ML20209B823
| ML20209B823 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Fermi  |
| Issue date: | 01/30/1987 |
| From: | DETROIT EDISON CO. |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20209B774 | List: |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8702040133 | |
| Download: ML20209B823 (143) | |
Text
THE DETROIT EDISON COMPANY ENRICO FERMI - UNIT 2 HEAVY LOADS HANDLING REVIEW Control of Heavy Loads Over or in Close Proximity to Irradiated Fuel or Critical Safety System Components Revision A 1
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100/R92/1.0 081686
2.1.1 Report the results of your review of plant arrangements to iden-tify all overhead handling systems from which a load drop may result in damage to any system required for plant shutdown or decay heat removal (taking no credit for any interlocks, techni-cal specifications, operating procedures, or detailed structural analysis).
RESPONSE: See Table 2.1.1.
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2.1.1-1 100/R92/1.1
Table 2.1.1 OVERREAD HOISTS CAPABT.E OF HANDLINC LOADS OVER SPENT FUEL OR SHUTDOWN SAFETY SYSTEM COMPONENTS Hoist Identific ation Hoist N umber Type Capacity Location Reactor Bldg Crain Main Hoist T3100E002 (1) 125 Ton RB-5th F1.
Reactor Bldg Crane Aux. Hoist T3100E002 (1) 5 Ton RB-Sth F1.
HPCI Hoist T3100E030 (2) 15 Ton AB-1st F1. A
. RCIC Hoist T3100E031 (2) 15 Ton RB-1 st F1.
RHR Pumps-Div.I Basement Hoist T3100E024 (2) 16 Ton RB-Basement RRR Pumps-Div.II-Basement Hoist T3100F025 (2) 16 Ton RB-Ba sement RHR Pumps-Div.I 1st Floor Hoist T3100E026 (2) 16 Ton RB-1st F1.
RHR Pumps-Div.II let Floor Hoist T3100E027 (2 ) 16 Ton RB-1st F1.
N& S Rec ire . Pump Hoist s T3100E015A&l6A (2) 24 Tn/Ea RB-1st F1. A MG Se t s , N , C. & S Ho ist s T3100E035, 036 (2) 12 Tn/Ea RB-4th F1.
& 037 MG Set Fluid Drive N&S Hoist T3100E038&39 (2) 20 Tn/Ea RB-4th F1.
Core Spray Div. I Hoist T3100E028 (2) 16 Ton RB-I s t F1.
Core Spray Div. II Hoist T3100E029 (2 ) 16 Ton RB-1st F1.
Diesel Cen. Div. I N&S Hoist X3103E001 &E002 (2 ) 2 Tn/Ea RHR-Gr . F1.
Diesel Gen. Div. II N&S Hoist X3103E003&E004 (2) 2 Tn/Ea RRR-Gr . F1.
Diesel Gen. Motor Control A Cent. Div. I N&S Hoist s X3103E0054E006 (2) 4 Tn/Ea RHR-U p . F1.
Diesel Gen. Motor Control Cent. Div. II N&S Hoist s X3103E007&E008 (2) 4 Tn/Ea RNR-Up . F1.
Ventilation Ecuip. Rm. Hoist (2) 8 Ton AB-5th F1.
Refueling Platform Monorail Hoist F1500E006 (2) 1/2 Ton RB-Sth F1.
Refueling Platform Aux. Hoist F1500E005 (2) 1/2 Ton RB-5th F1.
Refueling Platform Main Hoist F1500E004 (2) 1 Ton RB-5th F1.
i
! Refueling Platform Hand Winch F1100E021 (2) 1 Ton RB-Sth F1.
New Fuel Transfer Hoist F1100E023 (2)1-1/2 Ton RB-Sth F1.
l Fuel Channeling Crane F1100E024 (3) 250 lb. RB-Sth F1.
Fuel Pool Jib Crane F1100E021 (4) 1 Ton RB-Sth F1.
NE Equipment Door Hoist T3100E043 (2) 12 Ton RB-1 st F1.
Portable Gantry Hoist T3100E044 (3) 16 Ton RB-St h F1.
Drywell Equipment Hatch Hoist T3100E015 (2) 20 Ton Dryvell A
CRD Jib Crane T3100E042 (4) 2 Ton RB-3rd F1.
CRD Underslung Bridge Cranes T3100E040 (1) 1 Ton RB-3 rd F1.
CRD Underslung Bridge Cranes T3100E041 (1) 2 Ton RB-3rd F1.
Equipment Hatch Cover Hoist F1000E028 (4) 5 Ton RB-5th F1.
(1) Overhead Traveling Crane RB-Reactor Building (2) Monorail Hoist AB-Auxiliary Building (3) Portable Floor Crane RHR-RHR Building (4) Jib Crane (5) Stationary Winch
- 100/R92/1.2 2.1.1-2
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2.1.2 Justify the exclusion of any overhead handling system from the above category by verifying that there is sufficient physical separation from any load-impact point and any safety-related component to permit a determination by inspection that no heavy load drop can result in damage to any system or component required for plant shutdown or decay heat removal.
RESPONSE: See Table 2.1.2.
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2.1.2-1 100/R92/1.3
Table 2.1.2 OVERHEAD HOISTS EXEMPT FROM FURTHER ANALYSIS BECAUSE THEY CANNOT HANDLE HEAVY LOADS OVER SPENT FUEL OR SHUTDOWN SAFETY SYSTEM COMPONENTS A. Hoists incapable of handling heavy loads over 2000 lbs.
Rated Hoist Hoist Capacity Location Fuel Channeling Crane 250 lbs. Reactor Bldg.-Sth F1.
A Refueling Platform Monorail Hoist 1000 lbs. Reactor Bldg.-Sth F1.
Refueling Platform Aux. Hoist 1000 lbs. Reactor Bldg.-Sth Fl.
Refueling Platform Main Hoist 2000 lbs. Reactor Bldg.-5th F1.
Refueling Platform Hand Winch 2000 lbs. Reactor Bldg.-Sth F1.
Fuel Pool Jib Crane 2000 lbs. Reactor Bldg.-5th Fl.
New Fuel Transfer Hoist 2000 lbs. Reactor Bldg.-5th F1.
Camma Scan Port Hoist 2000 lbs. Reactor Bldg.-4th F1.
B. Hoists incapable of handling loads over safety shutdown system components.
Floor Drain Sump Cover Hoist (2) 5 Ton /ea. Reactor Bldg-Sub A Base.
Equipment Drain Sump Cover 5 Ton /ea. Reactor Bldg-Sub Hoists (2) Base.
All cranes and hoists located in the following buildings that do not contain safety equipment needed for safe unit shutdown.
- Turbine Building
- Radwaste Building
- Office Service Building
- Auxiliary Boiler Building
- General Service Water Pump House
- Circulating Water Pump House
- Warehouse No. 19 2.1.2-2 100/R92/1.4
I l
2.1.3 With respect to the design and operation of heavy-load ha idling )
systems in the Reactor Building and those load handling systems identified in Table 2.1.1, above, provide your evaluation concerning compliance with the guidelines of NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.1. The following specific information should be included in your reply:
2.1.3.a Drawings or sketches sufficient to clearly identify the location of safe load paths, spent fuel, and safety-related equipment.
RESPONSE: The attached figures identify the location of load travel paths, spent fuel, and safe shutdown equipment in the RHR Building and Reactor Building. Figures 24 through 30 and 40A through 46D are A
plan views or sections of various elevations of the Reactor Building showing safe shutdown equipment and piping located on that elevation. The figures may be used in conjunction with detailed written procedures to define load travel paths for any future heavy loads that cannot be identified at this time for this report. As a general procedure, the handling of heavy loads over the Reactor Vessel or Fuel Pool is prohibited except for those specific heavy loads normally located in these areas.
Heavy loads will not be handled above the equipment hatch without appropriate analysis and approval. Figures 1 through 12 depict the load travel paths for heavy loads that are to be handled by the Reactor Building Crane above the fifth floor.
2.1.3-1 100/R92/1.5
Figure 1 shows the laydown location for major components during a reactor refueling. Figure 2 is a composite drawing showing the floor area exposed to all heavy loads handled during refueling, and movement of the Spent Fuel Cask prior to and after refueling.
Figures 3 through 11 show the load travel path for each heavy load lift performed during refueling. Figure 3 shows the load path for the movement of the reactor pressure vessel service platform and support tracks from their permanent storage location just north of the equipment hatch during normal operation to .
temporary placement just east of the stud tensioner. Figure 4 shows the. load paths for movements of the six Reactor Shield Plugs. After all of the Reactor Shield Plugs have been moved, the Reactor Pressure Vessel Service Platform is moved back to its new storage location and is pie,ced on top of the Shield Plugs that have also been moved into this location. Figure 5 depicts the load travel paths of the Storage Pool Slot Plugs to and from the southeast quadrant of the refueling floor. Figure 6 shows the load travel paths of the Fuel Pool Slot Plugs to and from the .
west side of the refueling floor, the equipment pool and fuel ^
i I pool gate travel paths within the pools, and the portable A radiation shielding chute travel path. After all of the removable plugs have been placed into their laydown location, the Head Strongback is then attached to the Reactor Building Crane Main Hoist and the Drywell Head. Figure 7 shows the Drywell head 2.1.3-2 100/R92/1.6
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Ioad travel path. The Reactor Pressure Vessel Insulation is then moved to stop the southwest reactor shield plus pile as defined tW in Figure 8.
I Figure 9 depicts the load travel path of the Stud Tensioner.
s -
After the nuts and washers are removed and the Stud Tensioner returned to its storage location, the Reactor Pressure Vessel Head Strongback is moved along its travel path from its permanent storage location to stop the Reactor Vessel as viewed in Figure
- 10. This same figure shows the load travel path of the Reactor Pressure Vessel Head.
Figure 11 depicts the load travel path of the Steam Dryer, Steam Separator and the Dryer / Separator lifting device, to and from the
- Storage Pool. Figure 12 identifies the heavy load travel path of the Spent Fuel Cask which is not handled during refueling.
f Figure 1 also identifies the hinged Equipment Hatch Cover which
- is moved from a horisontal closed position to a vertical open position using a floor mounted winch. Figures 20 through 23 show f the lodation and travel path of monorail hoists in the RRR l A Building to be used for servicing the Emergency Diesel Generator.
Figures 24 through 30 show the location of various other heavy loads, load travel paths, and Emergency Safety Features (ESF) j equipmenc located below the fifth floor of the Reactor Building.
l 2.1.3-3 loo /R92/1.7
I The systematic placement of heavy loads handled for refueling was determined by the refueling procedure sequence of events and the i
f travel limitations of the Reactor Building Crane, with consider-ation for safety system components located below the fueling floor.
Because of the high strength integrity of the fueling floor (fifth floor) due to its heavily reinforced, 24-inch thick construction, very little added strength is achieved along the building column lines. However, travel paths along these column lines have been established where it is practicable, to keep the travel and placement as simple as possible, so as not to confuse operators and supervisors. The established travel paths (shown in Figures 3 thru 12) are referenced in specific maintenance procedures developed prior to criticality with the exception of the procedure for the spent fuel cask which will be developed prior to handling after criticality. An initial step in the procedures will require the person responsible for performing the A lift to verify the safe load path is free of obstructions that would interfere with the movement of the load. Because of the high strength integrity of the fueling floor at all locations and l
the separation of redundant safety systems located below the l
fueling floor, deviations from the travel paths shown in Figure 3 through 12 do not notably increase the consequences of any l
l 2.1.3-4 100/R92/1.8
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potential accidents as long as these deviations do not traverse over the Reactor, Fuel Storage Pool and Equipment Hatch areas.
Therefore, the placement of painted travel path lines for all heavy loads of fers very little advantage and could cause confusion. However, painted barrier lines and signs will be established around the Reactor, Fuel Pool, and Equipment Hatch A areas. Additionally, painted travel paths will be provided for the five major loads handled over the 5th floor deck. These include the Reactor Shield Plugs, Reactor Vessel Head, Drywell tiead, Spent Fuel Cask and the Equipment Storage Pool Slot Plugs.
2.1.3-4a 100/R92/1.9
FIGURE DESCRIPTION 1 Reactor Building Fifth Floor Equipment Laydown Locations 2 Composite Drawing of Refueling Travel Paths 3 R.P.V. Service Platform and Support Tracks Travel Paths 4 Reactor Shielding Plugs Travel Path 5 Storage Pool Slot Plugs Travel Path 6 Fuel Pool Slot Plugs, Puel Fool Gates, Storage g Pool Gate and Portable Shielding Chute Travel Path 7 Dryvell Head Travel Paths 8 R.P.V. Insulation Travel Path 9 Stud Tensioner Travel Path i
10 R.P.V. Head and R.P.V. Head Strongback Travel Path 11 Steam Dryer, Steam Separator and Dryer / Separator Lifting Device Travel Paths A
12 Spent Fuel Cask 20 RHR Complex Grade Floor Heavy Load Paths 21 RHR Complex Upper Floor Heavy Load Paths 22 RHR Complex Hoist Location (Front View) 23 RER Complex Hoist Location (Side View) t l 24 Reactor Building Sub-basement ESF Equipment 25 Reactor Building Basement ESF Equipment 1 26 Reactor Building First Floor ESF Equipment 27 Reactor Building Second Floor ESF Equipment l 28 Reactor Building Third Floor ESF Equipment 29 Reactor Building Fourth Floor ESF Equipment 30 Reactor Building Transverse View Looking South-Holst Locations l
2.1.3-5 100/R92/1.10
t FIGURE (S) DESCRIPTION 40 A, 403, 40C, 40D Reactor Building Sub-basement Piping Drawings 41 A, 41B, 41C, 41D Reactor Building Basement Piping Diagrams 42 A, 42B, 42C, 42D Reactor Building First Floor Piping Diagrams 43 A, 43B, 43C, 43D Reactor Building Second Floor Piping Diagrams 3
44 A, 44B, 44C, 44D Reactor Building Third Floor Piping Diagrams 45 A, 45B, 45C, 45D Reactor Building Fourth Floor Piping Diagrams 46 A, 46B, 46C, 46D Reactor Building Fif th Floor Piping Diagrams 2.1.3-6 100/R92/1.11
2.1.3.b A discussion of measures taken to ensure that load-handling operations remain within safe load paths, including procedures, if any, for deviation from these paths.
RESPONSE: Prior to handling heavy loads over or near spent fuel or safe shutdown equipment, load paths shall be identified in specific maintenance procedures or in an attachment to the maintenance order / work package required to perform the particular maintenance task. Procedures which control the operation of plant hoists and lifting devices shall establish the guidelines required for the identification and approval of any heavy load paths not identi-fied in specific maintenance procedures. When heavy loads are being handled by the Reactor Building Overhead Crane, mobile or portable hoists, the load paths will be verified as free of A
obstructions prior to initial movement of the load.
( Additionally, an individual other than the crane operator will 1
monitor the movement of the load along the travel path. These requirements are included in the procedure for controlling l
l operation of the Reactor Building Crane (No. 32.000.07) and in the procedure which addresses requirements for operation of cranes, hoists and lifting devices (No. 12.000.84).
2.1.3-7 i
100/R92/1.12 l
l _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ . . . ___ __
When heavy loads are being handled by use of monorail hoists, the load path will be verified as being free of obstructions by the operator prior to initial movement of the load. This requirement is included in the procedure for the operation of monorail hoists (No. 32.000.08). Since the travel path associated with a monorail is fixed, additional effort is not required to monitor load travel for deviation from the specified path.
If the need should arise to deviate from a load path identified in a specific maintenance procedure, a procedural change will be required. Plant administrative procedure entitled " Procedure Preparation, Review, Approval, Change, Revision, Cancellation and Distribution" (No. 12.000.07) describes in detail the procedure revision process. Procedures which control the operation of plant hoists and lifting devices shall establish the process for deviation from any heavy load paths previously identified in an attachment to the maintenance order or work package.
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.I 2.1.3-7a 100/R92/1.13
4 2.1.3.c A tabulation of heavy loads to be handled by each crane which includes the load identification, load weight, its designated lifting device, and verification that handling of such load is governed by a written procedure containing, as a minimum, the information identified in NUREG-0612. Section 5.1.1(2).
RESPONSE: The attached Table 2.1.3.c provides a list of heavy loads that will be carried by each crane along with any designated lifting devices. In order to control future heavy loads to be handled over or near spent fuel or required safe shutdown equipment, the procedures governing the operation of the Reactor Building Crane, A Monorails, and Portable Hoists will recuire the guidelines of NUREG-0612 be invoked by either specific maintenance procedures or by attachment to maintenance orders / work packages prior to movement of heavy loads in these areas.
All but one of the twenty-six (26) procedures listed in Table 2.1.3.c , have been written and approved. ,
2.1.3-8 100/R92 /1.14
Table 2.1.3.c TABULATION OF 3EAVY LOADS OVERHEAD HOIST; REACTOR BUILDING CRANE MAIN HOIST AREA; REACTOR BUILDING FIFTH FLOOR LOAD LOAD WEIGHT LIFTING DEVICE WRITTEN PROCEDURE
- 1. Drywell Head 67 Tons Head Strongback Maintenance Proce-(T2301A001A) (F1300E009) dure No. 35.000.81
- 2. Reactor Shield 100 Tons /Ea 3 Slings Maintenance Proce-Plugs (6) (T31-00A/B3369) dure No. 35.000.80
- 3. Reactor Pressure 6 Tons 3 Slings Maintenance Proce-Vessel Service Plat- (T31-00C/03369) dure No. 35.000.74 form (F1300E010)
- 4. Vessel Head Insulation 11.5 Tons 4 Slings Maintenance Proce-with frame (B1151H001) (T31-00F3369) dure No. 35.000.121 5 Reactor Pressure 89 Tons Head Strongback Maintenance Proce-l Vessel Head (F1300E009) dure No. 35.000.83) .
- 6. Reactor Pressure 5 Tons Connects directly thintenance Proce-Vessel Head to Main Hoist dure No. 35.000.83 Strongback Hook (F1300E009) l .
