ML20212D814
| ML20212D814 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Shoreham File:Long Island Lighting Company icon.png |
| Issue date: | 02/27/1987 |
| From: | Lieberman E, Weismantle J KLD ASSOCIATES, INC., LONG ISLAND LIGHTING CO. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20212D309 | List: |
| References | |
| OL-5, NUDOCS 8703040210 | |
| Download: ML20212D814 (63) | |
Text
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1 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
)
Before the Atomic Safety and Licarudrw Board
)
In the Matter of )
)
LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY ) Docket No. 50-322-OL-5
) (EP Exercles)
(Shornham Nuclear Power Station, )
) Unit 1) )
LILCO'S TESTIMONY ON CONTENTION EX 40
)
3-Hunton & Willisma 707 East Main Street P.O. Box 1535 Richmond, Virginia 23212 February 27,1987 3
3 8703040210 870227 PDR ADOCK 05000322 G PDR
b l
l UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION O
Before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board O
In the Matter of )
)
LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY ) Docket No. 50-322-OL-5
) (EP Exercise)
(Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, )
O Unit 1) )
LILCO'S TESTIMONY ON CONTENTION EX 40 0
0 Hunton & Williams 707 East Main Street P.O. Box 1535 Richmond, Virginia 23212 O
February 27,1987 9
O O
) LILCO, February 27,1987 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
- NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION J
Before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board O In the Matter of )
)
LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY ) Docket No. 50-322-OL-5
) (EP Exercise)
(Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, )
_ Unit 1) )
J LILCO'S TESTIMONY ON CONTENTION EX 40
- 1. Q. Please state your name and business address.
A. [Weismantle] My name is John A. Weismantle. My business address is Long Island Lighting Company,1660 Walt Whitman Road, Melville, New York 11747.
[Lieberman] My name is Edward B. Lieberman. My business address is KLD Associates, Incorporated, 300 Broadway, Huntington Station, New O York 11746.
- 2. Q. Please summarize your professional qualifications relating to Contention EX 40.
O A. [Weismantle] I am Vice President of Engineering for the Long Island Lighting Company ("LILCO"). In addition, during the February 13 Exercise, I was Manager of the Local Emergency Response Organization ("LERO") for 3 LILCO. My professional qualifications are being offered into evidence as part of the document entitled " Professional Qualifications of LILCO Wit-nesses on Exercise Contentions." My familiarity with the issues dealt with 3 in this Contention stems from my work in developing and implementing the LILCO Plan, as well as my participation in the February 13 Exercise.
D
k j [Lieberman] I am Vice President of KLD Associates, Incorporated. My.
professional qualifications are being offered into evidence as part of the document entitled " Professional Qualifications of LILCO Witnesses on Exer-cise Contentions." My familiarity with this Contention stems from work
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KLD Associates has performed for LILCO on evacuation time estimates and mobilization procedures for the LILCO Plan.
) 3. Q. Please summarim the issues raised by Contention EX 40.
A. [Weismantle, Lieberman] Generally, Contention EX 40 questions whether the mobilization of Traffic Guides during the February 13, 1986 Exercise
) was carried out in a sufficiently expeditious manner to permit a timely evacuation of the Emergency Planning Zone ("EPZ"). The admitted por-tions of the Contention are set out in their entirety in Appendix A to this
)- testimony.
- 4. Q. Please summarize the scope of this testimony.
A. [Weismantle, Lieberman) This testimony will address those issues raised in Subparts A, B and E of Contention EX 40. Pursuant to an agreement among the parties, Subpart C will be dealt with in the testimony filed in response to Contentions EX 38 and 39. Subpart D was not admitted by the Board.
Furthermore, it is taken as given in this testimony that the relevant inquiry here is the performance of the Traffic Guides during the February 13 Exer-cise and what that performance reveals about the sufficiency of the LILCO Plan, as already approved by the Board in its Partial Initial Decision of April 17,1985, Long Island Lighting Company (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), LBP-85-12, 21 NRC 644 (1985) ("PID"), aff'd, Long Island Lighting Company (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), ALAB-832,23 NRC 135 (1986).
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This ' testimony will begin by describing briefly the Board-appmved v .. .
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procedures' for mobilizing Traffle' Guides in the-event of a radiological emergency at the Shoreham plant. It Will th,en .v discuss the general time ,+
frame within which mobilizatio should be undertaken to' enable an evacua-tion to be completed in the times presented in the Plan. The testimony will
, V then discuss the events of'the.. February 13 Exercise as they relate to the b mobilization of Traffic Guides. FinaEy, the testimbny will describe the Plan revisions that have been made since the Exercise to improve future mobilization times. ,,
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- 5. Q. Please summarize your conclusions on Contention EX 40.
A. [Weismantle, Liebermtn] The Exercise presented an unprecedented test of an offsite emergency organization's ability to mobilize ih a imely O. fashion. Unlike any other nuclear power station emergency exercise where partial samples of field persoonel are mobillwd and evaluated by FEMA, the February 13 Exercise involved the mobilization of all LERO field per-O sonnel, meaning that approxiirMely 50 percent of the number of, workers actually needed in the event of a radiological c.nergepcy were called out.
As a result, approximately 1000 neld workers reported to the three staging O areas in addition to the staging area personnel themselves. Of these,165 Traffic Gttides,333 Bus Drivers,38 members of the Road Crews,19 Route Alert Drivers,.and-11 Evacuation Route Spotters were fully processed at O the staging areas and sent into the field to perform evacua/,lon-related tasks. Also, contrary to the typical exercise practice, which involves par-tial samples, the c'acisions mada during the Shoreham Exercise required the O manning of every traffic control poilyt ("TCP") in the EPZ. The Exercise, therefore, provided a literal and accurate picture of the mobilizatio'n of O
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k LERO field workers. The results clearly provide a basis for a finding of b
reasonable assurance that LERO can carry out the Plan as written.
There is no basis for the assertion in Contention EX 40 that the mobilization of Traffic Guides during the February 13 Exercise established a defect in the Plan. The Contention erroneously focuses on' the times nec-essary to perform selected subtasks in the mobilization process without considering overall mobilization performance. These subtasks are relevant only to the extent that they affect the overall mobilization time. Thus, the critical focus - a focus missed by the Contention - should be on the time
, / needed to complete the entire mobilization process.
