ML20205T463

Statement of Matl Facts as to Which There Is No Genuine Issue.Certificate of Svc Encl

ML20205T463
Person / Time
Site:	Seabrook
Issue date:	06/11/1986
From:	Sherwin Turk NRC OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE LEGAL DIRECTOR (OELD)
To:	Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Panel
Shared Package
ML20205T438	List: ML20205T436 ML20205T441 ML20205T453 ML20205T458 ML20205T463
References
OL, NUDOCS 8606130224
Download: ML20205T463 (200)

Text

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR MGULATORY COMMISSION .

BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD ~I In the Matter of )

)

PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF ) Docket Nos. 50-443 OL NEW HAMPSITIRE, et al. ) 50-444 OL

)

(Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2) )

STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS Pursuant to 10 C.F.R. 52.749, the NRC Staff hereby provides its statement of material facts as to which a genuine issue remains to be litigated with respect to the offsite emergency planning contentions for which Applicants and the State of New Hampshire filed motions for summary disposition on May 20, 1986.

The issues as to which material facts remain to be litigated are set forth in the " Affidavit of Edward A. Thomas," dated June 11, 1986, l attached hereto. The NRC Staff and FEMA are continuing to review the contentions addressed in the foregoing affidavit as well as the New Hampshire radiological emergency response plans, and additional facts material to the subject contentions could be identified in the future.

Respectfully submitted, B60613022486051y PDR ADOCK 0500 DR Sherwin E. Turk G Deputy Assistant Chief Hearing Counsel Dated at Bethesda, Maryland this lith day of June,1986

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION -

BEFORE Ti!E ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD ~I In the Platter of )

)

PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF ) Docket Nos. 50-443 OL NEW IIAMPSilIRE, e_t. _al.

) 50-444 OL (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2) )

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that copies of "NRC STAFF'S ANSWER TO MOTIONS FOR

SUMMARY

DISPOSITION OF OFF-SITE EMERGENCY PLANNING CONTENTIONS" in the above-captioned proceeding have been served on the following by deposit in the United States mail, first class or, as indicated by an asterisk, through deposit in the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's internal mail system or, as indicated by a double aeterisk, by express mail, this lith day of June,1986.

IIelen lioyt, Esq. , Chairman

• Dr. Emmeth A. Luebke*

Administrative Judge Administrative Judge Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Atomic Safety and Licensing Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Washington, D.C. 20555 Dr. Jerry liarbour* Ms. Carol Sneider, Esq.**

Administrative Judge Assistant Attorney General Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Office of the Attorney General U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission One Ashburton Place,19th Floor l Washington, D.C. 20555 Boston, MA 02108 Beverly Hollingworth" Stephen E. Merrill**

, 209 Winnacunnet Road Attorney General

! Hampton, Nil 03842 George Dana Bisbec Assistant Attorney General Sandra Gavutis, Chairman ** Office of the Attorney General Board of Selectmen 25 Capitol Street RFD 1 Box 1154 Concord, NH 03301-6397 Kensington, NH 03827 Richard A. Hampe, Esq.**

New Hampshire Civil Defense Agency 107 Pleasant Street l

Concord, NH 03301 1

Calvin A. Canney, City Manager ** Allen Lampert**

City Hall Civil Defense Director 126 Daniel Street Town of Brentwood Portsmouth, NH 03801 20 FrankHn Street

= Exeter, NH 03833 ~T Roberta C. Pevear" State Representative Angie Machiros, Chairman **

Town of Hampton Falls Board of Selectmen Drinkwatcr Road 25 High Road Hampton Falls, NH 03844 Newbury, MA 09150 Mr. Robert J. Harrison" Jerard A. Croteau, Constable **

President and Chief Executive Officer 82 Beach Road, P.O. Box 5501 Public Service Co. of New Hampshire Salisbury, MA 01950 P.O. Box 330 Manchester, NH 03105 Diane Curran, Esq."

Harmon & Weiss Robert A. Backus, Esq.** 2001 S Street, N.W.

Backus, Meyer & Solomon Suite 430 116 Lowell Street Washington, D.C. 20009 Manchester, NH 03106 Edward A. Thomas" Philip Ahrens , Esq.**

Federal Emergency Management Agency Assistant Attorney General 442 J.W. McCormack (POCH) Office of the Attorney General Boston, MA 02109 State House Station, #6 Augusta, ME 04333 H.J. Flynn, Esq." Thomas G. Dignan, Jr. , Esq.**

Assistant General Counsel Ropes & Gray Fcderal Emergency Management Agency 225 Franklin Street 500 C Street, S.W. Boston, MA 02110 t'ashington , D.C. 20472 Jane Doughty" Atomic Safety and Licensing Scacoast Anti-Pollution League Board

• 5 Market Street U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Portsmouth, NH 03801 Washington, D.C. 20555 Atomic Safety and Licensing Paul McEachern, Esq.*

Appeal Panel

• Matthew T. Brock, Esq.

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Shaines & McEachern Washington, D.C. 20555 25 Maplewood Avenue P.O. Box 360 Portsmouth, NH 03801

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Docketing and Service Section* William Armstrong" Office of the Secretary Civil Defense Director -

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Town of Exeter Washingtort, D.C. 20555 10 Front Street _

Exeter, NH 03833 -

Maynard L. Young, Chairman" Board of Selectmen Peter J. Matthews, Mayor" 10 Central Road City Hall Rye, NH 03870 Newburyport, MA 09150 Michael Santosuosso, Chairman ** William S. Lord **

Board of Selectmen Board of Selectmen South Hampton, NH 03827 Town Hall - Friend Street Amesbury, MA 01913 Mr. Robert Carrigg, Chairman ** Mrs. Anne E. Goodman, Chairman" Board of Selectmen Board of Selectmen Town Ofnce 13-15 Newmarket Road Atlantic Avenue Durham, NH 03824 North Hampton, NH 03862 R. K. Gad III, Esq.** Gary W. Holmes, Esq."

Ropes a Gray Holmes & Ellis 225 Franklin Street 47 Winnacunnet Road Boston, MA 02110 Hampton, NH 03842 Lb alt Sherwin E. Turk Deputy Assistant Chief j Hearing Counsel i

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FINAL EXERCISE ASSESSMENT JOINT NEW HAMPSHIRE STATE AND LOCAL RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE EXERCISE FOR THE SEABROOK STATION NUCLEAR POWER PLANT Seabrook, New Hampshire 4

February 26,1986 FEDE R A L E M E RG E N C Y M A N AG EM E NT AG E NC Y REGION I John W. McCormack Post Office and Courthouse Boston, Massachusetts 02109 June.2,1986 8 - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

SEABROOK STATION NUCLEAR POWER PLANT LICENSEE: New Hampshire Yankee LOCATION: Seabrook, New Hampshire REPORT DATE: June 2,1986 EXERCISE DATE: February 26, 1986 A~ g PARTICIPATING STATE: New Hampshire

' Area I, Office of Civil Preparedness Tl

\'

e PARTICIPATING COUNTY: Rockingham PARTICIPATING LOCAL GOVERNMENTS: Brentwood, N.H. Newfields, N.H.

Greenland, N.H. Newton, N.H.

Kingston, N.H. Portsmouth, N.H.

East Kingston, N.H. Stratham, N.H.

New Castle, N.H. Seabrook, N.H.

• Manchester, N.H.

• Salem, N.H.

STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS IN EPZ THAT DID NOT PARTICIPATE: State - Commbnwealth of Massachusetts Local Governments - Exeter, N.H.

(New Hampshire) - Hampton Falls, N.H.

- North Hampton, N.H.

- South Hampton, N.H.

- Kensington, N.H.

Rye, N.H.

Hampton, N.H.

l s l

Local Governments - Amesbury, Mass.

(Massachusetts) - Merrimac, Mass.

l . - Newbury, Mass.

l '. - Newburyport, Mass.

Salisbury, Mass.

- West Newbury, Mass.

l

• Andover, Mass.

• Peabody, Mass.

• Host Communities.

ii

CONTENTS LIST OF ABB REVIATIO NS AN D AC RON Y MS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

vi

SUMMARY

vili 1

i I NT R O D U C T IO N . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1 1.1 Exe rc ise Bac kgro und . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

2 1.2 Fe d e ral O bs e rv e rs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

4 e 1.3 Ex e rcise Obj e c tiv e s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

13 1.4 E x e rc is e Sc e n ario . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

16 1.5 Evaluat io n C ri t e ria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

17 2 E X E R C IS E EVA L U ATIO N . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

2.1 New Hampshire State Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 2.1.1 New Ham pshire State EO C . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 2.1.2 Ne w Ha m ps hire I FO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 2.1.3 R adiologic al He alth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 2.1.3.1 StateEOC.......................................... 30 2.1.3.2 Ne w Ham pshire EO F . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 2.1.3.3 Ne w Hampshire IFO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 2.1.3.4 Field Monitoring Teams . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 2.1.4 Field Implementation of the State's Ability to Satisfy Combined Participating and Nonparticipating Community Needs According to the Co m pensatory Plan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 2.1.5 State Police Access Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 2.1.6 M edia Relatio ns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48 2.1.7 Receotion Center, Mass Care and Decontamination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53 2.1.8 Rockingham County EOC and Staging Area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56 2.2 Ne w Ha m pshire Local EO Cs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60 2.2.1 B re n t w oo d E O C . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60 2.2.2 G ree nland EOC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69 2.2.3 K ings t o n EO C . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73 2.2.4 Eas t Kings ton EO C . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80 2.2.5 N e w C as tle E O C . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84 2.2.6 Ne w f ie lds E O C . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89 2.2.7 NewtonEOC............................................... 93 2.2.8 City of Portsmouth EO C . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98 105 2.2.9 Se ab roo k E O C . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

2.2.10 S t ra t ha m E O C . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111 3 SCHEDULE FOR CORRECTION OF DEFICIENCIES AND AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTIO NS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117 s

l TABLES l 1 Sequence of Selected Off-Site Events and Observed Times . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 2 Remedial Actions for Seabrook Station Nuclear Power Plant . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118 l

i IV f

9 TABLES (Cont'd) 3 Deficiencies and Areas Requiring Corrective Actions - Seabrook Station Nucle ar P o w e r P lan t . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 193 4 Status of Objectives - Seabrook Station Nuclear Power Plant . . . . . . . . . . .'. . . . . . 228 APPENDIX 1 Analysis of New Hampshire Transportation Resource Requirements Co mpared to Resource Availability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 233 V

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS ANL Argonne National Laboratory ARC American Red Cross ARES Amateur Radio Emergency Service BNL Brookhaven National Laboratory CDA Civil Defense Agency, New Hampshire CDD Civil Defense Director

. DOE U.S. Department of Energy DOT U.S. Department of Transportation DPHS Department of Public Health Services, New Hampshire

• EBS Emergency Broadcast System ECL Emergency Classification Level EMS Emergency Medical Services EOC Emergency Operations Center EOF Emergency Operations Facility ERBS Emergency Radio Broadcast System EPZ Emergency Planning Zone FDA U.S. Food and Drug Administration FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency IFO Incident Field Office KI Potassium Iodide NAS Nuclear Alert System NAWAS National Warning System NOAA National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission FEMA-REP-1 NU REG-0654/ FEM A-REP-1, Rev. 1 (" Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants")

NWS National Weather Service l PAR Protective Action Recommendation PIO Public Information Officer RAC Regional Assistance Committee RACES Radio Amateur Civil Emergency Service RADEF Radiological Defense RCDC Rockingham County Dispatch Center

. RC Resources Coordinator SAC Staging Area Coordinator SOP Standard Operating Procedures v- TLD Thermoluminescent Dosimeter USCG U.S. Coast Guard USDA U.S. Department of Agriculture l

I l

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vi

SUMMARY

On February 26, 1986, the State of New Hampshire, ten (10) New Hampshire communities within the Seabrook plume exposure emergency planning zone, two (2) New Hampshire host communities, and New Hampshire Yankee conducted an exercise of the plans and preparedness for off-site radiological emergency response for the Seabrook Station Nuclear Power Plant in Seabrook, New Hampshire. Seven (7) New Hampshire communities in the Seabrook plume exposure emergency planning zone chose not to participate in the exercise. The Commonwealth of Massachusetts, which has six (6) communities within the plume exposure EPZ, also did not participate.

Following the exercise, preliminary observations were discussed by the 48-member federal observer team, and a briefing for New Hampshire State officials was held on the morning of February 28, 1986 at the Howard Johnson Lodge in Portsmouth, NH. A public meeting for participants was held on the af ternoon of the same day in the Seabrook Town Hall in Seabrook, NH.

The full evaluation, deficiencies, areas requiring corrective actions, areas recommended for improvement, and recommendations are included in this document.

Each deficiency or area requiring corrective action and a corresponding recommended corrective action is described by jurisdiction in the text, Section 2 of this report. Areas recommended for improvement, which do not require corrective actions, also are described. Section 3 provides a summary listing of (a) deficiencies and, (b) areas requiring corrective actions. It also provides a suggested format for the State to use'for Indicating how they will respond.

STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE OPERATIONS i

The State of New Hampshire activities were conducted at the State EOC, the EOF and IFO, the Media Center, Rockingham County dispatch center and staging area, and the reception centers.

I

The State EOC is well equipped and has good displays. Staff notification and EOC activation were performed in a timely manner. The EOC was fully staffed with l

trained professionals who demonstrated a high degree of capability in responding to an accident at the Seabrook Station. Internal communications and message handling generally were good. However, the State did not demonstrate a capability to alert and notify the public within 15 minutes. The Civil Defense Director efficiently managed and coordinated the State EOC operations. The Governor actively participated in the

.- decision-making process by telephone. Protective action recc. nmendations from the EOF were discussed by telephone among personnel at the EOC, EOF, and IFO. The DPHS Director effectively managed the radiological health activities.

l The EOF and the State IFO are located in the same building. The facilities, equipment, and displays were adequate. The IFO Controller effectively managed opera-l tions. Activation and staffing were prompt. However, there were not enough people to staff the compensatory activities which we.e managing operations for 7 towns. State viii l

personnel demonstrated the ability to make independent decisions regarding protective actions. New Hampshire radiological field monitoring teams were promptly notified and mobilized with adequate equipment and demonstrated their technical competence.