- 7. Storage Pool Slot 41.5 Tons /Ea 2 Slings Maintenance Proce- f" Plugs (4) (T31-00P3369) dure No. 35.000.115 6
- 8. Fuel Fool Slot Plugs 9 Tons /Ea 2 Slings Maintenance Proce-(4) (T31-00P3369) dure No. 35.000.113
- 9. Stud Tensioner 3 Tons Connects directly Maintenance Proce-(F13--E007) to Main Hoist dure No. 35.000.82 Hook j
- 10. Steam Dryer 42 Tons Dryer / Separator Maintenance Proce-l dure No. 35.000.84 (B1107D041) lifting device (F1300E008)
- 11. Steam Separator 73 Tons Dryer / Separator Maintenance Proce-(B1112D002) lifting device dure No. 35.000.85 (F1300E008)
- 12. Storage Pool Gate 14 Tons 2 Slings Maintenance Proce-l (T31-00H3369) dure No. 35.000.116 l
- 13. Fuel Fool Gates 4.3 Tons & 2 Slings Maintenance Proce-(A & B) 2.5 Tons (T31-00K3369) dure No. 35.000.89 2.1.3-9 100/R92/1.15 i
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Table 2.1.3.c cont'd)
LOAD LOAD WEIGHT LIFTING DEVICE WRITTEN PROCEDURE
- 14. Crane load Block 5 To,ns None
- 15. Spent Fuel Cask 100 Tons Redendant Cask Maintenance Proce-(F1600E001) Slings dure No. 35.000.130
- 16. Concrete Floor 5 Tons 4-Leg Sling Maintenance Proce-i Hatch Plug (E 1/2-10 dure No. 35.000.133 column location)
- 17. RWCU Demin Floor 14 Tons 4-Leg Sling Maintenance Proce-Plug dure No. 35.000.132
- 18. Equipment Hatch Cover 7 Tons 2 Slings Maintenance Proce-dure No. 35.000.117 Maintenance Proce-
^
- 19. Debris Shipping Cask * +
dure No. 35.000,131 (Not Issued)
- 20. Fuel Storage Racks * + Maintenance Proce-dure No. 35.000.134
- 21. Portable Shielding 14 Tons 4 Slings Maintenance Proce-Chute (T2502D001) (T31-00T/W3369) dure No. 35.000.87 1
- 22. Dryer / Separator 2.4 Tons Attaches directly Maintenance Proce-Sling (F1300E008) to Main Hook dure No. 35.000.84 and 85
- 23. Source Cask 7.6 Tons 2 Slings Maintenance Proce-dure No. 82.000.08 TABULATION OF HEAVY LOADS OVERHEAD HOIST: REACTOR BUILDING AUXILIARY HOIST (5 TON)
AREA: REACTOR BUILDING FIFTH FLOOR LOAD LOAD WEIGHT LIFTING DEVICE WRITTEN PROCEDURE
- 1. Maintenance Tools 5 Ton * ,+ Maintenance Proce-dure No. 32.000.07
- 2. Lifting Fixtures 5 Ton *,+ Maintenance Proce-dure No. 32.000.07
- 3. New Fuel Vault Plugs 2-1/2 Ton 4-Leg Sling, + Maintenance Proce-dure No. 35.000.118
- To Be Determined Later
+ Not Yet Purchased 2.1.3-10 100/R92/1.16
Table 2.1.3.c (Cont'd)
TABULATION OF HEAVY LOADS OVERHEAD HOIST: NORTH, CENTER AND SOUTH MOTOR GENERATOR SET H01STS (3 12-TON EACH)
AREA: REACTOR BUILDING FOURTH FLOOR LOAD LIFTING WRITTEN LOAD WEIGHT DEVICE PROCEDURE
- 1. North and South Motor 11 Ton *,+ Maintenance Procedure Generator Set Generator No. 35.000.41 (Without Rotors)
B31035001A,B
- 2. North and South Motor 8 Ton *,+ Neintenance Procedure Generator Set Generator No. 35.000.41 Rotors 3 North and South Motor 11 Ton *,+ Nbintenance Procedure Generator Set Motors No. 35.000.41 (Without Rotors)
B31035001A,B
- 4. North and South Motor 8 Ton *,+ Maintenance Procedure Generator Set Motor No. 35.000.41 Rotors OVERHEAD HOIST: NORTH AND SOUTH MOTOR GENERATOR SET FLUID DRIVE HOISTS (2 20-TON EACH) A AREA: REACTOR BUILDING FOURTH FLOOR LOAD LIFTING WRITTEN LOAD WEIGHT DEVICE PROCEDURE North and South Motor
- Ton *,+ Nhintenance Procedure Generator Set Fluid No. 32.000.08 l Drives l B31035001A,B l
l OVERHEAD HOIST: CONTROL ROD DRIVE REPAIR HOIST (3-TON)
AREA: REACTOR BUILDING THIRD FLOOR LOAD LIFTING WRITTEN LOAD WEIGHT DEVICE PROCEDURE CRD Transfer Cask 2 Ton *,+ Maintenance Procedure (C1102E001) No. 35.000.29
- To Be Determined Later
+ Not Yet Purchased 2.1.3-11 100/R92/1.17
Tcbio 2.1.3.c (Cont'd)
TABULATION OF HEAVY LOADS A
OVERHEAD HOIST: RCIC HOIST (15-TON)
AREA: REktTOR BUILDING FIRST FLOOR LOAD LIFTING WRITTEN LOAD WEIGHT DEVICE PROCEDURE
- 1. RCIC First Floor Hatch 9 Ton *,+ Maintenance Procedure No. 32.000.08
- 2. RCIC Basement Floor 9 Ton * ,+ Maintenance Procedure Hatch No. 32.000.08
- 3. RCIC Pump (E5101C001) Ton *,+ Maintenance Procedure No. 32.000.08
- 4. RCIC Turbine Ton *,+ Maintenance Procedure -
(E5101C002) No. 32.000.08
. OVERHEAD HOIST: HPCI HOIST (15-TON)
AREA: REACTOR BUILDING FIRST FLOOR LOAD LIFTING WRITTEN LOAD WEICHT DEVICE PROCEDURE .
- 1. HPCI Floor Shield 15 Ton *,+ Maintenance Procedure Plugs (3) No. 32.000.00
- 2. HPCI Pump (E4101C001) Ton *,+ Maintenance Procedure No. 32.000.08
- 3. E7CI Turbine Ton * ,+ Maintenance Procedure l (E4101C2) No. 32.000.08
- To Be Determined Later
+ Not Yet Purchased ,
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l l 2.1.3-12 l 100/R92/1.18 l
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Table 2.1.3.c (Cont'd)
TABULATION OF HEAVY LOADS OVERHEAD HOIST: RECIRCULATION PUMP CEARED HOISTS (3-24-TON)
AREA: REACTOR BUILDING FIRST FLOOR A
LOAD LIFIING WRITTEN LOAD WEIGHT DEVICE PROCEDURE
- 1. Recirculation Motor 20 Ton /Ea * ,+ Maintenance Procedure (2) (B3101C001A,B) No. 32.000.08
- 2. Recirculation Drive 4 Ton /Ea *,+ Maintenance Procedure Mounts (2) No. 32.000.08
- 3. , Recirculation Pump 2.5 Ton /Ea *,+ Maintenance Procedure Covers (2) No. 32.000.08
- 4. Rotating Pump 1.5 Ton /Ea *,+ Maintenance Procedure Assembly (2) No. 32.000.08 (B3101C001A,B)
OVERHEAD HOIST: RHR DIVISION 1 AND DIVISION 2 BASEMENT HOISIS (2 16-TON)
AREA: REACTOR BUILDING BASEMEhT LOAD LIFTING WRITTEN LOAD WEIGHT DEVICE PROCEDURE
- 1. North and South Floor 7 Ton *,+ Maintenance Procedure Hatch No. 32.000.08
- 2. Division 1 and 2 RER 2 Ton *,+ Maintenance Procedure Pumps (4) (E1102C002A-D) No. 32.000.08
- 3. Division 1 and 2 RHR 2 Ton *,+ Maintenance Procedure Motors (4) (E1102C001A-D) No. 32.000.08 OVERHEAD HOIST: RHR DIVISION 1 AND DIVISION 2 AREA: FIRST FLOOR HOIST (2 16-TON)
LOAD LIFTING WRITTEN LOAD WEIGHT DEVICE PROCEDURE
- 1. North and South Floor 8 Ton *,+ Maintenance Procedure Hatch No. 32.000.08
- 2. Division 1 and 2 RHR 2 Ton *,+ Maintenance Procedure Pumps (4) (E1102C002A-D) No. 32.000.08
- 3. Division 1 and 2 RHR 2 Ton *,+ Maintenance Procedure Motors (4) (E1102C001A-D) No. 32.000.08
- To Be Determined Later
+ Not Yet Purchased 2.1.3-13 100/R92/1.19
Table 2.1.3.c (Cont'd)
TABULATION OF HEAVY LOADS I LOAD LIFTING WRITTEN IAAD WEIGHT DEVICE PROCEDURE OVERHEAD HOIST: CORE SPRAY DIVISION 1 AND 2 HOISTS (2 16-TON)
AREA: REACTOR BUILDING FIRST FLOOR 1.' Core Spray First 8 1/2 Ton *,+ Maintenance Procedure Floor Hatch (2) No. 32.000.08
- 2. Core Spray Basement 8 1/2 Ton *,+ Maintenance Procedure Floor Hatch (2) No. 32.000.08 .
- 3. Core Spray Pump Ton *,+ Maintenance Procedure j Motors (4) No. 32.000.08 E2101C00A-D OVERHEAD HOIST: NE EQUIPMENT DOOR HOIST (12 TON)
AREA: REACTOR BUILDING FIRST FLOOR NE Equipment Door 11.3 Ton
- Maintenance Procedure No. 35.000.11 A T2301A001B OVERHEAD HOIST: DIESEL GENERATOR MOTOR CONTROL CENTER j DIVISION 1 and 2 (4 4-TON)
AREA: RHR BUILDING UPPER FLOOR
- * *,+ Nhintenance Procedure No. 32.000.08 l
OVERHEAD HOIST: DIESEL GENERATOR NORTH AND SOUTH DIVISION 1 AND 2 HOISTS ( 4 2-TON) l AREA: RHR BUILDING GRADE FLOOR Diesel Generator * *,+ Maintenance Procedure Components (i.e., No. 32.000.08 cylinders, cylinder liners)
OVERHEAD HOIST: VENTILATION EQUIPMENT HOIST (8-TON)
AREA: AUXILIARY BUILDING
- * *+, Maintenance Procedure No. 32.000.08
- To Be Determined Later
+ Not Yet Purchased 2.1.3-14 100/R92/1.20
2.1.3.d Verification that lifting devices identified in 2.1.3.c, above, A comply with the requirements of ANSI N14.6-1978, or ANSI B30.9-1971 as appropriate. For lifting devices where these standards, as supplemented by NUREG 0612, Section 5.1.1(4) or 5.1.1(5), are not met, describe any proposed alternatives and demanstrate their equivalency in terms of load-handling reliability.
RESPONSE: To date, there are only two special lifting devices provided for the handling of heavy loads that would fall within the guidelines of ANSI N14.6-1978, as defined in NUREG-0612. These are the RPV Head Strongback, and the Dryer / Separator lifting device. A design review by General Electric finds that the RPV Read Strongback and Dryer / Separator lifting device meet the design
.i .
- strength criteria of Section 3.2 of ANSI N14.6-1978, taking into I
secount the combined static and dynamic load forces. However, A
- certain components in these lifting devices do not meet the additional strength criteria of Section 6.2 for single failure proof systems. Based upon General Electric's Design Review, modifications have been made to upgrade the RPV Bead Strongback and Dryer / Separator Lifting Device to meet the Section 6.2 strength criteria. These modifications were completed in October 1985 prior to the use of these devices after initial criticality.
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2.1.3-15 100/R92/1.21 1
- - - . - ~ _ _ , . - - . . . , . _ , . - _ . . - . . . ,-. - - - . _ _ - _ - , . _ _ . . - . . . _ . - - - - - . , _ . - _ - , . _ , , _ . , _ , , - - . . . . , - . . -
The Spent Fuel Cask handling system will satisfy single-failure proof criteria and is addressed in detail in the Enrico A j
Fermi FSAR, Section 9.1.4.2.1.
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2.1.3-15s 100/R92/1.22
All other special lif ting devices and slings will be purchased to ensure that the strength requirements of ANSI N14.6-1978 or ANSI A
B30.9-1971 are satisfied. Existing slings used for construction will not be used for handling of heavy loads around critical equipment af ter the plant is operational unless verified by tests and inspection to meet the requirements of ANSI B30.9-1971. A The requirements of the stress design factor will include the maximum static and dynamic loads as defined by NUREG-0612. Any single-failure proof handlir.g systems will also meet the require-ments of NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.6.
All slings that fall within the concerns of NUREG-0612 will be clearly marked per standard industry practice to identify their qualification for that application.
2.1.3.e Verification that ANSI B30.2-1976, Chapter 2-2, has been involved with respect to crane inspection, testing, and maintenance.
Where any exception is taken to this standard, sufficient information should be provided to demonstrate the equivalency of proposed alternatives.
RESPONSE: For the Reactor Building Crane, Main and Auxiliary Hoists, crane inspection, testing, and Maintenance Procedures will comply with g the guidelines in ANSI B30.2-1976, Chapter 2.2. Should any devi-ations from this standard be required, they will be equivalent to i
i 2.1.3-16 100/R92/1.23
the requirements of ANSI B30.2-1976. The requirements of this A
standard are incorporated into the Reactor Building Crane General Maintenance Procedures Nos. 35.000.120 and 37.000.13..'
For all other overhead hoists listed in Table 2.1.1, inspection, testing, and maintenance procedures will comply with ANSI A
B30.16-1981, Chapter 16-2.
2.1.3.f Verification that crane design complies with the guidelines of CMAA Specification 70 and Chapters 2-1 of ANSI B30.2-1976, including the demonstration of equivalency of actual design requirements for instances where specific compliance with these standards is not provided.
RESPONSE: The reactor building main crane is the only single-failure proof crane at the plant site. The Enrico Fermi 2 Atomic Power Station FSAR, Section 9.1.4.2.1, describes the single failure proof design features incorporated in the 125 ton crane.
The Fermi 2 Reactor Building Crane was designed under the EOCI
- 61 " Specifications for Electric Traveling Cranes".
However, additional, upgraded criteria included in the later CMAA
- 70-1976 specification was already a part of the manufacturer's design practices. The following identifies these criteria and 2.1.3-17 100/R92/1.24
provides the results of Edison's analysis verifying the Fermi 2 crane's conformance with this criteria.
For all other overhead hoists listed in Table 2.1.1, CMAA #70 and ANSI B30.2 are not the applicable standards for these hoists.
ANSI B30.16- 1973 is the applicable standard. The recirculating pump hoists design does conform to this standard. The remaining hoists, which are not yet purchased, will be specified to conform A to ANSI B30.16.
These hoists and any other future cranes or hoists that fall within the concerns of NUREG-0612 will meet the applicable design guidelines of Section 5.1.1 of NUREG-0612 or ANSI B30.16; and have been or will be subjected to the evaluation criteria of NUREG 0612 - Section 5.1 for non-single failure proof load i handling applications.
, There are no heavy load handling applications other than those
- that can be handled by the Reactor Building Main Hoist that i
l require handling within sirgle failure proof guidelines.
l However, if future single f ai' tre proof requirements should arise that cannot be handled by the Main Holst, the future upgrading of existing hoists or procurement of new hoists will be in conformance with NUREG 0554 guidelines.
2.1.3-18 100/R92/1.25
ANALYSIS CF THE FERMI 2 REACTOR BUILDING CRANE AGAINST THE UPGRADED AND ADDITIONAL CRITERIA OF CMAA #70-1976 CMAA No. 70 Article No. Criteria 1.71 Design stress shall not exceed 20% of the published average ultimate strength of the material.
Review Results: For ASTM, A-36 Material, the published ultimate strength is: Max. Su = 80 kai Min. Su = 58 kei A Avg. Su = 69 kai Maximum allowable design stress for Fermi 2 =13.8 kai 13.8/69 = 0.2
Conclusion:
Meets CHAA No. 70 criterion.
3.1 5 3.2 Welding design and procedures shall conform to AWS D14.1 and material shall conform to ASTM A36.
Review Results: Girder and trolly materials are ASTM-A36. End truck material is ASTM-AS44. Welding is in accordance '
with AWS D1.1 and AWS D14.1.
Conclusion:
Meets CMAA No. 70 criterion.
3.3.2.1.1.3 Impact allowance minimum is 15% of rated capacity for hoist speeds up to 30 FPM.
Review Results: Main hoist speed - 4 FPM Aux. hoist speed - 20 FPM Impact allowance used for crane design is 15%
Conclusion:
Meets CMAA No. 70 criterion.
3.3.2.1.3.2 Twisting moments due to overhanging loads and lateral forces and .3 acting eccentric to the horizontal neutral axis of a girder are to be calculated based on the distance between the load c of g and the girder section shear center (not girder e of g).
Review Results: Reactor Bid. crane girders are box beams whose symmetry places the girder section shear center at the girder c of g.
Conclusion:
Computations per EOCI No. 61 criterion also meets CHAA No. 70 criterion.
2.1.3-18A 100/R92/1.26
ANALYSIS OF THE FERMI 2 REACTOR BUILDING CRANE AGAINST THE UPGRADED AND ADDITIONAL CRITERIA OF CMAA #70-1976 (Cont'd)
CMAA No. 70 Article No. Criteria 3.3.2.2 Bending stresses are to address wind allowances for outdoor cranes.
Review Results: Reactor Building crane is located indoors.
Conclusion:
This CNAA No. 70 criterion does not apply.
3.3.3.1.2.1 Longitudinal stiffener is to be located 0.4 times the distance from the compression flange inner surface to the neutral axis.
Review Results: a. Comparison of bridge beam
- proportions against the allowable limits in Article No. 3.3.3.1.1.
. L, SPAN = 1365"
- b, distance between web plates = 44" c, top cover plate thickness = 1 1/2" l fe, maximum compressive stress = 11.47 kai ft, maximum tensile stress = 11.6 kai -
h, web depth = 92" k = ft/fc =1.011 l t = web thickness = 3/8" Allowable Limit L/h = 14.8 <25 max.
L/b = 31 (60 max.
b/c = 29 <60 max.
? h/t = 245 <376 max. or <403 max *
(for one ) 117.6
- h/t max. (stiffener) = 16'2(1.011+1)k11.47=403 l
b Comparison of the stiffener location against specified criteria in Article No. 3.3.3.1.2.1.
d = actual distance from compression flange to stiffener.
Sc = specified criterion for distance from the compression flange to stiffener.
Se =0.4 [(h/2)-0.4(46)] = 18.4" (40%) A d = 23 3/16" (50%) (Upper quarter point) 2.1.3-18B 100/R92/1.27
ANALYSIS OF THE FERMI 2 REACTOR BUILDING CRAhT AGAINST THE UPGRADED AND ADDITIONAL CRITERIA 0F CMAA #70-1976 (Cont'd)
CMAA No. 70 Article No. Criteria 3.3.3.1.2.1 (Cont'd) (Similar stiffeners are also located at the centerline and lower quarter point)
Existing stiffener placement was done to satisfy the tornado loading case which rules the web buckling design. Optimum locations for stiffeners for this case is at the quarter points.
For operational load cases, stress levels are low enough that the reduction of web stiffness associated with a stiffener location at the web quarter point will not reduce the factor of safety against buckling below 2.1
- c. Comparison of the stiffener I against minimum Io in Article No. 3.3.3.1.2.1.
a = 60 A, for 3" x 2 1/2" x 3/8", angle section = 1.92".2
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(60) (60) (1.92)(60 )f Io =1.2 ,,0.4+0.6(92)+0.9(92)+8(924) (3/8)j92 (3/8)3 ,
I o=8.52_
I= [2.5(3)3-(2.5- 3/8) (3-3/8)3 ) t 3 I I-9.68>8.52 minimum criterion i d. Comparison of stiffener width /thicknes ratio against minimum criterion in Article No. 3.3.3.1.2.3.
Stiffener #8/ts= 3 3/8 = 8 < 12 max.
criterion
Conclusion:
Cirder and girder stiffener proprotions are well within CMAA No. 70 acceptance criteria. Even with the stiffeners located below the optimum location (40%), adequate protection against buckling, within the intent of CMAA No. 70 is achieved.
2.1.3-18C 100/R92/1.28
7 ANALYSIS OF THE FERMI 2 REACTOR BUILDING CRANE AGAINST THE UPGRADED AND ADDITIONAL CRITERIA 0F CMAA #70-1976 (Cont'd)
CMAA No. 70 Article No. Criteria 3.3.3.1.3. For b/c ratios between 38 and 52, sirder allowable compres-sive stress values are less than the criteria in EOCI -
No. 61.
Review Results: Girderb/c=44/1.5=29<38 Therefore, allowable f e=17.6 kei maximum. Actual allowable feused for Reactor Bldg. crane is 13.8 kai and highest fe at rated load is 11.47 kel.
Conclusion:
11.47 <13.8 <17.6 kei meets CMAA No. 70 .
criterion.
Frovides allowable fatigue stress criteria for repeated loads exceeding 20,000 loading cycles.
Review Results: Appendix E, Ites 020.4 of the Fermi 2 FSAR - Amendment 1 provides a full analysis that shows compliance with the ,
criteria in Table 3.3.3.1.3-1.
Conclusion:
CHAA No. 70 fatigue criteria has been satisfied.
3.3.3.1.5.5 Diaphragm plate thickness sufficient to keep the trolley wheel load bearing stress within 26.4 kei.
Review Results: Bearing stress = (LL+DL+I) t (wr +2hr )tr i
Live load = 125 ton (rated)
Dead load = 210 ton Impset = .15 (125) = 18.8t n = No. of wheels = 4 We = 175 i Rail Width = 6" hr = 175 rail height + c = 7 1/2" c = 1 1/2" Bearing stress = 2000 (125+210+18.8) = 22.5 kai < 26.4 kai (max limit) 4(6+15) 3/8
Conclusion:
Meets CMAA No. 70 criterion.
