Letter Sequence Approval |
---|
|
|
MONTHYEARML20106B5331985-01-31031 January 1985 Forwards Investigation Into Sources of Chloride in Fort St Vrain Primary Circuit. Rept Re Investigations of Effects of Chlorides on Major Components in Primary Circuit Will Be Sent by 850228 Project stage: Other ML20100A0291985-03-0404 March 1985 Advises That Rept Re Effects of Chloride on Major Components in Primary Circuit Will Be Delayed Due to Many Activities in Progress.Rept Will Be Submitted by 850318 Project stage: Other ML20112G4721985-03-0505 March 1985 Investigation Into Sources of Chloride in Fort St Vrain Primary Circuit Project stage: Other ML20112G4631985-03-18018 March 1985 Forwards Ga Technologies,Inc Rept 907838, Investigation Into Sources of Chloride in Fort St Vrain Primary Circuit, Re Effects of Chloride on Major Components in Primary Circuit.Final Review & Clearance to Be Forwarded by 850326 Project stage: Other ML20100H1211985-03-21021 March 1985 Evaluation of Fort St Vrain Metallic Components Exposed to Primary Coolant Chloride Contamination Project stage: Other ML20100H1121985-03-26026 March 1985 Forwards Evaluation of Fort St Vrain Metallic Components Exposed to Primary Coolant Chloride Contamination, Per 850318 Commitment Project stage: Other ML20197D4411986-05-0707 May 1986 Forwards Request for Addl Info Re Util Submittals Concerning Corrosion Due to Chloride Contamination,For Response within 45 Days of Ltr Date Project stage: RAI ML20203J8151986-07-31031 July 1986 Forwards Request for Addl Info Re Corrosion Due to Chloride Contamination.Response Requested within 45 Days of Ltr Date Project stage: RAI ML20209H4741986-09-0808 September 1986 Forwards Response to 860731 Request for Addl Info Re 850318 & 26 Chloride Repts.Items Susceptible to Stress Corrosion Identified & Results of Metallographic Exam of Bolts Discussed Project stage: Request ML20214A0141986-11-13013 November 1986 Safety Evaluation Re Util Evaluation of Chlorine Release Into Primary Coolant Sys.Evaluation Provides Useful Info That Could Be Used to Reduce chloride-induced Corrosion of Reactor Components Project stage: Approval ML20214A0011986-11-13013 November 1986 Forwards Safety Evaluation Re 850131,0318 & 26 & 860709 Submittals Concerning Chlorine in Primary Coolant Sys. Util Evaluation Provides Useful Info That Could Be Used to Reduce chloride-induced Corrosion of Reactor Components Project stage: Approval ML20207S5461987-03-11011 March 1987 Forwards Safety Evaluation Supporting Util 850131,0318 & 26 & 860709 Submittals Re Corrosion Effects of Chlorine in Primary Coolant Sys Project stage: Approval 1985-03-05
[Table View] |
|
---|
Category:SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT--LICENSING & RELATED ISSUES
MONTHYEARML20141K9961997-05-0505 May 1997 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 89 to License DPR-34 ML20128D7191992-12-0101 December 1992 Safety Evaluation Approving Exemption from Requirement of 10CFR50.54(q) to Change to Biennial Emergency Plan Exercise Rather than Annual Following Completion of Next Scheduled Exercise at Plant ML20246J3261989-08-30030 August 1989 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 72 to License DPR-34 ML20245J3781989-08-14014 August 1989 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 71 to License DPR-34 ML20245J4511989-08-0808 August 1989 Safety Evaluation Responding to Issues Re Tech Spec Upgrade & Plant Defueling.Stated Tech Spec Sections Should Be Upgraded ML20246J3131989-07-0707 July 1989 Safety Evaluation Concluding That Operators Role in Mitigating High Energy Line Break at Facility Acceptable ML20247R2261989-05-26026 May 1989 Final Safety Evaluation Re LER 87-20 Concerning Interactions Between Steamline Rupture Detection/Isolation Sys,Plant Protective Sys & Control Sys at Facility ML20245C5031989-04-18018 