t p l i f
Pr5(I 9310) STEAM t.!NE f e
PUPTURE CIRCULAYOR DETECTION !
T XCR Lo91c A or 5 :
- of I-03543 !
HODULES gg, j YEVE 3
ACTUATION e lo 91c A off B J j LOGIC NEW of I 93544 l t l I
t f
l l 0 O l EXISTING ADDITIONAL OUTPUTS OUTPUTS l FIGURE 7.3-19 SLRDIS AND PPS RELATIONSHIP l
ATTACH MEWT A-1
dr - .
l UPDATED FSAR Revision 5 Table 7.3-3 ENG.INEER\ Nr'
" * ' #)
EVALUATie VALVES CLOSED BY SLRDIS AND ASSOCIATED RESET ACTIONS ;
C AT E G,OR ' S'.FDIS ACTUATION RESET LOOP OESCRIPTION LOGIC METH00(2) ACTION 2105 1 CIRC 1A SPEED CONT (1) LOOP 1 CT A&B (3) i-2106 2 CIRC IC SPEED CONT (1) LOOP 2 CT A&B d
, SV-2109 1 CIRC 1A WATER TURB CONT (1) LOOP 1 CT A&B "
i SV-2110 2 CIRC IC WATER TURB CONT (1) LOOP 2 CT A&B "
SV-2111 1 CIRC IB SPEED CONT (1) LOOP 1 CT A&B "
SV-2112 2 CIRC 10 SPEED CONT (1) LOOD 2 CT A&B "
SV-21 5 1 CIRC IB WATER TURB CONT (1) LOOP 1 CT A&B "
SV-2116 2 CIRC 10 WATER TURB CONT (1) LOOP 2 CT A&B "
A< HV-2109-1 1 CIRC 1A WATER TURB SUP (1) LOOP 1 CT A&B (3)
HV-2110-1 2 CIRC IC WATER TURB SUP (1) LOOP 2 CT A&B "
HV-211b1 1 CIRC IB WATER TURB SUP (1) LOOP 1 CT A&B "
HV-2116-1 2 CIRC 10 WATER TURB SUP (1) LOOP 2 CT A&B "
MV-2109-2 1 CIRC 1A WATER TURB OISCH (1) LOOP 1 CT A&B (3)
HV-2110-2 2 CIRC IC WATER TURB DISCH (1) LOOP 2 CT A&B "
HV-2115-2 1 CIRC IB WATER TURB DISCH (1) LOOP 1 CT A&B "
HV-2116-2 2 CIRC 10 WATER TURB OISCH (1) LOOP 2 CT A&B "
P HV-2201. 1 F4 INLET (1) LOOP 1 XCR (3)
HV-2202 2 F# INLET (1) LOOP I XCR "
FV-2205 FW CONTROL (1) LOOP 1 XCR (3)
O# FV 2206 1
2 Pd CONTROL (1) LOOP 2 XCR "
H'.'-2203 1 EMER FV INLET (1) LOOP 1 XCR (3)
HV-2204 "
s 2 EMER Pd INLET (1) LOOP 2 XCR HV-2223 SHT STM STOP CHECK (1) LOOP 1 CT A&B (3)
Af. HV-2224 2 1
SKT STM STOP CHECK (1) LOOP 2 CT A&B "
C/{ PV-2229 PV-2230 2 1 SHT STM BYPASS SHT STM BYPASS (1)
(1)
(5)
HV-2292 2 SHT STM STARTUP BYPASS (1) LOOP 2 XCR (5)
HV-2293 1 SHT SIM STARTUP BYPASS (1) LOOP 1 XCR (4)
B< HV-2241 1 RHT STM BWASS (1) LOOP 1 XCR (4)
HV-2242 2 RHT STM BYSASS (1) LOOP 2 XCR (5)
PV-2243 1 RHT STM BYP PRESS RATIO (1) LOOP 1 XCR (4)
C< Cc.1T PV-2244 2 RHT STM BYP PRESS RATIO (1) LOOP 2 XCR (5)
CONT e
HV-2249 1 CIRC la TURB TRIP (1) LOOP 1 CT (3)
A, HV-2250 2 CIRC IC TURB TRIP (1) LOOP 2 CT H/-2251 1 CIRC 18 TURB TRTP (1) LOOP 1 CT HV-2252 2 CIRC 10 TURB TRIP (1) LOOP 2 CT ATTAC.H MENT A-2. (SH Q
1 '
UPDATED FSAR .