' 2.1.3-18D 100/R92/1.29
ANALYSIS OF THE FERMI 2 REACTOR BUILDING CRANE AGAINST THE UPGRADED AND ADDITIONAL CRITERIA OF CMAA #70-1976
- (Cont'd)
CMAA No. 70 Article No. Criteria -
3.4.3 and .7 Allowable vertial stresses without impact shall be 14.4 kai tension or compression.
Review Results: EOCI No. 61 specifies allowable stresses no greater than 20% of the ultimate strength (A-36: 13.8ksi). This requires greater conservatism. The Fermi 2 crane allowable stresses are only 13.8 ksi.
Actual maximum design stresses including impact loading (15%) are below 13.8 kei.
Conclusion:
Allowable design stresses and actual
- stresses are within CMAA No. 70 criteria.
4 . 4.2.1 ~ Rated capacity'loso plus the bottom block weight divided by the number of parts of rope must not exceed 20% of the published rope breaking strength.
A. Main Holst
- Review Results: Hoist rated capacity = 125 ton Maximum hoist loading (fuel cask)=100 ton Bottom block weight = 5 ton Cable published breaking strength (6x41 strand, 1 1/4" cable (J&L) = 76.1 ton Number of cable parts per:
o Redundant system = 8
' . o Total = 16 l
- This is the heaviest loading that the crane will handle utilizing redundant support that meets single failure criteria.
- 1. % cable loading at full rated capacity without redundancy
= 100 (125 + 5) 76.1 = 10.6%
( 16 )*
- 2. % cable loading at maximum loading assuming cable failure (load is still supported by remaining redundant cable)
% = 100 (100 + 5) , 76.1 = 17.2%
8 2.1.3-18E 100/R92/1.30
ANALYSIS OF THE FERMI 2 REACTOR BUILDING CRANE AGAINST THE UPGRADED AND ADDITIONAL CRITERIA OF CMAA #70-1976 (Cont'd)
CHAA No. 70 Article No. Criteria 4.2.1 (cont'd) 3 Maximum permissable load allowed to reach 20% loading upon one cable support system. (Meets single failure criteria) MPL=76.1 ( 20) (8) - 5 = 116.8 ton (100)
Conclusion:
CMAA No. 70 criteria has been satisfied.
However, credit for compliance under single failure proof criteria requires loads to be limited to 116.8 ton.
Maximum load to be handled is 100 ton; therefore, CMAA No. 70 criteria vill also be met for redundant single failure proof handling.
B. Auxiliary Hoist Review Results: Hoist rated capacity = 10,000#
Bottom block weight = 500#
Cable published breaking strength (6 x 37 IWRC c/r stainless steel 1/2") = 20,400f Number of cable parts = 4 (10,000 + 500)
% cable loading =100 ( 4 ) 20,400 = 12.9%
Conclusion:
CMAA No. 70 criteria has been met.
4.4.1 The drum shall be designed to withstand combined crushing and bending loads.
Review Results: The simultaneous application of crushing and bending load is a normal consider-ation in the manufacturer's design practices.
Conclusion:
The main and auxiliary hoist drums are designed to withstand these combined loads and are in compliance with CMAA No. 70.
2 1.3-18F 100/R92/1.31
ANALYSIS OF THE FERMI 2 REACTOR BUILDING CRANE AGAINST THE UFCRADED AND ADDITIONAL CRITERIA 0F CMAA #70-1976 (Cont'd)
CMAA No. 70 Article No. Criteria 4.4.3 Minimum drum groove depth is 3/8 x rope diameter.
i Minimum drum groove pitch is 1.14 + rope diameter or rope diameter + 1/8", whichever is less
! Review Results: Rope diameter, main hoist = 1 1/4",
aux. hoist = 1/2" Drum grove depth, main hoist = 0.5" aux hoist = 0.1875" Main Holst Aux Holst Actual Depth 0. 5> .469 (min. limit) 0.1875" = (Min.11a)
Acutal Fitch 2.75>1.375 (Min. limit) .625 >.57 (Min. lia) l -
Conclusion:
CMAA No. 70 criteria has been satisfied.
I 4.5.2 Borsepower rating of gearbox gearing shall be based upon AGMA standards.
Conclusions:
The gearboxes are designed in accordance I to AGMA standards. ,
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! 4.7.2.2 CMAA-70 requires greater torque ratings for bridge motion only for configurations having the control cab located on the trolley.
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Review Results: The controls cab is located on the bridge not on the trolly.
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Conclusion:
This CMAA No. 70 criterion does not apply.
4.7.4.2 Hoist motion, holding brakes must meet minimum specified '
torque requirements.
Review Results: Main auxiliary hoist brakes are rated at 105% of the full torque rating of the hoist motors.
Conclusion:
CMAA No. 70 minimum requirements have been met.
2.1.3-18G 100/R92/1.32
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ANALYSIS OF THE FERMI 2 REACTOR BUILDING CRANE AGAINST THE UPGRADED AND ADDITIONAL CRITERIA OF CMAA #70-1976 (Cont'd)
CHAA No. 70 Article No. Criteria j 4.12 Bridge and trolly bumpers shall be rigidly mounted and capable of stopping the crane within specified deceleration limits.
Review Results: Bridge and trolly bumpers are spring loading stops welded in place.
- 1. Bridge stop spring deflection required to stop hoist from 40%
rated speed is 1.56".
Maximum bumper spring deflection is 2.25">1.56" Spring deflection to stop hoist from 20%
rated speed (d) = 1.56 .j!_ = 0.78" 4
v=0.2 (vrated)=0.2(55)/60=0.18 ft./sec.
a=12v2 = 12 (0.18)2 ? 2(0.78) = 0.25 ft/sec2 ,
This is below the 3 f t/see max. lim.
- 2. Trolly stop spring energy (E) is 49 ft-lbs.
Trolly speed is 10 f t/ min.
i Spring = (2Et) 12=(49) (2) (12)=0.59" Deflection (C,) 2000 l
Deceleration = 12 (102 ) t 2(0.59)=0.28ft/sec2 <3 ft/,,e2
! 632 max. lim.
Conclusion:
Bridge and trolly, spring loaded bumpers are sized adequately to meet CMAA No. 70 criteria.
l 5.4.6 Provides criteria that addresses static control.
l Both the main and auxiliary hoist, Review Results:
trolly and bridge drives feature A.C.
static stepless control. This control includes the features and meets the criteria addressed within this article.
Conclusion:
CMAA No. 70 criteria is satisfied.
2.1.3-18H 100/R92/1.33
ANALYSIS OF THE FERMI 2 REACTOR BUILDING CRANE AGAINST THE UPGRADED AND ADDITIONAL CRITERIA 0F CMAA #70-1976 (Cont'd) -,
CMAA No. 70 Article No. Criteria ,
5.6.2 Provides for protection to prevent motors from restarting upon restoration from a power loss until control handles are brought to the "of f" position.
Review Results: Controllers for each motor are ,
Barnischfeger type Sir Induction Mkster ~< , ,
Controllers that feature a spring return 2 ,,
control lever.
I
Conclusion:
CMAA No. 70 criteria is satisfied. ,
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1 2 1.3-18I 100/R92/1.34
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q 2.1.33, Exceptions, if any, taken to ANSI B30.2-1976 with respect to operator training, qualification, and conduct.
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RESPONSE: Operator training, qualification, and conduct will be in compli-a ance,with the requirements of' ANSI B30.2-1976 for operation of
, overhead traveling cranes. Operators of various types of cranes are trained and qualified to the appropriate standard for the specific r.ype of equipment to be used. Records of personnel A
training and qualification will be retained. This training
.' N m program is administered by the Nuclear Operations Training Group.
'The training program was implemented prior to fuel load and those individualb operating cranes are qualified prior to involvement with any post-criticality heavy load handling event.
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<, 2.1.3-19 l
L 100/R92/1.35 l
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2.2.1 Identify by name, type, capacity, and equipment designator, any cranes physically capable (i.e., ignoring interlocks, movable mechanical stops, or operating procedures) of carrying loads over spent fuel in the storage pool or in the reactor vessel.
RESPONSE: See Table 2.2.1 l
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2 2.1-1 100/R92/1.36 i
TABLE 2.2.1 HOISTS OPERATING OVER SPENT FUEL OR THE REACTOR VESSEL Hoist Rated Number Holst Type Capacity T3100E002 Reactor Bldg. Crane Traveling Overhead 125 Ton Main Hoist Aux. Hoist Hoists 5 Ton
- F1500E004 Refueling Platform Traveling Overhead 2000 lbs.
Main Hoist F1500E005 Refueling Platform Hoists 1000 lbs.
Aux Holst F1500E006 Refueling Platforms Traveling Monorail 1000 lbs.
Monorail Hoist Hoists Refueling Platform Hand vinch Fixed Manual Winch 2000 lbs.
F1100E020 Channel Handling Boom Boom Trolley Hoist 200 lbs.
F1100E021 Fuel Pool Jib Crane Boom Hoist 2000 lbs.
F1100E023 New Fuel Transfer Hoist Traveling Boom Hoist 2000 lbs.
F1160E024 Fuel Channeling Crane Portable Floor Crane 250 lbs. E-
- Restricted to 2000 lbs. when traveling over the spent fuel pool and A open reactor, i
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2.2.1-2 100/R92/1.37
2.2.2 Justify the exclusion of any cranes in this area from the above category by verifying that they are incapable of carrying heavy loads or are permanently prevented from movement of heavy loads over stored fuel or into any location where, following any failure, such load may drop into the reactor vessel or spent fuel storage pool.
RESPONSE: See Table 2.2.2
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2.2.2-1 100/R92/1.38
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s Table 2.2.2 OVERHEAD HOISTS EXEMPT FROM FURTHER ANALYSIS BECAUSE THEY CANNOT HANDLE HEAVY LOADS OVER SPENT FUEL OR SHUTDOWN SAFETY SYSTEM COMPONENTS A. Hoists incapable of handling heavy loads over 2000 lbs.
Rated Hoist Hoist Capacity Location Refueling Platform Monorail Hoist 1000 lbs. Reactor Bldg.-5th F1.
Refueling Platform Aux. Hoist 1000 lbs. Reactor Bldg.-Sth F1.
Refueling Platform Main Hoist 2000 lbs. Reactor Bldg.-5th Fl.
Refueling Platfor= Hand Winch 2000 lbs. Reactor Bldg.-5th Fl.
Fuel Pool Jib Crane 2000 lbs. Reactor Bldg.-5th F1.
Channel Handling Boom Hoist 200 lbs. Reactor Bldg.-5rd Fl.
New Fuel Transfer Hoist 2000 lbs. Reactor Bldg.-5th F1.
Fuel Channeling Crane 250 lbs. Reactor Bldg.-5th F1.
Camma Scan Port Hoist 2000 lbs. Reactor Bldg.-4th F1. ;,
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I 2.2.2-2 j 100/R92/1.39
2.2.3 Identify any cranes listed in 2.2.1, above, which you have eval-usted as having sufficient design features to make the likelihood of a load drop extremely small for all loads to be carried and y the basis for this evaluation (i.e., complete complia'nce with NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.6, or partial compliance supplemented by suitable alternative or additional design features). For each crane so evaluated, provide the load-handling system (i.e.,
crane-load combination) information specified in Attachment 1.
RESPONSE: The reactor building main crane is the only single-failure proof crane at the plant site. The narrative contained in the Enrico Fermi 2 Atomic Power Station FSAR, Section 9.1.4.2.2 describes
~
the design features incorporated in the 125 ton crane to achieve single-failure proof status. The sling and lift attachments for g handling the Spent Fuel Cask will be designed to meet single failure criteria. This conceptual design, as well as the crane design to meet single failure criteria, has been reviewed and found to be acceptable, as recorded in Section 9.1.4 of the Fermi Unit 2 Safety Evaluation Report (NUREG-0798).
The handling of the service platform, and shielding chute over 4
- spent fuel within the open reactor, using the main hoist, slings and lifting lugs designed within the guidelines of Section
^
5.1.6-(1) (b) and (3) of NUREG-0612, does meet single failure proof criteria. The handling of RPV head insulation over the closed reactor with the main hoist also meets these same single 2.2.3-1 100/R92/1.40 l
4 RESPONSE: failure proof guidlelines. The handling of the Reactor Steam Dryer / Separator and Pressure Vessel Head over spent fuel within the reactor, using the " single failure proof" main hoist will meet single failure proof guidelines.
A The lif ting devices used to handle the Reactor Steam Dryer / Separator and the Reactor Pressure Vessel Head have been modified to meet single failure proof guidelines.
The handling of the fuel pool slot plugs and pool gates in close proximity to spent fuel stored in the fuel pool, using the same main hoist also meets the above single failure proof guidelines.
The handling of these same loads and all other loads by the main hoist, involving no potential impact to spent fuel, is covered under Section 2.3.2.
l 2.2.3-2 100/R92/1.41
2.2.4 For cranes identified in 2.2.1 above, not categorized according to 2.2.3, demonstrate that the criteria of NUREG-0612, Section 5.1, are satisfied. Compliance with Criterion IV will be dem-onstrated in response to Section 2.4 of this request. With respect to Criteria I through III, provide a discussion of your evaluation of crane operation in the Reactor Building and your determination of compliance. This response should include the following information for each crane:
- a. Where reliance is placed on the installation and use of electrical interlocks or mechanical stops, indicate the circum-stances under which these protective devices can be removed or bypassed and the administrative procedures invoked to ensure proper authorization of such action. Discuss any related or proposed technical specifications concerning the bypass of such interlocks.
- b. Where reliance is placed on the operation of the Standby Gas Treatment System, discuss present and/or proposed technical specifications and administrative or physical controls provided to ensure that these assumptions remain valid.
- c. Where reliance is placed on other site-specific consider-ations (e.g., refueling sequencing), provide present or proposed technical specifications, and discuss administrative or physical controls provided to ensure the validity of such considerations.
2.2.4-1 100/R92/1.42
- d. Analyses performed to demonstrate compliance with Criteri I through III should conform to the guidelines of NUREG-0612, Appendix A. Justify any exception taken to these guidelines, and provide the specific information requested in Attachment 2, 3, or 4, as appropriate, for each analysis performed.
RESPONSE: a. The reactor building crane 5-ton auxiliary hoist is administrative 1y restricted from carrying a heavy load over the spent fuel pool or open reactor by a load limit switch which prevents this hoist from lifting loads above 2000f. This limit is placed in its " Restricted" mode by a switch on the crane cab operating panel. This energizes a red light on the control panel and a second red light outside of the control cab to alert the A
crane operator and personnel on the refueling floor that the hoist 2000# load limit is in effect. When this control cab switch is placed in the bypass position, similarly located green indicating lights are energized (red lights are de-energized) to alert personnel that the 2000# load limit is being bypassed and the Auxiliary Hoist must not be handling loads over the fuel pool l or open reactor vessel.
2.2.4-2 100/R92/1.43
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Maintenance Procedure No. 32.000.07, which covers the operation of the Reactor Building Crane, will provide specific direction controlling the application of this load limit switch to limit A
loads carried by the Auxiliary Hoist over the Spent Fuel Pool from exceeding 2000#s. Any deviations from this Maintenance Procedure requires prior approval from the Fermi 2 Onsite Review Organization, in accordance with Fermi 2 Technical Specification 6 5 1.
- b. The Standby Cas Treatment System is discussed in Enrico Fermi 2 Atomic Power Plant FSAR, Section 6.2. Ventilation of the reactor building is also discussed in FSAR Section 9.4.
The reactor building ventilation and filtration system is designed to limit potential releases of radioactive iodine and other radioactive materials. However, credit for SGTS operation is not taken in analysis presented in this report.
- c. When reliance is placed on other site-specific considera-tions for heavy load movements, additional maintenance procedures will be written addressing the guidelines of NUREG-0612 and this report to ensure the validity of such considerations.
l 2.2.4-3 100/R92/1.44
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- d. Analyses addressing evaluation criteria I, II, and III, is not required since the hoists identified in Table 2.2.1, and not categorized according to Section 2.2.3, will not be handling A
heavy loads in close proximity to spent fuel. This includes the auxiliary hoist which will be restricted by a load limit from handling heavy loads over the fuel pool or open reactor.
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2.2.4-4 100/R92/1.45
--- - - - .- -,,e - - - - - -, ,a,,,- ----- - , - , , - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
2.3.1 Identify any cranes listed in Table 2.2.1, above, which you have g evaluated as having sufficient design features to make the likelihood of a load drop extremely small for all loads to be carried and the basis for this evaluation (i.e. , complete compliance with NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.6, or partial compliance supplemented by suitable alternative or additional design features). For each crane so evaluated, provide the load-handling system (i.e., crane-load combination) information specified in Attachment 1.
RESPONSE: The reactor building main crane is the only single-failure proof crane at the plant site. See Response 2.2.3.
2.3.1-1 100/R92/1.46 I . , - . . .. -- - - , - - - - --
A 2.3.2 For any cranes identified in Table 2.1.1 not designated as single-failure proof in 2.3.1, a comprehensive hazard evaluation should be provided which includes the following information:
2.3.2.a The presentation in a tratrix format of all heavy loads and potential impact areas where damage might occur to safety-related equipment. Heavy loads identification should include designation and weight or cross-reference to information provided in 2.1.3.c.
Impact areas should be identified by construction zones and elevations or by some other method such that the impact area can be located on the plant general arrangement drawings. Figure 1 provides a typical matrix.
RESPONSE: Table 2.3.2 lists those heavy loads to be handled by non-single failure proof hoists that do not handle these loads in close proximity to the Fuel Pool or Reactor Vessel. Any potential drop of these loads cannot impact fuel or cause damage to the Reactor Vessel or Fuel Pool. Therefore, only Evaluation Criteria IV in Section 5.1 of NUREG 0612 has been addressed in evaluating these g loads. Evaluation Criteria I, II, & III do not apply The handling of most of the heavy loads by the single failure proof Main Hoist has been evaluated or upgraded to meet the i single failure proof guidelines of Section 5.6 of NUREG 0612.
These loads have been included in Table 2.3.2 where it is shown 2.3.2-1 100/R92/1.47 1
--. . =. - __ . _ - - _ _ . __
that Hazard Elimination Category - d is applicable for these loads. (Likelihood of failure is extremely small because Section 5.1.6 of NUREG 0612 is satisfied). Since the handling of these loads meets single failure proof guidelines, further evaluation addressing Evaluation Criteria I, II, III and IV is not required.
However, Evaluation Criteria IV has been addressed for these loads and has been included in Table 2.3.2.
The Reactor Shield Plugs, Drywell Head, Stud Tensioner and Storage Pool Slot Plugs are handled by the single failure proof ;
Main Hoist. However, their attachments to the Main Hoist have not been verified to meet single failure proof guidelines. The Storage Pool Slot Plugs will not be handled in close proximity to I
the fuel pool or reactor vessel. Therefore, a potential drop of I.
these plugs cannot impact fuel or cause damage to the reactor 4
vessel or fuel pool.
l l
The Reactor Shield Plugs, Drywell Head, Stud Tensioner are l handled over the Reactor Vessel location, but not over the Fuel Pool. A single failure of any of the non-single failure proof I
i attachments will not cause a failure of the remaining attachments. The load remains attached to the hoist. There can i be a shifting of the load to cause contact with adjacent structures. However, impact with fuel or damage to the reactor vessel will not occur. Therefore, only Evaluation Criteria IV has been addressed in the analysis of these three loads and the Equipment Storage Plugs.
2.3.2-la 100/R92/1.48
.- . .- - . . . . - - .- - ~- . .
TABLE 2.3.2 ENRICO FERMI UNIT 2 HEAVY LOAD HANDLING: ' LOAD / AREA-IMPACT MATRIK
! HOIST: REACTOR BUILDING CRANE MAIN HOIST - T3100E002 1
i j LOCATION BUILDING: REACTOR BUILDING IMPACT ALONG BUILDING COORDINATE LINE B ALONG BUILDING. COORDINATE LINE AREA FROM COORDINATE LINE 13 TO 15 1/3 FROM COORDINATE LINE TO LOADS SAFETY RELATED HAZARD SAFETY RELATED HAZARD ,
FLOOR /ELEV. EQUIPMENT ELIM. FLOOR /ELEV. EQUIPMENT ELIM.
