ML20212F057

Forwards Response to Gilinsky 840411 Questions Re Recent Rept on Isolation of High Pressure Charging Sys Portion of ECCS Experienced at Unit 1 on 840406.Related Documentation Encl

ML20212F057
Person / Time
Site:	Diablo Canyon
Issue date:	04/13/1984
From:	Dircks W NRC OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS (EDO)
To:	Gilinsky, Palladino, Roberts NRC COMMISSION (OCM)
Shared Package
ML20209D027	List: ML20209D022 ML20209D163 ML20209D349 ML20209D368 ML20209D434 ML20212F051 ML20212F057 ML20212F063 ML20212F070 ML20212F074 ML20212F080 ML20212F086
References
FOIA-86-197 NUDOCS 8701090026
Download: ML20212F057 (37)

Text

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. . . , .a-MEMORANDUM FOR

Chairman Palladino l Comissioner Gilinsky Lf Comissioner Roberts Comissioner Asselstine Comissioner Bernthal c 3l '

FROM: William J. Dircks Executive Director for Operations

SUBJECT:

DIABLO CANYON LOSS OF ECCS This is in response to Comissioner Gilinsky's memorandum of April 11, 1984 .

concerning the recent report of isolation of the high pressure charging system portion of the Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) experienced at Diablo Canyon Unit I at 1503 hours0.0174 days <br />0.418 hours <br />0.00249 weeks <br />5.718915e-4 months <br /> on April 6, 1984.

Attached are the staff responses to the specific questions.

&RD k William J. Dir s Executive Director for Operations t

Attachment:

As stated .

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Answers to Commission Gilinsky's Questions Regarding "Diablo Canyon loss of ECCS"

1. To what extent was the plant Emergency Core Cooling System disabled?

The plant Emergency Core Cooling System consists of 4 separate

. Systems as described in the attached figures. These are:

1. Charging System (2 pumps)

2. Safety Injection System (2 pumps)

3. Accumulators (1 per loop) 4 Low Pressure Injection System (2 pumps)

The only part of the system that was disabled by the inadvertent isolation of the Boron Injection Tank was the charging system. All three other systems were available.

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2. What accident ocenario(s) was the disabled equipment designed to mitigate?

In the FSAR Chapter 15 the following accidents are analyzed assuming

-mitigation by the 20,000 ppm BIT tank and from the safety grade charging system.

a. small break LOCA

b. steam line break with a stuck out control rod

c. large break LOCA ,

The charging system and BIT tank would also be utilized following a steam generator tube rupture accident or a rod ejection accident.

3. Did the licensed Reactor Operators have plain indication that the ECCS equipment was disabled?

Yes. Information tags were applied to the remote valve operators in the control room indicating that the motor breakers to the two inlet valves (in parallel) and two outlet valves (in parallel) to the Baron Injection Tank (BIT) were racked out. The information tags were in place from the time of racking out the valve breakers at approximately 8:00 pm on April 6,1984 until the breakers were closed at approximately 10:00 am on April 7,1984 There are also valve position indicating lights on each valve in the control room.

Since the motor breakers were racked out, the indicating were not lit.

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4 It would appear that the ECCS equipment was inoperable during each of the three shifts. Were shift surveillances and operator logs properly conducted by the licensed operators? Yes. Surveillance checks of equipment status are conducted on a shift basis as well as daily. Neither the shift nor daily check sheets list the four specific valves which were closed. A monthly surveillance check list does include the position of the four valves; however, this check list was not implemented during the period of disablement.

Logs maintained by shift foremen and-reactor operators did contain entries which addressed the inoperability of the BIT, during the period the breakers were racked open. However, there were no entries which addressed the disablement of the charging system per se.

5. Did Senior Reactor Operators review and approved either the original disabling incident or the subsequent shift surveillances? Yes. Closure of the inlet and outlet valves to the BIT were authorized by a Clearance Form approved by a Shift Foreman, who is a Senior Licensed Operator.

Shift surveillance check sheets were reviewed by each of the Shift Foremen (Senior Licensed Operators) on duty during the period the breakers were racked open. As discussed in response to Question 4, above, these check sheets do not include the four valves which were closed. Also as stated in response to Question 4, the check sheets did include notations indicating inoperability of the BIT.

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6. Did the plant advisors detect the loss of ECCS? Ifnot,whinot?

The staff is developing information to respond to this question.

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7. Were the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50.72 met?

The loss of both trains of high head charging system was reportable per 50.72(b)(2)iii whicn requires a notification via the emergency notification system (ENS) "as soon as practical and in all cases within four hours of the occurrence of any of the following:

(iii) Any event or condition that alone could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to:

(A) Shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition, (8) Remove residual heat, (C) Control the release of radioactive material, or (D) Mitigate the consequences of an accident."

The requirements of 50.72 were net because the event was reported within four hours of its discovery. Both trains of high head charging system became inoperable at approximately 2210 EST on 4/6/84 This was not discovered until 1230 EST on 4/7/84. The time of the report was 1458 EST on 4/7/84 The staff's interpretation of the beginning of the four hour time period is the time at which the event was discovered.

