ML20214B161

Seacoast Anti-Pollution League Motion for Continuation of Stay of Partial Initial Decision Pending Outcome of Appeals Thereof.* Stay Should Be Entered to Allow Parties Time to Bring Appeal in Federal Court If Appeals Denied by NRC

ML20214B161
Person / Time
Site:	Seabrook
Issue date:	05/14/1987
From:	Backus R BACKUS, MEYER & SOLOMON, SEACOAST ANTI-POLLUTION LEAGUE
To:	NRC COMMISSION (OCM)
References
CON-#287-3464 LBP-87-10, OL-1, NUDOCS 8705200164
Download: ML20214B161 (11)

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0 TED UNITED STATES OF AMERICA before the NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION KW 18 P1 :19 Docket No.

In the Matter of ) 50'4[4}f0L1k/f/ -o[ I '

Public Service Company of )

New Hampshire, et al ) (On-Site Emergency Planning (Seabrook Station, Unit 1) ) and Safety Issues)

Seacoast Anti-Pollution League's Motion For Continuation of the Stay of the Partial Initial Decision Pendina the Outcome of Acceals Thereof NOW COMES the Seacoast Anti-Pollution League and moves pursuant to 10 CFR S2.788 for a Stay of the March 25, 1987 Partial Initial Decision (PID) 1/ authorizing low power operation of Seabrook Station pending the outcome of appeals of that decision. The Commission currently has a stay in effect pending its consideration of the question of whether " plans" submitted by the Applicants for the offsite portion of the EPZ in Massachusetts satisfy the 10 CFR 550.33(g) requirement for the submission of offsite plans prior to issuance of an operating license for any level of operation. SAPL moves that the Commission continue its stay in effect regardless of the outcome of its determinations on the " question of mootness" to enable parties a fair hearing on the onsite issues being appealed.

Further, SAPL hereby joins in the Motion for Stay to be filed by Attorney General James M. Shannon with this Commission and adopts the Attorney General's arguments in regard to the issues he raises.

1/ LBP-87-10, 25 NRC .

8705200164 870514 PDR ADOCK 05000443 PDR

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• LIKELIHOOD OF PREVAILING ON THE MERITS SAPL raises three issues on which it believes there is a strong probability of success.

The three issues SAPL raises are: A) the Licensing Board 's error in failing to require a hearing on SAPL Supplemental Contention 3, B) the Licensing Board 's error in redefining the legal standard for the SPDS, in f ailing to require the production of the NRC Project Manager for Seabrook as a witness and in allowing licensure of Seabrook without a fully compliant SPDS and C) the Licensing Board 's errors in f ailing to reopen the record, in failing to admit SAPL's late-filed contention, in failing to conduct a hearing on the genuine issues of material fact in dispute regarding the reliability, audibility, intelligibility and legality of the siren system for Seabrook and in holding that 10 CFR S 50.54(a) (2) (ii) could support an initial licensing determination.

A) The Licensing Board Erred in Denying a Hearing on SAPL Supplemental Contention 3 SAPL challenged the adequacy of the accident consequence analysis in the Seabrook Station Final Environmental Statement (FES) in addressing the applicable requirements of the Commission 's Interim Policy Statement of June 13, 1980 on the following four points:

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1) that it provided information on environmental consequences of accidents only in terms of probabilities and also did not provide a worst case analysis

2) that the assumptions used in the probablistic risk assessment were faulty and bore no reason-able relationship to the Seabrook site, and ignored site specific data

3) that external events which could have a bearing on risk, particularly sabotage, were not adequately treated in the analysis, and that a quantitative uncertainty analysis was not

• 4) provided SAPL provided the Affidavit of Richard L. Kaufmann, a physicist, in support of its assertions. The Licensing Board ruled favorably on a motion by the Applicants for summary disposition of the contention and stated that "the issues raised in the motions are questions of law, not of fact." 2/ This ruling was clearly in error since Applicant's motion went to issues of material fact as to the truth, adequacy and completeness of the accident consequence analysis in the FES.

The Appeal Board, in its Memorandum and Order denying a stay of the PID, stated simply that there was a lengthy evaluation of Class 9 2/ Memorandum and Order of May 11,1983, at p. 30.