) When LERO's performance is judged on this basis, it is apparent that
. the mobilization of Traffic Guides during the February 13 Exercise was timely. The goal of mobilization is to have Traffic Guides at their TCPs in
) time to permit the evacuation to proceed within the " controlled" evacua-k tion time estimates, which the Board has already determined are valid. On the day 01 the Exercise, LERO would have achieved a " controlled" evacua-tion.
Moreover, while the mobilization of Traffic Guides assigned to the
.,. Riverhead Staging Area may not have proceeded at an optimal level, the Exercise results do not support FEMA's finding of a deficiency in the mobilization from that staging area. In addition, modifications to the Plan ,
and Procedures since the Exercise should improve mobilization of Traffic
, Guides in the event of an actual radiological emergency. Thus, Contention EX 40 is without merit.
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- 6. Q. Please describe the process by which Traffic Guides were mobi'iked on the
) day of the Exercise. , 11 A. [Weismantle, Lieberman] Under the Board approved Plan and Procedures, t most of the field workers, including Traffic Guides, are notified to report
) } for duty at the Site Area Emergency level. See Plan, Figure 3.3.4; OPIP 3.3.3, Att.1; and PID at 717. During the Exercise, approximately 150 per-cent of the number of relevant field personnel actually needed were called
). out at the Site Area Emergency level. They reported initially to one of
, three staging areas - Riverhead to the east of the EPZ, Patchogue to the south of the EPZ and Port Jefferson to the west of the EPZ. Each of these 3
staging areas is located outside the EPZ, but is close to its border. PID at
(- 724.
Once at the staging areas, the field workers were given dosimeters
) and KI tablets, and received briefings on radiological procedures. See OPIP 3.6.3, Att.1, and 3.9.1., Att.1. The Traffic Guides then waited for an order to evacuate. After an order to evacuate was given, the required '
) number of Traffic Guides received their TCP assignments and obtained the necessary traffic control equipment. & Although not part of the Plan, during the February 13 Exercise, all field workers, including Traffic Guides,
) also picked up box lunches at the staging areas. They would not do so, how-ever, in the event of an actual radiological emergency. Af ter obtaining their equipment, the designated Traffic Guides then lef t the staging areas
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and traveled to their assigned TCPs. & Once they reached their respec-tive TCPs, the mobilization process was completed.
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- 7. - Q. By what criteria do you evaluate the timeliness of the mobilization of Traf-
) fic Guides?
A. [Weismantle, Lieberman) The Plan itself does not provide a time frame
.within which Traffic Guides must be fully mobilized and at their TCPs. In
) ' testimony during the emergency planning proceeding, LILCO presented data gathered during earlier drills on the time necessary to complete the mobilization process. See PID at 719. Based upon these' data, the Board b held "that LILCO could substantially complete its mobilization in about 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br />." PID at 723. This, then, represents the minimum time necessary for Traffic Guide mobilization. While mobilization within this time period 1 would certainly be timely, it does not represent the outside limit within which traffic guide mobilization must be completed in order to achieve a
'_' controlled" evacuation. Moreover, the relevant mobilization inquiry is
)' whether Traffic Guides are at their TCPs at about the time that congestion begins to develop on the roadways within the EPZ. See PID at 720.
(Lieberman] To elaborate on this, the Plan contains a variety of evacua-tion time estimates which quantify the elapsed time between the order to evacuate and the completion of an evacuation of the EPZ under various conditions. These evacuation time estimates fall into two general categories. The first describes a " controlled" evacuation, that is, one in which Traffic Guides are in place at the time they are able to affect the evacuation times. The goal of Traffic Guides is to mobilize in time to meet these " controlled" evacuation time estimates. A timely mobilization is one that achieves this goal. At the other end of the spectrum are evacuation time estimates describing an " uncontrolled" evacuation, that is, one in which all TCPs remain unmanned throughout the evacuation. This would represent the maximum time necessary to complete an evacuation.
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Not all Traffic Guides have the same effect on evacuation times.-
J The ones who have the greatest effect are those whose activities serve to increase the capacities of certain highways. " Capacity" is defined as the maximum number of vehicles that a highway system can service in a spe-
) cific time interval under prevailing conditions. Of the total number of TCPs' in the Plan, only a limited number are designed to increase the capacities of evacuation highways and thereby play a role in reducing the I~
total evacuation time. It is these capacity-enhancing TCPs that are "criti-cal" to meeting the " controlled" evacuation time estimates.
These capacity-enhancing TCPs need not be manned from the start
) of evacuation in order to meet the " controlled" evacuation time estimates.
When traffic demand is less than highway capacity, there is definitionally no congestion. More importantly, as traffic demand increases, but remains 1 below capacity, the total number of vehicles serviced will continue to in-crease. As a result, there is no need for Traffic Guides to increase capaci-ty under these conditions, and, therefore, they cannot materially affect
) evacuation times.
It is only when traffic demand exceeds highway capacity that con-gestion on the highways begins, traffic speeds decrease significantly, and
) queues form as additional vehicles enter the highway. At this point, Traf-fic Guides implementing special traffic control treatments are able to decrease the evacuation times by increasing the capacity on individual I highway segments. Consequently, to meet the " controlled" evacuation time estimates for the Shoreham EPZ, Traffic Guides need not be in place at the limited number of capacity-cnhancing TCPs until traffic demand exceeds
) highway capacity and congestion begins. In the Shoreham EPZ, this will
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y begin to occur approximately one hour af ter the evacuation recommenda-
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tion is given. PID at 720.
In some cases, it is undesirable to implement traffic control treat-ments in the Shoreham EPZ prior to an hour af ter the order to evacuate is
) given. For instance, Traffic Guides have been assigned to convert a por-tion of Lower Rocky Point Road and North Country Road to one-way flow.
This traffic control function is deliberately deferred for about one hour
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af ter the order to evacuate to allow residents to return to their homes.
To the extent that capacity-enhancing TCPs are manned some time af ter congestion develops but before the evacuation is completed, the total
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evacuation time would lie somewhere between the " controlled" and the
" uncontrolled" estimates. PID at 724. The exact value would be some frac-tion of the difference between the two sets of evacuation time estimates.
)' Id. As an example, let us use the estimates for a summer evacuation under-normal weather conditions previously accepted by the Board. PID at 792.
