ML20215C116
| ML20215C116 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Palo Verde  |
| Issue date: | 11/21/1986 |
| From: | Haynes J ARIZONA PUBLIC SERVICE CO. (FORMERLY ARIZONA NUCLEAR |
| To: | Martin J NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION V) |
| References | |
| ANPP-39097-JGH, NUDOCS 8612150035 | |
| Download: ML20215C116 (85) | |
Text
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s Arizona Nuclear Power Project g P.O. Box 52034 e PHOENIX. AmZoNA 85072-2034 $
[5 m November 19,1985 h h ANPP-39097-JGH/BJ_A/98.057 63 y,,
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Mr. John B. Martin, Regional Administrator Office of Inspection and Enforcement U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region V 1450 Maria Lane, Suite 210 Walnut Creek, CA 94596-5368
Subject:
Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station (PVNGS)
Units 1 and 2 Docket Nos.t STN 50-528 (License No. NPF-41)
STN 50-529 (License No. NPF-51)
Supplemental 10 CFR 50.59 Annual Report File 86-A-056-026; 86-032-404 References (1) Letter from E. E. Van Brunt, Jr., ANPP, to J. B. Martin, NRC, dated May 21, 1986 (ANPP-36659).
Subject:
Annual Report of Changes Made Pursuant to 10 CFR 50.59.
(2) Letter from D. F. Kirsch, NRC, to E. E. Van Brunt, Jr., ANPP, dated August 21, 1986.
Subject:
NRC Inspection of Palo Verde Units 1, 2 and 3.
(3) Letter from E. E. Van Brunt, Jr., ANPP, to J. B. Martin, NRC, dated September 16, 1986 (ANPP-38261).
Subject:
Notice of a Violation 50-528/86-24-04.
Dear Mr. Martin:
Attached please find a revised report of those changes at PVNGS Units 1 and 2 which were made pursuant to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.59 during the 1985 calendar year. The attached report contains a brief description of such changes, tests, and experiments, including a summary of the safety evaluation of each change.
As discussed in Reference (3), the purpose of this supplemental 10 CFR 50.59 annual report is to correct the deficiencies that were noted by keference (2). This supplemental report supersedes the previous report (Reference (1))
in its entirety. In the attached report, item numbers 61 through 207 have been added to the previous report. By copy of this letter, we are also furnishing a copy of this report to the Director of Inspection and Enforcement.
8612150035 061121 PDR ADOCK 05000528 ,(
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Mrc John B. Martin Supplemental 10 CFR 50.59 Annual ~ Report ANPP-39097' Page 2 If- you have any additional questions.'on this matter, please- contact:
- Mr. W. F. Quinn of my staff.
Very truly yours, I
M J. G. Haynes-Vice President Nuclear Production JGH/BJA/dle Attachment <
cc O. M. DeMichele (all w/a)
E. E. Van Brunt, Jr.
E.'A. Licitra R..P. Zimmerman A. C. Gehr J. M. Taylor (Director-Office of Inspection
-and Enforcement)
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This : attachment i contains1 a f listing of the changes,- tests, :and experiments
!which twere .made pursuant. to .the' requirements of 10 CFR ' 50.59 during the 1985; Jealandarlyearc at. Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station :(PVNGS) Units 1 and 2.
. The " reporting . period for ! PVNGS - Unit 1 ;is the ' whole calendar year. . The reporting period ' for PVNGS. Unit 2 is defined as from December 9,1985 through .
the and of 1985. This . corresponds to the . dates that PVNGS ' Unit 2 had - an operating license during the 1985' calendar year.
A brief. lascription - of each change and a summary of' the safety evaluation for;
- each change is presented- below. It should.be noted'that none of the changes
' involved an unreviewed safety question. Specifically, none of these changes
-(i) increased the probability of occurrence or the consequences of'an accident or malfunction of equipment ~ important to safety previously evaluated in the (safety analysis report; or (ii) created = the possibility ' for an accident or.
malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously -in the safety
' analysis report; or (iii) reduced the margin of safety as defined in -the basis i for L any technical specification. Additionally, some of -these. changes were previously submitted to the NRC staff for' review prior to the ! receipt of the PVNGS Unit 2 Operating License. These changes are noted along with the date of the previous submittal.
(1) Description of Channe Revised the examination criterion for resuming licensed duties following the annual evaluation examination for licensed operators. The revised criterion stated that a . score of at least 70% on each section retaken and an overall average of at least 80% for all sections retaken is required prior to resuming licensed duties.
Summary of Safety Evaluation This change to the annual evaluation examination criterion did not
.esult 'n an unreviewed safety question.
. The change was in accordance with the NRC requirements for licensed operator requalification examinations. These requirements are identified in Enclosure 1 of the thrch 28, 1980 letter from H. R. Denton, NRC, to all power reactor applicants and licensees. The requirement states that the new passing grade for requalification shall be 80% overall and 70% for each category.
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L(2): ' Description of Chanaei ~
s Revised. the ' safety analysis report -to note that the flanges are removed from the 10-inch ~ drain lines from the refueling pool during normal' power-
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- operations. This precludes the trapping'of water in the pools..
- Summary of Safety Evaluation This change. to identify the fact that . the flanges are removed f during normal . operations did not involve an unreviewed safety question. The.
flanges .are removed from the drain lines during normal operations . to ensure that' water.- does not get trapped in the 1 drain lines . or "in .the refueling ' pool following an accident 'where ' sump recirculation is required. With the ' flanges removed, there is a path for the water to flow down from the . refueling pool to the ' recirculation sumps. This assures that the NPSH requirements for the ECCS pumps will be ' met. The removal of the flanges is administrative 1y controlled at PVNGS. This
- change was previously submitted to the NRC in a letter dated August 29, 1985 (ANPP-33291).
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-(3) Description of Channe Inclusion of PVNGS Units 2 and reactor coolant pressure boundary fracture toughness data in the safety analysis report.
4 Summary of Safety Evaluation j Fracture toughness data for reactor coolant pressure boundary components
- is required to be included in the safety analysis report. This is in
- accordance with the recommendations of Regulatory Guide 1.70 for the standard format and content of safety analysis reports. Thus, this l
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change was made to implement an NRC requirement for information contained in safety analysis reports and did not involve an unreviewed safety question. Additionally, this change was previously submitted for NRC staff review in Amendment 14 of the PVNGS Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) which was submitted on February 28, 1985.
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~(4)' Description of Channe
' Ravised the testing' duration of ventilation system air ' filtration units ' q to note-that the units will be operated at 'least once every 31' days for- l at ' least -15 minutes. This is i a deviation from' the recommendations of l
Regulatory Guide 1.52, Revision 1.
Summary of Safety Evaluation This change'did not result in an'unreviewed safety _ question. . Regulatory Guide 1.52 recommends operating the : atmosphere cleanup units - for : at ,
lesst 10 hours1.157407e-4 days <br />0.00278 hours <br />1.653439e-5 weeks <br />3.805e-6 months <br /> per month.S The purpose of this recommendation is - to reduce the ' buildup of ' moisture on the -adsorbers and HEPA filters. Due to the low 1 humidity in. the desert area of PVNGS, a -15 minute operating time every month will assure the operability of the filtration units and the moisture buildup will not be a problem in this-- environment.
Additionally, this change is in accordance with the surveillance requirements 'of the PVNGS . Technical Specifications which require a minimum 15 minute operating time every 31 days. This change has also been submitted to the NRC staff for review by letter dated August 30, 1985 (ANPP-33312).
(5) Description of Chanae Modification to the non-licensed operator training program to add formal classroom lectures on _ plant systems for those individuals without previous experience in nuclear power. '
Summary of Safety Evaluation this change will result in a more comprehensive training program for non-licensed operators (auxiliary operators). The change allows for the operators who do not have previous nuclear power experience to receive formal classroom training on plant systems. This will result in better training for non-licensed operators and will allow them to operate equipment more efficiently. Therefore, this change is an administrative change to the training program and is not an unreviewed safety ,
question. It should be noted that this change has been previously submitted to the NRC staff by letter dated August 30, 1985 (ANPP-33314). '
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Description'of manae-
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The FSAR was revised to ' note an exceptionL from the recommendat' ions of t s
- Ragulatory' Guide 1.16, Revision- 1 regarding-- non routine reporting i requirements.
Summary of Safety Evaluation' --
Section) C.2 .of . Regulatory' Guide 1.16, Revision 1 specified-. the -
requirements ;for ' non-routine reporting. ' Subsequent - to the issueace of this Regulatory Guide, the NRC has ; issued revised . regulations (10 CFR 50.72 and '10 ' CFR 50.73)' which provide some of ' the requirements -for
'non-routine reporting.. Additional reporting requirements . are provided-J in the PVNGS' Technical Specifications.- Thus, these non-routine
' reporting [ requirements supercede those contained in Regulatory ' Guide 1.16, Revision 1. This change was administrative in nature to note the exception'ito iRegulatory; Guide 1.16 . and does not involve an unreviewed 4
safety question. This change has been previously submitted to the NRC staff by letter dated August 30, 1985 (ANPP-33312).
(7)' Description of Channe Revision to FSAR' Section 1.1.5 to note the current scheduled completion
- dates and commercial operation dates for the three PVNGS units.
i Summary of Safety Evaluation I This change to the Safety Analysis Report is administrative in nature and does not involve an unreviewed safety question. The change is only required for the FSAR to reflect the current schedules for completion of I'
the units and for expected commercial operation dates for the units.
f This change does not modify any plant equipment and has no effect on plant safety. Additionally, this change has been previously submitted for NRC staff review by letter dated August 29, 1985 (ANPP-33289).
i j, (8) Description of Ganae l The preoperational test method for the Boric Acid Batching Tank (BABT)
- j. subsystem test was revised due to the fact that the tank is not capable l of being drained to the Equipment Drain Tank (EDT). Thus, the required l
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boric: acid concentration samples will Mt obtained while transferring the w- .contentsLof the BART t'o the Refueling Water Tank (RWT) or while the BABT
-is being' drained to the non-ESF sump.
i rSummary of Safety Evaluation The preoperational- test : requirements' for- the . BABT . subsystem . are
. presented in. CESSAR Section 14.2.12.1.12.- The test method! described in u
. CESSAR requires boric acid concentration samples. to be ;obtained as the BABT is being e drained . to 1 the . EDT.' -- This - test methodology , does not - '
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" reflect the .as-built condition of the plant ' as the BABT drains to the non-ESF sump instead ' of to the EDT. Therefore, the CESSAR test method was : changed .to allow for obtaining boric acid concentration samples as
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the BABT was being ' transferred to the RWT or while draining to the non-ESF sump. This change 'had no effect. on the safe 'opention of the-plant as the required boric acid concentration data is obtained to satisfy the preoperational testing requirement. Therefore, this change to the' test methodology did not involve an unreviewed ' safety question.
This . change has been submitted to the' NRC staff by letter dated August 29, 1985 (ANPP-33289).
4 (9) . Description of Change ,
This change eliminates the requirement to initially test the gas, stripper pumps to demonstrate head'and capacity.
Summary of Safety Evaluation
- - CESSAR Section 9.3.4.4 requires all pumps in the Chemical and Volume l Control System (CVCS) to be initially tested to demonstrate head and capacity. Contrary to this CESSAR requirement, the gas stripper pumps -
were not tested to demonstrate head and capacity during the preoperational test program due to the fact that there are no available 4
test connections for measuring suction and discharge conditions. This testing exception has been determined to be acceptable for the following i' two reasons.- Firstly, the gas stripper pumps are not required to operate following any design basis accidents. Thus, these pumps are not needed to mitigate any accidents or to safely shutdown the reactor.
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- Secondly, these pumps are ~ supplied as - part of the igas stripper package and this package was tested'and qualified by the vendor. LTherefore, the~
deletion of ' this : testing . requirement does not . compromise the safety c of.
, ' the . plant and does not constitute an unreviewed safety ' question. ' This change 'has been previously submitted ' to the - NRC by letter dated August 29, 1985l(ANPP'33289).. -
(10) Description of Change A change to a' procedure as described in the FSAR to.. delete the requirement to collect and analyze a : sample-'of^ the ~ containment atmosphere imunediately af ter each containment purge batch release.
Summary of Safety Evaluation A~ gas sample of the containment atmosphere is required per the PVNGS-1 Technical Specification prior to the initiation of a . containment purge batch release. The purge is continuously monitored by area radiation monitors and by the plant vent effluent radiation monitor during the containment purge. Additionally, the containment purge batch release contribution to the plant release is incorporated into the continuous sample collected at the plant vent release point. The deletion of the post purge containment atmosphere sample will have no effect on plant safety and does not result' in an unreviewed safety question. This change has been previously submitted to the NRC by letter dated ,
August 30, 1985 (ANPP-33310).
(11) Description of Change Additional non-metallic insulation was added to piping inside
, containment to reduce heat losses. The FSAR was revised to reflect the addition of this insulation.
Summary of Safety Evaluation This addition of non metallic insulation inside containment was evaluated for the pctential of blocking the recirculation sump screens or damaging the ECCS pump seals and bearings. The results of the
- analysis are within the NRC acceptance criteria and ensure the
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s availability of the. ECCS pumps . following a major accident.- . Therefore, this change did - not . result in an unreviewed safety _ question.1 .This .
change has been previously submitted to the NRC by letter dated August 29, 1985 (ANPP-33291).
(12)-~ Description df'Chanae-Changed the. FSAR ' to identify.- the- ANPP Nuclear Engineering Department 'as the responsible - organization : for the . classification of safety related items. The previous responsible organization was the PVNGS Engineering
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Department.
- Summary of' Safety Evaluation"
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1his change is an administrative change and only involves a ' change in . s the , departmental responsibility for a classification procedure.- This change does not involve a change to any equipment important to safety and does not constitute an unreviewed safety question. Additionally, this change has been previously submitted for NRC staff review by letter
, dated August 30, 1985 (ANPP-33311).
(13) Description of Chanae The FSAR was changed to reflect the as-built condition of the plant for the seismic monitoring instrumentation. Specifically, there is a single trigger switch to activate the seismic recording system. This trigger
, switch . continuously monitors the output level of a single accelerometer. It should be noted ' that the previous FSAR description implied the use of multiple trigger switches.
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l Summary of Safety Evaluation i The function of this single trigger switch is to activate the seismic recording system to record a seismic event. The recorded data is then used to analyze the event af ter occurrence. Thus, the trigger switch and tape recorder have no accident prevention or mitigation function and will not affect the safety of the plant. Therefore, this change does not result in an unreviewed safety question. This change has also been
- submitted to the NRC by letter dated August 30, 1985 (ANPP-33312).
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(14) Description of Chanae The FSAR was revised to reflect the as-built condition of the plant.
. Specifically, the combustible' loading for fire zone 54 was revised and the equivalent , fire severity for this zone was increased to 66. minutes based on this combustible loading.-
- Summary of Safety Evaluation The increased, equivalent- fire severity for this- zone required a re-evaluation ofzthe fire. consequences in this zone. It was determined
- that no automatic suppression capability is required for this zone due to the existing fire detection instrumentation, the zone perimeter wall, and the manual fire fighting capability. .This change did not result.in an unreviewed safety question . and this change was submitted for NRC ~
staff review by letter dated April 15, 1985 (ANPP-32398).
(15) Description of Change The FSAR was revised as a result of a physical modification .which provided for forced air circulation in the pressurizer compartment. Due to the increased subcompartment pressure caused by this modification, the pressurizer subcompartment design wall loading was increased from 54 paid to 73 paid.
Summary of Safety Evaluation The modification to the pressurizer subcompartment decreased the vent area available for relieving steam and water to the containment building in the event of t. pipe rupture inside the subcompartment. The prer.surizer subcompartment was re-analyzed to determine if the subcompartment was capable of sustaining the increased peak subcompartment pressure resulting from this modification. The re-analysis showed that the subcompartment is capable of withstanding at least 73 paid. This is greater than the calculated peak pressure in the subcompartment. Therefore, this. change did not result in an unreviewed safety question. This change has been previously submitted for NRC staff review by letter dated April 25, 1985 (ANPP-32497).
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- (16) - Description of' Chanas The FSAR was modified to indicate that a breathing air compressor.is not yet available at PVNGS. c
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Summary of Safety Evaluation
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The breathing air compressor was originally intended to' be a 1 backup to
'the normal air supply.' The normal air supply consists of self contained
. breathing units with a one hour air supply' and a six hour. supply of reserve- air to replenish exhausted air supply bottles. :The self-contained breathing units with the six hour backup air supply are sufficient to meet the requirements of Branch Technical Position CNEB
'9.5-1. Therefore, the elimination of the backup breathin, air compressor was not an unreviewed safety question. This change h m been submitted to the NRC staff by letter dated April 29, 1985 (ANPP-32515).
