ML20209G110

Forwards Draft SER Input,Based on FSAR Submitted to Date. Unresolved Issues Requiring Addl Info Listed

ML20209G110
Person / Time
Site:	Satsop
Issue date:	08/23/1985
From:	Rubenstein L Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:	Novak T Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
CON-WNP-1377 NUDOCS 8508300424
Download: ML20209G110 (29)

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g NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION wA::MNGTON, D. C. 20555 AUG 2 3 E65 Docket No.:

50-508 MEMORANDUM FOR:

Thomas M. Novak, Assistant Director for Licensing Division of Licensing FROM:

L. S. Rubenstein, Assistant Director for Core and Plant Systems Division of Systems Integration

SUBJECT:

ORAFT SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT INPUT FOR WASHINGTON PUBLIC POWER SUPPLY SYSTEM g

NUCLEAR PROJECT NU. 3 - AUXILIARY SYSTEMS BRANCH The enclosed Draft Safety Evaluation Report (DSER) input covers some of those portions of the Washington Public Power Supply System Nuclear Project No. 3 (WNP-3) Final Safety Analysis Report (FSAR) for which the Auxiliary Systems Branch (ASB) has primary responsibility. This evaluation is based on our review of WNP-3 FSAR submitted to date.

ASB has not completed its review of the following FSAR sect' ions:

9.1.4 Light Load Handling System 9.1.5 Heavy Load Handling System 9.2.1 Station Service Water System 9.2.2 Reactor Auxiliary Cooling Wa.ter System 9.2.3 Demineralized Water System 9.2.4 Potable and Sanitary Water System 9.2 i5 Ultimate Heat Sink 9.2.5 Condensate Storage Facilities 9.3.1 Compressed Air System 9.3.3 Equipment and Floor Orainage System

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9.4.1 Control Room Heating, Ventilation and Air Conditioning 9.4.2 Spent Fuel Pool Area Heating, Ventilation and Air Conditioning 9.4.3 Auxiliary and Radwaste Area Heating, Ventilation and Air Conditioning 9.4.4 Turbine Area Heating, Ventilation and Air Conditioning 9.4.5 Engineered Safety Feature Area Heating, Ventilation and Air Conditioning 10.3 Main Steam (Up to Main Steam Isolation Valves) 10.4.5 - Circulating Water System 10.4.7 - Condensate and Feedwater System 10.4.9 - Auxiliary Feedwater System

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AUG 13 EEG The enclosed input consequently does not include the above sections. Our draft SER input for the above sections will be provided in the future.

In addition, our review of the WNP-3 post-fire safe and alternate shutdown capability is continuing as the applicant has not yet provided complete information. Our SER input on this subject will be provided to the Chemical Engineering Branch as part of our secondary review responsibility for SRP Section 9.5.1.

Among those areas included in the enclosed DSER, the following have not been resolved and require additional information to be provided by the applicant.

We will report on the resolution of these open items in the final SER or supplements thereto.

1.

Section 3.5.1.1 Internally Generated Missiles (Outside Containment)

The applicant has not addressed the issue of pressurizeo tanks and gas cylinders (>275 psig) from becoming potential missiles.

2 Section 3.5.1.2 Internally Generated Missiles (Inside Containment) a.

The applicant has not provided specific information regarding protection against all potential primary system high-energy missile sources identified in CESSAR FSAR Table 3.5-1 and in the CESSAR SER Section 3.5.1.2.

b.

The applicant has not provided information on secondary missiles generated by the impact of primary missiles associated with high-energy systems.

3.

Section 3.5.2 Structures, Systems and Comoonents to be Protected from Externally Generated Missiles l

I a.

The applicant has not provided assurance that HVAC exhaust openings such as those for the control room, ECCS area / fuel building, diesel

, generator area, and the electrical equipment and battery rooms are protected from tornado missiles, b.

The applicant has not demonstrated that damage (such as crimping) to the Diesel Generator combustion air exhaust assembly (for example.

l the silencer) from tornado missiles will not disable the diesel l-generators.

4.

Section 3.6.1 Plant Design for Protection Against Postulated Piping Failures in Fluid Systems Outside Containment a.

The applicant's description of the moderate-energy piping systems does not demonstrate that they have been designed to meet the intent of the guidelines as set forth in BTP ASB 3-1.

-3 AUG 2 319C5 b.

The applicant has not provided a pressure and environmental analysis for all subcompartmdht's outside containment which house high-energy piping. Specifically, the CVCS charging and letdown, steam generator blowdown, and auxiliary steam lines have not been analyzed.

Original algned by L. S. Rubenstdn L. S. Rubenstein, Assistant Director for Core and Plant Systems Division of Systems Integration

Enclosure:

As Stated cc: w/ enclosure H. Thompson R. Bernero G. Knighton

0. Parr J. Wermiel B. K. Singh T. Chandrasekaran DISTRIBUTION:

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.o 3.4.1 Flood Protection Theilesignofthefacilityforfloodprotectionwasreviewedinaccordancewith 5

Section 3.4.1 of the Standard Review Plan (SRP), NUREG-0800. An audit review of'each of the areas listed in the " Areas of Review" portion of the SRP section was performed according to the guidelines provided in the " Review Procedures" portion of the SRP section. Conformance with the acceptance criteria formed '

the basis for our evaluation of the design of the facility for flood protaction with respect to the applicable regulations of 10 CFR 50.

In order to assure conformance with the requirements of General Design Cri-terion 2, " Design Bases for Protection Against Natural Phenomena," we reviewed the overall plant flood protection design including all systems and components whose failure due to flooding could prevent safe shutdown of the plant or result in the uncontrolled release of significant radioactivity. The applicant has provided protection from inundation and the static and dynamic effects.of flood-

- ing for safety-related structures, systems, and components by providing "hard-ened protection" in accordance with the guidelines of Regulatory Guide 1.59,

" Design Basis Floods for Nuclear Power Plants". The plant site is a " dry site" as defined in Regulatory Guide 1.102, " Flood Protection for Nuclear Power Plants," Position C.1.

The source of flooding at the site is the probable maximum flood _(PMF) in the Chehalis River. The water level at the site vicinity resulting from the PMF in the river'is 76.2 ft. MSL, approximately 313 ft. below plant grade. Since, all safety related systems and components are located at the plant grade which is well above the highest PMF level, they are not subjected to flooding concerns resulting from the PMF.

Refer to Section 2.4.2 of the SER for further discus-sion of site flooding due to local intense precipitation.