Under this scenario, a " controlled" evacuation of the entire EPZ is estimat-
) ed to take 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br /> and 55 minutes, and an " uncontrolled" evacuation of the entire EPZ is estimated to take 6 hours6.944444e-5 days <br />0.00167 hours <br />9.920635e-6 weeks <br />2.283e-6 months <br /> and 30 mhanes. Id. If all of the capacity-enhancing TCPs were manned by the enset of congestion, the evacuation would take roughly five hours, about four hours of which would be characterized by congested conditions. During the Exercise, however, not all of the capacity-enhancing TCPs were manned at the onset of con-
) gestion. The last of these TCPs, for instance, was manned 49 minutes af-terwards.
To demonstrate how the evacuation time may be extended when the capacity-enhancing TCPs are manned af ter the onset of congestion, then, let us use this 49 minute period but conservatively assume not that it was
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1 just one capacity-enhancing TCP, but all of them that had gone unmanned until this time. In this example, evacuation would proceed under an
" uncontrolled" scenario for about one-fif th (49 out of 240 minutes) of the relevant time. The total evacuation time, then, would be extended by approximately one-fif th, or roughly 20% of the difference between the ,
evacuation time estimates for " controlled" and " uncontrolled" evacuations.
The difference between the two evacuation durations in this example is 95 minutes. Thus, the manning of all TCPs 49 minutes after the onset of congestion would add about one-fif th of 95 minutes, or about 19 minutes, to the total evacuation time. This is a minor deviation from the " controlled" .
evacuation time estimate. In fact, as recognized in the PID, the evacuation time estimates for the Shoreham EPZ are generally accurate within plus or minus 30 minutes. PID at 792. The evacuation time in the example, then, would fall well within that uncertainty range. Accordingly, the " con-trolled" evacuation time estimates would be substantially met even if none of the capacity-enhancing TCPs were manneu until 49 minutes af ter the onset of congestion (or one hour and 49 minutes af ter the evacuation rec-ommendation).
The above example assumes that none of the capacity-enhancing TCPs was manned until 49 minutes after the onset of congestion. If, as was the case during the Exercise, most of the capacity-enhancing TCPs were manned before this time, the resulting extention of overall evacua-tion time would be less than the 19 minutes derived in the example. The exact amount would depend on how many TCPs were manned at what time.
Finally, though they may not be capacity-enhancing, those TCPs needed for the prompt evacuation of persons within 2 miles of the plant are
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9 also critical to the evacuation process. Persons located within 2 miles of the plant during a radioactive release need to be evacuated from the area as quickly as possible to minimize their radiation dose. Accordingly, those
- TCPs which are critical to the evacuation of these persons should also be J
manned within the same time frame as the capacity-enhancing TCPs.
- 8. Q. You have stated that only certain " critical" traffic control points must be manned within a given time to ensure a timely and efficient evacuation.
3 How do you define a " critical" traffic control point?
A. [Lieberman) The primary criterion in determining the " critical" TCPs is the likelihood that the timely manning of a TCP willincrease the capacity of the highway sections in that area. A TCP may also be critical if it involves a heavy volume of traffic and in addition services traffic evacuating from within the two-mile zone of the EPZ. Finally, in a few lo-D cations, a TCP may be critical where more than one evacuation path is available and a Traffic Guide is helpful in ensuring that the capacity of each evacuation path is fully utilized. These criteria were used to develop D the priority manning lists contained in OPIP 3.6.3, Att. 7. At each staging area, the " critical" TCPs are the first on the priority manning list. The fol-lowing is a list, in priority order by staging area, of the TCPs designated as O. " critical"in the Shoreham EPZ:
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)i Riverhead Patchogue Port Jefferson 2 126 4-3 31 86 99 32 6 95- 35 5 10 130 38
)- 7 30 81 13 65 85 12 -66 43 129 67 82 128 123 83 125 110
) 62 42 18 109 115 107 127 106 73 56 108 57
) 8 9
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- 9. Q. Please describe the sequence of emergency events that occurred during
)~ the February 13 Exercise.
A. [Weismantle, Lieberman] The accident simulated in the Exercise was unusually fast-breaking, resulting in only a short amount of time between
) the declaration of the Site Area Emergency and the order to evacuate.
The Site Area Emergency was declared on site at 08:19. Shortly thereaf ter, most of the LERO field workers, including all of the Traffic
) Guides, began mobilization. The initial evacuation recommendation was made in an Emergency Broadcast System message first broadcast at 10:24 - only about 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br /> after the Site Area Emergency had been de-
)- clarE.d. That recommendation covered Zones A-M, Q, and R, requiring the activation of most of the TCPs manned by Traffic Guides assigned to the Riverhead Staging Area and all of the TCPs manned by Traffic Guides as-
) signed to the Patchogue and Port Jefferson Staging Areas. All remaining zones in the EPZ were advised to evacuate at 11:46. Given these
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evacuation recommendations, congestion would have been predicted to begin about 11:24 - one hour af ter the initial evacuation recommendation was given. Thus, LERO had only approximately 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> to get the vast majority of its Traffic Guides to their TCPs. The Board has previously found that 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> would be the minimum time needed for LERO to sub-stantially complete mobilization of its field workers. PID at 723. Accord-ingly, the Exercise provided a rigorous test of this minimum mobilization time.
- 10. Q. Earlier you indicated that you disagree with the premise of Contention EX 40. Could you please expain?
A. [Weismantle, Lieberman] In the first place, the manning levels presented in Contention EX 40 do not provide useful information on the timeliness of the mobilization. ' They focus on isolated subtasks in the pro-cess, and fall to draw the pieces together into a meaningful conclusion about overall mobilization performance on the day of the Exercise.
In addition to focusing on too narrow a set of facts, Contention EX 40 misstates several facts. It alleges, for instance, that at 09:00 only two Traffic Guides had reported to the Riverhead Staging Area. In fact, five Traffic Guides had reported to the staging area by then. The Conten-tion also states that "[a]t 9:40, still only 19 [ Traffic Guides] had reported to Riverhead,10 to Port Jefferson, and 37 to Patchogue." This is incorrect. By 09:40, 30 Traffic Guides had reported to Riverhead,15 to Port Jefferson and 41 to Patchogue. In addition, the Contention alleges that "[t]he Riverhead Traffic Guides observed by FEMA did not arrive at their posts until between 11:50 and 12:10." In fact, the notes of a LILCO i observer indicate that at least 2 TCPs, TCPs 99 and 127, were manned at least 20 minutes before this time. (Attachments E.4-7).