April 1989 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 70 to License DPR-34 ML20248D6501989-03-31031 March 1989 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 69 to License DPR-34 ML20236A1401989-02-27027 February 1989 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 68 to License DPR-34 ML20235T4511989-02-24024 February 1989 Safety Evaluation Re Facility Core Support Flow Vent Sys. Continued Operation of Facility W/Current Core Support Flow Sys Configuration Acceptable ML20235J3421989-02-16016 February 1989 Safety Evaluation Supporting Util Action in Response to Generic Ltr 83-28,item 2.1 (Part 2) Confirming Establishment of Interface W/Either NSSS Vendor or Vendors of Each Component in Reactor Trip Sys ML20235J3841989-02-13013 February 1989 Safety Evaluation Concluding That Continued Operation of Facility Not Affected by Steam Generator Tube Failures Experienced by Advanced gas-cooled Reactors ML20195D3911988-10-27027 October 1988 Safety Evaluation Supporting Corrective Actions of LER 86-017 ML20205G0021988-10-24024 October 1988 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 65 to License DPR-34 ML20154J8021988-09-15015 September 1988 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 64 to License DPR-34 ML20154J4621988-09-15015 September 1988 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 63 to License DPR-34 ML20207F0571988-08-10010 August 1988 Safety Evaluation Supporting Util 870206 Submittal Re Safe Shutdowns During Postulated Accident Conditions ML20207F0431988-08-0505 August 1988 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 61 to License DPR-34 ML20207F2411988-08-0505 August 1988 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 62 to License DPR-34 ML20151M1601988-07-21021 July 1988 Safety Evaluating Supporting Requirements for Redundancy in Responding to Rapid Depressurization Accident ML20151A9961988-06-20020 June 1988 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 60 to License DPR-34 ML20195K0651988-06-15015 June 1988 SER Concurring W/Util Proposed Corrective Actions in Engineering Rept Entitled, Rept of Helium Circulator S/N 2101 Damage & Inlet Piping S/N 2001 Repair & Mod Activities ML20195F9661988-06-15015 June 1988 Safety Evaluation Re Destructive Exam Rept for Fuel Test Assembly-2.Fuel Represented by Fuel Test Assembly-2 Predicted to Be Safe for Operation in Facility for 1,800 EFPDs ML20154F8891988-05-10010 May 1988 Safety Evaluation Re Proposed Safe Shutdown Sys & Exemption Requests Concerning 10CFR50,App R.Licensee Request for Exemptions in Listed Areas Should Be Granted.Concept for Providing post-fire Shutdown Acceptable ML20148S6031988-04-0707 April 1988 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 59 to License DPR-34 ML20151B6651988-04-0101 April 1988 Supplemental Safety Evaluation Supporting Util Compliance w/10CFR50.App R Re Safe Shutdown DHR Capacity ML20150C4541988-03-10010 March 1988 Safety Evaluation Concluding That Seismic Analysis Methods for Bldg 10 & Walkover Structure Conservative.Gaps Provided Adequate to Accommodate Relative Motions Which Occur Between Subj Structures & Walkover Structure & Turbine Bldg ML20147C8181988-02-25025 February 1988 Safety Evaluation Supporting Changes to Interim Tech Specs 3/4.1.7, Reactivity Change W/Temp NUREG-1220, Safety Evaluation Accepting Plant Special Senior Licensed Fuel Handler Initial & Requalification Operator Training Program,Per NUREG-1220, Training Review Criteria & Procedures1988-01-13013 January 1988 Safety Evaluation Accepting Plant Special Senior Licensed Fuel Handler Initial & Requalification Operator Training Program,Per NUREG-1220, Training Review Criteria & Procedures ML20237D7631987-12-18018 December 1987 Safety Evaluation Updating 861118 Fire Protection Sys Safety Evaluation.Util Alternate Fire Protection