ML20212F070
| ML20212F070 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Diablo Canyon  |
| Issue date: | 08/30/1984 |
| From: | Asselstine J NRC COMMISSION (OCM) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20209D027 | List: |
| References | |
| FOIA-86-197 NUDOCS 8701090086 | |
| Download: ML20212F070 (8) | |
Text
....C.........
l l
l
-,f i.
8 I
l..
l j
Statement of James K. Asselstine h#
h )/
j Comissioner, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission a/
I i
before the
/
Subitrinittee on Energy and the Environment Cor.nittee on Interior and Insular Affairs August 30, 1984 jf I
17 I
Mr. Chainnan and members of the Coiisnittee I have a prepared I
statement from my colleagues on the Comission which I would like to submit for the record.
In addition, I would like to offer a few com-j ments of my own on the Comission's handling of the full-power operating i
i license proceeding for the Diablo Canyon nuclear power plant.
=
.i l
I was unable to vote in favor of the issuance of a full power j
operating license for Diablo Canyon Unit 1 because of the Comission's 1
s[
j treatment of two issues: the complicating effects of earthquakes on emergency planning, and the re-evaluation of the adequacy of seismic
(
l design for small and large bore piping in the plant. With regard to f-l seismic design, the record of this proceeding, allegations filed by I
former workers at the site and subsequent NRC inspections, including j
I those perfonced by NRC inspector Isa Yin, all document a widespread
.1
~i quality assurance breakdown in the seismic design work for small bore piping in the plant. This quality assurance breakdown raises serious t
questions regarding both the adequacy of quality assurance for other e
design activities for the plant and t'he adequacy of the Independent 1
Design Verification Program (IDVP). Those questions are of special
.f.:
importance for, the IDVP, which was established to verify that the I
87010'90096 870106 l
'/'
HOLhFS86-197 PDR S
- w.~.% Y'v f' ? ? *'*-WW K
'g py et
- o. sp.=
>l 7[
r*m. Ty* we'*9ff,~
m',s = * * ' s :-~ * %
- m ww **- - - ~
2 o.
6 I
i i
scismic design oroblems that led to the Commission's suspension of the l
Diablo Canyon low power license had been identified and corrected.
.I i
lhese questions existed at the time that the Comission authorized 1
the reinstatement of the low power license for Diablo Canyon, Unit 1.
.;j When I voted to permit low power operation, it was with the understand-ing that Mr. Yin and other elements of the NRC staff were in agreement t
,j on the measures needed to resolve those questions prior to a Comission decision authorizing full power operation.
I was particularly disap,
i pointed in the staff's subsequent handling of Mr. Yin's concerns. Given the special significance of seismic design for this plant and the extent il of the quality assurance breakdown in the seismic design program for 1
l portions of the plant, it was incumbent on the NRC staff to make every effort to verify that all significant design errors had in fact been identified and corrected.
Based upon the continuing concerns expressed by Mr. Yin regarding l
the adequacy of the staff's verification efforts and the extent of the i
seismic design quality assurance breakdown in the case, I am not yet satisfied that the Comission has the information needed to conclude, with a high degree of confidence, that all significant seismic design errors for this plant have been identified and corrected.
In that regard, it is important to keep in mind that the seismic design problems identified at this plant over the past several years indicate a failure l
on the part of' the utility to meet the requirements of our quality
- j assurance regulations. Given this failure to comply with our quality e
,N'"
W" * ' * *$;M, m
-[,
?,? *.
"NUU (% R19'a Q W[.* ?. f*,WT& T! * '""N T*0 f * *" ~ ~ ~
- of."t._
'q'}*'.*
m
~ ~ ' ' ~ ~ ~.
.._..1 3
.y i!
i f-
[
assurance regulations, the applicant must make a particularly strong 'and
=
j convincing showing that the design work for the plant has been done
.l.
correctly.
Indeed, that was the intended purpose of the IDVP program and the other design verification programs undertaken by the utility.