The Rockingham County dispatch center and staging area were promptly staffed. However, sufficient staff for all duties assigned was not demonstrated. All communications systems worked well, and frequent briefings were held regularly. The staging area has sufficient space for the buses.

The Media Center at the Newington Town Hall is a nearly complete, well-equipped facility. Displays generally were of high quality and media kits were

• available. Activation and staffing of the media center were prompt. The effectiveness of the public information officers assigned to the media center was good. However, some instances of conflicting information given out by the media center and ERBS were ,

noted. Briefings were held on a regular basis.

The emergency response capabilities of the two reception centers that participated were adequately demonstrated. The Manchester reception center is large enough; activation and staffing was timely and the opetation was well managed. The decontamination facility was well-arranged and had the proper radiological survey equipment on hand. Personnel were well trained in monitoring and decontamination, and proper procedures were demonstrated. The separate mass care facility at Memorial High School in Manchester was appropriately staffed. Activation of the Salem reception center also was adequately demonstrated. Resources at the Salem reception center were observed to be adequate.

Deficiencies observed in the State of New Hampshire's emergency response which require remedial action are described in the text and listed in Section 3. These included inadequacies in both the normal scope of emergency preparedness and the State's compensatory plan activities for nonparticipating and participating communities.

LOCAL OPERATIONS The ten (10) participating local governments had adequate emergency operating centers (EOCs) to support their emergency response. Activation and staffing was prompt and the staff appeared to be adequately trained. Written procedures were available and generally followed. Any deficiencies or areas requiring corrective actio'ns are identified in the text of the report (see Section 2) and listed in Section 3.

IX

i 1

1 INTRODUCTION 1.1 EXERCISE BACKGROUND On December 7,1979, the President directed the Federal Emergency Manage-ment Agency (FEMA) to assume lead responsibility for all off-site nuclear planning and response.

FEMA's immediate basic responsibilities in Fixed Nuclear Facility Radiological

• Emergency Planning include:

• Taking the lead in off-site emergency planning and in the review

• and evaluation of State and local government emergency plans for adequacy.

• Determining whether the plans can be implemented on the basis of observation and evaluation of exercises conducted by emergency-response jurisdictions.

• Coordinating the activities of volunteer organizations and other involved federal agencies:

- Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)

- U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)

- U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA)

- U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA)

- U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) l - U.S. Coast Guard (USCG)

- American Red Cross (ARC) l Formal submission of emergency plans to the regional assistance committee l

- (RAC) by the State of New Hampshire and relevant local jurisdictions was followed by l

this emergency response exercise on February 26, 1986. This was the first full-scale l ,

exercise for Seabrook Station. The purpose of this exercise was to assess the capability

• of the State of New Hampshire and New Hampshire local emergency preparedness organizations to protect the public in the event of an accident at the Seabrook Station Nuclear Power Plant.

( An observer team consisting of FEMA personnel, regional assistance committee members, and supporting personnel from federal and State agencies evaluated the February 26, 1986 exercise. A total of 48 observers trained in radiological emergency response were assigned to evaluate State, local, and field activities.

2 Following the exercise, a closed critique of the exercise for the participating State of New Hampshire officials was held at 11:00 a.m. on February 28 at the Howard Johnson Lodge in Portsmouth. The meeting was followed by one for the participants and the public at 1:30 p.m. In the Seabrook Town Hall.

The findings presented in this report are the results of a review of the federal observers' evaluations and were reviewed by the RAC chairman for FEMA Region I.

Since the FEMA Region I director is responsible for certifying to the FEMA associate director of State and Local Programs and Support that any significant deficiencies and areas requiring corrective action observed during the exercise have been corrected, and that such corrections have been incorporated into State and local plans as appropriate, ,

FEMA suggests that the State of New Hampshire complete the schedule for corrections of the significant deficiencies and areas requiring corrective actions included as Section 3 of this report. ,

1.2 FEDERAL OBSERVERS Forty-eight (48) federal observers participated in evaluating this exercise. These individuals, their agencies, and their observation locations are given below:

Evaluator Agency Location Henry G. Vickers, Regional FEMAa General Observations Director Edward A. Thomas, RAC Chairman FEMA General Observations

• Jack Dolan FEMA State EOC, Command / Control Floyd Davis ANL b State EOC, Operations Paul Quinty FEMA State EOC, ERBS/EBS Communications Byron Keene EPA C State EOC, Radiological Health Paul Lutz DOTd State EOC, Transportation

• Frederick Oleson FEMA EOF, Radiological Health Joseph Keller INEL' EOF, Operations Warren Church FDA f EOF, Field Monitoring Craig Gordon NRCI EOF, Field Monitoring Carolyn Herzenberg ANL EOF, Field Monitoring

• Thomas Baldwin ANL IFO, Operations i Andrew Hull BNL h IFO, Radiological Health James Opelka ANL Reception Centers, Decontamination ~

Karen Larson FEMA IFO, Contingency Operations Donald Hulet ANL IFO, Contingency Operations i Kenneth Horak FEMA Media Center ,

Jerry Staroba ANL Evacuation, Bus Companies Robert Nelsius ANL Rockingham County Brendan Bailey FEMA Rockingham County

• Danilo Santini ANL Evacuation, School District, Seabrook

Sue Ann Curtis ANL Evacuation, School District, Portsmouth

! Ross Hemphill ANL Evacuation, School District, Stratham

'i Evaluator Agenev Location Donald Jankowski ANL Evacuation, School District, Kingston William Chambers ANL Evacuation, School District, East Kingston and Newton Frank Lombardo FEMA Evacuation, Bus Companies, Seabrook John Rajan ANL Evacuation, Bus Companies, Kingston Gordon Veerman ANL Evacuation, Bus Companies, Portsmouth Lester Conley ANL Evacuation, Mobility Impaired,

. Stratham and Portsmouth Kenneth Rose ANL Evacuation, Mobility Impaired, Portsmouth

• Donald Connors ARC I Manchester Reception Center Roxanne Izzo ANL Salem Reception Center

• George Hatch FEMA Access Control, State Police Troop A

• Kevin Merli FEMA New Castle EOC Paul White FEMA Greenland EOC Gerry Ameno FEMA Portsmouth EOC James Gentile FEMA Stratham EOC Dorothy Nevitt USDAI Newfields EOC Michael Goetz FEMA Access Control, State Police Troop A Rebecca Thomson FEMA IFO, Operations Elizabeth Dionne FEMA Newton EOC William Knoerzer ANL East Kingston EOC William Vinikour ANL Kingston EOC Phillip Kler ANL Seabrook EOC

• John Tatar ANL Rockingham County Gerry Smith FEMA Brentwood EOC Carol Roselli FEMA New Castle EOC -

Daniel Carroll FEMA Administrative Support

• Team Leaders aFEMA: Federal Emergency Management Agency b

ANL: Argonne National Laboratory i

C EPA: U.S. Environmental Protection Agency d

f- DOT: U.S. Department of Transportation l 'INEL: Idaho National Engineering Laboratory I FDA: U.S. Food and Drug Administration

= - INRC: U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission h Brookhaven National Laboratory BNL:

I ARC: American Red Cross IUSDA: U.S. Department of Agriculture l

i l

I

4 l 1.3 EXERCISE OBJECTIVES The overall objectives of the State of New Hampshire and New Hampshire local communities were to demonstrate that their emergency response plans, operations, and capability for mobilizing and coordinating necessary resources are adequate to cope with an emergency at the Seabrook Station Nuclear Power Plant.

The objectives for the February 26,1986 exercise were reviewed and approved by the Regional Assistance Committee (RAC) with the following four (4) caveats:

1) There will be a drill at a later date to test designated hospitals for -

their preparedness to accept and treat contaminated injured individuals;

2) There will be a drill of the 50-mile ingestion pathway plans at a later date;

3) There will be a full test of the alert and notification system at a later date; and

4) There will be more deraonstration than indicated in the objectives for evacuation of special populations, including:

a) schools, and b) all other transit-dependent people.

The last item (4) was to include demonstration and observation on:

1) school evacuation

2) buses for transit-dependent people, and

3) ambulances for institutionalized people and other mobility-impaired.

The State of New Hampshire agreed to all of the above with the exception of a full demonstration of planning routes for buses on an ad-hoc basis for the transit-dependent. Instead, the State indicated through Scott McCandllss, of HMM Associates, - i that a plan change was imminent for this item. Therefore, with this taken into ,

consideration, FEMA and the RAC approved the objectives, with the extent of play  !

proposed to demonstrate attainment of each objective, as shown below. The {

corresponding FEMA core objective also is shown, if applicable. l l

~ +

5 State FEMA (New Local Exercise Objectives Objectives Hampshire) Jurisdictions A. Command and Coordination

1. Demonstrate the ability to promptly 1 partial partial mobilize staff and activate the Emer-gency Operations Center, all partici-

, pating local community Emergency Operations Centers, two New Hamp-shire Host Community Reception

. Centers, (one fully, one simulated) the Incident Field Office and Media Center.

Extent of Play:

One reception center will be fully activated. Staff resources to activate a second will be demon-strated. EOCs for all towns that choose to play will be opened. The State will demonstrate capability to handle emergency response capabill-ties for nonparticipating towns.

2. Demonstrate the procedural and organi-

• no no zational ability to fully staff facilities and maintain staffing around the clock through the use of shift duty rosters.

Extent of Play:

l State will demonstrate 24-hour capability with rosters. Locals will demonstrate one full shift, a partial l second shift (by roster) and ability to

. request any needed supplementary staffing from the State.

. - 3. Demonstrate ability to make decisions 3 yes yes and to coordinate emergency activities.

• Note: This is not FEMA objective 2, rather it is just a presentation of rosters which is part of the plan.

6 State FEMA (New Local Exercise Objectives Objectives Hampshire) Jurisdictions

4. Demonstrate adequacy of facilities and 4 yes yes displays to support emergency opera-tions.

Extent of Play:

Sufficient equipment will be in place in participating local EOCs. Additional -

equipment, beyond minimum require-ments, is on order.

5. Demonstrate ability to Identify need for 32 yes N/A and request federal and/or other assistance in accordance with existing procedures.

B. Notification / Communication

1. Demonstrate ability to communicate 5 partial *

• partial *

• l with all appropriate locations (parti-l eipating in exercisc), organizations and I

field personnel.

Extent cf Play:

Communic 9tions among all State and local facilities, and with the utility will be exercised. Likewise, com-munications with field teams will be tested, Massachusetts and Maine will also be notified during the course of the exercise.

C. Accident Assessment

1. Demonstrate ability to mobilize and 6 yes N/A deploy field monitoring teams in accordance with existing procedures in a timely fashion.

• No te: This is a partial demonstration only because it does not include alllocations.

~ _-

l 1

State FEMA (New Local Exercise Objectives Objectives Hamoshire) Jurisdictions Extent of Play:

Two State monitoring teams will be mobilized and dispatched.

(

2. Demonstrate appropriate equipment and 7 yes N/A procedures for determining ambient radiation levels.

3. Demonstrate appropriate equipment and 8 yes N/A procedures for measurement of airborne radiolodine concentrations as low as 10-7 bCi/cc in the presence of noble gases.

D. Protective Actions

1. Demonstrate ability to project dosage 10 yes N/A to the public via plume exposure, based on plant and field data, and determine appropriate protective measures, based on PAGs, available s'helter, evacuation time estimhtes and all other appropriate l

factors.

2. Demonstrate the availability of equip- 13 partial partial ment and procedures to alert the public (simulated) (simulated) by simulated siren activation within the 10-mile EPZ. Demonstrate the ability to disseminate an initial instructional message within 15 minutes through the use of the Emergency Broadcast System (EBS).

l ~ Extent of Play:

l ,. The State will demonstrate decisions l and procedures for activating sirens and ERBS. No actual sounding of sirens or radio messages will be broadcast. Activation times will be coordinated with local EOCs.

l 8 l l

1

' State

! FEMA (New Local Exercise Objectives Objectives Hamoshire) Jurisdictions

! I l

3. Demonstrate ability to formulate and 14 yes N/A  ;

i distribute appropriate instructions through the use of the EBS and radio to the public, in accordance with existing l t procedures.

Extent of Play:

State will formulate appropriate messages. Broadcast of messages i will be simulated.

1

( yes l 4. Demonstrate the organizational ability 15 yes and resources necessary to manage an orderly evacuation of all or part of the i plume EPZ.

Extent of P'ay:

l l Seabrook and several other towns will be advised to evacuate during t the scenario. Preparations for I evacuation will be undertaken in towns for which evacuation is not recommended. While no people will ~

l be physically transported during the

! evacuation, considerable activity will be devoted to demonstrating the capability. State Police will be asked to activate one access control point. Ability 'to activate other access control points will be demon-strated by duty roster. Each town j for which evacuation is recom- -

mended will be asked to dispatch a police officer to a traffic control-point. Ability to staff other traffic

• j control points in town can be veri- 1 fled by observer discussion with the I senior police official playing in each town.

l l

l i

9 State FEMA (New Local Exercise Obiectives Objectives Hampshire) Jurisdictions

4. Extent of Play (Cont'd)

Evacuation simulation will include general population, transients, schools, mobility impaired, and the non-auto owning population. No special activity is required to simulate evacuation of the general a

population and the transient popula-tion. The extent of play for schools is described in objective D-8. The extent of play for mobility impaired is discussed in objective D-7. Pro-cedures for evacuating the non-auto owning population will be followed by the local Transportation Coordin-ators. Controllers will insert messages, in evacuating towns, Indi-cating requests for transportation.