[ (17). Description of Channe Installed ionization smoke detector systems ' above the false ceiling of the hot and cold labs in the auxiliary building and the computer room in the control building.
Summary of Safety Evaluation The installation of these ionization smoke detectors will improve plant safety by providing an early detection of smoke from a fire which could potentially damage . safe shutdown circuits installed in conduit above these false ceilings. These new detectors will not have any adverse impact on other plant systems. Therefore, the installation of the detectors is not an unreviewed safety question. This change has been previously submitted to the NRC by letter dated August 30, 1985
- (ANPP-33310).
(18) Description of Change The FSAR was changed to require the control room to be pressurized to 1/8 inches water gauge pressure by the essential ventilation systen
- followias a radiological accident. The FSAR had previously required 1/4 I
inch pressurization.
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! Summary of Safety Evaluation-.
The control room is1 maintained at a positive f pressure with respect to atmospheric : pressure l during : certain - post-accident ' situations - -for the
- purpose of ensuring that - the control room operators are not exposed . to the harsh environment l during an accident. : Al pressurization of 1/8 inches w.g.~ pres,sure is acceptable to perform this function. ~As long as the cor. trol room envelope is maintained at this positive pressure with, respect to . the-- surroundings,' there will be no infiltration 'into - the
. control . room -and the ' operators will be 'sufficientlyf ; protected. 7, Therefore, the ' consequences ~of a/ radiation accident.;will not be .
increased as " a : result. . of this change.
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This -change also meets - the guidance of the Standard Review Plan and Regulatory Guides 1.78, 1.52, ,
and .1.95. - This change _is also in >accordance. .with the requirements of PVNGS Technical Specification 43.7.7 which requires the- essential-ventilation system to be capable of maintaining'at'least 1/8 inch water gauge pressure with respect to ' the adjacent areas. Therefore this change does not involve an unreviewed safety question. This change has
- been submitted to the NRC by letter dated August 30,1985 (ANPP-33291).
.(19) Description of Channe The FSAR was revised to reflect the as-built condition of the plant.
Specifically, emergency lighting with an eight hour capacity is installed in all areas of the plant where safe shutdown equipment is operated and in access and ' egress routes to these - areas. Emergency lighting with a 1-1/2. hour capacity is installed for personnel egress from areas other than safe shutdown areas.
Summary of Safety Evaluation Energency lighting with an eight hour capacity is installed in all areas of the plant required for safe shutdown. Thus, the capability to bring the plant to a safe condition after the accident is ensured. This J
change is in accordance with the applicable regulatory requirements and I
is not an unreviewed safety question. This change has been submitted to the NRC by letter dated August 30, 1985 (ANPP-33306).
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(20) Description of Chanae The FSAR was updated - to give the correct instrument identification tag-number for the plant vent radiation monitors.- The previously listed tag t
number on FSAR page 9A-25 was not correct..
Summary of Safety Evaluation This change does not involve an unreviewed safety question.. This change is - administrative and does not involve any physical- changes to the plant. Additionally, this change has been submitted to the NRC by letter dated August 30, 1985 (ANPP-33312).-
(21) Description of Change The FSAR was revised so that it would.be in agreement with previous ANPP commitments that were made in response -to NUREG-0737 iten I.A.2.3 regarding administration of training programs. The ' specific change involves revising the FSAR to require training instructors who teach
, systems, integrated responses, transients, or simulator courses, to hold
, or have held an NRC license or certification at the SRO level on a PWR.
Summary of Safety Evaluation 1his change is administrative in nature and involves revising the FSAR to reflect commitments which were made in a separate document (i.e., the-i PVNGS Lessons Learned Implementation Report). This change is in agreement with the NRC requirements which are presented in the March 28, 1980 letter from H. R. Denton, NRC, to all licensees. Therefore, this change does not involve an unreviewed safety question. This change has
!. also been submitted to the NRC by letter dated August 30, 1985 (ANPP-33314).
(22) Description of Change Change to . utilize a different prescure sensor to initiate the low suction pressure trip of the waste gas compressors of the gaseous t
l radwaste system.. The suction pressure trip setpoint for the new sensor is 1.5 psig as compared to a - setpoint' of 0.5 psig for the original pressure sensor.
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Summary of Safety Evaluation 'l
- The low suction pressure trip is designed'to ensure.that the waste gas -!
compressors .do not'. operate with a low suction - pressure - which . could l potentially damage the equipment. The pressure. sensor that is use'd to h ]
- i. . initiate the ' low pressure signal for the compressor suction is changed.
1he . pressure ; sensor that was ' originally used - for this purpose . was -
- installed ~as-part of the compressor assembly. Due.to equipment problems- .1 with this . sensor, the ' pressure instrument 1 on the waste gas > surge tank'_ !
was' selected to perform this function. A' presssure of 1.5 psig at the
' waste _ gas surge tank pressure sensor corresponds to'a compressor suction W pressure of 0.5 psig due to'. the pressure" drop _ in the lines. . Therefore, the low suction- pressure setpoint was - revised to compensate for _ line
' losses. . This change did not constitute'an unreviewed safety question as the change did not compromise the low ' suction pressure protection which is provided for the waste gas . compressors. This change has been submitted to;the NRC by letter dated August 30, 1985 (ANPP-33313).
(23) Description of Change Added -clarification to the FSAR to- define the acceptable Halon concentrations. A maximum Halon' concentration of 7% by volume is acceptable for occupied hazard areas and a maximum concentration of 10%
by volume is acceptable in unoccupied areas or in areas that are capable
- of_being evacuated within one minute.
- Summary of Safety Evaluation The purposc of this change was to clarify the acceptance criteria for maximum Halon concentrations in different areas of the plant. The
- acceptance criteria of a maximum of 7% by volume for occupied hazard areas and a maximum of 10% by volume in unoccupied areas or areas easily capable of .being evacuated, is in accordance with the acceptance criteria of NFPA Pamphlet 12A (1984). Therefore, this change does not constitute an unreviewed safety question. This change has been l
submitted for NRC staff review by letter dated August 30, 1985 (ANPP-33310).
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(24) Description of Change Modification' ~to ~ thd Quality TAssuranceu program to delete ' chemical ik , . _ analysis from, the. list. of special processes ' which. 'are' subject to . the
. requirements of CPR 4 50, Appendix .B.- Additionally,. the special
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l process'of cleaning has'been clarified as chemical cleaning.
' Summary-of Safety Evaluation 10 CFR 50,.. Appendix B requires that measures be established to assure 3 that special. processes are controlled and~ accomplished by_ qualified personnel using-' qualified. procedures in accordance with. applicable codes,- standards, specifications, criteria, and' other- special:
- requirements. Due to ' the programs and procedures ' utilized at PVNGS, chemical analysis does not fall under the category of special processes.' . Additionally, cleaning is not considered to be a special :
process, but chemical cleaning is considered a special. process. These changes to the list of special processes are in accordance : with the
- applicable regulatory guidance (ANSI' 18.7, 10 CFR 50, App. B,
- NUREG-0800). Additionally, this change does not result in a decrease of the controls on chemical analysis. Programs and procedures concerning chemical analysis are maintained at PVNGS. This change does not involve an unreviewed safety question. This change has been submitted to the NRC, in accordance with the requirements 'of 10 CFR 50.55(f), by letter dated September 30, 1985 (ANPP-33603).
(25) ' Description of Change Changed the preoperational test program to delete the -requirement to verify the undervoltage relaying of the Class IE 480V Motor Control Centers (MCCs).
- Summary of Safety Evaluation
- The preoperational test method for the Class IE 480V MCCs is presented i- in Section 14B.7 of the FSAR. The original test method requires the verification of the proper operation of the undervoltage relaying for the 480V MCCs. This test method is not appropriate because the 480V MCCs do not have undervoltage protection. The undervoltage protection
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i for'the~480V distribution system is at the:480V load center buses and is preoperationally tested 'in accordance with the test l method described 'in I FSAR Section 14B.6. ~ ~ Therefore, this . change is required - for the FSAR _ to reflect ' the 'as-built condition of the - plant and does ~ not involve ~ an -
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unreviewed safety question. . This change has also..been submitted to'the *
-NRC by letter dated August 30, 1985 (ANPP-33309). q (26) , Description of Chanae Modification- to the plant to upgrade .the doors, walls, and penetration seals for walls surrounding the Control Element Drive Mechanism (CEDM) room. The walls surrounding the CEDM room at'the 120 foot level of the
, auxiliary building have been upgraded to be a 2 hour2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> fire rated barrier.. ,
Summary-of Safety Evaluation This modification to the walls surrounding the CEDM ~ room enhances the .
fire zone separation and provides improved protection for the equipment -
located in the CEDM room. This change results in an increase to'the safety of the plant and does not involve an unreviewed ~ safety question.
This change has been submitted to the NRC by letter dated August _30, 1985 (ANPP-33310).
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, -(27) Description of Change A portion of the description of the Quality Assurance (QA) program-in '
Section 17 of the PVNGS FSAR was revised to provide clarification of the
' intent of the section.. Specifically, the responsibilities of the ANPP Technical Services Department concerning document control were clarified.
r Summary of Safety Evaluation This change to the program description is administrative and only
- provides' clarification to the original program description. Therefore, this change does not involve an unreviewed safety question. This change has- been submitted for NRC review. by letters dated June 13, 1985 (ANPP-32821) and ' August 30, 1985 (ANPP-33311). NPO Region V review and acceptance of the changes is documented in a letter dated July 9,1985 from D. F. Kirsch, NRC, to E. E. Van Brunt, Jr., ANPP.
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.'(28) Description of Channe
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" A - change was ~ made to the preoperational test description for the
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emergency lighting system.' The change . involved adding more - detail to the acceptance criteria. I l
Summary of Safety Evaluation l i
The preoperational test of the. emergency lighting system is described.in l
-I Section 148.10 of the ' PVNGS FSAR. The changes that were made to - the :
l test acceptance criteria were - for clarification purposes and are in
' accordance with the previously approved system design. Therefore, this.
change does not constitute an unreviewed ' safety question as the I
emergency lighting system is not being changed and' the design is thoroughly tested during the preoperational testing program to ensure its capability of performing its intended function. This change has been submitted to the-NRC by letter dated August 30, 1985 (ANPP-33309).
(29) Description of Change A change was made to the PVNGS training program for the general employee retraining for non-licensed personnel. The change . requires non-licensed plant personnel to receive retraining (general employee training) on an annual' basis but not-to exceed a period of 15 months. The previous training program description required retraining on an annual basis.
Summary of Safety Evaluation This change to.the general employee training program allows for a three month. grace period for the annual retraining. -This change does not affect the ability of the training program to comply with the recommendations of ANSI /ANS-3.1-1978. Thus, PVNGS Technical Specification 6.4.1 is met and the change does not involve an.unreviewed safety question. This change is also in agreement with the PVNGS Safety Evaluation Report (NUREG-0857) which states that general employee retraining shall be conducted at intervals not to exceed two years. ,
This change has been submitted to the NRC by letter dated August 30, l 1985 (ANPP-33306).
l l
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(30) Description of thanne The _ FSAR was revised ' to reflect changes that were made to the ' ANPP organization as well as changes that were made to position. titles.
Additionally,. the FSAR was revised to require- that members of the Independent Safety ; Engineering Group (ISEG) have at least, two years average level:of nuclear power plant experience.
Summary of Safety Evaluation r This change does not' involve - an 'unreviewed - safety ~ question.
The organizational ~ changes that were made do not decrease plant . safety.
These ' organizational _ changes were made to achieve a more efficient
~
operating organization for PVNGS. The change that was made to the ISEG experience requirement is in~ accordance with PVNGS ~ Technical Specification 6.2.3.2 which requires the ISEG personnel to have at least two years of professional level experience in his field. This change has been submitted to- the NRC by letter dated August 30, 1985 (ANPP-33314).
(31) Description of Chanae Revised the. Quality Assurance program regarding the effect of nonconformic3 items on the performance of preoperational tests. T:m change requires the - evaluation of nonconforming -items prior to _ the initiation ' of the preoperational test. Nonconforming items which are determined to have an effect on the test performance will be resolved prior to the affected step of the test.
Summary of Safety Evaluation The purpose of this change is to allow for more flexibility in the dispositioning of nonconformances that affect the preoperational test program. The QA program originally stated that nonconformances will be resolved prior to the start of the preoperational test. The revised program allows for evaluation of the nonconformance prior to the start of the preoperational test. If it is determined that the nonconformance will not have an impact on the outcome of the test, the test will be performed prior to final resolution of the nonconformance. If it is determined that the nonconformance will impact the outcome of the test,
the nonconformance will be resolved prior to the ' affected step of the preoperational test. This change meets the requirements of 10 CFR 50,
. Appendix B.and . Regulatory Guide 1.28 because procedures are in place to evaluate the effect of nonconformances on preoperational.-testing.
Therefore, -this ; change does not constitute an unreviewed safety question. This change has been submitted to the NRC by. letter dated i September-27,1985 (ANPP-33581).:
(32) Description of Change Qiange to the power ascension testing prcgram to remove the Reactor Power Cutback System (RPCS) from the test method-and acceptance criteria for certain power ascension tests.
Summary of Safety Evaluation The RPCS is a non-safety related system that is not required in order toc prevent an accident or:to mitigate the consequences of an accident. The function - of the RPCS is to produce a step reducti(n in reactor power following a large load rejection, turbine trip, or a loss of one of the main feedwater purps. The accident analyses for these events - do not credit the use of the RPCS to mitigate the event. As an example of this, the accident analysis for a turbine trip relies on the reactor tripping on high pressurizer pressure. There are other safety' related systems, such as the plant protection system, that are relied upon for plant safety after these types of; events. Therefore, this change does not constitute an unreviewed safety question. This change has been submitted to the NRC by letter dated August 23, 1985 (ANPP-33254).
(33) Description of Change This ' change involves a revision to procedures as described in the FSAR.
Specifically, the responsibility for validation of Nonconformance Reports (NCRs) has been transferred from the Project Quality Assurance Manager -to the Project QC Engineer.
1 1 ,
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' Summary of Safety Evaluation
~ This change does not involve an unreviewed safety question. NCRs will
~
continue to be validated in accordance with applicable procedures. This change only changes the responsibility ' for NCR validation. Thus, the PVNGS QA program continues to meet ' the requirements of 10 CFR 50, -
Appendir B. This change has been submitted to the NRC .by letter dated August 30, 1985 (ANPP-33311).
(34) Description of Change This change ~ is a minor' editorial change to the FSAR to correct an inconsistency in a cross-reference table on FSAR Figure 3.6-4.
Summary of Safety Evaluation This FSAR change is an editorial change and ~ makes no' physical modifications ~to the facility. FSAR Figure 3.6-4 incorrectly referenced Figure 3.6-3 for break number 2206. Break number 2206 is actually shown on -Figure 3.6-2. The FSAR was revised to present the correct reference. This change has been submitted to the NRC by letter dated
' August 30, 1985 (ANPP-33312).
(35) Description of Change The existing FSAR Section 11.3.1.1 states that waste gas will be held for 45 days prior to release. This has been changed to state that the gaseous radwaste system has been sized to provide the capability of
- j. holding radioactive gas for a 45 day decay period. !
i Summary of Safety Evaluation There is no requirement to hold gaseous radwaste for a period of time l
prior to release. The only criterion that must be considered is that I the tank must be sampled prior to release to aid in the determination of l the release rate. The release rate is determined so that the limits of the PVNGS Technical Specifications and the applicable NRC regulations are not exceeded. Additionally, there is no increase in the probability or the consequences of an accident as the holdup period has no effect on j the waste gas decay tank rupture accident scenario. This change does 1
not involve an unreviewed safety question. l I
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Section 16 E of ' the PVNGS FSAR ; originally contained the- preliminary-Technical Specifications. Upon- the issuance - of the - Operating . License for PVNGS Unit 1, this _ section was deleted and a11' references to -. the original ~ Section -_16 were- revised to - reference the final Technical
~ Specifications which were . included as an attachment . to - the Operating -
License. .
i -
> - Summary of Safety Evaluation This change'is. administrative and does not involve an.unreviewed safety question. The ' change was made so that the ' FSAR would reference the appropriate facility Technical Specifications. This change has been previously submitted to the NRC by letter dated August- 30,~ 1985 >
(ANPP-33312). ;
(37) Description of Change The FSAR was changed:to show that the turbine bypass valves are designed to fully close within 5 seconds. The previous FSAR description ' stated that the valves were designed to fully close within 1 second.