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The Contention also erroneously focuses on the time the last Traf-fic Guide performed a task in o*r to imply that the performance of all Traffic Guides was unacceptable. Again, this is not true. In the first place, to judge the mobilization process on the day of the Exercise, one must look at the performance of the Traffic Guides as a whole. Conten-tion EX 40 fails to do this. The LILCO Plan is not defective simply because a few Traffic Guides out of the 165 who manned TCPs may have taken longer than anticipated to arrive at their TCPs. More importantly, as already pointed out, only the critical TCPs are important in achieving a
" controlled" evacuation. Thus, the time the last Traffic Guide arrived at his TCP is irrelevant in judging mobilization.
- 11. Q. What were the mobilization times for Traffic Guides assigned to the Patchogue Staging Area?
-A. [Lieberman) A list of the relevant Patchogue mobilization times, listed in the order in which they appear in the manning list, is contained in Attachment B.
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- 12. Q. Do these results suggest that the mobilization of Patchogue Traffic Guides would have permitted the realization of the " controlled" evacuation time estimates?
) A. [Weismantle, Lieberman] Yes. Traffic Guides assigned to the Patchogue Staging Area began reporting their arrival at TCPs at 11:00, just 36 minutes af ter the evacuation recommendation was first made. By 11:25,
) essentially one hour af ter the evacuation was first recommended,28 of 42 Traffic Guides had reported in, manning 18 of 28 TCPs, including all of the " critical" ones. By 11:30, one hour and six minutes af ter the recom-
) mendation to evacuate was first made, 38 of 42 Traffic Guides had re-ported in at 26 of 28 TCPs, including the first 22 on the priority manning
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O-list. Another TCP was reported manned at 11:35, and the last TCP was reported manned at 11:40, just shortly more than an hour and 15 minutes after the recommendation was first made to the public. Thus, for the Patchogue Staging Area, all of the critical TCPs were manned within an hour of the initial evacuation recommendation, and the rest of the TCPs . 4 were manned within a few more minutes. Accordingly, the February 13 Exercise clearly demonstrated that the Traffic Guides assigned to the Patchogue Staging Area can be mobilized in time to assure a " controlled" evacuation.
O 13. Q. What were the mobilization times of the Traffic Guides assigned to the Port Jefferson Staging Area?
A. [Lieberman] A list of relevant Port Jefferson mobilization times, listed in the order in which they appear in the manning list, is contained in Attachment C.
- 14. Q. What do these results suggest about the mobilization of Port Jefferson Traffic Guides during the Exercise?
A. [Lieberman] During the Exercise, Port Jefferson Traffic Guides began arriving at their TCPs at 11:25, essentially One hour af ter the order to evacuate. At 12:00, 27 of the 72 Port Jefferson Traffic Guides had ar-rived at their TCPs; at 12:30,53 had arrived; and at 13:00, 60 had arrived.
The last Port Jefferson Traffic Guide arrived at his TCP at 13:26. As al-ready explained, though, it is the manning times of the 17 " critical" TCPS that are relevent in judging whether the mobilization of Port Jefferson Traffic Guides was timely. Those " critical" TCPs were manned as follows:
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)~ Time Traffic
) TCP Guide Reported Arrival at TCP 4 11:44 86 11:36 6 11:44 11:50
). 38 5
11:35 81 11:40 85 11:45 43 11:26 82 11:55
) 83 110 11:30 11:29 42 11:58 109 11:25 107 12:13 106 11:38
) 56 57 11:42 12:00 This table shows that the last of the " critical" Port Jefferson TCPs was manned by 12:13. As was previously explained in the example in
) Answer #7 above, the evacuation time estimates for a " controlled" evacu-ation could have been substantially met with the manning of " critical" TCPs by this time. In fact, the example in Answer #7 establishes that
) " controlled" evacuation time estimates would be extended by only 19 minutes if none of the critical TCPs had been manned until 12:13. On the day of the Exercise, however, only one of the critical Port Jefferson TCPs
) was not manned until this time. Twelve of the 17 critical TCPs were manned by 11:45, about 20 minutes af ter the anticipated onset of conges-tion, and all but two were manned by 11:55, about half-an-hour af ter the
) anticipated beginning of congestion. Thus, total evacuation time in the Port Jefferson area would have been extended by less than the 19 minutes postulated in Answer #7, Accordingly, the Port Jefferson Traffic Guides were mobilized in a timely manner.
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, [Weismantle] Furthermore, in the event of an actual radiological emer-gency, the mobilization of Port Jefferson Traffic Guides would be even quicker. In order to minimize the disruption to plant operations, on the day of the Exercise, Traffic Guides assigned to the Port Jefferson Staging Area parked in the north lot, located about 10-15 minutes by foot from the Port Jefferson power station. Traffic Guides had to make this trip twice on the day of the Exercise, once when reporting to the staging area, and once when leaving for their TCPs. As I testified during the earlier emergency planning litigation, in an actual radiological emergency, Traf-fic Guides would park either in the south lot, located just outside the power station, or in areas adjacent to the building. Tr. 7509. As a result, mobilization times should be reduced by as much as 20-30 minutes during an actual emergency, providing greater assurance that the Port Jefferson Traffic Guides can man their TCPs in a timely manner.
- 15. Q. What were the mobilization times for the Traffic Guides assigned to the Riverhead Staging Area?
A. [Weismantle, Lieberman] Unfortunately, the documents recording the times at which Riverhead Traffic Guides manned their TCPs cannot be found. The only known reporting times for Riverhead Traffic Guides are those recorded by a LILCO observer for seven of the Traffic Guides evalu-ated by FEMA. A list of known mobilization times for Riverhead Traffic Guides dispatched pursuant to the initial evacuation order, listed in the order in which they appear on the priority manning list, is contained in Attachment D.
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- 16. Q. Based on available information what conclusions can you draw about the
) mobilization of Traffic Guides assigned to the Riverhead Staging Area on the day of the Exercise?
A. [Weismantle, Lieberman] While we would prefer to look at overall mobi-lization performance rather than to focus on the performance of particu-lar mobilization subtasks, the lack of documentation precludes this approach with respect to the Riverhead Staging Area. Thus, it is neces-sary to view the Riverhead mobilization process at several relevant steps in order to draw conclusions about the timeliness of that process. The results of this approach support the conclusion that the Riverhead Traffic Guides were mobilized in time to substantially meet the " controlled" evac-uation tima estimates.