Configuration Acceptable ML20149E1621987-12-18018 December 1987 Marked-up Safety Evaluation Re Proposed Safe Shutdown Sys & Exemption Requests Concerning 10CFR50,App R ML20236U6961987-11-23023 November 1987 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 57 to License DPR-34. Addendum to Review of Proposed Tech Spec Change:Core Inlet Valves/Min Helium Flow & Max Core Region Temp Rise,Limiting Condition for Operation..., Technical Evaluation Rept Encl ML20236U5761987-11-20020 November 1987 Safety Evaluation Re Helium Circulator S/N C-2101 Damage. Util Corrective Action Program Initiated ML20236R3001987-11-13013 November 1987 Safety Evaluation Supporting Util Responses to Generic Ltr 83-28,Item 2.2.1 Re Equipment Classification Programs for All safety-related Components ML20238C7621987-09-0202 September 1987 Safety Evaluation Concurring W/Util 870702 & 27 Ltrs & 870818 Telcon Re Elimination or Reduction of Maint Requirements on Certain Fire Seals ML20235N6491987-07-13013 July 1987 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 56 to License DPR-34 ML20235F5281987-07-0202 July 1987 Safety Evaluation Re Safe Shutdown of Steam Generator Matls. Under Severe Transient Conditions,Fuel Temp Can Be Maintained Under Accepted Temp Limits & Plant Can Be Safely Shutdown ML20235F5151987-07-0202 July 1987 Safety Evaluation Re Safe Emergency Shutdown of Reactor Sys. Operation at 82% Acceptable ML20235F5441987-07-0202 July 1987 Safety Evaluation Re Effect of Firewater Cooldown on Steam Generator Structural Integrity.All Tests Acceptable ML20235E5281987-06-29029 June 1987 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 55 to License DPR-34 ML20216G9511987-06-24024 June 1987 Revised Safety Evaluation Re Steam Line Rupture Detection & Isolation Sys (Slrdis).Slrdis Meets Requirements of 10CFR50, App A,Gdc 20 & GDC 4 ML20216G9911987-06-24024 June 1987 Supplemental Safety Evaluation Supporting Application for Amend to License DPR-34 Re Tech Specs for Steam Line Rupture Detection & Isolation Sys ML20215J5401987-06-22022 June 1987 Draft Safety Evaluation Re Safe Emergency Shutdowns.Facility Operation at 82% Power Acceptable ML20216J1921987-06-17017 June 1987 Safety Evaluation Re Mods to Reduce Moisture Ingress Into Reactor Vessel.Periodic Insps & Preventive Maint Should Be Performed on Pertinent Components.Operational Performance Should Be Continuously Upgraded ML20214M4681987-05-20020 May 1987 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 54 to License DPR-34 ML20215J8271987-05-0505 May 1987 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 53 to License DPR-34 ML20209D7561987-04-22022 April 1987 Safety Evaluation Supporting Util 870211 Submittal Re Performance Enhancement Program,Finding 4-10 ML20206J9331987-04-0606 April 1987 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 52 to License DPR-34 ML20205S1141987-03-31031 March 1987 Safety Evaluation Accepting Util 831104 Response to Generic Ltr 83-28,Item 4.5.2, Reactor Trip Sys Reliability On-Line Testing. Facility Designed to Permit on-line Functional Testing,Including Testing of Reactor Trip Contactors 1997-05-05
[Table view] Category:TEXT-SAFETY REPORT
MONTHYEARML20196G6731997-07-0101 July 1997 Informs Commission That Decommissioning Process Has Been Completed at PSC of Colorado Fsvngs,Unit 1 Located in Town of Platteville in Weld County,Co ML20141K9961997-05-0505 May 1997 Safety Evaluation Supporting Amend 89 to License DPR-34 ML20140E1121997-04-10010 April 1997 Confirmatory Survey of Group Effluent Discharge Pathway Areas for Fsv Nuclear Station,Platteville,Co ML20134D1661997-01-30030 January 1997 Rev 1,Vol 6 to Final Survey Rept,Final Survey of Group E (Book 2A of 2) ML20137S6111996-12-31031 December 1996 Annual Rept Pursuant to Section 13 or 15(d) of Securities Exchange Act 1934, for Fy Ended Dec 