Summary of Safety Evaluation
} The turbine bypass system is a non-safety related system which is not credited for accident mitigation or safe shutdown in the accident.
analyses. The atmospheric dump valves provide the safety related method
, of ~ relieving steam from the secondary system for decay heat removal. ,
4 Additionally, the closure times for the steam bypass valves are not specified in the PVNGS Technical Specifications. This change does not involve an unreviewed safety question and has been submitted to the NRC by letter dated August 30, 1985 (ANPP-33313).
(38) Description of Change The facility design was changed to allow for a nominal 3 inch gap between the containment liner plate and the internal structures for seismic displacement allowances. Gaps smaller than 3 inches may be permitted based upon the results of a case-by-case evaluation. The l previous design (as described in the FSAR) required a 6 inch seismic gap.
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, ' This change does not involve an unreviewed safety question. The change still maintains 1.an e adequate ; separation Lbetween the ; containment liner
. plate and internal' structures under postulated safe shutdown earthquake
- conditions. The adequacy.of the 3.~ inch gap was determined ~ based upon a
- comparison;of the' maximum anticipated motions and the 3 inch gap. This change
- has been submitted ' to the NRC by letteri dated August 30, 1985 -l (ANPP-33306). i f' l I- -(39) Description of' Change Section 3.8.1.2.2 of the PVNGS FSAR was amended to reference. the correct code for containment design.. The existing FSAR section . incorrectly'-
! referenced ACI -301-72 for containment design. - This referenced' code is applicable to the construction of the containment. The correct code for the~ containment design is ACI 318-71.
Summary of Safety Evaluation This change does not involve an unreviewed safety question as it is an editorial change. The correct standard (ACI 318-71) was used in the design of the containment and is properly referenced in the project 3
Design Criteria Manual. This change has been submitted to the NRC by letter dated August 30, 1985 (ANPP-33313).
(40) Description of Change 1- The existing FSAR implied that the diesel generator fuel oil storage
- tanks are maintained at their 100% full level during normal operations.
l The FSAR has been revised to clarify that the 100% full level is the
- design capacity and not the normal tank inventory.
Summary of Safety Evaluation-Each diesel generator fuel oil storage tank is designed to provide
! inventory for the continuous operation of one diesel generator for 7 days plus 15% margin. The PVNGS Technical Specifications (Tech. Spec.
3.8.1.1) as well as other regulatory guidance only requires the inventory in the tanks to be maintained at the level for 7 days of l
diesel operation. This is approximately 71,500 gallons of fuel oil and 1
i
s corresponds.to an 80%.indicatedtievel in the tanks. Thus, the tanks are
- maintained at a minimum 80% level which is sufficient to ensure that the-
. diesel' generators are -capable Lof l performing 'their safety related
~ ~
function. This change does..not -constitute an unreviewed safety question. This change has beenf submitted to the NRC ~ by '1etter.~ dated
- August 30,-1985-(ANPP-33313).
(41) Description of Change The FSAR was revised to change the - procedure for initial criticality.
~ Specifically. - the change will allow PVNGS Units 2 and 3 ~ to achieve initial criticality b'y either withdrawal of the last regulating group of--
- CEAs or by RCS. boron dilution. In either of these two methods, the last regulating ' group of CEAs will be used to control the chain reaction following criticality.
Summary of Safety Evaluation.
Initial criticality for PVNGS Units 2 'and ~3 will be achieved in accordance with ~ approved - plant procedures. This change simply permits initial criticality to be achieved by an alternate e,ethod from the.
current method of dilution which is described in CESSAR Section 14.2.10.2. This change will not introduce a configuration any different than -those evaluated previously in the FSAR. Therefore, this ~ change does not constitute . an unreviewed safety question and this change has been previously submitted to the NRC by letter dated August 30, 1985 (ANPP-33315).
1 (42) Description of Change
. Table 2.5-17 of the FSAR was changed to correct a minor typographical.
1- error. Specifically, the units should be 1bs/ft per foot of wall height, for horizontal backfill. The previous FSAR table presented the units as 1bs/ft per foot of wall height. :
Sussary of Safety Evaluation This ' change is to correct the units associated with the horizontal
' backfill pressure in FSAR Table 2.5-11. This change only involves the correction of a minor typographical error and does not involve an
, unreviewed safety question.
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4 (43) 2 Description of Channe'
- The Tables-in Section 5.2, 5.3, . and 5.4 of i het PVNGS FSAR are changed to
~
revise the fracture toughness data for1 all three units and to, correct
- discrepancies in'the data.
Summary of Safety Evaluation The specifications of .the ; equipment' and components listed in' Sections 5.2, 5;3l and 5.4 ' of the ' PVNGS FSAR have not changed. The equipment.and components will function as previously analysed. Therefore, this change does) not constitute an unreviewed ' safety question. This change was made in response to an NRC request and - was ' submitted to the NRC ' by letter
~
dated August 30, 1985 (ANPP-33305).-
(44) Description of Chanae A change was made to the organizational responsibilities for the startup test program. Specifically, the position of Shift Test Director (STD) has been deleted. The STD responsibilities are now assigned 'to the-Responsible Engineers who are directly involved with the testing.
Summary of Safety Evaluation This change is an ' organizational- change and alters some of .the responsibilities that are described in Section 14.2 of the PVNGS FSAR.
The changes do not constitute an unreviewed safety question. The changes consolidate the responsibility for test conduct with those personnel who are directly responsible for the performance of the ,
tests. Additionally, this change has been transmitted to the NRC by letter dated October 22, 1985 (ANPP-33766).
(45) Description of Chanae Section 9.5.4.4 of the PVNGS FSAR was revised to be consistent with the !
PVNGS Technical Specifications regarding the quality of diesel generator fuel oil. The specifications for the API gravity, specific gravity, and the absolute specific gravity for the fuel oil were changed to be consistent with the requirements of Technical Specification 3.8.1.1.
Additionally, the numbers for the high and low heating values for the fuel oil are deleted from the FSAR since this specification is not required by the applicable regulatory criteria.
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Summary of Safety Evaluation-The emergency diesel generator fuel oil specifications .are designed to ensure . that the diesel generator will.-not malfunction in an accident
. situation as a result of poor quality fuel oil. PVNGS currently tests and procures the ' fuel oil in accordance with the PVNGS Technical Specifications, ASTM D-975, and Regulatory Guide 1.'137. This change to the PVNGS FSAR has no' effect on plant safety as the specifications of the fuel oi1~ will continue to meet the guidelines of Regulatory Guide 1.137 for the fuel - oil quality- and -testing. Additionally, the requirements. of- PVNGS -Technical ; Specification 3.8.1.1. vill be satisfied. Thus,' there will be no decrease to the margin of safety as defined in the bases for' that Technical Specification. This change to make the FSAR consistent with the Technical Specifications does not ,
involve an unreviewed safety question.
~
(46) Description of Chanae The FSAR was revised to clearly state the qualification requirements for certain Quality Assurance (QA) personnel. The following personnel qualifications shall apply:
(i) personnel performing audits shall be qualified to ANSI N45.2.23; (ii) ~ personnel performing material inspection shall be qualified - to I
ANSI N45.2.6; and (iii) personnel performing monitoring activities shall be qualified to [
ANSI N45.2.23 or. ANSI N45.2.6.
I Eummary of Safety Evaluation j This change does not decrease the effectiveness of the QA program and does not involve an unreviewed safety- question. All audits or monitoring activities conducted at vendor's. facilities will be conducted by trained personnel. This change clarifies the personnel l qualifications that are applicable to each of the separate QA functions.
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- (47)~.' Description of Channe'-
Table 3.2-l'of the PVNGS FSAR was revised.to describe the actual-Quality
' Assurance-(QA)' program for the new fuel racks. This-QA program does not-
- fully meet the criteria of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B, but the program- is sufficient to assure that the , safety related function of the racks is satisfied.
Summary of Safety Evaluat' ion The QA program under which -'the new fuel storage racks were fabricated does not - fully meet the criteria of 10 CFR 50, Appendix B. However, since the only safety related function of these racks is to maintain the minimum surface to' surface separation between assemblies, the QA program that 'was applied to the racks is acceptable. The design, specific components,- and - fabrication processes critical to: the structural.
integrity of the new fuel -storage racks are sufficient to ensure that the equipment -will' withstand the effects of the SSE and remain functional in accordance with Regulatory Guide 1.29.
(48) Description of Channe Section 95.2.11 of the FSAR was revised to correct a minor typographical error. This section of the FSAR describes the safe shutdown equipment for specific fire areas. The specific change involves. correcting the instrument tag number for the steam generator No. 1 wide range level instrument from J-SGA-LT-1113B to J-SGB-LT-11138. This level instrument is a Train-B component.
Summary of Safety Evaluation This change is to correct a minor typographical error in the FSAR and does not involve an unreviewed safety question. This change does not ,
' impact the evaluations which were conducted for safe shutdown and does ,
not impact plant safety.
i
! (49) Description of Change
- The FSAR was revised to eliminate the references to chlorine detectors 4' at PVNGS. The chlorine detectors were previously removed from the FSAR, i
but all of the FSAR references to the detectors were not removed.
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~
Summary of Safety Evaluatilon The purpose of this change was to eliminate all references to the chlorine detectors 'at PVNGS. These detectors were eliminated from the
~ PVNGS design because there is no onsite storage of liquid or- gaseous chlorine at PVNGS.
This ' eliminates th'a potential' for chlorine i contamination in the atmosphere ' which could be drawn into the control room; by the HVAC - supply - system.' The NRC staff had previously approved
- of the -removal of the - chlorine detectors from the PVNGS design. This approval'!is , documented Tin: Supplement No.- 3 to the .PVNGS Safety Evaluation Report. ,
(50) Description of Change FSAR Figures 95-36 and 95-37 were revised to correctly show the extent of wet pipe sprinkler coverage in the turbine buildings at elevations 100 feet and 140 feet.
Summary of Safety Evaluation This change did not result in a physical change to the facility. The FSAR was revised to reflect the as-built condition of the facility. The safety of the plant is not compromised as a result of this change.as no equipment which is relied upon 'for accident mitigation or for the safe shutdown of the plant is located in the turbine building. Therefore, this change does not involve an unreviewed safety question.
(51) Description of Change The initial test program for PVNGS Units 2 and 3 was revised. The following is a description of each of the changes: (1) For Units 2 and ,
3, the CELH performance testing which is described in CESSAR Section l 14.2.12.3.4 will be conducted at hot, zero power conditions only. (2)
For Units 2 and 3, only the regulating CEA groups will be measured for
- CEA group worth. If this measurement of group worth does not agree with predicted values, the test program will be expanded to include the l
measurement of shutdown group worths. This testing is described in Section 14.2.12.4.4 of CESSAR. (3) The test method for the Variable
- T test, which is described in CESSAR Section 14.2.12.5.2, was AVG
- changed for Units 2 and 3 to allow for flexibility in the test method.
l l .. -
The isothermal' temperature coefficient can- be measured by. CEA movement
~
. or by adjusting the- RCS boron concentration. The power, coefficient can be measured by CEA adjustment or by balancing. core average temperature.-
- (4)~ For Units 2 ' and ' 3, the testing of all moveable -incore detectors will
- not be conducted.- (5) For. Units 2 and 3, the control systems checkout test' will be conducted at 50% and 100% power. This is a -change to the
~
~
previous commitment to perfora th'a tests at 50% and 80% power. (6)l Th's
. turbine trip test will not be conducted for Units 2 and 3.
- Summary of Safety Evaluation The primary purpose for these changes to the initial test program-is due to the fact that Units 2 and 3 are - follow-on units. Thus, all of the
~
testing that was conducted on the first-of-a-kind System 80 unit does not have to be repeated for the follow-on units.' All three PVNGS units are designed to be essentially the same so that the performance of the plants will be very similar. These changes do not involve an unreviewed safety question as the plants will be tested sufficiently to ensure that the plant is capable of responding to off-normal conditions. These changes have been previously submitted to the NRC by letter dated August 30, 1985 (ANPP-33315).
(52) Description of Change This change to the facility involves changing the design pressure of the Equipment Drain Tank (EDT) from 60 psig to 30 psig.
j - Summary of Safety Evaluation The original design pressure of the EDT was specified in CESSAR Section 9.3.4 as 60 psig. The PVNGS design does not meet this design pressure due to the fact that the downstream side of the pressure regulating valve (CH-831) cannot meet a pressure requirement greater than 30 psig.
This change does not involve an unreviewed safety question as the function of the EDT is to serve as a collection point for reactor 4
coolant quality water which may be recovered from drains or leakage from systems outside of the containment building. The failure of this tank
!' would result in the inability to recover this reactor coolant quality 4
4
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. water $nd the water would be collected in- the auxiliary building Ldrains ,
system and transferred to the -liquid radwaste system. .The EDI does not
~
. serve any accident mitigation function.
(53). Description of Chanae lhe' remote seismic monitors were removed from the field. Section-2.5 of the PVNGS FSAR was revised to reflect . the removal of the remote ' seismic monitors.:
Summary of Safety Evaluation The remote seismic monitors were cinstalled in 1975 in ' order to collect seismic ' information on - the1 PVNGS region. This information is required by 10 CFR 100 to characterize the seismic activity of the region. There is a permanent plant seismic monitoring. system, which ;is required by the Technical Specifilcations, to~ gather l'nformation on - seismicL activity.
The remote seismic , monitoring,- which was removed, did not serve any accident monitoring-or mitigation. function and is not required to safely shut down the unit. The remote ' seismic monitoring system had fulfilled its information gathering function of collecting data on seismic activity, in~ the region. Therefore, the removal of the seismic monitoring instrumentation does 'not involve an unreviewed safety
. question.
(54) Description of Change The previous FSAR describes an in-line type Post-Accident Sampling System (PASS) which is fully automated to provide analysis results of post-accident samples from the RCS hot legs, containment sumps, auxiliary building sumps, ECCS A & B pumps mini-flow lines for liquid i samples and from the containment hydrogen control system for gas samples. The facility and the FSAR have been modified to describe a grab sample type PASS which provides samples for post-accident analysis in the hot lab. The sources for the post-accident liquid samples are t-the RCS hot leg, letdown line, containment radwaste sumps, auxiliary building sumps, and the ECCS A & B pumps mini-flow lines. The source for the post-accident grab sample of the containment atmosphere is the i cortainment hydrogen control system.
Summary of Safety Evaluation This change does not constitute an.unreviewed safety question. The PASS is not a safety. system used in mitigating the consequences of an accident. The- purpose of the PASS is to provide samples for post-accident analysis in order - to quantify radionuclides that are indicators .of core damage, hydrogen levels in containment atmosphere, concentrations of dissolved gas, chlorides,- and boron for liquid samples. The PASS is not credited in any of the accidents analyzed in the FSAR nor does it provide a function for maintaining the plant in a safe operating condition. Additionally,' this - change has been submitted to the NRC by letter dated September 26, 1985.(ANPP-33573).
(55) Description of Change This change involves a change to the project procedures which will permit the use of the operations phase Quality Assurance (QA) program for procurement during the remainder of the construction phase.
Summary of Safety Evaluation This change does not involve an unreviewed safety question as the change still requires that all procurement activities be performed in conformance with QA procedures and controls. Additionally, this change will not decrease the effectiveness of the QA program since the revised program will be implementing portions of a previously approved QA program for operations phase activities. This change has been submitted to the NRC by [[letter::05000528/LER-1985-048, Corrected LER 85-048-00:on 850819,ECCS Subsystem RQ & Bp Declared Inoperable Due to Noncompliance W/Surveillance Requirement 4.5.2.g.1.Temporary Change Initiated to Permit Testing of ECCS Throttle Valves|letter dated September 18, 1985]] (ANPP-33515).
(56) Description of Change The PVNGS containment analyses were revised and incorporated into the FSAR. The revised analyses were necessary to reflect reduced containment spray pump flows, as-built piping sizes, and PVNGS plant specific changes as discussed in ANPP-32401 dated April 15, 1985.
Summary of Safety Evaluation The plant specific changes were evaluated by the re performance of the containment analyses. The results of the revised analyses are within
- the acceptance criteria. The new analyses verify that the existing
^ . margin' of ' safety as defined in the - PVNGS Technical Specifications' bases .
, is' maintained J Therefore, : this ~ change .does not: involve an unreviewed
' safety question.: Additionally,, the revised analyses have been ' submitted .
for NRC review.by ' letter dated September 30,.1985 (ANPP-33610).