The Transportation Coordinators will calculate the numbers of buses needed to accommodate the demand, ,

call bus companies to arrange for the needed buses (actual movement of buses will be simulated), and assign guides to the buses.

Availability of the guides will be demonstrated by duty roster. In some cases the local emergency l

response organization may demon-strate requesting assistance with evacuation assignments from the State. Dialogue between the FEMA ,

observers and local players may be ,

helpful in evaluating the evacuation capabilities.

. The State will demonstrate the ability to provide these evacuation services for nonparticipating towns.

10 State FEMA (New Local Exercise Objectives Objectives Hampshire) Jurisdictions ,

4. Extent of Play (Cont'd)

(Note: Compiling lists of transport dependent persons is an ongoing effort. Observers should not expect to see lists of these individuals during the exercise. Such lists will .

be available for ASLB hearings, however.)

5. Demonstrate the organizational ability 16 no yes and resources necessary to deal with impediments to evacuation, such as inclement weather or traffic .obstruc-tions.

Extent of Play:

Evacuating towns will be given con-troller messages which call for removal of obstructions on an evacuation route. Road agents will be asked to simulate dispatching crews to remove obstructions.

6. Demonstrate the organizational ability and resources necessary to control 17 yes N/A access to an evacuated area.

Extent of Play:

State Police will demonstrate ability to establish access control at one preselected access control point.

(See also objective D-4 above.) -

11 State FEMA (New Local Exercise Objectives Objectives Hampshire) Jurisdictions

7. Demonstrate the organizational ability 18 no yes and resources necessary to effect an orderly evacuation of mobility-impaired Individuals within the plume EPZ.

Extent of Play:

Each town for which evacuation is implemented will respond to controller messages requesting transportation for at least one mobility-impaired citizen. Response will include identifying the vehicle to be sent and simulating a dispatch of the vehicle to the mobility-Impaired household.

(Note: Compiling of lists of mobility-impaired persons is an ongoing effort. Observers should not expect to see lists of people needing this service during the exercise.

Such lists will be available for ASLB hearings, however.)

8. Demonstrate the organizational ability 19 yes yes and resources necessary to effect an orderly evacuation of schools within the plume EPZ.

Extent of Play:

Evacuation of schools in towns for which evacuation is implemented will be simulated. The number of

~

buses needed will be calculated by the local Transportation Coordina-tors. Arrangements for the buses will be arranged with the school bus operators. One bus will be dis-patched to each town. Dispatch of other buses will be simulated. The buses will be sent to the local EOC, then released.

L

l l

\

L2 State .

FEMA (New Local l Exercise Objectives Objectives Hampshire) Jurisdictions

8. Extent of Play: (Cont'd)

Since.the exercise takes place during a week of school vacation, control-lers will provide the information required by the Transportation Coordinators (i.e., with schools not .

in session there may be no admin-

!strative staff at the schools).

School attendance, numbers for .

example, may be provided by the controllers to the Transportation Coordinators. FEMA observers are encouraged to quiz Transportation ,

Coordinators, bus companies, and controllers to the extent necessary to verify this capability.

9. Demonstrate ability to continuously 20 yes yes monitor and control emergency worker exposure through recordkeeping, the use of existing procedures, and dosimetry.

l 10. Demonstrate the ability to make the 21 yes N/A decision, based on predetermined criteria, whether to issue KI to emergency workers.

11. Demonstrate adequacy of procedures 27 partial N/A for registration and radiological monitoring of evacuees at one New Hampshire Host Community Reception Center.

Extent of Play: . ,

One reception center will be fully

activated. Several evacuees will be .

( processed.

i i

l l

i l

13 State FEMA (New Local Exercise Objectives Ob}ectives Hampshire) Jurisdictions

12. Demonstrate adequacy of facilities for 28 yes yes nians care of evacuees.

Extent of Playt

. Red Cross will simulate selection and opening of one mass care center.

. 13. Demonstrate adequate equipment and 29 yes N/A procedures for decontamination of emergency workers, equipment, and vehicles at the Emergency Operations Facility.

E. Public Information

1. Demonstrate the ability to brief media 24 yes N/A in a clear, accurate, and timely manner.

2. Demonstrate ability to provide advance 25 partial"* N/A coordination of Information released.

2. Demonstrate ab!!!ty to establish and 26 partial * *

• N/A operate rumor control in a coordinated fashion.

1.4 EXERCISE SCENARIO It should oe noted that the scenario was changed, reviewed, revised, and approved all within 48 hours5.555556e-4 days <br />0.0133 hours <br />7.936508e-5 weeks <br />1.8264e-5 months <br /> of the start of the exercise because the original had been released to the public accidentally thereby allowing the players an opportunity to know its contents ahead of time. The scenario which was used, which has significant differences from the original, is summarized below.

The assumed date for the scenario was June 6,1986.

This exercise scenario was based on a Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) which resulted in fuel melting. The inability to provide containment spray resulted in excessive containment pressurization. This coupled with failure of containment purge valves, resulted in an uncontrolled release to the environment.

"* Note: Nos. E.2 and E.3 are considered to be partial demonstrations only because Massachusetts did not play.

14 Initial conditions established that the unit was operating at full power with all plant parameters being normal and stable except as noted below. The unit had been at or above 90% power for 180 days and was near the end of core life.

At approximately 0805 hours0.00932 days <br />0.224 hours <br />0.00133 weeks <br />3.063025e-4 months <br />, an explosion was reported in the Chlorination Building. The explosion was due to defective instrumentation and a pump electrical fault which caused undetected hydrogen accumulation and subsequent ignition. There was no residual fire and no personnel were hurt as a result of the explosion. This event required an Alert to be declared and resulted in activation of the Emergency Response Facilities.

At approximately 0930, a fire was reported in the "B" containment building spray -

pump area when the pump was started for testing following maintenance. The fire was extinguished but the "B" containment spray pump was rendered inoperable. The fire damage to one train of safeguards equipment necessitated the declaration of a Site Area Emergency.

At 1030, a double-ended shear of cold leg "B" occurred. A design basis accident was indicated by Critical Safety Function C-Orange. In conjunction with the cold leg break, operators received indications that the Containment Building Spray Valve CBS-V11 failed to open and Safety injection Pump A failed to operate. Also at this time, Electrical Emergency Bus E6 failed.

At approximately 1045, station conditions degraded to the point where in-core thermocouples indicated greater than 700*F with RVLIS less than 40E Critical safety function status trees indicated C-Red. These conditions resulted in the declaration of a General Emergency.

Over the next ninety (90) minutes, in-station radiological conditions indicated that there was significant core damage due to the LOCA. Reactor vessel coolant level was eventually restored; however, pressures and radiation levels inside containment increased drastically. At approximately 1110, the "A" St Pump was restored, and at-1245, cold leg recirculation was initiated.

At approximately 1315, the closed indication for several containment on-line purge valves was lost as indicated by alarm logger and status lights. The plant vent stack monitor began to trend up and an off-site release began.

At 1545, the containment building spray was restored to service, thus reducing containment pressure. Off-site releases began to decrease and by 1615 were considered insignificant. -

At 1645 the exercise was terminated.

The sequence of off-site events, which resulted from the above scenario, and the observed times of these events are indicated on Table 1.

l

TABLE 1 SEQUEICE OF SELECTED OFFSITE EVENTS AND OBSERVED TIMES Se brook NuclEcr Power Ctction - Seabrook, New Hampshiro -

February 26, 1986 Protective Actions Access Control l

Fvac. Shelter Evac. State Eve nt: Site Gen'l Releases Releases Exer. Beaches Three Randr. Randr. ,

of Location (Alert) Area Bne rg. Be91 n Term Term. Closed Towns EPZ EPZ l5 Mi. .to Mi. Emerg EOF 8:15 9:41 10:48 13:20 16:00 16:15 9:45 10:55 11:37 13:10 - - -

IFO -

9:41 10:55 13:'25 16:00 16:15 9:45 10:55 11:45 13:25 10:45- 11:40 -

Msdia Center 8:52 9:58 10:57 13:35 16:03 16:15 10:09 11:03 11:47 13:40 11:03 11:47 '10:09 (received) (8:15) (9:43) (10:47) (13:23) (15:47) -

(09:45) (10:59) (13:30) (10:59) (09:45)

J NH EOc 8:27 9:51 10:50 13:20 - - - - - - - - 9:50

~

Cta:newood 8:21 9:54 10:58 13:27 - 16:00 9:54 10:58 11:48 13:27 -

11:48 -

E. Kings ton 8:22 9:58 10:45 13:35 - - 9:48 10:55 11:40 13:35 10:55 11:40 -

crcenla nd 8:21 9:52 11:00 13:32 - 16:02 9:50 -

11:49 13:32 10:51 11:49 -

C Kings ton 8:18 9:52 10:58 13:35 - 16:00 9:57 10:58 11:52 13:30 10:55 11:40 -

ilew Castle 8:23 9:54 10:58 13:274 -

16:00 1.0:00 11t53 11:53 13:27 10:45 11:53 11:27 Newfields 8:22 9:55 10:57 13: 25- Xs ' --

16:00 9:55 11:50 11:50 13:25 10:57 it:SO ,-

Newton 8:22 9:55 10:45 13:35 16:00 16:00 9:55 11:00 11:45 13:30 11:00 11:13 11:2's

' Portsmouth 8:18 10:02 10:45 13:30 -

16:00 9:41 10:09 - 'l3:30 11:05 lbsic 11:15 Seabrook 8:18 10:00 10:58 13:35 16:00 16:00 9:50 10:59 - - - -

11 72-13:57 11' 20.

Stratham 8:30 9:55 11:05 ~ 13:30 - 16:15 9:57 - - - -

Rockingham Cty 8:15 9:41 11:01 - -

16:08 10:15 - - - . - -

Troop A 8:25 -

10: 50 - - - - 1G:50 -- -

11:15 11:45 -

Riception Centers:

Hanchester 10:15 Salem 8:22 9:56 10:58 3 s w - - .

16 1.5 EVALUATION CRITERIA The excroise evaluations presented in Section 2 of this report, are based on applicable planning standards and evaluation criteria set forth in Section II of NUREG-  ;

0654, FE M A-11EP-1, Rev. 1 (November 1980). Following the narrative for each ,

l jurisdiction or setivity, deficiencies, areas requiring corrective actions, and areas recommended for improvement are presented with recommendations.

Deficiencles are demonstrated and observed inadequacies that would cause a ,

finding that off-site emergency preparedness was not adequate to provide reasonable Essurance that appropriate protective mecsures can be taken to protect the health and- '

safety of the public living in the vicinity of a nuclear power facility in the event of radiolcgical emergency. Because of the potential impact of deficiencies on emergency preparedness, they are required to be promptly corrected through appropriate remedial

• actions !ncluding remedial exercises, drills, or other actions. Deficiencies were observed Jn the ?cbrucry 26,1986 exercise.

Aress requiring corrective action are demonstrated and cbserved inadequacies of Stste totd local government performences. Although their correction is required during the next :cheduled biennial exercise, they are not considered by themselves, to adversely impact patlic health and sefety.

Arttas recommended for impmvement also are listed as appropriate for each jurisdiction or activity. These are probleni areas observed during the exercise that are hat considered to adversely irr.pset public health and safety. While not required, correution of these would enhanes an organization's level of emergency preparedness.

e O

e

- _ _ _ _ _.____m_ ____ _ ___ ____.___________-__ _ _ _ _ - _ _ - _ _ _ _ __

< Ntw damps' hire State CoC 17 ' ,

7 2 EXERCISE EVALUATION 2.1 NEW HAMPSHIRE STATE OPERATIONS l

2.1.1 New Hampshire State EOC ,

The State EOC; located in Concord, New Hampshire, is an outstanding facility.

Displays, furnishings, internal communications and functional arrangement were all excellent. A public address system and telephone amplifieswere used for briefings so that, at the Civil Defense Direetce's discretion, convcesuions with the Governor, the IFO ,

and others could be monitored by the EOC staff. There was a table and telephone for _

every staff member and State agency. Communications equipment and dose assessment activities were in rooms adjacent to the operations area. Prompt logging and distribution  :

of messages were facilitated by use of a word processor and printer. The clustering of l key State officials in the operations reom expedited information exchange and decision making.  ;

Activation and staffing of the State EOC was accomplished in a smooth and efficient manner. Activation of the EOC was triggered by a telephone call to the EOC Civil Defense Director by the State Police upor. ;he declaration of the Alert Emergency Classification Level (ECL) by the utility. This telephone call was received at 0827. The EOC was operational by about 0840 and was fully staffed by about 0915. Notification of EOC staff was by telephone and mobile radi.o. The ability to staff round-the-clock operations was demonstrated by presentation of a roster. At approximately 0830 a State representative was also dispatched to the EOF. This is done automatically when the DPHS Director is notified by the State Police. The State agencies and organizations represented at the State EOC included: Civil Defense, Department of Public Health Services, Public Works, and Highways, Governor's Liaison, State Police, Transportation, Agriculture, American Red Cross, Civil Air Patrol, Emergency Medical Services, National Guard, Water Supply and Pollution Control, Public Utilities Commissioner, ,

Human Services, Agency Liaison, Resources Officer, and Pupil Transportation (Department of Safety).

The State EOC operations were well managed by the New Hampshire Civil

~

Defense Director. The Director managed his operations staff and supporting State agency personnel well. He was in frequent direct contact with the Governor and the

~

IFO. Frequent definitive, concise briefings were held and the well-trained operations staff were fully involved with decision making. Operating procedures and checklists were effectively used by all EOC staff and State agency personnel during the exercise.

• • State and local plans were also available for reference in the EOC. The Governor's participation. In the exercise was excellent; his input was constant and decisive.

