ML20209D163
| ML20209D163 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Diablo Canyon  |
| Issue date: | 07/13/1984 |
| From: | Dircks W NRC OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS (EDO) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20209D027 | List: |
| References | |
| FOIA-86-197, TASK-PII, TASK-SE SECY-84-283, NUDOCS 8407240082 | |
| Download: ML20209D163 (58) | |
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fi # ',,s POLICY ISSUE (Information)
July 13, 1984 SECY-84 293 d
For:
The Ccmissioners Frem:
William J. Dircks Executive Director for Ocerations..
Sub4ect:
0IABLO CANYCN SEIF7 ADVISOP.S AND.0PE2ATING
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CREW FERFORMANCE Pur:cse:
Tc inform the Cermaissioners of the status of the Diabic Canyon shift acvisor program anc :ne :er'ormance of :ne Diablo Canyon operating crews.
Discussien:
A Staff Recuirements Memerancun dated. var:h 29, 1954, cirected the staff to (a)
- enitor the certifica-ion tests of snif; acviscrs c:nducted by the utility and (c) c ncuct a special inspection of the performance of the operating crews.
In order to obtain a preliminary uncerstanding of the status of shift advisors a: Diablo Caryen, a four-person team compcsed of three individuals fr:m the Licensee Qualifica:icns 3ranen of NRR arc a '.icensing Examiner f cm Region Y visited :ne Diablo Canyon site en Acril 10-11, 1984, to evaluate the ca: abilities c# :ne shift acvisors ::
provide adecuate acv1ce to :ne ccera:ing snifts. The purpose and plan for the evaluation are presented in.
At the time of the team visit, fcur shift l
advisors had c:mpleted the training program and five l
additional shift advisors were still being tra.ined.
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team reviewed the program status, the shift adviser -
l procedure, the. shift advisor training pregram, and the examinations given to the shift advisors.
The team also interviewed the shift advisors and selected members of ne operating shifts.
The team cencluded that the shift j
advisors at Diable Canyon were adecuately qualified anc Centact:
L. P. Crocker, NRR x24891 7
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The Commissioners.
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trained to perfoon their assigned duties. is a copy of the report of the evaluation team.
Monitor Certification Tests. On April 24-25, 1984, a follow-up team composed of the Chief of the Operator Licensing Branch of NRR, the Chief of the Operator Licensing Section from Region V, and the Licensing Examiner who had been present during the April 10-11 evaluation, visited the e
Diablo Canyon site to monitor the final examinations administered to the second group of shift advisors. The team reviewed the final examination prior o its administration, monitored the licensee's.. ministration of the final written examination, independently graded two of
. the written examin_ations -and coecar.e.jf_ their results to the
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facility staff's grading of the same examinations, and---
audited three of the oral examinatiens acministered by the facility. The team concluded that the licensee's training and certification program for shift advisors was adequate and in conformance with general industry criteria for shift i
adviso rs. is a letter to the licensee dated May 25, 1984, which encloses a Regien V examination report (No. 50-275/0L-84-02) describing the conduct and the results of both the April 10-11 and the April 24-25 evaluations.
Ooeratino Crew Performance. During the period April 19 -
May 23,1%4, anc June 12, 1984, a special inspection cf the Diablo Canyon operating crews during initial start-up and low power testing was conducted by Region Y.
The inspection c
team members included senior members of the Region V staff, t
Senior Resident and Resident Inspectors assigned to operating power reactors in Region V, and three NRC consultants from Lawrence Liver = ore National Laboratory and EG&G, Idaho. The inspection involvec 657 inspection hours-by eight NRC personnel and 148 inspection hours by the three consultants.
During the course of the inspection, several concerns were identified where improvements in the performance of operating activities appeared warranted. These concerns were brought to the attention of licensee management and priority attention was given to the satisfactory resolution of each.
The overall assessment of the Special Inspection Team was that the performance of the operating crews at Diablo Canyon Unit I was above average when compared to similar licensed facilities during initial start-up and low power operation.
The shift advisors were observed to ce effectively I
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The Comissioners
-l g*:s integrated into shift activities and appeared to be well accepted by memoers of the operating crews. The team found that involvement of both senior site management and corporate management in the day-to-day operations of Diablo Canyon was'both substantive and effective. Enclosure 3 is a memorandum from the jtegional Administrator, Region V, which forwards the report of the Special Inspection Team (Inspection Report No. 50-275/84-07), describing the conduct and findings of the special inspection.
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Conclusion:==
The staff concludes that:
1.
The licensee has provided shift acvisors that meet the gbidelines fo' r qtTalifications, training and 'exper,i.e.ged as adopted by the Comission in the Chainnan's letter of June 14, 1984, to Mr. J. H. Miller of Georgia Power Company (attached to Enclosure 4).
2.
The Diablo Canyon shift advisors are successfully integrated with, accepted by, and working with the operating shif t crews.
3.
Operating crew performance during start-up and low power
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testing has been above average in comparison to similar facilities at comparable operaticnal pnases and warrants confidence that there is reasonable assurance that Diablo Canyon Unit I can be safely operated at power i
levels above five percent ano up to full power.
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Licensee management is aceccately involved in :ne day-to-day cperations of Diacio Canyon Unit 1.
N Willi J. 01rcks Executive Director for Operations
Enclosures:
1.
Evaluation Team Report, April 19, 1984 2.
Letter to licensee dated May 25, 1984, j
enclosing Evaluation Report No. 50-275/0L-84-02 l
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Memorandum from Regional Administrator l
dated June 21,1984, enclosing Inspection Report No. 50-275/84-07 l
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Generic Letter 84-16, June 27,1984 p
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E!!CLOSUPE 1 j
/'s....,["e, UNITED STATE 3 f
i, NUCLE / R REGULATORY COMMISSICN e
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~,,,a MEP.CRANCUM.:CR: Hugn L. Denscn, Jr., Cinc :e 31 vision of Human Fact:rs Safety THRU:
Harold R. Bccher, Chief Licensee Qualifica:1cns Branen Division of Human Fact:rs Safety FRCM:
Lawrence P. Crecxer, Secticn Leader Management Technology See:1cn Licensee Qualificait:ns Branch Divisien cf Human Fac :rs Safey
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SUBJECT:
E'/ALUATION OF DIABLO CANYCN SHIFT ADVISCRS
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A::achec is :he evaluation cf the Shift Advisors at Diabic Canycn, pre:ared by the evaluation team, ::ased u;:en the :aam's visi
- :ne ::ian: en April 10-11,1984 4
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Lawrence P. Cr cxer, Section Leacer Manage.e.en: Tecnnciegy Section Licensee califica tens Bran:n Divisien :f Hu: an rac::rs Safe y I
Enclosures:
As stated
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'N E'/ALUATICN CF '5}FT ACV:SCRS DIABLO CANYCN FCWER PL*NT Intrecucticn On April 10lil,1984, an evaluation team c:meesed of :nree individuals frem s
the Licensee Qualificatiens Branch, Division of Human Fac crs Safety, NRR, and a licensing examiner fr m Regien V visitec the Diaolo Canycn P wer Plant.
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The makeup of the team is shewn in Enclosure 1.
The ;ur;cse of tne visit was to evaluate One :acabilities of the Diable Canycn Shift Advisers to provide acequate advice :: tr.e ccerating shifts.
The pur;cse and :ne :lan for the team visit are describec in Enclosure 2.
The team memcers reviewed Me precedure devel :ed by :Me licensee wnich describes -he duties and responsibilities of :ne Shif Acvisors; reviewed the resumes of the Shift Advisers :: determine wnether they mee: the industry 1
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criteria for Shift Acviscrs; reviewed the training =r: gram Orevicec to :ne Shift Acvisors; examinec Ne aeexiy Out::es anc :ne "cai.rt :en examina:icn l
a =inis;erec :: :ne Shift Acvisors; reviewee :ne availa:le ca:a relating ::
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the. oral examination acministered :D :ne Shift Advisers anc interviewec nree members of the station staff wne had administered portions of the oral examination; interviewed eight. cf the nine Shift Acviscrs and Shift Acvisne I
candidates; interviewed selected memters of tne plan: s:aff' regarting their knowledge of Shift Adviser cuties and resconsibilities; anc interviewec :Me Senior Resicent :nspect:r to determine his views regar:ing :ne Shif: Acviser program.
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2 Precram S:stus e
A the :ime of the team visit, four Shift Adviscrs had ccmoletec the training pr: gram.
Three were working with the plant. c:erating shifts anc the fcurth was undergo'ing a week of training at the Eicn simula:Or. Five Shift Advisor candidates,,includin.g crie memcer of.:he. plant staff, were in :nef r third week of the fcur-week training program.
The tnree incividuals new serving as Shift Advisors are working 12-hcur rotating shifts as centrasted to :ne licensee's five-shift rotation scheme for :ne ccera-ing snifts. The s:a:ed intent of the licensee is to assien an acviser :: eacn :cerating snif: such that the Shift Acvisor will rotate as a snift mem er anc will particicate in pericdic requalificatien training with the snift crew.
The team encerses l
this intent of the licensee as hignly cesirable.
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Shif-adviscr Prececure The precedure governing the duties and res:cnsibilities of the Shif-Advisor is TP 70-8401, ' Responsibilities and Outies of the Shif: Advisor.' Revisien 1 of this procedure, dated April 5,1984, currently is in effect. A cecy is enclosed (Enclosure 3). While on shift cuty, :he Shift Advisor reports to :ne Shift Foreman (Shift Supervisor). When not en snift cu y, Shift Adviscrs repor: to :he Senior Power Precucticn Engineer (Oceratiens), wnc also cirects
- he activities of the Shift Technical Aavisors.
The evalua-icn team considers these reporting' arrangement.s to be accectacle. Our review of :h,e l
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- recedure f und tha it acequately describes
- ne cuties and res:ensibilities cf the Shift Advisors.
s Shift Adviser Cualifications The evaluation team reviewed ne resumes of ne Shift Acviscrs. A su=ary of
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- he ex;erience of :ne Adviscrs is inclucec'as EncicTJre 4 The ::: Jir.e'ef.
2' the table snewn in Enc!csure A is the minimum ex:erience procesed by one industry for Shift Acviscrs.
Suc:eeding lines of tre :acle shew :ne ex erience of the nine Shift Acvisors (num:ers 1 :nreugn A; anc Shid: Acviser candidates (nuccers 5 :hr ugn 9) a: Diabic Canycn. As can be seen frem ne tacle, a'll of the adviscrs have c:nsiceraciy mere ;cwer plant anc nuclear plant experience than :ne minimums cr:cosac :y :ne 'ncustry.
!n addi:icn, three of the advisers have previcus Navy ex:erience arc two hcid degrees in angi: eering.
Eacn cf :ne acviscrs exce:: u::er 1 as nac :rev* us licensec l
c: era:ing ex:erience a :ne R'O cr SRO level, Or :::n, a: ::=er:ial euclear 1
plants using a Westingneuse nuclear steam su:oly system.
The licensac
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experience of Adviser #4 was as an RO en a plant using a Cem:ustien j
Engineering nuclear steam succly system. This aavisor was :ne ene.nc as attending simula:ce training at :ne :icn simula:Or a: the fime of :ne i
evaluation :eam visit. Ucon c:meletion of :nis simulater training, e I
c:nsicer :na; ne,sncuid be adecuately cualifiac c serve as a Snif Acviser a: Diacic Canycn.
