ML20204G192
| ML20204G192 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Summer, South Texas, Yankee Rowe, 05000000, Trojan |
| Issue date: | 07/31/1986 |
| From: | Haroldsen R EG&G IDAHO, INC. |
| To: | NRC |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20204G196 | List: |
| References | |
| CON-FIN-D-6001 EGG-NTA-7237, GL-83-28, TAC-52890, NUDOCS 8608070105 | |
| Download: ML20204G192 (10) | |
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EGG-NTA-7237 CONFORMANCE TO GENERIC LETTER 83-28 ITEM 2.1 (PART 1) EQUIPMENT CLASSIFICATION (RTS COMPONENTS)
SOUTH TEXAS.1 AND 2 VIRGIL C. SUMMER 1 TROJAN YANKEE R0WE R. Haroldsen Published July 1986 EG&G Idaho, Inc.
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83415 Prepared for the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C.
20555 under DOE Contract No. DE-AC07-76ID01570 FIN Nos. D6001 and 06002
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~E ABSTRACT o.
This EG&G Idaho, Inc. report provides a review of the submittals from
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selected operating Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR) plants for conformance to Generic Letter 83-28, Item 2.1 (Part 1). The following plants are included in this review.
Plant Name Docket Number TAC Number South Texas 1 50-498 South Texas 2 50-499 Summer 1 50-395 52885 Trojan 50-344 52890 Yankee Rowe 50-29 52895 l
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FOREWCRD'
- ac This report is supplied as part of the program for evaluating licensee / applicant conformance to Generic Letter 83-28, " Required Actions Based on Generic Implications of Salem ATWS Events." This work is being conducted for the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of Nuclear Reactur Regulation, Division of PWR Licensing-A, by the EG&G Idaho, Inc.
The U.S. Nucle &r Regulatory Commission funded this work unde.r the authorization B&R 20-19-10-11-3 and 20-19-40-41-3, FIN Nos. 06001 and 06002.
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i CONTENTS ABSTRACT..............................................................
11 FOREWORD..............................................................
iii 1.
INTRODUCTION AND
SUMMARY
1 2.
PLANT RESPONSE EVALUATI0NS'.......................................
3 2.1 South Texas 1 aad 2........................................
3 2.2 Conclusion.................................................
3 2.3 Summer 1...................................................
3 2.4 Conclusion.................................................
4 2.5 Trojan.....................................................
4 <r 2.6 Conclusion.................................................
4 2.7 Yankee Rowe................................................
5 2.8 Conclusion.................................................
5 3.
GENERIC REFERENCES...............................................
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- h 1.
INTRODUCTION AND
SUMMARY
On February 25, 1983, both of the scram circuit breakers at Unit 1 of
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the Salem Nuclear Power Plant failed to open upon an automatic reactor trip signal from the reactor protection system. This incident was terminated manually by the operator about 30 seconds after the initiation of the automatic trip signal. The fatiure of the circuit breakers was determined to be related to the sticking of the undervoltage trip attachment. Prior l
to this incident, on February 22, 1983, an automatic trip signal was
, generated at Unit.1 of the Salem Nuclear Power Plant based on steam generator low-low level during plant startup. In this case, the reactor g
was tripped manually by the opefator almost coincidentally with the automatic trip.
r-Following these incidents, on February 28, 1983, the NRC Executive l
Director of Operations (EDO), directed the staff to investigate and report on the generic implications of these occurrences at Unit 1 of the Salem Nuclear Power Plant. The results of the staff's inquiry into the generic implications of the Salem Unit 1 incidents are reported in NUREG-1000,
" Generic Implications of the ATWS Events at the Salem Nuclear Power Plant."
As a result of this investigation, the Consnission (NRC).
requested (by Generic Letter 83-28, dated July 8, 1983) all licensees of operating reactors, applicants for an operating license, and holders of construction permits to respond to generic issues raised by the. analyses of these two ATWS events.
This report is an evaluation of the responses submitted from a group of similar pressurized water reactors for Item 2.1 (Part 1) of Generic Letter 83-28.
The results of the reviews of several plant responses are reported on in this document to enhance review efficiency. The specific plants reviewed in this report were selected ba';ed on the similarity of plant design and convenience of review. The actual documents which were reviewed i
l for each evaluation are listed at the end of each plant evaluation. The generic documents referenced in this report are listed at the end of the report.
Part 1 of Item 2.1 of Generic Letter 83-28 requires the licensee or applicant to confirm that all reactor trip system components are identified, classified, and treited as safety-related as indicated in the following statement:
Licensees and applicants shall confirm that all components whose functioning is required to trip the reactor are identified as safety-related on documents, procedures, and information handling systems used in the plant to control safety-related activities, including maintenance, work orders, and parts replacement.