Messages were logged and distributed with minimal delay. Federal assistance was requested during the exercise when the Director requested that the FRERP be activated. In addition, the Coast Guard was contacted for assistance at 1032 and the Federal Aviation Administration at 0954. -

Nsw Hr_mpshire State EOC 18 i

Outstanding communications capability at the State EOC was provided by the New Hampshire Civil Defense radio, which includes high frequency,6 meter and 2 meter ]

f l radio equipment; Civil Defense radios compatible with equipment and frequencies used by Vermont, Maine and Massachusetts; a link with the Rockingham dispatch center; i

NAWAS; ARES; commercial telephone; and radio teletype. A dedicated Nuclear Alert

! System (NAS) telephone (orange telephone) linked the communications and operations rooms at the EOC.with the EOF, IFO and the utility. A telefax hard copy machine was also available and used extensively. However, the machine was sometimes overloaded l

l which prevented several hard copies of ERBS messages from reaching the Media l Center. It is recommended that one or more additional hard-copy transmission devices * '

be obtained for the EOC to eliminate delays in the transmission of hard copies of l

messages. All communication equipment'except telephones and the telefax machine j'

were located in one large communications room. The communications room was not

• completely finished at the time of the exercise. Additional backup systems are being Installed, and the existing communications capability is being expanded. The ERBS alert and notification system is presently being installed and was not yet operational at the time of the exercise.

l Dose projections were effectively carried out in the accident assessment area of

• the State EOC. These activities are described in Section 2.1.3.1 of this report.

i Protective action recommendations (PARS) which were generated at the EOF were thoroughly discussed over the telephone interlinking the EOF, IFO and the State I EOC. The Governor was also actively involved in this decision-making process. The means used to protect the public included access and traffic control, sheltering and evacuation. Access control was promptly initiated by dispatch of State Police from Troop A at Epping to control traffic in the nonparticipating towns. Access control was also instituted sequentially (simulated) for beach areas, the 5-mile, and the 10-elle l perimeters.

However, as indicated in Section 2.1.5, the staffing of all access control points

~

l I would have exhausted the State Police Troop A resources of the day shift and some of the night shift. The personnel resources apparently are not adequate to cover all traffic and access control functions simultaneously. The Public Works and Highways representative at the State EOC anticipated a conflict between their work setting up barricades for access control points, removing impediments to evacuation, and the need for supplementary bus drivers. Activating the National Guard to assist in traffic or access control functions would reduce the available pool of bus drivers since some bus drivers are also members of the National Guard. It is recommended that additional ,

personnel resources as necessary should be identified and documented in the State plan to ensure that activating one resource pool does not significantly deplete the capabilities of another resource pool in those areas where individuals are accounted for in more than , l one resource pool.

All public alerting and notification (ERBS broadcasts and siren activation) were  !

simulated for the exercise since the ERBS is not yet operational and the State chose not  !

to activate EBS. The Emergency Radio Broadcast System (ERBS) is a site-specific system designed to provide for public alerting, notification and information. This system is to eventually be used for activation of sirens and the tone alert radios that are to be

Nzw Hrmpshire State EOC 19 provided to key State and local emergency workers and isolated persons. The State -%n uses both ERBS and EBS nomenclature, the local plans refer to the EBS, and the ,

information brochures refer to ERBS. Under the present configuration and local ,

procedures, there is no assurance that all of the public would be alerted and informed by EREsS station WOKQ, an FM-only station. The ERBS is independent of the EBS which was not activated for this exercise. The exercise did not demonstrate that there is the capability for providing an alert signal and instructions to the public throughout the plume exposure EPZ within 25 minutes because the ERBS system, which is separate from EBS, was not activated, The ERBS system is not yet fully operational. WOKQ, which is the gateway station, has not been connected to the other satellite stations and cannot yet activate tone alert radios. It is recommended that ERBS and EBS be integrated and made operational. This integrated system should be demonstrated at the next exercise.

The simulat'ed public alerting and notification were promptly carried out at the Alert ECL by a simulated broadcast over gateway ERBS radio station WOKQ-FM.

Sounding of the sirens wa:, simulated at approximately 0955 followed by a simulated ERBS broadcast for the Site Area Emergency ECL which was declared at 0950.

Information was provided to the public via simulated ERBS broadcasts and news releases drafted at the EOC and telefaxed to the Media Center. Prescripted ERBS messages were used as the basis for formulating the actual texts. Those messages that provided instructions for transportation included telephone numbers for the public to call for assis.tance and information about bus routing for the towns covered by the compensatory plan. Information about bus routes was not delivered to the public in a timely fashion.

There was no attempt to coordinate actual bus availability in a community with ERBS messages. The single ERBS message instructing transit-dependent populations in nonpartleipating communities on where they should pick up a bus was issued at 1445.

This message was issued over one hour after the decision to evacuate Rye, North Hampton, Exeter, South Hampton, and Kensington. Moreover, this ERBS message was issued three and one-half hours af ter the. decision to evacuate Hampton and Hampton l

Falls and one hour and forty-five minutes after the simulated evacuation of Seabrook was completed. No ERBS messages were ever simulated to instruct the transit-dependent populations of participating towns. Therefore, these transit-dependent people would not have been given instructions to call their local EOC to arrange for evacuation transportation. Several messages generated at the State EOC and intended for broadcast to the public contained contradictory and partly inaccurate information. For example, ERBS message No. 4 released at 1110 called for both sheltering and evacuation in the towns of Seabrook, Hampton and Hampton Falls. Persons residing, working, or visiting beach areas in these towns were directed to evacuate. Further in this same message, the same population was advised to shelter. Another message, which provided telephone numbers for residents of nonparticipating towns with special transportation or medical needs to call, contained an incorrect telephone number for the IFO. It is recommended

! that procedures be implemented to ensure that erroneous, conflicting, or confusing l messages are not issued to the public.

j in addition, the Coast Guard was not notified until 1032, although the " Site Area Emergency" was declared at 0941. The State EOC attempted to contact the Coast Guard l at 0829 at the " Alert," but contact was not made as, apparently, an incorrect telephone number was called. Because the Coast Guard is responsible for alerting the boating l

N1w Hampshiro State EOC 20 public, the exercise objective of alerting the public throughout the plume exposure EPZ within 15 minutes was not met. It is recommended that the Coast Guard be notified at the " Alert" level so that notification of the boating public can begin promptly when required. The call-up number should be verified to insure that proper contact is made in the future. Further evaluation of the alerting of persons on boats will occur during the formal review of the alert and notification system pursuant to FEMA REP-10. Evacua-tion will be evaluated during the FEMA and RAC review of evacuation time estimates.

The allocation of transportation resources according to the New Hampshire Compensatory Plan is the responsibility of the EOC Resources Officer and the Emergency Medical Services (EMS) EOC Coordinator. The State EOC receives .

transportation needs information relayed (1) from local communities through IFO local liaison o,fficers responsible for participating communities and (2) directly from IFO local liaison officers responsible for nonparticipating communities. The State Resources -

Coordinator requests buses from transportation providers and sees that they are prestaged at the Rockingham County Brentwood Complex (see Section 2.1.8). Upon

( notification of a General Emergency ECL, the prestaged buses are to be dispatched to I the nonparticipating communities and to participating communities needing additional buses. The EMS Coordinator at the State EOC provides a similar service for mobility-impaired people. The State EOC has ultimate responsibility for acquiring adequate transportation resources. The capability of the State EOC to fulfill this responsibility is described in Section 2.1.4 of this report.

Serious questions arose at the exercise about the ability of the state to provide for transportation of special populations, including school children, mobility-impaired and otherwise transit . dependent. Driver resources are not sufficient to meet the transportation requirements. These deficiencies are described in detail in Section 2.1.4 of this report.

The capability to demonstrate the organizational ability to effect an orderly evacuation of school was hampered by the extent of simulated school participation.

Since schools were not in session on the day of the exercise, school notification, and requests for an activation of schools should be fully tested when schools are in session or when sufficient school administration staff are present.

Deficiencies

1.

Description:

The ability to fully staff facilities and maintain ,

j staffing around the clock was not adequately demonstrated for some functions by the State of New Hampshire. The personnel resources apparently are not adequate to cover all traffic and ,

access control functions simultaneously. The Public Works and Highways representative at the State EOC anticipated a conflict between their work setting up barricades for access control points, removing impediments to evacuation, and the need for supple-mentary bus drivers. Activating the National Guard to assist in traffic or access control functions would reduce the available pool l

1

Nw Htmpshira State EOC 21 of bus drivers since some bus drivers are also members of the National Guard. (FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1, II, A.4)

Recommendation: Additional personnel resources as necessary should be identified and documented in the State plan to ensure that activating one resource pool does not significantly deplete the capabilities of another resource pool in those areas where individuals are accounted for in more than one resource pool.

2.

Description:

The exercise did not demonstrate that there is the capability for providing an Alert signal and inst:uctions to the public throughout the plume exposure EPZ within 15 minutes because the ERBS system, which is separate from EBS, was not activated. The ERBS system is not yet fully operational. WOKQ, which is the gateway station, has not been connected to the other satellite stations and cannot yet activate tone alert radios.

(FEM A-REP-1, Rev.1, II, E.5, E.6)

Recommendation: The ERBS and EBS should be integrated and made operational. This integrated system should be demonstrated at the next exercise.

3.

Description:

Information about bus routes was not delivered in a timely fashion. The single ERBS message instructing transit-dependent populations in nonparticipating c~ommunities on where they should pick up a bus was issued at 1445. This message was issued over one hour after the decision to evacuate Rye, North Hampton, Exeter, South Hampton, and Kensington. Moreover, this ERBS message was issued three and one-half hours after the decision to evacuate Hampton and Hampton Falls and one hour and forty-five minutes after the simulated evacuation of Seabrook was completed. (FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1, II, E.5, E.6, J.10.g) l Recommendation: Procedures should be developed in the Compensatory Plan to insure that ERBS and EBS messages from the State to the nonparticipating towns are issued in a timely fashion. Transit-dependent individuals should be made aware of the routes that buses will follow before the buses begin to run those routes. The State should be aware of the time at which buses can be expected to arrive at the local staging area of each nonparticipating community after departing from the State's Rockingham County staging area. ERBS messages should specify, for each community, when buses can be expected to begin running their routes for transit-dependent pickups. These messages should be monitored by each Sheriff's deputy staffing a local staging area. If the Sheriff's deputy observes that the EBS/ERBS messages for the community are not timely or are inaccurate, the deputy should relay messages through the Communicator- at the l

l

Nid 8tmpshire State EOC 22 Rockingham County staging area to the State EOC in order to correct the problem.

4.

Description:

No ERBS messages instructing the transit-dependent or mobility-impaired populations of participating towns were ever simulated, so these people could not have called their local EOC to arrange for evacuation transportation. (FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1, II, E.5, E.6, J.10.d, J.10.g)

Recommendation: ERBS/EBS messages which instruct transit-dependent or mobility-impaired residents of participating towns ,

with regard to the procedures in effect in that town should be issued before evacuation. The time at which such messages must be issued, as well as the nature of the messages, depends upon the ,

degree of preparation for pick-up of transit dependent and mobility-impaired residents in the town to which the message applies. Towns such as Seabrook (see Section 2.2.9), which require call-in and bus route development at the EOC, require that the message be issued well in advance of a possible evacuation order.

Local EOCs should see that the staff member responsible for evacuating transit-dependent and mobility-impaired residents monitors and reviews copies of transportation-related EBS/ERBS messages to assure their timely issuance and contextual accuracy.

5.

Description:

Several messages generated at the State EOC and intended for broarleast to the pubile contained contradictory and partly inaccurate information. For example, ERBS message No. 4 called for both sheltering and evacuation in the towns of Seabrook, Hampton, and Hampton Falls. Another mes, sage, which provided telephone numbers for residents of nonparticipating towns with special transportation or medical needs to call, contained an incorrect telephone number for the IFO. (FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1, II, E.5, J.9, J.10.d, J.10.m)

Recommendation: Procedures should be implemented to ensure that erroneous, conflicting, or confusing mess. ages are not issued to the public.

6.

Description:

The Coast Guard was not notified until 1032, .

although the " Site Area Emergency" was declared at 0941. The State EOC attempted to contact the Coast Guard at 0829 at the

. " Alert," but contact was not made as, apparently, an incorrect ,

telephone number was called. Because the Coast Guard is responsible for alerting the boating public, the exercise objective of alerting the public throughout the plume exposure EPZ within 15 minutes was not met. (FEM A-REP-1, Rev.1, II, E.5, E.6, J.10.c, J.10.g)

Ntw Htmpshire State EOC 23 l

Recommendation: The Coast Guard should be notified at the  !

" Alert" level so that notification of the boating public can begin promptly when required. The call-up number should be verified to insure that proper contact is made in the future. Further evaluation of the alerting of persons on boats will occur during the formal review of the alert and notification system pursuant to FEMA-REP-10," Guide for the Evaluation of Alert and Notification Systems for Nuclear Power Plants." Evacuation will be evaluated during the FEMA and RAC review of evacuation time estimates.

7. Decription: The capability to demonstrate the organizational ability to effect an orderly evacuation of schools, which was an

. exercise objective (D.8), was hampered by the extent of simulated ,

school parti'cipation. Since schools were not in session on the day of the exercise, school notification, and requests for an activation of school bus resources could not be evaluated. (FEM A-RE P-1, Rev.1, II, J.10.d)

Recommendation: The capability to demonstrate the orderly evacuation of schools should be fully tested when schools are in session or when sufficient school administrative staff are present.

Area Requiring Corrective Action

1.

Description:

The extensively used telefax machine at the State EOC was sometimes overloaded which prevented several hard copies of ERBS messages from reaching the Media Center.

(FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1, II, F.1, G.4.b, H.3)

Recommendation: One or more additional hard-copy transmission devices should be obtained for the State EOC to eliminate delays in the transmission of hard copies of messages.