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1 CONGRESSMAN PATTERSON, I AM HAPPY TO BE HERE TODAY TO ADDRESS THE l LICENSING 0F THE DIABLO CANYON NUCLEAR POWER PLANT UNIT 1.

1 J Cunef- sk y L j A BRIEF DISCUSSION OF THE BACKGROUND LEADING UP TO THE LICENSING A

! 0F UNIT 1 FOR FULL POWER OPERATION WOULD BE APPROPRIATE. ON

! SEPTEMBER 22, 1981, THE NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION IS"UED A

] LOW POWER OPERATING LICENSE AUTHORIZING PG&E, THE LICENSEE, T0 I

l LOAD FUEL, BRING THE REACTOR TO CRITICALITY AND ALLOW TESTING UP TO 5 PERCENT OF RATED POWER. ONSEPJEMBER 28, 1981, PG8E INFORMED US THAT THEY HAD DISCOVERED ^ ERRORS IN CERTAIN SEISMIC X

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d DESIGN ANALYSES. AS A RESULT OF THIS DISCLOSURE, ON NOVEMBER 19,

-1 1981, THE COMMISSION SUSPENDED THE LOW POWER LICENSE AND REQUIRED i I PG&E TO PERFORM AN INDEPENDENT DESIGN VERIFICATION PROGRAM (IDVP) 1 REGARDING ALL SEISMIC SAFETY-RELATED ACTIVITIES PERFORMED PRIOR l TO JUNE 1978. THE ORDER ALSO PROVIDED FOR COMMENTS WITH RESPECT TO THE SELECTION 0F THE C0MPANY OR COMPANIES TO CARRY OUT THE I

l IDVP BY THE PARTIES TO THE.DIABLO CANYON LICENSING PROCEEDING

. THE GOVERNOR OF CALIFORNIA AND THE JOINT INTERVENORS )(

ADDITION, THE STAFF REQUIRED PG8E TO PERFORM AN INDEPENDENT DESIGN VERIFICATION PROGRAM 0F SEISMIC SAFETY-RELATED ACTIVITIES PERFORMED BY SEVERAL COMPANIES ALL UNDER THE MANAGEMENT OF TELEDYNE ENGINEERING SERVICES. THIS PROJECT WAS COMPLETED IN

, LATE 1983. IN ADDITION, PG&E INITIATED ITS OWN INTERNAL TECHNICAL

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PROGRAM WHICH GREATLY EXPANDED THE SCOPE OF THE DESIGN VERIFICATION EFFORT BY INCLUDING SEISMIC DESIGN ASPECTS OF ALL 4

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SAFETY RELATED STRUCTURES. THE RESULTS OF OUR EVALUATION OF THE DESIGN VERIFICATION EFFORT WAS REPORTED IN FOUR SUPPLEMENTS TO THE STAFF'S SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT. WHILE THIS PROCESS WAS j

1 TAKING PLACE, THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING APPEAL BOARD GRANTED THE REQUESTS OF THE JOINT INTERVEN0RS AND THE GOVERNOR OF CALIFORNIA TO RE0 PEN THE RECORD OF THE DIABLO CANYON PROCEEDING WITH RESPECT TO THE ISSUE OF DESIGN QUALITY ASSURANCE. ON OCTOBER 31, 1983 THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING APPEAL BOARD STARTED A HEARING IN AVILA BEACH, NEAR THE SITE, REGARDING THE DESIGN 3

VERIFICATION EFFORT. THE JOINT INTERVENORS AND THE GOVERNOR OF l

I CALIFORNIA PARTICIPATED IN THESE HEARINGS. A DECISION BY THE I ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING APPEAL BOARD WAS ISSUED ON MARCH 20, I 1984, IN WHICH THE APPEAL BOARD DETERMINED THAT DIABLO CANYON l THIS UNIT 1DESIGNADEQUATELYQETSTHELICENSINGCRITERIA.

DECISION HAS BEEN APPEALEDAT0 THE COMMISSION AND IS CURRENTLY PENDING WITH THE COMMISSION. ON NOVEMBER 8, 1983, PG8E's l

AUTHORITY TO LOAD FUEL AND CONDUCT COLD SYSTEM TESTING WAS REINSTATED BY THE COMMISSION. ON JANUARY 25, 1984, SUBCRITICAL, I

j HOT SYSTEM TESTING WAS AUTHORIZED. THE COMMISSION REINSTATED THE I

LOW Pf":~.R LICENSE EFFECTIVE APRIL 19, 1984. THE DIABLO CANYON, UNIT 1 REACTOR WENT CRITICAL ON APRIL 29, 1984, AND LOW-POWER l TESTING WAS SUCCESSFULLY COMPLETED ON MAY 23, 1984.