-(57) ~ Descrii> tion of Chanae The PVNGS. Main Steam' Line Break '(MSLB)' analyses were revised and=
~
incorporated into the FSAR. The revised analyses were necessary to
' demonstrate' the.--acceptability of3 various plant changes which ~ were ,
- discussed in . a - previous letter to the - NRC . (refer ~ to ANPP-32401 - da'ted .-
April--15,-1985).
Summary of' Safety Evaluation The plant specific changes were evaluated by the re performance of the MSLB analyses. ' The results of the revised analyses are within the applicable - NRC acceptance criteria and the analyses verify ' that the margin. of safety, as defined in the bases of the PVNGS Technical Specifications, is maintained. Therefore, this change does not involve an unreviewed safety question. Additionally, the revised analyses have been submitted for NRC review .by letter dated September- 30,. 1985
, .(ANPP-33611).
(58)- - Description of Change
.The fire protection section of the FSAR was revised to reflect the-J as-built condition of the plant. The specific changes are as follows:
- (1) The CO 2 fire extinguisher shown on the east wall of fire area SA (FSAR Figure 9B-9) is actually located on the north end of the room 4
adjacent to the HVAC chase; (2) The hose length at hose station #44 has been increased from 125 feet to 150 feet; (3) An exception was identified in FSAR Table 9B.3-1 to identify the fact that the isolation valves to the preaction sprinkler. heads at two missile doors in the ,
corridor building are not electrically supervised; (4) The fire door on i the east side of fire zone 30B is not shown on FSAR Figure 9B-18; (5)
Existing fire extinguishers are not shown in fire zones 37C and 37D; (6) -
The deluge valve shown on FSAR Figure 9B-22 in fire zone 52B is a 1
i maintenance isolation valvo and not a deluge valve; (7) The symbol for a t
hose station was added to FSAR Figure 9B-11 for hose station #93.
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, , , , ,m Summary of Safety' Evaluation The purpose of these changes 1was ~ to update - the: FSAR to reflect ' the
^
as-built condition of the plant. These : changes do not result in L.anL
~
E unreviewed . safety: question as_~'none: of the changes -result in the probability 7 of occurrences or the consequences of . an accident ' being increased lfrom'that previously evaluated'in the FSAR.-~
(59) Description of Channe The fire . protection : description contained in the FSAR was revised to reflect the as-built condition of the plant. The specific ' changes are as follows: _( 1) All preaction systems, with the exception of the turbine driven -auxiliary feedwater pump. room, are actuated by single zone products-of-combustion fire detectors; (2) The automatic preaction sprinkler system for those systems protecting electrical cable trays is initiated by either line type heat detectors or by . products-of-s combustion detectors.
3 Summary of Safaty Evaluation
. This change does not involve an unreviewed = safety question. The prob' ability of occurrence of- an . accident ' remains unchanged since the system remains as a preaction system. Specifically, inadvertent 4
actuation is not probable since both the detector and ' the sprinkler j heads must actuate in order for flow to be delivered to the affected area..
3
!- (60) Description of Chanae j The FSAR was revised to clarify the radiation protection activities that are subject to the requirements of the operational Quality Assurance
! (QA) program. This clarification supplements the information contained in the body of FSAR Table 3.2-1 pertaining to radiation protection equipment and activities.
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e y o . Summary of Safety' Evaluation m The change' states that- activities 'and equipment: related .to-:the-
~
- calibration of radiation protection and chemistry equipment are subject -
- to the applicable requirements of-the operations phase QA program.'.This-change does not involve an unreviewed safety. question as the' change does lnot reduce any previous commitments to apply-QA program requirements.to
. radiation ' monitoring equipment, the radiation monitoring ~ system, .or the -
radiation exposure ' management systaa. ' Additionally, the. QA requirements th'a t are applied to radiation protection ' equipment are sufficient to ensure u that the equipment will be available to perform its iintended safety function..
(61) Description of Change The drain piping - from the auxiliary feedwater pump Terry turbine steam supply line was revised to permit the drainage of ' condensate . from the Terry turbine which might otherwise. inhibit the cold, quick start of the Train-A safety related auxiliary feedwater pump. .This facility, change affected - FSAR Figure 10.411.and was completed ini PVNGS Unit 1 ~during this reporting period.
- Summary of Safety: Evaluation This change wilin reduce the probability of a failure to start by the turbine-driven auxiliary feedwater pump. The additional excess flow ,
check v'alves are required to enable the drainage of condensate when the
- system is cold and to prohibit the release of steam to the surrounding
' area during system operation. This change has no effect on the margin h of safety 'in regard to the pump's capability to deliver the required .
I flow. ,
(62) Description of Change For the downconer feedwater isolation valves, the existing actuator air cylinder was replaced with a new air cylinder fitted with internal coil l
) springs and new control valves. This change affected FSAR Figure h 10.3-1. This change was made to PVNGS Unit 1 during this reporting r
- period.
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k Summary of Safety Evaluation -
'The change;;to- the ~ downconer feedwater < isolation . valves ' providedJ additional thrust: to as'sure that' valve closure ' tires -. are' . within the design limits under operating conditions. , ,
- 1 , .
(63) ' Description of Change This-facility che.nge involves.the addition of an anti-siphon vent to th'e overflow loop seal on the condenser air removal vacuum pumps water outlet separator tank. This change affected FSAR Figure 10.4-1 and was implemented in PVNGS Unit 1 during this reporting period.
Summary of Safety Evaluation The purpose of this change was , to prevent water flooding up to the charcoal adsorption train' and to prevent air in-leakage back to th'e main -
condenser through a drain trap. ,
(64) Description of Qianae This - facility change - involved the removal of - the thermostatic air vent device. and capping the air relief tube from the condenser air removal vacuum pump - drain trap. This affected FSAR Figure 10.4-1 and the modification was performed 'in PVNGS Unit 1 during this reporting period.
Summary of Safety Evaluation The purpose of this change is to prevent air leakage into the main
- condenser. There is no effect on the PVNGS accident analyses.
l (65) Description of Change
, For the auxiliary steam system, the mode of operation of solenoid valve J-ASN-RY-11 was changed from normally closed to normally open. Thio I -
affected FSAR Figure 10.3-2 and this modification was made to PVNGS Units 1 and 2 during this reporting period.
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Summary-of Safety Evaluation The purpose of'.' this - change 1was to allow the solenoid valve - to - fail to = a -
u- safe- position on loss of power or loss of air to prevent contamination-of the main icondenser during periods ; of high level radiatiori s in the condensate b'eing pumped.
.(66) ~ Description'of Change For the condensate system, valves J-CDN-HV and 30 were replaced with -
Fisher controlivalves and aanual isolation valves and drain valves were :
-added. This affected FSAR ' Figure .10.4-9 and this modification was
. performed in PVNGS. Unit 1 during this reporting period.
Summary of Safety-Evaluation This' facility change did not involve an unreviewed safety question.-- The purpose : of- this. change is to provide for' flow control of condensate overboarding to' the circulating ' water system. . This change does not-affect any accident analyses nor does it reduce any margin of safety as defined in the bases for the Technical Specifications.
(67) Description of Change For the chemical and volume control system, the backflushable purification filter was replaced with a cartridge type purification filter. This change. was implemented in PVNGS Unit 1 and affects FSAR Figure 9.3-13.- In addition, the crud tank system was isolated.
Summary of Safety Evaluation This change has no effect on the safe operation of the facility. The new cartridge filter that replaced the backflushable filter is identical to the other existing letdown purification filter.
(68) Description of Change
- For certain components in the chemical and volume control system, the service gas system, the instrument air system, the main steam system, and the safety injection system, timing relays were added to delay reset
. . _ _ -. -. . , ~ . - . , _ ._. . . - -
3
- -
- of -the i ioverride untili after the associated ESFAS. i signal is re' set., This- -
.. change was implemented- in PVNGS Unit 1;during this . reporting'-period 'and -
~ . .. .
..affacts-various electrical . drawings . which : were . incorporated 1into' the 1PVNGSiPSAR by reference.
Summary of Safety Evaluation ~
This change'did not result in an_unreviewed safety question. =The changeL
~ improved plant safety by ensuring that components do not return'to'their ESFAS mode upon reset' of an ESFAS signal. With the previous design, reset of' the ESFAS - signal, after overrid'e had been implementedI for the :
component, caused- a relay race which resulted. in , a spurious -actuation I~ to the ESFAS- mode.,
signal _' returning the -equipment This change.
eliminates the spurious operation of the equipment.
(69)' Description'of Change
- For -the chemical' and volume control system, the flow -orifice for ' flow transmitter CHN-FT-281 was' relocated to the upstream side of the boric acid concentrator distillate outlet valve CHN-LV-289Q. Previously, the U flow ' orifice was on the downstream side of the valve. .This change affected FSAR Figure 9.3-13 and was implemented in PVNGS Unit 1 during this reporting period.
Summary of Safety Evaluation
- The purpose of this change was . to provide for more accurate flow indications by eliminating piping and flow induced signal fluctuations.
- 7 This change did not result in an unreviewed safety question.
(70) Description of Change For the chemical and volume control system, flow orifices (FO-266 and j 267) were installed at the reactor drain pump discharge header and in the gas stripper diversion line to the equipment drain tank. This ,
i change affects FSAR Figure 9.3-13 and was implemented in PVNGS Unit 1 i during this reporting period.
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This change did not result . in an unreviewed ' safety- question due to the
~
I fact: that the changes are required in order to ' ensure that the- reactor drain pumps ; operate per. their original design. Witihout the additional ~ ;
-flow orifices, . the pumps were operating cat iflows well above the rated .
pump ' capacity of 50, spa. In order -to correct .this ; condition, restriction -flow orifices were installed to reduce the reactor -drain pump flow to the pump rated flow of 50 spa.
(71) Description of Change
- For .the ~ chemical. and. volume control systea, valve CHN-VY-41 was relocated to an' area of. lower radiation and a check valve (GAN-V326) was
.added to the line. These changes - affected FSAR Figure 9.3-13 and were implemented in PVNGS Unit 1 during this reporting period.
t Summary of Safety Evaluation The primary reason for this change.was to relocate the valve.to an area of lower radiation. This was necessary to allow for safe operation of
.the gas stripper during plant operations. The check valve was'added to prevent backflow of potentially radioactive gasses. Thus, these changes were made for personnel safety and ALARA considerations. -i (72)' Description of Change For the chemical and volume control system, a drain line was added between the gas stripper instrument rack and a floor drain. This change affected FSAR Figure 9.3-13 and was implemented in PVNGS Unit i during this reporting period.
Summary of Safety Evaluation This change did not result in an unreviewed safety question. The purpose of this change was to prevent draining of potentially contaminated water across the floor. Therefore, this change was made primarily for ALARA purposes and does not affect the safe operation of' the facility.
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(73) fDescription of Change This -facilitya modification:-involved changing the , operators on the' containment - isolation ' valves - for ' the' containment power . access purge system ' from motor operators to pneumatically operated ' valves. - This change affects FSAR Section- 6.2.4 and FSAR Figure 9.4-13. . This change was' implemented in PVNGS Unit 1 during this reporting period. .
Summary of Safety Evaluation The actuators were changed to ensure that- the power access , purge -
isolation valves fail to a safe position. Previously, the valves failed
- as-is on loss of power. With the = pneumatic operators, the valves will now fail closed on loss of offsite power. Additionally, the valves will -
meet the closure time requirement of '8 seconds or less during a. loss of-offsite power. Therefore, this change ensures compliance with the; applicable design requirements for the power access purge isolation-valves and no'unreviewed safety question is involved.
'(74) Description of Change For the circulating water blowdown . system, the existing single-range flow measurement instrument was replaced with a - dual-range ~ flow instrument system. This change affected FSAR Figure 10.4-4 and was implemented in PVNGS Unit 1 during this reporting period.
Summary of Safety Evaluation This change does not involve an unreviewed safety question. The change will allow for accurate flow indications over the whole range of blowdown conditions (from abnormally high to abnormally low blowdown
!~
rates).
(75) Description of Change This facility change involved the addition of an emergency start switch ,
at the diesel generator local control panel to permit the operator to start diesel generator "B" locally (in the emergency mode) in the event
! of a control room fire. This change affected FSAR Figure 9.5-9 and was
! implemented in PVNGS Unit 1 during this reporting period.
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' Summary'of Safety Evaluation
- Operation of the B-train diesel _ generator is required in~ order to'obtain-safe shutdowa 'in the. event of a control room fire. This change ensures 4 thatlthe: requirements of 10 CFR Appendix R are met and-that'the unit can
, l
' be ,safelycshut . down in -~ the : event of a control, room fire. Therefore, this change does not involve an unreviewed_' safety-question.
- (76) Description of-Otanae
~
Thisc facility modification involved the reconfiguration of' the ; diesel
. generator breaker trip contacts and provided interlocks from redundant channels to prevent spurious actuations. . The specific modification 1was made to the emergency _ diesel generator low lube oil pressure trip.1 This
- change affected drawing 13-E-PEB-001.which is- incorporated into the FSAR by reference. This change was implemented in PVNGS , Unit 1 during.. this reporting period. '
Summary of Safety Evaluation FSAR Section 8.3;1.1.4.3 requires' a one-out-of-two-taken-twice logic' for the low lube oil pressure trip of the emergency diesel generators. - The previous system design did not meet this FSAR requirement so the, system ,
has been modified to comply with the FSAR description. Therefore,dhis ,
change is in accordance with the ' existing FSAR description and do a not involve an unreviewed safety question.-. -
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(77) Description of Change r- -f( L This facility change involves switching the cooling water supply to thW.' >d - ,/
p emergency diesel generator governor oil cooler from .the spray poN h i-l cooling system to the jacket water cooling system. This' change affected FSAR Figure 9.5-9 and was implemented in PVNGS Unit 1 during this - %
l' reporting period. -
Summary of Safety Evaluation l The purpose of this modification was to improve the performance of the' diesel generator governor. The higher temperature jacket cooling water i
j ,
- has been determined to provide this performance enhancement to diesel -
l generator operation. /
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[ ~ (78)[ Description"of ' Qiange This: change Ladds , a = travel stop to ' the Lexisting level' control valve
- (DW-LV-28) ! for! the Edomestic 1 water storage ' tank.~ , The change ' alsoJ1ocks closed L the Tsanualibypass - valve .( DWN-V038) - around the level control' valve.: ;This change 'affects FSAR ' Figure 9.2 and was : implemented in PVNGS Unit l' during _ this' reporting period.
Summary of Safety Evaluation
. - The purpose of this change is to establish a correct line resistance to prevent run-out conditions of - a Domestic Water Supply pump at- the Watier Reclamation Facility.- This change has no effect on plant safety and does not constitute an unreviewed sa'fety question.
(79) Description of Change'-
For the feedwater heater extraction steam and drain system, the internals of valves EDN-V551, V552, V559, and V625 were removed. This affected FSAR Figure 10.2-2 and the change was implemented in PVNGS Unit 1-during this reporting period.
Summary of Safety Evaluation The subject valves are vent and drain valves between feedwater heaters SA and SB and heater drain tanks A and B. The purpose of the change was to' prevent the inadvertent overpressurization of the heater drain tanks. This change did not impact any.of the safety analyses nor did it reduce any margin of safety.
f (80) Description of Change
- The existing #16 AWG power cable between the fuel transfer machine reactor side control console and the fuel pool control console was replaced by #14 AWG cable and new conduit was installed. '"his affects g various conduit and tray section drawings that were incorporated into Y the FSAR by reference. This change was implemented in PVNGS Unit 1
. during this reporting period.
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.This change;did not result.in an unreviewedLsafety. question. 'The'changeL 4
was made to; eliminate" the ~ potentialidegradation ,of1the . cable which may
~ have lead to a fire hazard or(degraded ' system' function. ? iy s; , '
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(81)? Description of Chanse :
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Fireproofing; or wrapping was providedf7oThe first 'cablet Y ray isupp)r't on -
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' either side of:ratedifire walls. :This change .wasiimplemented ^1n PVNGS1
> :n . x s
. Unit il and the, change affects geertain,iconduit my andi-
- tray plan : drawings
- which were incorporated'into the FSAR by relerence. ' '
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~ Thist change, providesifor sadditional. fireproofing and 'does not { result in--
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. an l-unreviewed safety question. - The change. does, not affect ~ any : safety .
1 analyses or reduce'any margins of safety..
