ML20210C470
| ML20210C470 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Trojan File:Portland General Electric icon.png |
| Issue date: | 09/17/1986 |
| From: | NRC |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20210C451 | List: |
| References | |
| GL-83-28, TAC-52890, NUDOCS 8609180342 | |
| Download: ML20210C470 (3) | |
Text
.. ENCLOSURE 1
. SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT GENERIC LtiltR 83-28, ITEM 2.1 (PART 1)
EQUIPMENT CLASSIFICATION (RT5 COMPONENTS)
TROJAN NUCLEAR PLANT DOCKET NO. 50-344 INTRODUCTION AND
SUMMARY
On February 25, 1983, both of the scram circuit breakers at Unit I of the Salem Nuclear Power Plant failed to open upon an automatic reactor trip signal from the reactor protection system. This incident was terminated manually by the operator about 30 seconds after the initiation of the automatic trip signal.
The failure of the circuit breakers was determined to be related to the sticking of the undervoltage trip attachment. Prior to this incident, on February 22, 1983, at Unit 1 of the Salem Nuclear Power Plant, an automatic trip signal was generated based on steam generator low-low level during plant start-up. In this case, the reactor was tripped manually by the operator almost coincidentally with the automatic trip. ,
Following these incidents, on February 28, 1983, the NRC Executive Director for ,
Operations (EDO), directed the staff to investigate and report on the generic
. implications of these occurrences at Unit 1 of the Salem Nuclear Power Plant.
The results of the staff's inquiry into the generic implications of the Salem unit incidents are reported in NUREG-1000 " Generic Implications of the ATWS Events at the Salem Nuclear Power Plant." As a result of this investigation, the Connission (NRC) requested (by Generic Letter 83-28 dated July 8,19831) all licensees of operating reactors, applicants for an operating license, and holders of construction pennits to respond to generic issues raised by the analyses of these two ATWS events.
8609180342 060'717 PDR ADOCK 05000344 P PDR _
- This report is an evaluation of the response subnitted by Portland General Electric Company, the licensee for the Trojan Nuclear Plant, for Item 2.1 (Part 1) of Generic 2
Letter 83-28. The actual documents reviewed as part of this evaluation are listed in the references at the end of the report.
Item 2.1 (Part 1) requires the licensee to confirm that all Reactor Trip System components are identified, classified and treated as safety-related as indicated in the following statement:
Licensees and applicants shall confirm that all components whose functioning is required to trip the reactor are identified as safety-related on documents, procedures, and information handling systems used in the plant to control safety-related activities, in-cluding maintenance, work orders, and parts replacement. -
EVALUATION The licensee for the Trojan Nuclear Plant responded to the requirements of Item 2
2.1 (Part 1) with a submittal dated November 4, 1983 . The submittal stated that the components whose function is required to trip the reactor are identified as safety-related on documents, procedures and in information handling systems used in the plant to control safety-related activities including maintenance, work orders and parts replacement.
d CONCLUSION Based on our review of these responses, we find the licensee's statements con-firm that a program exists for identifying, classifying and treating components that are required for performance of the reactor trip function as safety related.
ThisprogrammeetstherequirementsofItem2.1(Part1)oftheGenericLetter 83-28, and is therefore acceptable. .
REFERENCES
- 1. NRC Letter, D. G. Eisenhut to all Licensees of Operating Reactors, .
Applicants for Operating License, and Holders of Construction Permits,
" Required Actions Based on Generic Implications of Salem ATWS Events i (Generic Letter 83-28)," July 8, 1983.
- 2. Letter, B. D. Withers Portland General Electric Co., to D. G. Eisenhut. -
NRC, November 4, 1983.
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.. ENCLOSURE 2 EGG-NTA-7237 CONFORMANCE TO GENERIC LETTER 83-28 ITEM 2.1 (PART 1) EQUIPMENT CLASSIFICATION (RTS COMPONENTS)
SOUTH TEXAS 1 AND 2 VIRGIL C. SUMMER 1 TROJAN YANKEE R0WE R. Haroldsen
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Published July 1986 EG4,G Idaho, Inc.