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ON AUGUST 10, 1984, THE COMMISSION AUTHORIZED ISSUANCE OF A FULL l

POWER LICENSE. THIS AUTHORIZATION DID NOT PREJUDICE SEVERAL l

.i PENDING APPEALS AND PETITIONS FOR THE COMMISSION'S REVIEW 0F

'l VARIOUS LICENSING BOARD AND APPEAL BOARD DECISIONS. THIS DECISIONTOAUTHORIZEFULLPOWEROPERATIONWASAPPE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE D, C CIRCUIT AND AN 3

l ORDER WAS ISSUED ON AUGUST 17 WHICH STAYED THE FULL POWER OPERATING LICENSE AUTHORIZED BY THE COMMISSION PENDING THE COURT'S REVIEW, U THE COMMISSION'S DECISION ON THE ISSUANCE OF THE FULL POWER LICENSE WAS THE CULMINATION OF AN EXTRA 0RDINARY REVIEW EFFORT BY THE NRC, IT INCLUDED THE IDVP AND ITP, HEARINGS BY THE ATOMIC LICENSING APPEAL BOARD ON DESIGN QUALITY ASSURANCE, DECISIONS BY THE LICENSING BOARD AND THE APPEAL BOARD REGARDING CONSTRUCTION QUALITY ASSURANCE AND EMERGENCY PLANNING, REVIEW AND EVALUATION OF NEW GEOLOGIC INFORMATION AND ITS INTERPRETATION, AN EXTENSIVE EFFORT RELATED TO NUMEROUS ALLEGATIONS, CONCERNING THE DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION QUALITY ASSURANCE OF THE FACILITY AND OTHER l $ TECHCNIAL ISSUES, AND AN EVALUATION OF PIPING AND SUPPORT CONCERNS THAT RESULTED IN PART FROM ALLEGATIONS AND FROM AN AUDIT BY A 2 MEMBER OF THE NRC STAFF, THE STAFF RESOLUTION OF EACH OF THESE AREAS HAS BEEN DOCUMENTED IN SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT SUPPLEMENTS

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WHICH SUPPORT THE DECISIONS TO REMOVE THE SUSPENSION OF THE LOW POWER LICENSE AND TO ULTIMATELY AUTHORIZ FULL POWER OPERATION, THROUGHOUT THIS PROCESS THE INTERVENORS IN THE DIABLO CANYON PROCEEDING HAVE HAD AMPLE OPPORTUNITY TO PARTICIPATE.

WITH RESPECT TO GE0 LOGIC CONCERNS RAISED IN CONNECTION WITH THE j FACILITY, PGaE PROVIDED THE STAFF, IN MARCH 1984, WITH NEW j INFORMATION AND INTERPRETATION OF DATA REGARDING THE HOSGRI FAULT NEAR THE DIABLO CANYON SITE. THE STAFF EVALUATED THE INFORMATION

, AND DISCUSSED IT WITH THE ACRS. THE STAFF CONCLUDED AND THE ACRS AGREED, THAT THE NEW DATA ON THE CHARACTER OF THE HOSGRI FAULT DO NOT REQUIRE IMMEDIATE REVISION OF THE SEISMIC DESIGN BASIS FOR HOWEVER, THE STAFF DETERMINED THAT A LONGER TERM

) DIABLO CANYON.

REEVALUATION PROGRAM FOR THE SEISMIC DESIGN BASES OF THE DIABLO

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CANYON PLANT WAS NECESSARY. SUCH A PROGRAM WAS INITIALLY DISCUSSED BY THE ACRS IN 1978 AND HAS N0W BEEN INCLUDED AS A l LICENSE CONDITION REQUIRING THE PROGRAM TO BE ESTABLISHED BY I

JANUARY OF NEXT YEAR AND BE COMPLETED THREE YEARS AFTER STAFF APPROVAL.

MAJOR EFFORTS BY THE STAFF AND ITS CONTRACTORS WERE EMPLOYED TO

{ RESOLVE ALL ALLEGATIONS WHICH HAD ANY IMPACT ON FUEL LOAD, CRITICALITY AND FULL POWER OPERATION. g )(

IN THE CASE OF THE CONCERNS RAISED BY A MEMBER OF THE STAFF, A V

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SPECIAL PEER REVIEW PANEL WHICH INCLUDED SENIOR STAFF ENGINEERS EXPERT IN PIPING, PIPING SUPPORTS, AND QUALITY ASSURANCE, DID A I

CAREFUL EVALUATION OF THE CONCERNS AND THE FINDINGS WERE REVIEWED AND FOUND ACCEPTABLE BY THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON REACTOR SAFEGUARDS PRIOR TO THE COMMISSION CONSIDERATION OF FULL POWER LICENSING, i

REGARDING ALLEGATIONS, THE STAFF HAS DEVOTED EXTENSIVE EFFORTS TO j EVALUATE APPROXIMATELY 1400 ALLEGATIONS, BASED ON THEIR

. EVALUATION OF THESE ALLEGATIONS TO DATE, ALL ALLEGATIONS HAVING j IMPACT ON OPERATION THROUGH FULL POWER HAVE BEEN SATISFACTORILY

.! RESOLVED. THE NRC'S REGION V 0FFICE OF INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT AND THE COMMISSION'S OFFICE OF INVESTIGATION ARE CONTINUING THEIR l REVIEW 0F THE REMAINING ALLEGATIONS, lt ONE ADDITIONAL AREA 0F RECENT CONCERN TO THE COMMISSION WAS THE

] TRAINING AND QUALIFICATION OF THE OPERATING STAFF FOR DIABLO

., CANYON UNIT 1. AT A JULY 13, 1984, COMMISSION MEETING THE STAFF REPORTED THAT THEIR OBSERVATIONS OF OPERATING CREWS AND SHIFT ADVISORS, AS REQUESTED BY THE COMMISSION, AND REPORTED THEIR i CONCLUSION THAT THE OPERATING STAFF IS ADEQUATELY TRAINED.