1996 ML20134G6401996-10-29029 October 1996 Rev 0,Volume 6,Books 1 & 2 of 2 to Final Survey of Group E ML20134G6171996-10-29029 October 1996 Rev 2,Volume 1,Books 1 & 2 of 2 to Final Survey Description & Results ML20134G7271996-10-29029 October 1996 Rev 0,Volume 11,Book 1 of 1 to Final Survey of Group J ML20134G6861996-10-29029 October 1996 Rev 0,Volume 8,Books 1 & 2 of 2 to, Final Survey of Group G ML20134G6321996-10-26026 October 1996 Rev 1,Volume 5,Books 2 & 3 of 3 to Final Survey of Group D ML20133D7831996-10-22022 October 1996 Preliminary Rept - Orise Support of NRC License Insp at Fsv on 960930-1003 ML20116A4661996-07-19019 July 1996 Fsv Final Survey Exposure Rate Measurements ML20112J6861996-05-31031 May 1996 June 1996 Quarterly 10CFR50.59 Rept of Changes,Tests & Experiments for Fsv Decommissioning.Rept Covers Period of 960216-0531 ML20112C1531996-05-17017 May 1996 Fsv Final Survey Exposure Rate Measurements ML20101G5521996-03-21021 March 1996 Confirmatory Survey Activities for Fsv Nuclear Station PSC Platteville,Co, Final Rept ML20097E3201996-01-31031 January 1996 Nonproprietary Fort St Vrain Technical Basis Documents for Piping Survey Instrumentation ML20095K4131995-12-26026 December 1995 Rev 3 to Decommissioning Plan ML20095H7211995-12-20020 December 1995 Revs to Fort St Vrain Decommissioning Fire Protection Plan Update ML20095K9751995-12-15015 December 1995 Fort St Vrain Project Update Presentation to NRC, on 951207 & 15 ML20096C1671995-12-13013 December 1995 Rev 4 to Decommissioning Fire Protection Plan ML20094M1651995-11-30030 November 1995 Nonproprietary Fsv Technical Basis Documents for Piping Survey Implementation ML20092F3461995-09-14014 September 1995 Quarterly 10CFR50.59 Rept of Changes,Tests & Experiments for Fsv Decommissioning, Covering Period of 950516-0815.W/ ML20137H3531994-12-31031 December 1994 Partially Withheld, Rept of Independent Counsel Investigation Concerning Issues at Fort St Vrain Nuclear Generating Station Decommissioning Project, App D,Comments by Mkf & Westinghouse Team & Responses ML20137S2331994-12-31031 December 1994 Rept of Independent Counsel Investigation Concerning Issues at Fort St Vrain Nuclear Generating Station Decommissioning Project, Dec 1994 ML20029C6031993-12-31031 December 1993 1993 Annual Rept Public Svc Co of Colorado. W/940405 Ltr ML20058Q3791993-12-21021 December 1993 Rev 1 to Decommissioning Plan for Fort St Vrain Nuclear Generating Station ML20045B3641993-06-30030 June 1993 June 1993 Quarterly 10CFR50.59 Rept of Changes,Tests & Experiments for Fsv Decommissioning. ML20045A4291993-06-0303 June 1993 LER 93-003-00:on 930505,new Source of Natural Gas Introduced within 0.5 Miles of ISFSI & Reactor Bldg W/O Prior NRC Approval.Caused by Field Routing of Natural Gas Pipe.Well Isolated by Well operator.W/930603 Ltr ML20077D1631993-05-10010 May 1993 Enforcement Conference, in Arlington,Tx ML20125C7161992-12-0707 December 1992 Part 21 Rept Re Possibility for Malfunction of Declutching Mechanisms in SMB/SB-000 & SMB/SB/SBD-00 Actuators. Malfunction Only Occurs During Seismic Event.Balanced Levers May Be Purchased from Vendor.List of Affected Utils Encl ML20128D7191992-12-0101 December 1992 Safety Evaluation Approving Exemption from Requirement of 10CFR50.54(q) to Change to Biennial Emergency Plan Exercise Rather than Annual Following Completion of Next Scheduled Exercise at Plant ML20127P5861992-11-23023 November 1992 Followup to 921005 Part 21 Rept Re Potential Defect in SB/SBD-1 Housing Cover Screws.Procedure Re Replacement of SBD-1 Spring Cover Bolts Encl.All Fasteners Should Be Loosened & Removed.List of Affected Utils Encl ML20127F5691992-11-0303 November 1992 Informs Commission of Intent to Issue Order Approving Plant Decommissioning Plan & Corresponding Amend to License DPR-34 ML20101E5761992-05-31031 May 1992 