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E(82) ' Description -of Qianae $
For. the ' fire protection systes,. the ionizationi detectors were replaced -
- with thermal detectois,for oneY of the two ionizat.i~on detector circuits in the ESF.switchgear rooms. This change wam_ implemented in PVNGS Unit a 3:s.,
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1 and the change affects FSAIL Section 9.3.2. 'i t
Summary of Safety-Evaluationb ,
y e The purpose of' this change in dete'e. tor types was to prevent unexpected y.
discharge of CO to the switchgear ' rooms while still maintaining the 2
fully automatic functioning of the suppression system. This change will s
preserve the accessib ,iliby to the remote shutdown panels in the evenc'of ,
a control room fires by.r prec.luding
, 3 the spurious discharge of C0 2 into the ESF switchgear rooms. '
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(83) Description of Change ,
-- This facility modification involved the installation of Halon 1301 fire protection systems in the remote shutdown rooms in the control building 9
at the 100 foot elevation. *This change was implemented in PVNGS Unit 1
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during this..repWeting period and affected FSAR Sections 9.5 and 9.B.
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- ' Summary of Safety Evaluation r The change- provides for
- better : fire ' protection for the remote shutdown .
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rooms and meets the requirements of 10 CFR 50 Appendix R.
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(84')f De'scription of' Change ThisLfacility change involved the addition'of fire hose nozzle adapters
-to the fill s'ide of . th'e essential chilled water,' essential cooling : '
- water, and . diesel! generator jacket - water , systems. The' change affected .
FSAR Figurec 9.2-3, 9.2-10, 9.5-9'andLFSAR-Section 9.B. This change was '
implemented in PVNGS Unit l'during this reporting period.
Summary of Safety Evaluation This ? change will increase the reliability of the essential chilled.
water, essential cooling water, and diesel generator jacket water-cooling ' systems by providing these systems with an alternate source .of water- from the fire : protection system in the event - of a loss of the demineralized water system and the condensate transfer pumps.
(85)'-Description of Change This change provided an electrical interlock between the halon system E - and the HVAC' damper actuators such that the HVAC supply and return dampers to the inverter room 'will close when the halon system- is actuated. This change affects FSAR Figure 9.4-2 and was implemented in PVNGS Unit 1 during this reporting period.
Summary of Safety Evaluation The change was necessary to ensure that the halon concentration in the inverter - room is maintained at the required concentration for the h required time duration. The previous system design allowed the halon concentration to be diluted by the HVAC supply and return air.
Therefore, this change was required in order to comply with the original design requirements for fire suppression in the inverter rooms.
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This change installed a" single fusible ' link sprinkler above the ' missile -
_ : proofI doors 'of the' upper ; and : lower cable ~ spreading : rooms. The; change
'affected FSAR Figure 9.5--1 and was implemented . in -PVNGS . Unit l during '
this: reporting period.
Summary-of Safety Evaluation 7he installation of a fusible link sprinkler is. consistent with the fire l protection" system and NFPA ~ requirements and the change will' be .used to protect a -fire boundary. - : This change ~does not result in an unreviewed safety question.'
(87) Description of Change For the fire = protection system, a new valve was installed into header
- 145-HBDC-4"' 'just. before the connection into header 047-HBDC-6". This change affected FSAR Figure 9.5-1 and was. implemented in PVNGS Unit 1-during this reporting period.
Summary of Safety Evaluation The additional valve allows for the - isolation of . a segment. of the auxiliary building fire suppression system for either maintenance or to
. isolate a system failure. The change provides more fire protection system capability and'does not result in an unreviewed safety question.
'(88) Description of Change For the fire protection system, the hose lengths were increased from 75 foot to 150 foot for hose stations 21, 22, 32, and 36. Additionally, l hose stations 35 and 40 were lengthened from 100 foot to 150 foot hose lengths. This change affected FSAR Figures 9B-18, 21, and 22 and was implemented in PVNGS Unit 1 during this reporting period. '
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Summary of Safety Evaluation This change was implemented in order to comply with the requirements of Branch Technical Position APCSB 9.5-1. The additional fire hose length is a safety improvement- and allows for secondary fire suppression capability for nearby fire zones.
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- -(89) Description'of Change
~ Portable dry chemical ~.' fire extinguishers were installed in each - of . the two auxiliary building piping penetration: rooms. This addition affected
-PSAR Section 9.B.2 and Figure 9.B-19 and was implemented in PVNGS Unit 1--
_during this reporting period.
Summary of Safety Evaluation The additional fire extinguishers in these . locations provide for better fire - protection and reduces the dependence on fire suppression systems located outside of'these piping penetration rooms.
(90)- Description of Change For the service gas ' system, the ' auxiliary _ building HVAC -_ system, the instrument air system,' and' the normal ~ chilled water system, some :1500 ohm resistors were replaced with 2000 ohn resistors to limit the current flow to the_ control room indicating lamps. This ' change affected drawings 13-E-GAB-001) E-HAB-016, and 13-E-IAB-002 which are incorporated into the FSAR by reference. This change was implemented in PVNGS Unit 1 during this reporting period.
Summary of Safety Evaluation This change has no affect on plant safety. The previous design allowed for a current ' flow to the control room indicating lamps which was in excess of the manufacturer's allowable. This change will reduce the
-current flow to within the allowable which will provide consistent light intensity.
(91) Description of Change For the generator hydrogen system, two 1/2-inch drain valves (V-286 and-l V-287) were installed, with the associated drain piping, from low points at the turbine-end generator casing. The drain piping is routed to the j generator casing liquid detector. This change affects FSAR Figure
! 9.3-14 and was implemented in PVNGS Unit 1 during this reporting period.
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. Summary of Safety Evaluation:
=This' change had no-' adverse effect on plant safety. The' change-fulfills-
- the' liquid : detection function .for the entire generator casing when seal oil, stator cooling; water, or hydrogen cooling water - leaks - into the'.
- generator casing during normal or abnormal plant operations.
(92) ' Description of Change -
- For.the auxiliary building HVAC~ system,-the exhaust fan for-the elevator-machine room was chdnged to a supply fan. - This - change ~ affected . FSAR '
Figure 9.4-3 and was - implemented in PVNGS Unit 1 during this . reporting period.
Sussary of Safety' Evaluation
' The purpose of: this . change was to ensure that- small quantities of
--unfiltered air from lower elevations of the auxiliary building are not leaked . to the atmosphere. Changing the fan to be a supply fan and sealing the floor openings ensure- that the air must pass through the filtration ~ units prior to release-to the atmosphere.
-(93) Description of Change A disconnect -switch and separately fused circuit w as provided for-penetration room . air handling unit M-HAB-Z06. This change affected drawings 13-E-HAB-005 and 13-E-SIB-007 which are incorporated into the FSAR by reference. This change was implemented in PVNGS Unit 1 during this reporting period.
Summary of Safety Evaluation The essential Air Handling Unit (AHU) for the penetration room is required to operate for safe shutdown of the unit. This change provides i
for control of the penetration room AHU from an area outside of the main i
- control room in the case of a control room fire.
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((94); Description of ChAnae- l
. The : main L contiol room . isolation; switch .was revised andf an~ auxiliary,
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re1ay was added at' motor control' center : compartment PHB-M3631.= This;
'1 Jchange affected the controls'for the. essential air-handling unit for the_-
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-auxiliary Lbuilding- penetration- room.'. The . change affected drawing -
313-E-HAB-005 which is incorporatedi into; the .FSAR : by reference. This .
-change was implemented in'PVNGS Unit'1 during ihis reporting period..
~
Summary of Safety Evaluation This- change was intended to increase- the ; reliability without changing-
~
the equipment function for thC penetration room air handling' unit. .The.
- change is required : to ensure that - the . safe shutdown fuse wil1 ~ not blow -
~
- due - to a ground fault before the associated. main control room isolation switch is( placed in - the local position.. This ' air handling unit - is -
required for safe shutdown of the unit following a control room fire.
(95) Description of Change A -24. VDC power supply unit was installed- to provide a 24 VDC power source to - differential pressure transmitter ' HFA-PDT-070. This change
- affected i drawing 13-J-HFE-051 which is incorporated ' by reference into the. FSAR. The change was implemented . in PVNGS Unit 1 during this reporting period.
' Summary'of Safety Evaluation
-This change was required in order to make the existing system operational. The change affects the power supply for a differential pressure transmitter in the fuel building HVAC system. With this change, the system will operate as it was originally intended.
i.
-(96) Description of Change This facility change - involved the installation of disconnect switches
. and M02. This change affected certain electrical drawings which were L- incorporated into the FSAR by reference. The change was implemented in PVNGS Unit 1 during this reporting period.
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.Aspuriousactuationanalysisshowed3ha'tsmokefromacontrol"roomfire
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couldi render the 'ESF IswitchgearL room unhabitable due'..to -smoke.
i propagation.E l The installation of -these local control switches at. the~
. Remote ' Shutdown . Panel will ' allow
,: , t the' dampers ; to : be[ operated to - isolate -
the ESF switchgear rooms from.the control room' fire smoke.'
(97[ DescriptionJof Chanae
[A - two-inch : demineralized' water line ' and a- one-inch -instrument ' air line were' provided to the : decontamination . . spray. . booth. Lin the radwaste
. building. This' modification 'affected-' FSAR 1 Figures ,9.3-1 and ' 9.2-5.' and was implemented.in PVNGS Unit i during this reporting period; Summary of Safety Evaluation This modification was required in order for the. decontamination sprayL booth to operate as intended. The modification'does not have any effect
.on the safety:of the plant.
(98)- Description of' Change-
.For the feedwater' heater extraction -steaa.'and drain system, the internals of check valves EDN-V568, .V571', V573, and -V699 were removed.
This affected - FSAR Figure 10.2-1 and this change - was implemented in
'PVNGS-Unit 1 during this reporting period.-
Summary of Safety Evaluation The internals of these check valves were permanently removed per the vendor's recommendation to prevent possible water carryover into the main turbine.- The change has no effect on the safety analyses and does not reduce any margin of safety.
(99). Description of Change Wiring and logic changes were made to valve MTN-UV-250. The changes will slave the energizing and de-energizing of the valve to one of the other steam line drain valves to provide for parallel operation of all four steam line drain valves. This change affected FSAR Figure 10.2-1 and was implemented in PVNGS Unit 1 during this reporting period.
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- Summary of' Safety Evaluation This D. change ? does L not' result , in ' an1 unreviewed : safetyi question
'This change was: implemented as-part of the partial are' admission to full' arc-admission , modification. ' - This change - provides for : parallel' . operation of a ll four steam. line 'drainivalves MTN-UV-250, 249, -248, and 247. -
(10'0) Description of Chanae A 480V welding: receptacle lwas installed-on the south wall;of the special booting and " storage area -(140-foot ' elevation ' of _ auxiliary 1 building).-
.This change a'ffected drawing 13-E-ZAC-025.which is incorporated into.the-
- FSAR'by reference. This . change . was . implemented in PVNGS Unit 1 during-this reporting period.:
Summary of Safety Evaluation The new weldingi receptacle was installed to provide power to'a portable
.HEPA ventilation 1 unit. This change has no effect on the safety analyses and does-not reduce any margins of safety.
. (101) Description of Change For - the fuel pool cooling and cleanup system, manual valve PC-V150 was replaced with' a -threaded cap. This change affected FSAR Figure 9.1-9 and was implemented in. PVNGS Unit 1 during this reporting period.
Sunmary of' Safety Evaluation l
The replacement of manual vent valve PC-V150 with a threaded cap did not affect- the capability of the system to perform its function of removing decay heat _from the spent fuel. Therefore, this change did not involve an unreviewed safety question.
l
! _(102) Description of Change This facility modification provided the -capability to override a diesel j- generator start signal to allow the control room operator to transfer back to the preferred power source after preferred power has been
, restored to the 4.16 kV bus following an LOP. This modification will 1
l
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also provide for. automatic diesel! generator restart :and breaker closure-This change ' affected ' drawings .13-E-DGB-007 i and
~
. upon a E subsequent LOP.-
13-E-PEB-001 which are incorporated into .the FSAR by.- reference. This
. change was implemented in-PVNGS Unit.1 during this reporing period.-
~
1
' Summary of Safety Evaluation This . facility _ change was required - in -' order : for the diesel" generator
-control. circuitry to conform to the FSAR description.
(103) Description of chanae A ' jumper :was - installed across the "B" contact in - the charging motor This
~
circuit for the class - 480V load center main feeder breakers.
change affected drawing 13-E-PGB-021 which is incorporated by reference into the FSAR. - This change was implemented in PVNGS Unit l' during this reporting period. ,
& Summary of Safety Evaluation This change' was made 'in order to . comply with an FSAR commitment which requires the -capability to establish HPSI flow to the RCS with 13 seconds following an LOP. The installation of the jumper across the "B" auxiliary switch contact in the charging motor circuit allows the closing spring in the breaker to be charged when the breaker is closed and will permit the agastat relay in the diesel generator breaker control to be set from 5 second time delay to 2 second time delay.
Therefore, this change will allow the system to operate in accordance with the FSAR.
1 (104) Description of Qiange Additional fuses were installed in penetration control circuits for
{ backup protection. This change affected many electrical drawings for varLous systems that are incorporated by reference into the FSAR. This e
change was implemented in PVNGS Unit 1 during this reporting period.
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? Summary of ' Safety Evsluatic'n .
-The' installation off=the backup fuses..was needed .
R 'to. comply Dwith-Regulatory Guide.1.63.- This regulatory guide states that an electrical
- penetration assembly.shouldibe designed to withstand, without a-loss'ofi
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. .-mechanical integrity, ' the maxinum short-circuit versus ' time ~chaditions
~t hat - could ' occur given crandom.~ single 1 failures of ' circuit overload
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.(105).Descript on i of Channe i
< . This ' facility : modification involved the .~ addition of redundant : isolation o ~
devices to space . or strip . heaters that are not' qualified to the-requirements .of INLE 323~ and 344. This -change affected various electrical' drawings which were incorporated into the FSAR by reference.
This change was implemented in PVNGS Unit 1 during this reporting period.
Summary of-Safaty Evaluation The installation of - the redundant isointion devices was required ' to
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ensure that heater failures do - not affect ' safety related equipment..
This ' modification was required to ensure compliance with previous FSAR commitments and regulatory requirements.
(106) Description of Changes This . facility change involved the installation of fusible disconnect J
- switches- to isolate each safe shutdown circuit and a cosmon . fusible disconnect switch for all non-safe shutdown circuits inside the
- auxiliary relay cabinets. This change affects many electrical drawings incorporated by reference into the FSAR. The change was implemented in PVNGS' Units 1 and 2 during this reporting period.
I Summary of Safety Evaluation This change was implemented in order to meet regulatory '1uirements.
The change provides a fault protection device for the safe shutdown and non-safe shutdown circuits to ensure that failures in one circuit are isolated before they can affect other safe shutdown circuits.
[I y (107)' Description of Change Revised the 125 VDC' distribution panel breaker trip rating from 30 AT.to 20 AT for :better circuit protection coordination. This change affected various ' electrical - drawings that _ are incorporated ' by ' reference: into the i
.FSAR. The change was implemented it. PVNGS Unit 1, during this ' reporting period.
Summary of Safety Evaluation.
The change of the breaker trip rating described above provides acceptable circuit protection coordination and ensures that the
. requirements - of Regulatory Guide 1.63 and 'the Technicali Specifications are satisfied.
(108) Description of Change Additional emergency lighting fixtures were installed in various locations to aid operator actions to achieve. safe. shutdown. This change affected the control building lighting drawing, 13-E-ZJL-004, which is incorporated into the FSAR by reference. This change was e.ompleted in PVNGS Unit 1 during this reporting period.
Summary of Safety Evaluation 10 CFR 50, Appendix R requires adequate emergency lighting to achieve safe shutdown of the unit. This facility modification installs additional emergency lighting to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix R.
(109) Description of Change Flashing blue lights were installed in excessive noise areas as a part of the emergency evacuation plan. This change affected various conduit and tray plan drawings which are incorporated by reference into the FSAR. This change was completed in PVNGS Unit i during this reporting period.
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) ' Susaary of Safety Evaluation The additional flashing blue . lights .were installed for, personnel safety
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reasons. ' :In t ereas' of escassive noise', the emergency : evacuation siren
-may.:not be heard ~during an emergency. : Flashing blue lights that actuate-
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.along with' the evacuation ' siren wil1~ ensure that -personnel:are aware 'of the evacuation signal.
-(110)' Description of Channe- .- ;s j .
. Unit evacuation" speaker QFN-UE22 was replaced with one of ; greater sound'
-output i o t ensure that l the evacuation signal can- be ' heard. ' This change, affected ' drawings 13-E-ZAC-007' and 9012 'which are incorporated. by
' reference ~ into the FSAR. This change was completed in~ PVNGS Unit 1
- during this reporting period.