AFTER CONSIDERATION 0F ALL ASPECTS OF THE LICENSING ACTIVITIES N THE COMMISSION DETERMINED THAT THE FULL POWER LICENSE FOR DIABLO l

p CANYON COULD BE ISSUED, eu CONGRESSMAN PATTERSON, THIS CONCLUDES MY TESTIMONY,

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i CHRON0 LOGY OF EVENTS C f 4 cc

o o LOW POWER LICENSE ISSUED - 09/22/81 o PG&E INFORMED NRC 0F SEISMIC DESIGN ERROR - 09/28/81 i o LOW POWER LICENSE SUSPENDED - 11/19/81 t

o NRC REQUIRED PG8E TO PERFORM IDVP - 11/19/81 o IDVP PROGRAM COMPLETED - LATE 1983 l o ASLAB HEARING ON IDVP COMMENCED - 10/31/83 1

} o AUTHORITY TO LOAD FUEL REINSTATED - 11/08/83 l 0 FUEL LOADING COMMENCED - 11/15/83 l 0 FUEL LOADING COMPLETED - 11/20/83

! o ASLAB ISSUED FAVORABLE FINDING ON IDVP - 03/20/84 o LOW POWER LICENSE REINSTATED - 04/19/84

I o ACHIEVED CRITICALITY - 04/29/84 o COMPLETED LOW POWER TESTING - 05/23/84 l 1 o COMMISSION AUTHORIZED ISSUANCE OF FP LICENSE - 08/10/84

'I o ORDER STAYING ISSUANCE OF FP LICENSE - 08/17/84 i

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TESTIMONY l 1 i 0F THE i

j U.S, NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

! PRESENTED BY 8 COMMISSIONER JAMES K. ASSELSTINE f

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BEFORE THE 1 SUBCOMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND THE ENVIRONMENT l COMMITTEE ON INTERIOR AND INSULAR AFFAIRS

, UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES l

i ON i l l l DIABLO CANYON LICENSING 1

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l l AUGUST 30, 1984 l 1 i

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'MR. CHAIRMAN, THE COMMISSION IS PLEASED TO HAVE THIS OPPORTUNITY 1

TO BRING THE SUBCOMMITTEE UP-TO-DATE ON THE STATUS OF THE l LICENSING OF THE DIABLO CANYON NUCLEAR POWER PLANT. THIS IS THE i

i FOURTH TIME IN EIGHTEEN MONTHS THAT THE NRC HAS TESTIFIED BEFORE i THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON DIABLO, AND WE RECOGNIZE THE SUBCOMMITTEE'S i

l STRONG AND CONTINUING INTEREST IN THIS PROCEEDING.

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4 ON AUGUST 10, 1984, THE COMMISSION AUTHORIZED ISSUANCE BY THE NRC l

i STAFF OF A FULL-POWER LICENSE FOR DIABLO CANYON UNIT 1. IN SO DOING, THE COMMISSION COMPLETED THE THREE-STEP LICENSING PROCESS B

-: ESTABLISHED FOLLOWING SUSPENSION OF THE PLANT'S LOW-POWER LICENSE IN LATE 1981. IN PREVIOUS ACTIONS, THE COMMISSION AUTHORIZED THE 4

LOADING OF FUEL AND COLD SYSTEM TESTING AT DIABLO CANYON UNIT 1 Y ON NOVEMBER 8, 1983 AND FULL REINSTATEMENT OF THE SUSPENDED A

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ASSURANCE (AND RELATED MATTERS) AND VACATING THE LICENSING J

J BOARD'S REQUIREMENT THAT FORMAL FINDINGS BE OBTAINED FROM THE

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.j FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY ON THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA'S b

i EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN. THE COMMISSION DETERMINED THAT THE f4 PENDENCY OF THESE MATTERS DID NOT PRESENT ANY REASON TO STAY THE 5 ISSUANCE OF THE FULL-POWER LICENSE PENDING FURTHER REVIEW.

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'j Yh 1 THE COMMISSION'S AUGUST 10 ORDER MAKES EFFECTIVE, WITHOUT y

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.O PREJUDICE TO THE PENDING MERITS REVIEWS AND THOSE MATTERS YET a

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BEFORE THE APPEAL BOARD, THE 1982 DECISION OF THE LICENSING BOARD ji

. AUTHORIZING ISSUANCE OF A FULL-POWER OPERATING LICENSE FOR DIABLO

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CANYON. THE DECISION IS FOUNDED ON AN EXTENSIVE AND l

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.h WELL-DOCUMENTED PUBLIC RECORD. ITS REASONING IS SET FORTH IN THE

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.it AUGUST 10 ORDER. AS THE PRODUCT OF A COLLEGIAL PROCESS, THE G

l N h ORDER SPEAKS FOR ITSELF.

