ML20209H081

Recommends Concurrence W/Draft SER.Marked-up Page 6-19 of Draft SER Re Combustible Gas Control Sys Encl

ML20209H081
Person / Time
Site:	Satsop
Issue date:	09/19/1985
From:	Kudrick J Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:	Houston R Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
CON-WNP-1382 NUDOCS 8509260203
Download: ML20209H081 (2)

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MEMORANDUM FOR: R. Wayne Houston, Ascistant Director for Reactor Safety, OSI ,

FROM: Jack Kudrick, Acting Chief, Containa nt Systems Branch, DSI

SUBJECT:

RAFT SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT The Containment Systems Branch has completed its review of pertinent sections of the Draft Safety Evaluation Report for WNP-3. We recommend concurrence in the report.

A marked up copy of p. 6-19 of the DSER is attached, which notes a typograph-ical error.

Jack Kudrick, Acting Chief Containment Systems Branch Division of Systems Integration

Enclosure:

As stated cc: B. K. Singh DISTRIBUTION Docket FHe CSB Rdg.

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>, 5. The applicant should justify that the containment isolation setpoint pres-sure is the minimum value compatible with normal operating conditions.

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6. The ' applicant should commit *.o seal close the 48-inch purge valves during l operating modes requiring containment integrity.

o 6.2.5 Combustible Gas Control System -

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1 Following a LOCA, hydrogen may accumulate within the containment as a result of: 1) hydrogen dissolved in reactor epolant system; 2) metal-water reaction between the zirconium fuel cladding and the reactor coolant; 3) corrosion of

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metals by emergency core coolant and containment spray solutions; and 4) radio-lytic decomposition of the post-accident emergency cooling water. The applicant has provided a combustible gas control system (CGCS) to monitor and control the hydrogen concentration in containment following a LOCA.

[e CGCS includes the g containment hydrogen analyzers, the containment hydrogen recombiners, and the containment hydrogen purge ::ystem. ,

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The hydrogen analyzer system consists of two redundant subsystems, each of whi.ch can take samples from six locations within containment and one location in the shield building annulus. The hydrogen recombiner system consists of two sta-tionary 100% capacity therm'al~ (electrical) recombiners located within the con-tainment. Both the hydrogen analyzer system and the hydrogen recombiner system are designed to Safety Class 2 and Seismic Category I standards, and are powered from Class IE power sources. The recombiner will be st.arted manually from the

( control room by the operator upon indication of a hydrogen concentration of l

greater than 3.0 volume percent.

( Each of the two Westinghouse electric hydrogen recombiners is capable of proces-l- sing 100 scfm of containment atmosphere for post-accident hydrogen control.

The staff has reviewed tests that were conducted for a full-scale prototype and l

a production recombiner. The tests consisted of proof-of principle testing, j testing on a prototype recombiner, environmental qualification testing, and l functional tests for a production recombiner. (These tests are described in WCAP-7820 and its supplements.) The results of these tests demonstrate that the recombiner is capable of controlling the hydrogen in a post-LOCA containmant environment.

08/02/85 6-19 WNP-3 DSER SEC 6 4

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, c o UNITED STATES

['[ ], NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION g .l-

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WASHING TON, D. C. 20555 .

, SEP 191985 1

MEMORANDUM FOR: Thomas M. Novak, Assistant Director for Licensing Division of Licensing FROM: Dennis L. Ziemann, Acting Deputy Director Division of Human Factors Safety

SUBJECT:

WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM NUCLEAR PROJECT NO. 3 (WNP-3) DRAFT SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT The Division of Human Factors Safety (DHFS) has reviewed the Draft Safety Evaluation Report for WNP-3 as requested in your memorandum dated September 4, 1985. Our comments on this draft, cover Sections 13.2 (Training), 14. (Inftial Test Program) and 18. (Human Factors Engineering).

DHFS has not provided any comments on Sections 13.1, 13.4 and 13.5, since we have not prcvided any input to the draft SER for these sections.

1. Section 13.2 f .

Delete the request for additional infoimation, Questions 630.1, 630.2, 630.3,' 630.4', 630.5', 630.6', 630.7', 630.fi, 630.9, and 630.10. These questions were sent to the applicant in March 1983, and our Draft SER to you dated November 17, 1983, was based on the applicants responses to these questions.

2. Section 18.

The comments on this section are shown in the marked up enclosure of this section.

If you have any questiens on this input to you, please call Frederick R. Allenspach at x24904.

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n emann, Director Division of Human i-actors Safety

Enclosure:

As stated cc: G. Knightoa B. Singh

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18 HUMAN FACTORS ENGINEERING

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l Licensees and applicants for operating licenses shall conduct a Detailed l Control Room Design Review (DCROR). The objective is to " improve the ability d

of nuclear pcwer plant control room operators to prevent accidents or cope with accidents if the occur by improving the information provided to them" (NUREG-0660, Item I.0). The need to conduct a DCRDR was confirmed in NUREG-0737 and Supplenient I to NUREG-0737. DCROR requirements in Supplement 1 to NUREG-0737 replaced those in earlier documents. Supplement 1 to NUREG-0737 requires each applicant or licensee to conduct a OCRDR on a schedule negotiated with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC).

NUREG-0700 describes four phases of the DCROR and provides applicants and licensees with guidelines for its conduct.

The phases are (1) planning (2) review (3) assessment and implementation (4) reporting Aykk's A 4e $& hee hv/w P A Cst.9)'

Criteria for evaluating each phase are contained in _"'JC C20'.. g. g,, 9 Aiut f4 - o s so .