Areas Recommended for Improvement No areas recommended for improvement were observed at the State EOC during i this exercise.

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r N1w Htmpshire IFO 24 2.1.2 New Hampshire IFO The Incident Field Office (IFO) is located in the same building with the EOF.

The IFO is a good facility; there is sufficient space, good lighting, and adequate physical separation between different functional areas. The main operations room was large enough to accommodate all agencies and personnel. However, there should have been more tables available for use by Local Liaison officers, the National Guard, Coast Guard, and compensatory plan personnel. Occasionally, the noise level in the IFO was quite high during the exercise.

t l The status board (" Emergency Log") in the IFO was not updated rapidly enough, .  !

and events were not kept in chronological order. This caused problems for the IFO staff in recognizing and responding to situations rapidly. It is recommended that greater attention be paid to updating the status board in a more timely fashion and ensuring that .

events are posted chronologically. Some of the maps also need to be improved. In  !

i particular, the plume EPZ map was not large enough, and was not labeled by sector.

Furthermore, the protective action recommendations (PARS) and access control points ,

i were indicated in colored ink on a single overlay. This was extremely cumbersome when l l the PARS changed, necessitating an erasure and recoloring operation with the potential l for losing some of the access control point information. . It is recommended that the l l

l plume EPZ map be redesigned with multiple overlays to facilitate the rapid display of l changed protective action recommendations.

Activation and staffing of the IFO was prompt and thorough with the exception of the need for additional Local Liaison officers to handle the needs of nonparticipating communities under the State Compensatory Plan. Organizations represented included: .

the NHCDA, which directed the operations in the IFO; the State Police; the Department of Public Works and Highways, Division 6; the Emergency Medical Services; the U.S.

Coast Guard; the Civil Air Patrol; the New Hampshire Department of Fish and Game; l and the New Hampshire Department of Resources and Economic Development. The l

ability to meet the needs of the seven nonparticipating communities was not adequately demonstrated at the IFO because of the lack of an adequate number of Local Liaison officers. The three Local Liaison officers who participated there as part of the State Compensatory Plan were also listed in the State Plan as filling other staff positions for the second shif t at the IFO or State EOC. No roster was available in the Compensatory l

Plan to demonstrate 24-hour staffing capability of Local Liaison officers for non-participating communities, it is recommended that the State estimate the number of Local Liaison officers that would be required to handle the needs of the nonparticipating communities, and demonstrate that adequate staffing of the IFO can be provided to carry .

out the functions of communities which do not or cannot respond in an emergency. The identified Local Liaison officers should not be part of the second shift at the IFO or another facility. - .

Operation of the Compensatory Plan for nonparticipating communities became initially possible at 0925 with the arrival of two of the three Local Liaison officers l

serving nonparticipating communities. The third Local Liaison officer arrived at l approximately 0950. Under the Compensatory Plan, these Local Liaison officers were responsible for notification and evacuation of schools in the nonparticipating communities (including Hampton and Hampton Falls). In the participating community of i

Ntw Htmpshire IFO 25 Seabrook, the initial calls to schools were completed by 0912, thirteen minutes before the first nonparticipating community local liaison officer was available at the State IFO to see that Hampton and Hampton Falls schools were notified. The extent of play at the school district office located across from Winnecunnet High School in Hampton involved one telephone call. The Local Liaison officers on duty at the time evacuation of Hampton and Hampton Falls had been ordered failed to check the 1110 ERBS message to assure that transit-dependent and mobility-impaired individuals were properly informed of how to obtain transportation for evacuation (see Section 2.1.1).

Under the Compensatory Plan, the three nonparticipating communities and three participating communities (six total) Local Liaison officers had responsibility for relaying and assuring the timeliness and accuracy of messages which were passing from

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(1) residents and officials of nonparticipating towns to the State EOC Resources Coordinator and EMS EOC Coordinator, (2) the State EOC Resources Coordinator and EMS EOC Coordinator to residents and officials of nonparticipating towns, (3) EOC staff of participating towns to the State EOC Resources Coordinator and EMS EOC Coordinator, and (4) the State EOC Resources Coordinator and EMS EOC Coordinator to the staff of local EOCs.

These duties were not properly completed during the exercise. While the Local Liaison officers at the IFO did not have the final responsibility of formulating and issuing ERBS/EBS messages, they should assume and execute the responsibility of prompting the State EOC to issue appropriate instructional messages to the public to insure that transit-dependent residents of participating or nonparticipating ecmmunities are advised how to obtain transportation assistance. The problem with wrong information being given to prsons with special needs via ERBS/EBS messages is designated as a deficiency in media relations (see Section 2.1.6 of this report). Six Local Liaison officers was an inadequate number of officers to handle calls which could potentially come from all seventeen communities in the EPZ.

The New Hampshire IFO controller managed operations effectively and gave frequent informative briefings. Staff participation was excellent, especially in providing information updates in briefings that were conducted at the IFO. Coordination among State EOC, EOF, utility, and Compensatory Plan personnel was well done. Information flow between the utility, EOF, IFO, and the State EOC was excellent. A direct open telephone line between the IFO and the State EOC which was equipped with speaker telephones on both ends was used very effectively. The speaker telephone permitted simultaneous briefings of IFO staff when State personnel communicated with decisien makers at the State EOC.

NIw Hempshira IFO 26 The communications system at the IFO consisted of the following:

• Nuclear Alert System (NAS) dedited telephone linking to IFO/ EOF with the State EOC.

• Separate telephone lines for tha NHCDA liaison (2 lines) and the New Hampshire DPHS liaison (1 line).

• One telecopier for the transmission and receipt of hard copy.

• Separate telephone lines for the following organizations represented ,

in the IFO operations room:

- IFO controller (NHCDA) -

- State Police

- Department of Resources and Economic Development (DRED)

- NHCDA local liaisons (7 lines)

- Department of Public Works and Highways

- EMS

• A variety of radio frequencies for communications with local EOCs, local law enforcement agencies, medical services, and State response agencies.

All of the 'above communications systems were operational throughout the exercise. The l

IFO staff was able to communicate with appropriate organizations. However, the one telefax machine which was available was often overloaded and therefore insufficient to handle the number of hard-copy transmissions going to the State EOC and the media center. It is recommended that one or more additional telefax machines be obtained for use at the IFO to expedite the timely transmission of hard-copy messages. There was also a nee.d for additional telephones at the IFO for use by the State Police, National Guard, and the Coast Guard.

The IFO telephone communications system may not be adequate to support ,

implementation of the State Compensatory Plan in concert with normal IFO l communications responsibilities. According to the EOF /IFO communications coordinator, there is additional capacity in the telephone trunk lin 5 that supply the IFO ,

i to accommodate at least ten additional telephone lines and these could be made operational within a 2-3 hour time frame. Based on the limitad test of calls incoming to the IFO after implementation of the Compensatory Plan, the adequacy of the IFO telephone system was not tested under stress during this exercise. It was evident however that the number of telephones lines in the IFO available for use by the Local l Liaison officers implementing the Compensatory Plan was insufficient to handle the 1

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N1w Htmpshire IFO 27 potential incoming and outgoing calls that would be made during an emergency. The incoming telephone calls under the State Compensatory Plan would include calls from noninstitutionalized mobility-impaired persons requesting State assistance. It is recommended that the State conduct a study to determine the optimum number of telephone lines that would be needed to handle incoming and outgoing calls to and from nonparticipating communities. If it is determined that they are needed, the additional telephone lines should be installed and demonstrated at the next exercise. Two telephones were originally assigned to the NHDPHS. Because one telephone was appro-priated during the exercise for handling these call-ins, DPHS operations were hampered.

• Public alerting and notification responsibilities of the IFO are minimal. These functions consisted of coordination of simulated siren activation with ERBS messages and notification of local communities when sirens were expected to be activated. Because of the nature of this activity, it could not be fully observed. Where it was observed, it was generally found to be adequate. No inadequacies were observed.

Deficiencies

1.

Description:

The ability to meet the needs of the seven nonparticipating communities was not adequately demonstrated at the IFO because of the lack of an adequate number of Local Liaison officers. The three Local Liaison officers who participated there as part of the State Compensatory Plan were also listed in l the State' Plan as filling other staff positions for the second shift at the IFO or State EOC. No roster was available in the Compensatory Plan to demonstrate 24-hour staffing capability of Local Liaison officers for nonparticipating communities. (FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1, !!, H.4, A.4)

Recommendation: The State should estimate the number of Local Liaison officers that would be required to handle the needs of the nonparticipating communities, and demonstrate that adequate staffing of the IFO can be provided to carry out the functions of communities which do not or cannot respond in an emergency. The identified Local Liaison officers should not be part of the second shift at the IFO or another facility.

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2.

Description:

The number of telephone lines in the IFO available l- for use by the Local Liaison officers implementing the Compensatory Plan were insufficient to handle the potential incoming and outgoing calls that Would be made during an

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emergency. (FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1, II, F.1.b)

Recommendation: The State should conduct a study to determine the optimum number of telephone lines that would be needed to handle incoming and outgoing calls to and from nonparticipating communities. If it is determined that they are needed, the

N;w tianpshire IFO l

28 l

l telephone lines should be installed and demonstrated at the next i exercise.

Areas Requiring Corrective Action ,

1.

Description:

The status board in the IFO was not updated rapidly enough and events were not kept in chronological order. This

! caused problems for the IFO staff in recognizing and responding to situations rapidly. (FEMA > REP-1, Rev.1, II, H.3)

Recommendation: Greater attention should be paid to updating the status board in a more timely fashion and ensuring that events are posted chronologically. .

2.

Description:

At the IFO, the one telefax machine which was available was often overloaded and therefore insofficient to handle the number of hard-copy transmissions going to the State EOC and the media center. (FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1, II, F.1, G.4, H.3)

Recommendation: One or more additional telefax machines should i be obtained for use at the IFO to expedite the timely transmission of hard-copy messages.

3.

Description:

Under the Compensatory Plan, the IFO Local Liaison officers had responsibility for relaying and assuring the timeliness j

and accuracy of messages which were passing through the IFO l among the State EOC, participating community EOCs, and the residents / officials of nonparticipating communities. These duties

( were not properly completed during the exercise. (FEM A-REP-1, Rev.1, II, E.5).

Recommendation: Although the Local Liaison officees at the IFO do not have the responsibility of formulating and issuing ERBS/EBS messages, they should assume and execute the responsibility of prompting the State EOC to issue appropriate instructional messages to the public to insure that transit-dependent residents of participating or nonparticipating communities are properly advised how to obtain transportation assistance (also see Section -

2.1.6 of this report).

4.

Description:

There was need for additional telephones at the IFO .

for use by the State Police, National Guard, and the Coast Guard.

(FEM A-REP-1, Rev.1, II, F.1)

, Recommendation: Additional telephones should be obtained for use by IFO staff.

N2w lumpshire IFO 29 1

l Areas Recommended for improvement

1.

Description:

At the IFO there should have been more tables available for use by local liaison workers, the National Guard, Coast Guard, and Compensatory Plan personnel.

Recommendation: Additional tables should be obtained for use by IFO staff to enhance operations.

2.

Description:

At the IFO the plume EPZ map was not large enough and was not labeled by sector. Furthermore, the PARS and access control points were indicated in colored ink on a single overlay.

This was extremely , cumbersome when PARS changed, '

necessitating an erasure and recoloring operation with potential-for losing some of the access control point information.

Recommendation: The plume EPZ map should be redesigned with multiple overlays to facilitate the rapid di.; play of changed protective actions recommendations.

3.

Description:

More working space is needed for Local Liaison officers assigned to carry out New Hampshire's Compensatory Plan activities for nonparticipating communities.

Recommendation: More working space should be provided for Local Liaison officers who are assigned to carry out the State's Compensatory Plan activities for nonparticipating communities. If additional space cannot be made available in the IFO operations room, consideration should be given to the use of other space and the installation of telephones in another room of the IFO.

4.

Description:

Three Local Liaison officers may be an inadequate number of officers to handle calls which could potentially come from the ten participating community EOCs in the EPZ.

1 Recommendation: The State should estimate by study of local EOC staffing needs, the number of Local Liaison officers that would be required to handle the needs of EOF staff of participating communities (when participating communities cannot obtain needed transportation resources). The State should then demonstrate that this portion of the IFO can be staffed adequately.

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Rcdiological Ibslth - State EOC 30 2.1.3 Radiological Health 2.1.3.1 State EOC The Accident Assessment area is located in a separate room at the State EOC.

This area has ample size and is well arranged for its purposes, namely, communications with the IFO/ EOF, backup dose assessment and analyses, and recommendations of protective actions. In the accident assessment room, there are two separate telephone links to the IFO/ EOF. An LBM PC/AT, which is a duplicate of the METPAK Computer at the EOF, was available for backup dose assessments. All necessary displays were posted

• and EPZ maps with overlays were used in plotting field monitoring team locations.

Communications Trom the State EOC to the IFO/ EOF were effective,throughout the exercise. An open telephone line equipped with telephone amplifiers interconnected the EOC accident assessment room and the IFO/ EOF. The second telephone line was i used as needed to discuss plant conditions and dose assessment results. Most data and results were initially transmitted by telephone. The IFO/ EOF staff read the message data from a standardized report form. The staff at the EOC accident assessment area then recorded the data on the standardized form. These standardized report form messages were backed up by a telefax copy from the IFO/ EOF. Several delays occurred in telefax transmissions from the IFO/ EOF to the State EOC (see Section 2.1.3.2),

causing so'me backup messages on the telefax to be delayed up to 20 minutes. However, because the telefax was a backup communications system, no problems were caused by the telefax delays, some of which were the result of mechanical problems. Other reasons for the telefax delays are discussed in Section 2.1.3.2.

Activation of the State EOC was triggered by a telephone call from the State Police to the NHCDA Director at 0827, after the utility's declaration of an Alert ECL.

