ML20209D954

Forwards Proposed License Condition & Safeguards SER Input, Based on Review of Facility Security Plan.Protected SER App Containing Safeguards Info Available from E Mcpeek. SALP Input Also Encl

ML20209D954
Person / Time
Site:	Satsop
Issue date:	02/19/1985
From:	Crutchfield D Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
To:	Novak T Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Shared Package
ML19301C932	List: ML20209D954 ML20209D959
References
CON-WNP-1367 NUDOCS 8502220367
Download: ML20209D954 (14)

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February 19, 1965 Dncket No. 50-508 MEMORANDUM FOR: Thomas M. Novak, Assistant Director for Licensing Division of Licensing FROM: Dennis M. Crutchfield, Assistant Director for Safety Assessment Division of Licensing

SUBJECT:

PROPOSED LICENSE CONDITION AND SAFEGUARDS SER INPUT -

WPPSS NUCLEAR PROJECT - 3 (WNP-3)

Enclosed are a proposed license condition and a safeguards SER input resulting from the review of the Security Plan submitted by the Washington Public Power Supply System for WNP-3. .

A copy of the protected SER appendix, which contains Safeguards Informa-tion, may be obtained from Eugene McPeek in Room 336. This protected appendix is being withheld from public disclosure. Also enclosed for your use is the SALP evaluation input.

Dennis M. Crutchfield, Assistant Director for Safety Assessment Division of Licensing

Enclosures:

1. Proposed License Condition

2. SER Input

3. SALP Evaluation Input cc: w/ enclosures V. Nersus G. Knighton J. Lee

Contact:

E. McPeek, x24782 DISTRIBUTION-SSPB Reading P. Noonan E. McPeek H. Berkow C. Thomas f@bgD D.; $ '

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, UNITED STATES 7.

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION j wAsu NGTON. D. C. 20555 Februa ry 19, 1985 Docket No. 50-508 .

MEMORANDUM FOR: Thomas M. Novak. Assistant Director for Licensing Diytsion of Licensing l

FROM:

Dennis M. Crutchfield. Assistant Director for Safety Assessment Division of Licensing

SUBJECT:

PROPOSED LICENSE CONDITION AND SAFEGUAkDS SER INPUT -

WPPSS NUCLEAR PROJECT - 3 (WNP:3) '

Enclosed are a proposed license condition and a safeguards SER input resulting from the review of the Security Plan submitted by the Washington Public Power Supply System for WNP-3.

A copy of the protected SER appendix, which contains Safeguards Informa-tion, may be obtained from Eugene McPeek in Room 336. This protected appendix is being withheld from public disclosure. Also enclosed for your use is the SALP evaluation input.

&ennis Crutc M.7/l.

eld for Safety Assessme t ssistant Director Division of Licensing

Enclosures:

1. Proposed License Condition

2. SER Input

3. SALP Evaluation input cc: w/ enclosures V. Nersus G. Knighton J. Lee

Contact:

E. McPeek, x24782

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, 50-508 ENCLOSURE 1 PROP 0 SED LICENSE CONDITION The applicant shall fully implement and maintain in effect all provisions of the Commission approved physical security, guard training and oualification, and safeguards contingency plans, including amendments made pursuant to the authority of 10 CFR 50.54(p). The approved plans, which contain Safeguards Infomation as described in 10 CFR 73.21, are collectively entitled, "WNP-3 Physical Security Plan" dated January 20,1982 (transmittal letter dated May 26, 1982), with Revision 1 dated November 10, 1982 (transmittal letter dated December 1, 1982) and Revision 2 dated October 5, 1983 (transmittal letter dated October 17,1983); "WNP-3 Safeguards Contingency Plan", dated January 20, 1982 (transmittal letter dated May 26,1962) with Revision 1 datedNovember4,1982(transmittalletterdatedOctober 17,1983)and Revision 2 dated October 5, 1983 (transmittal letter dated October 17, 1983); and "WNP-3 Training and Qualificatfor. Plan" dated March 19, 1982 (transmittal letter dated March 23,1982).

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50-508 ENCLOSURE 2 i

SAFEGUARDS SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT WNP-3 O

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_1. 0 Introduction ' t

. The Wa,shington Public Power Supply System has filed with the Nuclear Regulatory Commissio9 for the WNP-3 site a Physical Security Plan, Saf.eguards Contingency Plan, and a Security Training and Qualificatio9 Plan.

This Safety Evaluatio9 Report (SER) summarizes how'the applicant has provided for meeting the requirements of 10 CFR Part 73.

The ,SER is composed of a basic smalysis that i s available for public review, and a protected Apoendix.

2.0 Physical Security Organization To satisfy the requirements of 10 CFR 73.55(b) the Washington Public Power Supply System has provided a physical security organization that includes a Shift Supervisor who is onsite at aLL times with the authority tg. direct the physica,L-proteEionactivities.