The Reactor Auxiliary Building (RAB), Fuel Handling Building, and Reactor Build-ing are protected against flooding as a result of groundwater seepage by the installation of a permanent Groundwater Orainage System (GWOS). The GWOS per-manently lowers the groundwater in the vicinity of the plant. Watertight seals 07/09/85 3-1 WNP-3 DSER SEC 3 A 5 e

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0 are also provided on all below grade penetrations of the RAB to further ifmit, groundwater seepage into the building. The Dry Cooling Towers and Refueling Water Storage Tank Structures are at plant grade and thus are not susceptible to flooding as a result of groundwater seepage.

The GWOS is not classified as seismic Category I.

The applicant has stated that this classification is adequate since a failure of the GWOS (clogging of the drain pipes) during a seismic event would not cause an appreciable rise in the groundwater level for a minimum of 115 days.

In addition, the GWDS will be inspectable to assure proper functioning at any time, including after an earth-quake.

Refer to SER Section 2.4.12 for further discussion regarding the GWOS.

Within safety related plant structures, protection against flooding from fail-ures in fluid piping systems as identified in the guidelines of Branch Technical Position AS8 3-1, " Protection Against Postulated Piping Failures in Fluid Systems Outside Containment," is provided by equipment location and drainage as described under Sections 3.6.1 and 9.3.3 of this SER.

I' Based on.our review of the design criteria and bases, and the safety classifica-tion of safety-related systems, structures, and components necessary for a safe plant shutdown during and following flood conditions, we conclude that the design of the facility for flood protection conforms to the requirements of General Design Criterion 2 with respect to protection against natural phenomena and conforms to the guidelines of Regulatory Guides 1.59 and 1.102 concerning flood protection. We, therefore, conclude that the flood protection design j

meets the acceptance criteria of SRP Section 3.4.1 and is acceptable. We fur-ther conclude that the CESSAR interface requirements are satisfied by t:.e above described design.

3.5.1.1 Internally Generated Missiles (Outside Containment)

The design of the facility for providing protection from internally generated missiles (outside containment) was reviewed in accordance with Section 3.5.1.1 of the Standard Review Plan (SRP), NUREG-0800.

An audit review of each of the areas listed in the " Areas of Review" portion of the SRP section was performed according to the guidelines provided in the " Review Procedures" portion of the 07/09/85 3-2 WNP-3'DSER SEC 3 A $

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SRP section. Conformance with the acceptance criteria except as noted below formed the basis for providing protection from internally generated missile 1

protection outside containment with respect to the applicable regulations of

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10 CFR 50.

The acceptance criteria for the design of the facility for providing missile protection includes meeting Regulatory Guide 1.115, " Protection Against Low-Trajectory Turbine Missiles." The review of turbine missiles is discussed

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separately in Section 3.5.1.3.

General Design Criterion 4, " Environmental and Missile Design Bases," requires protection of plant structures, systems, and components, whose failure could

-lead to offsite radiological consequences or that are required for safe plant shutdown, against postulated missiles associated with plant operation. The missiles considered in this evaluation include those missiles generated by rotating or pressurized (high-energy fluid system) equipment.

Protection is provided by any one or a combination of compartmentalization,,

barriers, separation, orientation, and equipment design. The primary means of providing protection to safety-related equipment from damage resulting from internally generated missiles is through the use of plant physical arrangement.

Safety-related systems and components of safety-related systems are physically separated from their redundant components.

The applicant has provided an evaluation of potential missile sources from rotating equipment failures and pressurized component failures. The potential missiles resulting from this analysis are valves in high energy systems. The applicant's evaluation has verified that plant design features such as walls or separation of redundant systems will prevent these missiles from causing adverse effect on safety-related systems and components. Other missile sources are pre-l cluded by the design of the equipment itself. We concur with the applicant's assumptions and evaluation for potential missiles outside containment.

Protec-tion of safety-related equipment and stored fuel from the effects of turbine missiles is discussed in Section 3.5.1.3 of this SER.

l The potential sources of missiles which were evaluated in the Fuel Handling Building are considered to be ' generated from failure of either a pressurized 07/09/85 3-3 WNP-3 DSER SEC 3 Ant i

component or a rotating component.

There are no high energy systems located within the Fuel Handling Building and therefore missiles from pressurized com-ponents are_,ot postulated. The only rotating pieces of equipment in the Fuel n

Handling Building are the component cooling water pumps, fuel pool cooling pumps, and the fuel pool clean-up pumps. All of these pumps and their motors are located at elevations below the spent fuel pool and are separated by seismic Category I barriers which prevent any missiles from penetrating the spent fuel pool.

In addition, we requested the applicant to provide assurance that turbine driven pumps would not become a source of missiles or that missiles from the pump tur-bine could not damage safety-related equipment. There are two types of f.urbine driven pumps at the plant, the steam generator feedwater pumps (nonsafety-related) and the auxiliary feedwater pumps (safety-related). The steam gen-erator feedwater pumps incorporate redundant overspeed protection devices and both the turbine and pump casings are designed of sufficient strength to prevent the release of missiles generated by failure of the rotor or impeller.

In the unlikely event that a missile penetrated the casing, the SG feedwater pumps are oriented such that the path of the missile would be away from safety-related components. Further, each of the two trains of the auxiliary feedwater system o

is located in a separate concrete cubicle containing one motor driven and one turbine driven pump. Thus, the plant design incorporates physical separaf. ion of trains A and B components with sufficient redundancy to ensure safe shutdown of the plant.

We conclude that the above described design satisfies CESSAR interface require-ments.

[However, the applicant's analysis does not address pressurized tanks and gas cylinders (>275 psig) from becoming potential missiles. Therefore, we cannot conclude that the design is in conformance with the requirements of General Design Criterion 4 as it relates to protection against internally gen-l erated missiles until the applicant provides additional information in this regard. We will report resolution of this item in our final SER.]

j 3.5.1.2 Internally Generated Missiles (Inside Containment)

The design of the facility for providing protection from internally generated missiles inside containment was reviewed in accordance with Section 3.5.1.2 of 07/09/85 3-4 WNP-3 DSER SEC 3A

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the Standard Review Plan (SRP), NUREG-0800. An audit review of each of the areas listed in the " Areas of Review" portion of the SRP section was performed according to, the guidelines provided in the " Review Procedures" portion of the SRP section. Conformance with the acceptance criteria formed the basis for our evaluation of the design of the facility for providing protection from internally generated missiles with respect to the applicable regulations of 10 CFR 50.