Personnel assigned to the accident assessment area of the EOC all arrived by 0905. The accident assessment area was almost immediately operational and the Seabrook corttrol room was contacted for the latest information on plant status and current meteorology.

All staff members knew their assigned tasks and carried them out promptly and efficiently. Twenty-four hour staffing and the ability to sustain continuous operations was evidenced by an assignment coster posted in the operations room.

Management of accident assessment operations by the accident assessment officer was excellent, as was the overall management of radiological health activities by the NHDPHS Director. Coordination with the IFO/ EOF was continuous and thorough. ,

Frequent verbal reviews of the current situation were carried out over the speaker-equipped telephones on the open line between the IFO/ EOF and the four DPHS personnel in the accident assessment area. Message logging and handling was done very efficiently. ,

Dose calculations were computed using METPAK on the IBM PC and cross-checked using the State's program on the handheld VRS computer. Plume plots for use at the EOC as well as some "what if" plume and dose projections were generated. A high level of technical competence was demonstrated.

Radiological ifaalth - State EOC j 31 Deficiencies No deficiencies were observed in the radiological health assessment function at the State EOC during this exercise.

Areas Requiring Corrective Actions No areas required corrective action were observed in the radiological health assessment function at the State EOC during this exercise.

Areas Recommended for Improvement No areas recommended for improvement were noted in the radiological health assessment function at the State EOC during this exercise.

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hdiological helth - Nsw Hcmpshira EOF 32 2.1.3.2 New Hampshire EOF The EOF is located in the same building with the IFO in Newington, New Hampshire. Space and furniture were sufficient. A single telefax machine at the EOF /lFO was used for transmission of hard-copy messages between the Media Center, State EOC and the EOF /lFO. In addition to experiencing some mechanical difficulties, the single telefax machine was often in use for correspondence with the media center and to receive weather reports. The telefax was, therefore, occasionally not available when it was needed by EOF /IFO staff as a backup system to transmit technical e Information to the State EOC in hard copy form. It is suggested that additional telefax equipment be installed at the EOF /lFO. .

All necessary displays were posted and used effectively. Message handling was efficient. Computers were used for determining the plume pattern, meteorological ,

conditions, and dose projections. Counting room equipment was available for analysis of air samples and dosimetry equipment was available for the field monitoring teams and for backup for local EOCs. Additional resources were also available from other states, DOE, RAP, FEMA, and the NRC. However, the availability of sufficient dosimeters for all emergency workers designated in the plan should be reviewed and additional equipment should be purchased as necessary. For example, neither mid-range (0-20 R) nor high-range (0-200 R) dosimeters were available for field monitoring teams dispatched from the IFO/ EOF (see Section 2.1.3.4). Instead, they had 0-5 R dosimeters. This is not optimal. Additionally, the field teams should have 0-200 R dosimeters, plus a CDV-715, and a CDV-742, or the equivalent. Also, additional dosimeters would be needed to supply emergency workers deployed to the field from the Rockingham Staging Area (see Section 2.1.8), New Castle (Section 2.2.5), Newfields (Section 2.2.6), and Portsmouth (Section 2.2.8) EOCs, if all workers were required in an emergency. It is recommended that the adequacy of current dosimeter supplies be evaluated in comparison to emergency worker resource needs at each location from which emergency workers may be deployed to assignments in the 10-mile EPZ. Additional dosimeters should be purchased, if necessary, or existing supplies of dosimeters should be redistributed based on emergency worker assignments speelfled in the plan.

The telephone assigned for the exclusive use of a FEMA liaison representative was " borrowed" during the exercise by other exercise participants. This imposed an unnecessary communication handicap for the FEMA liaison person. This may be an indication that there are not enough telephones available.

The utility and State participants were clearly professional and showed evidence of outstanding training and experience. Internal communications and Information exchange were generally excellent. The demonstration of teamwork between the utility

. and State was exceptional. The State personnel at the IFO/ EOF made independent recommendations regarding appropriate protective actions.

Although Internal communications and information exchange between utility and State personnel at the EOF was generally excellent, there was a problem (based on observations made at the IFO) experienced by IFO personnel in obtaining some information from the utility at the EOF. Despite repeated requests, information on isotope composition in the plant stack releases was not provided by the EOF to the IFO l

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Rtdiological H2alth - NIw Hanpshire EOF 33 until about two hours after the releases started around 1330. By this time, the information was superfluous. Since the stack flow rate could could be variable, it is recommended that specific information on the radionuclide concentrations and makeup of stack releases be promptly provided by the EOF to the IFO.

Deficiency i 1.

Description:

The availability of sufficient dosimeters for all emergency workers designated in the plan should be reviewed and additional equipment should be purchased as necessary. For example, the 0-20 R mid-range dosimeters indicated in the plan were not available for field monitoring teams dispatched from the IFO/ EOF. This is not optimal Instead, they had 0-5 R dosimeters.

Also, additional dosimeters would be needed to supply emergency workers deployed to the field from the Rockingham Staging Area, New Castle, Newfields, and Portsmouth EOCs, if all workers were required in an emergency. (FEM A-REP-1, Rev.1, II, K.3.a)

Recommendation: The adequacy of current dosimeter supplies should be evaluated in comparison to emergency worker resources needs at each location from which emergency workers may be deployed to assignments in the plume exposure EPZ. Additional dosimeters should be purchased if necessary or existing supplies of dosimeters should be redistributed based on emergency worker assignments specified in the plan. Field teams should be provided with CDV-715s, CDV-742s (or equivalent), and 0-200 R dosimeters for backup.

Areas Requiring Corrective Action

1.

Description:

The only available telefax equipment was jointly used by the EOF and the IFO. In addition to experiencing some mechanical problems, the telefax machine was of ten in use for transmitting to the media center and for receiving weather reports. Therefore, it was sometimes not avallatG when IFO/ EOF staff wanted to use the telefax as a bs.kup means of communication to transmit technical data to the State EOC.

(FEM A-REP-1, Rev.1, II, G.4.a)

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Recommendation: Additional telefax capability consistent with the expected level of use at the IFO/ EOF should be installed.

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2.

Description:

Although internal communications and information exchange between utility and State personnel at the EOF was generally excellent, there was a problem (based on observations made at the IFO) experienced by IFO personnel in obtaining some l

Rediological H2cith - N;w Hsmpshiro EOF 34 Information from the utility at the EOF. Despite repeated requests, information on isotope composition in the plant stack releases was not provided by the EOF to the IFO until about two hours after the releases started around 1330. By this time the information was superfluous. (FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1, II,1.10).

Recommendation: Since the stack flow rate could be variable, it is recommended that specific information on the radionuclide concentrations and makeup of stack releases be promptly provided by the EOF to the IFO. .

Areas Recommended for Improvement

1.

Description:

A telephone instrument assigned te the FEMA liaison was often also used by other exercise participants. This interfered with FEMA liaison activities.

Recommendation: Determine if this is because there aren't enough telephones for everyone and rectify if this is a problem. ,

Radiological Hralth - N w Hampshire IFO  !

35 2.1.3.3 New Hampshire IFO Dose projections were competently performed by the New Hampshire Depart-ment of Public Health Services dose assessment team at the IFO/ EOF, using the METPAK code. The use of the State projections was well coordinated with the utility dose projections. The consensus projections were used to direct field teams. However, once the initial field data appeared to be consistent with the projections, there was a tendency to rely on the projections rather than to aggressively instruct field teams to collect additional data. Different colored pins were used to show the disposition of NHDPHS field teams on a map in the dose assessment room. However, the field team data were not plotted at the IFO and this may have accounted for unaggressive use of the field teams.

State field monitoring teams were not effectively utilized in tracking the plume and taking air samples. All three State field teams were deployed to the same location.

One team was situated in the plume for six minutes and was not instructed to take an air sample. The absence of air sample data was not questioned by the IFO dose assessor until it became apparent near the end of the exercise that releases were decreasing.

Only one sample was taken. According to the scenario, low but positive results should have been obtainable on many other occasions by all three NHDPHS field teams.

There was some question as to whether one dispatcher could adequately communicate with six field teams on a single radio frequency (three utility, three New Hampshire) much less nine if the three additional Massachusetts field teams had participated. Difficulties in timely . communication were noted even though Massachusetts was not participating in this exercise and only six teams were involved.

Deficiencies No deficiencies were observed in the radiological health function at the IFO during this exercise.

Areas Requiring Corrective Action

1.

Description:

When early field data appeared to verify dose projections, further use of field teams for dose projection confirmation was minimal. (FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1, II, I.10)

< Recommendation: More aggressive use should be made of field teams and field data for continued support of dose calculations.

2.

Description:

State field monitoring teams were not effectively utilized in tracking the plume and taking air samples. All three state teams were deployed to the same location. One team was situated in the plume for six minutes and was not instructed to take an air sample. The absence of air sample data was not questioned by the IFO dose assessor until it became apparent near

Radiological Haalth - N;w Hangshire IFO 36 the end of the exercise that releases were decreasing. Only one sample was taken. Low but positive results should have been obtainable by all three NHDPHS field teams. (FEMA-REP-1, Rev.

1, II,1.8)

Recommendation: The State field teams should be trained to carry out complete monitoring procedures including air sampling before proceeding to a low background area for further instructions.

Also, dose projection estimates and data should be supplemented with aggressive use of field teams and field data. ,

Area Recommended For Improvement .

1.

Description:

There is some question as to whether one dispatcher f could adequately handle six field teams (nine with three additional Massachusetts field teams) on a single radio frequency.

Recommendation: Consideration should be given to adding one or more field team dispatchers and the possibility of adding another radio frequency for communications with the State field teams.

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Rtdiological H2alth - Field Monitoring Terms 37 s

2.1.3.4 Field Monitoring Teams Mobilization of the three New Hampshire field monitoring teams was initiated by a telephone call from the Seabrook Station Nuclear Power Plant control room to the State Bureau of Environmental Health in Concord. Individual team members were notified by State staff. Equipment available for each of the three teams included:

• Eberline Model RO-2A ion chamber (calibrated 1/10/86).

. Eberline Model E-140N survey meter with HP-210 pancake probe (calibrated 2/10/86).

• Air sampling equipment with charcoal and silver zeolite cartridges

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(calibrated 10/25/85).

• Meteorological equipment for humidity, wind speed, and wind direction.

• Auxiliary equipment and supplies, including cables, batteries, fuses, clothing, and forms.

All teams had arrived at the EOF by 1000 and were provided with all of the types of equipment specified in the plan except a Ludlum-19 micro R meter. The State plan has an inventory which lists supplies and equipment for monitoring teams. However, the equipment actually available for team No. 3, although adequate, differed from that identified in the plan.

The field monitoring teams were well briefed before being sent into the field.

All three teams used checklists to inventory equipment in their kits before deployment.

Communications between the field teams and with the EOF worked well. No dead spots were observed. Radio equipment consisted of: mobile mounted Civil Defense radio, or hand-held radio, portable Civil Defense radio, and base mounted 2-way radio at the EOF.

Team members demonstrated a high degree of competence in technical operations. They used their equipment well and adequately demonstrated monitoring procedures. They also were aware of many of the finer points in monitoring procedures

. such as preloading of filter cartridges to avoid sample contamination. Team members were generally familiar with the area and thought ahead about plume shifts caused by the changing wind. Apparently, only one air sample was taken (see Section 2.1.3.3).

.. However, the field monitoring teams were trained to perform addl.tlonal air sampling if called upon to do so by the dispatcher of the IFO.

When off-site releases started, team No. I was one and a half miles downwind from the plant. The team immediately detected and reported increasing radiation levels as the plume passed overhead. Team No. I was instructed by the field team coordinator to stand by for further instruction and remained in the plume for about six minutes before they were told to move to a low background area. However, no air sample was requested (see Section 2.1.3.3).

R-diological thcLth - Fiold Monitoring Tstms 38 Field team radiological exposure control equipment included protective suits, gloves, boots, remote handling devices, respirators, and KI. Regarding the use of KI, state field team members must sign a form which indicates that medical authorization is required for administration of K1 and may only be provided by the Director of the NHDPHS. Self-reading dosimeters were used by the field teams and were zerced prior to dispatch according to procedure MT/DK Coord-l ' " Field Monitoring Team /

Decontamination Coordinator," dated 1/18/85. A 0-200 mR dosimeter was available but the 0-20 R was not (see Section 2.1.3.2). Instead, teams used a 0-5 R self-reading dosimeter, a very low range for field teams (see Section 2.1.3.2). The field teams should also have CDV-715s, CDV-742s, and 0-200 R dosimeters for backup (see Sectica ,

2.1.3.2). TLDs were also provided to each state field monitoring representative at the EOF. Team members frequently checked their self-reading dosimeters and indicated that once the dosimeter reading exceeded 350 mR, they would exit the plume area. ,

Decontamination procedures were well understood and one team demonstrated vehicle monitoring for contamination upon their return to the EOF.

Deficiencies No deficiencies were-observed for New Hampshire field monitoring teams during this exercise.

Area Requiring Corrective Action

1.

Description:

New Hampshire field monitoring teams arrived at the EOF and were provided with all types of equipment specified in the plan except a Ludlum-19 micro R meter, and the equipment available for team No. 3, although adequate, differed from that identified in the plan. (FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1,11,1.7,1.8)

Recommendation: The number of field monitoring instruments and the availability of equipment for each of the field monitoring teams should be reviewed and checked for consistency with the inventory contained in the State plan.

Areas Recommended For improvement ,

No areas recommended for improvement were observed for the New Hampshire field monitoring teams during this exercise. .