Thus, it is particularly important to resolve fully those issues relat-i ing to the adequacy of the seismic design work for the plant and the seismic design verification efforts. The Agency's handling of these l
questions has been particularly unfortunate since the adequacy of the j
seismic design of the plant is a matter of public concern and since it l
appears that an adequate design verification program to resolve Mr.
Yin's concerns could have been completed in a matter of a few weeks from the time the Connission issued the full-power license.
l i.
I With regard to the complicating effects of earthquakes on emergency i
-l planning, I disagreed with the Connission's conclusion that our regu-l
{
1ations do not require consideration of this issue for the Diablo Canyon j
'l plant.
In its apparent detennination to avoid adjudicating an issue I
l
}
that the agency itself has acknowledged to be material to emergency
.]
planning, the Connission has repeatedly changed its mind about how to l
treat this issue only to end up right back where it started three years I
i ago--promising a generic rulemaking.
In the meantime, the Cosnission's i
~
l only accomplishment has been to deny parties the right to adjudicate the l
issue and to delay any action on this issue until the only two plants, i
Diablo Canyon and San Onofre, for which this issue probably has any real j
significance h' ave been licensed.
I would have recognized the obvious--that earthquakes ought to be considered for plants located in
'i yny :4.~ -.m, y,;,
,_,,.y
- .. y....m..
3,y,
L..;.
_..Z
~.
4 m
1 -
t t
i areas of high seismicity such as California, and let the parties adjudi-l cate the specifics in. individual cases.
In my view, the Comission should have provided the parties to the Diablo Canyon proceeding an opportunity for a hearing and let them litigate whether the Diablo Canyon emergency plan is flexible enough,to deal with the complicating i
i effects of earthquakes on emergency planning.
t 1
i j
The cornerstone of the Comission's decision is the Comission's f
conclusion that the probability of an earthquake disrupting an emergency 1
i j
response is so low that it need not be considered in emergency planning.
The basis for the Comission's conclusion is its determination that for various reasons there is unlikely to be a radiological release and an earthquake at the same time. The Comission's arguments on this score ignore one of the fundamental precepts of emergency planning: we plan for low probability occurrences because no matter how safe we try to l
}
make nuclear power plants there is always a possibility that some event will occur which will require use of one or more aspects of emergency planning. The probability arguments used by the Comission are really arguments that we do not need an emergency planning, rather than that we need not consider earthquakes in emergency planning.
u Unfortunately, the Comission ignores the fact that safety calcu-lations are s;bject to some uncertainties. The philosophy behind emergency planning is to recognize this uncertainty and to provide defense in depth in protecting the public.
Indeed, the Comission's
)
emergency planning regulations are founded on the judgment that adequate t
i
%~~~
- v: m p,7p.*.n,'mp
_vm-m
- - m my.,
, *== g
- ~ -r y
~ --- s, t.~ x- ~ - * ~~1s--
sw
- ~
~
{-
5 1
j 1
1 emergency planning is an essential element in protecting the public 1
health and safety inde. pendent of the Commission's other regulations and safety reviews focusing on the design of the plant itself.
i b
+
}.
.J j
A key element of the Comission's argument is that the probability
~
I of an earthquake disrupting an emergency response in an Emergency l
?
o Planning Zone (EPZ) is too low even to be considered. To apply this
.j argument to California, where almost 90 percent of the seismic activity in the United States occurs and where earthquakes which damage, obstruct
'1 or disrupt roads, buildings, bridges and comunications networks occur i
j with some regularity, simply ignores comon sense.
In support of this i
j assertion, the Comission argued that the Diablo Canyon site is located in an area of low to moderate seismicity. However, the only plant in i
the country with a comparable SSE and OBE (Operating Basis Earth-quake)--the key bases for the seismic design of the plant--is San Onofre
(.67g and.34g respectively).
In fact, the SSE's and OBE's for plants 1
i in other parts of the country are significantly lower (for other plants the SSE is typically.25g or less and the typical OBE is.11
.12g, with the highest being.13g) than those for Diablo Canyon (SSE of.75g a
1 l
l andOBEof.20g). Clearly, by requiring the plant to be designed to 1
i I
withstand an earthquake with ground motions almost twice those of other i.
plants in the country, the Comission has explicitly made the technical f
judgment that the earthquake risk for the Diablo Canyon area is not comparable to other areas of the country, and is, in fact, much higher.
