ML20211N475

Response & Objection to Applicant 860617 Motion for Incorporation of Certain Matls in Record,For Closing of Record & for Issuance of OL for Operation Not in Excess of 5% Power

ML20211N475
Person / Time
Site:	Seabrook
Issue date:	06/27/1986
From:	Backus R BACKUS, MEYER & SOLOMON, SEACOAST ANTI-POLLUTION LEAGUE
To:	Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel
References
CON-#386-810 OL, NUDOCS 8607030116
Download: ML20211N475 (7)

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FILED: June 27, 1986 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION '

DOCKETED BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSb M BOARD l

In the matter of: '86 JA. -2 All 52 PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF- 6sf ?? C' '

50-443 OL NEW HAMPSHIRE, et al Docketff[# h i:

50-444 OL (Seabrook Station, Units I a,nd 2) On-site Emergency Planning and Safety Issues SEACOAST ANTI-POLLUTION LEAGUE'S RESPONSE AND OBJ ECT ION TO APPLICANTS ' MOTION FOR INCORPORATION OF CERTAIN MATERIALS IN RECORD; FOR CLOSING OF RECORD; AND FOR ISSUANCE OF OPERATING LICENSE FOR OPERATION NOT IN ESCESS OF 5% OF RATED POWER NOW COMES the Seacoas t Ant i-Pollut ion League and obj ects to the Applicants' motion of June 17, 1986 insofar as it would allow the closing of the record and issuance of an operating license for operation up to 5% of Seabrook Unit l's rated capacity. SAPL does not object to having Section 13.3 of SSER Supp. No. 4 and the Staf f's environmental quali ficat ion review, submi t ted under date of June 11, 1986 as Section 3.11 of SSER Supp. No. 5, admitted into the record of this proceeding, provided that the parties to this proceeding are allowed a hearing with respect to the issues allegedly resolved by these materials. To deny a hearing would be to arbitrarily impair

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The particular issues which SAPL does not believe are adequately resolved are as follows:

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1. Contention NH-10 SAPL does not believe that the status of the Detailed Control Room Design Review nor the Safety Parameter Display Sys tem are adequate. SAPL set forth with particularity its arguments against the State of New Hampshire's Mot ion to Wi thdraw Content ion NH -10 in an obj ect ion filed on June 1"9,1986.1 SAPL incorporates its obj ect ion by reference herein (appended as " Attachment A") and reserves its right to cross examine on the issues detailed in that objection.

SAPL would par t icularly emphas ize the two ins tances in which a prior Applicant commitment to complete design review prior to fuel load is now reduced to a commitment by applicants to complete the task at the first refueling.

2. NECNP 1.B.2 and SSER Supplement No. 5, Section 3.11 SAPL is concerned that the NRC staff is taking a position of allowing the Applicants to put off installment of environmentally qualified instrumentation for monitoring accumulator pressure (or level) and instrumentation for monitoring containment sump water temperature until after the first refueling outage. The chances of an accident at Seabrook are as great, if not greater, during the initial stages of operation as at any other period between ref uelings.

In SAPL's view, the description of the justification for allowing this postponement in Sect ion 3.11 of SSER Supp. No. 5 is insuf ficient.

SAPL reserves its right to cross examine on t ri i s issue.

1. Inadvertently, Seacoast Anti-Pollution League's Objection to Motion to Withdraw Contention NH -10 was filed with the wrong ASLB Chairman and SAPL neglected to put the words "On-site Emergency Planning and Safety Issues" underneath the docket numbers pursuant to the Board order of Oct. 7, 1985. SAPL apologizes for any inconvenience this may have caused the Board and partles.

SAPL is also interested in probing the analysis of equipment performance and shutdown capability following a postulated main steamline break with accompanying release of superheated steam.

Further, SAPL would like to probe the equipment capability and saf e l

} shutdown performance resulting from high energy line breaks (HELB) in compartments outside containment, par ticularly in the main s team and feedwater pipe chase areas.

SAPL also is interested in examining in regard to the maint enance/ surveillance programs for identification and prevention of age-related degradation of mechanical and electrical equipment.