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7-During the c:urse of cur review of the' Shift Advisor qualifica icns, we nc ed that no provisic'ns had been made to evaluate the medical status of a
cancidates, althcugh we found :nat three cf the four present Shift Advisors had received a medical evaluation within tne last year in c:nnecticn with their NRC license renewal. To cur kncwledge, one"suojec: Of medical qualifications' has not been raised b'efere.
Mcwever7 we :elie've tha;_. Oe'
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acvisors shculd mee: :ne same medical cri aria as the licensec Operat:rs. 'de discussed this matter with the licensee and it was agreec :na: FGaE wculd arrange for recical examina:icns for the acvisors.
Trainine P-caram The training Oregram acminis ered :: the Shift Acvisor cancicates consists of a four-week ::urse c:vering Olan: rececures, :acnnical s:eci#ica-ices anc
- lant safety-related systems. The : raining eccuies are crawr. ' m ne -equiar plant : raining program and each eccuie is ac::::aniec Oy a "Neec-to-<new" i
sheet which describes the learning cejectives for :03: portien of the training. The evaluation team reviewed ne training progran and c:nclucec l
l that*1: is adecuate to provide the Shift Adviscrs wi-h ne kncwiecge neecec to successfully ;erform advisor du:ies at the Diable Canyon :lant.
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. i Oui::es' and '4rittan Examina:1cn Qui::es are administered at the end of the seccnd and third weeks of : e training pregram and a final writ en examina:icn is acministered at the end of the fourth week. Tne evaluation team reviewed the cui::es and the final examination and the results of these to cete nine heir adequacy. The team
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concluded that :ne final writ en examination, wnicn centained a ratic. of' 60/40% of R0-SRO/SRO level cuestiens, prcvided an adecuate measure of ne student's kncwledge of subject matter presented during the training.
Oral Examination In additien te ne final, written examina.icn of :ne Shift Acvisers, each cancica e alsc undersces an cral examina:icn ccrcuc ec by a beart cf three memcers cf :ne plan: : raining anc ccera:icns staf#s, a:' cf once : ave SRO licensas a: the clant.
Based ucen inteniews wi n :nree of :ne cral examiners and review the available written reccrds, :ne evaluatien team i
concluded that the oral examina:icn previded a valic eneck of -he advisor's kncwledge at the SRO level as related c the aaviser's cuties anc responsibilities. The makeuc of the oral examination boards varied frcm I
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l student to stucent. A total of five memcers of the ciant s aff ccncuctec ne oral examina:icns for :ne first fcur Shift Acvisors.
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Interview of Shift Acvisers The evaluation team interviewed each of the Shift Adviscrs new at the plan:
and on shift. We also c:nducted a gr up interview of the five Shift Acviser candidates who were undergoing the training pr: gram.
( As mentioned earlier, ene of the Shift Advisors wne hac ccmcleted the p1an: training was away frem
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the plant attencing simulator training during the period of the eva'rcatten O
team's visit.) Sach of the three Shift Advisers interviewed underst:cc his duties anc res;cnsibilities, felt that he had receivec acecuate plant-s:ecific training, and ap:eatec c:nfident in his role as Shif: Acviscr.
All re:orted goed working relationsnips with :ne ccerating shifts; nese are expected to impreve further when the advisors are assigned :: s:ecific shifts.
Saca of :ne advisors n,cw On shift as weil as :ne five cancicates in the training program reported favcracly en the training. While the training was intensive, it was acecua:e.
~he Acvisces also sta ac : a: :ne i
instructors wnc c:nducted the c:urse are very geoc. Several acvisces l
s menticned that the training was among the best.tney had ever receivec.
Interview of Selected Shift Crew personnel I
T Several merchrs of the evaluatien team interviewed selectec shif :ersennel, Formal : raining on :ne ranging frem a Shift Foreman to a Centrol Ocerator.
role ci :ne Shift Advisors has not been presented :c :ne shift crews, but the lc crews 3re being briefed by the Shif: Foreren en 'the roles of :ne acvisors anc i
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eacn shift me."cer is in :te process of ackncwlecging nis/her uncers ancing of the advisor roles. All shift memcers had not received the briefing since all cmws had not been on duty since the advisors started wcrting with the shifts.
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!nterview ci-, Senior.2esicent Iracec;cr The Senice Resident Inspector was intertiewed by the evaluation team c ceter-r.ine nis 6.newledge regarding the Shif-Acvisers. He was aware of the aavisces' role anc knew they we-e standing cuty with the coera-ing snifts.
Mcwever,. he had not had an ccccr: Unity Oc prccerly. evalua e the Shif t Acviser activities.
Corclusices The evaluatic.n team concluced :nat:
1.
All Shif t Advisors and Shift Acvisor candicates more than eet the minimum qualifications reco::nencec by the incus:rj.
2.
Procedu: e TP T0-84J1 adecuately describes the duties anc rescensibilities of the Shift Advisors.
2.
The tra.ining prcgram, including :ne qui::es anc examina-icns, acminis erec :o :ne Shift Acvisce cancica es is acecuate :c assure :na-
- ne acvisors will nave sufficient kncwlec;e of :ne iacic Canyon t
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j precedures, technical specifica:icns and safety-related plant systems to adequately per cem :teir duties.
Further, :he training ;r: gram e
adequately covers the duties and responsibilities, and the limitations, of the Shift Advisors.
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The Shift Advisors are ccmfortable with and have a positive attitude tcward their duties. They understand hcw they are to interface with the operating crew.
Further, the c:erating crews ' knew wnat to expect from the Shtf4 Adviscrs. --
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Subject to imolementation of the rec:r=enda:icns noted below, the evaluatien team c:ncluces that the Shift Advisors a: Diablo Canyon are adequately quclified and trained to per'or n their assigned duties.
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Recermendatiens 1.
As soon as sufficient Shift Advisors are available, they snculd be assigned to scecific shifts such that they can develoc as par. of the shift team, reta:ing witn and unde going recualifica:icn training i:n the shift crew.
The licensee stated to :ne evalua-ion team :na: :nis was the intent.
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A for nal evaluation system should be established to assere c:ntinuing i
assessme'nt of the Shift Advisor per'ormance.
Provisions also should be made to obtain :he views of the Shift Advisort en a periedic, formal
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EVALUATICN TEAM Lairence P. C.ecker - Team Leader, Section Leader, Management Tecnnoicey Section Licensee Qualifica:icns Branch 4
Divisien of Human Fact:rs Safety, NRR
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Josech J. Su:y -
Senice Reactor Engineer (Training and Assessment),
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Perscnnel Cualifica:icns Section O
Licensee Qualifica:icns Branch Division of Human Factors Safety, NRR Lcuis-S. Bencer -
Training and Assess =en: 5:ecialis:
Persennel-Qualifica:icns See: ten Licensee Gualificati:ns Branen Division of Human Fac:crs Safety, NRR John O. Elin -
Licensing Examiner Operator Licensing Section i
Region V t
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I Enclesure 2 TRIP TO DIABLO CANYCN Pur;cse: To evaluate the capabilities of the Diaolo Canyon shift advisors to providd' adequate advice to the cperating shifts.
J Plan:
1.
Review the procedurts developed by the lic$nsee ahica describe the
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duties of the advisors and the working relationships between the advisors and the cperating shift personnel.
2.
Examine and evaluate :he ac,equacy of the training pr: gram ;revicec to the shift advisors.
3.
Review the written examina:icn acministerec to ne snift acvisors and tne resuits.
4 Review shift adviser cral examina:icn data anc resu':s anc ciscuss with the examiners the overall. performance of the shift acviscrs en the examinaticn.
5.
Interview the shift advisors :c cc:ain a subjective evaluation of
-heir cacatilities and attitudes anc Oc determine ina: :ney uncers:2ac their duties and :neir relatiensnip :c :ne coe*eting crews.
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Examine ne training program given to ce shift c tws on tne role of the shift advisors and intarview selected operating shift perscnnel to ascertain that operators understand the role of the d
shift advisors.
7.
Obtain cbservattens as available from the-Senior Resident Inscec:cr regrrding t:fe current Terformancle of the. shif t acvisors and hcw.-
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they fit in with the operating crews.
8.
Obtain from the Senicr Resident Ins;ector his evaluatien of the current pe. Wor =ance of the' coerating crews.
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l7 Nu.MBER TP 70-4401 9 (G-sits Pacific Gas and Eectric Company REYIsICN 1 O
OE?MTMENT CF NGC:. EAR 71 ANT CPSFA 1C II 4/ /04
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4 Omat.O CANYCN ACWER P' ANT UNIT NC(S) 1 ANC 2 n
IF.FCRARY PRCCEURE
'll RE3FCMSIBILITIEI AND CUT *E3 CF T'.if 51iI.:7 ACVISCR l
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9 AP**CV C:
PtANT MANAGER CATE c
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.s e As par: cf Our operating licanse (Item 2.c.3.c), ?GancE. vill augmen:
the plan staff by ;r:viding en each shift an individual experienced in c:=carthTe'si:e PVR citirttien. ~ IH adcitien.:: tMs, ?GancE will
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et: the requirefrMts develcped ny the NTCL utility wertiEg7rcues ~~~~
- csiticn en shift c
- erating ex;erience. This precedure estaolishes res;cnsibilities, duties and working relati:nshi;s of this the primary (hencafcrth refer td t: as Shift Acviscr).
This precedure indivicual will be rescinded upon c:::letien of the c:n=1:=ent. This pr cacure and changes therite requires PSRC accreval.
- 4CCEURE
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To pr vide advisory su::crt :: the ::erating snift : tw.
The Shift Acviscr will review and assess :Se i ;_a:: cf si:nificin thift activities ::a art 5:neculec r in
- Nertss anc will kee: c:n -01 at:= :ert:nnei a::rtisec Of any':cteatiai :r :le: a rt a s. -Th e S h i'- acv'sc=-sn ti c : e-- -
invcivec in sign 1ficant snift :: era-t ; :ec si:rs anc ste:==end a::r:::ria:s ac;iens (inciucing ::an: Inut::wns).
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' ne Shift b.
To previi:e tecnnical anc ac=inis:rstive su::cr; ::
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Technical. Advisor,. Shift Fcreman, Sienice Centrei C:ed::r
- l and the C;eratiens Manager.
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Limitatiens_:
a.
Res;cnsibilities. vill net incluce cirect.ani:ulk:icn of equi;=ent.
5.
Res;:nsibilities will alsc net ine'u:e su:e-visien :f licensed c erat:rs in assignments ani:n requirt an erat:r's licznse.
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~n NUMBER 77 TC-6401 Q
s W i-RESFCNSIBI!.ITIE3 AND OUTIE3 CF THE SHIFT ACV:SCR N
3.
Outies:
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The Shift Advisce duties wili include, the follcwing tasks:
a.
Review and assess the impact cf significant shift activiti es.
b.
Review star up precedures planned f:r the shift.
c.
Research any ;ctantial pr:blems involving Technical Specifica icns and pr: vide input based u;cn his experierca.
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The Shift Acviser duti ts r.ay include the f=11cwing tasks:
a.
Review shift tur ever checklists.
b.
Review ecerst:r legs.
c.
Review equi;=ent s:WJs in the Cent-01 R:c=.
d.
Assist in review Of plan: pr:blem et:cr.s.
e.
Assis in :ne rt:aratien Of recuirec rt:cr:s.
f.
Review and rec:: end revisiens :: 0:erating anc I ergency Fr cecurts.
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Parti:i:a:a in snif t : urn:ver a::
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Other tasks as assigned by ne Shi#: Ferecan, 4
'acekine Relatienshics a.
