ML20212D407

Lilco Testimony on Contention Ex 34.* Disagrees W/Allegation in Contention Ex 34 That Route Alerting Process Comply W/Certain Regulations & Guidelines Governing Notification of Public within Plume Exposure Epz.Related Correspondence

ML20212D407
Person / Time
Site:	Shoreham File:Long Island Lighting Company icon.png
Issue date:	02/27/1987
From:	Daverio C, Weismantle J LONG ISLAND LIGHTING CO.
To:
Shared Package
ML20212D309	List: ML20212D304 ML20212D407 ML20212D548 ML20212D814 ML20212D894 ML20212D979 ML20212E104
References
OL-5, NUDOCS 8703040110
Download: ML20212D407 (15)

Text

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b q UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

> NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Before the Atomic Safety and Licenshu Board

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In the Matter of )

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LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY ) Docket No. 50-322-OL-5

) (EP Exercise)

) (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1)

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LILCO'S TESTIMONY ON CONTENTION EX 34

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Hunton & Williams 707 East Main Street P.O. Box 1535 J' Richmond, Virginia 23212 February 27,1987 J

'J 8703040110 870227 PDR ADOCK 05000322 g G PDR

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA D NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board O

In the Matter of )

)

LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY ) Docket No. 50-322-OL-5

) (EP Exercise) g (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, )

Unit 1) )

LILCO'S TESTIMONY ON CONTENTION EX 34 O

O Hunton & Williams 707 East Main Street P.O. Box 1535 g Richmond, Virginia 23212 February 27,1987 O

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> LILCO, February 27,1987 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION k

Before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board D In the Matter of )

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LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY ) Docket No. 50-322-OL-5

) (EP Exercise)

(Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, )

Unit 1) )

b LILCO'S TESTIMONY ON CONTENTION EX 34

1. Q. Please state your name and business address.

A. (Daverio] My name is Charles A. Daverlo. My business address is Long Island Lighting Company, Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, P.O. Box 628, Wading River, New York 11732.

D (Weismantle] My name is John A. Weismantle. My business address is Long Island Lighting Company,1660 Walt Whitman Road, Melville, New B York 11747.

2. Q. Please summarize your professional qualifications relating to Contention EX 34.

D A. (Daverio] I am the Assistant Department Manager of the Nuclear Operations Support Department for the Long Island Lighting Company (LILCO). My professional qualifications are being offered into evidence as D part of the document entitled " Professional Qualifications of LILCO Wit-nesses on Exercise Contentions." My familiarity with the issues dealt with in Contention EX 34 stems from my work in developing and imple-S menting the Shoreham Nuclear Power Station Local Offsite Radiological Emergency Response Plan (the "LILCO Plan") for Shoreham and from my 9

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, participation, as Lead Controller for the Local Emergency Response J

Organization (LERO), in the February 13 Exercise. In addition, through my work as an emergency planner, I am familiar with the applicable regu-lations and guidelines for public notification systems.

J (Weismantle] I am Vice President of Engineering for LILCO. My profes-sional qualifications are being offered into evidence as part of the docu-3 ment entitled " Professional Qualifications of LILCO Witnesses on Exercise Contentions." My familiarity with the issues raised by Contention EX 34 stems from my work in developing and implementing the LILCO Plan for 3 Shoreham, my participation as the Manager of Local Response during the February 13,1986 Exercise, my familiarity with the applicable regulations and guidelines that govern offsite emergency response organizations for

] nuclear power plants, and my prior testimony on the issue of route alerting in the emergency plan portion of the Shoreham licensing pro-ceeding.

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3. Q. Please summarize the issues raised by Contention EX 34.

A. [ Daverio, Weismantle] Contention EX 34 alleges that the LILCO Plan is fundamentally flawed because during the Exercise notification of the pub-lic via the Route Alert Driver system, which is the backup to the siren system, was not completed within the time frame set out in certain regu-lations for the prompt notification of the public in the plume exposure pathway Emergency Planning Zone ("EPZ"). The complete text of Con-tention EX 34 is set out in Attachment A to this Testimony.

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4. Q. Please summarize your testimony on Contention EX 34.

A. [Daverio. Weismantle] We disagree with the allegations in Contention EX 34 that the route alerting process must comply with certain regula-tions and guidelines governing notification of the public within the plume exposure pathway EPZ and that on the day of the Exercise the Route Alert Drivers observed by FEMA took "too long" to drive their routes.

First, the route alerting process need not be completed within any specif-ic time frame. The Licensing Board has already held in this case that the Route Alert Driver function is not required by the regulations or the guidelines and that, "a fortiori, no standard time limit need be met." Par-tial Initial Decision of April 17, 1985, Long Island Lighting Company (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), LBP-85-12, 21 NRC 644, 759 (1985) ("PID"), aff'd, Long Island Lighting Company (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), ALAB-832, 23 NRC 135,143 (1986). The regula-tions and guidelines are satisfied by the Prompt Notification System. PID at 756-64.