Revision 5 Table 7.3-3 ENCOMEERIN4 EV ALV ATt 0N VALVES CLOSED BY SLRDIS AND ASSOCIATED RESET ACTIONS S E cTioN E TAG SLRDIS ACTUATION C AT E CwoRY NO. LOOP DESCRIPTION RESET LOGIC METH00(2) ACTION B HV-2253 HV-2264
'l RH1 STOP-CHECK (1) LOOP 1 XCR (4) 2 RHT STOP-CHECK (1) LOOP 2 XCR (5)
PCV-5201 -
AUX STM TO 150 PSIG HOR (1) LOOP 2 XCR (7)
PCV-5213 -
AUX STM TO CRH (1) LOOP 1 XCR (6)
Cs PCV-5214 PCV-5214 CRH TO 150 PSIG HDR CRH TO 150 PSIG HDR (1) LOOP 1 XCR (6)
(1) LOOP 1 XCR (6)
PCV-5214 CRH TO 150 PSIG HOR (1) LOOP 2 XCR (7) s PCV-5305 -
150 PSIG HOR TO DA (1) LOOP 2 XCR (7)
(1) Panel 1-93543 Logic A or B and Panel I-93544 Logic A g B.
(2) XCR indicates valve is actuated thru an XCR Module in PPS. CT indicates valve is actuated thru Circulator Trip Logic portion of PPS.
(3) Requires:
- a. Return of temperature rate of rise to below setpoint
- b. Resst of microprocessor at monitoring and control rack I-93543 Logic A and Logie B
- c. Reset via existing methods to recover from N rculator Trip (or other existing logic in PPS)
(4) Requires:
- a. Return of temperature rate of rise to below setpoint
- b. Reset of microprocessor at monitoring and control rack I-93543 Logic A
- c. Reset of XCR's via HS-93375A and HS-933758 for Loop 1 valves on main control board (I-05).
4 1
(5) Requires:
- a. Return of temperature rate of rise to below setpoint
- b. Reset microprocessor at monitoring and control rack I-93543 Logic A
, c. Reset of XCR's via HS-93376A and HS-933768 for Loop 2 valves on main control board (I-05).
(6) Requires:
- a. Return of temperature rate of rise to below setpoint
- b. Reset of microprocessor at monitoring and control rack I-93543 Logic A
- c. Reset of XCR's via HS-93377A and HS-933778 for Loop common valves on main control board (I-06).
(7) Requires:
- a. Return of temperature rate of rise to below setpoint
- b. Reset of microprocessor at monitoring and control rack 1-93543 Logic A
- c. Reset of XCR's via HS-93378A and HS-933788 for Loop common valves s.. main control board (I-06).
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. R: vision 5 r.EACTOR BLOO. TURBINE BLIML REACTOR BLOG. TUR84NE BLOG.
SENSORS ZONE I SENSORS ZONE 2 SENSORS -ZONE I SEN! ORS ZCNE 2 INSI INST INST. INGT.