. CATEGORY
! 1. Drywell Head Subbasement 1. Div 1 RHR b,e
, T2301A001A 540' - 0" Piping (67 Tons) 2. Div 2 EECW b,e
! Piping i 3. Torus e,e j Basement 1. Div 1 EECW b,e
- 562' - 0" Piping
! 2. Div 1 RHR b,e i Piping
]
- 3. RCIC Turbine b,c.e Exhaust l Piping j 4. HPCI Turbine b,c e Exhaust Pi'p i n g j 5. Div 1 RHR b,e Service j WaterPiping l
2.3.2-2 100/R92/1.49 i
TABLE 2.3.2 ENRICO FERMI UNIT 2 HEAVY LOAD HANDLING: LOAD / AREA IMPACT MATRIK HOIST: REACTOR BUILDING CRANE MAIN HOIST - T3100E002 LOCATION BUILDING: REACTOR BUILDING IMPACT ALONC BUILDING COORDINATE LINE B ALONG BUILDING COORDINATE LINE AREA FROM COORDINATE LINE 13 TO 15 1/2 FROM COORDINATE LINE TO LOADS SAFETY RELATED HAZARD SAFETY RELATED HAZARD FLOOR /ELEV. EQUIPMENT ELIM. FLOOR /ELEV. EQUIPMENT ELIM.
CATEGORY
- 1. Drywell Head Basement -
Div 1 Cable b,e T2301A001A 562' - 0" Trays *
(67 Tons) IP-009 1C-008 1C-009 1P-011 1C-100 l
IC-001 1K-004 i IC-002 1K-008 1K-032 l
- See Cable Tray Index 2.3.2-3 100/R92/1.50
T_ABLE 2.3.2 ENRICO FERMI UNIT 2 HEAVY LOAD HANDLING: LOAD / AREA IMPACT MATRIX HOIST: REACTOR BUILDING CRANE MAIN HOIST - T3100E002 LOCATION BUILDING: REACTOR BUILDING
! IMPACT ALONG BUILDING COORDINATE LINE B ALONG BUILDING COORDINATE LINE l
AREA FROM COORDINATE LINE 13 TO 15 1/3 FROM COORDINATE LINE TO LOADS SAFETY RELATED HAZARD SAFETY RELATED HAZARD FLOOR /ELEV. EQUIPMENT ELIM. FLOOR /ELEV. EQUIPMENT ELIM.
CATEGORY
- 1. Drywell lle a d First Floor 1. Div 1 RIIR b,e T23301A001A 583' - 6" Piping
! (67 Ton) Div 1 Cable Trays
- e,c 2C-089
) -
I 1
Second Floor 1. Div 1 Core b,e 613' - 6" Spray Piping t
- 2. Div 1 EECW b,e l Supply and Return Piping 1
1
- See Cable Tray Index 2.3.2-4 100/R92/1.51 i
TABLE 2.3.2 ENRICO FERMI UNIT 2 HEAVY LOAD HANDLING: LOAD / AREA IMPACT MATRIX HOIST: REACTOR BUILDING CRANE MAIN HOIST - T3100E002 LOCATION BUILDING: REACTOR BUILDING IMPACT ALONG BUILDING COORDINATE LINE 11-12 ALONG BUILDING COORDINATE LINE AREA FROM COORDINATE LINE A TO C FROM COORDINATE LINE TO LOADS SAFETY RELATED HAZARD SAFETY RELATED HAZARD FLOOR /ELEV. EQUIPMENT ELIM. FLOOR /ELEV. EQUIPMENT ELIM.
2a. Reactor Shield Subbasement 1. Div 2 RHR b,e Plugs (3) 540' - 0" Piping c,e A (100 Tons Each) 2. Torus Basement 1. Div 2 RHR b,e,d 562' - 0" Piping
- 2. Div 2 RHR b,e,d Service Water
! 3. R.P.V. Service Piping (2 Platform only)
F 1300E010 3. Div 2 EECW b,e,d (6 Tons) Service Water Piping (2 only)
TABLE 2.3.2 ENRICO FERMI UNIT 2 HEAVY LOAD HANDLING: LOAD / AREA IMPACT MATRIK HOIST: REACTOR BUILDING CRANE MAIN HOIST - T3100E002 LOCATION BUILDING: REACTOR BUILDING IMPACT ALONG BUILDING COORDINATE LINE 11-12 ALONG BUILDING COORDINATE LINE AREA FROM COORDINATE LINE A TO B-1/2 FROM COORDINATE LINE TO LOADS SAFETY RELATED HAZARD SAFETY RELATED HAZARD FLOOR /ELEV. EQUIPMENT ELIM. FLOOR /ELEV. EQUIPMENT ELIM.
CATERCORY
- 2. Reactor Shield First Floor 1. Div 2 RHR b,e Plugs (3) 583' - 6" Piping (100 Tons Each) 2. Div 2 EECW b,e g Piping (2 only)
Div I Cable Trays
- e,d
- 3. R.P.V. Service 1K-038 Platform F1300E010 Div 2 Cable Trays
TABLE 2.3.2 ENRICO FERMI UNIT 2 HEAVY LOAD HANDLING LOAD / AREA IMPACT MATRIK HOIST: REACTOR BUILDING CRANE MAIN. HOIST - T3100E002 LOCATION BUILDING: REACTOR BUILDING IMPACT ALONG BUILDING COORDINATE LI N E 11-12 ALONG BUILDING COORDINATE LINE-AREA FROM COORDINATE LINE A TO B-1/2 FROM COORDINATE LINE TO LOADS SAFETY RELATED HAZARD SAFETY RELATED HAZARD FLOOR /ELEV. EQUIPMENT ELIM. FLOOR /ELEV. EQUIPMENT ELIM.
CATEGORY ,
2a. Reactor Shield Second F1. 1. Div 2 RHR b,e,d*
Plugs (3) 613' -
6" Piping (100 Tons Each) 2. Div 2 EECW e,d* A Service Water Piping
- 3. Div 2 EECW e,d*
- 3. R.P.V. Service Piping Platform 4. Div I EECW b,e,d*
F1300E010 Piping (6 Tons) 5. Div I EECW b,e,d*
Heat Exchanger P4400B001
- RPV Service ,
Platform Only 2.3.2-7 100/R92/1.54
TABLE 2.3.2 ENRICD FERMI UNIT 2 NEAVT LOAD 2ATDLINGt LCAD/ AREA IMPACT MATRIR HOIST: REACTGR BUILDING CRANE MAIN HOIST - T3100E002 LOCATION BUILDING: REACTOR BUILDING IMPACT ALONG BUILDING COORD(NATE LINE 11-12 ALONG BUILDING COORDINATE LINE AREA FROM COORDINATE LINE A-1/2 TO C FROM COORDINATE LINE TO LOADS SAFETY RELATED HAZARD SAFETY RELATED HAZAL FLOOR /ELEV. EQUIPMENT ELIM. FLOOR /ELEV. EQUIPMENT ELIM.
CATECORT 2b. Reactor Shield Subbasement 1. Div 2 RRR b,e Plugs (3) 540' - 0" Piping (100 Tons Each) 2. Div 2 EECW b,e Piping ,
- 3. Torus e Basement 1. Div 2 RHR b,e,d
- 4. Vessel Head 562' - 0" Piping Insulation 2. Div 2 RHR b,e,d B1151H001 Service Water (11.5 Tons) Piping A
- 3. Div 2 EECW b,e,d Piping
- 4. HPCI Steam to b,e,d RRR Heat Exchanger Piping Div 2 Cable Trays
- b,e,d 2K-001 2C-042 2K-0G5 2C-053 2C-076 2C-014 2C-077 2C-015 2P-009 2C-016 DC2P-009 2C-018 usee Cable Tray Index 2.3.2-8 4
100/R92/1.55
TABLE 2.3.2 ENRIC3 FERMI UDIT 2 NEAVT LOAD NACSLICCt LOAD / AREA IMPACT MATRIR l HOIST: REACTOR BUILDING CRANE MAIN HDIST - T3100E002
{
LOCATION BUILDING: REACTOR BUILDING
. IMPACT ALONC BUILDING COORDINATE LINE 10 ALONC BUILDING COORDINATE LINE l AREA
] FROM COORDINATE LINE A-1/2 TO C FRCM COORDINATE LINE TO
! LOADS SAFETT RELATED HAZARD SAFETY RELATED RAZAl
- FLOOR /ELEV. EQUIPMENT ELIM. FLOOR /ELEY. EQUIPMENT ELIM, CATECORT
. 2b. Reactor Shield First Floor 1. Div 2 RRR b,e Plugs (3) 583' - 6" Piping (100 Tons Each) 2. Div 2 RRR b,e 4
. Piping
! Second F1. 1. Div 2 RHR b,e,d 613' - 6" Piping
- 4. Vessel Head 2. Div 2 RRR b,e,d Insulation Service Water B1151H001 Piping (11.5 Tons) 3. Div 2 EECW b,e,d Service Water A Piping
] Div 2 Cable Trays
- b,e,d t
2C-064 2C-066 i
i 1
a 1
1 i
} #See Cable Tray Index 2.3.2-9 ,
100/R92/1.56 i
TABLE 2.3.2 ENRICO FERMI UNIT 2 HEAVY LOAD HANDLING: LOAD / AREA IMPACT MATRIX HOIST: REACTOR BUILDING CRANE MAIN HOIST - T3100E002 LOCATION BUILDING: REACTOR BUILDING IMPACT ALONG BUILDING COORDINATE LINE 12-1/2 ALONG BUILDING COORDINATE LINE AREA FROM COORDINATE LINE A-1/2 TO B-1/2 FROM COORDINATE LINE TO LOADS SAFETY RELATED HAZARD SAFETY RELATED HAZARD FLOOR /ELEV. EQUIPMENT ELIM. FLOOR /ELEV. EQUIPMENT ELIM.
CATEGORY
- 5. R.P.V. Head Subbasement 1. Div I RHR b,e,d (89 Tons) 540' - 0" Piping
- 2. Torus c,e,d A
Basement 562' - 0" 1. Div I RHR b,e,d Piping
- 6. R.P.V. Head First Floor 1. Div I RHR b,e,d Strongback 583' - 6" Piping F1300E009 (5 Tons) Div I Cable Trays
- See Cable Tray Index 2.3.2-10 100/R92/1.57
TABLE 2.3.2 ENRICO FERMI UNIT 2 HEAVT LOAD NAN 3LICG LCAD/ AREA IMPACT MATRIR HOIST: REACTOR BUILDING CRANE MAIN HOIST - T3100E002 l
LOCATION BUILDING: REACTOR BUILDING IMPACT ALONG BUILDING COORDINATE LINE E ALONG BUILDING COORDINATE LINE AREA FROM COORDINATE LINE 9 1/2 TO 11 FROM COORDINATE LINE TO LOADS SAFETY RELATED HAZARD SAFETY RELATED NAZAR1 FLOOR /ELEV. EQUIPMENT ELIM. FLOOR /ELEV. EQUIPMENT ELIM, CATECORY
- 7. Storage Pool Subbasement 1. Torus c,e Stor Plugs 540' - 0" (41.5 Tons Each)
A
- 1. Div 2 EECW ' b,e
- Basement 4
562' - 0" Piping I Div 2 Cable Trays
)
l l Second Floor 1. Div 2 EECW b,e 613' - 6" Piping
- 2. Div 2 EECW b,e I Heat Exchanger P4400B002 i
- See Cable Tray Index 2.3.2-11 ,
100/R92/1.58
- i. .
TABLE 2.3.2 ENRICO FERMI UNIT 2 HEAVY LOAD HANDLICC: LOAD / AREA IMPACT MATRIK HOIST: REACTOR BUILDING CRANE MAIN HOIST - T3100E002 LOCATION BUILDING: REACTOR BUILDING IMPACT ALONG BUILDING COORDINATE LINE 13 ALONG BUILDING COORDINATE LINE A-1 AREA FROM COORDINATE LINE A-1/2 TO D FROM COORDINATE LINE 13 TO 15 LOADS SAFETY RELATED HAZARD SAFETY RELATED HAZARD FLOOR /ELEV. EQUIPMENT ELIM. FLOOR /ELEV. EQUIPMENT ELIM.
CATECORY
- 8. Fuel Pool Slot Subbasement 1. Div I RRR b,e,d** Subbasement 1. Div I RRR b,e,d*
Plugs (4) 540' - 0" Piping 540' - 0" Piping (9 Tons Each) 2. Torus e,e,d** 2. Torus c,e,d*
Basement 1. Div I RHR b,e,d** Basement 1. Div I RRR b,e,d*
562' - 0" Piping 562' - 0" PipinR
- 2. Div I RHR b,e,d** 2. Div I Cable b,e d*
Service Trays
Piping
- 9. Stud Tensioner First Floor Div I Cable b,e,d*
F1300E007 583'-6" Trays *
(3 Tons) IC-138 Second Floor 1. Div I EECW b e,d*
613' - 6" Piping
- 2. Div I EECW b,e,d*
Pump and Makeup Tank
- See Cable Tray Index 2.3.3-12 .
- Fuel Pool Slot Plugs Only 100/R92/1.59
TABLE 2.3.2 ENRIC3 FERMI UOIT 2 HE AVY LCAD N AD"'LIEG t LOAD / AREA IMPACT MATRIX H3IST: REACTOR BUILDICG CRANE MAIN HOIST - T3100E002 LOCATION BUILDING: REACTOR BUILDING IMPACT ALONG BUILDING COORDINATE LINE 13 ALONG BUILDING COORDINATE LINE A-1 AREA FROM COORDINATE LINE A-1/2 TO D FROM COORDINATE LINE 13 TO 15 LOADS SAFETY RELATED HAZARD SAFETY RELATED HAZARD FLOOR /ELEV. EQUIPMENT ELIM. FLOOR /ELEV. EQUIPMENT ELIM.
CATECORT
- 8. Fuel Pool Slot First Floor 1. Div I Contain- b,e,d**
Plugs (4) 583' - 6" ment Spray A (9 Tons Each) Piping
- 2. Div I Cable Trays
- 3. Div 2 Cable b,e,d**
Tray
- A 2C-089 usee Cable Tray Index 2.3.2-13
- Fuel Pool Slot .
Plugs Only l 100/R92/1.60 l
l l
TABLE 2.3.2 ENRICO FERMI UNIT 2 HEAVY LOAD HANDLING: LtAD/ AREA IMPACT MATRIX HOIST: REACTOR BUILDING CRANE MAIN HOIST - T3100E002 LOCATION BUILDING: REACTOR BUILDING IMPACT ALONG BUILDING COORDINATE LINE D ALONG BUILDING COORDINATE LINE AREA FROM COORDINATE LINE 10 TO 12 FROM COORDINATE LINE TO SAFETY RELATED HAZARD SAFETY RELATED HAZARD LOADS FLOOR /ELEV. EQUIPMENT ELIM. FLOOR /ELEV. EQUIPMENT ELIM.
CATEGORY
- 10. Steam Dryer Subbasement 1. Torus c,e**d B1107D041 540' - 0" (42 Tons) b,e**d Basement 1. Div 2 EECW A
562' - 0" Piping Div 2 Cable Trays
- 11. Steam Separator First Floor 1. Div 2 EECW b,e**d B1112D002 583' - 6" Piping (73 Tons) Div 2 Cable Trays
- 12. Storage l' Pool Gate (14 Tons)
- See Cable Tray Index 2.3.2-14 ,
- Dryer & Separator only 100/R92/1.61
TABLE 2.3.2 ENRICO FERMI UNIT 2 IIEAVY LOAD HANDLING: LOAD / AREA IMPACT MATRIX HOIST: REACTOR BUILDING CRANE MAIN HOIST - T3100E002 LOCATION BUILDING: REACTOR BUILDING IMPACT ALONG BUILDING COORDINATE LINE D ALONG BUILDING COORDINATE LINE AREA FROM COORDINATE LINE 10 TO 12 FROM COORDINATE LINE TO LOADS SAFETY RELATED IIAZ A R D SAFETY RELATED HAZARD FLOOR /ELEV. EQUIPMENT ELIM. FL'00R/ELEV. EQUIPMENT ELIM.
CATEGORY
- 10. Steam Dryer Second Fir. 1. Div 2 Core b,e**,d B1107D041 613' - 6" Spray Piping (42 Tons) 2. Div 2 RHR b,e**,d Piping
- 3. Div 2 EECW b,e**,d A Piping
- 4. Div 2 EECW b,e**,d Service Water
- 11. Steam Separator Piping B1112D002 5. Div 2 EECW b,e**,d (73 Tons) Heat Exchanger P4400B002
- 12. Storage i Pool Gate (14 Tons) .
i i
2.3.2-15
- Dryer & Separator only j
1 100/R92/1.62 Y
~
r J
o, .
e
'L ;; ,
TABLE 2.3.2 ENRICO FERMI UNIT 2 NEAVY LOAD NANDLING d' LOAD /ARE A IMPACT MATRIR HOIST: REACTOR BUILDING CRANE MAIN HOIST - T3100E002 LOCATION BUILDING: REACTOR BUILDING -
IMPACT ALONG BUILDING COORDINATE LINE 13 ALONG BUILDING COORDINATE LINE AREA - N FROM COORDINATE LINE C TO E FROM COORDINATE LINE TO LOADS SAFETY RELATED ' HAZARD SAFETY RELATED RAZARD FLOOR /ELEV. EQUIPMENT ELIM. FLOOR /ELEV. EQUIPMENT ELIM.
CATECORY
- 13. Fuel Pool Gate Basement 1. Div I EECW b,e,d A& B 562' - 0" Piping (4.3 Ton & 2.5 Ton)
First Floor Div I Cable Trays
Second Fir. 1. Div I Core b,e,d 613' - 6" Spray Piping Third Floor 1. Fuel Storage e,d 641' - 6" Pool Liner
- See Cable Tray Index 2.3.2-16 .
100/R92/1.63
- - .~ _
TABLE 2.3.2 ENRICO FERMI UNIT 2 HEAVY LOAD HANDLING: LOAD / AREA IMPACT MATRIX HOIST: REACTOR BUILDING CRANE MAIN HOIST - T3100E002 LOCATION BUILDING: REACTOR BUILDING IMPACT ALONG BUILDING COORDINATE LINE A 1/2 ALONG BUILDING COORDINATE LINE B AREA FROM COORDINATE LINE 10 1/2 TO 12 1/2 FROM COORDINATE LINE 12 1/2 TO 15 LOADS SAFETY RELATED II AZ A R D SAFETY RELATED HAZARD FLOOR /ELEV. EQUIPMENT ELIM. FLOOR /ELEV. EQUIPMENT ELIM.
CATECORY
- 15. Spent Fuel Cask Second Floor 1. Div 2 EECW d First Floor 1. Div 1 RilR b,d F1600E001 613' - 6" Service Water 583' - 6" Piping (100 Tons) Piping
- 2. Div 2 RHR b,d' Piping
- 3. Div 1 EECW d Div 1 Cable Tray
- d Cooling Water IP-032 Heat Exchanger Div 2 Cable Tray
b,d 613' - 6" Piping
- *See Cable Tray Index 2.3.2-17 100/R92/1.64
TABLE 2.3.2 ENRICO FERMI UNIT 2 HEAVY LOAD HANDLING: LOAD / AREA IMPACT MATRIX HOIST: REACTOR BUILDING CRANE MAIN HOIST - T3100E002 LOCATION BUILDING: REACTOR BUILDING IMPACT ALONG BUILDING COORDINATE LINE A 1/2 ALONG BUILDING COORDINATE LINE B AREA FROM COORDINATE LINE 10 1/2 TO 12 1/2 FROM COORDINATE LINE 12 1/2 TO 15 LOADS SAFETY RELATED llA Z A R D SAFETY RELATED HAZARD FLOOR /ELEV. EQUIPMENT ELIM. FLOOR /ELEV. EQUIPMENT ELIM.