Idaho Falls, Idaho _83415 1 Prepared for the i U.S. %uclear Regulatory Comission Washington, D.C. 20555 under DOE Contract No. DE-AC07-761001570 FIN Nos. 06001 and 06002 l
01- X
0 A85 TRACT This Ef4G Idaho, Inc. report provides a review of the submittals from selected operating Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR) plants for conformance to Generic Letter 83-28, Item 2.1 (Part 1). The following plants are included in this review.
plant Name Docket Number TAC Number South Texas 1 50-498 --
South Texas 2 50-499 --
Sussner 1 50-395 52885 Trojan 50-344 52890 Yankee Rowe 50-29 52895 0
9 FOREWORO This report is supplied as part of the program for evaluating licensee / applicant conformance to Generic Letter 83-28, " Required Actions Based on Generic Implications of Salem ATWS Events." This work is being conducted for the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of Nuclear
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission funded this work under the authorization B&R 20-19-10-11-3 and 20 19-40-41-3, FIN Nos. 06001 and 06002.
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.. t CONTENTS ABSTRACT .............................................................. 11 FOREWORD .............................................................. 111 ,
- 1. INTRODUCTION AND
SUMMARY
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- 2. PLANT RESPONSE EVALUATIONS"....................................... 3 2.1 South Texas 1 and 2 ........................................ 3 2.2 Conclusion ................................................. 3 2.3 Summer 1 ................................................... 3 2.4 Conclusion ................................................. 4 2.5 Trojan ..................................................... 4 2.6 Conclusion ................................................. 4 5 ;
2.7 Yankee Rowe ................................................
2.8 Conclusion ................................................. 5
- 3. GE N E R I C R E F E R E NC E S . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 n
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- 1. INTRODUCTION AND
SUMMARY
l On February 25, 1983, both of the scram circuit breakers at Unit 1 of the Salem Nuclear Power Plant failed to open upon an automatic reactor trip u signal from the reactor protection system. This incident was teeminated manually by the operator about 30 seconds after the Initiation of the automatic trip signal. The fatIure of the circuit breakers was determir.ed to be related to the sticking of the undervoltage trip attatement. Prior to this incident, on February 22, 1983, an automatic trip stgr.41 was generated at Unit 1 of the Salem Nuclear Power Plant based on steam l generator low-low level during plant startup. In this case, the teactor was tripped manually by the operator almost ceincidentally with the ;
automatic trip.
i following these incidents, on February 28, 1983, the NRC Executive Director of Operations (E00), directed the staff to investigate and report 7 on the generic implications of these occurrences at Unit 1 of the $alem i
Nuclear Power Plant. The results of the staff's inquiry into the generic implications of the Salem Unit 1 incidents are reported in NUREG-100C,
' Generic Implications of the ATWS Events at the salem Nuclear Power
, Plant." As & result of this investigation, the Consission (NRC) ,
requested (by Generic Letter 83-23, dated July 8, 1983) all licensees of operating reactors, applicants for an operating license, anc hoicers of construction permits to respond to generic issues raised by the analyses of these two ATWS events.
This report is an evaluation of the responses submitted from a group of similar pressi.rized water reactors fnr Item 2.1 (Part 1) of Genertc Letter 83-23. .
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The results of the reviews of several plont responses are repcrted on in this document to enharce review ef ficiency, The specific plants ;
reviewed in this rieport were selected based on the similarity of plant design and ceavientence of review. The actual documents which were reviewed 1
for each evaluation are listed at the end of each plant evaluation. The generic documents ref erenced in this report are listed at the end of ~the report.
Part 1 of Item 2.1 of Generic Letter 83-28 requires the licensee or applicant to ccnfirm that all reactor trip system components are identified, classif ted, and treated as safety-related as indicated in the following statement:
Licensees and appitcants shall confirm that all components whose functioning is required to trip the reactor are ider.tified a,5 safety-related on documer.ts, procedures, and information hanoling systems used in the plar.t to control safety-related activities, including maintenar.ce, work orders, and parts replacement.
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- 2. PLANT RESPONS[ EVALUATICNS l
2.1 South Texas 1 and 2. 50-498/a3910t Plants 1
( The applicant for South Texas Units 1 and 2 (Hooston Lighting and l Power Co.) provided a response to lte'n 2.1 (Part 1) in a submittal dated June 28, 1985. The submittal states that the applicant f;ad conducted a review of all components whose function is required to trip the reactor.