All plant structures, systems and components (SSC) inside containment whose failure could lead to offsite radiological consequences or that are required for safe plant shutdown must be protected against the effects of internally generated missiles in accordance with the requirements of General Design Cri-terion 4, " Environmental and Missile Design Bases." Potential missiles that could be generated inside containment are frora failures of rotating components, pressurized components (high-energy fluid system) failures and gravitational etfects.

With regard to potential missiles from pressurized high-energy systems inside the containment, the applicant has analyzed the primary missiles that can be generated in the reactor vessel head area. The missiles considered in this context were the closure head nut, closure head nut and stud and the control rod drive assembly. The applicant's analysis verified that structures and shields provide protection for safety-related equip' ment from the above primary missiles. Also, potential gravitational missiles inside the containu nt result-ing from seismic events are prevented by either designing the structures, sys-tems and components located inside the containment as Seismic Category I or by designing them to withstand Seismic Category I loads without. falling.

l With regard to potential missile sources from rotating equipment, the licensee has verified that all HVAC rotating equipment located inside containment is designed to withstand the impact of self generated missiles such as fans or impeller blades by fabricating the equipment housing with sufficient material thickness. Also, either duct reinforcement or missile barriers have been pro-vided at the discharge of the fans to contain the generated missiles and addi-tionally prevent the generation of secondary missiles outside the HVAC rotating equipment housing.

For a discussion of compliance with the criteria of Regula-tory Guide 1.14, " Reactor Coolant Pump Flywheel Integrity" as it relates to MEi-07/09/85 3-5 WNP-3 DSER SEC 34ri-i

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i potential missile sources, refer to Section 5.4.1.1 of this SER and of the CESSAR SER.

The applicant has stated that temperature sensors or other detectors installed on pipes or in wells, nuts, bolts, studs, and combinations thereof contribute

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insignificantly to missile hazards due to the low amount of stored energy.

[However, the applicant has not provided specific information regarding protec-tion against other potential peleary system high-energy missile sources identi-fied in CESSAR FSAR Table 3.5-1 and in the CESSAR SER Section 3.5.1.2.

Addi-tionally, the applicant has not provided information on secondary missiles ge,nerated by the impact of primary missiles associated with high-energy systems.

Therefore, we cannot conclude ti.at the WNP-3 design is in conformance with the requirements of General Design Criterion 4 as it relates to protection against internally generated missiles inside the containment. We will report resolution of this item in our final SER.]

3.5.1.4 Missiles Generated by Natural Phenomena The tornado missile spectrum was reviewe'd in accordance with Section'3.S.I.4 of the Standard Review Plan (SRP), NUREG-0800. *An audit review of each of the areas listed in the " Areas of Review" portion of the SRP section was performed according to the guidelines provided in the " Review Procedures" portion of the SRP section except as noted below. Cor.formance with the acceptance criteria formed the basis for our evaluation of the tornado missile spectrum with respect to the applicable regulations of 10 CFR 50.

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The portions of the " Review Procedures" concerning the probability per year of damage to safety-related systems due to missiles was not used in our review.

Our review for this section of the SRP is concerned with establishing the mis-r l

sile spectrum, not with calculating the probability of damage.

General Design Criterion 2, " Design Bases for Protection Against Natural Phenom-l ena," requires that strc tares, systems, and components important to safety be designed to withstand.the effects of natural phenomena, and General Design Cri-

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terion 4, " Environmental and Missile Design Bases," requires that these same plant features be protected against missiles. The missiles gerarated by natural 07/09/85 3-6 WNP-3 DSER SEC 3JR k.

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phenomena of concern are those resulting from tornadoes. The applicant has identified a spectrum of missiles for a tornado Region III site as identified in Regulato,ry Guide 1.76, " Design Basis Tornado for Nuclear Power Plants," Po-sitions C.1 and C.2.

The spectrum includes the weight, velocity, kinetic energy, impact area, and height in accordance with current tornado missile criteria.

We have reviewed this spectrum and conclude that it is representative of missiles at the site and is, therefore, acceptable. Discussion of the protection (bar-riers and structures) afforded to safety related equipment from the identified tornado missiles including compliance with the guidelines of Regulatory Guide 1.117, " Tornado Design Classification," is provided in Section 3.5.2 of this SER. Discussion of the adequacy of barriers and structures designed to withstand the effects of the identified tornado missiles is provided in Sec-tion 3.5.3 of this SER.

Based on our review of the tornado missile spectrum, we conclude that the spec-trum was properly selected and meets the requirements of General Design Cri-teria 2 and 4 with respect to protection against natural phenomena and missiles and the guidelines of Regulatory Guide 1.76 with respect to identification of missiles generated by natural phenomena and is, therefore, acceptable. The tornado missile spect mm meets the acceptance criteria of SRP Section 3.5.1.4.

We further conclude that the above described design satisfies the CESSAR l

interf'ce requirements.

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3.5.2 Structures, Systems, and Components to be Protected from Externally Generated Missiles The design of the facility for providing protection from tornado generated mis-siles was reviewed in accordance with Section 3.5.2 of the Standard Review Plan (SRP), NUREG-0800. An audit review of each of the areas listed in the " Areas of Review" portion of the SRP section was performed according to the guidelines provided in the " Review Procedures" portion of the SRP section.

Conformance I

with the acceptance criteria formed the basis for our evaluation of the design of the facility for providing protection from tornado generated missiles with respect to the applicable regulations of 10 CFR Part 50.

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General Design Criterion (GDC) 2, " Design Basis for Protection Against Natural Phenomena," requires that all structures, systems, and components important to safety be protected from the effects of natural phenomena, and GDC 4. " Environ-mental and Missile Design Bases," requires that all structures, systems, and components important to safety be protected from the effects of externally gen-erated missiles. The WNP-3 site is located in tornado Region III as identified in Regulatory Guide 1.76, " Design Basis Tornado for Nuclear Power Plants." The tornado missile spectrum is discussed in Section 3.5.1.4 of this SER.

Protoc-tion from low-trajectory turbine missiles including compliance with RG 1.115

" Protection Against Low-Trajectory Turbine Missiles", is discussed in Sec-tion 3.5.1.3 of this SER.

f The applicant has identified all safety-related structures, systems, and com-ponents requiring protection from externally generated missiles. All safety-related structures are designed to withstand postulated tornado generated mis-siles without damage to safety-related equipment. Safety-related systems and components and stored fuel and spent fuel pool are located within tornado-missile protected structures or are provided with tornado missile barriers.