{
The Comission's decision must also be considered in light of the other natural phenomena the Comission includes in its consideration of
'. m--
- n
.. n-
. y.m, --
_.n,, :
, ~ v m- - -
6 i
emergency ;:lanning.
If the probability of an earthquake disrupting an emergency response in an EPZ in California is too unlikely to be con-j i
sidered, that probability must by definition be much lower than the probability of disruption caused by the other natural phenomena which the Comission does consider...It must, for example, be less likely than
]
the probability that a tornado will disrupt an emergency response in an i
EPZ in the Midwest or that a hurricane will disrupt an emergency re-sponse in a California EPZ.
I see no factual basis for concluding that earthquakes in California are-so much more unlikely than either of these events that earthquakes need not be considered.
The Comission's decision also ignores the fact that the staff has
'[
been requiring licensees for plants located in California-to consider
'l j
the effects of earthquakes on emergency planning. The complicating-
[
effects of earthquakes on emergency planning were fonnally considered by
'l the staff -in the San Onofre proceeding, and_were informally consid.ered l
by the staff for Diablo Canyon. Thus, by their own actions, the agen-l
'l cy's technical experts have demonstrated that they consider this issue l
to be material to the Comission's 1.icensing decisions in these two cases. Given the fact that the staff experts cn this issue have been concerned enough to consider it, I see no basis for the Comission's
~
argument that in the cases of Diablo. Canyon and San Onofre, seismic effects on emergency planning are irrelevant. Since the issue is
/
clearly material to the agency's licensing decision in those two cases, j
the Comission' is required by law to grant the parties an opportunity to l
litigate that. issue.
For these reasons, I would have required that the l
i i
k-n&gm.-~.~ -
.- - em,:.
/-
~ : y. -
..~..- - --
. _ _ -.. - - ~. -....
7 record of the Diablo Canyon licensing proceeding be reopened to consider the complicating effects of earthquakes on emergency planning for this plant.
I i
Mr. Chairman, as you know, on Augus.t 17, the United States Court of j
Appeals for the District of Columbia issued a stay of the effectiveness 1
of the full-power license for Diablo Canyon pending the Court's review of the Comission's decision in this case. This action by the Court is l
unprecedented and indicates serious weaknesses in the Comission's l
decisions. As it now stands, the Court's stay is likely to remain in effect for at least the next three or four months. This action provides an opportunity for the Comission to reconsider some of its previous l
positions and to take actions to minimize the potential for further t-f delays in this case.
I believe that the Comission should do three j
things. First, it should reopen the hearing record to permit litigation of the complicating effects of earthquakes on emergency' planning for
[
this plant. Second, the Comission should establish a further special review of the small and large bore piping seismic design adequacy. This i
l
. review should be under the direction of NRC staff members who have not j
-f been directly involved in the previous design review efforts and should
.I i
8 1
have as its objective achieving a consensus resolution of the concerns
=
j identified by Isa Yin and the allegations relating to the seismic design work at the plant. I would have Mr. Yin play a significant role in this review effort. Third, the Comission should reopen the investigation of I
the NRC staff's conduct during the Comission meetings prior to the issuance of the low power license for the plant with the objective of I
i
.i t
4 i.._
.,.m..,
m
.;- - g.-.. w
--.t
r
... _ _.... -.... - -. _. ~ -..
4 8
I assuring a thorough and complete investigation of the allegations that j
have been submitted to the Comissi,on regarding the staff's conduct.
i
~
Such an investigation should include interviews with those who have submitted the allegations to assure that we have all the facts.
I believe that these three measures would,do much to correct the problems
}
in the Comission's handling of the Diablo Canyon full-power operating license proceeding and to minimize the potential for further unnecessary
~
[
licensing delays in this case.
i*j Thank you.
3
'I
.E l
- f
't i
41
)
.a
..p
.+
4 n
4 i
A i
'1
>.r, n. n e,..
.-.+
.. ---