A. Program Plan is to be submitted within two monthe of the start of the OCROR.

Consistent with the requirements of Supplement 1 to NUREG-0737, the Program Plan shall. describe how the following elements of the OCROR will be accomplished:

(1) Establishment of a qualified mult1 disciplinary review team, e

03/18/85 18-1 WNP-3 OSER SEC 18

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(2) Function and task analyses to identify control room operator tasks and information and control requirements during emergency operations. .

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l (3) A comparison of display and control requirements with a control room

inventory.

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I (4) A control room survey to identify deviations from accepted human factors l principles.

4 (5) Assessment of human engineering discrepancies (HEDs) to determine which HEDs are significant and should be corrected.

(6) Selection of design improvements.

(7) Verification that selected design improvements will provide the necessary correction.

(8) Verification that improvements will not introduce new HEDs.

(9) Coordination of control room improvements with changes from other programs such as Sp0S, operator training, Reg. Guide 1.97 instrumentation and upgraded emergency operating procedures.

man factors evaluation of the design of the remote shutdown capa)J RE~/

provide meet 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, GDC-J!Pand 10' CFpPart 50, Appendix R, is t specifically identified ya' requirement'in Supplement 1 to

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NUREG-0737. The Co *ee to Review Ge Requ,trements is currently reviewing this issue to det ine if rt cc ification is necessary. In the interim, we recommend tha th "col# f the OCROR include a human factors evaluation of the design of .e /s't e s down capability. To the extent practical,withoutdelaying-[m'letionofthe R, it should address any control room modific ons a nd additions (such as cont and displays for inadequate core coling and reactor system vents) mace or plan, s a result of other t-TMI actions and the lessons learned from operating reactor events such as the Salem ATWS events. Generic implications of the Salem ATWS events 03/18/85 18-2 WNP-3 OSER SEC 18

, '; . '. G N, are diIcussed in NUREG-1 00 and uired ctions te desc ibed i  : tion .2, Post-T ip Revi - Data a d Inf rmation Ca ty, of the e osure neric Letter 3-2 .

A Summary Report is to be submitted at the end of the DCROR. As a minimum it

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I (1) outline proposed control room changes I

(2) outline proposed schedules for implementation i

(3) provide summary justification for HEDs with safety significance to be left uncorrected or partially corrected The NRC will evaluate the organization, process, and results of the OCRDR.

Evaluation will include review of required documentation (Program Plan and Summary Report) and may also include reviews of additional documentation, briefings, discussions, and on-site audits. In progress audits may be conducted after submission of the Program Plan but prior to submission of the Summary Report. Pre-i.mplementationauditsmaybeconductedaftersubmission of the Summary Report. Evaluation will be in accordance with the requirements of Supplement 1 to NUREG-0737. Additional guidance for the evaluation is provided by NUREG-0700 and NUREG ^ . Results of the NRC evaluation of a DCROR will be documented in a Safety E luatirn Report (SER) or SER Supplement.

( [ p 6)rA A FEP M *h NUREG-0737 Supplement 1 also requires that each operating reactor be provided with a safety parameter display system (SPOS) that is located convenient to the control room operators. This system will continuously display information from which the plant safety status can be readily and reliably assessed. The principal purpose and function of the SPOS is to aid the control room personnel during abnormal and emergency conditions in determining the safety status of the plant and in assessing whether abnormal conditions warrant corrective action by operators to avoid a degraded core. A written SPDS safety analysis shall be prepared describing the basis on which the selected parameters are sufficient to assess the safety status of each identified function for a wide range of events, which include symptoms of severe accidents. The applicant's 03/18/85 18-3 WNP-3 DSER SEC 18

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safety analysis and SPDS implementation plan will be reviewed by the NRC staff to confirm: (1) the adequacy of the parameters selected to be displayed to detect critical safety functions; (2) that means are provided to assurg that the data displayed are valid; (3) the adequacy of the design and installation of the system from a human factors perspective; and, (4) the adequacy of the verification and validation (V&V) program to assure a highly reliable SPOS.

Status As requested by Generic Letter 82-33, in its letter of April 14, 1983, the Washington Public Power Supply System (Supply System) submitted a proposed q schedule for activities required by Supplement 1 to NUREG-0737. By letter dated July 12, 1983, the Supply System submitted its " Control Room Design Review Program Plan for WPPSS Nuclear Project 3." The staff t-; c;? pits review of the Program Plan, M ai'- Em_. 2-P1 cemmente-t: th: Sppb Or '

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• * >_- ' /_ - y La M ys**d REFERENCES ff re 4c4 v. h d.

1. NUREG-0660, Volume 1, May 1980; NRC Action Plan Developed as a Result of the TMI-2 Accident.

2. NUREG-0737, November 1980; Clarification of TMI Action Plan Requirements.

3. Supplement 1 to NUREG-0737, December 1982; Requirements for Emergency Response Capability (Generic Letter 82-33).

4. NUREG-0700, September 1981; Guidelines for Control Room Design Reviews.

5. Letter to G. W. Knighton, NRC, from G. D. Bouchey, Washington Public Power Supply System,

Subject:

Nuclear Project 3 Response to Generic Letter No. 82-33 Requirements for Emergency Response Capability, dated April 14, 1983.

08/02/85 18-4 WNP-3 DSER SEC 18

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6. Letter.to G. W. Knighton, NRC, from G. D. Bouchey, Washington Public Power Supply System,

Subject:

Nuclear Project 3 Control Room Design Review ,

Program Plan, dated July 12, 1983. ,

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