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i NRC STAFF EVALUATION OF THE TRAINING AND QUALIFICATION OF j OPERATORS AND SHIFT SUPERVISORS; i

PENDING PETITIONS FOR ENFORCEMENT ACTION;

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ALLEGATIONS DETERMINED TO REQUIRE RESOLUTION PRIOR TO 1

1 l FULL-POWER OPERATION; i

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INVESTIGATIONS BY THE NRC OFFICE OF INVESTIGATIONS (0I) i AND THE NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTOR AND AUDITOR (0IA);

RECENT APPEAL BOARD DECISIONS ON MOTIONS TO REOPEN THE i

i RECORD, AND ON DESIGN QUALITY ASSURANCE AND CONSTRUCTION I

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{ QUALITY ASSURANCE;

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CONSIDERATION OF THE EFFECTS OF EARTHQUAKES ON EMERGENCY PLANNING; AND i

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THE COMMISSION APPEALED THE COURT OF APPEAL'S STAY RULING TO i

t CHIEF JUSTICE WARREN BURGER. ON AUGUST 21, 1984, THE CHIEF JUSTICE DENIED, WITHOUT COMMENT, THE COMMISSION'S REQUEST TO OVERTURN THE PANEL'S STAY. ON AUGUST 22, 1984, THE COMMISSION JOINED A REQUEST TO THE COURT OF APPEALS BY PACIFIC GAS &

i

.; ELECTRIC TO ACCELERATE FURTHER THE BRIEFING AND ORAL ARGUMENT SCHEDULE FOR THE UNDERLYING CASE. THAT MOTION IS PRESENTLY

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! PENDING.

' MR. CHAIRMAN, THIS COMPLETES THE COMMISSION'S PREPARED STATEMENT.

i FOR YOUR CONVENIENCE, THE COMMISSION'S ORDER OF AUGUST 10,17 '4 i

AND A BRIEF CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS AND ACTIONS SINLL iod INITIAL l

t j ISSUANCE OF THE LOW-POWER LICENSE ARE APPENDED TO THIS STATEMENT.

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

,; COMMISSIONERS:

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! Nunzio J. Palladino, Chairman i

Thomas M. Roberts .h Asto p420 James K. Asselstine Frederick N. Berntha1 u EE ii: = ,

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In the Matter of

, / PACIFIC GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY, Docket Nos. 50-275 OL I 50-323 OL 1 (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant,

! Units 1 and 2) -

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MEMORANDUM AND ORDER CLI-84-13 2 . Introduction -

e This, order concludes the Nuclear Regulatory Connission's process for detennining whether to make effective the Atomic Safety and Licens-i ing Board's (" Licensing Board") fourth and final Partial Initial 1

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Decision (PID), LBP-82-70,16 NRC 756 (1982) authcrizing the issuance of

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] a full power license for the Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1

("Diablo Canyon" or " plant"), to Pacific Gas and Electric Company

("PG&E"), subject to the satisfaction of certain license conditions.

Fonnal appeals and petitions for Connission review of the merits of

• various Licensing Board and Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board I

("Apneal Board") decisions for Diablo Canyon are still pending. This

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• 3 Conclusion 4

The Ccannission's decision on these issues is discussed below. In sum, the Commission has determined: (1) to make effective, without .

prejudice to the pending merits reviews, the Licensing Board decision authorizing issuance of the full power operating license for Diablo Canyon; (2) that the license conditions imposed by the Licensing Board have been fulfilled; and (3) that all of the other matters listed above -

have been resolved adequately to authorize issuance of the full power license for Diablo Canyon Unit 1. However, this Order shal-1 not become

} effective, and no full power license may issue, until 5:00 p.m., Eastern

a Daylight Time, August 17, 1984. This delay is to allow orderly processing of any request for expedited judicial review.

} Discussion .

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1. Licensing Board Decision

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In LSP-82-70, 16 NRC 756 (1982), the Licensing Board determined that a full power operating license for Diablo Canyon could be issued l d upon the satisfaction of certain license conditions. Previous decisions by the Licensing Board and Appeal Board resolved other contested L

matters. The two remaining issues decided by the Licensing Board in LBP-82-70 were:

(1) the adequacy of the Diablo Canyon emergency plan; and

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l (2) whether the plant's pressurizer heaters, block valves and power-operated relief valves were required to be

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As for the pressurizer heaters, power-operated relief valves and their associated block valves, the Licensing Scard found that:

(1) pressurizer heaters were not, required to be safety-grade; (2) two of I the three PORVs and associated equipment are safety grade; and

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(3) adequate protection of public health and safety is provided by this equipment as installed. These decisions obviously s,upport the issuance l of a full power license. The Consission finds nothing in the pending l appeal which would support a stay of license issuance.