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accidents, that site-specific data were included, that the evaluation "makes reference to" external events and why they are not separately analyzed, and "makes an effort" to quantify analytical uncertainties.

SAPL contends that since there was R2 clear statement of the consequences of a single major accident, that since the probabilistic risk assessment was based on rebaselined results for the Surry PWR, that since there are certain external events such as earthquake and sabotage that could have fundamentally different consequences than internal events, and that since the " effort" to quantify the i analytical uncertainties was woefully inadequate, the Appeal Board erred in finding that there was little probability of success in prevailing on the merits on this issue.

B) The Licensing Board Erred in Its Rulings Regarding the Safety Pes /smeter Display System (SPDS)

In its March 25,1987 PID, the Licensing Board allowed deferral of correction of three deficiencies in the Safety Parameter Display System for Seabrook until the first refueling outages addition of a containment isolation display, tests to determine SPDS computer response time under heavy computer loading and improvement of the data validation algorithm. Other items were allowed to be deferred until exceedance of 5% of rated power, including containment hydrogen and radiation variables. The Licensing Board admitted in the PID (at

10) that it made no attempt "to make any independent evaluation of the relative safety significance of individual deficiencies." Though the Appeal Board, in denying a stay, states that the basis for the Board 's conclusions are fully explained in the PID, there was in

f act no basis upon which the Board distinguished between the safety significance of the missing parameters and fixed upon the times up to which they could be deferred.

The standards for the SPDS are set out in NUREG-0737, Supplement No. 1, Generic Letter No. 82-33. That document required that implementation dates for the SPDS negotiated in 1983 were to have been translated into " binding legal requirements" in the manner specified in the document. The NRC Staff Project Manager was to have reviewed the licensee's schedule and to have mutually agreed with the licensee upon implementation dates that were to have been " formalized into an enforceable document". Both the Licensing Board and the Appeal Board have neglected to acknowledge that the negotiated schedules arrived at in 1983 were to have been legally binding.

It is uncontroverted that Seabrook Station's SPDS is not in compliance with the minimum requirements for an SPDS. It is well to recall that the Three Mile Island accident occurred in the period between initial startup and the first refueling outage. The lack of an operable SPDS contributed to the accident at the Davis Besse plant in June of 1985 (see Attachment A) .

The Licensing Board should be reversed in its failure to evaluate the SPDS in terms of the binding legal requirements for prompt completion set out in NUREG-0737, Supplement No. 1, in failing to have the then NRC Project Manager produced as a witness to discuss the dates negotiated for completion and in allowing the licensure of Seabrook withcut a fully compliant SPDS with no basis for judging the relative safety significance of the missing parameters.

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I C) The Licensing Board Erred in Falling to Reopen the Record to Admit SAPL's Late-Filed Contention on the Public Alert and Notification System for Seabrook and in Relying on 10 CFR 5 50.54(a) (2) (ii) to Support an Initial Licensing Decision SAPL filed a late-filed contention and motion to reopen the record on two grounds: 1) that a January 31, 1987 test of the siren system in the Town of East Kingston, N.H. showed that the sirens did not activate reliably, were not suf ficiently audible and did not convey properly intelligible voice messages; and 2) that a Rockingham County Superior Court judge found against the lead Applicant, Public Service Company of New Hampshire, in a suit contesting the legality of the installation of the system brought by the Town of Rye and joined in by the Town of Hampton Falls. SAPL supplied the affidavit of a witness to the East Kingston test. SAPL contended that the I failure of the sirens to work properly in that town and the finding that the systems were illegal meant that there was no assurance that the public alert and notification system for the entire EPZ would either be adequate or even available.

The Applicants and the NRC staff responded that the contention should not be admitted and provided affidavits to try to support that position.

Both the NRC Staf f 's and the Applicants ' af fidavits went only to try to support the conclusion that the siren system in the Town of East Kingston has been corrected to the point that it will be adequate. Neither of the two affidavits claimed that its purpose was

to establish the adequacy of the siren system for the entire EPZ. No ,

affidavit was provided addressing the legality of the system.

