ML20212D548
| ML20212D548 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Shoreham File:Long Island Lighting Company icon.png |
| Issue date: | 02/27/1987 |
| From: | Kessler J, Mileti D, Watts R, Weismantle J COLORADO STATE UNIV., FORT COLLINS, CO, LONG ISLAND LIGHTING CO. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20212D309 | List: |
| References | |
| OL-5, NUDOCS 8703040143 | |
| Download: ML20212D548 (33) | |
Text
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA j NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board
)-
In the Matter of )
)
LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY ) Docket No. 50-322-OL-5
) (EP Exercise)
(Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, )
)' )
Unit 1)
LILCO'S TESTIMONY ON CONTENTION EX 36 (WIND SHIFT)
)
)
Hunton & Williams 707 East Main Street
) P.O. Box 1535 Richmond, Virginia 23212 February 27,1987
)
)
8703040143 870227 PDR ADOCK 05000322 G PDR
)
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
) NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board In the Matter of )
)
LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY ) Docket No. 50-322-OL-5
) (EP Exercise)
(Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, )
Unit 1) )
)
LILCO'S TESTIMONY ON CONTENTION EX 36 (WIND SHIFT) l l
l l
r I
Hunton & Williams
( 707 East Main Street P.O. Box 1535 Richmond, Virginia 23212 February 27,1987
)
LILCO, Febru:ry 27,1987 j
) UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board
)
In the Matter of )
)
LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY ) Docket No. 50-322-OL-5
) (EP Exercise) j- (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1)
)
)
LILCO'S TESTIMONY ON CONTENTION EX 36 (WIND SHIFT) 3 1. Q. Please state your names and business addresses.
A. [ Kessler] My name is Jay R. Kessler and my business address is Long Is-land Lighting Company,175 East Old Country Road, Hicksville, New York, 11801.
[Mileti] My name is Dennis S. Milett and my business address is Depart-3 ment of Sociology or Hazards Assessment Laboratory, Colorado State Uni-versity, Fort Collins, Colorado,80523.
[ Watts] My name is Richard J. Watts and my business address is 404 Bluhm Road, Fairport, New York,14450.
[ Weismantle] My name is John A. Weismantle and my business address is
) 1660 Walt Whitman Road, Melville, New York,11747.
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- 2. Q. Please summarize your professional qualifications and describe how they relate to Contention EX 36.
A. [Kessler] I am Vice President of Gas Operations for LILCO. I also acted
- as Director of Local Response for the Local Emergency Response Organiza- ,
- tion (LERO) during the Exercise on February 13, 1986. My full professional
)
qualifications are being separately offered into evidence as part of the doc-ument entitled " Professional Qualifications of LILCO Witnesses on Exercise Contentions." As Director of Local Response, I was responsible for making
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the decisions regarding protective action recommendations for the general public during the Exercise. ,
)' [Mileti] I am a Professor of Sociology and Director of the Hazards Assess-ment Laboratory at Colorado State University. My full professional qualifi-cations are being offered into evidence as part of the document entitled
" Professional Qualifications of LILCO Witnesses on Exercise Contentions."
My work has included extensive examination of human response in disasters and emergencies.
)'
i (Watts] I am the president of Richard J. Watts, Inc., a consulting firm l
[ specializing in the areas of health physics, radioactive waste management, i
) and emergency planning. My full professional qualifications are being sepa-rately offered into evidence as part of the document entitled " Professional Qualifications of LILCO Witnesses on Exercise Contentions." I have been retained by LILCO to serve as a Radiation liealth Coordinator for LERO and served as the primary Radiation Health Coordinator during the Exer-cise on February 13, 1986. My responsibilities included making recommen-
) dations to the Director of LERO regarding protective action recommenda-tions for the public.
)
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J [Weismantle] I am Vice President, Engineering, for LILCO. Sly full pro-3 fessional qualifications are being separately offered into evidence as part of the document entitled " Professional Qualifications of LILCO Witnesses on Exercise Contentions." During the Exercise on February 13, 1986, I O served as the hianager of Local Response for LERO. In that capacity I par-ticipated in advising the Director of Local Response regarding protective actions and was responsible for ensuring that the protective action deci-sions made by the Director of Local Response were implemented rapidly and effectively.
g 3. Q. Please summarize the allegations in Contention EX 36.
A. [ Kessler, 5111eti, Watts, Weismantle] The Intervenors allege in Contention EX 36 that LERO personnel at the EOC had "no apparent basis" during the g Exercise for the decision to continue recommending that people in the original downwind zones,14 A-51, Q and R, evacuate when the EOF was projecting that a wind shif t would direct the plume away from the original
- O downwind zones, and that "it may have been more appropriate, and resulted in more dose savings, for individuals who had not yet lef t their homes by, for example,2:00 or 3:00, to remain sheltered in their homes until af ter the O wind had shif ted." The complete text of Contention EX 36 is Attachment I A to this testimony.
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- 4. Q. Please summarize your testimony on Contention EX 36.
O- A. [Kessler, watts, weismantle) contrary to the Intervenors' allegation that LERO made protective action recommendations without apparent basis, there was a manifest basis for continuing to recommend evacuation. It 0- would not have been appropriate for LERO to seriously consider changing its initial protective action recommendation of evacuation to sheltering, for several reasons. First, LERO knew that it was faced with a probable O long term release. Second, we monitored plant and environmental readings and ran dose projections at the EOC throughout the day which indicated that plant release rates and offsite dose rates resulting from the exercise scenario achieved maximum levels that were even higher than those as-sumed in formulating the initial decision to evacuate. Third, continued sheltering would not have been effective because homes in the downwind O direction had already been immersed in the plume for at least an hour.
