ML20209D987

Forwards Draft SER Input on FSAR Section 4.2, Fuel Sys Design. License Condition 4.2.3.1(g) Re Maintaining Shoulder Gap Clearance During First Two Refueling Outages Should Be Relaxed

ML20209D987
Person / Time
Site:	Satsop
Issue date:	02/26/1985
From:	Rubenstein L Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:	Novak T Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
References
CON-WNP-1370 NUDOCS 8502280495
Download: ML20209D987 (4)

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MEMORANDUM FOR: T. M. Novak, Assistant Director for Licensing, DL fC -76 8 FROM: L. S. Rubenstein, Assistant Director for Core and Plant Systems, DSI

SUBJECT:

DRAFT SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT INPUT FROM CORE PERFORMANCE BRANCH FOR SECTION 4.2 0F THE WNP-3 FSAR Core Performance Branch has prepared the enclosed safety evaluation on FSAR Section 4.2 " Fuel System Design" for WNP-3. Since WNP-3 is a CESSAR-80 plant, we have relied heavily in our SER on Section 4.2 of our CESSAR-80 SER and have only discussed differences and plant specific issues.

C;!p.~.f % $ 6V L. C. R _ .r. r J n L. S. Rubenstein, Assistant Director for Core and Plant Systems, DSI.

Enclosed:

As stated cc: R. Bernero

Contact:

R. Lobel, CPB:DSI X-29475 CPB:r/f L. RUBENSTEIN L. PHILLIPS R. LOBEL D. FIEN0

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NAME :RLOBEL:ls ttCBE LINGER :LRUBENSTEIN :  :  :  :

DATE :2/ D /85 :2/Ah85 :2/ '-t /85 [  :  :

0FFICIAL RECORD COPY #

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ENCLOSURE WNP-3 is a CESSAR System 80 plant. We have reviewed the CESSAR fuel system and concluded (Rubenstein, June 8,1983) that the CESSAR fuel system has been designed so that (a) the fuel system will not be damage'd as a result of normal operation and anticipated operational occurrences, (b) fuel damage during postulated accidents would not be severe enough to prevent control rod insertion when it is required, and (c) core coolability will always be main-tained, even after se' vere postulated accidents, and thereby meets the related requirements of 10 CFR Part 50.46; 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, General Design Criteria 10, 27, and 35, 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix K, and 10 CFR Part 100.

This conclusion is based on the following:

1. ~ Combustion Engineering has provided sufficient evidence that these design objectives will be met based on operating experience, proto-type testing, and analytical predictions. Those analytical predictions dealing with control rod ejection and fuel densification have been performed in accordance with the guidance of Regulatory Guide 1.77 and with an acceptable alternative of Regulatory Guide 1.126 (Ref. 55).

2. Combustion Engineering has provided for testing and inspection of new fuel to ensure that it is within design tolerances at the time of core loading. The NRC will require (Rubenstein, February 17,1983) l that applicants (a) make comitments to perform CEA reactivity checks and pcst-irradiation surveillance to detect anomalies or confirm that the fuel has perfonned as expected and (b) provide assurance of

. adequate shoulder gap clearance.

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3. . Combustion Engineering has described methods of adequately predicting fuel rod failures during postulated accidents so that radioactivity releases are not underestimated and thereby meets the related require-

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. e ments of 10 CFR Part 100. In meeting these requirements, C-E has ~

(a) used the fission-product release assumptions of Regulatory Guides 1.25 (Ref. 57) and 1.77, and an acceptable (more conservative) alter-native to 1.4 (Ref. 58), and (b) performed the analysis for fuel rod failures for the rod efection accident in accordance with the guide-lines of Regulatory Guide 1.77.

On the basis of the NRC's review of the fuel system design, the NRC concluded (Rubenstein, June 8, 1983) that the CESSAR fuel system design has met all the requirements of the applicable regulations, regulatory guides, and current regulatory positions.

All applicants referencing the CESSAR FSAR (including the WPPSS application for WNP-3) must supply the following applicant-specific information (Rubenstein, June 8, 1983):

1. A CEA surveillance program (see paragraphs 4.2.1.1(j) and 4.2.3.1(j)).

In Q490.2 (Berlinger, April 14,1983), WPPSS was asked to provide this infomation. No response has been received.

2. A fuel assembly loads analysis due to combined seismic and LOCA forces (seeparagraph4.2.3.3(d)). In Q490.2, WPPSS was asked to provide this information. We have not yet received a response.

3. A t.cmitnent to perform a general fuel surveillance program (see para-graph 4.2.4.3). In Q490.2, WPPSS was asked to provide this information.

l We have not yet received a response.

4. Certification that the mechanical fracturing analysis result confonns to the acceptance criterion (see paragraph 4.2.3.2(g)). In 0490.2, WPPSS was asked to provide this information. We have not yet received a response.

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In addition, the following license condition will be required to address the concern discussed in Section 4.2.3.1(g) related to axial growth.

"The licensee shall confirm that adequate shoulder gap clearance will be maintained during the first two refueling outams (Cycles 1/2 and 2/3). This may be done either by analysis or nardware modf-fication and shall be based on measurements taken on a suffic-fent number of fuel assemblies irradiated in WNP-3."

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