The Shift Advisce assigned :: a shift will et;cr. directly to the Shift Fortman during nor-nal cceratien and plant l
testing, and :s the Shift Technical Adviscr (STA}_ curing any c
plant emer;ency. The Shift Adviscr will also wort closely l
.with all c; era:1cns personnel as necassary :: ;er':rm his duti es.
b.
Shift Acvisers not assigned :
shi't will rt;cr. direcity ::
the Senice Fewer Pr:cuc;ien Engineer (C:erations).
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NWE6 77 t0 M
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- aal.C C#4YCN 7CwF.M 7'.W47 'Ji? NC(31 1 Ang g AEVISICN t 1
OATE 4/5/34 PAGE 3 CF 1
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'm4 RESFCNSI!!!.ITIE5 AND CUTIE 5 CF THE SHIF ACyIsca c.
~he Shift Advisor will es:crt any disagreements that canne:
.te resolved-wita ne Shift ?crt:.an (wnicn..ay affect safe cceratien of the plant) to the General Ccerating Foreman, the Senier Pcwer Pr: duction Engineer, C;eratiens Manager er cther a:pecpriate plant =anagement.
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Miscellanecus At least ene Shift Advisor shall be en duty en each snift a.
whenever the react:r is not in a cold shutd wn c:nci icn.
In case.cf illness.cr.ctheN se, the ":n shif
- Shift i
5-Advisor will make ar angements f:r reMef.
The :n sM f.;'.' '
- ersen will stay until relieved, c.
It shculd be underst:cd tha: the Shift Advisors hear no direct responsibility f:r the c:ert ing crews acti:ns.
CCFF is res;cnsitie f r all as:ects cf ;1an :; era icns.
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i ENCLOSURE 2
/p ney#o, UNITED STATES i
j NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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REGION V
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t450 MARIA t.ANi. SUITE 210 l\\ v f WAL. NUT CREEK.CAUFCRNIA M5SI May 9-'Iv 4'
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~v Docket No. 50-275 Pacific Gas and Electric Company 77 Beale Street, Room 1435 s
San Francisco, California 94106 Attention:
Mr. J. O. Schuyler, Vice President Nuclear Power Generation Gentlemen:
~.
Subject:
Evaluation of Shift Advisor Examinations at the Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant On April 9 through 11, 1984 and on April 24 and 25,1984, the NRC evaluated the qualification, training, and examination of Shift Advisor candidates for the Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plan,t, Unit 1.
As a result of this evaluation the performance of the Training Department of Diablo Canyon was determined to be adequate to ensure that the Shift Advisors neet the ninimum qualifications recoc: mended by the industry. The training program, including quiz:es and examinations, administered to the Shift Advisor candidates was determined to be adequate to assure that the Advisors had sufficient knowledge of the Diablo Canyon procedures, technical specifications, and safety related plant systems to adequately perform their duties.
At the conclusion of the audit on April 11 and 25,1984, the findings were discussed with members of your staff as detailed in the enclosed report.
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l MAY 251984
?acific Gas and Electric Coa:pany 2
i In accordance with 10 CyR 2.790(a), a copy of his 'etter and the enclosure v;11 be placed in the NRC's Pubric Document Room unless you ' notify this office by, telephone within ten days of the date of.his letter and submit written application to withhold informatica contained derein within thirty days of the date of this letter.
Such application must be consistent with the requirenents of 2.790(b)(1).
Sincerely, l
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Bishop, Director
~ Dut'sion e f Reactor--Safety *
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and Projects Tsclosures:
1.
Exanination Report No. 50-275/0L-84-02 cc w/o enclosure:
Robert Thornberry, Plant Manager Tim Martin, Training Manager John Elin, Operator Licensing Exaniner Don Beckhan. OLB. HO n-E.ev.W:.M.aY7'C..
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IXAMINATICN REPORT No. 50-275/0L-84-02 b IACILITY:
Diablo Canven Nuclear Power Plant, Unit 1 DOCKI No:
50-275 kvaluation. of Training and Izamination of Shift Advisor candidates at Diablo payonNuclearPowerPlant, San Luis Obispo, California during April,1984 Auditors:
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Don 3/Beckham, Chief
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/ Date Operator Licensing 3 ranch Division of H n Factors Safety 4.0 a
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//awrenceD.C' rocker,SectionChief
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(/ Lis(nsee Qualifications B, ranch Division of Human ctors Safety
~/ k picenseeQualificatonBranch seph J. Bu:y / Day i Divisi of Hunan actors Safety ~ / i O 2 4 4e . ~ uis S. Bender / Date icensee Qualifications Branch Division of Human Factors Safety CNL Yik? Robert J. Pate, Chief ' Date Operati ns Section L ). b 5 23 r4 ~ hn O. Elin / Dat( erator Licensing Examiner Approved: 3" 4 I Robert J. Pate( Chief / Dat.e t Operations Section SI2fdARY: The purpose of the visit was to evaluate the program of training and certification of the Diablo Canycc Shift Advisors and to assess their ability to provide adequate advise based upon their previous operating experience and their detailed knowledge of the Diablo Canyon Facility. l The licensee's training and certification program for Shift Advisors was l adequate and in conformance with general industry criteria for Shift Advisors. 1 i
, - - - = '1 l.* 4 t 1 i DETAII.S 'h 1. Persons Contactid ^ /
- R.
C. Thornberry, Plant Macr c r
- W. G. Crockett, Senior Powe,r ireduction Engineer
- T. Martin, Trnining Manager
- J. Holden, Assistant Training Manager
- P. T. Sargent, Senior Training Instructor T. Nahay, Shift Advisor D. Fordham, Shif,t Advisor P. Saavely, Shift Advisor
- 3. Lewis, Shift Advisor s
D. Riity, Shift Advisor E. Hyde, Shift Advisor D. Barkley, Shift Advisor J. Maley, Shift Advisor [,
- Indicates,attendaq,ce at the exit interyiews on April 11 and Ap il 25 r
1984 ~ . : ~: a 2. Scope of the Evaluation: An initial evaluation team composed of three members of the Licensee Qualifications Branch, Division of Human Factors Safety, NRR, and an Operator Licensing Examiner from, Region V visited the site during the week of April 9, 1984. This team reviewed, as part of the evaluation of the licensee's Shif t Advisor Program: a. The resumes of the Shift Advisors. b. The procedure developed by the licensee which describes the duties l and responsibilities of the Shif t Advisor. c. The training program provided to the Shift Advisors by the licensee. d. The weekly quizzes and the final written examination s'$ninistered to the first group of Shift Advisors. The results of the oral awa=+nationa administered to the first e. group of Shift Advisors. Additionally, interviews were conducted with the following individuals: i f. Three seabers of the facility st ff who had administered portion's of the Shift Advisor oral 'av==4 amtions. ~~ g. Selected members of the facility operating staff regarding the Shift Advisor program. h. Eight of the nine Shift Advisors. ~.. .} 7 1 v+ u-y., -ww ..r-. --i_- --,--c-r_--,--p-.-. w-- ,w+,---ww-, .cw-,-w 4-e-.-----, w nw.,- -g-. _--,-..-s-.--
4 2 A followup evaluation team composed.of the Chief of the Operator ) Licensing Branch, Division of Human Tactors Safety, NRR; the Chief of the Operator Licensing Section, Region V, and an Operator Licensing Examiner, Region V, visited the facility during the week of April 23, 1984 This team, as part of the evaluation; a. Reviewed the final examination for the second group of Shift Advisors prior to it's administration. b. Monitored the licensee's administration of the final examination for the second group of Shift Advisors. c. Independently graded two examinations and compared the results to the facility staff's grading of the same examinations. ~ d. Audited three oral examinations administered by the facility. -* ~ ~. -~ ~ ~-~ The evaluation team did not make a pass /f ail recommendation on any---. individual candidate but rather evaluated the licensee's program for training and certification of these candidates. 3. Program Status At the time of the initial-NRC team visit, four Shif t Advisors had completed the facility training program. Three of these Shift Advisors were working with the plant operating shifts on a 12-hour rotating shif t basis. The fourth Shift Advisor was undergoing a week of training at a simulator. Five additional Shift Advisor candidates were in the licensee's training program. The 12-hour shif t schedule of the Shif t Advisors contrasted to the five shift rotation scheme of the licensee's operating crews. The licensee intended to assign a Shift Advisor to each of the five shift sections upon the completion of certification of the five Shift Advisors who were in the training program. The Shift Advisor would then rotate as a shift member for both watchstanding and for requalification training. Thus the Shift Advisor would participate in the same requalification program as the shift crews. 4. Shift Advisor Procedure i The procedure governing the duties and responsibilities of the Shift Advisor was TP T0-840, " Responsibilities and Duties of the Shift Advis o r." Revision 1 of this procedure, dated April 5,1984 was in effect at the time of the audit. In accordance with this procedure, the Shift Advisor, while on duty, reports to the Shift Foremaal Vhen not on shift duty, Shift Advisors report to the Senior Power Production 4 Engineer (Operations). The procedure was found to describe the duties i of the Shift Advisor adequately and detail his lines of communicatica with the opesating crew. + i 1 i 1 ( .J l I .i
a j 4 5. Shift Advisor Oualification s l i ne evaluation team reviewed the resumes of the Shift Advisors. All of l l the advisors had considerably more power plant and nuclear plant experience than the minimum proposed by the industry. In addition, three of the advisors had previous Navy Nuclear experience a'nd two hold degrees in Engineering. All but one of the advisors had previous licessed operating experience at the RO or SRO level, or both, at commercial nuclear power plants using a Westinghouse Nuclear Steam Supply System similar to that utilized at Diablo Canyon. One advisor candidate had previous licensed experience as an R0 at a facility using a Combustion Engineering Nuclear Steam Supply System (also PMO. This advisor was attending. simulator training at the Zion simulator to supplement the standard Shift Advisor training. All Shift Advisors and Shift Advisor candidates were deemed to have adequate comunercial nuclear power plant experience to serve as Shift Advisors. ~. ~~~~ 6. Trainina Program The training program administered to the Shift Advisor candidates consisted of a four-week course covering plant procedures, technical specifications and plant systems. The training modules are drawn from the regular plant training program and each module is accompanied by a "Need-to-know" description of the learning objectives for that portion of the training. The training p'rogram was deemed to be adequate to provide the Shif t Advisor with detailed information of systems and procedures specific to the Diablo Canyon facility. 7. Week 1v Quizzes and Writtig, Examination Quizzes were administerei at the end of the second and third weeks of the training program. A final written examination, administered at the completion of the four-week course concluded the written evaluation of the Shift Advisor candidatss ability. The evaluation teams reviewed the quizzes and the final eximination to determine their adeguacy. The written examination given to the first group of Shif t Advisors consisted of about 60% questions appropriate to SR0/R0 level candidates and 40% appropriate to SRO level candidates. The l written es==4 nation given to the second group of Shift Advisor Candidates consisted of 23% RO level questions 57% SRO/R0 level questions and 20% Sao level questions. On this examination, about 22% of the questions were Technical Specification related and 64% of the questions were specific to the Diablo Canyon facility. \\ g, The final written examination administered to the second group of Shift Advisor candidates was monitored by the second NRC evaluation team. At the conclusion of this examination, prior to grading, a copy of the responses of two of the five candidates was provided to the evaluation team for independent grading. After the facility had completed grading of the. candidates' response, the resulting grades were compared. The l facility grades proved to be within 1% of the grade arrived at by the evaluation team in one case and the same grade was assigned in the other. j ~ t {
4 Both evaluation teams concluded that the written examinations were an 'S adequate and appropriate measure of"the candidate's knowledge of plant specific material as presented during the training program. Additionally, the recommendations of the training department as to the capability of the candidate seemed appropriate. ~
- 3. ' ~0ral Examinations
- 4.,'. -