Fourth, the precise time at which the wind shif t was to occur was uncer-tain and another wind shif t directing the plume back toward zones A-M, Q O and R was possible. Finally, changing the protective action recommenda-tion to sheltering in the middle of the evacuation would have confused the public, in contravention of good emergency planning practice.
Those of us responsible for developing protective action recommen-dations always consider, at least implicitly, any information that might bear on protective action recommendations. Though we implicitly consid-ered the impact of the projected wind shlf t on our protective action ree-ommendations, it was unnecessary to consider changing the protective ac-ti n r mmend tt n f r m va uation to sheltering because it was so O
obvious that evacuation remained the appropriate recommendation.
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-[Mileti) Contention 36 suggests that LERO should have considered recom--
b mending that persons in zones A-M, Q and R who had not yet lef t their homes to evacuate by, for example 14:00 or 15:00, should instead shelter in their homes. This contention falls to recognize, however, that other people h' in the process of evacuating would have been in this same geographical
! area at the. time. The Intervenors are suggesting that LILCO should have considered recommending that some people in zones A-M, Q and R shelter at~the same time it recommended that other people in the same area con-tinue to evacuate. Had LERO publicly issued such a dichotomous ' pro-tective action recommendation it would have caused many people to be-
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come confused about what they should do. This would have defeated a basic purpose of emergency planning, which is to reduce potential confu-sion in emergency response.
) 5. Q. What factors are considered by LERO in determining which protective ac-tion recommendation should be given to the public?
A. (Kessler, Watts Weismantle] Guidance for making protective action dect-h sions is found in OPIP 3.6.1 of the LILCO Plan. The EPA Protective Action Guides (PAGs) have been adopted in OPIP 3.6.1 of the LILCO Transition Plan. See Long Island Lighting Company (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station,
) Unit 1), LBP-85-12,21 NRC 644,772 (1985)(hereinaf ter cited as PID). The PAGs call for mandatory evacuation if the projected dose is 5 rem or more l
! to the whole body (or 25 rem to the thyroid). S_e_e Table 5.1 of the Manual
) of Protective Action Guides and Protective Actions for Nuclear Accidents, EPA-520/1-75-001 (September 1975) (Table 5.1 updated June 1979). Be-tween I and 5 rem v note body (5 and 25 rem thyroid) the protective action
) is " shelter as a minin.um," with a recommendation to " evacuate unless con-straints make it impractical." !d. The choice ut protective action is made
)
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on the basis of the projected radiation doses that would result from a re-
)E -lease of radioactive fission' products along with consideration of plant con-ditions. PID at 771. The factors used to calculate the dose projections in-
- clude the nature of the release, the amount of time until the release is expected to occur, and the anticipat'ed duration of the release. Id.
In addition, OPIP 3.6.1 provides guidance for making protective ac-tions based on plant co'nditions. Attachment. 5 to OPIP 3.6.1, which
~
contains figures that we commonly refer to as "ple charts," provides guld-ance for evaluating protective actions based upon plant conditions. See At-tachment 5 to OPIP 3.6.1, which is Attachment B to this testimony. Based
)' upon plant conditions, the appropriate prc.?ctive action to be recom-mended for various zones is made relative to the existing wind direction.
See Attachment 6 to OPIP 3.6.1, which is Attachment C to this testimony.
D
- 6. Q. When did LERO first decide that evacuation was the appropriate protective action recommendation for zones A-M Q and R?
A. [Kessler] I made the initial evacuation decision for zones A-M, Q and R at D 10:10 af ter consulting with the Nuclear Engineer, the Radiation Health Coordinator, the Manager of Local Response, and the individual simulating the position of County Representative at the EOC.
- 7. Q. What factors led LERO to recommend evacuation for zones A-M, Q and R?
L A. (Kessler, Watts, Weismantiel At 09:46 on the day of the Exercise, we
) were notified at the EOC by onsite personnel that the radiological emer-gency had escalated to a General Emergency. At 10:02 we received infor-mation that the plant was experiencing engineering problems that were af-fecting safety systems. We were advised by our Nuclear Engineer that if
- this situation continued there would be dramatic radia tion release
consequences. At that point we knew that the plant was in serious trouble.
As we mentioned earlier, OPIP 3.6.1 of the LILCO Plan provides for evalua-tion of protective actions based on plant conditions. Af ter applying the guidance set forth in Attachments 5 and 6 of OPIP 3.6.1, we determined that evacuation was the appropriate protective action for zones A-M, Q and R.
(Watts] Calculations I did to determine projected radiological dose con-
)
firmed that evacuation was the appropriate protective action recommen-dation. Dose projections based upon the calculated dose to a child's thy-roid, assuming a nine-hour exposure duration, and a hypothetical release
)
concentration of 1000 micro curies per cubic centimeter indicated a child thyroid dose of 7.88 rem, which exceeded the EPA Protective Action Guide of 5 rem. See Dose Projections-Case Number 3, which is Attachment D to
)
this testimony. The assumption of a nine-hour exposure duration was based on the time from the calculation until the time the wind shif t predicted to
) occur early that evening would have moved the downwind release plume from the southwest to the southeast.
- 8. Q. Is it true, as the Intervenors suggest, that LERO personnel at the EOC did
) not perform any calculations or dose projections to determine whether evacuation remained an appropriate recommendation?