First, the Traffic Guides were briefed and given their job assign-ments in a timely manner. The Riverhead Traffic Guides assigned as a result of the initial evacuation order were dispatched between 10:52 and 11:08. Under the Plan, these Traffic Guides had only to pick up their equipment and to travel to their TCPs. In the PID, the Board accepted as reasonable LILCO's estimate that obtaining equipment should have taken approximately 10 minutes and that traveling from the Riverhead Staging Area to the TCPs should have taken from 5-40 minutes (with an average of 20 minutes). See PID at 719, 723, 725. Given these times, a_11 Riverhead Traffic Guides, not just the ones assigned to " critical" TCPs, could have reported to their TCPs by no later than 11:58, or about an hour-and-a-half af ter the evacuation recommendation. As previously explained, complete mobilization within this period would be timely since it would permit the evacuation to proceed under the " controlled" evacua-tion time estimates.
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D Second,it appears that the Riverhead Traffic Guides took a reason-D able amount of time to travel from the Riverhead Staging Area to their TCPs. The FEMA Post-Exercise Assessment (" FEMA Report") states that
"[t] ravel times from the staging area to the TCPs were up to twenty (20)
J minutes." FEMA Report at 74. This falls well within the 5-40 minute time frame previously approved by the Board. Thus, this phase of the mo-bilization process supports the conclusion that the mobilization of D
Riwrhead Traffic Guides was timely.
The FEMA Report states, however, that earlier parts of the post-dispatch process did not run as smoothly. In its only criticism of the D mobilization of Riverhead Traffic Guides, the Report states that "[t]he time between deployment at Traffic Guides from the staging area and their arrival at TCPs was excessive, taking between fif ty (50) and seventy D (70) minutes." FEMA Report at 74. The Report observes that 30 minutes of this time was spent in lines at the staging area. Ld. This delay, howev-er, does not seem to have prevented the manning of TCPs in time to meet D the " controlled" evacuation time estimates.
The FEMA Report notes that Riverhead Traffic Guides arrived at their TCPs between 11:50 and 12:10. FEMA Report at 74. As already D pointed out, the notes of the LILCO observer indicate that Riverhead Traffic Guides began reporting to their TCPs as early as 11:15 and support the FEMA observation that the TCPs were manned by 12:10. As already G
explained, manning of the critical TCPs within this time frame would not cause significant lengthening of evacuation times. Thus, based upon these reporting times, the Riverhead Traffic Guides were mobilized in a timely S
fashion.
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The only suggestion of a longer mobilization period is the allegation in Contention EX 40 that TCP 26 was still not manned by 12:50. There is a 12:50 message from the Lead Traffic Guide at the Riverhead Staging
! Area to the Traffic Control Point Coordinater at the EOC indicating that iO at that time TCP 26 had not been manned. It is not clear why the Traffic Guide assigned to this TCP had not arrived by 12:50. Nonetheless, this TCP is not critical to meeting the " controlled" evacuation time estimates.
Thus, this single fact does not alter our conclusion about the mobilization of the Riverhead Traffic Guides.
- O (Weismantle] In my view, these Exercise results refute the FEMA find-ing of a " deficiency" in the Riverhead mobilization process. The perfor-
- mance was at worst an " area requiring corrective action," if that, for it
!O did not materially affect the evacuation times, and hence, public health
, and safety.
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- 17. Q. You have mentioned that the FEMA Report indicates some delays at the
,O Riverhead Staging Area. Would these delays occur in the event of an actual radiological emergency?
. A. [Weismantle] Probably not. FEMA reported delays between the time the Riverhead Traffic Guides were given their job assignments and the time
- O they lef t for their TCPs. In the event of an actual radiological f
emergency, that time interval should be substantially reduced. In the first i place, while the lunch procedure added time to the mobilization process
,0 l at all three staging areas, the effect was most acute at Riverhead. The box lunches at Riverhead were handed out af ter the job briefings. As the large number of field personnel converged on the lunchline, a long backup
!O
! developed, delaying the mobilization of Riverhead Traffic Guides. Since
'O
- O lunch would not be provided during an actual emergency - at least not in a manner that would interfere with timely deployment - these time de-lays would not exist during an actual radiological emergency.
Moreover, in response to the FEMA Report, LILCO has modified O
the Traffic Guide dispatching procedures at all three staging areas. In the past, once Traffic Guides had received their dosimetry briefings, they waited until an evacuation recommendation was made before obtaining
.v their assignments and completing their processing. Under the latest ver-sion of the Plan, Traffic Guides assigned to TCPs supporting the evacua-tion of vehicles from within 2 miles of the plant are pre-assigned and pre-briefed at the staging areas. This includes nearly all of the TCPs which have been designated as " critical." The Traffic Guides assigned to these TCPs are instructed to obtain and load the necessary equipment in their cars as they are ready, even if an evacuation recommendation has not yet been made. As a result, these TCPs should be manned more quickly. This is precisely the type of modification that FEMA prescribed for the deft-ciency it reported. In fact, in its December 15, 1986 review of Revisions 7 and 8 to the Plan, FEMA concluded that this modification is adequate to correct the delays it found on February 13.
40 In addition, LILCO has modified the Riverhead equipment trailer.
On the day of the Exercise, the trailer had a single door serving as both an entrance and an exit. Traffic Guides entered the trailer through the sin-gle door, picked up their equipment, and then exited through the same door, as other Traffic Guides were trying to enter. As a result, backups developed in picking up equipment. A second door has been added to the trailer so that the entrance is at one end and the exit is at the other.
O
O g Traffic Guides will now enter the trailer at one end, pick up their equip-ment, and exit at the other end of the trailer. Also, an additional person has been assigned to distribute equipment from the trailer. These changes should increase the throughput of the trailer and reduce the time needed O
to obtain equipment. Thus, the delays reported by FEMA would not occur in the event of an actual radiological emergency.