-;.i* In addition to the final written examination, each candidate was J' examined orally by a board of three members of the facility training and operations staff, each of whom holds an SRO license at the Diablo Canyon facility. The Oral Examinations were conducted in the control room sad consisted of a valkthrough of rystems, procedures, and Technical Specification requirements similar to that given on NRC license examinations. The first evaluation team interviewed three of the five oral board members for the initial group,of Shif t Advisor candidates, and reviewed .he writt'en records of"the oral-bo'ard examinatiocs given to' the fi.rst; ~~ group of Shift advisor candidates. Based upon these interviews and record reviews, the audit team concluded that the oral examinaiton provided a valid check of the Advisor's knowledge of the facility at the SRO level, and the Adviser's duties and responsibilities while on shif t. The second evaluation team observed the oral examinations of three of the five members of the second group of Shif t Advisor candidates. The questions used were varied over the two days of the oral examinations and appropriate care was taken to assure that the candidate did not have access' to the previously used oral questions. The examinations appeared consistent in scope and depth and provided an adequate evaluation of the candidate's abilities. The evaluation team agreed with the recommendations of the oral board. 9. Interview of Shif t Advisors The initial evaluation team interviewed.three of the four Shif t Advisors who had been previously certified by the licensee and all five of the Shift Advisor candidates who were in a training status at the time of the initial visit. One Shift Advisor was attending simulator training as noted previously. Each of the Shif t Advisors interviewed adequately understood his duties and responsibilities as Shif t Advisor and felt that the training that he had received was adequate as a result of int 4nsive trsining on the facility. The advisors generally felt that.the instructors who had conducted the course were very good. Several Advisors mentioned that the training provided, though intense, was among the best that they had received at a facility. 4 All of the Shift Advisors reported a good working relationship with the licensee's shiftt crews and expected that this working rel.ationship would r improve when the Shift Advisors were assigned to a specific shift crew rather than the overlapping watch organization dictated by the lack of certified Shift Advisors. t
5 7 10. Interview of Selected Shift Crew Personnel Several members of the initial evaluation team interviewed selected shift personnel. Formal training on the role of the Shift Advisors had not been presented to the shift crews; however, the crews wene briefed by , the Shift Foreman on each crew as to the duties and responsibilities of S ^' the Shift Advisor. All shift ' members had not received or acknowledged ,. ' _the briefing at the time of the initial visit, since all of the crews 'E had not been on duty since the advisors commensed shif t operations. This briefing of operating personnel had been completed by the time of the second visit. s 11. Conclusions The evaluation teams concluded that: a. All Shif t Advisors met the minimum experiepce recommended by the ] nuclear industry. ~. b. The facility procedures adequately 'defise' the' Shif t Advisor'-e--, duties and responsibilities. c. The training program, including written and oral exanisations was adequate to ensure that the advisors will have sufficient knowledge of the Diablo Canyon procedures, tech =ical specifications, and systems to adequately perform there, duties. d. The training program adequately covers the areas of responsibility of the Shift Advisor. 12. Recommendations a. A formal evaluation system should be established to ensure continuing assessment of Shif t Advisor performance. b. Shift Advisors should meet the same medical requirements as licensed operators. 13. Exit Interview At the conclusion of the team evaluations on April 11 and April 25, 1984, the evaluation teams met with the licensee representatives, as detailed in paragraph 1, and discussed the evaluation findings as detailed above. ^ z. ~Q., e 6 e' e d. 's e + - = = * ,..._m=== ^ 4 j/ UNITED STATS 3 g , ( %' NUCLEAR REGULATORY COM*,ilSSICN / I REGION V f " </[# f 1450 MARI A *.ANE. SQ1TE *10 .s WALNUT oREZK. CALIFC ANIA 9 106 s y ....= El2' S MEMORANDUM FOR: Harold R. Denton, Director, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation FROM: J. B. Martin, Regional Administrator
SUBJECT:
SPECIAL INSPECTION OF THE PERFORMANCE OF THE OPERATING CREWS - DIABLO CANYON, UNIT.1. (
Reference:
Staff Requirements Memorandum, S. J. Chilk to W. J. Dircks, dated March 29,1984) ~ . ~. Enclosed is the report of the subject special inspection directed of the staff by the Comission. .c This inspection was conducted by a Special Inspection Team consisting of senior members of the Region V staff, Senior Resident and Resident Inspectors assigned to operating power reactors' in Region V, and three consultants frem the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory and EG&G Idaho, Inc. The overall assessment of the Special Inspection Team was that the per#cmance of the operating crews at Diablo Canyon, Unit 1 was above average when compared to similar licensed facilities during initial startuo and low power operation. The shift advisors were cbserved to be effectively integrated into shift activities and appeared to be well ac:epted by re.T.bers of the operating crews. This inspection provided an opoortunity by the Special Inspection Team to assess the involvement of licensee management, both senior site management and corporate management, in the day-to-day operation of Diablo Canyon, Unit 1. In this regard, we found management involvement to be substantive and effective. During the course of the inspection, concerns were identified by the Special Inspection Team where improvements in the performance of operating activities appeared to be warranted. These concerns were brought to the attention of licensee management, and priority attention was given to the satisfactory i resolution of each. In addition, the licensee has comitted to goals. for continued involvenent by corporate and senior site management in the day-to-day operation of the facility. e 1 i
j -i JUN 2*.i'.i -1 Harold R. Denton f Based upon the results of this ins;:ection and licensee management ccmitments o continued invoivement in c: erat;onal activities, 4 feel there is reasonable assurance that Diaolo. Canyon, Unit I can :e safety : cerated at =cwer levels above 5 percent and up to f all. ower. c Should you or your staff have questions regarding this inspectico or Our findings, please let me knew. J. 3. Martin Regional Administrator
Enclosure:
~ Inspecticn Rel:crt No. 50-275/84-07. - ,s . : ~ cc: w/o Enclosure H. L. Thompson. 0/DHFS g. ? e i
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UNrTED STATES .i NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 5' .e ;
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e REGICN V %i c - e m taso M Aa:A :.ANs. SutTE 210 g w AL.9ur castx. c2uncasia sasse Jiit . t O V ' w '.. Docket No. 50-275 4 Pacific Gas and Ilectric Company 77 Beale Street Room 1/.35 San Traccisco, California 94106 Attention: Mr. J. O. Schuyler, VJce President ~ Nuclear Power Ge:eration' ' ~ ~ ~
Subject:
NRC Inspection of Diablo Canyon Unit 1 This refers to the special teain inspection conducted by Mr. J. L. Crews and others of this of fice, on April 19 - May 23,198I. a:d June 12, 198!., of activities authori:ed by NRC License No. DPR-76. / Areas examined during this inspection.are described i: the enclosed i spection report. Wi:his these areas, the inspection consisted of se'.ective exacisations of procedures and representative records, iste:siews with personnel, and observations by the inspectors. No. items of concocpliance with NRC requirements were ide:tified within the scope of this inspection. In accordance with 10 C7R 2.790(a), a copy of this le er a:d :.he enclosure will be placed i: the NRC Public Docu=e :. Room unless you so-ify this of fice,-, by telephece, wi:hin ten days of the date of this let.e: and sub=i writte: application to withhold infor=ation connaised thereis withis thirty days of the date of this letter. Such application must be consistent wi.h the ) require =ents of 2.790(b)(1). <~ e oP 1 4 4 -) J .9 lt 11 .i
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Daci[ic Gas and Electric Ceepany -2, w-t . r. 2 Should you have any questions concer:i=g this inspection, we will be glad to discuss them with you. Siscerely, 2A ed a,. T. d Dishop, Direc $r
- Division of Reactor Saf ety and Projects Esclosure:
Inspection Repor-No. 50-275/84-07 ec w/ enclosure: P. A. Cra=e, PG&.c. S. M. Skidmore, PG&E R. C. nor:berrf, PG&E p t
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- t Observations and Cements Initial Reacter StErtup and Zero Pcwer Reacter Physics Tests Diablo Canyon Nuclear Pcwer Plant, Unit 1 NRC Region V Scecial Inspection a
.e= by L. Rolf Petersen Nuclear Systems Safety Procram Lawrence Livermore Natienal Laboratory May 18, 1984 6 l
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't a t, h Cbservatiens and Coninents Initial Reacter Startuo and Zero 7:wer Reactor Mysics Tests Diablo Canyon Nuclear Pcwer Plant, Unit 1 3 j by / L. Rolf Peterson Lawrence Liverscre Natienal ' abcratcry May 18,1984 ) I participated as a consultant member of the NRC Region V Scecial Inspection Team at Diablo Canyon Nuclear Pcwer Plant, Unit 1, during April and May 1984 Frier to initial reacter criticality I was en site at Diasle Canycn from s Acril 19 until April 22, 1984 Initial reacter criticality was achieved at C007, Acril 29,1984 After initial reacter startuo, I was on site fren A:ril 30 until May 2,1984, and from May 7 until May 9,1984, to evaluate the zero power reacter physics tests and to cbserve the per,f:rmance of
- rtue and ccerating personnel during these tests.
I~~~ ~he initial startup of Diablo Canycn 1'was cond0cted' in'ite:rdance with -. ' Facific Gas and Electric C moany (PG&E) Test Precedure Nc. 40.0, Startuo Fracram Master Cccument, Sections 13.0 thecugh 17.0. Zero ecwer :hysics tests were conducted in accordance with Secticn 18.0. Detailed PG&E test peccedures used in conjuncticn with Test Pr:cedure 40.0 were: Test Precedure No. 41.2 Initial Criticality Test Procedure No. 41.3 Nuclear Design Checks Test Precedure No. 41.4 Rcc and Ber:n *derth Measurements Curing Beren Dilution Test Precedure No. 41.5 Centrol Bank '4crtn "easuremer.ts (with Overla:) Curing Beren Accition Test Precedure No. 41.6 Roc Centrol Cluster Assembly (RCCA) Pseudo Ejection at Zero j a Power i Test Precedure No. 41.7 Minimum Shutdown Verification and Stuck Rod Worth Measurement l
- j
'j On April 19, 1984, I attended the briefing given by Bob Fischer en the Diablo d Canyon plant operations organizatien and the briefing on initial criticality 1 and zero pcwer testing given by Mike Ncrem (lead startu: engineer) and Steve l Santon (startup engineer). A synocsis of the cetailed test orecedures listed i above was rev.iewed during the latter briefing. j l w 4 S e. f ii
.] .I ] During the remainder of this 4/19-22/84 plant visit I made c:mplete tours of s the Unit I turcine and auxiliary buildings and tne Unit I centainment building. ^ , I familiarized myself with the Unit 1 centrol reem and observed preparations ~ to heat up the plant and make.the transitien from Mode 5 Cold Shutdown to Mcce a Hot Shutdewn. I reviewed in' detail Test Precedure 41.2, Initial Criticality. I found that the precedure was c mplete and incorscrated gced Operating practices for a safe approach to initial reactor criticality. The precedure included preper precautions to prevent an unanticipated criticality and to ensure proper detecticn of the neutren multiplicatien and neutrcn Doculatien by the scurce range detectors and the intermediate range detecters during reactor startue. The precedure incorporated precer cocedination of boren dilutien and centrol rce assemoly withcrawal to ensure an crderly and safe accroach to initial reactor criticality. The procedure also included procer stees af ter initial criticality to detect the onset of nuclear heating, to determine the flux level uccer limit for zero ocwer physics testing, to check the basic kinetic - ber.avice of the re3ctor by hea's1; ring 'the d'oubTing time-or reactor period after ~~~ a small reactivity addition, and to check the operatien of the reactivity ^ computer. Initial reacter criticality of Diablo Canyon 1 was achieved at 0007 hours (12:07 am), Acril 29, 1984 The precicted bcron ccncentration fer initial cr'ticality with all centrol rods withcrawn was acercximately 1310 + 52 ocm. Actual measured beren cencentration cur,ing initial criticality was T344 pcm. f-This value was within the acceptable uncertainty tolerance of the predictec va ue. Curing my-visit to the plant en April 30 until May 2,1984, I reviewec Test Pr:cecures 41.3, 41.4, 41.4, 41.5, 41.5,.And 41.7 and observed the progress of zer: cower pnysics tests. In the control recm, I ccserved measurements of
- ntr01 red bank reactivity acrth, critical bcron concentration at control rod tart end cints, isothe" mal temCerature ccefficient, and zer: ;cwer c0re #1ux cistribution. Tnese measurements were concucted using Test Or:cedures 47.3 anc 41.4 I also observed a calibration check of tne reactivity c0mouter against reacter ccubline time (reacter period) measurements in acc:rcance with Stancard Test Procedure G-8C.