A. [ Watts] No. At the EOC, we ran computerized dose projections throughout the Exercise. For examples, see Dose Projections-Case Num-bers 3,13 and 15, which are Attachments D, E, and F to this testimony.
- 9. Q. Did you consider whether the projected wind shif t warranted changing the protective action recommendation from evacuation to sheltering?
)
A. ( Kessler, Watts. Weismantle] Whenever we receive information regarding
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1-plant or environmental conditions, we' consider what impact those condi- c 7
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I tions might have on protective action recommendation $. LERO personnel _
monitored and evaluated environmental and plant conditiors'throughout.
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the day. We were regularly informed of radiological and meteorological de-' ,
.velopments. During the course .of the Exercise, we received,at leastjfi're ~',
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different wind shif t projections ranging between 1500 and 18:00. The fact / ,.) .
that a wind shif t was projec ted to occur sontetimii betvreen 15:00 and 18.00 3
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was not sufficiently comp 3111ng to cause us to conside changing the pro-tective action recommendation from evacuaticn to sheltering - not only ,
because it was uncertain exactly when the projected wind shif t would n
) occur, but because there were several other factors which clearly Edd un- (
equivocally indicated that evacuation was the. appropriate protect!ve ac-e . ',
tion recommendation. . .
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- 10. Q. What other factors led you to belfeve th1t it w'sa necessary for the evacua - '
tion to proceed?
A. [Kessler, Watts, Weismantle] First, LERO knew that it was l' aced with a
)-
probable long term release. Secqnd, plant release rates and offsite , dose rates resulting from the exercise scenario achieved maxfmum IP. veli, that .
) were even higher than those assumed in formulati1g the initial decision to evacuate. Third, continued sheltering would not have been an effective e .
protective actiori in any case because the homes of those " individuals who -
2
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) had not yet lef t their homes by, for example,2:00 or 3:00 p.m." had already .
i been immersed in the plume for at least an hour and therc'was substantial contamination in zones A-M . Q and R. Fourth, another widd shif t directing the plume back toward zones A-M. Q anc R was possible. Finally, changing the protective action recommendation to sheltering ir, the middle of the
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- evacuation would have tended to confuse the public and would not there-I y fore have constituted good emergency planning practice.
- 11. Q. Would you explain what impact a probable long term release had on your
. decisions.regarding protective actions?
.,. A_.
[Ker,sler, Watts, Weismantle] Yes. LERO knew that it was faced with a
,) "I. .
probable'long term release. LERO personnel at the EOC had received indi-g a cations tnat substantial radioactivity had been released in the plant reactor
) . building and that the reactor building would continue to release ra-dioactivity for several hours or possibly days. It was important, therefore, e that the evacuation proceed -- sheltering would not have 'een a satisfacto-
}1 -
r ry protective action recommendation in light of the probable long-term re-9 lease.
) *, " 12. Q. Would you explain how the plant release rates and ofIsite dose rates result-ing from the exercise scenario impacted on your assessment of protective action recommendations?
A. [ Watts] Yes. The plant release rates and offsite dose rates resulting from the exercise scenario achieved maximum levels that were even higher than
)
those assumed in formulating the initial decision to evacuate. This served to reinforce the validity of the original decision to evacuate.
- 13. Q. Can you explain why you say that continued sheltering would not have been ef fective in any care?
A. (Watts) Yes. Sheltering clearly would not have been an appropriate pro-tective action recommendation given the f act that the area occupied by the people that the Intervenors claim may have benefited by sheltering rather than evacuating, la, those " individuals who had not yet lett their homes by, for example. 2:00 or 3:00," had already been immersed in the t
)'s r x
) 3 plume for at least an hour. By'13:00 the antire downwind area was covered k to ten miles and by 14:0b the plume had been there at least an hour.
The degree of protection afforded by sheltering depends upon the source of radiation. For a thyroid dose where contamination is received by ,
- inhalation, the protection afforded by sheltering decreases as outside air-Infiltrates into the house. Af ter the shelter has been in the plume for over an hour, the air inside is approximately as radioactive as the air outside.
3 This short term protection from thyrcid dose would have been even shorter during the. emergency. This is because sheltering had never been recom-mended and' ventilation control would not have been implemented in any houses.
The LERO planning basis, which already has been litigated, see PID at 772-74, is that sheltering is assumed to provide 50% thyroid dose reduc-D tion for the first hour and little or no protection af ter that time. The per-cent dose savings detailed in the PID,1&,25% for two hours.17% for three hours, assumes sheltering from the time the major release arrives. Thus, D~'
sheltering is effective in reducing thyroid exposure from inhalation of 10-dine, primarily in short duration, puff type releases lasting less than an hour, where sheltering begins prior to arrival of the plume.
3 Since by 14:40 (the time at which LERO allegedly learned that 20%
of the population had not yet lef t their homes) the entire downwind area D-had been immersed in the plume for at least an hour and there was substan-O tial contamination in the area. homes no longer afforded effective pro-tection from inhalation of radioactive lodine. Thus. If the rediaining popu-lation had sheltered and waited td evacuate until af ter the wind shif t L3 <
occurred (as the Intervenors propose in Contention EX 36), the population
(
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's
) would actually have received a greater dose than had they evacuated. The
) suggestion offered by the Intervenors that persons should have stopped evacuating and begun sheltering approximately three hours af ter the major release of radiation began, at a time when the entire downwind area had been immersed in the plume for at least an hour, therefore is utterly with-out merit.