Field Implemantation of ths State's Ability to Satisfy Combinad Participating and Nonparticipating Coc:munity Needs According to the Compensatory Plan 39 2.1.4 Field implementation of the State's Ability to Satisfy Combined Participating -

and Nonparticipating Community Needs According to the Compensatory Plan Serious questions arose at the exercise regarding the ability of the state to provide buses for the transportation of special populations, including school children..

mobility-impaired, and otherwise transit-dependent populations. Driver resources were not sufficient to meet the transportation requirements. ,

For _ example, the State Compensatory Plan consistently uses the number of buses available, rather than the number of bus-and-driver pairs, assuming that more drivers can be made available during an  ;

emergency than the number that were supported by the letters of agreement in force on the day of the exercise. This Is' not a safe ,

i assumption. The letters of agreement of several of the bus companies list fewer drivers available than buses. Furthermore, the observers found that the estimates in the letters of agreement for drivers available represent an absolute maximum rather than the number reliably available in the event of an emergency, which would, in all probability, be a smaller number. In addition, the details of the plans and the letters of agreement are inconsistent. The letters of

. agreement in force on the day of the exercise indicate that fewer buses are available from bus companies than are specified as required in the Compensatory Plan (see Appendix 1). The observers also found that the numbers of buses available in the letters of agreement represents the absolute maximum rather than the number reliably available. Bus company dispatchers estimated that most buses would not be in the yards during normal working hours and/or the vacation / charter season.

Therefore, the buses might be out of the area (as charters), or difficult to recall because most buses are not equipped with radios. School officials in one local EOC express doubt that they would get buses other than those already contracted to the school district (Section 2.2.3).

It is recommended that the State should review the availabillty of buses and drivers and develop adequate backup resources and methods for recalling vehicles to make up the shortfall that would exist for a range of emergency scenarios. A pool of reserve drivers should be established. .

Because this exercise called for full New Hampshire evacuation of the plume exposure EPZ, maximum stress would have been placed on the availability of transportation resources and the ability of the State to acquire and deliver buses to both nonparticipating and participating communities. During the exercise, several of the participating local communities were unable to obtain, through procedures specified in their local plan, the single prearranged bus called for to satisfy the exercise objectives.

These local communities requested a bus from the State through the IFO. These actions

Field Icpttmentation of tha Stcts's Ability i C to Sctisfy Corbin:d Participsting cnd

' ' Nonparticipating Conununity N2;ds Acccrding  ;

i to the Compensatory Plan  !

?

40 j -

1 I by the local communities were consistent with the procedures called for in the State's -

d Compensatory' Plan. The Compensatory Plan indicates that a supply of buses /

a ' automatically be prestaged at the Rockingham County Staging Area at the Site Area Emergency ECL, and for these prestaged buses to be dispatched after an evacuation

- order issued et the General Emergency ECL. However, of the eight buses dispatched to ttle Rockingham County Staging Area, only one arrived at the Staging Area before the General Emergency ECL. In addition to the seven buses that were dispatched to 4 . nonparticipating communities, the State received requests from four participating .

communities. The ~ Federal observer at the State 80C observed that the State Transportation Coordinator received these requests and $1mulated the dispatch of buses a

to fill those requests. However, with the exception of a bus that arrived at the ,

l Portsmouth EOC, it appeared to the observers, who were stationed in the field at the

• local level, that the State was unable to satisfy the requests of participating local

communities for bus transportation resources.

i The need for participating local communities to request, through the IFO, State j a.ssistance with transportation resources arose when eight of the ten participatir.g communities were unable to obtain a prearranged bus by directly contacting a aus esmpany, following the procedures in their localplan. The ability to provide prearraned

buses directly to the local EOCs from the bus enm; antes was therefore not 4dequately demonstrated. Tha State should coordinate with local jurisdictions and bus companies to develop proctdures ensuring that prearranged buses can actually. be provided to l participatitg local jurisdictions in response tc requests for bus transportation assistance

made directly to bus companies from local EOCs. The procedures by which local EOCs f request and receive bus resources directly from bus companles should be demonstrated at i a future exercise.

! East K!cgston's reqwest for a pecarra'iged bus was satisfied within 40 minutes.

I Seabrook's requent foe a prearranged bus was satisfied within about 30 minutes. Neither

{ comclunity had to request asslatance from the State to obtain these prearranged buses.

Portsmouth was succassful In obtaining a bas with the State's assistance, but the total time from the recoramendation to evacuate n the arrival of the bus was about one hour and fifty-three clinutes. About one hour and seven minutes of this total time represented the lag between the request to the IFO and tae arrival of the bus (See Section 2.2.E).

According to federal observers, requested tuses never arrived at Brentwood (Section 2.2.1), Kingston (Section 2.2,3), Newfiends (Section 2.2.6),' Newton (Section 2.2J), or Stratham (Section 2.2.10). Accorcirg tu the IFO me.ssages, communities that failed to receive a bus did not place an udditionei request for these resources to the

• IFO. The State was, therefore, not fully awatt of the extent of the problem with the '

delivery of buses -to pseticipating communities. The State 2nd local communities shofd cons!stently implement peccedures for confirming the arrival of transportation resources at local EOCs and the evacuation of people dependent upon these resources.

Bus drivers consisteatly experienced problems in getting to where they would have been needed. A tot.il of twelve buses, wnich were to be dispatched through the

Fiold ImpLcmentction of th2 Stcte's Ability to S:tisfy Conbin;d Perticipnting cnd tionparticipating Community Nads According to the Compensatory Plan 4L Rockingham County Staging Area, were sent out by bus companies during the exercise.

Only eight of the twelve arrived at the Rockingham County Dispatch Center. One of the eignt that arrived was not able to continue because it was low on fuel. Although the State Transportation Resources Coordinator made arrangements for refueling of the bus, it returned back to its company instead of continuing with the exercise. The drivers of two of the seven buses disphtched to the schools of nonparticipating communities had difficulty reaching their destination. They were unfamiliar with alternate routes and

. experienced difficulties because of the poor quality of photocopied maps. One of the bus drivers made wrong turns and finally required prompting to complete his route. Some of the evacuation and other bus route maps distributed at the Rockingham County Staging

. Area were illegible, some provided insufficient detail to specify the route clearly, and some did not include adequate addresses for the locations at which evacuees were to be picked up.

To address these problems, the State could arrange to have reserve buses available to replace buses that do not arrive or cannot continue af ter arrival. Also, maps of the routes from the points of origin of buses to the Rockingham County Staging Area should be made available to the drivers of buses that are to be staged at the staging area. In addition, evacuation route bus drivers should receive additional training in running evacuation bus routes originating from the Rockingham Ccunty Staging Area.

Also, the legibility, level of detail, and address informal!on on maps of bus routes from the Rockingham County Staging Area to local staging areas and of community pick-up and evacuation bus routes should be improved to provide adequate guidance to bus drivers and guides.

The two bus drivers of Timberlane Bus Company who were interviewed at the Seabecok EOC (where they had mistakenly arrived - see Section 2.2.9) stated that they had not been trained in the use of dosimetry. Dosimetry and a person trained in its use must be provided for each evacuation bu: (see Section 2.1.8).

The State Compensatory Plan was not adequately prepared for two of the seven nonparticipating communities: Exeter and North Hampton, which, on the day before the exercise, voted not to participate in the exercise. The State compensatory Plan included bus route maps and narrative descriptions of bus routes only for Hampton Falls, South flampton, Kensington, Rye, and Hampton, communities that had not been expected to participate. Bus route maps and narratlye descriptions of bus routes also were not available for the participating cummunttles of Brentwood, Greenland, Kingston, East Kingston, New Castle, Newfields, Newton, Portsmouth. Stratham, or Seabrook, The State Compensatory Plan should be revised to antleipate the nonparticipation of any of the local jurisdictions the Seabrook plume exposure EPZ.

According to IFO message forms generated by the State EOC Emergency Management Services (EMS) Coordinator, a supply of ambulances sufficient to meet the transportation needs of special-needs persons could not be dhpatched through the IFO.

Based on discussions with nursing home and hospital administration personnel, Portsmouth also supported the conclusion that the number of ambulances available would -

Fictd Icplcmentation of thn Stato's Ability to Sctisfy Corbin:d Particip ting cnd Nonparticipating Community N uds According to the Compensatory Plan 42 be inadequate to evacuate mobility-impstred and special-needs population in these institutions. The State Compensatory Plan called for pre-staging and dispatch of ambulances from the Rockingham County Staging Area, but this was not demonstrated.

A series of three messages from the EMS representative at the State EOC to the IFO at about 1130-1143 indicated that ambulances would not be available to respond to all requests for ambulances from local EOCs. When it became apparent that the demand for ambulanoes from the State exceeded the supply available to the State, the Director of the EMS developed a set of priorities to be used in allocating the available ambulances. ~

It must be noted that the State llealth Department had decided that the nursing homes would not be evacuated. (The role and good performance of the EMS State EOC director is further discussed in Section 2.1.1.) The State, in consultation with the local '

jurisdictions, should conduct a study to determine the demand for ambulances and specially equipped vans to be used for evacuation in much the same way that it should estimate bus needs. Based on the results of this study, procedures for supplying the necessary vehicles should be developed And incorporated in the State RERP and the State Compensatory Plan. As is the case for buses, the numbers and specifications of the vehicles available from various companies / sources should be tabulated and cross-matched with needs. Also, the staging and dispatch of ambulances from the Rockingham County Staging Area should be demonstrated at the next exercise to ensure that, under the provisions of the State Compensatory Plan, the State can evacuate persons who require ambulances and special vans.

Deficiencies

1.

Description:

Serious questions arose at the exercise regarding the ability of the State to provide buses for the transportation of special populations, including school children, mobility-impaired, and otherwise transit-dependent populations. Driver resources were not sufficient to meet the transportation requirements.

(FEM A-REP-1, Rev.1, !!, J.10.g)

Recommendation: The State should review the availability of buses and drivers and develop adequate back up resources and methods for recalling vehicles to make up the shortfall that would exist for a range of emergency scenarios. A pool of reserve ,

drivers should be developed,

f.

Description:

Several of the local communities were unable to ,

obtain, through procedures specified in their local plan, the single prearranged bus called for to satisfy the exercise objectives.

These communities requested a bus from the State through the IFO. These actions by the local communities were consistent with the procedures called for in the Compensatory Plan. (FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1,11, J.10.g) l

Fiold Irplcmentetion of th3 State's Ability

~

to S:tisfy Combin d Participating cnd Nonparticipating Community Nasds According to the Compensatory Plan 43 Recommendattom The State should coordinate with local Jurisdic-tions and bus companies to develop procedures ensuring that prearranged buses actually can be provided to participating local jurisdictions in response to requests for bus transportation assistance made directly to bus . companies from local EOCs. The '

procedures by which local EOCs request and receive bus resources directly from bus companies should be demonstrated at a future

. exercise. ,

3.

Description:

The communities that failed to receive a bus did not

- place an additional request for buses to the IFO. The Sto;e was, therefore, not fully aware of the extent of the problem with delivery of buses to participating communities. (FEM v REP-1, Rev.1, II, J.10.g)

Recommendation: The State and local communities ,thould consistently implement procedures for confirming the arrival of transportation resources at local EOCs and the evacuation of people dependent upon these resources.

4.

Description:

Bus drivers consistently experienced problems in getting to where they would have been needed. They were unfamiliar with alternate routes and experienced difficulties because of the poor quality of photocopied maps. One of the bus drivers made wrong turns and required prompting to complete his route. One of the buses that arrived at the Rockingham County Dispatch Center was unable to continue because it was low on fuel. Some of the evacuation and other bus route maps distributed at the Rockingham County Staging Area were illegible, some provided insufficient detail to specify the route clearly, and some did not include adequate addresses for the locations at which evacuees were to be picked up. (FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1, !!, J.10.g)

Recommendation 1: The State should review the State Compensatory Plan to ensure that reserve buses and drivers are

- available to replace buses that do not arrive or cannot continue af ter arrival.

.' Recommendation 2: Maps of the routes from the points of origin of buses to the Rockintrham County Staging Area should be made available to the drivers of buses that are to be staged at the Rockingham County Staging Area.

Recommendation 3: Evacuation route bus drivers should receive additional training in running evacuation bus routes originating from the Rockingham County Staging Area.

Fiold Implqmentation of th9 State's Ability to Saticfy Cocintd Participting cnd Nonp3rticipating Contunity heds According to t,he Compensatory Plan t.t.

Recommendation 4: The legibility, level of detail, and address information on ' maps of bus routes from the Rcckingham County Staging Arca lo local staging acess of the community pickup and evacuation bus routes should be improved to provide adequate guidance to bus drivers and guides.

5. '. Descriptiom The two bus drivers of Timberlane Bus Company who were intervie'wed at the Seabrook EOC (where they had mistakenly

• arrived - see Section 2.2.9) stated that they had not been trained in the use of dosimetry. (FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1, II, K.3.a)

Recommendattom Dosimetry and a person trained in its use must be provided for each bus (see Section 2.1.8).

6. Descript!om The State Compensatory Plan was not adequately prepared for two of the seven nonparticipating communities:

Exeter and North Hampton, which on the day before the exercise, voted not to participate in the exercise. Bus route maps and narrative descriptions of bus routes were also not available for the participating communities of Brentwood, Greenland, Kingston, East Kingston, New Castle, Newfields, Newton, Portsmouth, Stratham, or Seabrook. (FEM A-REP-1, Rev.1, II, A.1.a,b)

Recommendattom The State Compensatory Plan should be revised to anticipate the nonparticipation of any of the local jurisdictions in the Seabrook plume EPZ.

7. Descriptiom A supply of ambulances sufficient to meet the transportation needs of special-needs persons could not be dispatched through tha IFO. Although the State Compensatory Plan allowed for prestaging and dispatch of ambulances from the Rockingham County Staging Area, the State did not us,e or demonstrate this procedure. ,(FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1, II, J.10.d,g).