The PGLE crews on shift properly followed test procedures in making all me as urements. I observed that the lead startup engineer on each shift was ex:erienced in reactor startue and test operations and understood the measurements being made. They used proper testing technicues to ensure that valid data was obtained. The PG&E startuo organization also used these nuclear design checks to give less experienced persennel imocrtant en-the-jeb training in performing st'artuo core physics measurements. I observed good c cceraticn between the PG&E startuo persennel and the Westinghouse startuo re:resentatives while the nuclear design verification measurements were being made. -2 e _w gm - ~
j .i ~ When I left the plant'on May 2,1984, I was satisfied that PG&E had adecuate S safe precedures in place for the Diablo Canycn 1 zero pcwer physics tests and lthat the plant startuo cersonnel were conducting these tests ccrrectiv and ~ safely. PG&E ccmpleted zero power physics tests en May 6,1984 t I visited the Diable Canyon clant again en May 7 until May 9,1984 During tnis visit I reviewed the data and results of the zero pewer physics tests. I aise reviewed'the centrol rod withdrawal limits imecsed to ensure that a negative mcderator temperature ccefficient is maintained to meet Technical Specification 3.1.1.3. I concur with the rod withdrawal limits chosen by PG&E which were based on measured isothermal temperature coefficient data obtained Acril 30 - May 2,1984 On May 8, 1984, I met with PG&E startuo engineers Steve Santen and Pete Sarafian and reviewed all zero pcwer physics test data and results. In all cases except two, the measured parameters confermed to predicted design values anc tolerances that were provided by Westinghcuse and incorperated into the PG&E test precedures. For both exceptient, the measurec values were mere ~ ~ ~ cceservative from' a safety staWccoint ttian the predictec,alues. ~ ~ ~ Ouring Test Precedure 41.7, the measured integral wceth cf Shutdewn Control Rec Bank 0 was 948 pcm reactivity. This measured value exceeded the predicted value of 854 pcm with a + 10% tolerance that had been previded by Westingneuse. The measured integral reactivity =crth was verified by ccecarisen with beren cencentratien endcoint measu'rements made, fer Shutdcwn Bark 0 fully withdrawn / anc fully inserted. The PG&E startue c'ersennel and the Westinghouse startue recresentative determined that the measured reactivity wceth was acceptable. I cencur with this evaluatien. The intergral reactivity worth measurements anc :ne beren endcoint measurements are censistent. The larger measured reactivity worth of Shutdewn Bank 0 indiqates that a greater shutdewn cacacility is available fecm this centrol rod bank than was originally predicted. Cc-ing Test Precedure 41.5, the measured integral -eactiv ty wceth of : suede i ejection of Rod Control Cluster Assemoly 3-6 (RCCA 5-6) cf Contrei Bank 0 was 275 ccm reactivity. The predicted value proviced by Westingneuse was 420 ccm witn a + 10% tolerance. The worth of RCCA 3-6 was measured during toth beratien and bcron dilution with less than 1 pcm reactivity deviatien. The PG&E Startup personnel and the Westinghouse startup representative determined that this result deviated from Westinghcuse design review criteria but did not violate safety review criteria. I concur with this determinaticn. The measured worth indicates that a smaller positive reactivity increase would occur frcm ejection of the single red' control cluster assembly that had been predicted. .? The test data sucocrts the accuracy of the RCCA 3-6 pseuco ejected rod measurements. The predicted 480 pcm reactivity worth of tne single ejected centrol rod assemely ap' pears to be too larv. Centrol Bank 0 has nine centrol red assemblies, including RCCA 9-6. Th e C J trol Bank 0 integral worth was S j - 1q i
j measured during Test Precadure 41.4 with all other centrol reds withdrawn. D,e measured total integral worth of Control _.3ank 0 was 938 ;cm reactivity. , The measured 275 ;cm reactivity worth for ejection of single assemoly RCCA S-6 'is reasonable when ecmpared to the measured worth cf the entire Centrol Bank 0 in a similar core configuration. ~ Cenclusions I found that PG&E had adecuate and c:melete crecedures in place to safely conduct the initial reactor startup and zero pcwer physics tests at Diable Canyon Nuclear Pcwer Plant, Unit 1. The Diaolo Canycn 1 ocerating crews and startuo perscnnel that I cbserved en shift in the centrol recm follcwed the establisned precedures and performed competently. I reviewed the data and results of the Diablo Canyen 1 initial reacter criticality startue and zero pewer reacter physics tests. I cencur with the test data analyses and evatbations made-by by PG&E and.Wes:ingneuse startuo personnel. .No deviatiens from expected reactor nuclear design characterittTes ' ~.. _ - that would adversely affect safety of operations of Diabic Canycn 1 were - cbserved curing initial reactor startue and :ero pewer reacter :hysics tests. s O I e 0025R ,4 i l ~ r-
~ i 3 U. S. NUCLEAR REGUI.ATORY CCMMISSION w
- l REGICN 7 Report No.
50-275/St.-07 Docket No. 50-275 License No. DPR-76 Licensee: Pacific Gas and Electric Conpany 77 Beale Street San Francisco, Califor:tia 9t.106 Facility Name: Diablo Canyon, Unit 1 Inspection at: Diablo Canyon Site Inspection conducted: April 19 - May 23, 1981. and June 12, 198t. ~.. NY J N-Inspectors: J. L. l Crews; Senior Reactor Eng:.neer and Dite Signed TeagLeade f/k/W6:1/ d s,'f / A.'-C. Johnson, Enforcenent Of ficer D4te Sig:rud IY) f. d /' 4 v A. E/. ' Chaff ee, Senzor Resident Inspector, Date Signed San Onofre ./ bl/3 /$d ^ 'f M-D -/ J.E.',Kd.ardt, Senior Resident Inspector, Date hgned Hamcho.Seco /lif Ga h / Ey$s/ru S hemards Resident In:pector, Irojan Date Signed P. J J Morri ', Reactor Inspector Date Signed l lI [A/l/jY { / / 'A ~ M. J...' P ovan, Residsjet' Inspec or, Date S5igned Diablo.anyon v /,' Y,$~~ g 1 e ~ D. P. Hatst, Reactor Inspettor Date Jigned i ~$
..d Other Accompanying Personnel: L. R. Peterson, Consultant, Lawrence Liver:nore National Laboratory (LI.NL) Consultant, EG&G Idaho, Inc. (EG&G) R. L. S _ P. ~. Isak en, Consultant, EG&G Idaho, Inc. (EG&G) Approved 37: / J. B. Martin, Regional Administrator Date Signed J Summary: Inspection on Aoril 19-May 23, 1984 and June 12,1984 (Report No. 50-275/84-07) Areas Inseected: Special Team Inspecticn of the operating crews during initial star.up and low' power testing.~ ~ Thil inspection. involved 657 ' ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ inspection hours (including 300 hours devoted to routine inspection activities) by eight NRC personnel and 143 inspection hours by three NRC ^ consultants. Findings: No items of noncempliance resulted from this inspection. The NRC Resident Inspection staff is, however, continuing to examine the circumstances regarding the use of a special test device (optical isolator) in a non-safety related system without proper testing prior to use. Additional information is necessary to determine if such use was in violation of NRC requirements. ~ 'l w e 6. .. s e g w - m
q... DETAILS 'N L. Persons Contacted
- G. A. Maneatis, Executive Vice President
- J. O. Schuyler, Vice President, Nuclear Power Generation
- J. D. Shiffer, Manager, Nuclear Power Operations W. A..Raymond, Assistant Manager, Nuclear Powe: Operations
- R.
C. Thornberry, Site Manager R. Patterson, Assistant Site Manager. Plant Superintendent J. D. Townsend, Assistant Plant Superintendent J. M. Giscion, Assistant Site Manager, Technical Services T. J. Martin, Training Manager s J. A. Sexton, Manager of Operations R. L. Fisher, Sr. Power Production Engineer L. F. Vomack, Manager, Engineering (Site) S. N. Santon, Sr. Nuclear Enginee-B. W. Giffin, I&C Maintenance Manager S. R. Frid(e'/, Gene.ral Operating Ioreman _~ The inspectors also held discussions with and observed the performance of numerous other licensee employees and contractor / consultant personnel during the course of the inspection; these included Shif t Foremen, Shif t Advisors, Shif t Technical Advisors, Senior Control Room Operators, Control Room Operators, unlicensed operations personnel startup engineers, saintenance technicians and quality assurance personnel.
- Attended Management Meeting on June 12, 1984 2.