- 14. Q. Would you explain your concern over the possibility of a later wind shif t
} that may have directed the plume back over zones A-M, Q and R?
A. (Kessler, Watts, Weismantle] Yes. Even though the wind shif t that was anticipated to occur between 15:00 and 18:00 was projected to direct the D plume away from portions of zones A-M, Q and R, it was possible that the wind could shif t back again and that people in zones A-M, Q and R would receive additional exposure to radiation.
)
- 15. Q. Would you explain the impact of your concern about confusing the public on your protective action recommendations?
A_ .
[ Kessler, Watts, Weismantle] Yes. We are aware that emergency planning D practice requires all reasonable efforts to ensure that the public not be confused. In table tops, practice drills, and discussions we had with sociological and emergency planning experts, it was made very clear that it is crucial to avoid confusion among the general public. We did not want to confuse the public by changing the protective action recommendation in the middle of an evacuation. We were concerned that confusion would re-suit if we recommended that some people in zones A-M. Q and R shelter while recommending that others in that area, who were in the process of evacuating, continue evacuating.
D
[M11eti] If LERO had changed the protective action recommendation from evacuation to sheltering it would have ereated public confusion.
- 16. Q. Why do you say that if LERO had changed the protective action recommen-dation from evacuation to sheltering it would have created public confu-y sion?
A. [Mileti] This contention suggests that LERO should have considered recom-mending that persons in zones A-M, Q and R who had not yet lef t their homes to evacuate should instead shelter in their homes at, for example,
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14:00 or 15:00. The contention f alls to recognize, however, that people in the process of evacuating would have been in these very zones at the time.
That is, people in the same geographical area as those persons still in their
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homes would have been in vehicles evacuating. From a public response viewpoint, therefore, this contention suggests that LERO should have con-
) sidered recommending that people in a particular geographical area shelter at the same time it recommended that other people in the very same geo-graphical area continue to evacuate.
Recommending that people in a particular geographical area shelter at the same time that others in the same area continue to evacuate would have confused the public. People in both categories of recommended public response would have heard that others in their geographical area were being advised to engage in a different protective action recommendation.
It is also quite possible that people would have seen Others engaged in a protective action different than the one recommended to them.
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As a result of the dichotomous recommendation some evacuees would have sought shelter and some people who were advised to shelter
) would have begun to evacuate and yet others would have waffled, that is.
engaged in one protective action and then changed their minds and engaged
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in another and then perhaps another again. It is impossible to now estimate with. precision how many or what percentage of the evacuating public would have sought shelter, or how many or what percentage of the shel-tering public would have attempted to evacuate, or how many or what per-centage of either group would have waffled. I can say with confidence, however, that some of each activity would have occurred. In addition, it would have been difficult for LERO to estimate how many people in zones
} A-M, Q and R were doing what, resulting in a significant loss in LERO's ability to help the public in zones A-M, Q and R make good response deci-sions and then follow through on them.
) In my judgment, the purpose of emergency planning is to minimize the potential for confusion in emergency response. If LERO personnel did not consider the dichotomous public protective action recommendation
) proposed by the Intervenors it speaks well of LE'RO personnel. It suggests to me that the numerous conversations I and other social scientists had with them about public behavior in emergencies were worthwhile. From a
)
public response viewpoint, I judge that LERO personnel should be praised and not faulted for not considering dichotomous protective action recom-mendations for persons in the same geographical area.
- 17. Q. Are there any circumstances in which you believe it would be appropriate to change a protective action recommendation to the public once it is is-sued?
) A_. (Mileti} It is quite possible to consider the unlimited world of imaginable and hypothetical emergencies and even actual historical emergencies and ask the generic question. "Is it ever appropriate to consider changing a pro-
) tective action recommendation to a public once it is issued?" The answer to this question is yes, but this is the case only in extraordinary circumstances.
)
1.j An exampic of an extraordinary circumstance is the 1985 Cheyenne O Flood, in which emergency officials thought the public threat stemmed from a tornado. The public was advised to shelter in their basements and many did. It later became clearer that the real threat to public safety was a flood. The place not to be in a flood is the basement of a house, for obvi-ous reasons. In this case it would have been inappropriate not to advise the public of a needed protective action change. In this example, however, n" even though members of the endangered public would have been advised to engage in an alternate protective action, all people in a particular geo-graphical crea at risk would have been engaging in the same alternate pro-O' tective action. If the logic of Contention Ex 36 were applied to the Cheyenne Flood it would suggest that some people in the floodplain be ad-vised to stay in their basement at the same time that others were being ad-O vised to seek high ground while also stating that the same amount of flood waters would pass over all houses.
Thus, while it inight be desirable to change a protective action ree-O ommendation under extraordinary circumstances, from a public response viewpoint, one of the major prerequisites to consider should be whether all members of the public in a particular geographical area can reasonably be asked to engage in the same revised protective action.
[ Kessler, Watts, Weismantle] At this time, we cannot conceive of a situa-O tion where we would change the protective action recommendation from evacuation to sheltering once the evacuation was underway. In the realm of possibilities, however, there may be a situation in which it would be ap-O propriate to change the recommendation from evacuation to sheltering.
Though we cannot conceive of such a situation at the moment, we certainly O
) would at least consider changing the recommendation from evacuation to sheltering if such an extraordinary circumstance would ever arise.
18.' Q. Are you aware of any actual emergencies in which dichotomous protective action recommendations were issued to different groups of people in the same geographical area?