O O
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O ATTACHMENT A O
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ATTACHMENT A g CONTENTION EX 40 The exercise demonstrated a fundamental flaw in the LILCO Plan in that the Plan fails to provide any traffic assistance or guidance for evacuees until long after they are likely to be on the roads attempting to evacuate. Under the LILCO Plan and the
" evacuation time estimates used by the LILCO players during the exercise, it is assumed that Traffic Guides will be at their Traffic Control Posts, " guiding" motorists and implementing traffic control stategies to assure that evacuees will follow the evacuation routes preccribed by the Plan, during the entire evacuation process. See, e.Q., App. A at IV-5 thru -72e and V-2; OPIP 3.6.3. Indeed, every LILCO EBS message surcosedly broadcast every fifteen minutes, beginning with the " 73ge simulated at 10:24, stated that LERO Traffic Guides would b, in place along evacuation routes to guide evacuees. Howeve. for the reasons set forth in more detail below, the LILCO Plan rails to comply
, with 10 CFR S 50.47(b)(10), NUREG 0654 II.J.9 and J.10, LILCO J failed to satisfy objectives EOC 7, 11, 16, SA 1, 2, 5, 7, 9, 10, FIELD 9, 11 and the exercise precludes a finding that the protective action of evacuation can and will be implemented in the event of a Shoreham accident. Specifically:
, EX 40.A. During the exercise and pursuant to the LILCO Plan J (Plan, Figs. 3.3.3 and 3.3.4; OPIP 3.3.3; OPIP 3.6.3), the LERO Traffic Guides were not notified of the emergency or required to report to the staging areas until after the declaration of a Site Area Emergency. That declaration occurred at approximately St19, and the Traffic Guides were presumably notified of the emergency
-s beginning shortly thereafter. By 9:00, only two Traffic Guides J had reported to the Riverhead Staging Area (52 Traffic Guides are required under the Plan); only one hcd reported to the Port Jefferson Staging Area (72 are required under the Plan); and one had reported to the Patchogue Staging Area (41 are required under the Plan). At 9:40, still only 19 had reported to Riverhead, 10 to Port Jefferson, and 37 to Patchogue. Thus, at the time a General Emergency was declared -- 9:39 -- only 40 percent of the J
LERO Traffic Guides essential to the implementation of evacuation according to the LILCO Plan were mobilized; none were at their posts in the field to perform their duties under the Plan.
EX 40.8. Pursuant to OPIP 3.6.3 and during the exercise, no 8 Traffic Guides were dispatched from the three staging areas until after the evacuation recommendation had been made to the public by simulated EBS message. And, subsequent to their being dispatched, it took substantial amounts of time before Traffic Guides arrived at their posts and were in a position to perform the functions which the Plan and the evacuation time estimates S used during the exercise assume will be performed throughout the entire evacuation process. Specifically:
F .
(
i (i) During the exercise, the EBS messages recommending evacuation were simulated at 10:24 (zones A-M, Q, and R) and
) 11:46 (entire EPZ). The dispatch of Traffic Guides began at Riverhead at 10:25 and 12:00, and was not completed until shortly after 11:00 and approximately 12:20, respectively. Traffic Guides at Port Jefferson were dispatched beginning at 10:30; the process was not completed until either 12:20 or 12:49. Dispatching at Patchogue began at 10:30 and was completed at approximately
) 10:59.
(ii) Traffic Guides from the Patchogue Staging Area did not begin arriving at their posts until 11:00, with the last Guide reporting his arrival at 11:40. From the Port Jefferson Staging
( Area where dispatching was not completed until either 12:20 or J 12:49, Traffic Guides took up to 58 minutes to arrive at their posts. The Riverhead Traffic Guides observed by FEMA did not arrive at their posts until between 11:50 and 12:10. See FEMA Report at 74. And, other Riverhead Traffic Guides were still not at their posts as of 12:50, even though in at least one case (TCP 26), the Guide had been dispatched at 11:08 -- almost 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />
) earlier.
Thus, even assuming arouendo that no one would attempt to evacuate prior to the EBS announcement at 10:24, the LILCO Plan, as demonstrated during the exercise, fails to provide any evacuation assistance, or the " guidance" necessary to ensure that
) evacuees follow the prescribed routes which form the basis of the evacuation time estimates used during the exercise, until long after evacuees would be on the road attempting to evacuate.
Indeed, LILCO does not even have the potential capability to provide such assumed assistance and guidance under the Plan as written, since according to the Plan no Traffic Guides are to be
) dispatched until after there has been an evacuation order.
EX 40.C. To be litigated with Contentions EX 38 and 39.
EX 40.D. Not admitted.
) EX 40.E. Finally, attempting to dispatch Traffic Guides to those Traffic Control Posts Vithin a 2-mile zone of the plant upon the issuance of an evacuation order, even assuming arouendo that the " dispatch" activities could be accomplished more expeditiously than they were during the exercise, would not correct or even substantially lessen the defect inherent in the
) LILCO Plan. (See letter dated June 20, 1986, from John D.
Leonard to Harold R. Denton (SNRC-1269), Encl. 1 at 16.) In light of the notification and reporting provisions for Traffic Guides, and the realities that an evacuation order can swiftly follow a Site Area Emergency declaration and evacuation will begin prior to an official evacuation advisory, such an attempted defect the LILCO Plan would be
) "fix" to the fundamental ineffective.
in
)
O Accordingly, for the reasons set forth in subparts A through E, the LILCO Plan is fundamentally flawed in that it fails to comply with 10 CFR 5 50.47(b)(10) and NUREG 0654 5 II.J. The
() exercise thus precludes a finding of reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a Shoreham emergency.
O -
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)
)
)
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ATTACHMENT B
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Attachment B Patchocue Mobilization Times 1/
Time Called Number of In To Report TCP- Traffic Guides Arrival at TCP
) 1. *126' 2 11:10
- 2.
- 31 4 11:00
- 3.
- 32 1 11:25
) 4.
- 35 2 11:00
- 5. *130 1 11:20
- 6.
- 30 1 11:15 2 11:10
) 7.
- 65
- 8.
- 66 2 11:25
- 9.
- 67 1 11:25
- 10. *123 2 11:15
)
- 11. 53
. 11:30
- 12. 54 1 11:15
- 13. 2 11:30
) 124
- 14. 75 1 11:15
- 15. 70 1 11:25
- 16. 101 1 11:30
)
- 17. 69 1 11:25 i
- 18. 68 2 11:15 l
- 19. 63 2 11:30
)
t 1/ This list is based on the document entitled " Traffic Control Point Communication List," OPIP 3.6.3, pages 69 and 70 of 77, Attachment 17 pages 5 and 6 of 11, as it was tilled out on the day of the Exercise at the Patchogue Staging Area.