Oceratine Crev ?erformance
===. Background=== By Staff Requirements Memorandum, dated March 29, 198a, the Commission directed the NRC staff to "... conduct a special :nspectica of operating crews..." during low power operation at the Oiablo Canyon L*n : 1. The principal purpose of the current Special Team Inspection was to implement the special inspection directed by the Commission. Soecial Inscection Team Cemoosition and Pattern of Inseection The inspection was carried out by senior sembers of the Region V staff, Senior Resident and Resident Inspectors assigned to operating power reactors in Region V, and three NRC consultants from the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) and EG&G Idaho, Inc~ (EG&G). The latter ccasultants (two individuals) from EG&G currently provide contract assistance to the NRC staff in the conduct of operator license examinations for PVR (Vestinghouse supplied) power reactor facilities. The consultant,from LLNL is an experienced reactor physicist, and has previously served as a consultant to the NRC staff in the area of human f actors evaluation of control room layout and design. To evaluate the performance of the operating crews, sembers of the Special Inspection Team were assigned to essentially around-the-clock 4 l e 3
2 j 1 i 4 coverage of shift operations c:mmencing on April 19, 1984, when plant heacup in preparation for initial criticality was snarted. Excep for .j g the period April 22-24, 1984 during which the approach to initial / criticality was discontinued for :eplace=ent of a leaking 0-ring in the No. 4 Reactor Coolant Pump Seal housing, this essentially around-the-clock coverage continued through initial criticali.y (at 0007 hours on April 29, 1984) and until May 4, 1984. During the balance of the inspection period through May 23, 1984, when low powe: testing was completed, members of the 5 ecial Inspec. ion Team visited the plant as 2 random hours, unannounced, on May 7-11, 14-18, and 21-23, 1984. The above pattern of inspec-ion permit.e4 me:nbers of the inspection team to observe the performance of each of the five operating crews as well as the conduct of portions of essencially all of the zero power physics and special low power tests. Assessment of Ooerating Crew Performance Operating t ew performhhee wa's ass' esse'a hased spco. the Special Team's-observation of (1) the conduct of scheduled plant evolutions duriHg'iero' ~.. - power physics and low power tests and training demonstrations (including natural circulation tests), (2) crew response to unplanted events (including one occasion on May 3, 1984 when reactor trip and Safety Injection actuation occurred), and (3) through discussions with individual operating crew member,s. Particular emphasis was given to the extent to which Shift Advisors (individuals under contrac: to the licensee to provide on-shift experience in the operation of similar licensed power reactor facilities) were integrated into the shift operations. The overall performance of the operating crews was judged by the Special Inspection Team to be above average in plant k.nowledge and in the conduc. of operating duties (including the use of and adherence to operating procedures) when compared to operators of power :eactor facilities of similar type (Vestinghouse, P%'R) during the initial plant startup and early operating period. Prior to commencement of the current inspection, on Apr:1 i3,1984, the leader of the Special Inspection Team questioned a ser.ior licensed operator in the control room regarding the no: mal alignment. (manual and-. automatic valve positions) of the Safety Injection System. The operator's response was one of apparent uncertaint/ regarding the proper alignment (position) of such valves. This observation, coupled with a recent event (on April 7,1984) in which valves for the Boron Injection Tank were found to be improperly aligned (electrical motor breakers racked out) prompted a concern which was brought to the attention of licensee management. In response, prompt steps were taken by senior site management to direct special training for all licensed plant operators in the proper alignment of safety related systems of the plant and the Limiting Conditions for Operation a:seciated with these systems. During the course of the current inspection there was not a repeat of such a response by any of the plant operators. i g j s _m
l 3 i An instance of i= proper clearance and independent verification of the removal from service of a 3aric Acid-Transfer pump by two non-licensed plant operators occur ed during the current inspection, and is discussed 5 in paragraph 3 of th5hE report. Although this occurrence did not have direct i= pac: on nuclear safety, in this instance, it did reveal a potential generic. weakness in the licensee's procedures and practice with regard to the independent verification of operating activities by operations personnel. Shift Advisors were observed to participate extensively in the conduct of plant operations and the evaluation of plant performance. Seven qualified Shift Advisors are currently utilised at the plant. Tive have been assigned to the operating shifts, and thus rotate with the crews to which they are assigned. Their knowledge and experience appears to have been integrated effectively into the operating staff. These individuals were observed to confer frequently with plant opera c es and shif t supe rvision. Discussions with plant operators and supervision revealed an appare.n high degree of acceptance.of the Shift Advisors by the operating crews. In a'd'ditten to the role of--pr:viding experienced advice ~ - - ~'~~ to the operating crew members, Shift Advisors have been assigned to special tasks for plant improve =ent. One such task is a special effort to reduce the number of unnecessary control room annunciator actuations during normal plant operation. The tur over of infor=ation during shift change was observed by the Special Inspection Team on a routine basis. Individual one-to-one turnover by Shif t Foremen and the Control Operators is covered by for=al checklists on which the status of plant sys ems and instru=entation is docume::ed during a joint "walidown" of the control room panels. Following the one-to-one turnove gs, a shift briefing is conducted by the oncoming Shift Foreman. These briefisgs were observed to be thorough, typically lasti=g approximately 20 to 30 minutes. Startup engineers were observed to participate extensively in the shif t briefing to discuss testing seneduled for the shift and the expected plant response. During these sh f: briefings plant :perator c:=me: s, questions a:d recoc=endations were encouraged. Overall, the shif turnover and briefings were observed to be thorough and effective. Observaticas by the Special Inspection Team did, however, reveal the need for improvements in two areas of shif t turnover. During the early part of i the inspection period the number of personnel in the control room area duri=g shif t briefings was observed to be large, approaching 15 or more persons on some occasions. This led to an atmosphere of potential distraction to the control operators. Whe: -his observation was brought to the attention of licensee management, sh:. briefing were moved to the Unit 2 area of the control room, while two to three operators remained in the Unit 1 area and were subsequently briefed separately. Another observation by the Special Inspection Team was that shif t briefings did not include participation by maintenance representatives. In response to this observati::, licensee management included the regular participation by the on-shift Instru=ent and Control Maintenance Foreman in the shift briefings. The planned installation and use of special tes: I equipment was a particular subject covered by these individuals. } 9 i
4e> e 4 The licensee has established a " carpeted area" of de control room whe:ein visual and audible surreillance of instrumenta: ion, alarms, and reactor controls is maintained by plant operators. Access to this area / was obser-red to be effectively controlled. Rules have been established and implemented, whereby permission to enter the "ca:peted area" must be obtained from the. Senior Control Operator or Control Operator. There appeared to be a strong discipline in adherence to the access control
- ules 1
Hours of work by operations personnel were examined and found to be well within regulatory requirements. For the period April 1 through May 15, 1984, the average and maximum overtime for operations personnel regularly assigned to shift operations was as follows: Classification Average Overtime
- Maximum Overtime
- Shift Foresen 4 hours /wk 5 hours /wk Senior Control Operators 5 hours /wk 7 hours /wk cond51 Op'rators"
.'4 hours /wk. 6 hours /wk ~ e Assistant Control Operators 4 hours /wk 7 hours'/Uk ~ Auxiliarf Operators 4 houxs/wk 8 hours /wk
- Rounded to nearest hour The average overtime for Instrum' ntation and Control Technicians during a e
similar period, although within regulatory requirenents, was somewhat highe: than operations personnel, averaging approximately 14 hours per week during the period April 23 through May 19, 1984 Additional findings regarding opfrating crew perfor=ance are included in the reports of NRC consultants who participated'in the inspection. These reports are included as At.achments 1 through 3 to this report. 3. Equi; ment Control procedures and practices 4 The Special Inspection Team observed the implementation of procedures - established by the licensee over the use of electrical ju=pers (and lifted leads) and the removal / return to service of equipment and components important to safety. The records of jumpers and lifted leads were examined frequently during the course of the inspection. Although administrative discrepancies (essentially in all cases errors in the current index of the active jumper log) were identified on two occasions, no actual misuse or loss of effective control over the use of electrical jumpers was identified. Errors in the current index of active jumpers were resolved in each case when it was deter:sined that either an " active" jumper in question had i been removed and the record of its use thus removed from the log without the index being updated or the record of a specific jumper's use had been improperly placed in the jumper logbook. The S'pe~cial Inspection ~reas observed the ilmplementation of procedures for the removal from service and restoration of equipment on several 1 -o---
a occasions, and except for the instance on May 15, 1984' discussed below . observed no significant discrepancies. In particular, the removal of de J Steam-Driven Auxi'liary Feedvater Pump from service for repair on April 27, 1984 was examined in detail. The removal of the pump from service was carried out in accordance with equipment clearance procedures, including tag-o'ut. Ent.y into an Action Statement of the governing technical specification was properly documented to assure return of the pump to se:vice within the time period required. An occurrence on May 15, 1984, involving the improper removal from service of a Boric Acid Transfer Pump (P1-2), was examined in depth by the Special Inspection Team. This occurrence was brought to the attention of,the NRC inspectors who arrived at the site shortly following its discove:7 Circumstances regarding the occurrence were as follows. A Clearance Request had been approved on May 14, 1984 to remove pump P1-2 from service to investigate reported motor vibration. In preparation for ] this work the pump was to be remov.ed from servn e on the morning of May 15,1984..,Two nos:; lice;ised Auxiliary Sperators (AO) were, assigned to, remove the ; ump from service by' racking 'out 'the erectrical breakar for I ~ ~~ the pump motor. In accordance with procedures for independent verifi:ation of the activity, one A0 was to rack-out the notor breaker and the second A0 was to verify that the motor breaker had been racked-out. Clearance records indicated that this task had been completed and clearance tags (Man On The Line-Caution tags) were attached to the motor breaker panel at approximately 0509 hours on May 15, 1984 At approximately 0730 hours on May 15,198a, Control operators, while walking down the control room panels during shift turnover, discovered that electrical power to the breaker for pump P1-2 was on. contrary to that indicated on an information tag attached to the pu=p switch and the Clearance Request form. Prelimin,ary investigation by the plant operators at that time revealed that the breaker for pump PI-2 had not been racked out at 0509 hou:s as previously reported by the AO's involved. i Discussions relating to this occurrence were held with licensee i representatives, including the two AO's involved, from which the following information was obtained. It has beccme cutine practice at the Diablo Canyon plant when performing independent verificatten of operating activities to have two perscus so together when a task is performed - one performing the activity, and the other independently . verifying conduct of the activity. This practice is consistent with current written procedures for independent verification, which require that independent verification be completed within 4 hours of the i completion of the activity. Consistent with the above practice two AO's went together to the motor [ control center for pump P1-2 on May 15,1984 When they arrived at the motor control center the pump was observed to be running. Therefore, a request was mad,e, via plant telephone, for operators in the control room to shut the pump off. During the course of their task the AO's related to NRC inspectors that they were engaged in conversation unrelated to their work task at the time. Upon observing that the pump had been shut off (audible and light indications were observed), the AO's proceeded to hang Man On The Line Caution tags on the breaker panel for pump PI-2 and 1 eft the area. They failed to realize that the breaker for pump P1-2 had s 1 j f ase.w= gros-.=y c > = = - - - -
6 not been racked-out as required. When questioned by NRC inspectors, the AO's stated that they were rimply inattentive to the job at the time -- they had experienced "...a lapse in concentration." 3eth AO's have been employed in their current jobs at the plant for approximately 18 nonths. e Each stated that they had been ::ained in the applicable equipment clearance procedures and their i=portance since initially being assigned to their jobs. ney also stafed that they had performed equipment clearance tasks on many occasions in the pas vithout error. ne 1.icensee's clearance procedures require that in addition to the steps taken by operations personnel in removing equipment from service for maintenance the maintenance craftsman must also "walkdown the clearance" d to assure himself the equipment is properly removed from se:-rice. In this instance the assigned electrician had not yet walked down the clearance in preparation for work, nor had he coc:=enced work on the pump motor. ~ In considering the circumstances of the above occurrence, NRC inspectors developed -a.generS: concern regarding-the curreg practice of the licensee in conducting independent verification of equipment status: The - specific concern is that two persons essentially arm-in-arm cin and often are e= ployed to perform a check or other operating task and independently verify the check or completion of the task at the same time. It appears that such a practice could, under circumstances similar to that which occurred on May 15, 1984, seriou, sly cocpromise the " independence" of the independent verification. This concern was brouga: to the attention of licensee management, who acknowledged the validity of the NRC concern and committed to review and revise, as appropriate, the governing procedures and practices for independent verification. (See Paragraph 8, Management Interview). 4. Work Planning An entry in the Control Operators log on May 14, 1984 described an event wherein spurious cycling open and closed of the pressurizer Power Operated Relief Valves (PORV's) had occurred.
- he plant operators responded to the event without difficulty, and no serious transtant is plant operation resulted.