)
A. [Miletil I do not recollect an actual emergency in which different or dichotomous protective action recommendations were issued for different groups of people in the same geographical area.' The Three Mile Island Ac-
)
cident and evacuation in 1979, however, is a close example. The public in the area of Three Mile Island (TMI) received a large number of information transmissions about the accident over a span of several days. One of these
)
was clearly a dichotomous recommendation. Governor Thornberg suggested that pre-school aged children and pregnant women leave the area. This implied a dichotomous recommendation since all others in the area were
)
not advised to leave. The resulting public response to this and other public information was that many people became confused about the risk and many more people evacuated than those advised to do so. It is true that
)
many factors beyond the dichotomous recommendation issued by the Gov-ernor must be taken into account to understand public response at TMI.
) However, the TMI accident certainly does document how the Governor's
! dichotomous advisory (along with other factors) contributed to public con-fusion.
- 19. Q. Do you have any reason to believe that you should have considered changing the protective action recommendation from evacuation to sheltering?
A. [Kessler, Watts, Weismantle} No. Evacuation clearly was the appropriate
) protective action recommendation given the probability of a long-term re-lease. Indeed. the FEMA Post-Exercise Assessment (FPEA), dated April 17.
)[ 1986, stated that " appropriate protective action recommendations were
) made by the accident assessment staff in the LERO EOC," FPEA at 31,"the Radiation Health Coordinator and the Nuclear Engineer demonstrated good judgment in making correct PAG determinations," FPEA at 33, and "the
) protective action recommendations made by the Radiation Health Coordinator were consistent with the EPA PAG for thyroid dose which was the appropriate dose pathway for this exercise scenario," FPEA at 33. It is noteworthy that nowhere have Intervenors claimed that LERO's protective action recommendations during the exercise were inappropriate given the scenario data.
)
- 2 0. Q. Would a dose savings have resulted had you changed the protective action recommendation from evacuation to sheltering?
A_ . [ Watts] No. In f act, it is likely that those persons who sheltered instead
) of evacuating actually would have received a greater dose.
)
)
D D
D-3 ATTACHMENT A D
D D
D e
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Attachment A 10.
CONTENTION EX-36. The exercise demonstrated a fundamental flawJin the LILCO. Plan in that subsequent to their adoption of the original-. recommendations from the onsite staff at the EOF, LERO personnel made protective action recommendations without ap-
- O' parent basis, failed to consider alternative protective measures thatLcould have resulted in more dose savings, and made inappro-priate recommendations, in violation of 10 CFR S 50.47(b)(10),
and NUREG 0654 5 II.J.10.m. Thus, LILCO failed to satisfy objec-tives EOCL8 and'12 and the exercise precludes a finding of rea-O sonable assurance that' adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a Shoreham accident, as required by 10 CFR S 50.47(a)(1).
Specifically, LERO personnel had no apparent basis for the 4
decision to recommend that people in'the original downwind zones -- i.e., zones A-M, Q, and R -- should as late as 3:48
,?-
I leave their homes and attempt to evacuate if they had not done so earlier. EBS messages simulated every 15 minutes between 12:06 and 3:48 contained such a recommendation. The documents gener-ated at the EOC fail to indicate that any calculations or-dose
^
projections were performed to determine if this remained an ap-propriate recommendation for the entire period during which it LO was broadcast. There is no indication that the continuing appro-priateness of such a recommendation was ever even carefully con-sidered by LERO personnel in the EOC.-
In fact, while such EBS messages were being simulated (be-ginning at 12:06), the EOF was projecting that a wind shift.would direct the plume away from the original downwind zones as early
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l as 3:00. LERO personnel were aware of that projecton. In light of that projection, however, it may have been more appropriate, and resulted in more dose savings, for individuals who had not yet left their homes by, for example, 2:00 or 3:00, to remain sheltered in their homes until after the wind had shifted, rather than getting on the roads with no protection before the wind 1 0 shift. After the shift, such persons may have been able to evac-uate with a likelihood of less exposure and smaller doses. The failure even to. consider such an alternative protective action for those in the original downwind zones who had not yet evacu-ated is significant because the LERO players knew that as of q') 2:40, according to the exercise controller, there were still sup-posedly 20,550 people who had not yet evacuated.
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ATTACHMENT B
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Attachmsnt B OPIP 3.6.1 Page 44a of 44 Attachm:nt 5 Page 1 of 1
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PREDETERMINED PROTECTIVE ACTION '
RECOMENDATIONS FOR GENERAL EMERGENCY CLASSIFICATIONS 2
>' 2 PAR TO BE
- CORE CONTAINnENT FAILURE CONSIDERED FAILURE NO NO COND.