Monthly Defueling Operations Rept for May 1992 for Fort St Vrain ML20096E8221992-04-30030 April 1992 Monthly Operating Rept for Apr 1992 for Fort St Vrain.W/ ML20095E9601992-04-17017 April 1992 Rev to Fort St Vrain Proposed Decommissioning Plan ML20100R7431992-03-31031 March 1992 Monthly Operating Rept for Mar 1992 for Fort St Vrain.W/ ML20090L0621992-02-29029 February 1992 Monthly Operating Rept for Feb 1992 for Fort St Vrain Unit 1 ML20092D0081992-01-31031 January 1992 Monthly Operating Rept for Jan 1992 for Fort St Vrain Nuclear Generating Station ML20102B2241992-01-22022 January 1992 Fort St Vrain Station Annual Rept of Changes,Tests & Experiments Not Requiring Prior Commission Approval Per 10CFR50.59, for Period 910123-920122 ML20094N6701991-12-31031 December 1991 Public Svc Co Annual Financial Rept for 1991 ML20091J6251991-12-31031 December 1991 Monthly Operating Rept for Dec 1991 for Fort St Vrain.W/ ML20094D6711991-11-30030 November 1991 Monthly Operating Rept for Nov 1991 for Fort St Vrain Unit 1 ML20090M1871991-11-20020 November 1991 FOSAVEX-91 Scenario for 1991 Plant Exercise of Defueling Emergency Response Plan ML20086D6891991-11-15015 November 1991 Proposed Decommissioning Plan for Fort St Vrain Nuclear Generating Station ML20085N1451991-11-0505 November 1991 Revised Ro:Operability Date of 910830 for Electric Motor Driven Fire Water Pump P-4501 Not Met.Pump Not Actually Declared Operable Until 911025.Caused by Unforseen Matl & Testing Problems.Equivalent Pump Available ML20086C5451991-10-31031 October 1991 Monthly Operating Rept for Oct 1991 for Fort St Vrain.W/ ML20085H6611991-10-10010 October 1991 Assessment of Mgt Modes for Graphite from Reactor Decommissioning ML20091D7671991-10-0101 October 1991 Rev B to Engineering Evaluation of Prestressed Concrete Reactor Vessel & Core Support Floor Structures for Proposed Sys 46 Temp Change ML20085D9861991-09-30030 September 1991 Monthly Operating Rept for Sept 1991 for Fort St Vrain.W/ 1997-07-01
[Table view] |
Text
'
j g pracg[g UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION g p,
- rj WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555
\...../ SAFETY EVALUATION BY THE OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REACTOR REGULATION RELATING TO THE EVALUATION OF CHLORINE RELEASE INTO THE PRIMARY COOLANT SYSTEM PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF COLORADO FORT ST. VRAIN NUCLEAR GENERATING STATION DOCKET NO. 50-267
1.0 INTRODUCTION
By letters dated January 31, March 18 and 26,1985 and July 9, 1986, Public Service Company of Colorado (PSC) submitted for our review their evaluation of the role played by chlorine in the primary coolant system with respect to corrosion of different safety related components. The evalua-tion was performed for PSC by a contractor. The PSC submittals consist of two parts. In Part I, the licensee evaluated different sources of chlorine and estimated the amount of chlorine ingress into the primary circuit. In Part II, the licensee evaluated corrosion effects produced by this chlorine. This safety evaluation covers Part I of the licensee's evaluation including the January 31 and March 18, 1985 submittals and a portion of the July 9, 1986 submittal. Our safety evaluation on Part II will be provided in the near future.
The licensee's contractor performed an analytical and experimental study in order to determine possible sources of chlorine. The contractor deter-mined experimentally that the water incoming to the primary circuit did not contain chlorine and, therefore, the sources of chlorine existed somewher0 within the primary coolant system. By making careful screening analyses, the contractor was able to determine the major sources of chlorine as well as the mechanisms by which this chlorine was introduced into the primary coolant (helium).