See Attachment E.1.
- Indicates traffic control points designated as " critical."
)
I
- - ~ -
-c- ,, , . - , , , - , , , , , - - - . - - . - , - . , - - - . - - - . , , - - - -n , - , , - ,. ,- - , . , - , , , , - . - -
.. . . - - . . . . . - . _ . - ~. . . - . . .. .
'O Time Called Number of In To Report IO TCP Traffic Guides Arrival at TCP
- 20. 64 1 11:30 7 21. 79 1 11;25
,.O 11:25
- 22. '24 2 4
- 23. 80 2 11:35 4
- 24. 84 1 11:30
- O
- 25. 78 2 11:40
- 26. 77 1 11:25
! 27. 71 1 11:30 10
- 28. 76 1 11:30 l
- O i
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ATTACHMENT C
)
)
)
)
)
)
Attachment C j Port Jefferson Mobilization Time1 **
No. of Time Called Traffic In To Report TCP Guides Arrival at TCP
- 1.
- 4 1 11:44
- 2.
- 86 1 11:36
- 3.
- 6 1 11:44
- 4.
- 5 2 11:50
- 5.
- 38 1 11:35
- 6.
- 81 2 11:40
- 7.
- 85 1 11:45
- 8.
- 43 2 11:26
- 9.
- 82 2 11:55 i
- 10.
- 83 1 11:30
- 11. *110 ~ l 11:29
- 12.
- 42 2 11:58
) 13. *109 1 11:25
- 14. *107 1 12:13
- 15. *106 1 11:38
- 16.
- 56 4 11:42 l
1 This list is based on the document entitled " Traffic control Point Communication List," OPIP 3.6.3, pages 71 through 75 of 77, Attachment 17 pages 7 through 11 of 11, as filled out on.the day of the Exercise at the Port Jefferson Staging l
l Area. See Attachment E.2.
- Indicates traffic control points designated as " critical."
) ** A blank in this chart indicates that the call in time for that traffic control point is not documented.
I I
- - -- -, -a- ,---no-,,-,,e- , -, , ,---,---+,- --- -n-. ---,
e-r -g--. w-.+-,,p w -,-r ,e,-m , e, , w p-n,- p-m ----w - - - -- -
}_ , . .-
No. of Time Called
) TCP Traffic Guides In To Report Arrival at TCP i
- 17.
- 57 2~ 12:00
\ ,
). 18. 41 - 1 11:45
- 19. 120 1 41:58 .
- 20. 122 1 12:02 .
) 12:04
- 21. 93 -
1 -
22 92 1 12:12 ;
2 3. . 37 1
, 12:01 .,.'
)
- 24. 118 'l 12:15 l 25. 40 1
' -* 12:14
- 26. 1 1, 12:28 l
) 27. 104 , ,1 /. 12:36 28, 103 1 12t26 ,
- 29. 100
~
l 12:17 I' 12:52
) 30. 121 . 1-117
,12: 02
- 31. 1
- 32. 44 1 12:29 -
- 33. 74 1 I) ,
34, 113 1 12:18
- 35. 45 ,
1 12:14
- 36. 105 1 J12:09
]
- 37. 46 1 12:04
- 38. 47 1 12:25 12:29
) 39. 50 2
- 40. 52 2 12:24
?
i .
) i
- . 7; .
i i
- 0- ,
No. of Time Called Traffic In To Report TCP Guides Arrival at TCP 41, . 49 2 12:24
- O
- 42. 88 1 12:44 1
43, 55 1 12:30 it 44, 119 1 12:15
) 12:45 45, 58 2
! 46. 91 1 12:28
- 47. 61 1 13:01
.O
- 48. 59 1
'49.
48 1 12:44
- 50. 60 1 13:04 i(3 '
- 51. 98 2 13:21
- 52. 114 1 13:17 E
- 53. 97 1 12:53 104
- 54. 90 1 13
- 26 1
i 55. 96 1 13:04 1
- 56. 89 1 13:07
,)
'( ,
- 57. 102 1 12:59 l -
13.22
- 58. 51 1 1
10 C) ,
i i i e
5 -
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- ,,y a'.,----y ---rw-,ww--w-wwwr---, .,-y-r--,-.--ee---- - - , - - , o--m,-w-e.--.e-,-ww+ww--ew-
3 8
t (; .
No. of Time Called l Traffic In To Report TCP ' Guides Arrival at TCP
- 41. 49 2 12:24 1 ,
88 1 12:44 42,i
- 43. 55 1 12:30
- 44. 119 / 1 12:15 g
- 45. 58 2 12:45
- 46. 91 , 1 12:28
- 47. 61 1 13:01
- 48. 59 1
- 49. .48 1 12:44
- 50. )- 60 1 13:04 51, 98 2 13:21 ,_. .'~~~'"
- 52. 114 1 13:17 l
- 53. 97 1 .12:53 -
s, _~
} i 54, 90 1 i3:26
- 55. 96 1 , 13:04 ,
3
- 56. 89 1 -
13:07
- 57. 102 1 , 12':59
- 58. 51 1 ,
13.22 ,
l l
9
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3
) -
ATTACHMENT D
)
J-3
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ATTACHMENT D Riverhead Mobilization Timesl/**
D No. of Time Given Time Stated Traffic Specific TCP Reported To TCP Guides Assionment TCP ***
- 1.
- 2 1 10:53
]
- 2.
- 3 1 10:53
- 3.
- 99 1 10:53 11:15-11:30
- 4.
- 95 1 10:53
[)
- 5.
- 10 1 10:54 12:10
- 6.
- 7 1 10:58
- 7.
- 13 1 10:58 D
- 8.
- 12 1 10:58
- 9.
- 129 ,
1 10:59 10:59 11:50
- ) 10.
- 128 1
- 11.
- 125 _ 2 10:54
- 12.
- 62 1 11:00 11:55
- 13. 11:00 11:45
- )
- 18 1
- 14.
- 115 1 11:01
- 15.
- 127 1 11:01 11:20 m 16.