2 MILES 0 CTION l YES NO CONO.
II
)
5 MILES A DIRECTION
'[ WINO
) # ' -
COND. YES LIKELY SUT '
III NOT WITHIN -j i
3 HOURS i.
z 5
)
10 MILES WIND
/j/ OIRECTION
)
/ [j CONO. YES YES OR IV WITHIN 3 HOURS ,
) 5 10 MILES
) NOTE:
- 1. CORE FAILURE-RELEASE OF FISSION PRODUCTS INTO CONTAINnENT
- 2. CONTAINnENT FAILURE-RELEASE OF FISSION PRODUCTS INTO ATn0 SPHERE SHELTERING WINO
)
EVACUATION AREA [///// AREA DIRECTION TOWARO Rev. 4
D D
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OPIP 3.6.1 Page 44b of 44 Attachment 6 Page 1 of 1 EVACUATION AREAS BY ZONES PROTECTIVE ACTION RECOMMENDATIONS BY ERPA FOR GENERAL CLASSIFICATION l l l l l Wind l l Condition III l Condition IV l l From (Degrees) l Condition I l Condition II ll l Evacuate: ABCDE l Evacuate: ABCDECHI l Evacuate: ABCDEFGilIJ l Shelter: ABCDEFGillJ lN 349 to KLMNOR l Ki]0iOR l l Shelter : FJ l l 11 l l Shelter: ABCDEFGilIJ ll l Evacuate ABCDE I Evacuate: ABCDEGil l Evacuate: ABCDEFGilIJ l NNE 12 to KLMNOR l KIJiNOR ll 33 l l Shelter : FJI l l
l Evacuate ABCDEFGli l Evacuate: ABCDEFGilIJ l Shelter: ABCDEFGilIJ l l NE 34 to l Evacuate: ABCDE l KIRNQR l l 56 l l Shelter : IJ l KLHNQR l
57 to l Evacuate: ABCDE I Evacuate: ABCDEFG l Evacuate: ABCDEFGilIJ l Shelter: ABCDEFGilIJ l l ENE l KlJtQR l 78 l l Shelter : IIIJ l KLHQR l
79 to l Evacuate: ABCDE l Evacuate: ABCDEFG l Evacuate: ABCDEFGilIJ l Shelter: ABCDEFGilIJ l l_ E l KLQR l 101 l l Shelter : IIIJ l KLQR l Shelter: ABCDEFGilIJ l l Evacuate: ABCDE l Evacuate: ABCDEFG l Evacuate: ABCDEFGilIJ l ESE 102 to l KQ l l 124 l l Shelter : ilIJ l KQ l Shelter: ABCDEFGil1J l l Evacuate: ABCDEF l Evacuate: ABCDEFGilIJ l SE 125 to l Evacuate: ABCDE l KQ .l l 146 l l Shelter : GilIJ l KQ l
147 to 1 Evacuate: ABCDE l Evacuate: ABCDE l Evacuate: ABCDEFGilIJ l Shelter: ABCDEFGilIJ l l SSE l l 168 l l Shelter : FGilIJ l ABCDEFGil1J l Shelter: ABCDEFCllIJ l l Evacuate: ABCDE l Evacuate: ABCDE l Evacuate lS 169 to l l l 191 l l Shelter : FGilIJ l l Shelter: ABCDEFGillJ l l Evacuate: ABCDE I Evacuate: ABCDEFGilIJ l SSW 192 to l Evacuate: ABCDE l l l 213 l l Shelter : FGilIJ l l Shelter: ABCDEFGilIJ l 214 to l Evacuate: ABCDE l Evacuate: ABCDEJ l Evacuate: ABCDEFGilIJ l l SW P l P l 236 l l Shelter : FGill l l Shelter: ABCDEFGilIJ l l Evacuate: ABCDE l Evacuate: ABCDEJ l Evacuate: ABCDEFGillJ l WSW 237 to OPS l OPS l l 258 l l Shelter : FGill l ABCDEFGillJ l Shelter: ABCDEFGilIJ l l Evacuate: ABCDEIJ l Evacuate lW 259 to l Evacuate: ABCDE OPS l OPS l g l 281 l l Shelter : FGil l ABCDEFGilIJ l Shelter: ABCDEFCil1J l <t l Evacuate: ABCDEll1J l Evacuate l WNW 282 to l Evacuate: ABCDE OPS l OPS _l $
l 303 l l Shelter : FG l l Shelter: ABCDEFGilIJ l l Evacuate: ABCDEllIJ l Evacuate: ABCDEFGil1J {in l NW 304 to l Evacuate: ABCDE NOPS l NOPS l l 326 l l Shelter : FG l l Shelter: ABCDEFGilIJ ll $
l Evacuate: ABCDE l Evacuate: ABCDECHIJ l Evacuate: ABCDEFGillJ l NNW 327 to 1RNOS l IJtNOS g l Shelter : F l l 348 l Rev. 5
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$HP3 - 0FFSITE OOSE ASSESSMENT LILCO<ENTECH 003E5
-...__.._._ (M009_01/86) .___...........____
PBSVS ISOTOPIC RELEASE RATE 5
]) e vC1/SEC3 KP33M ?.35E+005 KFS5M 1.75E+006 kRSS 1 26E+005 kR37 i S5E+006 VR$3 6 37E+006 AP99 7 34E-011 KR90 0.00E+000 XE31M 7.50E+004 XE33M 9.44E+004 XE133 2.26E+007 XE35M 1.64E+006 XE135 2.07E+007 XE137 1.34E-007 XE138 3.01E+003 AR41 0.00E+000 !130 0 00E+000 -
1131 1.51E+005 I132 9 10E+004 1133 2.25E+005 I134 3.01E+004 I135 1.82E+005 TOTAL 5 66E+007 DATE 08 ENTRY: 01/13/%6
) TIME OF ENTRYc 09:04 l
GROS 3 NOBLE GAi FELEASE PATE =
! 2b 5 593E+007 (wCt/1EC) CR 5.302E+006 <wCi/?EC XE133 EQUIV)
GPoil 100!HE FELEAiE DA*E 09
=
l -9> 6.737E+005 <uct,SEC) -
2.144E+005 <wC /?EC I131 EQUIVs
[)
THE EFFLUENT !$0 TOPIC CONCENTRA-TIONS WEPE ADJUSTED BY THE _
FOLLOWING MULTIPLYING FACTOR (Si:
PB1Vi 2 630E+001 l
I
- 2) ,
C 3 C 3'C 3 C3,C 3 C3 C3 C 3 C 3 C 3 C 3 C 3 C 3 C 3 C3 C3 C3C3C3C3C3CJC3C3C3CJC3C3C3C3C3CJ
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?NPi - 0FF31TE 00iE Ai!EiiMEHT 005Ei *M009-01/S6> LILCQ ENTECH WHOLEE00Y OOSE 5 ATE E i'. i SECTGF- WiW 01/13/56 03 04 5!TE E09:4043Y= 3 13E-00.