CATEGORY
- 15. Spent Fuel Cask Subbasement 1. Div 2 RHR b,d Subbasement 1. Torus d F1600E001 540' - 0" Piping 540' - 0" 2. Div 1 RHR b,d (100 Tons) 2. Torus d Piping
- 3. Div 1 EECW b,d Piping Basement 1. Div 2 RHR b,d Basement 1. Div 1 RilR b,d 562' - 0" Piping 562' - 0" Piping
- 2. Div 2 RilR b,d 2. Div 1 RHR b,d Service Service Water Water Piping Piping 3. RCIC Turbine b,d Exhaust Piping
- 4. HPIC Turbine b,d Exhaust Piping
- 5. Div 1 ECCW b,d Piping Div 1 Cable Trays
- See Cable Tray Index 2.3.2-18 100/R92/1.65
TABLE 2.3.2 ENRICO FERMI UNIT 2 HEAVY LOAD HANDLING: LOAD / AREA IMPACT MATRIK HOIST: REACTOR BUILDING CRANE MAIN HOIST - T3100E002 LOCATION BUILDING: REACTOR BUILDING IMPACT ALONG BUILDING COORDINATE LINE 15 ALONG BUILDING COORDINATE LINE AREA FROM COORDINATE LINE B TO C FROM COORDINATE LINE TO LOADS SAFETY RELATED HAZARD SAFETY RELATED HAZARD FLOOR /ELEV. EQUIPMENT ELIM. FLOOR /ELEV. EQUIPMENT ELIM.
CATEGORY
- 15. Spent Fuel Cask Basement 1. Div 1 RHR b,d i F1600E001 562' - 0" Piping j (100 Tons) 2. Div 1 RHR b,, d Service Water Piping
- 3. RCIC Turbine b,d Exhaust Piping
- 4. HPIC Turbine b,d
- Exhaust Piping Div 1 Cable Trays
l j First Floor Div 1 Cable Trays
Third Floor 1. Fuel Storage d 645' - 9" Pool Liner 1
i
- See Cable Tray Index 2.3.2-19 100/R92/1.66
TABLE 2.3.2 ENRICO FERMI UNIT 2 HEAVY LOAD HANDLING: LOAD / AREA IMPACT MATRIX I
l HOIST: REACTOR BUILDING CRANE AUXILIARY HOIST - 5 TON - T3100E002 I.3 l
PORTABLE GANTRY HOIST - 16 TON LOCATION -BUILDING: REACTOR BUILDING f
IMPACT ALONG BUILDING COORDINATE LINE E 1/2 ALONG BUILDING COORDINATE LINE C l
- AREA i FROM COORDINATE LINE 10 To 10 1/2 FROM COORDINATE ~ LINE 15 TO 17 (17 only) (18 Only)
SAFETY RELATED HAZARD SAFETY RELATED HAZARD, l LOADS
- FLOOR /ELEV. EQUIPMENT ELIM. FLOOR /ELEV. EQUIPMENT ELIM.
CATEGORY l
- 16. Concrete Floor Subbasement 1. Torus c Subbasement 1. Torus e i Hatch 557' - 9" 540' - 0" 2. Div 1 RHR b i 6E 1/2 x 10 1/2 Piping I Basement 1. Div 2 EECW b Basement 1. Div I RHR b 575' - 0" Piping 571' - 0" Piping
- 2. RCIC Turbine b Div 2 Cable Tray
- b 3. HPCIC Turbine b j 583' - 6" 2P-079 Exhaust Piping
- **17. Concrete Floor Second Floor 1. Div 2 EECW b Plugs 613' -
6" Heat Exchanger Div 1 Cable Tray
- b IC-047 1P-035
{l l Second Floor 1. Div 1 RHR b 613' - 6" Piping l
I *See Cable Tray Index 2.3.2-20 3
- To be handled only with the Portable Cantry Holst
., 100/R92/1.67 l
1
TABLE 2.3.2 ENRICO FERMI UNIT 2 HEAVY LOAD HANDLING LOAD / AREA IMPACT MATRIK HOIST: REACTOR BUILDINC CRANE MAIN HOIST - T3100E002 LOCATION BUILDING: REACTOR BUILDING I
IMPACT ALONG BUILDING COORDINATE LINE A-1/2 ALONG BUILDING COORDINATE LINE j AREA
] FROM COORDINATE LINE 10 TO 11 FROM COORDINATE LINE TO
, LOADS SAFETY RELATED HAZARD SAFETY RELATED HAZARD 1
FLOOR /ELEV. EQUIPMENT ELIM. FLOOR /ELEV. EQUIPMENT ELIM.
CATEGORY
- 18. Equipment Hatch Subbasement 1. Torus Cover 540' - 0" 2. Div 2 RHR b,d (8 Tons) Piping 3
- 2. Div 2 RHR b,d Service Water
! Piping
- 3. Div 2 EECW b,d Piping Div 2 Cable Trays
- See Cable Tray Index 2.3.2-21 100/R92/1.68
TABLE 2.3.2 ENRICO FERMI UNIT 2 REAVT LOAD HANDLICC: ' LOAD / AREA IMPACT MATRIR
- HOIST
- REACTOR BUILDING CRANE MAIN HDIST - T3100E002 i
LOCATION BUILDING: REACTOR BUILDING i IMPACT ALONG BUILDING COORDINATE LINE 13 ALONC BUILDING COORDINATE LINE l AREA
! FROM COORDINATE LINE D To B-1/2 FROM COORDINATE LINE TO i LOADS EAFETY RELATED HAZARD SAFETY RELATED NAZARD
- FLOOR /ELEY. EQUIPMENT ELIM. FLOOR /ELEY. EQUIPMENT ELIM.
CATECORT I
! 21. Portable Shielding Subbasement 1. Div I RRR b,e,d i Chute 540' - 0" Piping 1
(14 Tons) 2. Torus e,d l First Floor 1. Div I Cable 'b,e,d 583' - 6" Trays A 1P001 1P002 i IC106 IK035 1 2. Div I RRR b,e,d Piping i Second Fir. 1. Div I Core b e,d j 613' - 6" Spray Piping
- 2. Div I EECW b,e d l Piping
! 3. Div 2 Drywell b,e,d i Monitoring l Inst. rack
}
l *See Cable Tray Index 2.3.2-21a l 100/R92/1.69 l
ENRICO FERMI UNIT 2 HEAVY LOAD HANDLING: LOAD / AREA IMPACT MATRIX TABLE 2.3.2 HOIST: REACTOR BUILDING CRANE AUXILIARY HOIST - 5 TON - T3100E002 BUILDING: REACTOR BUILDING-FIFTH FLOOR REACTOR BUILDING-FIFTH FLOOR LOCATION ALONG BUILDING COORDINATE LINE A 1/2 ALONG BUILDING COORDINATE LINE E1/E IMPACT AREA 13 TO 15 FROM COORDINATE LINE 10 TO 11 FROM COORDINATE LINE (1 and 2 Only) (3 Only)
HAZARD SAFETY RELATED HAZARD LOADS SAFETY RELATED ELIM. FLOOR /ELEV. EQUIPMENT ELIM.
FLOOR /ELEV. EQUIPMENT CATECORY c Subbasement 1. Torus c
- 1. Maintenance Tools Subbasement 1. Torus 540' - 0" 2. Div 2 RHR b 540 ' - 0" Piping
- b Lifting Fixtures Basement 1. Div 2 RHR 2.
Piping IP-029 DCIP-029 562' - 0" IK-011 1C-100
- 2. Div 2 RHR b First Floor Div 1 Cable Trays
- b Service Water Piping 583' - 6" 1P-034 1C-112
- 3. Floor Piping Plugs (2 1/2 Ton) 2K-001 2C-020 b 2C-018 2P-008 630' - 9" 2. Div 1 Core 2C-014 2P-009 Spray Piping DC2P-009 Div 1 Cable Trays
- LP-040 usee Cable Tray Index 2.3.2-22 100/R92A/1.70
TABLE 2.3.2 ENRICO FERMI UNIT 2 NEAVT LOAD MANDLING: LCAD/ AREA IMPACT MATRIX
, HOIST: MOTOR GENERATOR SET, CORTH, CENTER AND SOUTH HDISTS -
12 TON EACH -
i T3100E035, 036 & 037 1,
l LOCATION BUILDING: REACTOR BUILDING 4TH FLOOR-NORTH REACTOR BUILDING 4TH FLOOR-CENTER I
l IMPACT ALONG BUILDING COORDINATE LINE B 1/2 ALONG BUILDING COORDINATE LINE Bl/
AREA FROM COORDINATE LINE 13 TO 15 FROM COORDINATE LINE 11 TO 12 (Motor Hoist Only) (Generator Holst Only)
LOADS SAFETT RELATED HAZARD SAFETY RELATED HAZARE FLOOR /ELEY. EQUIPMENT ELIM. FLOOR /ELEV. EQUIPMENT ELIM.
CATEGORT I
i 1. Motor Generator Subbasement 1. Torus c Subbasement 1. Torus c
, Set Motor (Without 540' - 0" 2. Div 1 RRR b $40' - 0" 2. Div 2 RRR b 1
Rotor) (11 Tons) Piping ,
Piping (B31035001 A&B)
- 2. Motor Generator Basement 1. Div 1 EECW b Basement 1. HPCI Steam to b Set Motor Rotor 562' - 0" Piping 579' -2 3/4" Div 1 RRR Rest (8 Tons) 2. Div 1 RRR b Exchanger i Piping 4
First Floor Div 2 Cable Tray
- b Div 1 Cable Tray
- b 583' - 6" 2K-023 IP-011 j 3. Motor Generator First Floor 1. Div 1 RRR b Second Floor 1. Div 2 EECW b 4 Set Generator 594' -
3" PipinR 630' - 9" Service Water (Without Rotor) 2. RRR Valve b ?iping I
A (11 Tons) V23-2012 (B31035001 A&B)
Div 1 Cable Tray
- b 1P-035 4
Div 2 Cable Tray
- b 2C-089
- 4. Motor Generator Second Floor 1. Div 1 EECW b Set Generator 594' -
3" Piping Rotor (S Tons)
- See Cable Tray Index 2.3.2-23 .
4 1 100/R92A/1.71 1
1
l TABLE 2.3.2 EURICO FERMI UDIT 2 NEATT LCAO NAUDLICC: 'LSA9/ AREA IMPACT MATGIR j HOIST: MOTOR GECERATOR SET, NORTR, CENTER AND SOUTH R3ISTS - 12 T33 EACR - 3 J T3100E035, 36 & 37 i
LOCATION BUILDING: REACTOR BUILDING 4TH FLOOR-SOUTH
}
( IMPACT ALONG BUILDING COORDINATE LINE B 1/2 ALONG BUILDING COORDINATE LINE j AREA FROM COORDINATE LINE 9 TO 10 FROM COORDINATE LINE TO
) (Motor Holst only)
{ LOADS SAFETY RELATED dAZARD SAFETY RELATED HAZARD FLOOR /ELEY. EQUIPMENT ELIM. FLOOR /ELEV. EQUIPMENT ELIM.
j CATECORT
- 1. Motor Generator Subbasement 1. Div 2 RRR b Set Motor 540' - 0" Fiping (Without Motor)
(11 Tons) Basement 1. Div 2 RRR '
b 575' - 0" Service Water Piping
- 2. Motor Generator 2. Div 2 RRR b Set Motor Rotor Piping (8 Tons)
First Floor 1. Div 2 RHR b
- 606' - 3" Service Water j Valve t
i V15-2010
- 3. Motor Generator Second Floor 1. Div 2 RRR b Set Generator 517' - 3" Service Water l (Without Rotor) Fiping (11 Tons) 2. Div 2 RRR b A
Fiping j 3. Div 2 RRR b
- 4. Motor Generator Valve l Set Generator V17-2016 Rotor (8 Tons) l l
) 2.3.2-24 .
i 100/R92A/1.72 2
1
TABLE 2.3.2 ENRICO FERMI UNIT 2 HEAVY LCAD HANDLING: LOAD / AREA IMPACT MATRIK
^
HOIST: MOTOR GENERATOR SET FLUID DRIVE NORTH AND SOUTH llOISTS - 20 TON EACH T3100E038 & 39 LOCATION BUILDING: REACTOR BUILDING 4TH FLOOR-NORTH REACTOR BUILDING 4TH FLOOR SOUTH IMPACT ALONG BUILDING COORDINATE LINE 12 1/2 ALONG BUILDING COORDINATE LINE10 1/2 AREA FROM COORDINATE LINE B TO B 1/2 FROM COORDINATE LINE B TO B 1/2 SAFETY RELATED HAZARD SAFETY RELATED HAZARD LOADS FLOOR /ELEV. EQUIPMENT ELIM. FLOOR /ELEV. EQUIPMENT ELIM.
CATEGORY Subbasement 1. Torus c Subbasement 1. Torus c
- 1. Motor Generator Set Fluid Drives 557' - 9" 2. Div I RHR b 557' - 9" (B31035001 A&B) Piping
- 1. Div 1 RilR b Basement 1. Div 2 EECW b Basement 562' - 0" Piping 562' - 0" Piping
- b
- b First Floor 1.
582' - 6" Piping 583' - 6" 2C-042
- Sce Cable 1 ray Index 2.3.2-25 100/R92A/1.73
7 TABLE 2.3.2 ENRICO FERMI UNIT 2 HEAVY LOAD HANDLING: LOAD / AREA IMPACT MATRIX HOIST: A MOTOR GENERATOR SET FLUID DRIVE NORTH AND SOUTH HOISTS - 20 TON EACH T3100E038 & 39 .,
LOCATION BUILDING: REACTOR BUILDING 4TH FLOOR-NORTH REACTOR BUILDING 4TH FLOOR SOUTH IMPACT ALONG BUILDING COORDINATE LINE 12 1/2 AREA ALONG BUILDING COORDINATE LINE10 1/2 FROM COORDINATE LINE B TO B 1/2 FROM COORDINATE LINE B TO B 1/2 LOADS SAFETY RELATED HAZARD SAFETY RELATED HAZARD FLOOR /ELEV. EQUIPMENT ELIM. FLOOR /ELEV. EQUIPMENT ELIM.
CATEGORY
- 1. Motor Generator Second Floor 1. Div 1 RHR b Second Floor 1. Div 2 EECW b Set Fluid Drives 613' - 6" Piping . 630' - 9" Service Water
- 2. RHR Valves b Pipe V8-2179 V8-2180 2.3.2-26 100/R92A/1.74
TABLE 2.3.2 ENRICO FERMI UNIT 2 HEAVY LOAD HANDLING: LOAD / AREA IMPACT MATRIX A
HOIST: CONTROL ROD DRIVE REPAIR HOIST - 3 TON - T3100E019 LOCATION BUILDING: REACTOR BUILDING 3RD FLOOR REACTOR BUILDING 3RD FLOOR 1
, IMPACT ALONG BUILDING COORDINATE LINE A 1/3 ALONG BUILDING COORDINATE LINE A 2/3 AREA FROM COORDINATE LINE 11 T'O 15 FROM COORDINATE LINE 11 TO 15 LOADS SAFETY RELATED HAZARD SAFETY RELATED HAZARD FLOOR /ELEV. EQUIPMENT ELIM. FLOOR /ELEV. EQUIPMENT ELIM.
CATEGORY i 1. CRD Transfer Cask Subbasement 1. Torus e Subbasement 1. Torus e (2 Tons) 541' - 3" 2. Div 1 RHR b,e 541' - 3" 2. Div 1 RHR b,e i (C1102E001) Piping Piping
! 3. Div 1 EECW b,e I
Piping 1
Basement 1. Div 2 RHR d,e Basement 1. Div 2 RHR b,e 570' - 0" Ser'vice Water 570' - 0" Piping Piping 2. Div 1 RHR b,e
- 2. Div 2 RHR b,e Piping i Piping
- 3. Div 1 RHR e Div 1 Cable Trays
- b,e Service Water IP-009 1P-001 Piping IC-009
- 4. Div 1 RHR e j Piping l
! Div 1 Cable Trays
- b,e i IP-009 1C007 1
i j
I
- See Cable Tray Index 2.3.2-27 100/R92A/1.75
. _ . _ . ~ . _ _ . _ . _ . _ _ . .-. _ -.-._. _ _ _ . . _ _ _ . . _ _ _ .
t
,4 TABLE 2.3.2 ENRICO FERMI UNIT 2 HEAVY LOAD HANDLING: LOAD / AREA IMPACT MATRIX A
HOIST: CONTROL ROD DRIVE REPAIR HOIST - 3 TON - T3100E019 1
LOCATION BUILDING: REACTOR BUILDING 3RD FLOOR REACTOR BUILDING 3RD FLOOR l
l IMPACT ALONG BUILDING COORDINATE LINE A 1/3 ALONG BUILDING COORDINATE LINE A 2/3 I AREA I FROM COORDINATE LINE 11 TO 15 FROM COORDINATE LINE _11 TO 15 t i
1 LOADS SAFETY RELATED HAZARD SAFETY RELATED HAZARD FLOOR /ELEV. EQUIPMENT ELI t! . FLOOR /ELEV. EQUIPMENT ELIM.
CATERGORY l
- 1. CRD Transfer Cask First Floor 1. Div 1 RHR b First Floor 1. Div 1 RHR b (2 Tons) 594' - 3" Piping 594' - 3" Piping Second Floor 1. Div 2 EECW e Second 1. Div 2 EECW b J
628' - 0" Service Water Floor Service Water i Piping 628' - 0" Piping
! 3. Div 1 EECW b,e 3. Div 1 EECW b P4400B001 r 4. Div 1 EECW b,e
! Piping
- 5. Div 1 EECW b,e j] Pump P4400C001A j a 6. Div 1 EECW e Service Water
{
j Piping i
1 1
I J
2.3.2-28 100/R92A/1.76 i
4 l
1
i TABLE 2.3.2 ENRIC3 FERMI UNIT 2 NEAVT LOA 7 NACDLING: LCAD/ AREA IMPACT MATRIK A
NOIST: NORTN AND SOUTN TORUS NATCN NOISTS LOCATION BUILDING: REACTOR BUILDING FIRST FLOOR REACTOR BUILDING FIRST FLOOR IMPACT ALONG BUILDING COORDINATE LINE 16 ALONG BUILDING COORDINATE LINE F
]
AREA 1
FROM COORDINATE LINE C 1/2 TO D FROM COORDINATE LINE 9 1/2 TO 10 i
] LOADS SAFETY RELATED NAZARD SAFETY RELATED NAZARD i
FLOOR /ELEY. EQUIPMENT ELIM. FLOOR /ELEV. EQUIPMENT ELIM.
j CATEGORT l
- 1. North Torus Subbasement 1. Torus c Subbasement 1. Torus c Concrete hatch 540' - 0" 540' - 0"
, Basement 1. Div 2 Core b 562' - 0" Spray Fiping
- 2. South Torus
- Concrete Hatch i
i l
! e I
t I
i l
l j 2.3.2-29 .
I 100/R92A/1.77 i
TABLE 2.3.2 ECRICO FERMI UCIT 2 HEAVY LOAD llANDLING: LCAD/ AREA IMPACT MATRIX A
HOIST: RCIC HOIST (15 TON) -
DIVISION 1 - T3100E031 LOCATION BUILDING: REACTOR BUILDING FIRST FLOOR IMPACT ALONG BUILDING COORDINATE LINE 16 1/2 ALONG BUILDING COORDINATE LINE AREA FROM COORDINATE LINE F TO F I/2 FROM COORDINATE LINE TO __
LOADS SAFETY RELATED II AZ A R D SAFETY RELATED llAZARD FLOOR /ELEV. EQUIPMENT ELIM. FLOOR /ELEV. EQUIPMENT ELIM.
CATEGORY
- b 562' - 0" 1K-015
- 2. RCIC Basement Floor Hatch
- 3. RCIC Pump E5101C001
- 4. RCIC Turbine E5101C002 "Sce Ca b l e Tray Index 2.3.2-30 100/R92A/1.78
TABLE 2.3.2 ENRICO FERMI UNIT 2 HEAVY LOAD HAN%LINC: LOAD / AREA IMPACT MATRIX A HOIST: HPCI HOIST (15 TON) - DIVISION 2 - T3100E030 LOCATION BUILDING: REACTOR BUILDING FIRST FLOOR IMPACT ALONG BUILDING COORDINATE LINE 9 1/2 ALONG BUILDING COORDINATE LINE AREA TO _H _ FROM COORDINATE LINE TO FROM COORDINATE LINE C_ _
SAFETY RELATED HAZARD SAFETY RELATED HAZARD LOADS ELIM.