Summary'of Safety Evaluation
. Testing.: indicated that the evacuation -alarm could not be heard in Roon A-506 of -the -auxiliary building due to background . noise. The new-speaker will generate an output alarm at a level greater than background noise to ensure that the alarm is heard by personnel in the area.
(111) Description of Change Installed an additional public address speaker in the Operations Support Center for use during emergency conditions. This change affected-drawing 13-E-ZAC-028 which is incorporated by reference into the FSAR.
This change was completed in PVNGS Unit 1 during this reporting period.
Summary of Safety Evaluation This change provides an improvement in the communications during energency situations by ensuring that personnel in the Operations Support Center receive audible instructions during an energency.
'(112) Description of Qianae Backup battery packs were provided to smoke detection panels QKN-E10D and E18D which serve fire - zones ! which ' contain safe shutdown related conduits. This change affected drawing 13-E-ZAC-026 which is
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incorporated Ey reference into'the FSAR. This change was implemented in PVNGS Unit' 1'during this reporting periodI- '
' Summary'of Safety Evaluation ,t This change provides an alternate power source to ftwo smoke detection panels. The change is ~ a safety enhancement in that it allows ~ for continued operation of the smoke detection panels in the event of a loss of the normal power supply.
(113) Description of Change Two ionization fire detectors were added. The new detectors are located at the 140 foot elevation of the control building near the airlock and or. the suspended ceiling in the corridor building. This change affected t'ae description 'of the fire protection program contained in Section 9.B cif the FSAR. This change was implemented in PVNGS Unit 1 during this ceporting period.
Summary of Safety Evaluation The installation of these ionization fire detectors will improve plant safety by providing detection of a fire which could potentially damage safety related equipment. The new detectors will not have any adverse impact on other plant systems.
(114) Description of Change The installation of the reactor coolant pump lube oil collection system to meet the 10 CFR 50, Appendix R requirements was completed. This installation affected FSAR Figure 5.1-1 and was completed in PVNGS Unit i during this reporting period.
Summary of Safety Evaluation The modified reactor coolant pump lube oil collection system is designed to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 50, Appendix R.
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(115) Description of Channe; For ~ the Train B pressuriser backup heater bank,- contacts . were added to
. the' ' circuit to isolate :the field. contacts ' associated ' with: the-
- pressuriser pressure 'and level contacts. This ' change affected' drawing 13-E-RCB-010 - which is incorporated by reference into the . FSAR. . This-change was implemented in PVNGS Unit:1 during this reporting period. ;
. Summary of Safety Evaluation -
Without ; the additional contacts in the circuit', iwhen the ' disconnect-r switch is . in - the Olocal position .there is a possibility of getting spurious ~ actuation signals from the field pressuriser pressure and level contacts. This modification -will' preclude the possibility of receiving these spurious signals and will improve plant safety. . '
i (116) Description of Channe Circuit E-RC-68CC-1XB for shutdown cooling suction . isolation valve [
SIC-UV-653 was re-routed such that it now remains west of column line ,
"AG" at the 100 foot elevation of, the auxiliary. building. This modification: affected various conduit and tray plan drawings that were -
incorporated into the FSAR by reference. This modification was completed in PVNGS Unit 1 during this reporting period.
Summary of Safety Evaluation Without this modification, it was postulated that a fire in fire zone 42C while the plant is in Mode 4, 5, or 6 could disable the Train B shutdown cooling system as well as causing a spurious closure of valve SIC-UV-653 which would isolate the Train A shutdown cooling system.
!. This modification re-routed the circuit for the valve to be outside of
' fire zone 42C to preclude the possibility of this type of occurrence.
(117) Description of Change i A passive backflush path was installed to direct any potential reactor j drain tank backflush water away from the reactor coolant pump seals (3rd ,
stage vapor seal leak-off) and to a floor drain. This change affected l FSAR Figure 9.3-13 and was implemented in PVNGS Unit i during this I
reporting period.
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Summary of Safety Evaluation The : addition of this. modification prevents flushing of~.the reactor coolant pump seal huusings and other pump components with water , backing up-from the vapor seal leak-off.line. The flushing of these components could result in damage to some pump components when exposed to . the borated . water.
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Thus, 'this change -gives a safety improvement :by preventing potential compo- at degradations.
(118)~ Description of Change A vacuum ' breaker was added and the existing plug valves (RDN-V155 and V156) were replaced with globe valves on the decontamination sump pumps' discharge lines. This . modification affects FSAR Figure 9..l-9 and was implemented in PVNGS Unit 1 during this reporting period.
Summary of Safety Evaluation This modification .does not involve an unreviewed safety question. The addition of the vacuum breakers stops the siphoning of the decontamination sump to the chemical drain ~ tanks. The change-out of the discharge plug valves with globe valves will allow the throttling of the pump discharge to prevent pump run-out and tripping of the pump motor on overcurrent.
(119) Description of Change Directional arrows were added to the main control board mimic for the chemical and volume control system to clarify the flow going to and coming from the reactor coolant system. This change affected some chemical and volume control system electrical drawings which are incorporated into the FSAR by reference. This change was completed in PVNGS Unit 1 during this reporting period.
Summary of Safety Evaluation This modification was the result of a human factors study. The modification will aid the operators by providing a better control board mimic for the chemical and volume control system.
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>(120) Description of Channe 1 -
The . control ' circuits :for containment isolation valves IAA-UV-002, NCB-W-401, : NCA-UV-402, NCB-W-403,' .- CHB-UV-505, . and CHA-W-506 were changed . such that the valves will now' close on ' a containment spray.-
actuation signal. The valves previously closed on _-a containment
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isolation. actuation signal.' This change affected FSAR Table 6.2.4-2 and Figures 9.3-13, 9.3-1, and 9.2-4. This change was implemented in' PVNGS
.. Unit 1 during this reporting period..
Summary ~of Safety Evaluation The subject valves are containment isolation valves in systems that are-required to support reactor coolant pump operation. This change is required to support ' continued operation of two reactor coolant pumps following a containment isolation / safety injection actuation. Continued pump operation following a safety injection actuation is part of the trip two/ leave two reactor coolant pump operating strategy which has been approved by the NRC as part of the CEN-152, Rev. 2 review. i (121) Description of- Change For the domineralized water system and the secondary chemical control system, a needle valve was installed to serve as a snubber in the sensing line to pressure regulating valve DWN-PCV-266 and a local pressure indicator was installed. This modification affected FSAR
- Figure 10.4-5 and was implemented in PVNGS Unit 1 during this reporting period.
Summary of Safety Evaluation -
1his modification does not affect the safety analyses or reduce any margins of safety. With the previous system design, the pressure ;
regulating valve would cycle erratically on flows of 50 spa or less due to pressure fluctuations in the sensing line. The installation of the neadle valve will preclude the erratic valve operation. The local pressure indicator was installed for monitoring purposes only.
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' 188A,189A,190A, .191A, -192A,' . and 333A were deleted and :the tubing was rerouted. This modification affected FSAR Figure 10.4-7 'and was l implemented in PVNG8 Unit i during this reporting period.
Summary of Safety Evaluation This change has no significant impact on plant safety.1 The' change was made to achieve proper system operating conditions. With the stop valves installed, there were inadequate sample flow rates to give proper conductivity readings.- This modification eliminates this problem.
(123) Description of Change, For the secondary chemical control system, the rupture discs (PSE-218, !
231, and 229) were replaced with three spring loaded relief valves. l This modification affected FSAR Figure 10.4-7 and was completed in PVNGS. f Unit 1 during this reporting period.
Summary of Safety Evaluation The ' replaced rupture discs provided overpressure protection for. the j' polishing domineralisers. The rupture : discs were replaced because they I were not capable of providing the required relief setting of 150 peig. -
The new relief valves ' (PSV-218, 231, and 229)~will be set at the. I required 150 psis. [
(124) Description of Channe This facility modification provides inputs to the ERFDADS system from ,
various process locations in the plant. The change affected various electrical and conduit and tray plan drawings incorporated by reference into the FSAR. This change was implemented in PVNGS Unit 1 during this i reporting period. ;
Summary of Safety Evaluation The changes to provide additional inputs to the ERFDADS system were 7 required to meet the requirements of Regulatory Guide 1.97.
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- = - ' . penetration; assemblies were reworked to . arrange the r conduit entrance .
into' thel enetration boxes. This modification affected various : conduit :
p and f tray plan drawings 'that , are incorporated by reference- ~ into 'the
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FSAR. This change was implemented ,in' PVNGS Unit l' during this . reporting .
} period.-
, ,r Sunnary of Safety Evaluation
. The-purpose of this-. change was to route the cables from the detectors to
- a n containment penetration that was compatible with the cables and to -
meet the 12 inch minimum bend ~ radius requirement for the cables. :This change did ~ not affeet the ability of the safety channel detectors to perform their safety function.
- (126) Description of Qianne The control circuitry for the atmospheric dump valves was modified to provide a control room alarm if the remote shutdown panel valve control station has -taken over control of the valves. This change affected drawing 13-E-SAB-015 as well as some conduit and tray plan drawings that are incorporated - into the FSAR by reference.~ This change was implemented in PVNGS Unit 1 during this reporting period.
Summary of Safety Evaluation The change does not have a significant effect on plant safety. The change will alert the control room operator if control of. the atmospheric dump valves is switched to the remote shutdown panel control station. This will ensure that the operator is alerted to abnormal conditions involving the atmospheric dump valves.
(127) Description of Chanae This modification involved the installation of low oil level switches on all main steam isolation valve and feedwater isolation valve hydraulic oil reservoirs. This change affected various conduit and tray plan drawings incorporated by reference into the FSAR. This change was implemented in PVNGS Unit 1 during this reporting period.
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Summary of Safety Evaluation The additional low oil-level swit!ches wil1 provide an alarm in the main
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control room on low oil-level in .the - hydraulic oil reservoirs for the valves. This alarm will alert the operators to an abnormal condition in-
.'the valves. This change does not involve an unreviewed safety question.
(128) Description of Qianae For Valcor solenoid valves in the main steam system and the sampling-system, the damaged solenoid valves were replaced and " black boxes" with timers were installed in the circuitry to reduce voltage to the solenoid valve after -the valve has actuated. This modification affected various
. electrical drawings incorporated into the FSAR by reference and was implemented in PVNGS Unit 1 during this reporting period.
Summary of Safety Evaluatio,n, This modification did not result in an unreviewed safety question. The installation of the " black boxes" with timers reduces the voltage to the Valcor solenoid valves after a time delay required to actuate the valve. This change eliminates overheating and damage to the coils and further ensures that the valves will satisfactorily perform their safety functions.
(129) Description of C yh For the main steam system, the locations of pressure transmitters SGA-PT-313 and SGB-PT-306 were interchanged along with a wiring modification in the auxiliary relay cabinets for valves SGA-PV-313A and B and SGB-PV306A and B. This modification affected FSAR Figure 9.3-1 and was implemented in PVNGS Unit i during this reporting period.
Summary of Safety Evaluation The purpose of this change is to meet the NRC requirements for safe shutdown of the unit following a fire in the main steam support structure. The change will ensure that, in the event of a fire, the ability to provide a nitrogen supply to open an atmospheric dump valve will not be lost and an ADV will remain operable to allow cooldown of the unit.
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( .(130) Description of Onanne For -shutdown cooling' suction isolation valves SIA-HV455 and SIS-HV-456,
'the esisting escutcheon plate (jos close-normal-jos open) wes' replaced -
. with' a new escutcheon plate (close-normal-open). This change affected drawing 13-E-SIS-015 which is - incorporated :into the . FSAR by ' reference.
The change was completed in PVMS Unit 1:during this reporting period.-
Summary'of Safety Evaluation This change has no significant impact ' on plant safety. The escutcheon ~
plates are being replaced to better reflect the operation of theEvalves.
(131) Description of Channe For various safety related . valve operators with Limitorque or Rotork motor operators, the space heaters were disconnected. .This change affects electrical' drawings for safety related valves in various systems. This change was implemented in PVNGS Unit 1 during this reporting period.
Summary of Safety Evaluation The disconnection of the space heaters does not impact the capability of j the valve operators to perform their safety function. The disconnection p was/ necessary because the space heaters were not qualified ~by the supplier.
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(132) Description of Channe i ,
For safety injection system motor operated valves SIA-UV-617, 627, 637, 674 and SIB-UV-616, 626, 636, 646 the limit switch contact used for the IRFDADS input has been changed to indicate closed when the valves are
! fully closed. This change affected electrical drawings related to the valves that are incorporated by reference into the FSAR. The change was
- implemented in PVNGS Unit i during this reporting period.
i Summary of Safety Evaluation The change ensures that the control grade information system (ERFDADS)
! receives accurate information relating to valve position for the high pressure cold les injection valves.
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- (133) Description of Channe The : asin control board indicating . lights for - shutdown cooling suction
. isolation valves SIC-UV-653 and SID-UV-654 were rewired . to provide an independent power _ supply from the power = supply for the valve motor operators.- Additionally, breaker indicating - lights : were . provided ' for the valves on ' the main ' control' board. This ; change affected 1 drawing
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13-E-SIB-014 which is incorporated into the PSAR by reference. .The change was completed;in PVNGS Unit 1 during-this reporting period.
Summary of Safety Evaluation This change was tha ' direct result . of spurious actuation studies that were conducted. As:a result of the studies,-~ the breakers for the valves -
were racked out. In order ' to maintain valve iposition indication while the breakers are racked out, the position indication circuit was given a separate-power supply. The breaker status lights were installed to sid-the operator in verifying correct breaker position.
. (134) Description of Chanas The orientation of high pressure cold leg injection valves SI-UV-616, 626, 636, 646, 617, 627, 637, - and 647 was reversed and flow belance orifices were installed downstream of the valves.. This change affected FSAR Figure , 6.3-1 and was implemented .-in PVNGS . Unit i during this
. reporting ~ period.
Suasary of Safety Evaluation The purpose of these valves is to open upon a safety injection actuation signal to provide safety injection flow to the RCS cold legs. During initial testing, the valves would not perform satisfactorily with the existing configuration. This facility modification was made to ensure proper operation of the valves for the accomplishment of the safety injection function.
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The conduitsH forf thel containment " sump temperature sensors ' (SIN-TE-712
-and 713) were changed from stsialess steel fles'to rigid stainless steel fconduit extending .a foot above i the maximus' flood - elevation f and then t sealed with an : ECSA. ' This. modification affects various' containment
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building conduit and (tray plan drawings incorporated into the FSAR by ~
reference. The change was ' completed Lin PVNGS Units 1 and 2 during this reporting . period.
Summary of Safety Evaluation
^The containment- sump temperature sensors- are required to -be
. environmentally qualified by Regulatory Guide 1.97. 'This conduit change and installation of an ECSA ensures the qualification of these sensors.
'(136) Description of Chanae High Pressure Safety Injection (HPSI) pump ultrasonic flow meters (UFNs) were cha'nsed from the-discharge side of the pumps to the suction side of the pumps. This modification affects FSAR Figure 6.3-1 and was implemented in PVNGS Units 1 and.2 during this reporting period..
Summary of Safety Evaluation The HPSI'UFNs were not operating correctly on the discharge side of the pumps. Installing the UFMs on the suction side will eliminate this problem and ensure that the commitment in CESSAR Section 6.3.2.2.3 is satisfied. This CESSAR section requires that the HPSI pumps be provided with UFNs and low flow alarming capabilities.
(137) Description of Change For the safety. injection system pumps (high pressure, low pressure, and containment spray) the existing one-inch seal piping vent caps were replaced with a 3/8-inch valve on the seal piping. This modification affected FSAR Figure 6.3-1 and was implemented in PVNGS Unit 1 during this reporting period.
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( r Summary of Safety Evaluation s s This change has no 'significant impact on plant safety. The replace eat -
'of'the vent cap with s'. vent valve allows for a controlled venting method
' and . a manna to icollect - potentially contaminated fluid that is vented -
'from the pump seal piping.
(138) Description'of Channe For. the spray chemical addition portion of. the safety. injaction systea,-
the existing 1/2-inch globe valves, V-128 and V-148, were replaced. with . !
. 3/8-inch needle valves. This change affected FSAR Figure 6.3-1 and was' implemented in PVNGS Unit 1 during.this reporting period.
Summary of Safety Evaluation ~ +
This change does not involve. an-~unreviewed safety , question. The existing ' globe valves . were replaced with ~ needle valves to provide a throttling capability.when the pumps are operating' in the recirculation ,
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. mode to the spray chemical addition tank during' surveillance' testing.