1 i The Board ruled that SAPL did not meet the 10 CFR S2.734 criteria for reopening the record and that, therefore, it was not i

necessary to balance the five factors for late-filed contentions at 10 CFR S 2.714(a) (1) . The Board concluded that the issues raised by

SAPL were not sufficiently significant to safety to warrant reopening of the record and that a materially different result would not have been likely had the proffered evidence been considered intially.

SAPL contends that the efficacy of the measures taken to correct

{ the siren system problems are f acts subject to dispute and that the adequacy and availability of the public alert and notification systems are matters of great public safety significance since adequate protective measures cannot be implemented by the public if l

the public is not alerted to the necessity of taking such actions.

The Licensing Board invoked the provisions of 10 CFR 550.54(a) (2) (ii) to support its position that the illegality of the siren system was not a concern. 10 CFR S 50.54(a) (2) (ii) is a regulation that has

! - effect only in post-licensing circumstances. It cannot be used to leverage Applicants past the initial licensing requirements.

SAPL has learned that a court in the Commonwealth of i ,

Massachusetts has also found the siren system illegal in that state.

The fact that the removal of the the siren poles are stayed pending

appeal in both cases does not lessen the significance of the f act a

that two tribunals in two states have found, after hearing, that the

systems are illegal. It would be presumptuous of this Commission to make its decision based on the assumption that either or both of I

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i these decisions will be reversed on appeal. The Commission ought j assume that the decisions will stand.

j The Appeal Board, in denying a stay, did not deal with the issue 4

of the illegality of the siren system since the issue was not directly discussed in either SAPL's or the Massachusetts Attorney General's stay motions. Further, the Appeal Board did not yet have the benefit of SAPL's argument in its appeal brief regarding the NRC Staff's and Applicants' narrow focus on only the East Kingston l

l sirens.

j For all of the above reasons, SAPL believes it has a high probability of success on the merits on the issues it raises. SAPL

! suggests, therefore, that this Commission enter a stay that will l

! remain in effect until such time as the appeal process has concluded

and, further, that it grant a stay to allow the parties time to bring r I

j an appeal in federal court should the appeals be denied by this i

, agency.

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Respectfully submitted,

. Seacoast Anti-Pollution League by its Attorney i BACKUS, MEYER & SOLOMON l

Dated: May 14,- 1987 t

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! 'RdSert A."Backds ' '

l 116 Lowell Street Manchester, NH 03105 j

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I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing " Seacoast Anti-Pollution League's Motion for Continuation of the Stay of the Partial Initial Decision Pending the Outcome of Appeals Thereof" was sent this date, first class mail, postage prepaid to all persons on the attached service list. .

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Dated May 14, 1987 Robert A. Backus

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1 From liUREG-1154 July 1985 MN'T A

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lead you step by step through the procedure until you do discover g your fault.

This procedure was followed during the event. The Team believes it was imple- '

p mented correctly until the decision point was reached in the section entitled l'

.; " Lack of Heat Transfer" regarding the initiation of MU/HPI cooling. With both

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steam generators dry, f.e., pressure is below D60 psig and decreasing or water Q level is less than 8 inches and with no feedwater, the procedure indicates I that MU/HS! cooling is to be initiated. However, based on the operator inter-

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views, it appears that none of the control roce operators were fully aware that both steam generators were " dry" as defined by the emergency procedure.

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g'1 8 At Davis-Besse, the available instrumentation did not provide clear information

/ f to the operator that the steam generators were dry. For example, steam generator M. pressure is not recorded in the control room for trending purposes. As a M l result, when the steam generator pressure reaches 960 psig, the operator must 7 .

remember whether the pressure has been decreasing or whether a sudden depressuri-

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.M ration has occurred. Further, steam generator levels are indicated in the control room on a ' scale of 0 to 250 inches on the startup level instrumentation Jf shown in Figure.3.10. Given this scale, the operator cannot read "8 inches" on *

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the instrument accurately, even if the instrument is accurate at the low range

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, of its scale. l

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% f Both the steam generator pressure and water level can be trended using tha *

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] safety parameter display system (SPDS); however, it was 1.1 operable prior to x g

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the June 9 event. The inoperability of the SPDS and the lack of adequate indi-

.) ; cationofsteamgeneratorconditionscontributedtothecentrolroomoperators} .

k not knowing that the steam generators were dry, which resulted in their failure

{ s to follow the emergency procedure.