MILE 3 MP/ND MILE 3 "E -c EXCL 3.0SE+001 3.5 4 19E-06:
0 2! 3 30E+A01 4 0 3 iOE-001 05 5 64E+001 4.5 3 13E+001 1.0 3.16E+001 50 2 'iE+001 1.5 S 50E+001 7.5 1 66E+001 2.0 7.27E+001 10 1.15E+001 15 6.76E+000
[) 25 3.0 5.97E+001 4 96E+001 20 4.72E+000 FE905 MQre!T05 = FM134
= 100s.
Mor4ITUG cEADING CONCEt4TP . AOJUST = ' 420 +601 S FEit: 50VSCE OE A L X A - C0cE INVENT 0F .
DECAVED F0F 3 HOU53 -
OATE 0F EHTcY 01 13 is tit:E Or EhT3Y 01 31 METEq 0(QG10AL CATA
() DATC OF ENTRY: 01 13 i6 TIME OF ENT*Y. 03 33
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5 64 '.LILCO. EHrEC w Roses is070Pic evCs SEC'sELEAst MATES l'PS7H 4 ??t*004 KP85M1.2iE+wo? 1.t?t+007 t' P15 f.57t+405 KPSP [
LPS$ 4 32E+00? M.E73M APSP 5.07E*095 5.32E-610 tt?9 0 00E*0@4 EE177 l.57E*00?
hE77H i 41E*005 XE175 1 40E+000 *
- E75H 1.12E*00* XE13? 2.04E+004 KEt37 7 10E-007 I!30 0.00E+009 "
l A#41 e.00E+000 q s 1.03E+004 1172 6.19E*005 /
!!38 1134 2.04E*005 1837 1.52E*994 TOTAL 3.34E*006 1875 1.2*E+004 pT1 FWE O r @ 12.y y -
) -
DATE OF EHTPV- 01/17.'$$
T!HE OF ENTRY,' 12:11.
Cro$$ HOELE ' vC t / SGAS EC .- PELEASE OP PATE * '
- 3.???t+009 3 400E+00?,vCt 1EC XE133 EQUIV7 CP033 100tHC DELEASE PATE OR =
re 40$E+004 *vCs. SECS EQUIV' 1.454E*006 'vCn/SEC !!71 THE EFFLUttif I?0 TOPIC CONCENTRA- THE 710HS HEPE ADJUSTED BY C3C3C3CJC3C3C3C3C3C3C3C3L3CJC3L*
FOLLONING HULTIPLv!HG FACTOP<S$' $NP$ . OFFSITE 001E A?stiSHEHf EC1VS
< l 329E*002 00$En 'NODP..
.....ele 56.'.LILCo EtiTECM
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'St3VS C3C3CJC3C3C3C3C3C3C3C3C3C3C3C3C3CHILO SECTOR' H$H THYPO!O 00$E Ol/17eS4 PATE 12*11 1 2?E*001
$1TE SOUHOAPV= NR, HP HILEi MP'HP MILES 3.5 l E4E*003 EXCL 6.52E-ea5 1 4?E+003 0.25 1.?tE+990. 4.0 9.5 3.33E+003 5.0 4 5 t 22E+003 1 03E*003
) C3C3CJC3C3CJCJC3C3C3C3C3C3CJCJC3 1.0 1.5 7.9?t+093 7.5 6.0?E+003 10. 5 $?E+v02 ,
4.29E*003 4 7SE*002 THPS
- OFFSITE DOSE ASSESSMENT LILCO/ENTECH 2.0 ? 0?t+062 DOSEJ (MUDP-01/86) 2.5 3.12E+aa7 15 2 44E*002 3.0 2.36E+963 20
'RS$VS _
HHOLEBOOV DOSE PATE 12*11 SECTOR: WSH 01/13/86 PH134 }
3.0?t+002 Pr$VS M0HITOP e 6.* ?0 Sitt BOUNDA*Y= MP/HP MONITOP REM 0!!IG = 1 320E+ O2 HILES HR/NP HILES S.4?E*091 CONCENTR. ROJUST.
3.5 EXCL 2.24E*002 0.25 3.03E+e02 4 0 6.82E*001 5.45E*001 i Rssv$ SOURCE-9.5 4 ??E+002 4.5 5.0 4.*?t+ eel i OSA LOCA - CORE INVEllTORY 1.0 4.14E+992 7.5 2.74t*001 CECMYED FOP 3 HOUR $ ,
1.5 2.33E*002 2.03E*991 DATE OF ENTPYi 91/17/$6 2.0 1.?6E+092 10 15. 1.44E+861 TIME OF ENTRY 08+31 N 2.5 1.41E*002 1.13E*481
> 3.0 1.0?E*002 29.