The two dry cooling towers which constitute the ultimate heat sink for WNP-3

'are enclosed in structures designed to prevent tornado and missile impact damage to any vital component of the towers. The cooling tower fans, particularly, 1

are protected from tornado generated missiles by missile grating. Therefore, we conclude that the guidelines of RGs 1.13. " Spent Fuel Storage Facility Design i

Basis," 1.27, " Ultimate Heat Sink for Nuclear Power Plants", and 1.117. " Tornado Design Classification," concerning tornado missile protection for stored fuel, ultimate heat sink and the spent fuel pool are met. With regard to HVAC open-ings, the outside air HVAC intakes for the control room, the fuel building, diesel generator (DG) area, and the electrical equipment and battery rooms are all protected from tornado-missiles by protective missile grating. Also, the component cooling water system dry cooling towers electrical equipment room outside air HVAC intake and exhaust openings are protected against tornado-missiles by missile grating.

Additionally, the applicant states that the DG combustion air intake opening is protected from external missiles by shield bars and that both the normal and emergency combustion air exhaust path openings,

are protected against externally generated missiles.

[However, the applicant has not provided assurance that HVAC exhaust openings such as those for the 07/09/85 3-8 WNP-3 DSER SEC 3 4 1

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control room, ECCS area / fuel building, diesel generator area, and the electrical equipment and battery rooms are protected from tornado-missiles. Also, we are unable to conclude that possible damage to the DG combustion air exhaust assem-bly (for example, the silencer) from tornado-missile, such as crimping will not disable the DG. Therefore, we cannot conclude that the requirements of GDC8; 2 and 4 with respect to missile protection and the guidelines of RG 1.117 concern-ing tornado-missile protection for safety-related structures, systems and com-ponents are met. We will report resolution of this concern in the final SER.]

[ Based on the above, we conclude that except as noted above, the applicant's list of safety-related structures, systems and components to be protected from externally generated missiles and the provisions in the plant design providing this protection are in accordance with the requirements of GDCs 2 and 4 with respect to missile protection and the guidelines of RGs 1.13, 1.27, and 1.117 as they relate to tornado missile protection for safety-related structures, systems and components including stored fuel and ultimate heat sink. We, therefore, conclude that the design meett the acceptance criteria of SRP Sec-tion 3.5.2 except as noted above. We cannot conclude that the design meets the intent of CESSAR interface requirements. We will report the resolution of the concerns identified abnve in the final SER.]

3.6.1 Plant Design for Protection Against Postulated Piping Failures in Fluid Systems Outside Containment The design of the facility for providing protection against postulated piping failures outside containment was reviewed in accordance with Section 3.6.1 of the Standard Review Plan (SRP), NUREG-0800. An audit review of each of the areas listed in the " Areas of Review" portion of the SRP section was performed according to the guidelines provided in the " Review Procedures" portion of the SRP section. Conformance with the acceptance criteria formed the basis for our evaluation of the design of the facility for providing protection against pos-tulated piping failures outside containment with respect to the applicable regulations of 10 CFR 50.

The staff's guidelines for meeting the requirements of General Design Crite-

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postulated piping failure in high energy and moderate energy fluid systems outside containment are contained in Branch Technical Position (BTP) ASB 3-1,

" Protection _Against Postulated Failures in Fluid Systems Outside Containment."

Theapplicanthasidentifiedhigh-andmoderate-energypipingsystemsinah[or-1 dance with these guidelines and has also identified those systems requiring pro-tection from postulated piping failures (refer to Section 3.6.1 of the CESSAR SER for a discussion of the high-and daoderate energy fluid systems outside containment which are in the CESSAR scope).

The plant design accomodates the effects of postulated pipe breaks and cracks including pipe whip, jet impingement and environmental effects. The means used to protect essential (safety-related) systems and components include physical separation, enclosure within suitably designed structures, pipe whip restraints, and equipment shields. To be consistent with BTP ASB 3-1, the applicant has utilized separation as the primary means of protection, and where separation was not feasible, one of the other acceptable methods of protection was used.

The plant design includes the ability to sustain a high-energy pipe break acci-dent coincident with a single active failure and retain the capability for safe cold shutdown. For postulated pipe failures, the resulting effect will not cause the loss of function of power supplies or controls and instrumentation needed to complete a safety action and will not preclude the habitability of the control room as indicated in BTP ASB 3-1.

The applicant has also analyzed the effects of moderate-energy line breaks out-side containment on safety-related systems by postulating cracks in moderate energy lines at any location.

For moderate-energy essential system piping cracks in other than dual purpose moderate-energy essential systems which satisfy the guidelines of BTP ASB 3-1, Position 3.b.(3), a single active failure in the redundant train or trains of the essential system was also considered and it g

was shown that safe shutdown will not be affected or the functional capability of the essential systems will not be compromised. [However, we cannot accept the applicant's assumption that a seismic event concurrent with a crack in non-seismically designed moderate energy piping is not a credible event since the

' seismic event by itself can cause a pipe break in a non-seismically designed 07/09/85 3-10 WNP-3 DSER SEC 3 Af4 i

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piping system. Also, we cannot grant credit for mitigation of flooding con-sequences resulting from postulated seismically induced pipe failures by non-seismically designed systems, components or equipment such as floor drainage systems, sump pumps etc. Therefore, we cannot conclude that moderate energy systems have been designed to meet the intent of the guidelines set forth in BTP ASB 3-1.

We will report resolution of this concern in the final SER.]

The main steam and feedwater systems up to the first restraint outside contain-ment are classified as part of the break exclusion (BEX) boundary as defined in ites B.1.6 of BTP MEB 3-1, " Postulated Breaks and Leakage Locations in Fluid System Piping Outside Containment." At our request, the applicant provided the results of a subcompartment analysis of a nonsechanistic break in these lines to determine the environmental effects in the compartments housing the main steam and feedwater lines. The applicant determined that the structural integ-rity of the applicable steam tunnel (there are 2 steam tunnels) which hbuses the BEX portion of these lines will not be affected by the pressure increase from the resulting blowdown. The tunnel is vented to relieve the pressure effects. Main steam isolation and feedwater isolation valves (MSIVs and FWIVs) functional capability will be maintained by assuring that they are environ-mentally qualified to conservative bounding conditions determined by the analy-sis. We concur with this analysis.