FLOOR /ELEV. EQUIPMENT ELIM. FLOOR /ELEV. EQUIPMENT CATECORY HPCI Floor Shield Subbasement 1. HPCI Piping b 1.
Plugs (3) 540' - 0" Div 2 Cable Trays
E4101C001 Piping Div 1 Cable Trays
- b IC-005 DCIP-069 1P-024
- 3. HPCI Turbine E4101C002
- See Cable Tray Index Z.3. 2 !!
100/R92A/1.79
o TABLE 2.3.2 ENRICO FERMI UNIT 2 CEAVY LOAD HANDLING: LOAD / AREA IMPACT MATRIK A
HOIST: N&S RECIRCULATION PUMP GEARED HOISTS (2) - 24 TONS - T3100E015A & 16A (N & S - INSIDE DRYWELL - 15A & 16A)
(S - OUTSIDE DRYWELL - T3100E015 25 TONS)
LOCATION BUILDING: REACTOR BUILDING FIRST FLOOR ,
IMPACT ALONG A LINE FROM BUILDING COORDINATES ALONG A LINE FROM BUILDING AREA C 1/2, 11 3/4, TO B, 10 T3100E015A & SOUTH COORDINATES D 3/4, 12 1/2 TO E,12-3/4 DRYWELL & OUTER HOIST (605' - 7") T3100E016A - NORTH HOIST (605' -
7")
LOADS SAFETY RELATED HAZARD SAFETY RELATED HAZARD FLOOR /ELEV. EQUIPMENT ELIM. FLOOR /ELEV. EQUIPMENT ELIM.
CATECORY
- 1. Recirculation Subbasement 1. Torus c*** Subbasement 1. Torus c Motors (20 Ton) 540' - 0" 2. Div 2 RHR b 540' - 0" (83101) Piping Basement 1. HPCI Steam to b,c 562' - 0" Div 1 RHR Heat Exchanger Piping
- 4. Div 2 RHR b A Service Water Piping Div 2 Cable Trays
- b
- See Cable Tray Index
- South Recirc Pump hoist-drywell is T3100E015A 100/R92A/1.80
TABLE 2.3.2 ECRICO FERMI UNIT 2 HEAVY LOAD HANDLINC: L AD /ARE A IMPACT MATRIX HOIST: N&S RECIRCULATION PUMP GEARED HOISTS (2) - 24 TONS -T3100E015A & 16A (N & S - INSIDE DRYWELL - 15A & 16A)
(S - OUTSIDE DRYWELL - T3100E015 25 TON)
LOCATION BULLDING: REACTOR BUILDING FIRST FLOOR
- 4. Rotating Pump NOTE: Same as for Assembly (1.5 Ton) items 1, 2, (B3101C001 A&B) and 3 on pa ge 2.3.2-32 2 3.2-32a 100/R92A/l. 81
TABLE 2.3.2 ENRICO FERMI UNIT 2 HEAVY LOAD HANDLING: LOAD / AREA IMPACT MATRIX A
HOIST: RIIR DIVISION 1 AND DIVISION 2 FIRST FLOOR IIOIST TROLLEYS (16 TONS)
(2) T3100E026 AND T3100E027 LOCATION BUILDING: REACTOR BUILDING FIRST FLOOR REACTOR BUILDING FIRST FLOOR IMPACT ALONG BUILDING COORDINATE LINE A 3/4 ALONG BUILDING COORDINATE LINE A 3/4 AREA FROM COORDINATE LINE 14 TO 16 FROM COORDINATE LINE 9 TO 10 Division 1 - North Division 2 - South I SAFETY RELATED HAZARD LOADS SAFETY RELATED llAZ AR D FLOOR /ELEV. EQUIPMENT ELIM. FLOOR /ELEV. EQUIPMENT ELIM.
CATECORY North Floor 11a t c h Subbasement 1. Div 1 RilR b Subbasement 1. Div 2 RilR b 1.
541' - 11" Piping _
541' - 11" Piping
- 3. Div 1 RHR b 3. Div 2 RilR b Pump and Pump and Motor Motor
- 2. South Floor fla t c h Basement Div L Cable Trays
- 3. Division 1 and 2 RHR Pumps (E1102C001 A-D)
- 4. Division 1 and 2 RHR Motors (E1102C001 A-D) l
- Sce Cable Tray Index 2.3.2-33 100/R92A/1.82
TABLE 2.3.2 ENRICO FERMI UNIT 2 HEAVY LOAD HANDLING: LOAD / AREA IMPACT MATRIK
^
HOIST: RHR DIVISION 1 AND DIVISION 2 BASEMENT HOIST TROLLEYS (2) - T3100E024 & 25 j (16 TONS)
LOCATION BUILDING: REACTOR BUILDING REACTOR BUILDING
)
IMPACT ALONC BUILDING COORDINATE LINE A 3/4 ALONG BUILDING COORDINATE LINE A 3/4 AREA FROM COORDINATE LINE 14 TO 16 FROM COORDINATE LINE 9 TO 10 1/2 1 Division 1 Division 2 SAFETY RELATED II AZ AR D SAFETY RELATED HAZARD LOADS ELIM.
FLOOK/ELEV. EQUIPMENT ELIM. FLOOR /ELEV. EQUIPMENT CATECORY Div 1 RHR b Subbasement 1. Div 2 RHR b
- 1. North and South Subbasement 1.
541' - 11" Piping 541' -
11" Piping Floor Itatch Div 1 ECCW b - 2. Div 2 ECCW b
. (7 Tons Each) 2.
Piping Piping l
i Div 1 Cable Trays
- b Basement Div 2 Cable Trays
.1 2 RHR Pumps IC-009 1C-008 2C-020 2C-013 _
E1102C002A-D i 3. Division 1 and 2 i RHR Motors _
i E1102C001A-D I
4 l
}
"See Cable Tray Index 2.3.2-34 f
4 l 100/R92A/1.83 i
TABLE 2.3.2 ENRICO FERMI UDIT 2 HEAVY LCAD HACCLINC: LCA3/ AREA IMPACT MATRIK A
HOIST: CORE SPRAY DIVISION 1 and DIVISION 2 HOISTS (2) - (16 TON) - T3100E028 4 029 LOCATION BUILDING: REACTOR BUILDING FIRST FLOOR REACTOR BUILDING FIRST PLOOR IMPACT ALONG BUILDING COORDINATE LINE 15 1/2 ALONG BUILDING COORDINATE LINE F 1/2-AREA FROM COORDINATE LINE F 1/2 TO G FROM COORDINATE LINE 9 1/2 TO 10~~~
Division 1 (North) Division 2 (South)
LOADS SAFETY RELATED HAZARD SAFETY RELATED HAZARD FLOOR /ELEV. EQUIPMENT ELIM. FLOOR /ELEV. EQUIPMENT ELIM.
CATECORY
- 1. Core Spray Floor Subbasement 1. Div 1 Core b Subbasement 1. Div 2 Core b Hatch (2) 540' - 0" Spray Piping 540' - 0" Spray Piping b 2. Div 2 Core b (8.5 Tons Each) 2. Div 1 Core Spray Pump Spray Pump Motors Motors
- 2. Core Spray Basement Floor Basement 1. Div 1 Core b Basement 1. Div 2 Core b Hatch 562' - 0" Spray Piping 562' - 0" Spray Piping (8.5 Tons Each) 2. Div 1 EECW b 2. Div 2 EECW b Piping Piping
- 3. RCIC Piping b Div 2 Cable Trays
- b Div 1 Cable Trays
- 3. Core Spray Pump IK-016 1C-016 Motors IP-016 DCIP-016
- a. E2101-C001A
- b. ~.2101-C0015
- c. E2101-C001C
- d. E2101-C001D
- See Cable Tray Index 2.3.2-35 100/R92A/1.84
D R .
E T
X AT I LN C EE T RM A P M YI 3 TU T 4 EQ C E FE A 0 A P 0 S M 1 I 3 .
T V A E E - L R E A ) /
/ S R D N O A O O O T L L F 2
1 4
( R /
G O 3 Y C - O - R I L 3 D O L T F 1 R .C O S AME C N I T , ZI T A O S 2 ALA C H R / HEC I 1 D R F - - _
A O D N0 _
C O - S O3 L D o D E N0 G t E N 2 T T N G T IVD -
V N I N4 AT LRN2 A E D I/ LN SA2 E M L D3 EE E - V P L- RM CS1 a N I 5
I U I2 P RD7V 3 2 U B U1 YI AA0R .
Q B TU H 2S 3 T E R , EQ CM - - .
I O M4 FE SO2S 2 C E T O/ A IR2D U N C R1 S DFVA A F -
I E E M : R E .
R T NS V E S IE E F I : LT L O G A E L O H N AN / L C I I R E I D GD O W R L NR O Y C I OO L R E U LO F D B AC 2 I 3
2 E A R L TE O B CR O A AA D T N P O M T I I N 5 T E 8 A M .
C P I
O I
/
L U S Q A D E 2 A 9 E /
O 0 L t 0
1
1 TABLE 2.3.2 EERIC7 FERMI UNIT 2 HEAVY LOAD HANDLING: LOAD / AREA IMPACT MATRIX Il01ST: DIESEL GENERATOR MOTOR CONTROL CENTER DIVISION 1 NORTH AND SOUTH HOISTS - (2-4 TONS)
LOCATION BUILDING: FHR BUILDING UPPER FLOOR Rll R BUILDING UPPER FLOOR NORTil 1101 S T SOUTil 110 I ST IMPACT ALONG BUILDING COORDINATE LINE 6 1/2 ALONG BUILDING COORDINATE LINE 5 1/2 AREA FROM COORDINATE LINE E 1/2 TO F 1/2 FROM COORDINATE LINE E 1/2 TO F 1/2 (1 only) (2 Only)
LOADS SAFETY RELATED llAZARD SAFETY RELATED HAZARD FLOOR /ELEV. EQUIPMENT ELIM. FLOOR /ELEV. EQUIPMENT ELIM.
CATEGORY
- 1. Diesel Generator Grade Floor 1. Div 1 Diesel b Grade Floor 1. Div 1 Diesel b Division 1 590' Generator 590' - 0" Generator Cv11nder R30015001 R3001S002 Upper Floor 1. Div 1 4160 b Volt Switch-gear
- 2. Diesel Generator Division 1 Cylinder 2 . 3 . 2 - 3 f.
IOf'/R42A/1.F#,
TABLE 2.3.2 ECRICl FERMI UJIT 2 HEAVY LOAD IIAr ;LICC: LCAD/ AREA IMPACT HATRIX HOIST: DIESEL GENERATOR DIVISION 1 NORTH AND SOUTH HOISTS - (2-2 TONS)
LOCATION BUILDING: RilR BUILDING GRADE FLOOR Ril R BUILDING CRADE FLOOR NORTH HOIST SOUTil HOIST IMPACT ALONG BUILDING COORDINATE LINE 6 1/2 ALONG BUILDING COORDINATE LINE 5 1/2 AREA FROM COORDINATE LINE D TO C FROM COORDINATE LINE D TO G X3103-E-001 (1 Only) X3103-E-002 (2 Only)
LOADS SAFETY RELATED HAZARD SAFETY RELATED HAZARD FLOOR /ELEV. EQUIPMENT ELIM. FLOOR /ELEV. EQUIPMENT ELIM.
CATECORY
- 1. Diesel Generator Grade Floor 1. Div 1 Diesel b Grade Floor 1. Div 1 Diesel b Division 1 590' - 0" Generator 590' - 0" Generator R3001S001 R3001S002
- 2. Diesel Generator Division 1 l
l 2.3.2-37 100/R92A/1.87
TABLE 2.3.2 EC3ICO FERMI UNIT 2 HEAVY LOAS HANSLING: LCAD/ACEA INPACT MATRIK HOIST: DIESEL GENERATOR MOTOR CONTROL CENTER DIVISICQ 2 CORTC A23 SOUTH HOISTS -
(2-4 TONS)
LOCATION BUILDING: RNR BUILDING GRADE FLOOR RHR BUILDING GRADE FLOOR NORTH HOIST SOUTH HolST IMPACT ALONG BUILDING COORDINATE LINE 8 1/2 ALONG BUILDING COORDINATE LINE 7 1/2 AREA FROM COORDINATE LINE E 1/2 TO F 1/2 FROM COORDINATE LINE E 1/2 TO F 1/2 (1 Only) (2 Only)
SAFETY RELATED HAZARD SAFETY RELATED HAZARD LOADS ELIM.
FLOOR /ELEV. EQUIPMENT ELIM. FLOOR /ELEV. EQUIPMENT CATEGORY Grade Floor 1. Div 2 Diesel b Grade Floor 1. Div 2 Diesel b
- 1. Diesel Generator 590' - 0" Generator 590' - 0" Generator Division 2 Cylinder R300lS003 R30015004 Div 2 Motor b Upper Floor 1. Div 2 4160 b Upper Floor 1.
617' - 0" Control Center 617' - 0" Volt Switch-gear
- 2. Diesel Generator Division 2 Cylinder 2.3.2-38 100/R92A/1.88
i TABLE 2.3.2 ECRICO FERMI UDIT 2 NEAVT LOAD MANSLINC: LOAD / AREA IMPACT MATRIR HOIST: DIESEL CENERATOR DIVISION 2 NORTH AND SOUTH HOISTS -
(2-2 TONS)
LOCATION BUILDING: RHR BUILDING CRADE FLOOK RHR BUILDING GRADE FLOOR
! NORTH HOIST SOUTH HOIST j IMPACT ALONG BUILDING COORDINATE LINE 8 1/2 ALONG BUILDING COORDINATE LINE 7 1/2 j AREA J
FROM COORDINATE LINE D TO G FROM COORDINATE LINE D TO C j (1 Only) (2 Only)
SAFETY RELATED HAZARD SAFETY RELATED HAZARD i LOADS ELIM.
FLOOR /ELEV. EQUIPMENT ELIM. FLOOR /ELEV. EQUIPMENT i
CATECORY
- 1. Diesel Generator Crade Floor 1. Div 2 Diesel b Grade Floor 1. Div 2 Diesel b l Generator i Division 2 590' - 0" Cenerator 590' - 0" R3001S003 R300lS004 Div 2 Motor b Upper Floor 1. Div 2 4160 b Upper Floor 1.
617' -
O' Control Center 617' - 0" Volt Switch-gear 4
j 2. Diesel Generator ,
j Division 2 i
I t
1 1
I 2.3.2-39 1
l 100/R92A/1.89 i
?
TABLE 2.3.2 ENRICO FERMI UDIT 2 HEAVY LCAD HAO% LING: LOAD / AREA IMPACT MATRIX HOIST: VENTILATION EQUIPMENT HOIST - 8 TONS LOCATION BUILDING: AUXILIARY BUILDING FIFTH FLOOR IMPACT ALONG BUILDING COORDINATE LINE 11 3/4 ALONG BUILDING COORDINATE LINE AREA FROM COORDINATE LINE G TO H FROM. COORDINATE LINE TO LOADS SAFETY RELATED HAZARD SAFETY RELATED HAZARD FLOOR /ELEV. EQUIPMENT ELIM. FLOOR /ELEV. EQUIPMENT ELIM.
CATEGORY
- 1. Ventilation Basement 1. Div 2 Control b,e Equipment 551' - 0" Air System Compressor P5002D002
- 2. Div 2 Control b,e Air Piping
- 3. Div 2 Control b,e Air Receiver P5002A002
- 4. Div 2 Control b,e Air Dryer P5002D004,6,8
- 5. Div 2 Control b,e Air Fan Coil Unit
- 6. Div 2 EECW b,e Piping Div 2 Cable Trays
- See Cable Tray In cl e x 2.3.2-40 100/R92A/1."0 ,
TABLE 2.3.2 ENRIC3 FERMI UNIT 2 HEAVY LOAD HANDLING LOAQ/ AREA IMPACT MATRIK HOIST: VENTILATION EQUIPMENT HOIST -
8 TON ,
LOCATION BUILDING: AUXILIARY BUILDING FIFTH FLOOR ,__
s IMPACT ALONG BUILDING COORDINATE LINE 11 3/4 ALONG BUILDING COORDINATE LINE AREA FROM COORDINATE LINE G TO U FROM COORDINATE LINE TO LOADS SAFETY RELATED HAZARD SAFETY RELATED HAZARD FLOOR /ELEV. EQUIPMENT ELIM. FLOOR /ELEV. EQUIPMENT ELIM.
CATEGORY
- 1. Ventilation Basement Div 1 Cable Trays
^
Second Floor Div i Cable Trays
- See Cable Tray Index 2.3.2-41 100/R92A/1.91 I
KEY TO TABLE 2.3.2 Safety-Related System Safety-Related Symbol Control Rod Drive System CRD Residual Heat Removal System RHR Core Spray System Core Spray High Pressure Coolant Injection HPCI System Reactor Core Isolation Cooling RCIC System Automatic Depressurization ADS System Residual Heat Removal Service RHR Service Water Water System Control Air System Control Air Diesel Generators Diesel Generators Emergcucy Eqeipment Cooling EECW Water System Emergency Equipment Cooling Water EECW Service Water Service Water System Hazard Elimination Categories
- a. Crane travel for this area / load combination prohibited by electrical interlocks or mechanical stops.
- b. System redundancy and separation precludes loss of capability of system to perform its safety-related function following this load drop in this area.
- c. Site-specific considerations eliminate the need to consider load /
equipment combination.
- d. Likelihood of handling system failure for this load is extremely small (i.e., Section 5.1.6 NUREG-0612 satisfied) .
- e. Analysis demonstrates that crane failure and resulting load drop will not damage safety-related equipment when load lift heights comply with calculated permissible lif ting heights. A 2.3.2-42 100/R92A/1.92
SYSTEM CODE INDEX System Code System Identification B21 Nuclear Boiler System B31 Reactor Recirculating System C11 Control Rod Drive Hydraulic System C32 Feedwater Control System C35 Feedwater Control Remote Shutdown System C51 Neutron Monitoring System C71 Reactor Protection System C91 Computer System D11 Process Radiation Monitoring System D21 Area Radiation Monitoring System D30 Seismic Monitoring System E10 ECCS Leak Detection System E11 Residual Heat Removal System E21 Core Spray System E41 High Pressure Coolant Injection System E51 Reactor Core Isolation System F17 Under Vessel Servicing Equipment Gil Radwaste System G33 Reactor Water Cleanup System G41 Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup System C51 Torus Water Management H30 Annunciators and Sequence Recording System H50 Bearings and Motor Winding Temperature Monitoring System Hil Control and Auxiliary Panel P44 Emergency Equipment Cooling Water System P45 Emergency Equipment Service Water System P50 Compressed Air Systems R14 Switchgear R16 480 Volt Motor Control Distribution Center R30 Standby Emergency Power System R32 28/48 Volt Battery System R37 Engineer's Test System T23 Containment System T41 Heating, Ventilation and Air Conditioning T47 Containment Atmosphere Cooling Systems T48 Containment Atmosphere Control Systems TSO Primary Containment Atwosphere Monitoring System X41 Heating, Ventilatfon and Air Conditioning System X80 Fire Protection System X82 Fire Detection System 2.3.2-43 100/R92A/1.93
CABLE TRAY INDEX Y ,a Page 2.3.2-3 yt i
, I ,7 , f Div 1 Cable Trays .
,;,t h .
