ML20214Q581

Forwards Rept of Investigation 4-84-039 Re Brown & Root,Inc Alleged Improper Instructions to QC Inspector to Make Late Entry sign-offs on Insp Documentation Resulting in Falsification of Records

ML20214Q581
Person / Time
Site:	Comanche Peak
Issue date:	08/28/1985
From:	Hayes B NRC OFFICE OF INVESTIGATIONS (OI)
To:	Martin R NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION IV)
Shared Package
ML20214Q578	List: ML20214Q575 ML20214Q581 ML20214Q585 ML20214Q590
References
FOIA-86-180, FOIA-86-A-61 NUDOCS 8609260171
Download: ML20214Q581 (2)

Text

_ - _ _ _ _ _ - .

l ..

4M h UNITED STATES

(

8 4 1! j d NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555 s  % o

..... August 28, 1985 MEMORANDUM FOR: Robert D. Martin, Regional Administrator Region IV FROM Ben B. Hayes, Director ffice of Investigations

SUBJECT:

COMANCHE PEAK STEAM ELECTRIC STATION: ALLEGED IMPEDIMENT OF THE ORGANIZATIONAL FREEDOM 0F A QUALITY CONTROL INSPECTOR (4-84-039)

The enclosed Report of Investigation documents the Office of Investigations' (01) efforts to determine whether Brown & Root, Inc. (B&R) Quality Control (QC) supervisors improperly instructed a B&R QC inspector to make late entry sign off's on inspection documentation which could have resulted in the falsification of records.

Preliminary information revealed that certain QC inspection travelers had signatures missing for a number of hold points on liner plate constructed during 1978 and 1979. In 1983, the incompleteness of these travelers caused the non-ASME QC group at the Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station (CPSES) to refuse acceptance of the travelers. A QC managerial solution was sought to complete the documentation and transfer the travelers to the non-ASME QC group. Subsequently, it was determined that certain construction documents (nondestructive examination (NDE) chits) existed which bore evidence of QC acceptance of hold points during the initial construction phase of the liner plate. A QC supervisory decision was made to use the information on these construction documents to support a late entry sign off on the inspection travelers so that construction and inspection work could proceed.

An allegation was subsequently made to the NRC Office of Investigations (01) that the sign off of liner plate inspection travelers using the construction documents was improper because the QC inspector who signed the travelers had not perfortned the inspections. It was further alleged that the construction documents might not represent the unsigned hold points. As this investigation proceeded in coordiration with a representative of the Comanche Peak Technical Review Team (TRT), the TRT assumed the responsibility for determining the validity of using the construction documents to make late entry sign offs on the travelers. The focus of the OI investigation changed when it was deter-mined that two QC supervisors may have improperly ordered the QC inspector to i sign off incomplete travelers whether or not corresponding support documents l were available. It was further learned that one of the QC supervisors threatened to make the QC inspector stay over a weekend if necessary to .

complete the task.

Investigation revealed that the QC inspector assigned to the traveler project initially resisted the supervisors' instructions and voiced concerns about the propriety of the project to a number of other inspectors and supervisors. At 8609260171 860722 PDR FOIA GARDE 86-A-61 PDR

.I .

Robert D. Martin 2 August 28, 1985 least two meetings were held wherein the two QC supervisors instructed the QC inspector how to complete the project.

One of the accused QC supervisors denied participation in the meetings. The other QC supervisor denied ordering the sign off of uncorroborated hold points and denied threatening the QC inspector with having to stay over a weekend until the project was complete. This supervisor also testified that at the time he gave the instructions as to how to complete the travelers, only the QC inspector was present.

Interviews with other personnel who were knowledgeable of the meetings held between the supervisors and the QC inspector corroborated that the QC inspector had expressed serious concern over the validity of the instructions.

A non-ASME QC inspector who had no direct participation in the conversations specifically recalled that one of the QC supervisors ordered the QC inspector to sign off the travelers even if support documentation was not in evidence.

However, this non-ASME QC inspector said the QC inspector did not follow the QC supervisor's instructions since unsupported travelers were not signed off.

Additional testimony confinned that a nonconformance report (NCR) was prepared on travelers which had not been signed off due to the absence of supporting documentation.

Related issues, such as the validity of the use of the. NDE chits for late entry acceptance on QC travelers and the accuracy of the travelers themselves, were concurrently reviewed and analyzed by a representative of the CPSES Technical Review Team (TRT) and are reported in a Safety Evaluation Report (SER 11). This report noted there were apparent record anomalies which violated procedures in the liner plate travelers; and that some travelers appeared to have been improperly signed off. However, none of these irregularities were attributed to the QC inspector who made the late entry sign offs on the travelers.

It is 01's belief that the weight of evidence points to the conclusion that at least one of the QC supervisors knowingly and willfully ordered the QC inspector to perform an activity which would have resulted in the falsifi-cation of QC inspection documentation. The QC supervisor's act was compounded by an implied threat that was intended to convey to the QC inspector that continued employment rested on compliance with the order; and that if necessary the QC inspector would have to stay over the weekend until the task was completed. This improper order by the QC supervisor seemed to have been I l

solely motivated by production demands.

Neither this report nor memorandum may be released outside the NRC without the permission of the Director, Office of Investigations. Internal NRC access and dissemination must be on a need and right-to-know basis.

Enclosures:

As stated cc w/ encl:

W. J. Dircks, EDO (3)

R. K. Herr, 01:RIV

.- . _ - _ _ _ -