The June 16, 1986 IE Information Notice No. 86-49 on the subj ect of Age / Environment Induced Electrical Cable Failures reinforces SAPL's belief that this is a very important safety issue. This notice describes an incident in November of 1985 in which San Onofre Unit i experienced a loss of offsite power; the most likely cause was determined to be temperature-induced accelerated aging and degradation of electrical insulation.

Additionally, SAPL has an interest in deficiencies found in the Environmental Qualification A'u d i t . SAPL has an interest in deficiencies found in the Environmental Qualification Audit. SAPL would like to examine on the issue of how representative the files selected for audit were, how the correction of deficiencies is to be verified before fuel load and what the j us t i f ica t ion was for not auditing addit ional files given the f act that deficiencies were found in the audited files.

3. SSER Supplement No. 4, Section 13.3 The notice of proposed rulemaking on the issuance of operating licenses authorizing only fuel loading and low power opernt ion up to 5% of rated power (46 Federal Register 61132) stated as follows:

) While the proposed rule would eliminate the need to have any NRC or FEMA review, firidings , or determinat ions on the adequacy of offsite agencies' emergency planning and preparedness, the NRC review of the licensees' onsite response will necessarily include aspects of some offsite elements:2 Communications; not i f icat ion; ass is tance agreement s wi th local law enf orcement ,

fire protection and medical organizations; and the like.

SAPL does not agree with the interpretation in SSER Supp. No.

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4 that the let ters of agreement gef erring to the concept of operat ions developed between the Applica nts and the States of Massachuset ts and New Hampshire are not required before operation up to 5% of rated power. If communications, notification and local law enforcement are to be in place, it seems only reasonable that the concept of operations with New Hampshire and Massachusetts be in place. The plant is s ituated near the border between the two s tates (wi thin two miles) and any evacuation of plant employees could affect traffic enforcement in both states. ,

SAPL would like to examine on the issue of how the operational capability of the public alerting system is to be confirmed and on the issue of how the public information materials are to be distributed pr ior to f uel load. SAPL is also concerned with the decontaminat ion capability for onsite personnel, particularly given SAPL's understanding that t he Emer gency Opera t ions Facili t y (EOF) only has one shower.

2. The footnote refers to NUREG-0654/ FEMA REP-1, Rev. 1 and states that NRC will review only those elements under planning criteria essential for assessing licensee preparedness.

Further, SAPL is concerened with the finding in SAPL Report No.

50-443/86-99 at 25 that there are a lack of sufficient numbers of qualified individuals to fill key emergency response positions on a 24-hour basis during an emergency and that there is a lack of on-shift dose assessment capability. SAPL believes both of these situations ought to be corrected prior to any level of operation.

Finally, SAPL is very much concerned with onsite and offsite emergeney medical services. As far as offsite issues go, SAPL continues to find the Commission's action on the GUARD remand arbitrary and capricious. A year has gone by since the Commissio issued its Statement of Policy following the Court's vacation and remand of the Commission's interpretation of 10 CFR 950.47(b)(12).

The time is past ripe for moving this issue out of limbo and taking some rational action on it. Particularly in light of the Chernobyl 4 accident, the Commission's generic findings that accidents that would expose the public to dangerous levels of radiation are of low probability and that the adverse reactions to overexposure would be slow in developing require a critical reappraisal.

SAPL does not believe that letters of agreement with Exeter Hospital and Brigham and Women's Hospital are sufficient to assure that onsite personnel will receive adequate medical care. Exeter Hospital is within the EPZ and hence should not be relied upon.

Other Contentions 13 As this Board will be aware, a very large number of contentions raised by the parties were deposed of by summary disposition, and therefore without evidentiary hearings.

One of the issues so disposed of was SAPL's Supplemental Contention III, admitted by the Board Order of September 13,.1982.

This contention raised the issue of whether or not the Seabrook FES met t he requi remen t s o f t he Na t ional Envi ronmen tal Pol icy Act in the Commission's Interim Policy Statement of June 13, 1980, 45 Fed. Reg. 40101, when it did not disclose the consequences of a single major accident, and f ailed to quantify the bounds of uncertainty regarding an accident.