IP-009 1C-008 1K-008 Ell E11 B21 R16 Gil B31 P44 CSI R31 Ell 1P-011 T23 T50 Ell T41 R16 T50 1K-032 B21 1C-001 1C-009 B31 C71 C71 C51 Ell Ell E10 E21 Gil T50 E41 CSI E51 P44 G51 R31 Hil T23 P44 T41 R31 T48 T23 T50 T41 T47 T48 IC-100 T50 C71 Ell 1C-002 E21 C71 E41 i
Ell E51 E21 Gil E41 G51 E51 Hll G51 P44 Hll T23 P44 T47 R31 T48 T23 T50 T41 T47 T48 1C-004 T50 B21 Example:
B31 C51 B21 - See System E11 System Code Index TSO Code 2.3.2-44 100/R92A/1.94 i
t CABLE TRAY INDEX, CONT'D s Page 2.3.2-4 Div 1 Cable Trays Div 2 Cable Trays 2C-089 IP-032 C-11 B21 T-48 E11 P44 R16 R32 T47 IP-033 B21 Ell G33 P44 T47 T48 1K-038 B21 B31 C11 Gil H50 T47 TSO IC-046 B21 Ell E21 P44 R16 R31 R32 T41 T47 T48 T50 Example B21 -
See System System Code Index ,
Code 2.3.2-45 100/R92A/1.95
CABLE TRAY INDEX, CONT'D Page 2.3.2-6 Div 1 Cable Trays IK-038 B21
'i B31
'C11 Gil H50 T47 T50 Div 2 Cable Trays 2K-023 2K-055 B21 B21 B31 B31 Dll C11 Ell D21 E21 D30 E41 Gil E51 G33 P44 H50 T48 T47 T50 T50 1
4 2K-056 Cll 2K-054 B31 D30 G33 H50 T47 f
' Example :
1 B21 - See System System Code Index Code i
2.3 2-46 t 100/R92A/1.96 I
t 1
CABLE TRAY INDEX, CO E'D Page 2.3.2-8 Div 2 Cable Trays 2K-001 2C-016 B21 C32 B31 Ell 2C-076 C51 E21 B21 E10 E41 Ell Ell E51 E21 E41 G51 E41 T50 P44 E51 R31 G33 T41 T50 2K-005 T50 B21 C51 2C-007 E10 2C-018 C32 Ell C32 Ell E21 Ell E21 E41 E21 E41 E51 E41 E51 T50 E51 G51 G51 P44 P44 R31 2C-014 R31 T41 C32 T41 T50 Ell T50 E41 E51 2P-009 Gil 2C-042 Ell G51 B21 T41 R31 Ell T23 E21 T41 Gil DC2P-009 T50 P44 Ell R14 E41 R16 E51 2C-015 T47 Ell T48 E21 E41 E51 2C-053 Gil B21 Example:
G51 C32 P44 Ell B21 -
See System T23 E21 System Code Index T50 E41 Code E51 G33 c51 P44 R31 T41 T48 T50 2.3.2-47 100/R92A/1.97
CABLE TRAY INDEX, C0hT'D Page 2.3.2-9 Page 2.3.2-10 Div.2 Cable Trays Div 1 Cable Trays 2C-064 1K-037 B21 C11 Ell T47 E21 E41 E51 1K-038 G33 B21 TSO B31 Cll Gil 2C-066 H50 Ell T47 E21 T50 TSO Example:
B21 -
See System System Code Index Code I
I I
l j 2,3,2-48 l 100/R92A/1.98 i - -- .- -- -..__ ._ . - . _ ._. . _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ .___ __ _. ___ __
CABLE TRAY INDEX, C0hT'D Page 2.3.2-11 Div 2 Cable Trays 2K-005 2C-019 B21 B21 CSI Ell E10 E21 Ell E41 E21 E51 E41 G51 E51 P44 T50 R32 T23 T41 2K-007 T50 B21 C51 E10 DC2P-013 Ell Ell E21 E41 E41 E51 E51 TSO 2P-038 Ell 2C-015 Gil Ell P44 E21 R16 E41 R31 E51 T47 Gil, G51 P44 2P-079 T23 R16 T50 R31 T50 2C-013 C32 2K-050 Ell Cll E41 Gil R31 T41 Example:
TSO B21 -
See System System Code Index Code
( 2.3.2-49 l
100/R92A/1.99
CABLE TRAY INDEX, CONT'D Page 2.3.2-12 Div 1 Cable Trays IP-011 1K-008 1C-037 C51 B21 Dil Gil B31 G51 G33 C51 R31 T47 Ell T41 T50 T46 T48 1C-002 C71 1K-032 Ell B21 E21 B31 E41 - C51 E51 E10 G51 T50 H11 P44 R31 1K-035 T23 C11 T41 T47 T47 T48 T50 1P-035 B21 Ell 1C-009 P44 C71 R16 Ell R32 C11 T47 G51 P44 R31 1C-001 T23 C71
- T41 Ell T48 E21 TSO E41 E51 G51 Hll l P44 R31 Example:
i T23 T41 B21 -
See System T47 System Code Index T48 Code T50 l
2 3.2-50
! 100/R92A/1.100 l
t CABLE TRAY INDEX, CONT'D ,
Page 2.3.2-13 Div 1 Cable Trays f
IP-032 B21 E11 P44 R16 R32 T47 1C-046 B21 E11 E21 P44 R16 R31 T41 3
T47 T48 T50 Example:
l B21 -
See System System Code Index Code
! 2.3.2-51 l 100/R92A/1.101
, . , , _ . -,,.--,.y_ -.. ._-.. -.7,i ,,r-,,, , , - _ , . , , , _ . _ , , , _ . , , - , . ,,y, , , , , , _ _m,,y. y.,-. -__ ,,. --
CABLE TRAY INDEX, CONT'D Page 2.3.2-14 Div 2 Cable Trays 2P-007 2C-015 2C-102 B31 E11 B31 C51 E21 C51 C11 E41 Gil G33 E51 G33 P44 Gil G41 T47 G51 P44 P44 T47 T23 2P-010 T50 Ell 2C-103 P50 CSI R16 2C-017 Gil T41 B21 G33 Ell P44 E21 T47 2P-011 Gil C51 G51 Gil R32 2K-005 G33 T41 B21 T47 T48 C51 E10 E11 2P-012 2C-100 E21 B31 B21 E41 CSI B31 E51 Gil C51 T50 G33 E11 P44 G11 G33 G41 2P-023 P44 E11 T47 T41 2C-101 DC2P-023 B21 Example:
Ell Ell E41 Gil B21 - See System E51 T47 System Code Code Index 2C-104 2P-006 B31 B31 C51 C51 Gil Ell G33 Gil G41 G33 P44 P44 T47 2.3.2-52 100/R92A/1.102 y y . , , . . - ., -
CABLE TRAY INDEX, C0hT'D Page 2.3.2-16 Page 2.3.2-17 Div 1 Cable Trays Div 1 Cable Trays IK-035 1P-032 C11 B21 T47 Ell P44 R16 1P-001 R32 B21 T47 E31 C51 Ell Div 2 Cable Tray F17 G11 2C-089 P44 C71 P50 T48 T47 T48 1P-002 Ell P44 P50 T48 1C-106 B21 B31 C51 D21 Ell E21 Gil G33 P44 l'
P50
, T47 l T48 Example
' B21 -
See System System Code Index f Code i
l
(
2.3.2-53 100/R92A/1.103 l
l
CABLE TRAY INDEX, CONT'D Page 2.3.2-18 Page 2.3.2-19 (CONT'D)
Div 1 Cable Trays IP-035 1P-011 B21 Ell Ell R16 P44 R16 R32 1C-009 T47 C71 Ell Gil 1C-047 G51 B21 P44 C71 R31 Ell T23 E21 T41 E41 T48 E51 TSO G51 Hll P44 R16 Page 2.3.2-19 R31 Div 1 Cable Trays R32 T41
' T47 1P-001 T48 B21 T50 B31 C51 Ell 1K-032 F17 B21' Gil B31 G33 c51 P44 E10 P50 TSO T47
. T48 1P-009 Example:
Ell R16 B21 -
See System System Code Index 1P-032 Code B21 Ell P44 R16 R32 T47 2.3.2-54 100/R92A/1.104
CABLE TRAY INDEX, CONT'D Page 2.3.2-20 Div 2 Cable Trays 2K-001 2P-008 B21 Eli B31 T41 C51 E10 Ell 2P-009 E41 Ell TSO T41 2C-013 DC2P-009 C32 Ell Ell E41 E41 E51 Gil R31 T41 T50 2C-014 C32 Ell E51 Gil G51 R31 T23 T41 TSO 2C-020 l T23 i
/
' Example:
B21 -
See. System System Code Index Code l
l l
2.3.2-55 100/R92A/1.105
CABLE TRAY INDEX, C0hT'D Page 2.3.2-21 Div 2 Cable Trays 2K-007 1C-002 1P-011 B21 C71 Ell C51 E11 R16 E10 E21 Ell E41 1C-047 E21 E51 B21 E41 G51 C71 E51 H11 Ell T50 P44 E21 R31 E41 T23 E51 2P-079 _ T41 G51 R16 T47 H11 R31 T48 P44 T50 T50 R16 R31 R32 1C-100 T23 Div 1 Cable Trays C71 T41 Ell T47 1C-001 E21 T48 C71 E41 T50 Ell E51 E21 Gil IP-035 E41 G51 B21 E51 Hil Ell G51 P44 P44 H11 T23 R16 P44 T47 R32 R31 T48 T47 T23 T50 T41 T47 T48 IK-028 TSO B21 B31 C51 E10 Ell T50 Example:
B21 -
See System System Code Index Code 2.3.2-56 100/R92A/1.106
t CABLE TRAY INDEX, CONT'D s P gs 2.3.2-22 s Div 2 Cable Trays Div 1 Cable Trays 2K-001 1P-029 1C-113 (CONT'D)
B21 E11-3 P50 B31 R16-1 T41 C51 T47 E10 1P-034 T48 Ell G33 E41 P44 1C-112 T50 R16 B21 R32 Ell 2C-013 T47 E21 C32 T48 E41 Ell E51 E41 DClP-029 G51 Gil E41 H21 R31 E51 P44 T41 R14 TSO 1P-040 R16 P44 R30 2C-014 R16 R31 C32 R32 R32 _
T41 T41 Ell {
E41 T47 -
=
Gil B21 TSO G51 E10 R31 E21 1C-040 T23 E41 B21 T41 E51 C71 T50 Gil Ell E21 2C-020 1C-100 E41 4
T23 C71 E51 Ell G33 2P-008 E21 G51 Ell E41 H21 T41 E51 P44 Gil P50 2P-009 G51 R14 Ell H11 R16 T41 P44 R30 T23 R31 DC2P-009 T47 R32 Ell T48 T41 E41 T50 T47 E51 T48 1C-113 T50 B21 C71 Example:
Ell B21 -
See System G33 System Code Index G51 Code 2.3.2-57 100/R92A/1.107
- - . _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _l
CABLE TRAY INDEX, CONT'D Page 2.3.2-23 Div 1 Cable Trays IP-Oll Ell R16 IP-035 B21 Ell P44 R16 R32 T47 Div 2 Cable Trays 2K-023 B21 B31 Dll Ell E21 E41 E51 P44 T48 T50 2C-089 C71 T48 Example:
B21 -
See System System Code Index Code 2.3.2-58 100/R92A/1.108
CABLE TRAY INDEX, C0h'I'D Page 2.3.2-25 Div 1 Cable Trays 2K-001 2C-042 B21 B21 B31 Ell C51 E21 E10 Gil Ell P44 E41 R14 T50 R16 T47 T48 2K-023 B21 B31 2P-009 Dil Ell Ell T41 E21 E41 '
E51 DC2P-009 P44 Ell T48 E41 T50 E51 2C-014 C32 Ell E41 E51 Gil G51 R31 T23 T41 TSO l
Example:
B21 -
See System System Code Index Code 2.3.2-59 100/R92A/1.109
CABLE TRAY INDEX, C0hT'D Page 2.3.2-27 Div 1 Cable Trays IP-001 B21 B31 C51 Ell Fil Gil G33 P44 P50 T47 T48 1P-009 Ell R16 ,
IC-007 Ell T41 T48 TSO IC-009 C71 Ell Gil G51 P44 R31 T23 T41 i T48 i T50 Example:
B21 -
See System System Code Index i
Code 1
2.3.2-60 100/R92A/1.110 l
I
CABLE TRAY INDEX, CONT'D Page 2.3.2-30 Page 2.3.2-31 Div 1 Cable Trays Div 1 Cable Trays IK-015 1C-005 B21 Ell E51 H30 P45 P50 R14 R30 R37 T41 X41 X80 X82 1P-024 Ell E21 R16 DCIP-069 E41 E51 Div 2 Cable Tray 2P-001 T41 Example:
B21 -
See System Code Code Index System 2.3.2-61 100/R92A/1.lli
CABLE TRAY INDEX, CONT'D Page 2.3.2-32 Page 2.3.2-33 Div 2 Cable Trays Div 1 Cable Trays 2K-001 1C-008 B21 E11 B31 Gil C51 P44 E10 R31 E11 T23 E41 T41 T50 T50 2C-014 1C-009 C32 - C71 E11 E11 E41 Gil E51 G51 Gil P44 i G51 . R31 R31 T23 T23 T41 T41 T48 T50 T50 2P-009 IP-011 E11 E11 T41 R16 DC2P-009 E11 E41 E51 Example :
B21 -
See System System Code Index Code 2.3.2-62 100/R92A/1.112
e CABLE TRAY INDEX, CONT'D ,
Page 2.3.2-34 Div 1 Cable Trays Div 2 Cable Trays IP-009 2P-008 Ell Ell R16 T41 1C-007 2K-001 Eli B21 T41 B31 T48 C51 TSO E10 Ell E41 1C-008 T50 Ell Gil P44 2C-020 R31 T23 T23 T41 T50 2C-013 C32 Ell IC-009 E41 C71 Gil Ell R31 Gil T41 G51 TSO P44 R31 T23 T41 T48 TSO Example:
B21 -
See System System Code Index Code 2.3.2-63 100/R92A/1.113
CABLE TRAY INDEX, C0hT'D Page 2.3.2-35 Div 1 Cable Trays Div 2 Cable Trays 1K-016 2C-023
+ B21 E21 E21 E51 i E41 T41 E51 Gil
> 2P-016 E21 I 1C-016 E21 1 E41 E51 Gil T41 1P-016 l E21 T41 i
i DC1P-016
! E51 s
i i
1 1
Example:
! B21 -
See System System Code Index i
Code i
l J.
2.3.2-64 100/R92A/1.114 J
y e--s-.,
,, , . ,m, - , , , , , , - - - . , , , , , , - - , . , ,,-,,-~na .,-,.,nn, - - - - ~ . - - - . - - = - - - - - -.-,,-------,--,,,,-m a--- - - -
c CABLE TRAY INDEX, CONT'D Page 2.3.2-40 Div 2 Cable Trays 2K-020 2C-027 B21 E11 C91 E21 E10 E51 Ell P50 E21 R30 E41 R32 P45 T33 R30 T50 TSO X41 X82 Example:
B21 -
See System System Code Index Code 2.3.2-65 100R92A/1.115
CABLE TRAY INDEX, C0hT'D Page 2.3.2-41 Div 1 Cable Trays Div 2 Cable Trays 1K-022 1C-058 2C-062 C91 C35 B21 Ell E11 C32 G33 P44 C35 H50 R14 C71 P45 R31 D11 R14 Ell
- R30 E21 X41 1C-059 E41 X82 B21 E51 D11 G33 Ell G51 1P-024 E21 Hll Ell E41 P44 E21 E51 P50 R16 G51 R14 P44 R30 P50 T41 1C-005 R14 T46 Ell R30 T47 H30 R37 T4B P45 T41 T50 P50 T46 T51 R14 T48 X41 R30 T50 X42 R37 T51 X80 T41 X82 X80 X82 2C-063 B21 C71
! E41 Hll f R14 T41 T46 l
Example:
B21 -
See System System Code Index Code l
l l
2.3.2-66 100R92A/1.116
2.3.2.b Far ccch intar:ction idsntified, indic:te which cf the leed end impact area combinations can be eliminated because of separation and redundancy of safety-related equipment, mechanical stops and/or electrical interlocks, or other site-specific considera-tions. Elimination on the basis of the aforementioned considera-tions should be supplemented by the following specific informa-tion:
- 1) For load / target combinations eliminated because of separa-tion and redundancy of safety-related equipment, discuss the basis for determining that load drops will not affect continued system operation (i.e., the ability of the system to perf orm its safety-related function) .
- 2) Where mechanical stops or electrical interlocks are to be provided, present details showing the areas where crane travel will be prohibited.
Additionally, provide a. discussion concerning the procedures that are to be used for authorizing the bypassing of inter-locks or removable stops, and for verifying that interlocks are restored to operability after operations which require bypassing have been completed.
s 2.3.2-67 100/R92A/1.ll7
e
- 3) Where load / target combinations are eliminated on the basis of other, site-specific considerations (e.g., maintenance sequencing), provide present and/or proposed technical specifications and discuss administrative procedur'es or physical constraints invoked to ensure the validity of such considerations.
RESPONSE: A. REACTOR BUILDING CRANE MAIN HOIST
, Item No. 1 Drywell Head Floor strength analysis verifies that an inadvertant Drywell Head load drop failure up to a maximum drop height of 5'6" will not damage safety-related equipment in close proximity to the Drywell Head travel path and laydown area. Maintenance Procedure No.
35.000.81 references the designated travel path and specify the A safe height limitations for handling of the Drywell Head. System separation and redundancy of potentially affected safety systems l
also provides additional protection against the inability of these systems to perform their safety-related functions in these areas. Only Division I safety systems are located below the l
Drywell Head travel path except for the power supply to two Division II services that will already be in their fail safe position.
2.3.2-68 100/R92A/1.ll8 1
t
. Items No. 2a and b Reactor Shield Plugs The Reactor Shield Plugs load drop analysis verifies that there is adequate floor strength to withstand a load drop from a maximum height of 5 feet, thus providing adequate protection for safety-equipment located along the Shield Plug travel paths and laydown areas. Maintenance Procedure No. 35.000.80 re ference s the load height limits and the designated travel paths for the Reactor Shield Plugs.
Item No. 3 R.P.V. Service Platform The Reactor Pressure Vessel Service Platform Lifting Lugs are up-graded to meet single-failure proof guidelines. The specific slings for the RPV service platform also meets single-failure-proof guidelines. Therefore, the~ handling of this platform with the main hoist meets single-failure proof requirements.
Maintenance Procedure No. 35.000.74 defines the designated travel A data for the Reactor Service Platform.
Item No. 4 Vessel Head Insulation The specific slings designated to handle the Vessel Head Insu-lation are designed to meet single-failure proof guidelines. The Insulation lifting lugs also meet single-failure-proof guide-l lines. Therefore, the handling of the Reactor Vessel Insulation l
with the main hoist meets single-failure proof criteria.
Maintenance Procedure No. 35.000.121 references the designated travel data for the Vessel Head Insulatian, l
l 2.3.2-69 100/R92A/1.119 l
I i
Items No. 5 and 6 Reactor Pressure Vessel Head Strongback and Reactor Pressure Vessel Head The Reactor Pressure Vessel Head is removed only during cold shutdown conditions and only with its special lifting d'evice, the Reactor Pressure Vessel Head Strongback. The Torus is not re-quired to maintain cold shutdown and sufficient redundancy exists such that a postulated load drop will not cause the loss of other safety functions. Additionally, load / floor analysis demonstrates that a load drop will not damage any safety-related equipment away from the Reactor Vessel if the RPV Head is not carried more than 4 feet above the floor along its travel path and laydown area. Maintenance Procedure No. 35.000.83 references travel path and lift limits. ,
The handling of the RPV Head over the Reactor Vessel meets the criteria of NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.6 for single-failure proof handling systems, with the following comments:
2.3.2-70 100/R92A/1.120
- 1. General Electric has stated that the RPV Head Lifting lugs do meet the criteria of NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.6(3).
Further Edison review has confirmed this.
i
- 2. General Electric, however, has stated that the RPV head l i
strongback lifting device has several components that do not i i
meet the additional design strength criteria of ANS1 N14.6, Section 6.2. Based upon General Electric recommendations, modifications were made to upgrade the Strongback to meet ;
the Section 6.2, Single Failure Proof Strength Guidelines ,
for the maximum combined static and dynamic forces imposed A I
upon this dsvice.
I As stated in Section 2.1.3.d, these modifications were completed prior to the first post critical use of this device.
The direct redundant attachment of the Strongback to the Reactor Building Crane Main Hook, assures that single failure proof i
guidelines are met whenever this lif ting device is carried unloaded from its storage location to the Drywell area, or RPV Head or Drywell Head Leydown Locations.