To implement'the commitments made in the physical security plan, train 19g and qualification plan, a9d the safeg'uards co9 tinge 9cy plan, writte9 security procedures specifying the duties of the security organization members have been develop $d and are available for inspection. '

The training program and critical security tasks and duties for the security organir,ation persoq9el.are defined in the

"L4NP-3' Security Personnel Traiqi9g-a9d Qualificatio9 Plan" .

which meets the requirements of 10 CFR Part 73, Appendix 8 1

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. .. - 2-for the traiqing,' equipping and qu'alification of the security orga91zatio9 members. The physical security pla9 a9d the ,

tra19199 program provide commitme9ts that preclude the assigque9t of a9y 19dividual,to a security relate,d duty or task i.

prior to the 19dividual be11g trai9ed, equipped a9d qualified to perform the assig7ed' duty 19 accorda9ce with the approved guard trai911g a9d qualificatio9 plaq.

3.0 Physical Barriers In meeting the requireme9ts of 10 CFR 73.55(c) the applicant has provided 'a protected area barrier which meets the defiqition 19 10 C FR 13.2 (f) (1) . An isolation zone, to permit observation of activities alo9g the barrier, of at least 20 feet is proyided o9 both sides of the barrier with the exception of the Locatio9s Listed 19 the Appendix. The staff has reviewed thos.e locations and determined that the security measures in place are satisfactory and co9tique to meet the requirements cf 10 CFR 73.55(c).

Illumi9atio9 of 0.2 foot-ca9dles is mainta19ed for the isolation zo9es, protected area barrier, a9d exterqal i

portioqs of the protected area. Ia areas where illumi9atio9 of 0.2 foot-candles ca99ot be maintained, special procedures are applied as described 19 the l

Appendix.

! 4.0 Identification of Vital Areas The Appendix conta19s a d.iscussio9 of the applicant's program a9d ide9tifies those areas aqd equipme9ts determined to be l vital. -

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Vita'L, equipment is Located within vital areas which are located 1

within the protected area and which' requires passage through'at Least two barriers, as defi.ned in 10 CFR 73.2(f)(1) and (2), to ,

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, . gain access tv the vital equipment. Vital area barriers are separated from the protected area barrier. '

The control room and central alarm station are provided with butLet-resistant walls, doors, ceilings, floors, and windows.

Based on these findings and the analysis set forth .n paragraph D of the Appendix, the staff has concluded that '

the applicant's program for identification and prt tection of vital equipment satisfies the regulatory intent. However, this prograa is subject to onsite validation by the staff in the futuce, and to subsequent changas.jf found to be necessary.

5.0 Access Requirements In accordance with 10 CFR 73.55(d) aLL points'of personnel and vehicle access to the protecte.d area are controlled. The individual responsible for controlling the final point of access into the protected area is located in a bullet-resistant structure. As part of the access control program, vehicles (except under emergency conditions), personnel, packages, and materials entering the protected area are searched for explosives, firearms and incendiary devices by electronic search equipment and/or physical search.

Vehicles admitted to the protected area, except Licensee designated vehicles, are controlled by escorts. . Licensee G

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desig'nated vehicles are. Limited to on site

- station functions an,d remain in the protected area except for operational

. maintenance, repair, s'ecurity and emergency purposes.

Positive control over the vehicles is maintained bf personnel authorized to use the vehicles or by the escort personnel.

A picture badge / key card system, utilizing encoded information, icentifies individuals that are authorized unescorted access to protected and vital areas, and is used to control access to these areas. Individuals not autho-ized unescorted access are 1ssued non picture badges that indicate an escort is required.

Access authorizations are Limited to those individuals wh'o have a need f or access to perform their duties. -

Unoc~cupied vital areas are Locked and alarmed. During periods of refueling or major maintenance, access to the reactor containment is positively controlled by a member of the security o'rganization to assure that only authorized individuals and ma,terials are permitted to enter. In addition, aLL doors and personnel / equipment hatches into the reactor conteinment are Locked and alarmed. Keys, Locks, combinations and related equipment are changed on an annual basis. In addition, when an individual's access authorization has been terminated due to the lack of reliability,or trustworthiness, or for poor wo x performance, the keys, Locks, combinations and related equipment to which 'that person had access are changed.

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6.0 Detection Aids In satisfying the requirements of 10 CFR 73.55(e) the -

applicant has install'ed intrusion detection systems at the protected area barrier, at entrances to vital areas, and at aLL emergency exits. The applicant has exceeded the regulation by providing two separate and dissimilar perimeter intrusion detection systems at the protected area barrier. Alarms from the intrusion detection system a,qunciate within the continuously manned central alarm station and a secondary alarm station Located within the protected area. The central alarm station is located such that the interior of the station,is not visible from outside the perimeter of the protected area. In addition, the central-station is constr cted so that walls, floors, ceitings, and doora are bullet-resistant. The alarm stations are located and designed in such a manner so a single act cennot interdict the capability of calling for assistance or responding to alarms.

The central alarm station contain's no other functions or

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duties that would interfere with its alarm response function.

The intrusion detection system transmission Lines and associated alarm annunciation hardware are self-checking and

. tamper-indicating. Alarm annunciators indicate the type of 1 alarm and its location when activated. An automatic. indication of when the alarm system is on standby power is provided in the central alarm station.