Three mechanisms of chlorine transfer into the primary coolant system were identified. These were: 1) water leaching of chlorides, 2) releases of hydrogen chloride (HC1) to dry helium on heating, and 3) release of hcl to moist helium on heating. Ths contractor has established that the majority of chlorine was introduced as hcl on heating different chlorine-containing materials in contact with dry helium.
In order to obtain quantitative estimates of the amount of hcl present, the contractor performed tests and from the results of these tests was able to estimate not only the amounts but the approximate time of release of hcl as well. Two types of tests were performed: water leaching tests and heating in contact with dry and moist helium. Also, the contractor measured concentrations of Cl-36 radioisotope in the chloride deposits on different components of the primary coolant system. From the results of 8611190155 861113 7 DR ADOCK 0500
1 these tests, the contractor predicted that during the total time of plant operation, 300g of chlorine were released into the primary system. Of this amount, 200g of chlorine were released at the beginning of plant operation, mainly as hcl from the heated core and graphite moderator. An additional 50g were released after reloads from new fuel, and finally, 50g were released by hydrolysis of chlorides by moist helium.
It should be recognized that the above estimates are very approximate since they were extrapolated from the test data to full scale plant conditions. Therefore, they cannot be expected to possess a high degree of accuracy. Despite these limitations, the information is still very useful in determining the environment to which different components in the primary coolant system were exposed and thereby permitting a finding as to the probable cause of their corrosion.
2.0 EVALUATION An estimate of the amounts, sources, and times of chlorine ingress into the primary coolant system during plant operation was required as a first step in performing an evaluation of the corrosion of safety related components at Fort St. Vrain. The licensee's contractor approached this issue by performing analytical and experimental studies with the objective of providing answers to the following questions:
(1) What were the sources of chlorine ingress?
(2) What were the mechanisms by which this chlorine entered the primary coolant system?
(3) What was the amount of the chlorine ingress?
(4) At what times during plant operation did different amounts of chlorine enter into the plant's primary coolant system?
In order to answer these questions, the contractor performed several tests. The first test consisted of analyzing incoming water for chlorides. The results of this test indicated that there were no chlorine compounds in the incoming water, and hence the sources of chlorine were within the primary coolant system or within the systems remaining in direct communication with it. The possible candidates for chlorine-containing materials were: concrete, graphite, fuel, ceramic insulation and titanium sponge. Chlorine-containing compounds could be released from these sources in three different ways:
(1 As chlorides by water leaching; (2 As hcl by heating in contact with dry helium; (3 As hcl by hydrolysis of chloride salts in contact with moist helium.
To determine the magnitude of water leaching release, the contractor performed a test in which crushed materials were boiled in water for two hours. Except for concrete, other materials released only relatively small amounts of chlorine. Although concrete constituted a major source of leached chlorides, other materials like graphite or ceramic insulation,
1 1
.. 1 i
i i
1 because of their large masses, could also become significant contributors.
Because leached chlorine was in the form of chlorides which are nonvola-tile and therefore not readily transportable by the circulating helium, the contractor implicitly considered this mechanism as having a very minor effect on the overall chlorine ingress. We consider this judgment to be somewhat speculative, although lack of volatility of the leached chlorides makes this a logical assumption.
A more important mechanism for chlorine release is heating of certain chlorine-containing materials in contact with helium. The importance of this mechanism is due to the fact that in this case, chlorine is released in the form of volatile hcl which can be easily transported by the circulat-ing helium and deposited on various components resulting in their corrosion.
The contractor performed a series of experiments with different materials which remained in contact with hot helium in the plant. The experiments consisted of heating these materials to temperatures between 370 C and 950"C and simultaneously passing helium over them. The released hcl was collected and its amount measured. The experiments were performed by initially passing dry helium over a sample and then, after a certain time, passing helium saturated with water vapor. The results of these tests indicated that a considerable amount of hcl could be released by this mechanism. Dry helium removed the hcl contained in the material tested.