Environmental qualification of essential auxiliary feedwater (AFW) system pumps and flow control / isolation valves and AFW turbine steam supply valves and essential equipment located in the steam tunnel including the MSIVs and FWIVs and the atmospheric dump valves is dis-cussed in Section 3.11 of this SER.

[The applicant has not provided a pressure and environmental analysis for the other subcompartments outside containment which house high-energy piping (the CVCS charging and letdown, steam generator (SG) blowdown and auxiliary steam lines).

The staff evaluation of the results of the analysis to assure that safety-related equipment is protected from the postulated failure in these piping systems will be provided in the final SER.]

[ Based on our review as described above, we cannot conclude that the applicant has adequately designed and protected areas and systems required for safe plant shutdown following postulated failures in high-and moderate-energy piping out-l side containment as required by GDC 4 until we complete our review of the sub-compartment pressure and environmental analysis for the CVCS charging and let-07/09/85 3-11 WNP-3 DSER SEC 3 J R

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down lines, SG blowdown lines and auxiliary steam lines, and until our concern relating to moderate-energy piping identified above is resolved. The resolution of all these. concerns will be discussed in our final SER.

CESSAR interface requirements (refer to CESSAR SER,.Section 3.6.1) specify that safety-related equipment must be protected from the effects of high-and moderate-energy pipe failures. Therefore, we cannot conclude that these requirements have been met by the applicant until we complete our review of applicant's responses to the concerns identified above.]

4.6 Functional Design of Reactivity Control Systems The functional design of reactivity control systems is within the scope of

-CESSAR.

Refer to Section 4.6 of the CESSAR SER for this discussion.

5.2.5 Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary Leakage' Detection The reactor coolant pressure boundary (RCPB) leakage detection systems were reviewed in accordance with Section 5.2.5 of the Standard Review Plan (SRP),

NUREG-0800. An audit review of each of the areas listed in the " Areas of Review" portion of the SRP section was performed according to the guidelines provided in the " Review Procedures" portion of the SRP section.

Conformance with the acceptance criteria formed the basis for our evaluation of the reactor coolant pressure boundary leakage detection systems with respect to the applicable reg-ulations of 10 CFR 50.

' A limited amount of leakage is to be expected from components forming the reac-tor coolant pressure boundary (RCPB). Means are provided for detecting and identifying this leakage in accordance with the requirements of General Design Criterion 30, " Quality of Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary." Leakage is clas-sified into two types - identified and unidentified. Components such as valve stem packing, pump shaft seals, and flanges are not completely leak tight.

Since this leakage is expected, it is considered as identified leakage and is monitored, limited, and separated from other leakage (unidentified) by directing l

it to closed systems as identified in the guidelines of Position C.1 of Regula-tory Guide 1.45, " Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary Leakage Detection Systems."

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Refer to CESSAR SER Section 5.2.5 for discussion on the scurces, disposition, and indication of identified leakage.

Unidentified leakage, which includes steam generator tube sheet and intersys-tem leakage, is monitored by several devices as identified in the guidelines of Positions C.1, C.3 and C.4 of Regulatory Guide 1.45.

Steam generator tube leak-age is monitored by the condenser air rencval system raciation monitors, steam generator blowdown systes radiation monitor:,, or routine steam generator water sample:. The method of detection of intersystes leakage depends on the partic-ular interfacing system.

Leakage of reacter coolant through the safety injec-tion system can be identified by high pressere alarms in the control room.

In the evsnt seat le.skage takes place past two shutdown cooling isolaticn valves, the leakage will pressurize the shutdown cooling lines and lift the two relief valves. The discharge from the relief valves is directed to ths safety injection system recirculation sump 'and monitored as an unidentifi6d Icakage source.

The means of detecting intersystem leakage of primary cociant to the component cooling water system through the letdown teat exchanger, reactor ccol.snt pump seal heat exchanger and thermal barriers is as follows. Heat exchanger leaks will produce inleakage of reactor coolant and fission products into the cooling water. Su:h inleakage will increase the radicactivity content of the cooling water. The increase will be detected by the compened ceoling water system radiation mo".itors located in the recirculataan lines acrcss the cciponent cool-ing water pumps of each train-Leakage of reactor coolant also increases the inventory in the componan: cooling water system, causing an increase in the surge tank level which would reslut in a high level alarm in the main control room.

l Leakage to the primary rector centainment from unidentified sources is collected and the flow rate monitored with an accuracy of ono gpo or better.

Indication of unidentified leakage into the containment is monitcred by four independent methods:

1.

Sump Level and Flow Monitering

' Unidentified leakage inside the containment including condensate frce the con-tainment fan coolers will flow to the contair.rrent drain sumo.

Leakage fro.t the f.

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RCS will result in either an increase in humidity in containment (which will cause condensation on the fan ecoler coils) or water on the floor. Thus, RCS unidentified leakage will pass to the containment sump. All flow entering the sump is routed first to a measurement tank. The tank is fitted with a level transmitter that sends a signal proportional to the tank level to the main con-trol room. An alarm occurs whenever the equivalent of one gpm in one hour is exceeded as prescribed by Regulatory Guide 1.45, Positions C.2 and C.5.

Sump level and flow monitoring equipment will remain functional efter being subject to an SSE.

Unidentified leakage inside the reactor cavity will be collected in the reactor cavity sump and will be pumped directly into the measurement tank.at the contain-ment drain sump.

Pump start alarm, sump level alarm, and ficod detection alarms are provided for the reactor cavity area to alert the operator in case of any leakage into the area.

2.

Airborne Particulate Radioactivity Monitoring The containment atmosphere is monitortd for radioactive particulates by the con-tainment atmosphere / containment purge airborne radiation monitors.

These moni-tors are a pair of identical and redundant units.

The particulate channel in each monitor is capatie of detecting the airborne radinactive particulates resul-ting from an increase of one gpm in the leakage rate frem the primary coolant pressure boundary into the containment atmosphere within one hour.

In addition, the particulate filter tape and the downstream icdine filters may be removed for laboratory analysis. The monitoring equipment used for leakage detection has been designed to remain functional following an SSE as indicated in guidelines of Regulatory Guide 1.'45, Position C.6.

3.

Airborne Gaseous Radioactivity Monitorinc The containment atmosphere is monitored for radioactive gases by the containment /

atmosphere purge airborne radiation monitors. These monitors are a pair of iden-tical and redundant units.