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2. Uncontested Licensina Issues

a. Conditions On The low-Power License l

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. The low power license .for Diablo Canyon contained several license I -

! conditions required to be satisfied by PG&E prior to a full power l license decision. Seven of these conditions were a direct outgrowth of concerns raised by Mr. Yin. In response to his concerns, the NRC staff formed the Diablo Canyon Peer Review Group (Peer Review Group), which included senior staff engineers expert in piping, piping supports, and

_ quality assurance. After meeting with Mr. Yin and PG&E, and after examining areas of the plant of concern to Mr. Yin, the Peer Review

, , Group fannulated the seven license conditions.

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[FootnoteContinued]

interpreted to require completion of the formal FEMA review process under 44 CFR 350. To the extent that the Licensing Board may have had a j less formal FEMA review in mind, the Board's condition has been i satisfied by FEMA's letter of July 11, 1984. The merits review of 1 ALAB-776 is pending before the Connission, and the Comission does not, i

l at this point, express any view on the correctness of ALAB-776.

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f At the August 2,1984 public Comission meeting, Mr. Yin expressed l his professional disagreement with*the Peer Review Group's report on.the adequacy of the resolution of ce,rtain design issues. The Comission j explored with Mr. Yin and other members of the NRC staff the details of this differing professional judgment. Based on these discussions and l

! the analyses in SSER 25, the Comission believes th,at the collective judgments by the Peer Review Group and ACRS are deserving of more weight than the views of Mr. Yin. Accordingly, the Comission accepts the judgments of the Peer Review Group and ACRS and believes that these j matters have.been resolved adequately for issuance of a full power l license. ,

1 Staff concluded in SSER-23 that PG&E had sacisfied its requirements i related to fire protection. Staff also reported in SSER 24 that PGAE's jet impingement evaluation, conducted in response to a condition imposed t .I l

by the Appeal Board in ALAB-763, was acceptable.

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.f j b. Other Issues I As with any full power license, the license for Diablo Canyon con-

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tains several technical conditions which reflect the NRC staff's preli-censing technical review of issues relevant to full power operation.

For Diablo Canyon, the license conditions and the technical bases for i

e them are contained in SSER 27. The Comission believes that SSER 27 9

adequately addresses the full power issues considered by the staff.

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l b. Other Issues .

Supplements 18,19 and 20 to the Safety Evaluation Report for  ;

Diablo Canyon also-identified a , number of other items requiring resolu- l j tion prior to full power operation. In Supplement 24 to the Safety

.i l j Evaluation Report (SSER 24) the staff has reported that all these items have been resolved. The Consission has no reason to disagree with the

! staff's analysis. -

4. Training And Qualification Of Operators And Shift Supervisors

,. j On July 13, 1984, the NRC staff reported to the Consission on the 2

performance of operating crews and ' shift advisors during start-up and

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., low power testing. -SECY-84-283 (1984). The report was based on obser-.

'l vations and eval'uations by various teams composed of members of the MC

)t staff expert in operator licensing, license qualification, and license examination. The teams concluded that:

, j 1. PG&E has provided shift advisors that meet the Commission requirements for qualifications, training and experience; 1l 2. the shift advisors are successfully working with operating 1 .

• 1 shift crews; 4; .

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2 l "1 Shift advisors experienced with PWRs comparable to Diablo Canyon i

~f were provided for each operating shift to provide operating support until the operating crews attained experience with operating the ,

i facility.

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e li 11 All allegations were handled by the Diablo Canyon Allegation Management Program (DCAMP) described in SSER 21 and SSER 22. Under that I

program, the NRC staff has spent thousands of hours investigating and evaluating those allegations. All allegations were screened using criteria set out in SSER 22 for determinating which allegations required l

resolution prior to full power operation. ,

s l As a result of this screening, seven areas were identified in SSER j

4 22 as requiring resolution prior to exceeding low power:

. 1. Operational Limits for the Component Cooling Water

! i System; C 2. Replacement of Welded High Strength Bolts; l 3. As Built Drawings for Operations; . .

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4. Completion of Systems Interaction Program and i Modifications,

', 5. Evaluation of Coating Concern; l

.j 6. Piping and Supports and Related Design Issues; and i

7. Residual Heat Removal Low Flow Alarm.

.i The detailed evaluations and resolutions of these allegation areas f are contained in SSER 26. In addition, SSER 26 resolves a subsequently j developed allegation area regarding bolted connections.

}.h At the August 2,1984 public Comission meeting, the staff reported N that approximately three hundred of the remaining allegations had been resolved satisfactorily and that the documentation of these resolutions il would be available shortly. The staff also reported that resolution of 1

] all of the allegations required only very few (less than ten) physical u

changes to the plant. Some 500 allegations remain which have not been

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13 the same meeting, the Office of Inspector and Auditor (OIA) reported

, that allegations of wrongdoing by the staff had not been substantiated.

The Connission also discussed wi.th Mr. Ronald Smith, the OIA investigator, allegations regarding his conduct of the investigation.

Based on the written and oral report by the staff, the Comission

! concludes that authorizat' ion of the full-power license need not await i

' resolution of pending investigations and that there is no reason to pursue further the allegations of staff wrongdoing.

8. Ad.iudicatory Decisions

In ALAB-756,'the Appeal Board detemined that Joint Intervenors and the Governor of California had failed to carry the heavy burde t of -

i showing that the femal adjudicatory record on construction quality assurance should be reopened. Petitions for Connission review of this decision were then filed. A majority of the Ccanission not having voted l ,

to review this decision, the petitions for review were deemed denied.