In general, this release occurred at the beginning of the heating period with only very small amounts released afterwards. When moist helium was passed over the sample, chloride salts were hydrolized and additional hcl was released. This release was also relatively small when compared to the initial release. The contractor extrapolated these results to the condi-tions existing in the Fort St. Vrain plant and determined that about 100g of hcl would be released from the core and an additional 100g from the graphite moderator. Titanium sponge would release only a very insignifi-cant amount of hcl, somewhere between 1 and 3g. Later in the life of the
- plant, an additional 50g would be released from the new fuel after reload
, startups and 50g after moisture ingress. The total amount of hcl released l
would be slightly over 300g, resulting roughly in 300g of chlorine. In reviewing this part of the analysis, we found that the hcl release in these l experiments reflected fairly accurately the general nature of the release I mechanisms existing in the plant. However, application of the data by simple extrapolation to the plant conditions at best could only produce very approximate results. This is due to the fact that in the actual plant, release of hcl was controlled by much more complex mechanisms. The reported figures for chlorine release should, therefore, be treated as a very gross approximation which was obtained without spending a large amount of time and effort. It is, however, still a very useful body of information for evaluating chloride-induced corrosion in the plant.
In addition to the quantitative studies of chlorine release, the contractor performed a study to determine the approximate times at which different amounts of chlorine were released. Information was obtained by measuring the concentrations of radioactive isotope Cl-36 present in chloride deposits
1 1
on different components of the primary coolant system. Cl-36 is formed by neutron activation of Cl-35, and for a given neutron flux its concentration is proportional to the time of exposure. The contractor measured the concentration of Cl-36 (expressed as ACi Cl-36/g Cl) on the following compo-nents: control rod drive cable wire, moisture monitor valve, circulator duct, circulator bolts, plateout probe, HPS knockout pot and reserve shutdown system balls. The measured concentrations of Cl-36 on these components confirmed that the major source of chlorine was the active core
- and that the chlorine was not uniformly released throughout the life of the plant. Rather, most of it was released upon initial plant heat-up with much smaller a
- nounts released afterwards. Low concentration of Cl-36 isotope on the plateout probe compared with other components indicated that the greatest release of hcl occurred during the later part of cycle 3 when the probe was already removed and the reactor was operating with high moisture content in the helium coolant. This confirmed the previous findings based on experimental data and gave the approximate time when the release of hcl due to moisture ingress occurred. We believe that this information is very important in evaluating chloride-induced corrosion of the primary system components.
Measurement of activated species were also carried out for the deposits on the failed control rod drive (CRD) cable. Examination of these deposits indicated that the concentrations of Cl-36 and Cs-137 were much higher near the failure point than at the upper elevations of the cable. Two possible explanations of this finding were offered by the contractor. When the rods were fully out of the core, the part of cable which failed was exposed to helium while its upper portion was protected by the CRD mechanism housing.
High Cl-36 content on the portion which failed would indicate that the rod was in the out-of-core position when the contamination occurred and the failure must have occurred at a time late in the plant life when highly activated chlorine was released to the primary coolant. In their first explanation, the contractor attempted to correlate this observation with the rod insertion sequence, but in our opinion, the correlation was not very convincing. The contractors second explanation was that during rod insertion, contaminated moisture condensed on the cable and dripped down its length until it reached a temperature where it evaporated leaving the deposit. Since moisture ingress to the helium coolant occurred relatively late in the plant life, and high concentrations of Cl-36 were observed, this second hypothesis appears much more plausible.
3.0 CONCLUSION
S Based on the considerations discussed above, we conclude that the licensee has provided a thorough evaluation of the available data utilizing suitably designed experiments, and a generally satisfactory explanation of the sources and mechanisms for the chlorine ingression in the primary coolant system. However, since most of the quantitative information was obtained by extrapolating the test results to full scale plant conditions, the l
1 t limitations of the results should be recognized because of the large approximations. However, despite this shortcoming, the methods used provided useful information, and we consider the reported work to be a significant contribution toward understanding and eventual correction of the chloride-induced corrosion problems at the Fort St. Vrain plant.
Principal Contributor: K. Parczewski Dated: November 13, 1986 i
3 J
, - - - . , , . ,-.m- , - - . . - , . . . -, - . , , , , , _ _ _ _ _ . . _ _ _ _ , _ . - , _ . . , _ _ - - . . _ - , . , . - , _ _ _ . . _
_ , , , - _ . _ . _ _ . _