The gaseous channel in each monitor is capabla of detecting the airborne radioactive gases resulting from an increase of one gom 5

07/09,d' 3-14 WNP-3 DSER SEC 3p6ri w,

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in the leakage rate from the primary coolant pressure boundary into the contain-ment atmosphere within one hour. The airborne gas monitoring equipment used for leakage detection has been designed to remain functional following an SSE.

4.

Reactor Coolant Inventory Monitoring Abnormal leakage from the reactor coolant system is also detected through measurement of the net amount of makeup flow to the systte (refer to CESSAR SER Section 9.3.4 and Section 5.2.5 for further discussion).

As described above, the RCPB leakage flow and radioactive monitors within con-tainment are seismic Category I, testable, and may be calibrated as identified in the guidelines of Positions C.6, C.7, and C.8 of Regulatory Guide 1.45.

Further, their accuracy meets the guidelines of Position C.5 of Regulatory Guide 1.45.

Additional scurces of indication of unidentified leakage include containment pressure, temperature, and humidity indicators, pressurizer level indicators, and low pressure safety injection header pressure. Technical specifications will include limiting conditions for identified and unidentified leakage and will also address availability of the various leakage detection systems to as-sure adequate coverage of all times as indicated in Regulatory Guide 1.45, Position C.9.

Based on the above, we conclude that the RCPB leakage detection systems are diverse and provide reasonable assurance that primary system leakage (both iden-tified and unidentified) will be detected. The systems meet the requirements of GDC 30 with respect to provisions for RCPB leak detection and identification, and the guidelines of RG 1.45 with respect to RCPB leakage detection system design. We, therefore, conclude that the design is acceptable and that it meets the acceptance criteria of SRP Section 5.2.5.

We further conclude that the CESSAR interface requirements, as discussed in CESSAR SER Section 5.2.5 are satisfied by the above described design.

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9 5.4.11 Pressurizer Relief Tank (Reactor Drain Tank)

The reactor drain tank is within the scope of CESSAR.

Refer to Section 5.4.11 of the CESSAR SER for this discussion.

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07/09/85 3-16 WNP-3 DSER SEC N 1

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9. 0 Auxiliary Systems We have reviewed the design of the auxiliary systems necessary for safe reactor operation, shutdown, fuel storage, or whose failure might affect plant safety, including their safety-related objectives, and the manner in which these objec-tives are achieved.

The design for auxiliary systems for WNP-3 is the responsibility of the applicant.

However, since WNP-3-is a CESSAR reference plant, the applicant is required to incorporate the interfaces identified in CESSAR for the various auxiliary system designs.

Refer to the corresponding sections of the CESSAR SER for a discussion of our evaluation of the CESSAR interfaces.

The auxiliary systems necessary for safe reactor operation or shutdown include the component cooling water system, the ultimate heat sink, the condensate stor-age facility, the auxiliary feedwater system, the essential chilled water system, essential portions of the compressed air, equipment and floor drainage, and chemical and volume control systems, and the heating, ventilation and air con-ditioning (HVAC) systems for the control room, ESF systems and essential portions of the Reactor Auxiliary Building (RAB).

The auxiliary systems necessary to assure the safety of the fuel storage facility include new fuel storage, spent fuel storage, the fuel pool cooling and cleanup system, fuel handling systems and the HVAC system foe the essential portions of the fuel building.

l We have also reviewed other auxiliary systems to verify that their failure will not prevent safe shutdown of the plant or result in unacceptable release of radioactivity to the environment. These systems include the demineralized water makeup system, potable and sanitary water system, service water system, circu-lating water system, plant makeup water system, nonessential chilled water sys-tem, nonessential portions of the compressed air, equipment and floor drainage and chemical and volume control systems, and the HVAC systems for the turbine building and nonessential portions of the RAB and the fuel building.

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None of the above mentioned systems performing a safety function or utilized for maintaining the safety of the fuel storage facility is shared between WNP-3 and any other WNP unit. Therefore, the requirements of General Design Crite-rion 5, " Sharing of Structures, Systems, and Components," which concerns the capability to maintain safe operation of multiple units when essential systems are shared, are not applicc51e.

9.1 Fuel Storage and Handling 9.1.1 New Fuel Storage The new fuel storage facility was reviewed in accordance with Section 9.1.1 of the Standard Review Plan (SRP), NUREG-0800. An audit review of each of the areas listed in the " Areas of Review" portion of the SRP section was performed according to the guidelines provided in the " Review Procedures" portion of the SRP section. Conformance with the acceptance criteria except as noted below, formed the basis for our evaluation of the new fuel storage facility with respect to the applicable regulations of 10 CFR 50.

The acceptance criteria for the new fuel storage facility include compliance with guidelines of ANS 57.1, " Design Requirements of Light-Water Reactor Fuel Handling System," and ANS 57.3, " Design Requirements for New LWR Storage Facili-ties." The guidelines contained in the " Review Procedures" were used in lieu of ANS 57.1 and ANS 57.3.

The new fuel storage facility provides dry storage for a maximum of 90 fuel assemblies (more than one-third of.a core load) and includes the new fuel assem-bly storage racks, and the concrete storage cavity that contains the storage racks.

The fuel handling building which houses the facility is designed to seismic Category I criteria as are the storage racks and cavity. This building is also designed against flooding and tornado missiles (refer to Sections 3.4.1 and 3.5.2. of this SER). Thus, the requirements of General Design Criterion 2, "De-sign Bases for Protection Against Natural Phenomena," and the guidelines of Reg"u-

'latory Guide 1.29, " Seismic Design Classification," Position C.1 are satisfied.

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The storage cavity housing the new fuel storage racks is not located in the vicinity of any moderate-or high-energy lines or rotating machinery.

Therefore, physical pro,tection by means of separation is provided for the new fuel from internally generated missiles and the effects of pipe breaks (refer to Sec-tions 3.5.1.1 and 3.6.1 of this SER). Thus, the requirements of General Design Criterion 4, " Environmental and Missile Design Bases," are satisfied.

The facility is designed to store unirradiated, low emission, fuel assemblies.

Accidental damage to the fuel would release relatively minor amounts of radio-activity that would be accommodated by the fuel building ventilation system.

The racks can withstand the maximum uplift forces exerted by the fuel handling machine. Thus, the requirements of General Design Criterion 61, " Fuel Storage and Handling and Radioactivity Control," are satisfied.