El In ALAB-763, the Appeal Board extensively reviewed contentions 4

'II regarding alleged deficiencies in the design quality assurance program tj as reviewed by the Independent Design Verification Program (IDVP). The h Appeal Board found that the IDVP had not uncovered any uncorrected c

$ deficiencies in design quality assurance requiring a reversal of the h Licensing Board's previous decision on the adequacy of design quality 3 .

.V assurance. The Connission is considering the petitions for review of this decision and the responses thereto. The decision in ALAB-763 obviously supports issuance of a full power license, and the Connission

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earthquakes in central California. This information has also been supplied to the Appeal Board in Joint Intervenors' motion to reopen the seismic record in this proceeding. ,

Subsequently, on July 25, 1984, Joint Intervenors moved the Appeal

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-l Board to stay the Diablo Canyon proceeding. That stay request incor-1 l parated Joint Intervenors' previous request of July, 17, 1984 and raised i

!; other issues. By Order of July 27, 1984, the Appeal Board directed that

stay request to the Comission.

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- The Commission has reviewed the parties' filings and determined,

) 1 for the reasons discussed below, that a stay of the licensing proceeding

] is not warranted.

Before addressing the stay criteria, the Consission notes that it i

has recognized the growth of scientific knowledge in seismology arid geology and the resulting potential need to reassess the seismic design basis of Diab 1' o Canyon. The license for Diablo Canyon is conditioned on PG&E's completion of a seismic reevaluation by 1988. Of course, if new information developed in the interim requires more prompt action, that action will be taken. But the information presented now by Joint Intervenors does not warrant a stay.

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' r Traditional stay analysis requires a movant to address several factors including, in particular, a demonstration of irreparable injury J and probability of success on the merits. As applied to the new seismic

.n information, this requires Joint Intervenors to demonstrate that the new

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c information requires the conclusion that there is no longer reasonable assurance that the seismic design of Diablo Canyon is adequate, and that j Joint Intervenors will be' irreparably injured by permitting the plant to j -

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i 17 The Cossiission finds that the Morgan Hill data does not undermine

! the Appeal Board's analysis. As PG&E and the NRC staff point out, the t

i new high value of ground acceleration observed at Morgan Hill was I

i measured at a dam abutment, thus presenting a situation similar to that i

-' at the Pacoima Dam. Moreover, as discussed below, the " focusing" effect

believed partially responsible for this high value of ground accelera- -

tion has already been found not present at Diablo Canyon. Under these 1

i circumstances, the Joint Intervenors have not established that they are 1

likely to demonstrate a lack of reasonable assurance that the seismic design is adequate.

i Joint Intervenors also rely on the conclusions of the United States s

! Geologic Survey that the Morgan Hill earthquake demonstrated " focusing" ,

and"fiigh,stressdrop." These findings, Joint Intervenors contend,-

contradict the Appeal Board's conclusions that focusing and high stress drop were speculative phenomena.

l j But the Appeal Board did not merely dismiss focusing and high stress drop as speculative phenomena. For example, focusing was dis-missed in part for Diablo Canyon because of site geology. The Appeal

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, Board found that focusing would not be expected because the Diablo Canyon site had the wrong orientation to the Hosgri Fault and was too far from the source of the focussed motion. By contrast, the high ground acceleration associated with the Morgan Hill earthquake was ,

measured at a site aligned with the unilateral rupture expansion and q close to a secondary energetic source of seismic radiation. Thus, the Morgan Hill data does not undercut the Appeal Board's discussion of

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review process. Indeed, in a letter of June 20,.1984, the ACRS stated j that the new data on the character of the Hosgri fault do not require "innediate revision of the seismic design basis for Diablo Canyon."

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Finally, Joint Intervences contend that recent earthquake activity

,j in California's central coastal region contradicts the Appeal Board's

! conclusion that the plant is situated in an area of low to moderate I seismicity. PG&E has provided contrary expert opinion, and the staff I

J notes that the six earthquakes referred to by Joint Intervenors occurred over a widely scattered area. Under these circumstances, Joint Inter-venors have not demonstrated the necessary probability of success on the merits on this point. .

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b. 'Other Issues Joint Intervenors' stay request of July 25, 1984 raises five other i

issues which have been raised before the Connission in earlier stages of this proceeding. Because Joint Intervenors present no new perspectives l {

on these issues, the Commission responds to them briefly below.

1 (1) Class Mine Accidents - Once again Joint Intervenors j contend that the Connission violated the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 and its own regulation by not explicitly considering Class 4,i

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This would include a reevaluation of the Safe Shutdown Earthquake should the character of the fault be definitively determined to be of

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the thrust variety. Pending such a reevaluation, there is no basis for i the Joint Intervenors' assumption that an SSE of magnitude 7.5 would I still be appropriate for a different type of fault motion.

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l I that the California State Emergency Plan for Diablo Canyon is adequate.

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Accordingly, this issue cannot support a motion for a stay. .