A review of facility records and discussions with licensee representatives revealed the following information relating to the event. The cause of the PORV cycling was attributed to the installation of defective special test equipment (an optical isolator) in the PORV control circuityy. The special test equipment, which was being installed to permit the recording of selected parameters in the pressurizer control circuitry, had not been tested for proper performance prior to installation. (The NRC resident inspection staff is' continuing to examine the quality assurance program aspects of this occurrence, and will report separately their findings). This occurrence, together with a previous observation by the Special Inspection Team relating to work by Instrumentation and Control (I&C) technicians on non-safety related systems, led to a closer examination of the work planning effort for I&C activities. The previous observation I s l ~
y involved work on de recorder for the main steam system of the plant--a non-safety related system. The Clearance and work order in 2:.s instance au dorised calibration of the recorder wcile the reactor was operating. Aldcugh, dis work (calibrstion of the recorder) was not actually perfor=ed while the reactor was operating, it could have caused unexpected oscillation of the sain steam system and unnecessary challenge to the reactor protection and engineered safety features. In both instances the lack of proper work planning was evident to fully assess the effect work on non-safety related systems (particularly instr.unentation and control systems) could have on safety related systems of the plant. Further discussion with licensee representatives revealed that two of four currently authorized positions in the I&C Work Planning group were unfilled. In addt. ion, so ; oposed positions in this group had not yet been authorized. NRC concerns in the work planning area were discussed with senior licensee site and corporate office management. Cn May 21,198!.. offers were approved for two individuals to fill vacant ;ositions in the I&C Vork Plana *ng grouf. Prie rity st:ent:3n. by licensee management is currently being given to furster staf fing needs in the work plandsig' area, including mechanical and electrical maintenance (See Paragraph 8, ~ Management Interview). Licensee management also c:r.itted to the ;'-tcs: ation of written instructions regarding the handling and use of special test equipment as well as testing or other work on non-safety related instrumentatics and control systems. (See Paragraph 8, Management Inte r n ew) 5. Initial' Criticalit/, Zero Pewer and Low Power Testing Members of the Special Inspection Team witnessed in: ial criticality and portions of all :ero power and special low power tests. Details regarding these observations are discussed in Attachnent 3. Portions of the following Natura*. Cir: ' ation ';en:ns. ration Tests. including those tests repeated f or the purpose of operator ::ain:.ng f or each operating crew were witnessed. The objectives of eact test were successfully demonstrated. Operating crew performance was judged to be good, with no discrepancies observed. Test 1.1 - Natural Circulation Test 1.2 - Natural Circulation Vith Loss of Pressurt:er Heaters Test 1.3 - Natural Circulation at Reduced Pressure Test 1.4 - Natural Circulatton Vith toss of of fsite Power Test 1.5 s Effect of Steam Generator Isolation en Natural Circulation I ' ', 6. Post-Trip Infor nation System Reliability 1 1 1 f _ m,. : _ m
1.. g 4 yellowing a resesor trip and Safety Injection initiation on May 8, 1984, it was observed that information free the sequence-of-events (p-230) computer was not available due to apparent frequency s drift /re-synchronization problems associated with the computer's inverter power source. Information provided by the p-150 computer is a significant input in the licensee's post trip review procedure. A::espes during the current successful inspection to reproduce the conditions of May 8,1984 were not in identifying the exact cause of the loss of information from the Licensee management committed to a continuing priority effort computer. to improve the reliability of this equipment. e A probles similar to that of the sequence-of-events computer was' experienced with the Main Annunciator Recorder (typewriter) following a simulated loss of AC power test. As a result, attempts to obtain an alarm summary were unsuccessful. This inf ormati'oc, like that of the g sequence-ni-events.soeputer.iJ important during operation and for post trip reviews by plant operators.' ' Priority attent:en to a fesolutice o*f -~. ~ ~ this problem was committed to by licensee canagement. (See Paragra'p'd 8, ~ a Management Interview) 1 7. Management Involvement During the course of the inspec; ion numerous opportunities were available to observe the involvement of both site and corporate level management in the day-to-day operation of Diablo Canyon, Uni 1. Trequent discussions, at least weekly, were held by telephone or in person at the site with corpora:3 level management, particularly the Executive Vice President, Manager of Nuclear Plant Operations, and Assistant Manager of Nuclear Plant Operations. Essentially daily discussions were held with senior site management. Trem the above discussions a assessment was made of management involvement in plant operations. The results of this assessment are presented below. Site Manatement Involvement } A significant program of site management involvement in plant operations was initiated by the licensee in early April 1984. This program, which was fully implemented prior to commencesent of the current inspection, involves the assignment of one of the following senior managers on shif t at all times. ,n Assistant Plant Manager - Technical Services Assistant Plant Superintendent Operations Manager Training Manager These individuals were. relieved of their normal duties and responsibilities to enable them to spend full time in the role of assessing and supporting shif t personnel in the conduct di plant
- ]
1 ~
- H 1
'80 enw.. c-e* amme nsee.w 4=.- , wo n
- e....-+.
emegego e
9 i; ie l operations. These shift management personnel made several recommendations for the improvement',o.f plant operations. Among the significant :ecommendations made were: Reduce the administrative tasks assigned to the Control a. Operator by reassigning many record keeping duties not directly related'to plant operation to an Assistant Control Operator. An additional study was undertaken to further =inimine the nonessential duties performed by both the Control Operator and the Assistant Control Operator. b. !sterim changes be made ;o i= prove the timeliness of reporting the completion of surveillance testing by all departments to the Shift Technical Advisor so that a computer based status tracking system will be more current and complete. Such imprevements were determined to be essential to keep plant operators better informed of the current status of these tests. c. Agressively pursue a program to reduce the number of outstanding electrical ju=pers by more carefully scrutinizing a requests for the use of ju=pers. I=plementation of this recommendation placed responsibility on the shift managers to approve all ju=pers. This interim measure reduced the number of outstanding jumpers,by more than 50 percent. d. Improve the timeliness of operator knowledge of plant modifications which may impact them, by having such changes documented in such a manner that they can be covered in shif t briefings rather than {uring requalification ::aining sessions. Continue ef forts, including exchange of information with other e. nuclear utilities, to more effectively and efficiently handle equipment clearances and configuration control. A continuing effort in this area was recognized due to the large number of equipment and cceponents out of service for prevent ve maintenance and surveillance testing. f. Continue an assessment program similar to that implemented by .i the on-shift management by assigning many of. the responsibilities presently assigned to them to the Shife Advisors and Shift Technical Advisors - with periodic 4 management review. Corporate Office Management Involvement ]' During the period of the current inspection corporate office management personnel were observed at the plant on frequent occasions, including back shift hours. For example, the Manager, Nuclear Plant Operations (NPO) was at the plant more than 25 percent of the time during the period from mid-April through mid-May 1984 The Assistant Manager, Npo speut a similar period of time at the plant. These individuals were observed on other than day shift on several occasions. The Manager, VPO personally participated in a decision to discontinue the approach to initial i 1 a ~-
a -1 ? 10 n n. o criticality on April' 12, 1984 to perform repairs on a reactor coolant j -), pump 0-ring seal, although, leakage'past the seal was at the tine well ./ within limits of the technical specifications. He expressed the view that his participation, while at the site, on this occasion was partially to demonstrate by example corporate management's support of such ~ decisions when in' the inte est of prudent and safe operation. Both the Manager, NPO and the Executive Vice President were on site at the time of initial criticality. Daily reports of plant status are issued by the Assistant Manager, NPO. These reports are given vide dis ribution withis the corporate office. g At least weekly discussions were held by the Special Inspection Team leader with the Executive Vice President. The status of plant operations and the findings of the inspection team were routine topics of discussion during these contacts, which revealed a high degree of awareness and personal iqvolvement in.such 4a,t ars hy the Exceg ive Vice. President., .m Goals have been established by licensee management to insure continc.ed management involvement in the day-to-day operation of the Diablo Car. yon plant. (See Paragraph. 8, Management Interview) 8. Management Inte rviev On June 12, 1984, a meeting was held by the leader of the Special Inspection Team with those licensee representatives indicated in Paragraph 1. The scope and findings of the inspection as described in this report were discussed. The following infor=ation and commitments were provided by licensee representatives. (References are to Paragraphs of this report where the subject is discussed) A. Indeoendent Verification of Ooerational Activities Licensee representatives stated that a change had been nade to Administrative Procedure EPAC C-104 requiring that, except for unusual circumstances such as ALARA considerations, p'e': sons performing independent verification are not to accompany the person performing the operational activity to bc independently verified. (Paragraph 3) B. Work Planninz J Offers have been made to individuals to fill two vacant positions in the I&C Vork Planning group. It is expected that these individuals will be on board by July 1,1984. Authorization has also be given to procure the contract services of six additional persons in the Work Planning section. C. Post-Trip Information System Reliability 2 1 ,1 3 2-
l c gz t J s 1 Testing and saintenance have identified and corrected the reliability problems experienced vi-h both the sequence-of-events 3, s' computer and the main annunciacor typewriter. (Paragraph 6) D. Management Involvement Goals have been established for continued management involvement in the operational activities at the Diablo Oanyon plant, as follows: Corocrate Office Personnel - The Manager, NPO and Assistant Manager, NPO vill each average approximately four days per month at the Diablo Canyon Site. Oite Management Person el - Senior Managers will spend approximately 20 percent of their time in the plant observing and evaluating the conduct of personnel.;nd operational perfor=ance. (Paragraph 7) ~. O m. g a .e e .~ = 9 I 9 e e s I 4 e e -1 l ~ i e > w-
-j j g ,j p g E 6 6 Idaho NOTEGRAAi .i w~ 5-10-84 1 j$ R. L. Sailor hf _j em cat. Jesse Crews prem 1 s s E m Icano J NRC en;, Accross peeress OIABLO CANYON PCWER PLANT SPECIAL lNSPECTICN As a member of the on shift s:ecial inscection team at the Diablo Canyon P:wer P'. ant from April 20 to April 22, 1984, I cbserved the 12-8AM shift anc mace several plant tours to verify c:mpliance and ensure plant cleanliness was satisf actory for startup. The operating crew was rated at an acove average pe #ermance level as c moared to similar vendor group coerating crews. The crew operated with a " team concept" in all cperations. tna: were cbserved anc a:clied a questioning attitude to any abnormalities. The crew had an abcve ' average academic-tnewledfe level en'tnefr phn*, ne Shift Advisce maintained a true advisory position witn res:ect to c:ntrol Mcm operators. He was given the ability to c: serve all cperations and gave n s input to cperators and crew sucervision. This acticn was required very infrequently hewever, in the three snifts coservec. The Shift Acvisor a:: ears to be effectively utilized at,the Diaolc Canyon P wer Plant, ec i M i i ,.n_ ~- ' s ATTACHMENT 1 i En