-(139)' Description of Change :
'An automatic backpressure regulating valve was added to line :
N-DWN-099-HCDA-6 in the domineralised water system. This valve addition :
.affected FSAR Figure 9.2-5 and was completed during this reporting .
l period.
Summary of Safety Evaluation This change has no significant impact on plant safety. The addition of the backpressure regulating valve will provide backpressure to the ['
askeup desineraliser effluent piping which will provide a pressurised p water supply to the affluent water analezer skid. [
(140) Description of Change For the essential spray pond system, a bypass line was installed around !
the spray pond hypochlorite day tank and metering pump. This ;
modification affected FSAR Figure 9.2-1 and was implemented in PVNGS
! Unit i during this reporting period. ;
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Summary of Safety Evaluation-This change did not involve an unreviewed safety question. The bypass line will allow hypochlorite to be added to the spray ponds ' during periods when the metering pump is out of service. This will ensure that
' hypochlorite can be added to maintain proper water chemistry conditions in the system. *
(141) Description of Qianae-For essential spray pond valves SPB-HV-50A and SOB, the out-of-service portion of the control room SEIS display was deleted to eliminate nuisance alarms. This change affected various spray pond system electrical and control drawings incorporated into the FSAR by reference. The change was implemented in PVNGS Unit 1 during this reporting period.
Summary of Safety Evaluation Valves . SPB-HV-50A and 50B were previously locked in' their actuated positions with power removed as a result of studies for 10 CFR 50, Appendix R compliance. This resulted in a nuisance SEIS inoperable alarm in the main control room. This change only eliminates the nuisance alarm so that the control room operators can obtain meaningful data from SEIS for the essential spray pond system.
(142) Description of Change This modification provided grab sample access to radiation monitors 141, 143, 145, 1, 34, 14, 8, 15, 10, and 9. The modification involved the addition of in-line sample tees and piping downstream of each isolation valve that is threaded to receive a cap end fitting. This change affected FSAR Figures 9.4-13, 10.4-1, 9.4-9, 9.4-12, 9.4-5, 9.4-3 and was implemented in PVNGS Unit i during this sample period.
Summary of Safety Evaluation The existing licensing documents required the capability to obtain grab samples from these radiation monitor locations. This modification will implement these requirements.
(143) Description of Channe A flow sensing ' device was installed upstream of isokinetic nossle SQN-AW11 for radiation monitors SQN-RE-141 and 142 in the condenser evacuation system and existing globe valve V027 was replaced with a gate valve. This modification affected FSAR Figure 10.4-1. The change was
. implemented in PVNGS Unit 1 during this reporting period.
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Susaary of Safety Evaluation l This change has no impact on plant safety. The previous method of determining flow in the condenser exhaust was not adequate to properly update the RMS, CRACS, and ERFDADS Computer Systems. The new annubar flow sensing device will continuously update the monitor as to duct flow. The valve was changed to a gate valve to reduce flow restrictions which will reduce plate-out and ensure a representative sample at the radiation monitor.
(144) Description of Chanze An isokinetic probe and a flow sensor were installed in the fuel building exhaust duct. This modification affected FSAR Figure 9.4-9 and was implemented in PVNGS Units 1 and 2 during this reporting period.
Summary of Safety Evaluation The previous method of determining flow in the fuel building exhaust was not adequate to properly update the RMS, CRACS, and ERFDADS Computer Systems. The flow sensor will continuously provide the flow information and the isokinetic probe will ensure that sampling of effluent releases is in accordance with ANSI-13.1-1969.
(145) Description of Change For the existing containment purge exhaust duct radiation monitor, a new sample line along with an isolation valve was installed. This allows the existing monitor to sample the exhaust from the containment refueling purge or the containment power access purge. This modification affected FSAR Figure 9.4-13 and was implemented in PVNGS Unit i during this reporting period.
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Summary of Safety Evaluation '
t This ' change does:~not _ involve an unreviewed safety question. The.
existing containment purge exhaust radiation monitor (SQB-RU-34) can now' sample either the refueling purge exhaust or the power access purge- r exhaust.
- (146)-Description'of Qianae For the fuel building exhaust radiation monitor, - the sample isolation valve (V005) was removed. This affected FSAR Figure 9.4-9 and was implemented in PVNGS Units 1 and 2 during this reporting period.
Summary of Safety Evaluation The removal of. the manual isolation valve will' reduce- the flow I restrictions which will reduce the - plate-out in the sample line. This '
will' ensure that the sampling guidelines of ANSI N13.1-1969 are met.
(147) Description of Channe For- post-accident radiation monitors SQA-RE-148 and 150 and SQS-RE-149 ;
and 151, the ' existing mineral insulated cable containment electrical penetrations feed-throughs were replaced with environmentally qualified i feed-throughs. This modification affected various containment building conduit and tray plan drawings incorporated by reference into _ the FSAR.
This change was implementad in PVNG8 Unit i during this reporting period.
Summary of Safety Evaluation The newly installed environmentally qualified equipment was necessary in [
order to meet the requirements of 10 CFR 50.49 for these post-accident ,
radiation monitors.
(148) Descrtetton of channe For the solid radweste systes, a bypass line was provided around the spent resin tanks so spent resin can be routed directly to the vendor f connection in the radweste building truck bay. This affected FSAR [
Figure 11.4-2 and FSAR Section 11.4.2 and was implemented during this l reporting period in PVNGS Unit 1. I t
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Summary of Safety Evaluation ' e his bypass line does not decrease the safety of the plant. The additional bypass -line will increase the flexibility of the solid radweste ' system by providing the capability to process spent resin j, on-site or by a qualified vendor.
L (149) Description of Change ,'
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Various low point drain valves and associated drain piping were deleted from the spent resin transfer piping.
he specific valves which ' were , r. ,
deleted are valves SRN-V108, V109 and CHN-VR75, VR82, VR88, VX09. his modification affected FSAR Figures 11.4-2 and 9.3-13 and was implemented in PVNGS Unit i during this reporting period. -
Summary of Safety Evaluation
- The deletion of these drain valves and drain piping in the spent resin transfer system eliminates potential resin traps in the system and ensures that FSAR commitments are satisifed for spent resin transfer lines. The change eliminates a potential occupational radiation exposure hasard. f (150) Description of Chanae For the solid radwaste system, drain valve SRN-V975 was relocated to the blind flange side of the inlet connection for the portable ,
solidification system. The previous valve location was on the opposite' side of the flange. This change affected FSAR Figure 11.4-2 and was implemented in PVNGS Unit 1 during this reporting period.
4 Summary of Safety Evaluation This change does not have a significant impact on plant safety. The change was implemented to reduce personnel radiation exposure when transferring spent resins to a portable solidification system. The previous location of valve SRN-V975 was a resin trap that would create an unacceptably high radiation zone at the vendor inlet connection.
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(151) Description of Chanae~
g For the nuclear sampling system, a vacuum pump and sample vessels were installed in=the nuclear sample sink. fume hood =to provide the capability-to obtain off gas l samples from the reactor.. coolant system and the pressuriser ' steam space. This modification' affected FSAR Figure 9.3 j and was implemented in PVNGS Unit 1 during this reporting period.
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/ Summary of Safety Evaluation this change will provide additional capabilities for reactor coolant system chemistry analysis. The change does not affect the safety analyses or reduce any safety margins.
-- (152) Description of Change
<- The existing hot lab sink drain was replaced with a 3 x 1.5 inch reducer and valve SS-V151. was replaced with a loop seal. This affected FSAR Figure 9.3-2 and was implemented in PVNGS Unit 1 during this reporting
, period.
Summary of Safety Evaluation f
With the previous hot lab sink drain design, the sink drain would leak when water was in the sink. This modification will correct the leakage problem and eliminate a potential crud trap location.
(153) Description of Change Loose parts monitoring system accelerometers SVN-YE-1 and 2 were A relocated from the support skirt assembly to the reactor closure head a rea. This modification affected various containment building conduit and tray plan drawinga that are incorporated into the FSAR by reference.
Summary of Safety Evaluation this change was required in order for the system to operate properly.
The previous accelerometer location resulted in the monitors being in a continuous alare condition due to background vibration from the CEDM cooling fan structure.
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gy r A :V For the turNine e ling irater system, . a venti;ngi capability -was provided.-
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for: the generator . hydrogen cooler by in' a talling piping from each cooler; s ,.
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'waterbox -vent ,to.{the turbine ' deck with proper ~ valves to control
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leakoff. This modification. affdeted FSAR Figute 9.2-8 and was
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y 1 implemented'in'PVNGS' Unit'l during this reporting period. ,
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Summary of Safety Evaluation' p This- change improhes the operationD'of the -generator by- providing
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balanced generator hydrogen cooling. , Unbalanced cooling may have'. caused
' excessive vibration and resulted' inta 'tiurbine/ generator trip.
~
. T (155) Description of Change- '
~
For the. turbine cosling water system, isolation. valves were installed on
, the . return. and supply lines -(two ' . valve s -' 'on - each This~
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line).".
~ modification affected FSAR Figures 9.2-8 and 10.4-4 and was implemented' inPVNGSUnits[and2duringthisreportingperiod.'"
Summary of Safety Evaluation This change did not significantly affect plant safety. fa the event of a leak, the -additional isolation valves will provide the capability tio isolate- the underground < portion of the piping to allow continuous operation of tiie' system while repairs are being made to underground piping.'
.(156) Description of Change The existing 1 wall' between the health physics sample Iroom and 'the personnel ~ decontamination 'areaiwas removed and^ a/ new wali was built -
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eight feet east into roc.t A-315. This change af'fected FSAR Figure 9.4-3 and was implemented in PVNOS Unit 1 during this reporting period.
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. Summary of Safety Evaluation > ..
- The expansion of the health physics sample room has' no affect on plant j.
safety. The room was expanded to contain current and future laboratory equipment. s. ,
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In' the auxiliary building,- a.' curb was installed across valve gallery
- A-A01 l with a- floor _ drain hard piped to . the _. sump. This modification affected FSAR Figure 9.3-5 and was -implemented in PVNGS Unit .1 during this reporting-period.
Summary'of Safety Evaluation This modification will allow for the collection of ' spills ' fros ' leaky valves -in the -_ valve gallery. This modification was made for ALARA purposes and does not affect the safety.of the plant.
(158) Description 6f Change On:. some inside-containment. post-accident required instruments ,
Electrical Conduit Seal -Assemblies (ECSA's) were installed. This modification affected ~various containment building conduit and tray plan e drawings ; incorporated . into . : the FSAR' by reference'. . The2 change was completed during this reporting period for PVNGS Unit 1.
Summary of Safety Evaluation- ~
e The change was required for environmental qualification purposes for
'some instruments ' located inside the containment building. The modification ensures that the instruments will be capable of performing their post-accident functions.
(159) Description of Cbange I Insulation was installed at all support locations on the pressurizer N
spray line that were not previously insulated. This affected FSAR Section- 6.2.2 concerning the use of insulation inside the containment building. The modification was implemented in PVNGS Unit 1 during this reporting period.
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- The previous. lack of[insulationjai thh f ~ pressuris'er ... spray line support -
, locations -was contributing to .the :RCS . heat loss.. .The additional.
- insulation id calculated tlo sa've' '291kW of heat input by the pressurizer
~
heaters and will reduce - the - amount - of heat. added ' to - the , containment
^
atmosphere.'
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(160) Description of Change In the .. containment . building, existing' conduits 1EZCZCARK14 and 1EZC1CCRK01. were . reworked; by removing - the existing flex and rigid steel' 90* conduit and replacing it. with flex conduit of the same size. - This-affected drawings -.13-E-ZCC-011 and ,015 which are incorporated 'into . the .
FSAR by ' reference. This - modification was completed in PVNGS Unit 1
, 'during this-reporting period.-
Summary of Safety Evaluatiion This change will decrease the probability of.a seismic failure of these conduits and ensure that the seismic gap criterion is set.-
(161) Description of Change
.At-the 140 foot level of the control building, racks were fabricated ~and
. installed to secure' SCBA's and air bottles. This change affected drawing 13-J-ZJF-009 which is incorporated by. reference into the' FSAR.
The cinnge was implemented in PVNGS Unit 1 during this reporting period.
i
, . Summary of Eafety Evaluation
- This change improves the safety of the main control room complex by providing a means of securing the air bottles and SCBA kits to reduce a
. potential safety hazard.
(162) Description of Change local tank level indication was provided for the refueling water tank and for the reactor makeup water tank. This change affected FSAR Figure 9.3-13 and was implemented in PVNGS Unit 2 during this reporting period.
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m Summary of Safety Evaluation This change was necessary to support safe shutdown of the plant in the event of a control room fire. This change will . ensure that tank level information is'available to the operators to support safe shutdown.
'(163) Description of Change For valve GR-UV-002 in the gaseous radwaste system,' a timing. relay was added to delay reset of the override until after the Containment.
Isolation Actuation Signal (CIAS) is ' reset. This change affects Electrical drawing 13-E-GRB-004 which is incorporated into the FSAR by reference. The change was implemented in PVNGS Unit 2 during this reporting pericd.
Summary of-Safety Evaluation The change improves plant safety by ensuring that the valve does . not return to its actuated-position upon reset of a CIAS. With the previous design, reset of the CIAS, af ter override had been implemented for the valve, caused a relay race which resulted in a spurious -actuation signal returning the valve to the CIAS actuated position. This change eliminates the spurious operation of the equipment.
(164) Description of Change For the high pressure safety injection pumps, a normally closed contact was installed in parallel with the existing normally closed contacts from the flow switches for the pumps. The flow switches provide the low flow alarms for the pumps. This change affected drawing 13-E-SIB-001 which is incorporated into the FSAR by reference. The change was implemented in PVNGS Unit 2 during this reporting period.
Summary of Safety Evaluation The additional contact that was installed will allow the main control room HPSI pump low flow alarm to be activated only when the pump is running. This will eliminate a nuisance alarm in the main control room while ensuring that the operators are alerted to a low flow condition
! while the pumps are running.
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'(165) Description of Chanae^
For the' qualified 1 safety parameter display system (QSPDS);.115V'AC 1;ower wasJsupplied to . Channels C and D of the' QSPDS . isolation ' cabinet to.-the
. control: room. . This change affected Electrical-Drawints 13-E-PNA-001 and 4 002, which ' are incorporated ' into the . FSAR by ' reference. The change. was implemented in PVNGS Unit 2 during this reporting period.
Summary of Safety Evaluation This change allows the QSPDS to operate as originally intended. -
7
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Description:
of Change. 1 For the essential' chilled water system, vent valves ' V227 "and V226 were added.- The addition of these valves.affected FSAR Figure 9.2-10 and was implemented in'.PVNGS Unit 1 during this reporting period.
Summary of Safety Evaluation The addition of the two vent valves does not - result in ,an unreviewed safety question. - The ' valves were added to support proper operation of the essential chilled water system.
(167) Description of Change A temporary modification was implemented in PVNGS Unit 1 to ' remove .the
'1 ~ internals of flow gauges and to install flanges to direct oil from, the -
> charging pumps away from the non-ESF sump. This affected FSAR Figure.
9.3-13.
Summary of Safety Evaluation
' This modification was performed due to the fact that oi1 ~ from the charging pumps cannot be tolerated in the liquid radwaste system.
I- l(168) Description of Change A temporary modification was implemented in PVNGS Unit 1 to eliminate the manual start capability of the jacket water heater on the diesel -
generators. This affected drawing 13-E-DGB-015 which is incorporated by reference into the FSAR.
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~ Summary of Safety Evaluation This' change ~only. removes'the manual start. capability.ofIthe jacket water.
heater. The automatic. start function of the' heater -is stillf allowed. .
. Removal of ' the manual - start feature.provides assurance that-the heater will~ not. be energized while they jacket water circulating pump 'is :not
= running. This wil1 prevent heater damage.
~
- (169) Description of Change A temporary modification was implemented in PVNGS. Unit 1 to the B-train essential chilled water surge tank to add tubing from the surge tank to an open expansion tank. This affected FSAR Figure 9.2-10.
~
Summary of Safety Evaluation This. change supported troubleshooting of the. B-train essential chilled water system during Mode 5 operations where the system is not required -
-to be operable.
. (170) Description of Change.
A . temporary modification was implemented in PVNGS Unit' 1 to add a-temporary bypass line around containment isolation valves GA-UV-2 and IA-UV-2 in the service gas and instrument air systems. This affected.
FSAR Figures 9.3-1A and 9.3-14.