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PPS PPS PPS PPS LOGIC A LD0lc A LOGIC A LOGIC A VALVE TRIP VALVE TRIP CIRC TRIP CIRC TRIP LOOPI LOOP 2 LOOPi LOOP 2 Figurs 7.3-18 Steam Line Rupture Detection Isclotion Instrumentalbn AT TA C H MENT A_4
{~ CA- 113:29A]
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th Loop I 82 (Sheet t )
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(19310-1202 P9) (I9310 -1002P 9) 1-9310 ( 1- 9340 f !- 9310 I 9380 f}I-934 0 SECT.1100%.} SECT.1100v}8ECT 1100(v }!-SECT. 9380 S ECT.800 VSECT. 800 C R - 9 335 A CR 9337A CR 93394 CR 933SB C#=93378 CR 93398 mv- 2 2 S3(IN0) Hv 2201(IN0) PCV S213 ) HV 2253(IN0) HV 2201(IN0) PCV-5213 N Y
HV-2241(IMO) FV 220SIIN0) PCV 5214 2J Hv-2241( twol Fv 220S(IN0) PCV 5214 2 e PV 2229(IMO,4NC) C 2fol(INO) ePV 2229(INO,1NC) C 2101(INO) e PV 2243(IMO,1NC) C 2iO2(INC) *PV-2243(INC tWC) C 2102(1N0) s OvCRL APPike CONTACT (Want SCFORE BREAK)
NOTE:
SYSTEW SMowN IS FOR LOOP l.
l Figure 7.3 24 SLRDIS Outputs to Volve Trip LoglC in PPS - LOOP 1 (Sheet 2)
AT T Ac.H M EN T A- 5 ( S H 2.)
SLRDIS FAILURE ANALYSIS
SUMMARY
SHEET COMPONENT AND ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC HV-2201 Loop 1 Feedwater Block Valve (E-1203, p. 450)
FUNCTION OF SLRDIS DEVICE AND RESULTANT COMPONENT OPERATION SLRDIS relay contacts (2) of device CR-9337A (Loop 1, Logic A) and CR-93378 (Loop 1 Logic B) close during a SLRDIS actuation to energize solenoid HSV-2201 to close HV-2201.
F,iILURE MODES CONSIDERED MODE At Short circuit to ground in contact (2)
MODE B: Open circuit of contact (2)
MODE C: Hot short of contact (2)
POTEFTIAL EFFECTS OF DEVICE FAILURE ON SLRDIS OBJECTIVE MODE A: Short to ground in either contact CR-9337A (2) or CR-9337B (2) could cause fuse F1 at main control board I-10 to interrupt power to the valve control circuit.
The failure would prevent valve HV-2201 from closing to provide its SLRDIS function. Feedwater Control Valve FV-2205 (E-1203, P454) and Emergency Feedwater Block Valve HV-2203 (E-1203 pg. 452) will close via independent SLRDIS circuitry to provide the required system isolation.
MODE B: Open circuit of either contact CR-9337A (2) or CR-9337B (2) would have no effect on closing HV-2201 for the SLRDIS actuation. The two contacts are connected in parallel and therefore the contact that continues to operate will provide tne requised SLRDIS function.
MODE C: Hot short of either contact (2) will cause HV-2201 to close which is its required position for a SLRDIS actuation. The valve could be reopened by removing the i control fuse F1 in main control board I-10.
ATTACHMENT B1
CONCLUSION:
The SLRDIS function and the P'S function are provided via !
separate isolated contacts; any 'r: lure of either system contacts will not interact or effect the arner system.
The addition of the SLRDIS device contacts and the SLRDIS wiring (resultant wiring failures are the same as analyzed for the SLRLIS device) do not introduce any new failure modes that were not analyzed as part of original design criteria.
A failure of any device in the normal control circuit (Mode A: !
Worst case short to ground) will not prevent the SLRDIS or PPS system from performing their required functions. The function is accomplished through independent isolated control logic to redundant valves.
There is no credible failure of either the SLRDIS or PPS system devices that will prevent the independent PPS or SLRDIS systems from performing their required functions.