- 73 1 11:01 11:55 a ,
1/ This list is based on the document entitled " Traffic Guide Dispatch Log," OPIP 3.6.3, page 54 of 77, Attachment 9 page a 1 of 1, as it was filled out on the day of the Exercise at the Riverhead Staging Area. See Attachment E.3.
- Indicates traffic control points designated as " critical."
- Blanks in this chart indicate that the missing time is not g documented.
- The only reporting times available for Riverhead Traffic Guides are those recorded by a LILCO observer. The actual reporting times were not observed. Those reported here are based on responses to questions asked by the observer.
J
I) l No. of Time Given Time Stat Traffic Specific TCP Reported l
- 17.
- 108 1 11:02
- 18.
- 8 2 10:56
- 19.
- 9 2 10:55 j
)
- 20.
- 33 3 10:57 i
- 21. 39 1 11:03
- 22. 34 1 11:03
- 23. 14 1 11:04
- 24. 16 1 11:04
- 25. 15 1 11:05
)
26, 87 2 10:52
- 27. 94 1 11:05
- 28. 36 1 11:06
)
- 29. 11 1 11:06 30, 27 1 11:06
- 31. 28 1 11:06
- 32. 111 1 11:07
- 33. 17 1 11:07
- 34. 19 1 11:07
) '
- 35. 72 1 11:07
- 36. 29 1 11:08
- 37. 116 1 11:08
- 38. 26 1 11:08 l
I
J l 3
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J RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS EXERCISE OBSERVATIONS AND EVALUATIONS 3 FIELD ACTIVITY MODULE TRAFFIC CONTROL J
OBSERVER DATA Facility: k:w N $U M A "
Date: 2 - (3 -7f, Specific Assignment: % X2;c C h l, ,7 'c J :I ' E J C~ - er ' -.
3 Team Leader:
Name:
D Organization:
Title:
Business Address: _.
O Business Phone: ,
O D
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INSTRUCTIONS 3
Introduction _
' This fons is intended as a tool for the observer to use in observing and evaluating an exercise. There are several different " modules" g corresponding to different observer assignments; an observer assigned to the EOC should have the "E0C Module", an observer assigned to the Emergency The News Center should have the " Emergency News Center Module", and so on.
module you have should correspond to your assignment.
The You should bring the form along with you when you go to observe.
s questions in it will serve as a useful guide concerning what to look for. -
You may wish to fill out some or all of the questions while on location.
NOTE: Some responses may already be marked as N/A because the activity is -
rated under another part of the response organization.
Directly below is a short explanation of what is in the form and how to fill it out; please read this explanation as soon as possible.
3
- Concept of Form and Instructions for Use (1) Structure and Fonnat. Each module is composed of several sections. Each section 1s about a particular part of the emergency activities - for example, " equipment,"
3 " communications," or " dose assessment." Each section has two parts. The first part is a series of questions for you to rate the perfonnance. The second part is a summary section, with
~
space to write a narrative essay summarizing your overall impressions.
(2) Rating Questions. You have four options when answering these questions: Satisfactory, Unsatisfactory, N/A, and N/0.
o " Satisfactory" means that personnel and equipment perfonned at an acceptable level. Errors noted were not severe and the task was completed in an acceptable manner. For 3 example, if personnel. are to check their dosimeters once every 15 minutes, but the person you are observing checks his dosimeter only 7 of the 8 times he should in 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />, his perfonnance is satisfactory. However, your narrative susunary should explain the rating.
o " Unsatisfactory" means that personnel and equipment generally perfonned below an acceptable level. There were deficiencies of a significant nature. The area's ability to carry out its function was significantly impaired.
O O -
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o "N/A" stands for "not applicable." For example, if the personnel observed did nct have dosimeters, then the
) question, "Were their dosimeters properly zeroed or checked?
should be "not applicable". In some cases, a whole section may be not applicable. For example, if you will be
' observing a local EOC, most likely the section (in your EOC module) on " Media Relations" will not be applicable, since media relations are conducted at another facility,
) "N/0" stand for "not observed"; meaning you do not know or o
cannot judge whether the activity was done properly. If something should have been done (or should have been there) but wasn't, then you should mark " unsatisfactory".
) (3) Short answer questions. These are generally self-explanatory.
Most are informational, itsking you to list the participants at your location, qr to describe a certain procedure observed, etc. Some call for you to record a specific, event, e.g. who made a certain phone call, or when someone arrived. Se alert for these events.
). i brief essay (4) Summary. On the summary pa (one paragraph to onetopage)ge, youevaluate describe and shouldthewr te a activities and resourt:es covered by~ that section. DescribeYou the .
resources available and what occurred, in your own words.
should cover the main points raised in the rating and short 3 answer questions, and any other observations you cor. sider relevant; explanations of " Satisfactory" or " Unsatisfactory" -
answiers are also appropriate and are encouraged.
Miscellaneous Notes
) (1) The front cover of tlw critique fom has blank lines for you to write your name, assignment, etc.
(2) Please do not use blue ink - it does not pnoto-copy.
Please note: The observations and judgements recorded on this form will be 3 the basis for future reports and decisions. Be thorough and clear; this will avoid the necessity of contacting you lator for clarification.
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io 1. itiat traffic control point (s) k did you observe (give location)? j'#
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- 3.Q Were personnel at each locaton:
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- Familiar with the location of relocation center? /
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- 4. Did they periodically report in/get f updates?
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- 8. Do regular procedures include keeping -
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.. l Summary 1
) In your own words, describe and evaluate the demonstrated activities, capabilities and resources, or lack thereof, covered by this section. Put the facts recorded in the questions in perspective.
Explain both deficiencies and go'odw;1 perfonnance.
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- 1. Did each emergency worker in the field have a:
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- Mid range dosimeter (0-20 R)?
- High range dosimeter (0-200 R) /
- Permanent record dosimeter (film badge or TLD)? ,
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) 2. Did emergency workers follow proper procedures for reading and recording their dose?
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- 3. Did emergency workers know what was
) the maximum dose allowed without authorization? /
- 4. Were emergency workers supplied with XI? /
Did emergency workers follow proper
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procedures concerning when to take XI? / .
- 6. Were emergency workers aware of rocedures for decontamination 1.e., when and where to report 3 for a contamination check)? /
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.. l Summary In your own words, describe and evaluate the demonstrated activities, capabilities and resources, or lack thereof, covered by this section. Put the facts recorded in the questions in perspective.
Explain both deficiencies and good performance.
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