Sussary of~ Safety Evaluation These temporary mechanical bypasses allow nitrogen gas and instrument air to be supplied to containment during the A-train outage when the
. containment isolation valves are inoperable. Containment integrity was not required during the time that these modifications were implemented due to the plant being in Mode 5.
(171) Description of Change A temporary modification was implemented in PVNGS Unit I to install an electrical jumper to bypass the Hi-Hi oxygen concentration alarm on the waste gas surge tank gas sample and the vaste gas decay tank sample.
This affected FSAR Section 11.3.
+
Summary of Safety Evaluation-
_ Per FSAR Section 11.3.1.1.6, a Hi-Hi- oxygen concentration will trip th'e-
~
waste' gas compressors and-nitrogen will be automatically injected. :This .
prevents the presence ~of an explosive gas mixture. .During the time when '
this temporary modification was implemented, ' there was -no rahtoactivity. 2 in" the system .thats could have been i released l dtie to a }rtipture in the -
system caused by_an explosive gas mixture.
('172)-Description of Change
' A temporary modification was implemented in PVNGS Unit 1 to install a-jumper' to allow .the auxiliary building normal exhaust ~.. units to be ;
. stopped while . the supply fans remained running. . This . affected FSAR i Section 9.4. .
Summary of-Safety Evaluation This modification was implemented while painting and welding were being performed in the auxiliary building to prevent ! damage to the exhaust .
. units charcoal adsorbers. The modification was only in affect' prior to ,
initial' mode 4~ entry for Unit.1., Thus, there was no possibility of an-
. unfiltered = release =of radioactivity due to ' the loss of the slight negative pressure that is normally maintained in the auxiliary building. ;
(173) Description of Change t- A temporary modification was implemented in PVNGS Unit 1. to maintain certain auxiliary building, fuel building, control building dampers in the locked - open position during Train A (Train B) outages. This affected various HVAC diagrams which are contained in Section 9.4 of the FSAR.
t Summary of Safety Evaluation Maintaining the dampers in the locked open position allowed continuation-of normal ventilation during outages of each train. This modification was implemented in Mode 5 where only one train is required to be operable. Additionally, the opposite train of dampers was maintained operable to provide isolation if required.
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(174) Description'of Change-
, A temporary modification was implemented in~ PVNGS Unit 1 to- allow' the.
pumping : of water. f ron',: thel liquidi radweste - system TDS ' tank : to ' a - tank -
-truck. This affected FSAR Figure 11.2-2.-
- Summary of' Safety Evalua' tion -
~
This . temporary change was / implemented prior -. to. initial criticality -' of
~
the. unit so that the. water did.not have to be: processed as radioactive
~
water. At this time in unit operations, there was no.; radioactivity ini the. water being .sent to the LRS ta'nks' -
, ~
h (175) Description of Change '
A temporary ' modification w'as . implemented in $PVNGS Unit 1 to remove the.
cap from valve LRV-448 in the li uid radwaste system nd then to run a
' hose to a portable demineralizer and then to the' tank truck connection.1
=This affected FSAR Figure 11;2-2.
Summary of Safety-Evaluation This modification. allowed for routing liquid radwaste to a tank truck to allow for processing by separate equipment.
-(176) Description of Change A temporary modification was implemented in PVNGS Unit 1 to the liquid radwaste system to add temporary-piping which will route water fron-the demineralizer outlet into the recycle monitor task. This affected FSAR Figure 11.2-2.
Summary of Safety Evaluation This tes.porary change allows for continued system operation during-repair of the evaporator.
1(177) Description of Change A temporary modification was implemented in PVNGS Unit 1 to install blind flanges on makeup lines to the spent fuel pool. This affected l FSAR Figure 9.1-9.
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S'ummary of Safety Evaluation
, The. blind ; flanges were; added to, the makeup 11?.nes to preclude the:
. inadvertent ~ addition of water . to . the ~ spent fuel pool while l new - fuel is
- being : stored in the ' spent - fuel pool . (no spent. fuel; being' stored at . the time of~this modification).
'(178) Description of Change A' temporary ; modification .' was : implemented in PVNGS Unit. 1. to supply
' temporary ' power to th'e '120 VAC distribution panels during -the- Train A.
and B outages. This affected. drawing'13-E-PHA-002 which is incorporated by reference into the FSAR.
' Summary'of Safety Evaluation This modification had lno affect on -the safety of the plant because . it i
- was done during a. plant operational mode where only . one train 'of equipment was required to be operable.
(179) Description of Change A . temporary modification was implemented .in.- PVNGS Unit 1.to provide temporary power to emergency -lighting panels during the Train A and B
~
outages.
Summary of Safety Evaluation This modification did not affect plant safety since the outages were ,
conducted while the' unit was in Mode 5 where only one train of equipment t-i is required to be operable.
j (180) Description of Change A temporary modification was implemented in PVNGS Unit i to modify the liquid radwaste system by running a hose between valves V244 and V054.
This affected FSAR Figure 11.2-2.
Summary of Safety Evaluation The temporary line provides a capability for discharging the contents of f the recycle monitor tanks to the CVCS holdup tank. The accident analyses are not affected by this change.
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(181) Description ~ 7 of'Cha l -
A temporary modification was implemented in PVNGS Unit 1 to change fire:
detectorst QKN-AS-14111 and: 1421 from ionization detectors 'to photoelectric type detectors. This affects FSAR Section 9.B.
~ Summary of Safety Evaluation This change was made -to ' eliminate spurious alarms which~ were caused by .
high velocity air flow. The changes improve safety by . assuring ' the
! proper. operation of these' detectors.and ensuring that the detectors are t' not'in a continuous-alarm condition.'
(182) Description of Change
~ A~. temporary modification was implemented -in- PVNGS' Unit 'l to . install a temporary nitrogen gas rig to supply nitrogen to the pressurizer. The change affects FSAR Figure 9.3-14.
-Summary of Safety Evaluation The change allows for establishing a nitrogen bubble in the. pressurizer to allow for RCP - operation without a steam bubble' in the pressurizer.
- This facilitiates plant startup and shutdown with a nitrogen . bubble in the pressurizer.
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' (183) Description of Change A temporary modification was. implemented in PVNGS Unit 1 to connect 1/4"
[ plastic tubing between valves RCV-214 and RCV-058. This affected FSAR -
Figure 5.1-1.
Summary of Safety Evaluation The modification allows for indication of RCS level daring fill and vent 4
of the system and the tubing is removed during system operations. This improves plant safety by assuring that personnel are aware of level in the RCS.
(184) Description of Change A temporary modification was implemented in PVNGS Unit 1 to install a switch which will allow for the manual trip of all 4 RCP's simultaneously.
- _ . . . _ _ . . _ . ~ . - . _ . . . _ , _ . - _ , . _ - _ _ _ _ . . . _ . _ _ . . . _ . . , _ . _ _ _ _ . . , , _ . . _
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Summary of Safety Evaluation-The' switch .wa's installed 1 temporarily [tof allow ' tripping . of : all 4-RCP's ' ,
J simultaneously sin support of the' power ascension testing program.- This '
allowed the measurement of; plant response Lto- a total;1ossiof RCS forced -
~ circulation.' -
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.(185) Description of Change
< s A- temporary modificationw' as implemented! for PVNGS . Unit l' to install a -
drain. line -~and bucket . at the; seal bleedoff flange s of s RCB . 2B.. This affected.FSARlFigure.5.1-12 .
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, Summary of Safety Evaluation -
4 . ..
'This temporary installation:allowe'd for monitoring' leakage to determine if a. flow blockage. existed -in the flow passage from ths secondary side
' 'of the third stage seal.
(186) Description of Change A temporary . modification was implementedi in PVNGS - Unit' 1 to install a portable pump at the hold up tank sump, and via a temporary hose, route
~
4 the~ water to the spray pond backwash sump. This affected FSAR Figure 9.3-8.
Summary of Safety Evaluation This ' temporary change - allowed for routing of the sump ' water to ~the i circulating water canal and does not affect plant safety.
l, (187) Description'of Change A. temporary modification was implemented in PVNGS Unit 1 to install a
-- temporary hose in the auxiliary steam system from valve ASN-V550 to AS-VY14. This affected FSAR Figure 10.3-2.
Summary of Safety Evaluation The temporary hose was installed to supply proper cooling to the boiler feed pumps while valve DSN-V403 is being repaired and to allow auxiliary 2
boiler operation during domestic water system outages.
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~ (188) Description of Change A temporary 7 modification -was . implemented in . PVNGS Unit . l'~ to install .
- temporary level - gauges -- i.n the refueling 1 water tank and the . reactor makeup water tank. This affected FSAR Figure 9.3-13.
f r Summary of' Safety Evaluation The' temporary level gauges were installed until a permanent plant-change was completed to insta11' permanent level instrumentation. The level indication is necessary.to meet an NRC commitment-for shutdown outside the control room.~.
(189) Description'of Change
. A temporary modification was , implemented in' PVNGS iUnit 1 ~ to open the exhaust inspection hatches on the discharge - side of the . fume - hood exhaust fans. This affected FSAR Figure 9.4-3.
Summary of Safety Evaluation This temporary change allows the chemistry lab hoods to-~ exhaust. to atmosphere while the normal exhaust units are out - of service. This-temporary change 'was implemented prior to initial Mode- 4 entry on the unit so that no radioactivity was released.
i-
-(190) Description'of Change A temporary m'odification was implemented for PVNGS Unit 1 to incorporate
~
-an open contact in the control circuitry for the diesel generator.
Summary of Safety Evaluation This change assures that Appendix R isolation requirements are met when the mode selector switch is in the local position.
(191) Description of Change r
A temporary modification was implemented in PVNGS Unit 1 to defeat the RCS low flow trip to allow maintenance and troubleshooting of the CEDMCS.
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~ CESSAR Section 7.2.2i requires a RCS flow flow . trip.
This _., trip _will- be deleted while this. temporary modification is installed. However, - iti is only installed during modes.when the trip isinot required to be o'perable'~
per Technical Specifications.
+ .
(192)< Description of Change- ,
A temporary modification was - implemented in PVNGS Unit'l' to install temporary tygon' tubing 1 for indication < of ' the steam _ generator ; . level.
This affected FSAR Figure 10.3-1.
Summary of Safety Evaluatica - e This - temporary change was made ~ to allow for level indication ~ of the steam genersors prior to initial startup of the unit.
~
. (193) Description of Change A temporary modification was implemented in PVNGS Unit 1 to replace the air operator- on atmospheric- dump valve SGA-HV-184 with .a motor-operator. This affected FSAR Figure 10.3-1.
Summary of Safety Evaluation This change was made prior to initial criticality to allow the testing -
~
. of - the valve with a motor operator. This modification was installed only for a short testing period to gather information on operation of the valve with a motor operator.
' (194) Description of Change ,
For the main steam system, a temporary modification was installed in PVNGS Unit 1 to add a second manual isolation valve by valve SG-V140.
This affected FSAR Figure 10.3-1.
' Summary of Safety Evaluation v
This change did not affect plant safety but it does provide for positive
! isolation in the event that steam is leaking past valve SG-V140 when it is closed.
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Q .; (195) Description of Change For 'the- safety :- injection system, ..a; ' temporary ' modification ; was 1
~ V024. - This-affected FSAR Figure 6.3-1.
-Summary of Safety-EvaluationL.
This installation of, a pressure gauge Lwas a temporary change to allow
^ troubleshooting' of a - suspected leak from valve ' SI-UV-668. This change was implemented l prior to initial' criticality on the unit.1 -
(196) Description of Change' ,
~
For the spray 5 pond ' syste's,' a temporary ' modification was implemented in PVNGS Unit 'l t"o. install snubbhrs in'"the sensing lines for flow transmitters SP-FT-5 and 6. This affected FSAR Figure 9.2-1.
~
Summary of; Safety Evaluation-The installation of the snubb'ers improves the operation of the - - flow transmitters by reducing fluctuations. ,
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' (197) Description of Change For : the spray pond system, a temporary modification was performed ' to install temporary pressure gauges in the pipng system. This affected FSAR Figure 9.2-1.
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Summary of Safety Evaluation The temporary pressure gauges allow for the monitoring of spray pond system pressures for the spray pond piping integrity monitoring
[ program. The monitoring program implements an NRC commitment. ,
i! (198) Description of Change For ' the turbine cooling water system, a temporary modification was implemented to install mechanical jumpers to allow an alternate water L
supply to the instrument air compressors while the turbine cooling water system is out uf service. This affected FSAR Figure 9.2-8.
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. Summary'of Safety Evaluation :
-This temporary : change did not affect plant ~ safety. It. . did ' allow for:
- : continued operation ' of the : instrument . air compressors while' the turbine
-cooling water system was'out of' service.
(199) Description of Change.
For~the' domestic water system, a temporary modification was implemented PVNGS ' Unit -2Eto install mechanical jumpers to permit continued
.-in -
operation of the system. This affected FSAR Figure 9.2-6.
Summary of Safety Evaluation The mechanical jumper allowed for the continued operation of the system while performing work on some valves in the systems.
(200) Description of Change For the chemical-and' volume control system, a temporary modification was implemented in FVNGS Unit 1 to install a charging and gauging assembly with : nitrcgen bottles and regulators for the charging - pump pulsation
-dampeners. This affected FSAR Figure 9.3-13.
Summary of Safety Evaluation-This modification did not decrease plant safety but it did allow for timely precharging operations of the charging pump pulsation dampeners.
l; (201) Description of Change For the fuel handling system, a temporary modification was implemented I
in PVNGS ' Unit 1 to install two jumpers to allow bridge and trolley i
j operation with the hoist below the up limit to support shipment of fuel bundles from Unit 1 to Unit 2. This affected FSAR Section 9.1.4.2.2.
f-l Summary of Safety Evaluation The FSAR- Section requires interlocks to prevent movement of the crane when the hoist is withdrawing (or inserting) a new fuel assembly into its storage location.- The change only allows for the interlocks to be l
I bypassed under certain controlled circumstances. Operation with the bypass in effect was administrative 1y controlled.
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~For ,the ) containment '. combustible -- gas control ~ system, l a- temporary.
-sciification was - performedl to ' install- valves and tubing to provide for sample analysis of the air . inlet to the hydrogen ; analyzer. This 1affected-FSAR Figure'6.2.5-1.5 -
1 Summary of Safety Ehaluation The temporary change Nill allow for the sampling and analysis of=the air inlet to the hydrogen analyzers. The new sample . lines have isolation -
_ valves to assure system' integrity.
(203) Description of Change Forithe liquid radwaste system, a' tamporary modification was implemented in- PVNGS Unit 1 to remove .the internals of check valve LRN-V004~. This-
~
~ affected FSAR Figure 11.2-2.
Summary of Safety Evaluation The change allows for the releasing of clean- water from the liquid .
- radwaste system to -the turbine building retention basins. This system flow path will- be administrative 1y controlled to prevent- the release of potentially contaminated water.
(204)' Description'of Change .,
For the liquid radwaste system, a temporary modification was installed in PVNGS Unit 1 to remove the internals of ' filter LRV-F01B and from strainer LRN-F02A. This affected FSAR Figure 11.2-2.
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Summary of Safety Evaluation I This modification provides a means to pump out the LRS holdup tanks when- ,
!~ the LRS evaporator is out of service. Sampling is performed prior to discharge to assure that releases are within applicable limits. t (205) Description of Change For the reactor coolant system, a temporary modification was implemented fl in FVNGS Unit 1 to remove the insulation from line N-002-GCDA-18". This affects FSAR Figure 9.3-13.
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Summary of Safety Evaluation This line . is the ' primary safety valve relief -line to- the reactor ; drain tank.~. RemovalLof' the insulation provides for passive cooling in case ~ of a leaking safety valve. = This will ' condense the L ateam - and sid in 1,
re-seating the valve.
- (206)' Description of Change ~
For the reactor coolant, system, a' temporary modification was implemented
.to- instr.11 flanges .in leakoff' ines N-14 -HCDA-1/2"~
and N-141-HCD.t-1 2". This affects FSAR-Figure 5.1-1. ,
Summary of Safety Evaluation The installation of the flanges facilitates ' removal of the main spray valve bonnet .without welding or grinding :inside. containment. This simplifies removal an'd lessens the amount of time- spent in .high
^ radiation areas.
('207) Description of Change For - the ' sampling system, a temporary modification was implemented in
~ PVNGS Unit 1 to install two swagelock tees, two isolation valves, .and one control valve at the nuclear sampling sink preparation panel. This affected FSAR Figure 9.3-2.-
Summary of Safety Evaluation The modifications enhances the de gas capability of the RCS hot leg I' sample panel for performing total gas analysis.
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