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7.0 commun'ications As recuired in 10 CFR 73.55(f) the applicant has provided fo'r the capability of contin,uous communications betwee,n the central and secondary atarm station operators, guards, watchmen, and armed response personnel through the use of a co venticreat telephone system, and a security radio system.- In addition, direct communication with the local Law enforcement authorities is maintained through the use of a conventional telephone system and two way FM radio Links.

ALL non-portable communication Links, except the conventional telephone system, are provided with an uninterruptible emergency power sourts. .

8.0 Test and Maintenance Requirements -

In heeting the requirements of 10 CFR 73.55(g) the applicant has established a program for the testing and maintenance of aLL intrusion alarms, emergency alarms, communication equipment,-

physical ' barriers and other security related devices and equipment.

Equipment or devices that do not meet the design performance criteria or have failed to otherwise operate wilL be compensated for by appropriate compensatory measures as defined in the "WNP-3 Physical Security Plan" and in site-procedures.

' The compensatory measures defined in these plans will assure that the effectiveness of the security system is not reduced by failures or other conting7ncies affecting the 1 operation of the secu'rity related equipment or structures.

1 Intrusion detection systems are tested for proper performance  !

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at th beginning and end of any peri.od that they.are used for.

security.-

Such testing'wiLL be conducted at least once every seven days.

'C'o m mu'n i c a t'i o n' s y s t e m s for onsite communications ane tested at the beginning of each security shift. ,0ffsite communications are tested at least once each day.

Audits of the security program are conducted once every 12 months by personnel independent of site security management and supervision. The audits, focusing on the effectiveness of the physical protection provided by the onsite security organization implementing the approved security program plans,

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include, but are not limited to: a review of the security procedures and practices; system testing and maintenance programs; and local Law enforcement assistance agreements. A report is prepared documenting audit findings-and recommendations and is submitted to the Plant Management.

9.0 Response Requirements In meeting the requirements of 10 CFR 73.55(h) the applicant has provided for armed responders immediately available for respanse duties en alL shifts consistent with the requireme~nta of the r e gu l a t i or.s . Considerations used in support of this-number are attached (see Appendit). In addition, liaison with local Law enforcement authorities to provide additional response support in the event of security events has been established and documented.

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rh Th e a'pp li cant 's safeguards contingency plan for cealing with thefts, threats, and radiological sabotage events satisfies the requirements of 10 CFR Part 73, Appendix C.

The Plan identifies appropriate securi.ty events which couldrinitiate a radiological' sabotage e' vent and identifies the applicant's preplanning, response r'esources, safeguards contingency participants and coordination activities for each identified event. Through this plan, upon the detection of abnormal presence or activities within the protected or vital areas, response activities using the available resources would be initiated. The response activities and objectives include the neutrali,,zation of the existi.ng threat by requiring the response force members to interpose theessives between the -

adversary.and their objective, instructions to use force commensurate with that used by the adversary, and authority to request sufficient assistance from the local Law enforcement authorities to maintain control over the situation.

To assist in the assessment / response activities a closed circuit television system, providing the capability to observe the entire protected area perimeter, isolation tones and a majority'of the protected area, is provided to the security organization.

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_10. 0- Employe'e Screening Program In meeting the requirements of 10 CFR 73.55(a) to protect against the design basis threat as stated in 10 CFR.73.1 (a)(1)(ii),- the Washington Pub Lic Power Supply System h as provided an employee screening program. Personnel ~who successfulLy comple'te the employee screening program or its equ.ivalent may ,be granted unescorted access to protected and vital areas at the WNP-3 site. AlL other personnel requiring access to the site are escorted by persons authorized and trained for escort duties and who have successfulLy completed the employee screening ' program.

The employee screening program is based upon accepted industry standards and includes a background investigation, .

a psyciological evaluation, and a continuing observation program. In addition, the applicant may recognize the screening program of other nuclear utilities or contractors based upon,a comparability review. The plan also provides for a " grandfather clause" exclusion which atLows recognition of a certain period of trustworthy service with the utility or contractor, as being equivalent to the overaLL employee screening program. The staff has reviewed' the applicant 's .

screening program against the accepted industry standards (ANSI N18.17 1973) and has determined that the Was.hington Public Power Supply System's program is acceptable.

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'. l ENCLOSURE 3 50-508 '

SALP INPUT EVALUATION ,

WNP-3 ,.'.

Criteria , Category

1. Management Involvment and Control in Assuring Quality 1 Applicant has provided evidence of. prior planning and proper prioritization of safeguards matters. Safeguards issues are decided by plant management.

2. Approach to Resolution of Technical Issues from a Safety Standpoint 1 Applicant has demonstrated an understanding of safeguards issues. Approaches to safety / safeguards matters are sound, thorough and conservative.

3. Responsiveness to NRC Initiatives _. 1 Applicant provided technica11y sound responses in a timely manner.

4. Enforc~ement History N/A

5. Reporting and Analysis of Reportable Events N/A

6. Staffing (Including Management) 1 Positions are identified, authorities .and responsibilities are well defined.

7. Training and Qualification Effectiveness 1 The safeguards training and qualification plan and procedures 1

contribute ,to a well defined security program.

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