1 (v) Quality Assurance - Joint Intervenors' arguments

here essentially repeat the arguments in their petitions for review of ALABs-756, 763 and 775. A Comission majority does not favor the 1

] petitions for review of ALA8-756. As for the petitions for review of l

j ALAB-763 and ALAB-775, this is no different from the pendency of any 1

j exceptions before the Appeal Board when the Comission conducts an effectiveness review of a Licensing Board's decision. While the Comis-j sfon has detennined that the petition for review of ALAB-763 and 1"- . ALAB-775 do not raise issues warranting a stay, this determination is 4 without prejudice to the Comission's ultimate disposition of the petition.

y a Joint Intervenors have also made no showing of irreparable injury.

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Their contention that operation of the plant will create a substantial

. risk is based on their conclusion that there is no longer any reasonable assurance that the seisdic design of the plant is adequate. As c g .

discussed above,. this conclusion is not supported.

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1 EXPLANATORY STATE. M OF CODiISSIONER LANDO W. ZECH The history of the licensing of the Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power r

l l, Plant is complex and protracted.. .

The record of the proceeding is voluminous. I have reviewed a considerable part of the record. I have visited the Diablo Canyon plant. I have talked to the utility management personnel, including ,some of the f

operators. However, the time available to me as a Commissioner has simply not bee,n sufficient for me to satisfy myself that I l have read, analyzed, and adequately reflected upon all the relevant material. If my vote were needed, either yea or nay, I believe I would need several more weeks before I could come to a decision. Therefore, I.have concluded that I cannot vote today ,

2 on the full power license decision for Diablo Canyon.

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DISSENTING VIEWS OF C0!mISSIONER ASSELSTINE I

I I I am unable to vote in favor of the issuance of a full power operating license for Diablo Canyon Unit 1 at this time because of the Comission's treatment of two issues: the complicating effects of earthquakes on emergency planning, and the re-evaluation of the adequacy l of seismic design for small and large bore piping in the plant. The d Comission's decision regarding the effects of earthquakes on emergency 1

l planning is being addressed in a separate order, and my views on the j Comission's handling of this issue will be set forth in detail there.

.. ! Suffice it to say here that this issue is material to the Comission's 1

licensing decision in the Diablo Canyon case and that the Comission is

, compelled as a matter of law and logic to afford the parties to this l

proceeding an opportunity to litigate the issue prior to ' authorizing the j issuance of a full power license for the plant.

. With regard to seismic design, the record of this proceeding, allegations filed by former workers at the site and subsequent NRC inspections, including those performed by NRC inspector Isa Yin, all document a widespread quality assurance breakdown in the seismic design work for small bore piping in the plant. This quality assurance break-down raises serious questions regarding both the adequacy of quality assurance for other design activities for the plant and the adequacy of the Independent Design Verification Program (IDVP). Those questions are of special importance for the IDVP, which was established to verify that 1 the seismic design problems that led to the Comission's suspension of 1

,) the Diablo Canyon low power license had been identified and corrected.

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DIABLO CANYON CHRONOLOGY l

-l 9 SEPTEMBER 22, 1981 - LOW-POWER LICENSE ISSUED LATE SEPTEMBER, 1981 -

" MIRROR IMAGE" PROBLEM DISCOVERED BY PGaE OfNovEMBER 19, 1981 - COMMISSION ORDER SUSPENDS LOW-POWER LICENSE; NRC STAFF LETTER SETS REQUIREMENTS FOR' FULL-POWER AUGUST 31, 1982 - ASLB INITIAL DECISION AUTHORIZING OL ISSUANCE

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DECEMBER 8, 1982 - COMMISSION APPROVES 3-STEP LICENSING PROCESS l

! STEP 1 - FUEL LOAD N STEP 2 - CRITICALITY AND UP TO 5% OPERATION

. STEP 3 - OPERATION ABOVE 5% POWER l OCTOBER 31, 1983 - APPEAL BOARD HEARING ON IDVP COMMENCED

.- fNOVEMBER8,1983 - COMMISSION APPROVES STEP 1: FUEL LOAD AND COLD l SYSTEM TESTING NOVEMBER 20, 1983 - FUEL LOAD COMPLETE l

j LATE 1983 - INDEPENDENT DESIGN VERIFICATION PROGRAM COMPLETED

] JANUARY 25, 1984 - COMMISSION APPROVES HOT SYSTEM TESTING

! MARCH 20, 1984 - APPEAL BOARD ISSUES FAVORABLE FINDING ON IDVP 1

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APRIL 13, 1984 - COMMISSION APPROVES STEP 2: OPERATION UP TO 5%

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POWER (FULL REINSTATEMENT OF SUSPENDED LICENSE)

APRIL 29, 1984 - INITIAL CRITICALITY ACHIEVED MAY 23, 1984 - LOW-POWER TESTING COMPLETED

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AUGUST 10, 1984 - COMMISSION AUTHORIZED ISSUANCE OF FULL-POWER OL 51 AUGUST 17, 1984 - COURT OF APPEALS STAYS NRC ORDER PENDING REVIEW AUGUST 21, 1984 - CHIEF JUSTICE DENIES. REQUEST TO OVERTURN STAY g

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