\\ i SPECIFIC ITEMS NOTID CURING ~. DIABLO CANYCN STARTUP CPERATICN (12-8AM) 1. Noted a large numoer of pers'ennel (accrex. 12) "On the car:et" wnile the 8:00 AM shift turnover was in pecgress. Many of these pecole were not en the actual shift crew. (4-20-84) 2. All shift turnovers were excellent. (4-20 througn 4-22-84) 3. The shift briefs held by the SF (L. Collins) were structured and thorougn. All watchstanders are given the opportunity to report to the crew en the status of their watchstaticns. C:cedination for evolutions is planned at the briefing. (Sest I have ever seen.) (4-20 througn 4-22-84) 4 Annunciator, response precedures were ut.ili: d as exoectec wnan alarms, ~ 2 -'- were received. (4-20 through 4-22-84) 5. The heatup precedure was utili:ed at all times. (4-21 thr:ugn a-22-84) 5. When RCP alarms were all " locked in" en annuncia :r beare, the wa:en-section placed the ACO at the alarm typewriter to menit:r any accitional alarms that might be receivec. (4-21-84) 7. Engaged in group discussion (SCO, CO, ACO, SA) to ensure that RCP seal package leakage was in fact identified and could not be c:nsiderec eitner bouncary cr controlled leakage. (4-22-84) 8. When decision was made to cocidewn for repairs en #4 RCP seal ;ackage, the cooldewn frem hot standby procecure neeced to be entered m1cway based on the actual plant conditions. 3ctn :ne CD anc ACD reviewed ne entire crececure to ensure no stees :cule te emittec :rior :c entry into a miccoint in the procecure. Onc: ming 00 ;er#:rmed c:m:lete review of procedure as above prior Oc relief. (The degas step Of RCS that was necessary was in the beginning of :ne pr:cedure.) (4-22-84) 9 s e =. 9 6 e- +-
I 6 E G Idaho NOTEGRAM i 5-16-84 m ea-m Date Mr. Jesse CrW5 Fmm P. T. Isaks } NRC INEL ce % e,,, 4 Accress Accrees DIABLO CANYON POWER PLANT SPECIAL INSPECTICN I was a memoer of the Special Inspection Team at the Diablo Canycn Fewer Plant frem May 7 tnrcugh May 11, 1984 I observed crew cperations during Icw pcwer c:eratiens and testing. These observations inclucec shift relief / turnover, snift briefings, coerator logs and awareness of plant / system status, procecural c:mpliance, limiting conditions for operatien and centrols utilized during -emoval and restoration of system ecmcenents frem service curing maintenance and surveillance testing. The overall rating of crew cperations is above average. ~. .~. The three Shift Advisors CDserved teck an active interest in assessment iff~ ~
- ngoing anc upcoming significant shift activities, especially in regard to
^ ecnnical Scecificatien requirements. They a;ceared to be effectively utili:ec in tneir primary roles by crew memeers. i ec cc: T. F. Pointer A. J. Vinnola P. T. Is'aksen File s ATTACm!NT 2 MAY ic ;ta 4 .i j a
.t .. a b SPEC;FIC ITE.95 NOTED OURING OIABL3 C5NYCN LOW PCWER TE37*.NG OPERAT 0N s (5/7/84 - 5/11/84) ~ 1. All snift briefings cbserved were excellent excect for swingshift en 5-7-84, wnich did not incluce status anc p!ans for Uni: 1. (Unit was in Hot Standby, Mede 3.) 2. Coerator response and precedure compliance for recovery fecm sourious safety injection en 5-2-84 was excellent. 3. Noted no discrepancies en clearance (cr maintenance en :ne Steen Driven Auxiliary Feecwater Pump. c. All cperators were aware cf Technical Scecificati:n limiting conditions for coerati,cn,and ac; ion..,statempnt, r, equi ements. f 5. Conscienticus reviews and greuc ciscussions, including Snif: Advisors, for surveillances performed (i.e., STP M-16N slave relay testing for o FC't-95 ). 6. Cn a plant teur, noted tha :ne recuired fire watches were set and kncwlecgeatle of their res;cnsibil,ities. 7. No concerns identified on the Reac ce Trip and Safety :njection, Reac:cr Trio Reviews en 5-6 anc 5-3-84 respectively, i. Cne en watch Centrol Coerster cic get know withcut checking gesen, the control red withcrnwal limits for current plant conditions (Scron concentration and reactor ;cwer). Initially re cried incorrect (unconservative) value anc nas immectately corre: ec by :ne A00. Centrel eccs were well witnin tne witherswal limits at :ne time. g e 4 3- -1
ja nog'o, .7 UNITED STATES /-.,., e % NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 8 5 I wasmNo roN. o. c. 2csss 's5% , l ......f June 27, 1984 TO ALL LICENSEES OF OPERATING REACTORS, APPLICAtlTS FOR OPERATING LICENSE, AND HOLDERS OF CONSTRUCTION PERMITS Gentlemen:
SUBJECT:
ADE0VACY OF ON-SHIFT OPERATING EXPERIENCE FOR NEAR TERM OPERATING LICENSE APPLICANTS (Generic Letter 84-16) 1 On June 14, 1984, the Chairman of the U. S. Nuclear Degulatory Commissien, N. J. Palladino, sent J. H. Miller, President, Georgia Power Company, a letter in which the Comissioners presented their views on the subject of adecuacy of on-shif t operating experience for near-term oceaating license applicants. This letter is enclosed and is applicable for near-term operating license applicants. The June 14, 1984 letter accepted, with some clari'ications, an Industry Working Group proposal on this subject, presented to the Comission on February 24, 1924 1 Comissioners Gilinsky and Asselstine expressed individual views on the subject. In accordance with the Chairman's letter, March 31, 1985, is the latest date for use of shift advisors. Beyond that date, utilities should plan to have sufficie" operating experience on-shif t such that there no lancer is a need to rely on the use of shift advisors. We urderstand, of course, that circumstarces may arise, beyond the control of the utility, wM ch would mandate the use of advisors to cover one or more shifts, but these circumstances can be treated on a case-by-case basis. The acceptance of these experience requirements by the NPC does not alter the guidance for eligibility, included in Regulatory Guice 1.3 and 'iUREG-0737, fer R0 ard SR0 licensing examination candidates. Further, acceptarce of the Industry Working Group proposal does not foreclose the development of any long l term raouirements for crew crarating experience. We understand that each utility is in possession of a copy of the Industry Working Group proposal of February 24, 1984 Copies are also available from i the NRC Public Document Room. This letter contains no reporting requirement and is for information only, Sincerely, ={ ' Darrel! G. Eisenhut. Director Division of Licensing i
Enclosure:
Ltr of June 14, 1984 1meeemte'
/'.mee. A, umiso STATES [ NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION wasMemofon. o. c. aosse June 14, 1984 c=4: aman Mr. J. H. Miller, President Georgia Power Company P. O. Box 4545 Atlanta, Georgia 30302
Dear Mr. Miller:
The Commission appreciates the ef forts you and the other members of the Industry Working Group put forth in developing the proposal you presented to us on February 24, 1984, to assure the adequacy of on-shif t operating experience for near-ter= operating license applicants. The level of utility participation in developing and supporting this proposal clearly reflects the needed degree of involvement by senior utility management to assure sound implamentation. The industry proposal recognizes that the use of shift advisors to supplement plant experience depends upon the adequacy of the training of advisors and their integration into the shif t crew. It is particularly important where advisers are used that there is a management commitment to (1) provide plant specific training for shift advisors which includes plant procedures, tec'hnical specifications, plant systems, and where available, time for use of a plant simulator, and (2) training for the remainder of the shift crew on the role of advisors. Furthe rmore, the industry proposal recogni:es the desirability of phasing out the use of shift advisors as soon as is practically achievable, but pro date for terminating the use of advisors. posed no specific The Commission accepts the Industry Working Group proposal with the following clarifications: With regard to the shif t crews that meet the industry experience proposal 1. The Hot Participation Experience tabulated in your slide 5 should be at a large, same type plant. 2. The use of an SRO-licensed STA to satisfy the Hot Participation Experience is acceptable provided that the STA serves as a member of the shift.
Mr. J. H. Miller. requirements for crew operating experience which the staff may develop for Commission consideration that would apply to operating plants. Commissioner Asselstine acos: I disagree with two aspects of the Commission's decision on the matter of shif t experience requirements. first, I do not believe that the " hot participation experience" element in the industry proposal is adequate. I would only eliminate the requirement for a shift advisor if one licensed senior reactor operator on the shift has at least one year's prior experience as a licensed SRO at a similar plant. Without at least tnat amount of prior operating experience on the part of the shift crew, it seems prucent to me to require a shift advisor with that level of experience. Second, I believe that the matter of shift experience requirements should not be hancied by means of a generic letter but rather should be the subject of a Commission policy statement. In my view, the Commission should have prepared a proposed policy statement on the subject and should nave sought incus try and public comment on it. Commissioner Gilinsky adds: Every recipient of thir-letter should understand its full implications. In pressuring the Commission to accept a feeble approach toward shift experience requirements at a few plants nea ring coera tion, tne industry is jeopardizinc its long standing safety recore. I do not think I have to underline what that means. I would remind you that the original NRC staff proposal that at least one member of a shift have one year of previous licensed operating experience -- was very modest, as any experienced shift supervisor will tell you. It is also feasible -- ! have attached an NRC staff memorandum on the number of experienced operators available. The suggestion that it is sufficient for the most senior person on shift to have six months of " hot participation", of which only six weeks need be a t power, is simply ridiculous. 'The Commissioners who approved this approach may not realize what they have done, but you do. It says to me the industry is not yet capable of policing its members.
,,s ** ' 8 5,,'c, 3 i{'~ vi i UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY ' COMMISSION I wasmwcTok. o. c. 2ctss ~ 2, %~.M/. ! 'W s.... = e
- v..,.:
.- r Attached per Commissioner Gilinsky's addeo comments V iC MEMORAfiDUt' Oc : 3.. icner Gilinsky FROM: r.'liiam J. Dircks Ext:::ive Dire::or for Opera:icns ^ G SUSJECT: LICENSED OPERATOR POOL The sta" has cevelopec the enclosec responses to :ne cuestions y:u asked in y::u Mar:h 2,1984, memoranoum. The responses in:iude cur bes estim&te f-cr information ir. the Operator Licensing Tra: King System (C.TS). / William J. Dircks Exe:::ive Dire::or for Operatier.s inclosure: As Stated Chairma Faiia ino Comissiorer Accerts Comissier.er Asselstine Comissier.er Eernthal OGC OPE SECY 9 e n ,v,w-
l.' RESPO';SES TO COPM:S!!0NER G:.!!.Si"S OUES' 0;;S Oh LICEI; SED OFERATOR 300LS 1. How many Senior Reae:or Operator-(5:.0' licenses nave seen issuec in
- ne n;s::ry of the NRC?
Response
I: is ne; cessible :t oe: ermine exac-ly now many SRC or RO iicenses nav teen issuec in :ne nistory of NRC. Sys;em (OLTS) was no: initiatec until 1922.Tha Operator Licensing Tracking harc copy files were usec before OLTS. estabitsned anc maintained.The Privacy Act recuires that recerc retention Since Ine four year retention period for some of :ne earlier licenses has ela:see, the nard co y files of inactive cperaters were cestroyed er purgac of inic ma i:n prior tc initiation of OLTS. These files cannot be recoverec. SRO's anc 3,251 RC's.The to als that are incicated in OLTS as of Mar Tnis inciuces :: n :ower We estimate that ac:roximately 6Ci cf :ne licenses a a for oowerand non-pow Particularly for cicer cocke:s, :ne info"matior. in OLTS is reactors. ciffi:u'it :: verify. conservative estimates.However, we censicer tnese ficures to :e senior Operat:rs whose files havt sett eurgec.There may be as m Ors anc I note inis inf mation is sufficien for your neecs. ~ generatec, s:e:ial programs wiiL. nave ::cr accitional informa 1cn.o be the Regional dockets performed, ceiaying our worx cr u;: gracing :n capabilt:y cf :he OLTS. This couio ui:. mate'.y :ause oeitys in fu ure recuests. 2. How many Rea::or Opera::r (RO) Iicenses nave :ee. issueci _Resoonse Same as Question 1. S. How many SRO's have held a license for more than one year?
Response
Of the licensed SRO's 1,040 have held a license for more than one ye but have not nad the iteense renewed. This number does no: incluce 'SRO's anc RO's whose licenses have been enewed (Qu .}}