The new fuel storage racks are designed to store the fuel assemblies in an array with a minimum center-to-center spacing which is sufficient to maintain a K,ff of 0.95 or less in flooded condition. The racks are also designed to maintain a K,ff of 0.98 or less under optimum moderation (foam, small droplets, spray, or fogging). The racks themselves are designed to preclude the inadvertent placement of a fuel assembly in other than the prescribed spacing.

Thus, the requirements of General Design Criterion 62, " Prevention of Criticality in Fuel Storage and Handling," are satisfied.

Based on our review, we conclude that the n w fuel storage facility is in con-formance with the requirements of General Design Criteria 2, 4, 61, and 62, as they relate to new fuel protection against natural phenomena, missiles, pipe break effects, radiation protection and prevention of criticality, and the guide-lines of Regulatory Guide 1.29 relating to seismic classification. We, therefore, conclude that the design is acceptable and meets the acceptance criteria of SRP Section 9.1.1.

We further conclude that the_CESSAR interface requirements are satisfied by the above described design.

9.1. 2 Spent Fuel Storage The spent fuel storage facility was reviewed in accordance with Section 9.1.2

'of the Standard Review Plan (SRP), NUREG-0800. An audit review of each of the 07/09/85 9-3 WNP-3 DSER SEC 9 t

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areas listed in the " Areas of Review" portion of the SRP section was performed according to the guidelines provided in the " Review Procedures" portion of the SRP section.

Conformance with the acceptance criteria, except as noted below, formed the basis for our evaluation of the spent fuel storage facility with respect to the applicable regulations of 10 CFR 50.

The acceptance criteria for the spent fuel storage facility include compliance with various portions of the guidelines of ANS 57.2, " Design Objectives for Light Water Reactor Spent Fuel Storage Facilities at Nuclear Power Stations."

The guidelines contained in the " Review Procedures" were used in lieu of ANS 57.2.

Additionally, the acceptance criteria include Regulatory Guide 1.115, " Protection Against Low Trajectory Turbine Missiles." Turbine missiles are evaluated sepa-rately in Section 3.5.1.3 of this SER.

Protection against damage to stored irradiated fuel due to failure of light / heavy load handling systems is discussed in Sections 9.1.4 and 9.1.5 of this report.

The spent fuel storage facility provides underwater storage for 1120 fuel assem-blies or for at least 10 normal refuelings plus one full core off-load. The facility, located in the fuel handling building, includes the spent fuel storage racks and the stainless steel lined concrete pool that contain; the storage racks.

The structure housing the facility (the fuel handling building) including the spent fuel pool, storage racks, and gates is designed to seismic Category I i

criteria. The spent fuel pool liner plate is designed to stay in place in an SSE, thus precluding potential mechanical damage to the spent fuel or damage

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resulting from overheating due to blocking of cooling water flow paths. The fuel handling building is also designed against flooding and tornado missiles (refer to Sections 3.4.1 and 3.5.2 of this SER). Thus, the requirements of General Design Criterion 2, " Design Bases for Protection Against Natural Phenom-ena," and the guidelines of Regulatory Guides 1.13, " Spent Fuel Storage Facility Design Basis," Position C.3, 1.29, " Seismic Design Classification," Positions C.1 and C.2, and 1.117, " Tornado Design Classification," Positions C.1 through C.3 are satisfied for the facility.

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The fuel pool is not located in the vicinity of any high-energy lines or rotating machinery. Therfore, physical protection by means of separation is provided foc.the spent fuel from internally generated missiles and the effects of pipe breaks (refer to Sections 3.5.1.1 and 3.6.1 of this SER). Thus, the requirements of General Design Criterion 4, " Environmental and Missile Design Bases," and the guidelines of Regulatory Guide 1.13, Position C.3 are satisifed.

Each spent fuel assembly will be stored in a stainless steel can. The assembled storago cans are formed into rack assemblies with the cans oriented such that alternate storage cans are positioned with neutron absorbing B C plates located 4

in the gaps on the outside of the cans in the north-south and east-west direc-tions respectively. This will ensure neutron absorber plates between adjacent storage locations. The spacing and design of the racks are such that the effec-tive multiplication factor (K,ff) for new or spent fuel stored within the rack, will not exceed 0.95 under all conditions including fuel handling accidents.

The rack arrays have a center-to-center spacing of 11.12 inches. The storage racks are designed such that a ' fuel assembly cannot be inadvertently positioned in other than a prescribed storage position. The racks can withstand the impact of a dropped fuel assembly without unacceptable damage to the fuel and can with-t stand the maximum uplift forces exerted by the fuel handling machine. Thus,

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the requirements of General Design Criteria 61, " Fuel Storage and Handling and l

Radioactivity Control," and 62, " Prevention of Criticality in Fuel Storage and Handling," and the guidelines of Regulatory Guide 1.13 concerning fuel storage facility design are satisfied.

The design of the spent fuel pool includes a fuel pool liner leakage system to detect and limit leakage of the pool liner welds,'a pool water level and tem-l perature monitoring and alarm system, and radiation monitoring and alarm systems

.with annunciation in the control room. These features satisfy the requirements of GDC 63," Monitoring Fuel and Waste Storage."

Based on our review, we conclude that the spent fuel storage facility is in conformance with the requirements of General Design Criteria 2, 4, 61, 62, and 63 as they relate to protection against natural phenomena, missiles, pipe break effects, radiation protection, prevention of criticality, and monitoring 07/09/85 9-5 WNP-3 DSER SEC 9 l

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provisions, and the guidelines of Regulatory Guides 1.13, 1.29 and 1.117 concern-ing the facility's design, seismic classification and protection against tornado missiles. lie, therefore, conclude that the spent fuel storage facility design meets the acceptance criteria of SRP Section 9.1.2 and is acceptable. We fur-ther conclude that the CESSAR interface requirements are satisfied by the above described design.

9.1.3 Spent Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup System The spent fuel pool cooling and cleanup system was reviewed in accordance with Section 9.1.3 of the Standard Review Plan (SRP), NUREG-0800. An audit review of each of the areas listed in the " Areas of Review" portion of the SRP section was performed according to the guidlines provided in the " Review Procedures" portion of the SRP section. Conformance with the acceptance criteria, except as noted below, formed the basis for our evaluation of the spent fuel pool cool-ing and cleanup system with respect to the applicable regulations of 10 CFR 50.