The Board dismissed this contention on May 11, 1983, and the Appeal Board refused to accept the appeal, on the ground that SAPL remained a party since it was a co-sponsor of Contention NH - 10.

SAPL sets this forth in order to make clear it intends to preserve as an issue on appeal the denial of this contention on the f ailure to adequately disclose the consequences of a severe accident.

SAPL renews its claim that this issue was a matter that required an evidentiary hearing, since there were factual issues in dispute in l

regard to this contention.

Conclusion In conclusion, SAPL would ref er to this Board's Order of November 4, 1985, which provided that "After a prehearing conference, and after discovery, if any, a supplemental hearing will be ordered to tale evidence on the above identified matters... .

For the reasons set forth, prior to the closing of the record on this matter, SAPL believes that the hearing anticipated by this Board in its November 4th Order should now be scheduled, and that it should be entitled to participate on the matters set f orth herein.

Respectfully submitted, SEACOAST ANTI-POLLUTION LEAGUE By its attorney, BACKUS , MEYER & SOLOT10N

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. Robert A. Backus P.O. Box 516 116 Lowell Street Manchester, N.H. 03105 Tel: (603) 668-7272 DATE: June 27, 1986 I hereby certify that a copy of the within Seacoast Anti-Pollution League's Response and Obj ection has been sent this date, first class, postage prepaid, to all counsel per attached, service list.

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ATTACHMENT A Filed: June 19,1986 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD  ;

In the Matter of:

PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF DOCKET NOS. 50-444 OL NEW HAMPSHIRE, ET AL 50-443 OL (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2)

SEACOAST ANTI-POLLUTION LE A GUE'S O BJECTION TO MOTION TO WITH D R AW CONTENTION NH-10 The Seacoast Anti-Pollution League hereby objects to the withdrawal of Contention NH-10 on the grounds that such withdrawal is premature. Contention NH-10, amended by the State of New Hampshire and Gregory H. Smith, Attorney General j of the State of New Hampshire on May 24, 1982, reads as follows:

The Seabrook Station Control Room Design does not comply with General Design Criteria 19 through 22 in 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, and NUREG-0737, Items I.D. I and I.D. 2.

In the State of'New Hampshire's statement of basis for Contention NH-10, the State declared that: ,.,

It is especially critical at Seabrook that accident monitoring and control room design be the optimum because of the difficulties inherent in carrying out protective actions for the population in the immediate ' vicinity of the plant.1 By Board Order of Sept. 14, 1982, the Board admitted SdP'L Supplement 6 in which SAPL joined in and adopted as its own the contentions an bises of the State of New Hampshire and Attorney General Gregory Smith, Nos. 4 through 10, and 12 through 1 See Amendment and Supplement to the Petition for Leave to Intervene akd; Request for Hearing of the State of New Hampshire and Gregory H. Smith, Attorney General of the State of New Hampshire, April 5,1982, at 27. ,

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16. The Board stated that it would permit SAPL to participate as a Joint Intervenor with New Hampshire. Contention NH-10, therefore, cannot be withdrawn without SAPL's assent. SAPL does not lend its assent to this action for the reasons set forth herein.

The Seacoast Anti-Pollution League does not believe that the results of the Detailed Control Room Design Review (DCRDR) nor the design of the Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS) are adequate at this time. Particularly in view of the Chernobyl 4 reactor accident, SAPL holds that additional variables need to be displayed on the SPDS. Further, SAPL does not believe it acceptable to allow the so-called lower priority Human Engineering Discrepancies (HEDs) resolutions to remain uncorrected until the first refueling outage. Additionally, SAPL asserts that the change to the Video Alarm System (VAS) color coding scheme, to make it more consistent with other control room CRT's should be accomplished prior to fuel load and low power testing. SAPL also holds that a preliminary evaluation of the control room environment (including such variables as humidity, acoustic noise, auditory signals, airflow and temperature) ought to be accomplished prior to fuel load. SAPL is aware of no evidence that such a preliminary review has been accomplished except on some auditory signals.