Second, the times clocked by Route Alert Drivers on the day of the Exercise do not accurately reflect the time needed to complete the route alerting function. During the Exercise, each of the three Route Alert Drivers observed was assigned to cover an entire siren area alone. In the event of an actual radiological emergency, however, LERO could assign more than one Route Alert Driver to a given route, thus shortening the time to complete it. For these reasons, there is no basis for Contention EX 34.

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5. Q. You have used the terms " regulations" and " guidelines". What do you mean D by these terms?

A. [Daverlo, Weismantle] We used the term " regulation" to refer to the por-tions of the Code of Federal Regulations that govern emergency response D plans. The principal regulations involved in developing emergency plans are 10 C.F.R. S 50.47 and 10 C.F.R. Part 50, Appendix E. An example of a specific regulation would be 10 C.F.R. S 50.47(b)(5). That regulation D provides that an emergency response plan must include "means to provide early notification and clear instruction to the populace within the plume exposure pathway Emergency Planning Zone . . . ."

D By contrast, " guidelines" are intended to suggest criteria or consid-erations that should be made in developing an emergency response plan in compliance with the regulations. The guidelines that are applicable to an 3 offsite emergency response organization for a nuclear power plant are contained in NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1.

6. Q. A number of regulations and a guideline are cited in Contention EX 34. In D your view, how do these regulations and the guideline apply to the issues raised by Contention EX 34?

A. [Daverio, Weismantle] We do not believe that the regulations or the guideline cited in Contention EX 34 are applicable to the route alerting function as that is defined in the LILCO Plan, nor are any other regula-tions or guidelines applicable to this backup notification system. S_ee PID at 759. The regulations and the guideline, as is evident on their f ace, apply to the initial notification of the public, not to backup alerting sys-tems such as the route alerting system in the LILCO Plan. I_d. Specifical-ly, the regulations cited by Intervenors in the Contention state:

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10 C.F.R. S 50.47(b)(5)

Procedures have been established for notifica-tion, by the licensee, of State and local response organizations and for notification of emergency per-sonnel by all organizations; the content of initial and followup messages to response organizations and the 3 -public has been established; and. means to provide early notification and clear instruction to the_popu-lace within the plume exposure pathway Emergency Planning Zone have been established.

10 C.F.R. Part 50. Appendix E. IV.D.3.

Q-- A licensee shall have the capability to notify responsible State and local governmental agencies within 15 minutes af ter declaring an emergency. The i licensee shall demonstrate that the State / local offici-l als have the capability to make a public notification g decision promptly on being informed by the licensee-of an emergency condition. . . . The design objective of the prompt public notification system shall be to have the capability to essentially complete the initial notification of the public within the plume exposure pathway EPZ within about 15 minutes. The use of g this notification capability will range from i immediate notification of the public (within 15 l minutes of the time that State and local officials are I- notified that a situation exists requiring urgent action) to the more likely events where there is sub-stantial time available for the State and local govern-

,o mental officials to make a judgment whether or not to activate the public notification system. . . .

In addition, the cited guideline provides that:

NUREG-0654 S II.E.6 O Each organization shall establish administra-l tive and physical means, and the time required for t

! notifying and providing prompt instructions to the public within the plume exposure pathway Emergency l-l Planning Zone. (See Appendix 3.) It shall be the

o licensee's responsibility to demonstrate that such means exist, regardless of who implements this i

requirement. It shall be the responsibility of the State and local governments to activate such a sys-3 tem.

As the Licensing Board has found, the LILCO Plan complies with O

these regulations and the guideline with the Prompt Notification System.

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PID at 756-64. The route alerting system at issue here is not within that J

regulatorily required system. Instead, it is a discretionary backup or redundant system, implemented out of good practice rather than regulato-ry duty.

7. Q. Please describe that backup system.

A. [Daverio, Weismantle] The LILCO Plan, as already approved by the

$ Board in the PID, provides for Route Alert Drivers as a means for noti-fying the hearing impaired and, if necessary, for providing backup notifi-cation to persons in any area where it has been determined that a siren O has not functioned. OPIP 3.3.4. It is this backup responsibility upon which Intervenors focus in Contention EX 34.

Under the Plan, Route Alert Drivers report to their respective O staging areas at the Alert level. OPIP 3.3.4, Att.1. Thus, they should be in place to provide backup notification, if needed, at the Site Area or the General Emergency levels. At the staging areas, the Route Alert Drivers 3 obtain dosimetry equipment and mount and test their public address equipment on their vehicles so that they will be ready to be dispatched immediately upon receipt of notification that a siren has malfunctioned.