2.3.2-70a 100/R92A/1.121
Item No. 7 Storage Pool Slot Plugs Sufficient redundancy in Division 2 safety-related equipment exists for any load drop of the Storage Pool Slot Plugs, to pre-clude the loss of safety functions. The Storage Pool Slot Plugs will be removed only when the reactor is in a cold shutdown con-dition when the Torus is not required. Load drop analysis of the Storage Pool Slot Plugs along their load travel paths demon-strates no damage to any safety-related equipment from a maximum load drop height up to 7 feet 0 inches above the refueling floor.
Maintenance Procedure No. 35.000.115 references the 7'0" height limitation for any lift of the Storage Pool Slot Plugs along their designated respective travel paths.
Item No. 8 Fuel Pool Slot Plugs The Fuel Pool Slot Plug Lifting Lugs are designed to meet single-failure proof guidelines. Specific slings designated to A
handle this load also meet single-failure proof guidelines.
Therfore, the handling of these plugs with the main hoist meets single-failure proof criteria. There is also sufficient redun-dancy and separation of safety-related equipment below the designated travel path for these plugs to provide additional in-depth protection for the handling of these loads. Maintenance Procedure No. 35.000.113 references the designated travel path for the Fuel Pool Slot Plugs.
2.3.2-71 100/R92A/1.122
Item No. 9 Stud Tensioner System redundancy and separation preclude loss of capability to perform safety-related functions in the load drop area of the Stud Tensioner. The Stud Tensioner is only moved in the reactor vessel vicinity to remove and reinstall reactor vessel studs during cold shutdown. Maintenance Procedure No. 35.000.82 references a maximum limit of 12 feet for this load to be lifted A above the floor. Load drop analysis of other loads having greater impact potential, which follow the same load travel path, provides verification that there is adequate floor strength to withstand a potential load drop of the Stud Tensioner within this height limitation.
Items No. 10, 11 and 22 Steam Drver, Steam Separator and Drver/ Separator Sling The redundant direct attachment of the Dryer / Separator Sling to the Reactor Building Crane Main Hook has sufficient strength to meet single failure proof guidelines whenever this lifting device is moved, unloaded, to and from its storage location in the Equipment Pool to the Drywell area. The St:3m Dryer and Steam Separator are only moved during cold shutdown. Steam Dryer and A
Steam Separator floor drop analyses demonstrate no damage to any safety-related equipment away from the Reactor Vessel when dropped from their maximum respective heights of 12 feet and 9 feet. Maintenance Proce."ure Nos. 35.000.84 and 35.000.85 reference height limitations for these loads whenever they are A carried along their designated load travel paths and laydown i
l areas.
l 2.3.2-72 l
l 100/R92A/1.123
Additionclly, safsty-ralstsd cystsa redund2ncy pr2cludes gny eys-ten from performing its safety-related function when these loads could possibly be dropped.
The dryer / separator lif. ting lugs have sufficient strength to meet single failure proof guidelines of NUREG 0612 - Section 5.1.6. l The Dryer / Separator lif ting device was modified to meet ANSI l N14.6-1978, Section 6.2 Single Failure Proof Guidelines for the lg maximum combined static and dynamic load forces. These l modif"ications were completed in May 1986 prior to post-criticality handling of the Dryer / Separator.
Item No. 12 Storace Pool Gate Movement of the 14 ton Storage Pool Gate during a refueling outage is from its operating location to a location within the Storage Pool, where it will be secured to the side of the pool.
2.3.2-73 100/R92A/1.124
ESF located below the Storage Pool have sufficient redundancy and separation to preclude the complete loss of a system due to a potential load drop. Also, the handling of this gate With the main hoist does meet single-failure proof criteria.
Item No.13 Fuel Pool Cates A & B Movement of the Fuel Pool Gates during a refueling outage is from their operating location to their storage location along the same A
(south) wall of the Fuel Storage Pool, where the gates are to be secured to the wall. The handling of these gates with the main hoist meets single-failure proof criteria. This includes the lifting lugs for these gates. Maintenance Procedure 35.000.89 describes the handling activities of the Fuel Pool Gates.
l i
2.3.2-73a 100/R92A/1.125
Item No. 15 Spent Fuel Cask Handling / hoisting procedures and administrative controls for the Spent Fuel Cask are described in the Enrico Fermi 2 Fin'al Safety Analysis Report, Section 9.1. The likelihood of a handling sys-tem failure for this load has been demonstrated and accepted as being extremely small.
Items No. 16 and 17 Concrete Floor Hatch (Co. E-1/2 1/2) and the RWCU Demineralizer Concrete Floor Plugs The concrete floor hatch located at building coordinates E-1/2 -
10-1/2 will be handled by the auxiliary hoist or by the Portable Gantry Hoist. The RWCU demineralizer concrete floor plugs are outside the coverage area of the Reactor Building Hoist. These A
plugs will be handled by the Portable Gantry Hoist. This hoist and the Maintenance Procedure 35.000.132 covering the use of this portable hoist are in accordance with NUREG-0612 guidelines and were implemented prior to the handling of these plugs after initial operation.
I 2.3.2-74 100/R92A/1.126
Item No. 18 Equipment Hatch Cover The Equipment Hatch Cover is hinged on one edge and moves from a closed horizontal position to a vertical open position by the use f
of a floor mounted winch. The hinged edge of the cover remains f astened to the floor framing and the cover dimensions exceed the opening dimensions which precludes the cover from falling through the opening.
i If necessary, the hatch cover can be completely removed from the opening using the main hoist and rigging that meet single failure proof criteria.
A Item No. 21 Shielding Chute l
The handling of the Shielding Chute witn the Main Hoist meets single-failure-proof criteria. There is also sufficient redun-dancy and separation of safety systems located below the Shielding Chute to provide additional in-depth protection in the handling of this load. In addition, the Shielding Chute is handled during a cold shutdown refueling outage when these safety systems are no longer required.
Maintenance Procedure No. 35 000.87 defines the handling criteria for the Shielding Chute.
l l
2 3.2-75
! 100/R92A/1.127 l
B. REACTOR BUILDING AUXILIARY CRANE HOIST LOADS
- 1. Analysis of the reactor building fifth floor has shown that there is sufficient strength to withstand a free fall load drop up to 12 feet for loads handled by the auxiliary hoist, weighing up to the hoist's maximum rating of 5 tons. This hoist will be handling various loads including maintenance tools, equipment lifting fixtures, etc. Maintenance procedure 32.000.07 will be ;
followed including specification of the 12 foot height limita ti on t for the handling of these loads. l
- 2. The Reactor Building first floor strength under the equipment hatch location is adequate to withstand a five ton free fall load +
drop up to 4-3/4' feet for heavy loads handled by the auxiliary hoist or any other non-single failure proof hoist. At heights greater than 4-3/4 feet above the first floor under the equipment hatch, an energy adsorption mat will be placed on the first floor under the suspended load. This collision mat is designed to ,
withstand the impact of a five ton load drop from the auxiliary hoist maximum hook elevation position. This collision mat will I
be available prior to the handling of any heavy loads with the auxiliary hoist or any other non-single failure proof hoist af ter l initial plant operation. Heavy loads otherwise will be handled i
- by the main hoist in accordance with single failure proof j guidelines. l 1
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- 3. The Auxiliary Hoist has a 2000 pound load limit switch which is i used when lifting a heavy load over the fuel pool or open reactor. This load limit can be bypassed by a switch in the control cab to allow the Auxiliary Hoist to handle heavier loads outside of the Fuel Pool and Reactor Vessel area. Activation of this bypass switch energizes warning lights on the control cab operating panel and outside of the control cab to alert the crane A
operator and other personnel on the Reactor Building refueling i floor that the load limit is on bypass and that the Auxiliary Hoist must not be operated within the fuel pool and open reactor vessel area. Rigid administrative control of the Auxiliary Hoist and the load limit bypass is implemented through the written
! Maintenance Procedures and painted barrier lines and signs around the fuel pool and reactor vessel.
C. MOTOR GENERATOR SET HOISTS Three 12-ton monorail hoists are provided to aid in overhaul of the motor generators. Sufficient separation exists to preclude any loss of safety-related system function following any poten-i tial load drop in this area. The Motor Generator Set Hoists will not be ured to handle any other heavy loads unless the reactor is in cold shutdown.
Maintenance Procedure No. 35.000.41 will specify the lifting f
i equipment and handling procedures for these loads along these monorail hoist travel paths.
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- ..-v~..,,-+.---w --,_-,-.-.._.-7 _..-,,--.-ym--- .e.-----.-mm, ..,..---.m,- -,--...--,-,---w---,=.-,,-,. , - , - . . . . - - - ~ - . - - . .
D. MOTOR CENERATOR SET FLUID DRIVE HOISTS -
Two 20-ton monorail hoists are provided to aid in the overhaul of the motor generator sets. Sufficient separation exists to pre-clude any loss of safety-related system functions following a load drop in this area. These monorail hoists are operated as A described in Maintenance Procedure 32.000.08.
E. CONTROL ROD DRIVE REPAIR HOISTS The three control rod drive repair hoists T3100E040, 041 and 042 are used for any corrective or preventative maintenance required on the control rod drives. Analysis demonstrates that there is adequate floor strength to withstand a potential drop from the maximum lifting height of these hoists. Maintenance Procedure No. 35.000.29 describes the handling activities for the movement A of heavy loads along this monorail travel path.
F. DRYWELL EQUIPMENT HATCH HOIST The 20-ton hoist is used to lift the Reactor Recirculation Pump Motor and cart high enough to install the track beneath them.
Analysis demonstrates that there is adequate floor strength to withstand a potential drop height of four (4) feet. Maintenance
. Procedure No. 35.000.112 describes the handling activities for g the movement of heavy loads along this monorail path.
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G. RCIC HOIST The RCIC hoist is a 15-ton monorail overhead hoist designed for overhaul of the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling system. Suffi-cient physical separation exists, ensuring that an inadvertant A drop of the RCIC system components would not cause damage to any other system required for safe shutdown or decay heat removal.
R. RPCI ROIST The RPCI Hoist is a 15-ton monorail overhead hoist designed for overhaul of the High Pressure Coolant Injection system. Suffi-cient physical separation exists, ensuring that an inadvertant a
drop of the RPCI system components would not cause damage to any other system required for safe shutdown or decay heat removal.
I. N&S RECIRCULATION PUMP ROISTS The handling of heavy loads with either of the two recirculating pump 24-ton hand-operated hoists, inside the Rasetor Primary A Containment will occur only during cold shutdown when any poten-tially affected safety equipment is not required for safe shutdown or decay heat removal.
For the hoist just outside of the primary containment, there is adequate floor strength at this location to withstand a 25-ton load drop from a height of four feet. For lighter loads, higher height limits which are reviewed and approved by Engineering, A will be imposed. These limits will be observed any time this outer hoist is used to handle heavy loads when the plant is not in a cold shutdown condition.
2.3.2-78 100/R92A/1.131
Except for the torus, there is also sufficient separation and redundancy for other safety systems located under this hoist that would prevent a complete loss of that system for any inadvertent load drop. Maintenance Procedure No. 32.000.08 describes the A height limitations, and the handling of any heavy loads beyond the height limitations or within the drywell, only when the plant is in cold shutdown.
J. RHR FIRST FLOOR HOIST TROLLEY AND RHR BASEMENT HOIST TROLLEYS The RHR first floor hoist trolleys and RHR basement hoist trol-leys are four sixteen-ton hoists used for access of repair equipment and parts including RHR components to the basement and sub-basement. The inadvertent drop of any component, causing the total loss of a safety system division, cannot prevent a safe shutdown and decay heat removal since a redundant division of that system still remains operable.
K. CORE SPRAY HOISTS
- The Division I and II Core Spray Hoists are two 16-ton hoists designed for overhaul of the Core Spray Pumps. Suf ficient phys-ical separation and system redundancy exists, ensuring that an inadvertent drop of any Core Spray Pump components would not cause damage to any other system, or the other Division Core Spray equipment, required for safe shutdown or decay heat i
removal.
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L. DIESEL CENERATOR HOISTS AND DIESEL CENERATOR MOTOR CONTROL CENTER HOISTS The diesel generator hoicts and diesel generator noter centrol center hoists are used during corrective and maintenance procedurcs on the diesel generators. The accidental dropping of a diesel engine component will have no effect upon any other system required for safe shutdown or decay heat removal.
i H. VENTILATION EQUIPMENT HOIST A Ventilation Equipment overhead hoist with up to 8-ton capacity is used for corrective and preventive maintenance on various ventilation components. At present an 8 ton rated trolly beam l l'
and trolly have been installed to support a future hoist that lA will be in conformance with ANSI - B 30.16. There is adequate floor strength to withstand an inadvertent load drop up to 10 ,
tons, from the fifth floor to the third floor without impacting l l
critical systems below the third floor. ;
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N. NE EQUIPMENT HATCH HOIST The Equipment Hatch Hoist is a 12-ton monorail hoist used exclusively to move the NE Equipment Hatch to one side of the drywell NE Equipment access opening. Thi: is to be perforted during shutdowns whenever large equipment is to be moved to or f rom the drywell (i.e. , N. recirculation pump motor).
The only safety-related equipment located under the monrail travel path of this hoist are the discharge pipes from ADS safety relief valve V22-2071 and NON-ADS safety relief valve V22-2070. ;
The handling of the NE equipment hatch cover will not take place
' A whenever the availability of these valves is required for reactor q I
protection.
I Maintenance Procedure No. 35.000.11 covers the handling of this hatch.
2.3.2-80a 100/R92A/1.134
2.3.2.c For interactions not eliminated by the analysis of 2.3.2.b, above, identify any handling systems for specific loads which you 1
have evaluated as having sufficient design features to make the likelihood of a load drop extremely small and the basis' for this evaluation (i.e., complete compliance with NUREG-0612, Section 5.1.6, or partial compliance supplemented by suitable alternative or additional design features). For each so evaluated, provide
- the load-handling system (i.e., crane-load combination) information specified in Attachment 1.
RESPONSE: The Spent Fuel Cask, KPV head, Dryer / Separator, RPV Service Platform, Reactor Vessel Insulation, Storage Pool Gate, Fuel Pool Gate, Fuel Pool Slot Plugs, and Shielding Chute are handled by the single-failure proof Reactor Building Crane Main Moist and A
have handling systems that meets single-failure proof criteria.
The Enrico Fermi 2 Atomic Power Plant FSAR, Section 9.1 provides a descriptioa of the handling of the Spent Fuel Cask within single-failure proof guidelines.
2.3.2.d For interactions not eliminated in 2.3.2.b or 2.3.2.c, above, demonstrate using appropriate analysis that damage would not i
i preclude operation of sufficient equipment to allow the system to perform its safety function following a load drop (NUREG-0612, Section 5.1, Criterion IV). For each analysis so conducted, the following information should be provided:
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- 1) An indicatien cf whath;r cr not, for th2 cpecific Iscd being investigated, the overhead crane-handling system is designed and constructed auch that the hoisting system will retain its load in the event of seismic accelerations equivalent to thole of a safe shutdown earthquake (SSE).
- 2) The basis for any exceptions taken to the analytical guidelines of NUREG-0612, Appendix A.
- 3) The information requested in Attachment 4.
RESPO!!SE: The following review is a synopsis of the assumptions, method of analysis, results, and references of the heavy load / floor interactions which were analyzed in accordance with Attachment 4 of the generic letter from Mr. Darrell G. Eisenhut of December 22, 1980. An independent review of the Reactor Building fifth floor, has verified that the results of this analysis have been
! very conservatively determined. (Reference 4).
This review has verified that adequate floor strength to withstand an inadvertent load drop does exist for loads handled I
within the specified limits determined by this analysis.
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ASSUMPTIONS A. Material Properties 1 Reinforcing Steel: Minimum yield strength Fy is 60 ksi (ASTM A615 Grade 60)
- 2. Reinforced Concrete: Minimum compression strengthe f ' is assumed to be 4.5 ksi. Although the specifications call for f e' = 4.0 ksi, it is felt that an increase of 12.5% is justified due to the aging of the concrete. According to Reference 2, compression strength of 4.0 ksi at 28 days may reach 5.4 ksi after 5 years of aging. The Fermi 2 Reactor Building concrete floors have all been poured prior to January,1977.
- 3. No increase in the material strength was considered due to the dynamic nature of loading.
B. An average moment of inertia for the reinforced concrete is used:
I, = 1/2 ( Ig+I) C where:
Ic = moment of inertia for the gross concrete section IC = moment of inertia for cracked concrete section C. The yield line theory is used to determine the resistance of slabs (Reference 3).
D. The resistance of structural element is determined on the basis of the minimum value of resistance for shear or flexure.
l E. The impact is assumed perfectly plastic when determining the postim-l f pact response of the system.
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'F. Th2 fallswing values cf the ductility ratio cra usad:
Overall flexural response of reinforced concrete system, u = 10 Overall shear response of reinforced concrete system, u = 1.3. .
G. A side-drop condition in case of single lug failure is also considered for the following. One half of the total load weight is used in these calculations.
- 1. dryer / separator pool shield plugs
- 2. drywell head 3 reactor shield H. No advantage is taken due to drag forces caused by the environment.
Specifically, no credit was taken for the submerged weight reduction or the water drag forces during the drop of the steam separator.
I. The load combination considered includes: the dead weight of the structural element, the weight of the dropped load, and the weight of the lifting device.
J. For each heavy load, the most critical drop areas along the travel path were identified and analyzed to determine the drop height. This information is reported in the results section.
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MET 110D OF ANALYSIS It is assumed that, immediately after impact, the dropped object and the target will move together with a velocity v. The motion stops when the kinetic energy is completely absorbed by the straining of the target. The final deflected shape of the target is reached when the velocity is zero.
Applying conservation of momentum yields:
moov = (ma + m,)v where:
mo = mass of dropped object vo = velocity of dropped object immediately before impact es= mass of target involved in the exchange of momentum from the dropped load v = velocity immediately after impact Solving for v, one obtains:
v= o o (mo +m) s i
Hence, the kinetic energy to be absorbed by the target is:
1 KE = 1/2 (ma + m,) E KE = 1/2 m oov 2(
'o )
mo + m, but, j 1/2 moov 2=wh o 1
where wo = weight of dropped object h = height KE = woh "o a o + m, 2 3.2-85 100/R92A/1.139
The strain of the target, using a ductility ratio of u, is:
SE = (u - 1/2) eR, where:
e = elastic deflection of target under Rm Rm= target ultimate resistance Equating the kinetic energy to the strain energy and solving for h yields:
h = (u - 1/2) e (Re) --
(mo + m, )
' wo un For dropped objects having a contact area of less than four square feet, the local damage of the impacted structural element in the form of scabbing is considered. The object is considered as a rigid missile and the height e required to cause scabbing of the concrete according to equations in l
Section 4.1 of Reference 1 is evaluated. The reported limiting heights in l
these cases correspond to the minimum of heights determined from overall and local damage consideration.
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III. RESULTS Results are summarized below:
DESCRIPTION OF HEAVY LOAD WEIGHT OF THICKNESS OF MAX 1UM HEAVY LOAD IMPACTED SLAB DROP HEIGHT Reactor Shield Plugs 100 T/ea 24" 5'-0" Drywell Head 67 Ton 24" 5'-6" RPV Head 89 Ton 24" 4'-0" Steam Dryer 42 Ton 42" 12'-0" Steam Separator 73 Ton 42" 9'-0" CRD Transfer Cask 2 Ton 30" 20'-0" Stud Tensioner 6 Ton 24" 12'-0" Storage Pool Slot Plugs 43 T/ea 24" 7'-0" Drywell Equipment Hatch hoist 20 Ton 4'-0" i
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REFERENCES 1 Second ASCE Conference on Civil Engineering and Nuclear Power, Report of the ASCE Committee on Impactive and Impulsive Loads, Vol. V, Knoxville, Tennessee, September 15-17, 1980.
- 2. Winter, G., et. al., Design for Concrete Structures, Seventh Edition, McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1972.
- 3. Wang, Chu-kai, and C. G. Salmon, Reinforced Concrete Design, Second Edition, Intext Education Publishers, 1973.
- 4. Letter from Hopper and Associates to Dr. Yogindra Anand Detroit Edison Company, March 2,1982, (HA-3/82-62) " Heavy Load Drop Evaluation".
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