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PLANT RESPONSE EVALUATIONS 2.1 South Texas I and 2. 50-498/499 (OL Plants)
The applicant for South Texas Units 1 and 2 (Houston Lighting and Power Co.) provided' a response to Item 2.1 (Part 1) in a submittal dated June 28, 1985. The submittal s'tates that the applicant had conducted a review of all components whose function is required to trip the reactor.
These components were verified to be properly classified. The classification is designated in design documents and the plant Q-List.
Maintenance, work orders and parts replacement require identification of n
safety classification prior to approval.
2.2 Conclusion
,r Based on the review of the applicant's submittal, we find that the applicant's response confirms that the components required to trip the reactor are identified as safety-related, and that documents used to initiate design changes, maintenance, or procurenent require identification of safety-related components. The licensee's responses, therefore, meet the requirements of Item 2.1 (Part 1) of Generic Letter 83-28, and is acceptable.
Reference 1.
Letter, J. H. Goldberg, Houston Lighting and Power Co., to H. L. Thompson, Jr., NRC June 28, 1985.
2.3 Viroil C. Summer 1. 50-395. TAC No. 52885 The licensee for the Virgil C. Summer i Nuclecr Plant (South Carolina Electric and Gas Co.,) provided a response to Item 2.1 (Part 1) in a submittal dated November 4, 1983. The submittal states that the components of the reactor trip system have been reviewed and verified to be properly classified.
In addition the design documents such as drawings, specifications and bills of material are issued with safety-related 3
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~i designations and replacement parts are procured via safety-related procurement documents. The licensee at the time of the submittal was integrating the equipment classification lists into a Computerized History and Maintenance Planning System. This system was scheduled for completion in January 1984.
2.4 Conclusion Based on the review of the licensee's submittal, we find that the licensee's response confirms that the components required to trip the reactor are identified as safety-related, and that documents used to initiate design, maintenance, or procurement require identification of safety-related components. The licensee's response, therefore, meets the requirements of Item 2.1 (Part 1) of Generic Letter 83-28, and is l
acceptable.
References i
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Letter, O. W. Dixon, Jr., South Carolina Electric and Gas Company, to H. R. Denton, NRC, November 4, 1983.
2.5 Troian Nuclear P16nt, 50-344. TAC No. 52890 i
The licensee for the Trojan Plant (Portland General Electric Co.)
provided a response to Item 2.1 (Part 1) in.a submittal dated November 4, 1983. The submittal states that the components whose function is required to trip the reactor are identified as safety-related on J
documents, procedures and in information handling systems used in the plant to control safety-related activities includin; maintenance, work orders and parts replacement.
2.6 Conclusion Based on the review of the licensee's submittal, we find that the licensee's response confirms that the components required to trip the 1
reactor are identified as safety-related, and that documents used to 1
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initiate design, :na1ntenanc.e. or procuremen.t require identification of safety-related components. The licensee's response, therefore, meets the requirements of Ite:n 2.1 (Phrt 1) of Generic Letter 83-28, and is acceptable.
Rsference 1.
Letter, B. D. Withers, Pcitland General Electric Co., to D. G. Eisenhut NRC, November 4, 1983.
2.7 lankee Rove. 50-23. TAC No. 52895 m
The licensee for the Yankee Acwe Nuclear Plant (Yankee Atomic Electric Co.) provided a response to Item 2.1 (Part I) in a submittal dated
- er November 5, 1983. The submittal states that the reactor trip system and components whose function is required to trip the reactor are identified as safety-related on appropriate documents, procedures and information handling systems usec in the plant to control safety-related. activities, includin3 maintenance, job orders, and parts replacer.ent.
2.8 C_onclusion Based on the licensee's submittal, we find that the response meets the requirements of item 2.1 (Part 1) of Generic Letter 83-28 and is, therefore, acceptable.
Reference l
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Letter, L. H. Heider, Yankee Atomic Electric Company, to l
- 0. G. Eisenhut, NRC, November 5, 1983.
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GENERIC REFERENCES l
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Generic Implications of ATWS Events at the Salem Nuclear Power Plant, i
NUREG-1000, Volume 1, April 1983; Volume 2. July 1983.
2.
NRC Letter, D. G. Eisenhut to all Licensees of Operating Reactors, Applicants for Operating License, and Holders of Construct 1on Permits, "RequiredActionsBasedonGenericImplicationsofSalemATW$ Events 1
(Gener-ic Letter 83-28)," July 6, 1983.
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