Additional Parameter Displays needed on SPDS SAPL does not believe that the. Applicants' justifications for non-inclusion of three safety parameter displays and the deferral of inclusion of two others until the first refueling outage, as described at P. 9 of SBN-987, should be at all acceptable to this Board. The three parameters the Applicants do not intend to include are RHR flow, Containment Isolation and Containment Hydrogen Concentration.

Residual Heat Removal Flow is a key indicator of the efficacy of heat removal when steam generators are not available. Applicants argue that RHR flow is not a

" stand alone" parameter, and they assert that the core cooling status tree on the SPDS is best used for determining that the heat removal function is being performed. SAPL holds that it would greatly enhance safety to have both parameters displayed. This would be consistent with the NRC's avowed defense in depth philosophy.

Containment isolation is important for a rapid assessment of the conditions prevailing in the containment and can provide additional assurance of containment integrity. Aoplicants argue that since there are status light indicators for every containment isolation valve on the main control board, it is not necessary to add containment isolation to the SPDS. Applicants assert that the status light indicators are visible from the SPDS console. In an emergency situation, there could be many people walking around in the control room who could obstruct the line of vision to the main control board. This potential problem should be eliminated prior to operation at any level by installation of the appropriate parameter display on the SPDS console.

Containment hydrogen concentration is a key parameter required to monitor combustible gas control. Aaplicants aver that this parameter display is unnecessary because it is indicated on the main control board, is not likely to cause any need for action within the first few hours of any accident, that an operators emergency support group would be in place at any time hydrogen concentration would be a threat, and that it is a parameter reviewed in the emergency procedures set. SAPL urges that this line of argument be found non-persuasive. Particularly in view of the questions that are yet unanswered with regard to the role of hydrogen in the breach of the Chernobyl 4 containment, the monitoring of combustible gases is very important. It is possible that, even in light water moderated reactors; combustible gases could accumulate much more quickly than anticipated via processes not yet fully understood.

The Applicants seek a deferral of the incorporation of parameter displays for Steam Generator Radiation and Stack Monitor until the first refueling outage. This should be wholly unacceptable. These parameters are very important and without them the SPDS will be incapable of displaying information allowing the assessment of radiation in the secondary steam system when the steam generators and/or their steamlines are isolated. Applicants point to the fact that there is a radiation monitoring console in the Control Room. Applicants do not detail whether or not the information on the

radiation monitoring console is readable from the vantage point of the SPDS console.

In SAPL's view, there is no justification for postponement of installation of these

parameter displays. All 5 of the above-mentioned parameter displays ogt to be installed prior to fuel load and station operators should be thoroughly trained in their use prior to any operation of the plant.

4 HEDS Resolutions including the V,KS Color Coding Scheme f In SBN-839, the Applicants on July 17, 1985 committed to review the control

room furnishings for HEDs "at least 120 days PTLF" (prior to loading fuel). However, i

SER Supplement 4, transmitted to the Board and parties by the staff on June 4,1986, 1

! indicates as follows:

$ Subsequent to completion of installation of furnishings in the control room a review will be conducted by PSNH and any HEDs found will be resolved prior to startup from the first refueling outage.

In SBN-839, the Applicants said that operator protective equipment and emergency t

equipment storage would be reviewed at least 120 days PTLF and any HEDs submitted for NRC review. Yet, SER Supplement 4 says:

Once the equipment has been purchased and installed, the storage facilities i will be re-evaluated by PSNH. Any HEDs found will be resolved prior to start up from the first refueling outage.

SER Supplement 4 goes on to state that final evaluation of the control room i

j environment will be completed and reported to NRC for confirmatory review after a year of commercial operation has been achieved. Hoivever, there appears to SAPL to

, be no good reason why a preliminary evaluation and identification of HEDs cannot be unciertaken prior to fuel loading.