The acceptance criteria for the spent fuel pool cooling and cleanup system includes compliance with the guidelines of Regulatory Guide 1.52, '" Design, Testing and Maintenance Criteria for Post Accident Engineered-Safety-Feature Atmosphere Cleanup System Air Filtration and Absorption Units of Light-Water Cooled Nuclear Power Plants," and 10 CFR Part 20 based on Regulatory Guide 8.8, "Information Relevant to Ensuring That Occupational Radiation Exposures at l

. Nuclear Power Stations Will Be As Low As Is Reasonably Achievable." Compliance with the guidelines of Regulatory Guides 1.52 and 8.8 is discussed separately in Sections 9.4.2 and 12.1 of this SER, respectively.

The spent fuel pool cooling and cleanup system is designed to maintain water quality and clarity and to remove decay heat generated by spent fuel pool assemblies in the pool. The system includes all components and piping from inlet to exit from the storage pools, piping used for fuel pool makeup, and the cleanup filter /demineralizers to the point of discharge to the radwaste system.

The design consists of two independent, full-capacity essential fuel pool cooling trains, each with a fuel pool cooling pump and a fuel pool cooling heat exchanger and two separate nonessential purification trains, each with a fuel pool cleanup pump, a cleanup basket strainer, a fuel pool filter, and a fuel 07/09/85 9-6 WNP-3 DSER SEC 9 s

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pool ion exchanger. The safety related component cooling water system (CCWS) provides cooling water to the fuel pool heat exchanger and transfers the heat to the ultimate heat sink (refer to Sections 9.2.2 and 9.2.5 of this SER).

Supplemental fuel pool cooling (emergency situation) can be provided by inter-connection to a single train of the safety related shutdown cooling system utilizing one Low Pressure Safety Injection (LPSI) pump and one shutdown heat exchanger.

The essential portions of the system are housed in the seismic Category I, flood and tornado protected fuel handling building (refer to Sections 3.4.1 and 3.5.2 of this SER). The system itself, with the exception of the cleanup portion, is designed to Quality Group C and seismic Category I requirements. Failure of the nonseismic Category I, Quality Group D cleanup portion will not affect operation of the cooling trains /as the two are completely separate and, therefore, no ad-verse effect on safety related equipment or pool cooling would result from such a failure. Therefore, the design satisfies the requirements of General Design Criterion 2, " Design Bases for Protection Against Natural Phenomena," and the guidelines of Regulatory Guides 1.13, " Spent Fuel Storage Facility Design Basis,"

Positions C.1 and C.2, and 1.29, " Seismic Design Classification," Positions C.1 and C.2, with respect to seismic classification of the fuel pool cooling system.

The various components of the system are located in an area of the tornado missile protected fuel handling building which is separated from potential inter-nally generated missile sources and from moderate-and high-energy piping systems t

l (refer to Sections 3.5.1.1 and 3.6.1 of this SER). Thus, the requirements of General Design Criterion 4, " Environmental and Missile Design Bases," and the guidelines of Regulatory Guide 1.13, Position C.2 are satisfied.

During normal operation, with a single fuel pool cooling train operating, the l

fuel pool cooling system maintains the pool water temperature at 130*F or less l

with a heat load based on decay heat generation from storage of one-third core successive annual batch discharges for 10 pars, with the 10th one-third core batch placement within the fuel pool assumed to be completed within seven days after reactor shutdown (full pool minus space for one full core offload). This maximum " normal" heat load temperature is below the SRP Section 9.1.3 acceptance criterion of 140*F.

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e With a single low pressure safety injection (LPSI) pump and shutdown heat exchanger operation, the spent fuel pool water temperature is maintained below 135*F with a heat load based on decay heat generation from one full core placed in the pool seven days after reactor shutdown (emergency core offload) plus successive annual one-third core refueling batch discharges placed in the pool for the previous 10 years. This maximum " abnormal" heat load temperature is within SRP Section 9.1.3 limits which specify no pool boiling and assumes the emergency core offload has occurred and the remaining spent fuel storage rack locations are full.

Heat loads for the above storage modes were calculated by the applicant based on BTP ASB 9-2, " Residual Decay Energy for Light Water Reactors for Long-Term Cooling," thus meeting the requirements of General Design Criterion 44 " Cooling Water".

All connections to the spent fuel pool are either near the normal water level or are provided with antisyphon holes to preclude possible draining or syphoning of the pool water below a safe shielding level., The system is designed such that a single failure of any component will not impair its ability to provide cooling for the fuel pool. Manual valves in both trains of spent fuel pool cooling are normally open to facilitate operator action to bring either or both cooling pumps on line. The spent fuel pool cooling pumps can be powered from the emergency (Class 1E) power sources.

The design of the spent fuel pool cooling system and its accessible location is such that periodic testing and inservice inspection of the system can be accomplished. The active components of the spent fuel pool cooling system are either in continuous or intermittent operation during all plant operating con-ditions. Thus, the reequirements of General Design Criteria 45, " Inspection of Cooling Water System," and 46, " Testing of Cooling Water System," are satisfied.

Normal makeup to the fuel pool to replace losses due to leakage through the i

liner and evaporation and thus maintain proper water level for shielding is I

provided by the deionized water storage tank.

Backup makeup is provided by the seismic Category I refueling water storage tank (RWST) or the condensate 07/09/85 9-8 WNP-3 DSER SEC 9 l

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storage tank. The line from the RWST to the fuel pool is seismic Catergery I.

Thus, the requirements of General Design Criterion 61, " Fuel Storage and Hand-ling and Radioactivity Control," and the guidelines of Regulatory Guide 1.13, Position C.6, concerning fuel pool design are met.

The system incorporates control room alarmed pool water temperature and building radiation level monitoring systems.

Local pool water level alarms are provided in the fuel handling building. Thus, the requirements of General Design Cri-terion 63, " Monitoring Fuel and Waste Storage," are satisfied.

Based on our review, we conclude that the fuel pool cooling and cleanup system is in conformance with the requirements of General Design Criteria 2, 4, 44, 45, 46, 61, and 63 relating to protection against natural phenomena, missiles and environmental effects, cooling water capability, inservice inspection, func-tional testing, fuel cooling and radiation protection, and monitoring provisions, and the guidelines of Regulatory Guides 1.13 and 1.29, and Branch Technical Position 9-2 relating to the systems design, seismic classification, and design decay heat loads. We, therefore, conclude that the spent fuel pool cooling and cleanup system meets the acceptance criteria of SRP Section 9.1.3 and is accept-able. We further conclude that the CESSAR interface requirements are satisfied by the above described design.

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