! These components were verified tc be properly classified. The classification is designated in design documents and the plant Q-List.
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Maintenance, work orders and parts replacement require identific~ation of ,
safety classification prior to approval. ,
l 2.2 Lonclusion ;
l Based on the review of the applicant's submittal, we find that the applicant's response confirms that the components required to trip the reacter are identified as safety-related, and that documents used to ,
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initiate design changes, maintenance, or procurement require 10entification of safety-related components. The licensee's resoonses, therefore, meet the requirements of Item 2.1 (Part 1) of Generic 1.etter 83-26, and is acceptable.
ileference
- 1. Letter. J. H. Goldberg, Houston Lighting And Power Cn., to H. L. Thoepson, Jr . , NRC . lune 26, 1985.
I 2.3 Virait C. Sumet 1. 50 395. TAC No, $286!
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l The licensee f or the Virg11 C. Sumer ) Nuclear Plant (South Carolina l Electric and Gas Co..) provided a response to item 2.1 (Part,1) in a submittal dated November 4, 1983, the submittal states that the components l
of the reactor trip system have beep 1eviewed and verified to be properly classified. In addition the design documents such as drawings, specifications and bills of material afe issued with safety-related f
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designations and replacement parts are procured via safety-related procurement documents. The licensee at the time of the submittal was integrating the equipment classification lists into a Computerized History and Maintenance Planning System. This system was scheduled for completion in January 1984.
2.4 Conclusion Based on the review of the licensee's submittal, we find that the i
licensee's response confirms that the components required to trip the reactor are identified as safety-related, and that documents used to initiate design, maintenance, or procurement require identification of saf ety-related camponents. The licensee's response, therefore, meets the requirements of Item 2.1 (Part 1) of Generic Letter 83-28, and is acceptable.
References
- 1. Letter, 0. W. Dixon, Jr., South Carolina Electric and Gas Company, to
- H. R. Denton, NRC, November 4, 1983.
2.5 Tro_ian Nuclear Plant. 50-344. TAC No. 52890 The licensee for the Trojan Plant (Portland General Electric Co.)
provided a response to Item 2.1 (Part 1) in a submittal dated November 4, 1983. The submittal states that the components whose function is required to trip the reactor are identified as safety-related on documents, procedures and in information handling systems used in the plant i ,
to control safety-related activities including maintenance, work orders and parts replacement.
2.6 Conclusion ,
Based on the review of the licensee's submitta), we find that the licensee's response confirms that the components required to trip the reactor are identified as safet -related, 3 and that documents used to 1
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initiate design, maintenance, or procurement require identification of safety-related components. The licensee's response, therefore, meets the requirements of Item 2.1 (Part 1) of Generic Letter 83-28, and is acceptable.
Reference
- 1. Letter, 8. D. Withers, Portland General Electric Co., to D. G. Eisenhut, NRC, November 4, 1983.
2.7 Yankee Rowe. 50-29. TAC No. 52895 The licensee for the Yankee Rowe Nuclear Plant (Yankee Atomic Electric Co.) provided a response to Item 2.1 (Part 1) in a submittal dated Novester 5, 1983. The submittal states that the reactor trip system and components whose function is required to trip the reactor are identified as safety-related on appropriate documents, procedures and information handling systems used in the plant to control safety-related activities, .
including maintenance, job orders, and parts replacement.
2.8 Conclusion ,
Based on the licensee's submitta), we find that the response meets the requirements of item 2.1 (Part 1) of Generic Letter 83-28 and is, therefore, acceptable.
Reference
- 1. Letter, L. H. Heider, Yankee Atomic Electric Company, to D. G. Eisenhut, NRC, November 5, 1983.
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- 3. GENERIC REFERENCES
- 1. Generic Implications of ATWS Events at the Salem Nuclear Power Plant, NUREG-1000, volume 1. April 1983; Volume 2, July 1983.
- 2. NRC Letter, D. G. Eisenhut to all Licensees of Operating Reactors, Applicants for Operating License, and Holders of Construction Permits,
" Required Actions Based on Generic Implications of Salem ATWS Events (Generic Letter 83-28)," July 8, 1983.
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