.' NFurther, becausa the equipment operators restored auxiliary feedwater floi'to

.i thFsteam generators in approximately 12 minutes, the shift supervisor's delay

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J in implementing MU/HPI looling did not lead ~to adverse consequences. However,

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the time to restore the feedwater is a critical factor regarding the serious-

.._k ness of this event, and further delays in restoring feedwater could have had

,!!.Ri potentially serious safety consequences, as discussed in Section 7.

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Th This event points out a natural relucLance on the part of operators to initiate

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.0, any action which could result in long plant shutdowns or other major economic consequences. That is, the operator can be expected to explore and discuss all M.i%q available options and to take the time to assure the need before initiating a

" drastic" action. This consideration should be recognized and reflected through

@. precise and clear instructions in any procedure which addresses the need for y'C such " actions."

Alb 6.1.3 Operator /STA Interaction 11 h Neither the shift supervisor nor any of the other licensed operators requested "l the assistance of the shif t technical advisor (STA) during the event. One I. reason for not doing so is the fact that the STA was not in the control room

.M wher. the event occurred. (Note: He is allowed 10 minutes to reach the control

'tf( room af ter being called. ) Moreover, the event occurred so rapidly that it

'fa was essentially over when he did arrive. In summary having the STA available b

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE AND SERVICE LIST COL r L H.?

WIPr Joseph Flynn, Asst.Gn.Cnsl Lando W. Zech, Jr., Chrmn* Thomas Dignan, Esq.*

Fed. Emerg. Mgmt. Agcy. U.S. NRC Roppg & Gray 500 C St. So. West Washington, D.C. 2iE55MY 18 EhlFranklin St.

Washington, D.C. 20472 Boston, MA 02110 Offk.. t ><

Office of Selectmen Thomas M. Roberts

• fGjD eting & Serv. Sec.*

Town of Hampton Falls Office of the Secretary U.S. NRC Hampton Falls, N.II. 03844 Washington, D.C. 20555 g;higon,D.C. 20555 anc Dou@ty Sherwin E. Turk, Esq.* James K. Asselstine

• Office of Exec. Legl. Dr. U.S. NRC rket Street U.S. NRC Washington, D.C. 20555 Portsmouth, N.H. 03801 Washington, D.C. 20555 Phillip Ahrens, Esq. Frederick M. Bernthal

• Maynard Young, Chairman Asst. Atty. General U.S. NRC n a State House Sta. #6 Washington, D.C. 20555 03870 Augusta, ME 04333 Rye, N.H.

Carol Sneider, Esq- Kenneth M. Carr corge Dana Bisbye, Esq.

Office of the Atty. Gen. A ny neral s W .

U.S. NRC State f New Hampshire One Ashburton Place 19 F1, Washington, D.C. 20555 Boston, MA 02108 Concord, N.H. 03301 Richard A. Hampe, Esq. Paul McEachern, Esq. William S. Lord New Ilampshire Civil Def. Matthew Brock, Esq. Board of Selectmen Hampe & McNicholas 25 Maplewood Ave. Town Hall - Friend St.

35 Pleasant St. P.O. Box 360 Amesbury, MA 01913 Concord, N.H. 03301 Portsmouth, N.H. 03801 Diane Cunan, Esq. Sandra Gavutis Rep. Roberta Pevear  !! arm n & Weiss Town of flampton Falls Town of Kensington 20001 S Street, NW # 430 Drinkwater Road Bo 1154 Washington, D.C. 20009 East Kingston, N.H. 03827,

!!ampton Falls, N.H. 03844 Judith H. Mizner, Esq. Edward Thomas Mr. Robert Harrison Silverglate, Gertner, FEMA Pres & CEO Baker, Fine, Good & Mi;:ner 442 J.W. McCormack (POCH) PSNH 88 Broad Ctreet Boston, MA 02109 P.O. Box 330 Boston, MA 02110 Manchester, N.H. 03105