- HETEOPOLOGICAL DATA
/'
DATE OF ENTRYi 01/17'94 a PH134 TIME OF ENTRY' 11'54 PFSV2 N0Htine = 6??e MOHITOP READIl4G 1.820E 802 C3C3C3C3C3C3C3C3C3C3C3C3C3C3C3C3 C0HCE14TP. A0JUST. = --
E
/ OBA LOCA - COPE titVENTORY -
DECAYE0 F08 7 HOUPS .
DATE OF ENTPYi ole 13ess TtHE OF EllTPYe OS*71 E
HETE0POLvC1 CAL DATA g DATE OF E14T PY ' 01/13/96 TIME OF EhTPYi 11+$f E ~
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C3C3C3C3C3C3CJC3C3C3C3C3C3C3CJC3 !CH302060Ei
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. .' We.'* ..*.5 ;" '
SNPS - 0FFOITE DOSE ASOESSMENT DOSES (M009-01/86) LILCO/ENTECH
~~ Y. ; ; i'i:2 . .. ' ' .,' - -
g , j.h ? ::.*C,*f,..
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t
(
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' (wCt/SEC)
KRS3M 4.76E+006 KRSSM 1.13E+007 KRSS 0.13E+005 KRS7 1.20E+007 VPS8 4.12E+007 KR39 5.07E-010 KR90 0.00E+000 XE31M 4.85E+005 XE33M 6.10E+005 XE133 1.46E+008 ME35M 1.06E+007 XE135 1.34E+008 (
l l XE137 S.67E-007 XE133 1.95E+004 (
AR41 0.00E+000 I130 0.00E+000 ,
1131 9.78E+005 I132 5.89E+005 ;
1.45E+006 I134 1.95E*005
~
[) 1133 i I135 1.1SE+006 TOTAL 3.66E+008 .
DATE OF ENTPY: 01/13/86 TIME OF ENTRYs 13:57 i CROSS HOBLE GAS PELEASE RATE =
[]
3.619E+00S (vCi/SEC) OR (
3.430E+009 /wCi/SEC XE133 EQUIV) ;
GR'OSS 10 DINE RELEASE FATE =
4.391E+006 (vC1/SEC) OR ,
1.387E+006 /uci-/SEC !!31 EQUIV)
THE EFFLUENT ISOTOPIC CONCENTFA-L) 1 TIGHS WERE ADJUSTED BY THE FOLLOWING MULTIPLY 1HG FACTOR (S) g RBSVS 1.734E+002 C3C3CJC3C3C3C3C3C3C3C3CJC3C3C3C3 33 C3C3C3C3C3C3CJC3C3CJC3C3C3CJCJCJ m SHPS - 0FFSITE DOSE ASSESSMENT
'# 00SE3 (M009-01/36) LILCO. Er4 TECH WHOLEBODY 00SE RATE . .pBSuS SECTOR: WSW 01/13/36 17 57 i!TE SOUNDA*Y= 2 94E+002 MILES MR 'WD MILES Me +:
3 EXCL 2.13E+002 3.5 ? 09E-001 0 25 2.39E+002 4.0 6 50E-001 0.5 4.73E+002 4 5 5 31E-001 1.0 3.93E+002 50 4 57E-001 .
1 5 2.70E+002 75 2 61E*001 1.34E-001 1.0 1.47E+002 10 2.5 1.37E+002 15 1 37E*001 3.0 1.04E+002 20. 1.0SE+001 .
O _
PESUS MONITOP = *M134 MONITOR EEADING = 4470 CONCENTR. A0JUST = 1 "34E+002 EESVS SOURCE DEA uGCA C05E IHUENTOP'.
gg DECAVED F08 3 HOUFO DATE OF E N T * '. 01 13'36 TIME OF EN**'* 0?:31 ff E T E0F 0LOGI C AL DATA DATE OF ENTpv: 01 13/86 TIME OF ENTRY 114 =.6
- ) .
C3C3CJC3C3C3C3C3C3C3CJC3C3C3C3r3
'b $
. 2 3698
). ,
L C3C3C3CJC3ClCJCJC3CJC3CJC3C3CJC3
-SHPS - 0FFSITE DOSE ASSESSMENT I bbb_b $~_bbI $__b_bb_b [bb _
CHILD THYROID DOSE RATE >RBSVS -
SECTOR: WSW 01/13/86 13:57 -
SITE BOUNDARY = 1.23E+001
) MILES MR/HR MILES MR/HR E'CL A 6.21E-005 3.5 1 75E+003 0.25 1.82E+000 4.0 1.40E+003 0.5 3.1TE+003 4.5 1 16E+003
- 1.0 T.52E+003 5.0 9.85E+002
- 1.5 5.78E+003 7.5 5.61E+002 j 2.0 4.08E+003 2.5 2.97E+003 15.
- 10. 4.1?E+002 2.95E+002. l 3.0 2.25E+003 20 2.33E+002 RBSVS MONITOR = PM134 . .
) MONITOF. REAOING'. = 6470
- CONCENTR. ADJUST. = 1 734E+002 RBSVS SOURCE: .
DECAYED FOR 3 HOURS *
)-
DATE OF ENTRY: 01/13/86 TIME OF ENTRY: 08:31 .
METEOROLOGICAL DATA DATE OF ENTRY- 01/13/86 TIME OF ENTRY- 11:56
) ,
s C 3 C 3 C3 CJ C3 C 3 CJ C3 C J CJ C J C J C 3 CJ C J C3 9
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. .