O OPIP 3.3.4 5 5.3.4. Once such notification is received, the Route Alert Drivers are dispatched from the staging areas by the Lead Traffic Guide to drive a route, which may be all or a portion of the area covered by one 3 siren. On his drive through his assigned area, the Route Alert Driver will broadcast a message over the loudspeaker attached to his vehicle noti-fying the public that there has been an accident at the Shoreham Nuclear 3 Power Station and that they should tune in to their local emergency broadcasting station for further information.

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8. Q. In Contention EX 34,Intervenors assert that during the February 13 Exer-1 cise the Route Alert Drivers "took much too long and demonstrated LILCO's failure to comply with the regulatory requirement of prompt notification," thereby establishing a fundamental flaw in the Plan. Do you agree with this statement?

A. (Daverio, Weismantle] No. The basic premise of Contention EX 34 is that Route Alert Drivers must complete their routes within the 15 minute time frame set out in the regulations and the guideline already discussed.

In addition, though not stated in the Contention, Intervenors argued in their October 27, 1986 Objections to Prehearing Conference Order that Route Alert Drivers must meet another guideline - the 45 minute notifi-cation requirement in NUREG-0654, Appendix 3 at 3-3. The Licensing Board, however, has already ruled that both of these premises are wrong.

PID at 759. During the earlier litigation of the adequacy of the Plan itself, the Intervenors, just as they do now in Contention EX 34, argued that the Plan is defective because the Route Alert Drivers cannot com-plete their routes within the notification time (15 minutes) set out in the regulations and the guideline. It-was also argued in the earlier litigation that \ Route Alert Drivers must meet the 45 minute requirement of NUREG-0654, Appendix 3 at 3-3. Tr.12,689-90 (Kowieski); Baldwin ej al.,

ff. Tr.12,174, at 47-48. The issues pressed then were virtually identical in substance to the present issues. The only real difference is that in the prior litigation Intervenors had argued that route alerting would take too long based on their own estimates of the time it would take to drive a route. Now, Intervenors' argument that route alerting takes too long rests on times clocked during the February 13 Exercise.

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1 In the PID, the Board agreed that the route alerting process "may indeed take several times that (15 minute] period" to complete. PID at 759. Nonetheless, the Board concluded that the issues raised were "with-out merit." Id. Following the decision in Kansas Gas & Electric Co. (Wolf Creek Generating Station, Unit 1), LBP-84-26, 20 NRC 53 (1984), the Board held that the regulations and' guidelines relied on here by the Inter-L venors do not require LERO to implement a siren backup system. The

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l Board went on to hold that "[i]f no .such (backup] procedures are I needed, a fortiori, no standard time limit need be met." PID at 759, aff'd, i

ALAB-832, 23 NRC at 143. Accordingly, the Board rejected the argu-ment that the LILCO Plan is inadequate because it might take a long time for the Route Alert Drivers to complete their routes. Instead of finding the Plan inadequate, the Board commended LILCO for including the back-up system in the Plan at all. Id.

The basic premise of Contention EX 34, then, is invalid, rendering the Contention itself without merit. Since LILCO is not even required to provide Route Alert Drivers, they face no time limit; therefore, there is no basis for concluding that they took "too long" to complete their routes.

This conclusion has been reiterated by FEMA through Robert

Wilkerson, Chief of FEMA's Technological Hazards Division of the Office of Natural and Technological Hazards Programs. In an April 6,1986 letter responding to a request from Roger Kowieski, then Chairman of the Region II Regional Assistance Committee, for standards for evaluating redundant route alert driver systems during exercises, Mr. Wilkerson stat-ed that while primary route alerting must be completed within the time period set out in the regulations and guidelines, "there are no such time

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- frames for redundant route alerting." (Emphasis in original).- Accord-ingly, he instructed Mr. Kowieski that "(iln an exercise, if the comple-tion of a route for redundant route alerting takes more than a reasonable amount of time, only an ' area recommended for improvement designation should be made.' " (A copy of this letter is appended to this testimony as Attachment B). Thus, under FEMA's definition of the term " area recom-mended for improvement," the siren backup ' system in the LILCO Plan does not " adversely impact public health and safety," and, therefore, does not require specific corrective action. FEMA Report at 8. In its final Post-Exercise Assessment report, FEMA characterized the performance of the three Route Alert Drivers reviewed therein as " areas recommended for improvement." Not one of the performances was graded as a " deft-ciency" or even as an " area requiring corrective action." Thus, there is no basis for Intervenors' Contention EX 34.

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9. Q. Contention EX 34 lists the times that it took.the three Route Alert Driv-ers observed during the February 13 Exercise to complete their routes.