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o . e - SLRDIS PAILDRE ANALYSIS
SUMMARY
SHEET COMPONENT AND ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC PV-2229 Loop 1 Superheater Steam Bypass Valve (E-1203, P1915) PUNCTION OF SLRDIS DEVICE AND RESULTANT COMPONENT OPERATION SLRDIS relay contact (5) of device CR-9335A (Leop 1, Logic A) and CR-9335B (Loop 1, Logic B) open during a SLRDIS actuation to provide a zero input to the valve position card, with a zero input valve PV-2229 will close. SLRDIS relay contact (6) closes during a SLRDIS actuation to provide a 100 0 load across the controller output. Contacts (5) and (6) are make before break to shunt the control current to preclude the possibility of electrical transients damaging valve components. - PAILURE MODES CONSIDERED MODE A Short circuit to ground in contacts (5) & (6) MODE B: Open circuit of contacts (5) & (6) MODE C: Hot short of contacts (5) & (6) POTENTIAL EPPECTS OP DEVICE PAILURE ON SLRDIS OBJECTIVE MODE A Short to ground in either contact CR-9335A (5) or CR-9335B (5) would have no effect on closing PV-2229 for the SLRDIS actuation. The contacts would open and either isolate the ground or not depending on the location of the ground. The ground would not effect the closing of the valve because the valve position card would still have a zero input. Short to ground in either contact CR-9335A (6) or CR-9335B (6) would have no effect on closing PV-2229 for the SLRDIS actuation. The contacts function is to ! protect the valve controller and has no effect on vcive operation for the SLRDIS actuation. 1 ATTACHMENT B7
9 . O ' MODE B: Open circuit of either contact CR-9335A (5) or CR-9335B (5) would have no effect on SLRDIS actuation. The contact is required to open for a SLRDIS actuation. Open circuit of either contact CR-9335A (6) or CR-9335B (6) would have no effect on SLRDIS actuation. The two contacts are connected in parallel and therefore the contact that continues to operate will provide the required SLRDIS function. MODE C: Hot short of either contact CR-9335A (5) or CR-9335B (5) would have no effect on SLRDIS actuation. The two contacts are cont.3cted in series and therefore the contact that continues to operate will provide the required SLRDIS function. Hot short of either contact CR-9335A (6) or CR-93358 (6) would cause PV-2229 to close which is its required position for a SLRDIS actuation. L CONCLUSION: The addition of the SLRDIS device contacts and the SLRDIS wiring (resultant wiring failures are the same as analyzed for the ' SLRDIS device) do not introduce any new failure modes that were not analyzed as part of original design criteria. , A failure of any device in the normal control circuit (Mode C: worst case hot short of contact (6)) will not prevent the SLRDIS system from performing its required function. l ATTACHMENT B8
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O V O SLRDIS FAILURE ANALYSIS
SUMMARY
SHECT COMPONENT AND ELECTRICAL SCHEMATIC t PCV-5213 Aux. Steam to Chr. (E-1203, P2272) FUNCTION OF SLRDIS DEVICE AND RESULTANT COMPONENT OPERATION SLRDIS relay contact (1) of device CR-9339A (Loop 1 Logic A) and CR-9339B (Loop 1 Logic B) close during a SLRDIS actuation to energize solenoids TSV-5213-1 and TSV-5213-2 respectively to close PCV-5213 FAILURE MODES CONSIDERED MODE At Short circuit to ground in contact (1) MODE B: Open circuit of contact (1) M_0DE C: Hot short of contact (1) ' POTENTIAL EFFECTS OF DEVICE FAILURE ON SLRDIS OBJECTIVE MODE At Short to ground in either contact CR-9339A(1) or CR-9339B(1) could cause fuse at Main Control Board I-10 to , interrupt power to the associated solenoid valve. The l solenoids are powered from different buses and therefore the circuit that continues to operate will provide the SLRDIS function. MODE B1 Open circuit of either contact CR-9339A(1) or CR-9339B(1) would have no effect on closing PCV-5213. The contact that continues to operate will energize its associated solenoid to provide the SLRDIS function. MODE C: Hot short of either contact (1) will cause PCV-5213 to close which is its required position for a SLRDIS actuation. The valve could be reopened by removing the control fuse in Main Control Board I-10. ATTACHMENT B10
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- CONCLUSION:
- The addition 'of the SLRDIS device contacts, the solenoids and the SLRDIS wiring (resultant wiring failures are the same as analyzed for the SLRDIS device) do not introduce any new failure modes 4 that were not analyzed as part of original design criteria. A failure of any device in the normal control circuit will not
} prevent the new solenoids from providing the required SLRDIS system function.
l l l l 1 l i i I i i ! d i i i < i l I i I r 1 I i t i I ATTACHMENT B11 ; i
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