In sum, it appears to SAPL that the rush to core load Seabrook is causing the NRC and Applicants to push aside tasks that ought to be completed before any operation for the plant is allowed, even in the face of Applicant's own prior commitment to complete them.

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The color-related HED in the Video Alarm System clearly ought to be corrected before any operation of the plant is allowed.

Plant operators should accustom themselves to the change in color-coding before the plant operates at any-level. It is imprudent to allow the plant to be low power tested while the color coding is still inconsistent with other CRT's. This will only serve to reinforce this anomalous situation in the minds of the operators and could lead them to make an error when the plant is put into full power operation with the color code modified.

In attachment 1 to SBN-948, in the discussion related to the need for a sensitive containment pressure indicator, applicants note that they have " committed to banding indicators by the end of the first refueling outage." Again, SAPL urges this Board to find that there is no acceptable justification for deferring improvements that will aid the plant operators in monitoring plant conditions.

SAPL would call to attention again the State of New Hampshire's statement of April 5,1982, that monitoring and control room design should be optimum because of the population in the immediate vicinity. The State of New Hampshire appears to be retreating from its prior commitment to protect public health and safety in its withdrawal of Contention NH-10. Although this is truly unfortunate, the NRC ought nonetheless insist on a high standard of safety. F6r the reasons set forth above, SAPL objects to and opposes the Motion to Withdraw Contention NH-10 on the grounds that such withdrawal is premature.

Respectfully submitted, SEACOAST ANTI-POLLUTION LEAGUE By its Attorney, BACKUS, MEYER & SOLOMON

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Robert A: ~Backus Pt O. Box 516 116 Lowell Street Manchester, NH 03105 Tel: (603) 668-7272 DATE: June 19,1986 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE AND SERVICE LIST Asst.Gn.Cnsl. Sheldon J. Wolfe, Chrm. Thomas Dignan, Esq.

Joseph Fed. Flynndgmt. Agcy.

Emerg. Admn. Judge Ropes & Gray 500 C.St. So. West Atomic Safety & Lic Brd. 225 Franklin St.

Washington, DC 20472 USNRC Boston, MA 02110 Washington, DC 20555 Office of Selectmen Dr. Jerry Harbour Docketing & Serv. Sec.

Town of Hampton Falls Admin. Judge Office of the Secretary Hampton Falls, NH 03844 Atomic Safety & Lic Brd. USNRC USNIlC Washington, DC 20555 Washington, DC 20555 Sherwin E. Turk, Esq. Jane Doughty Dr. Emmeth A. Luebke Of . e of Exec. Legl. Dr. Admin Judge SAPL Atomic Safety & Lic. Brd. 5 Market Street Wahsington, DC 205__ USNRC Portsmouth, NH 03801 Washington, DC 20555 Phillip Ahrens, Esq. Paul McEachern, Esq. George Dana Bisbee, Esq.

Asst. Atty. General Matthew BInck, Esq. Attorney General's OFF.

State House, Sta. F6 25 Maplewood Ave. State of New Hampshire Augusta, ME 04333 P.O. Box 360 Concord, NH 03301 Portsr:nuth, NH 03801 Carol Sneider, Esq., Asst.AG Diane Curran, Esq. William S. Iord One Ashburton Place, Harmon, Weiss Board of Selectmen 19th Floor 20001 S Street NW Suite 430 Town Hall-Friend St.

Boston, MA 02108 Washingcon, DC 20009 Amesbury, MA 01913 Richard A. Ha::pe, Esq. Maynard Young, Chainmn Sandra Gauvutis New Hampshire Civil Delense Board of Selectmen Town of Kingston Agency 10 Central Road Box 1154 Harpe & McNicholas Rye, NH 03870 East Kensington, NH 03827 35 Pleasant St. ,

Concord, NH 03301 Edward Thomas Mr. Robert Harrison FEMA Pres, & Chief Exec. Officer 442 J.W. McCormack (pOCH) PSCO Boston, MA 02109 P.O. Box 330 Manchester, NH 03105 Roberta Pevear State Rep.-Town of Harpt Falls Drinlexater Road Hanpton Falls, NH 03844

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