) What do these times indicate chout the length of time it would take to complete the route alerting process in the event of an actual radiological emergency?

A. (Daverio, Weismantle] The times listed in the Contention are not an

) accurate reflection of the time it would take to notify the public of an emergency using the backup notification system of route alerting. Dur-ing the Exercuse, LERO dispatched only one Route Alert Driver per

) staging area to perform the siren backup function; each driver was as-signed to cover an entire siren area alone. The Plan, however, does not restrict LERO to one Route Alert Driver per siren area, and in an actual

') emergency LERO would not so limit itself. In fact, under the Plan there are more than enough Route Alert Drivers assigned to the siren backup

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function to permit LERO to assign multiple drivers to a single siren area.

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Sixteen of the 60 Route Alert Drivers provided for in the Plan are needed to provide notification to the deaf, leaving 44 Route Alert Drivers to cover 89 siren routes. OPIP 3.3.4, Att. 6. Thus, there is substantial

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redundancy even if one agrees with the 5-20% siren failure rate previously predicted by Intervenors. PID at 759. In the event of an actual radio-logical emergency, the backup notification procedure can be completed

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more rapidly than was demonstrated in the February 13 Exercise.

10. Q. Does this complete your testimony on Contention EX 34?

) A. [Daverio, Weismantle] Yes.

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ATTACHMENT A

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a h ATTACHMENT A Contention EX 34 The exercise revealed a fundamental flaw in the LILCO Plan' in that LILCO is incapable of providing prompt notification to the public in the event of a siren . failure, as : required by 10 CFR S 50.47(b)(5), 10 CFR Part 50 Appen-dix E S IV.D, and NUREG 0654 S II.E. According to the LILCO Plan, .in the event of siren failure, Route Alert Drivers will-be dispatched-to drive through the area around the

) failed siren and broadcast, through loudspeakers, e notification message. LILCO Plan at 3.3-4; OPIP 3.3.4.

During the ' exercise, LILCO attempted to demonstrate the capability of implementing this procedure, and to support compliance with the regulatory requirements for prompt notification and alerting of the public, in response to

) " free play" messages postulating the failure of three sirens (one~in each staging area's territory). One Route Alert Driver was dispatched from each staging area to drive through the simulated siren failure areas identified in the messages. In all three cases, however, the notification process took much too long, and demonstrated LILCO's failure

) to comply with the regulatory requirement of prompt public notification.

Specifically,.as of 9:52, 90 minutes after the siren failure message had been received by the EOC, the Port-Jefferson Route Alert Driver had completed only one half of

) his route. FEMA Report at 57, 58. Thus, he would not have completed his entire route until about three hours after receipt of the failure message. Similarly, the Riverhead Driver did not complete his assigned route until 78 . minutes after the failure message had been received by the Riverhead Staging Area and one hour and 41 minutes after the EOC

) received the message of the failed siren. The Patchogue Driver completed his route 70 minutes after receipt of the failure message at the Patchogue Staging Area. FEMA Report at 68, 74. Accordingly, the results of the exercise preclude a finding that LILCO complied with 10 CFR S 50.47(b)(5), 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E S IV.D, and NUREG

)' 0654 S II.E, and demonstrated LILCO's inability to implement its Plan. The exercise also demonstrated LILCO's failure to satisfy objective FIELD 5. The exercise results thus demonstrated a fundamental flaw in LILCO's Plan which precludes a finding of reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a

) Shoreham accident, as required by 10 CFR S 50.47(a)(1).

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ATTACHMENT B

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ATTACEMENT 5 Federal Emergency Management Agency Washington, D.C. 20472

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) Me o w gam rent paper B. Kowieski Chairman, Regional Assistance cannittee rpm ion II York) rxm: Met . erson ~

Chief, Technological Hazards Division

) Office of Natural & Mchnological Hazards Programs SUE 7ECT: Redundant Route Alerting This is to clarify criteria for evaluating the adequacy of redundant

) route alerting systems at nuclear per plant exercises. These systens

• are designed to be put into offeet only when primary systens, especia11 -

sirens, fail. There is no "hard and fast" time requirement for the -

redundant route alerting systems. Primary route alerting must be done within 45 minutes in the 5 - 10 mile portion of the Dnergency Planning zone (EP2), and within 15 minutes in the 0 - 5 mile portion of the EP2.

) Hcw ver, there are no such time frames for redundant route alerting.

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In an exercise, if the cepletion of a route for redundant route alerting takes nere than a reasonable amount of time, only an ' area reemmended for inpraement* designation should be made. Since there are no mininan time frames, no corrective actions may be required.

I hope that this responds to your concerns. If you have any other questions, please feel free to contact me at 646-361.

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