Recommenuatiom The State, in consultation with the local jurisdictions, should conduct a study to determine the demand for ,

ambulances and specially-equipped vans to be used for evacuation in much the same way that it should estimate bus needs. The staging and dispatch.of ambulances from the Rockingham County ,

Staging Area should be demonstrated at the next exercise to ensure that, under the provisions of the State Compensatory Plan, the State can evacuate persons who require ambulances and special vans.

Fiold Imptsm:ntaticn of th2 Stato's Ability to Satisfy Combintd Participating cnd Nonparticipating Community Needs According to the Compensatory Plan 45 Areas Requiring Corrective Action During the exercise, there were no areas requiring corrective action noted in connection with the State's ability to satisfy combined participating and nonparticipating community evacuation transportation needs according to the State Compensatory Plan.

Areas Recommended for Improvement During the exercise, there were no areas recommended for improvement observed in connection with the State's ability to satisfy combined participating and nonparticipating community evacuation transportation needs according to the State Compensatory Plan.

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Stato Polico Accoss Control 46 2.1.5 State Police Access Control Control of access to areas within the plume EPZ is a primary responsibility of the State Police and is directed by State Police senior officers at the State EOC. Troop A, stationed in Epping, New Hampshire, bears most of this responsibility. According to need, the 35 troopers assigned to the Epping Station are supplemented by other troops from throughout the State and by troopers from other states,if necessary. The National Guard also is available to supplement Trocp A, which also is responsible for assisting local communities with traffic control and for assisting the Mw Hampshire Department of Highways in establishing barriers.

Access control to the beaches was ordered from the State EOC at the Site Area Emergency ECL. This was extended to the nonparticipathg towns, then for the 5-mile EPZ perimeter, and later to the entire 11-mile EPZ perimeter as the situation

• developed. Although the exercise objective called for staffing only one access control point, traffic control was established for all of the nonparticipating towns except South Hampton, which gave late notification of its intent not to participate in the exercise.

The State Police officers were properly equipped with and instructed in the use of dosimeters and record keeping. There were some problems with breakup of radio communications with the IFO, and one trooper said that they needed better maps, especially for troopers who are not familiar with the area. The adequacy of the State Police communications between the IFO and the State Police officers stationed at access and traffic control points in the EPZ should be studied and improved, if necessary.

Better maps also should be prepared and made available for troopers not familiar with the area to ensure prompt staffing of access and traffic control points.

It was clear that Troop A does not alone have sufficient personnel to control access to the entire 10-mile EPZ perimeter. During the exercise it was determined that forty-four State Police officers would be required to staff all access control points. This would have exhausted the State Police Troop A resources of the day shift and some of the night shif t. It is recommended that plans for the staffing of access control points should be reviewed and revised as necessary to include arrangements for obtaining supplementary staffing resources in a timely manner without using second shif t personnel on the first shift. Even with help from other troops, the State Police force could be seriously depleted and law enforcement possibly impaired. The State Police assisted by the Department of Public Works and Highways, did, however, follow their procedures and clearly know their traff!c control assignments. The problem with, availability of sufficient personnel was recognized by tile State Police commander at the State EOC, who took steps to augment Troop A forces by simulation.

Deficiency .

1.

Description:

State Police Troop A does not alone have sufficient I personnel to control access to the entire 10-mile EPZ perimeter.

During the exercise it was determined that 44 State Police officers would be required to staff all access control points. This would have exhausted the State Police Troop A resources of the day shift l

Stato Polica Access Control 47 and some of the night shift. Even with help from other troops, the force could be seriously depleted and law enforcement possibly impaired. (FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1, II, A.4, J.10.j)

Recommendation: Plans for the staffing of access control points should be reviewed and revised as necessary to include arrange-ments for obtaining supplementary staffing resources in a timely manner without using second shift personnel on the first shif t.

!* Areas Requiring Corrective Action

, 1.

Description:

During the exercise there were some problems with breakup of radio communications between State Police troopers

, and the IFO. (FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1, II, F.1, J.10.j)

Recommendation: The adequacy of the State Police communica-tions between the IFO and the State Police officers stationed at access and traffic control points in the EPZ should be studied and improved.

2.

Description:

State Police troopers indicated that better maps l were needed, especially for troopers who are not familiar with the l area. (FEM A-REP-1, Rev.1, II, J.10.a, J.10.])

Recommendation: Better maps should be prepared and made available for troopers not familiar with the area to ensure prompt

! staffing of access and traffic control points.

Areas Recommended for Improvement No areas recommended for improvement were observed at the State Police access control.

l

M2 die Rslations 48 2.1.6 Media Relations The Media Center which is located at Newington Town Hall is an excellent facility. The Public Information Officers (PIOS) and their support staff have access to more than adequate space, furniture, lighting, and equipment to fully perform their respective roles. Typewriters, copiers, and telefax machines as well as clerical supplies were readily available. Both print and electronic media representatives were accommodated with necessary support equipment.

Detailed charts and displays of excellent quality were readily available and used. A large map of the 10-mile EPZ, however, was not available until midway through '

the exercise, and when it became available was not used effectively by the state spokesperson to demonstrate the protective actions that were under way. A map of the plume EPZ should be readily available at the Media Center and State spokespersons '

should be trained in the use of this map to better communicate the content and areas

' recommended for protective actions.

The communications capabilities at the Media Center generally were very good.

There was a variety of direct and backup !!nks with the EOF /lFO and the New Hampshire and Massachusetts State EOCs. The communications systems at the Media Center included ring down telephones to the EOF /lFO; two telephone lines plus one telefax line to each State EOC; two outside telephone lines for utility use; two telecopier lines, and one word processor line. Backup communications included radios, walkie-talkies, and mobile telephones.

Activation and staffing of the Media Center were accomplished promptly and efficiently. Public Information Officers and support staff were provided by the Governor of New Hampshire, New Hampshire Civil Defense, and the utility. This staff can be mobilized on a twenty-four hour basis.

Besides a Media Center Director / Moderator, the utility provided a technical expert on the plant and a professor from the University of Lowell who explained the off-site effects of radiation caused by the simulated accident. Each of these spokespersons effectively and consistently demonstrated the training and knowledge required for their sensitive positions.

In accordance with the State plan, the NHCD PIO was used as a support resource during the exercise. However, more active participation in media briefings by the NHCD PIO would enhance information dissemination. The Governor's office was represented early in the exercise by a staff person who relinquished his temporary role as ,

spokesperson to the Governor's Press Secretary when that person arrived later in the morning. While the Governor's Press Secretary demonstrated overall knowledge and capability as chief spokesperson for the State, there were occasions when additional ,

preparation and/or information would have improved his effectiveness. This was especially true when questions arose during media briefings on the evacuated population figures. The increased participation by the NHCD PIO in media briefings would help to support and supplement the information provided by the Governor's Press Secretary.

M2dia Ralations 49 An excellent and thorough post-exercise debriefing and analysis of the media center operations was done by the utility staff who also suggested areas for future improvement.

The informational functions of the Media Center generally were adequate.

Media kits containing appropriate information were available in sufficient quantity for the large number of media representatives who appeared. Eight briefings were held on a regular hourly basis and when other events warranted. The PIOS conferred often and coordinated their activities and information at pre-media staff briefing sessions. The briefings were generally thorough, clear, and well controlled.

The utility generated a number, 22 in all, of news releases during the exercise.

While these generally were clear and prompt, summary information should have been periodically provided.

There were some problems with early briefings by the State PIO who insisted that nonparticipating communities were participating in the exercise. Later briefings contradicted this. When the beach communities including Hampton were being evacuated, the PIOS insisted during a briefing that Hampton officials were cooperating in effecting the evacuation. Reporters questioned the accuracy of this statement since Hampton was not playing in the exercise. The PIO response was that they were playing the reality of the scenario events and not the reality of the drill. This response resulted in consternation and disbelief since one of the exercise goals was to test the State Compensatory Plan. The end result was that a major credibility problem was developed with the media.

There were other problems with information flow in hard copy form from the State EOC, and coordination of information given to the public by the ERBS and to the media at their briefings. There also was a wrong telephone number given in an ERBS message for persons with special needs to call (see Section 2.).1), which caused a problem at the IFO. This same wrong telephone number appears in the public information brochure.

The only telefax machine at the State EOC was overburdened with traffic flow to and from the EOF /lFO and to the ERBS station. Only three hard copies of the seven ERBS messages that were generated reached the media center. One message released at 1110 contradicted Information being given by a governor's aide to the media at the time. The message directed sheltering for the three towns for which the governor had recommended evacuation at 1059 (see Section 2.1.1). The result was that the public l

would have been given confusing and conflicting instructions., Some key State decisions, such as the governor's State of Emergency declaration and the mobilization of the National Guard, were not covered by hard copy news releases. Clearly, better review and coordination of ERBS messages and news releases between the State EOC and the media center is needed.

The rumor control system demonstrated during the exercise at the media center was not the system described in the state plan. The plan calls for two "800" number telephone lines carrying taped messages to be operated by the utility. Such a system clearly would not be sufficient. The system demonstrated during the exercise at the

M2ifia R31stions 50 media center by contrast was efficient and effective. Four separate telephone lines '

were staffed by competent personnel who were kept informed of the latest plant status information and news releases by a rumor control manager and a " roving" briefer.

Additionally, the rumor control manager briefed the PIOS before each media briefing ,

about the nature and extent of the rumors being received so that they cou.ld be dispelled at the media briefings. The rumor control staff members were trained to only handle rumors pertaining to the plant status, while referring protective action rumors to the state rumor control number. It was apparent that the state rumor control line malfunctioned. The NHCD PIO determined that the problem was caused by a new tape message machine which apparently broke down. .

The scenario provided a great deal of activity at the Media Center. The unfolding events occurred at a pace that obviously challenged the Media Center system, -

equipment, and personnel to convey accurate current information to the media.

Deficiency

1.

Description:

Lack of coordination between the media center and the State EOC led to confusing and conflicting instructions for the public and caused a credibility problem with the media. There was also a wrong telephone number given in an ERBS message for persons with special needs to call. This same wrong telephone number also appears in the public information brochure. (FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1, II, G.4.a)

Recommendation: One telefax machine at the State EOC is not sufficient for all the hard-copy needs. Installation of a second telefax machine that would be dedicated for media and ERBS use should be considered. Releases to ERBS should be coordinated with releases to the Media Center so that both news sources have the same information at the same time. Also, the Governor's aide at the State EOC command table should coordinate with the Governor's aide in the Media Center, especially before an ERBS message release and coincident briefing at the Media Center. The validity of all telephone numbers referenced in ERBS messages should be verified.

Areas Requiring Corrective Action

1.

Description:

A large map of the plume EPZ was not available until midway through the exercise and when it became available it was not used effectively by the State spokesperson to demonstrate the protective actions that were under way. (FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1, II, G.4.a) l

)

Msdia Ralctions 51 Recommendation: A map of the plume EPZ should be readily available at the Media Center and State spokespersons should be trained in the use of this map to better communicate the content and locations of protective action recommendations.

2.

Description:

While the Governor's Press Secretary at the Media Center demonstrated overall knowledge and capability as chief spokesperson for the State, there were occasions when additional preparation and/or information would have improved his effective-ness. This was especially true when questions arose during media briefings on the evacuated population figures. (FEMA-REP-1, Rev.

1, II, G.4.a, 0.1)

Recommendation: Additional training should be provided to the Governor's Press Secentary and/or information flow procedures reviewed and improved in order to improve the effectiveness of the Governor's Press Secretary. The increased participation by the NHCD PIO in media briefings would help to support and supple-ment the information provided by the Governor's Press Secretary.

3.

Description:

The State PIO early in the exercise incorrectly informed the media that nonparticipating towns were in fact participating which caused a credibility problem. (FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1, II, G.4.a)

! Recommendation: The PIO staff at the State EOC should be f trained to insure that the correct information is available to the

! PIO who is responsible for briefing the media.

4.

Description:

Although the rumor control system demonstrated during the exercise at the Media Center worked well, it is not the system described in the State Plan. (FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 1, II, i

G.4.c, P.4)

Recommendation: If it is Intended to permanently use the rumor control system demonstrated during the exercise, the plan should be revised to describe this system.

Areas Recommended for Improvement i

~

l 1.

Description:

In accordance with the State plan,~ the NHCD PIO was used as a support resource during the exercise. However, more active participation in media briefings by the NHCD PIO would enhance information dissemination. (FEM A-REP-1, Rev.1, II, G.4.a, G.4.b)

MIdie R31stions 52 Recommendation: In the future it would be advisable to include the NHCD P!O in the media briefings.

2.

Description:

Although the utility generated numerous clear and prompt news releases from the Media Center during the exercise, summary information should also have been periodically provided.

Recommendation: The provision of periodic summary updates, which consolidate information previously released, would enhance the media's understanding of the situation.

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Rsesption Centar, Mass Cara and Daconttmination 53 2.1.7 Reception Center, Mass Care and Decontamination Manchester High School in Manchester, New Hampshire, has a stated capacity of 1100 evacuees and meets the resource requirements for reception centers. Specific areas are designated for administration, health services, registration, food preparation, recreation, and supply storage, and sleeping. These areas provide at least 40 square feet per person. Facilities are available for assigning families with small children, elderly, and handicapped persons to separate areas. Cots and blankets (200) are on hand and additional equipment can be supplied by the State and the American Red Cross.

• Communications for both the reception and mass care centers were provided by commercial telephone and amateur radio.

- At 0900, the DHS Director at the State EOC notified the Director at Manchester to be ready to open the center. Official notification to open was received by the reception center manager at 1025 which was timely. Staffing was complete and written procedures were available and used. Police support was very good. The entire reception center operation was well managed. However, the Red Cross liaison person arrived late and did not interact with the manager.

According to police, road signs guiding evacuees to the Reception and Mass Care Centers were too small and not durable enough. Some of the road signs were blown over and they also were too small. Better directional signs should be developed for directing evacuees to the Reception and Mass Care Centers.

Amateur radio and commercial telephones were the means of communication at the reception center. The manager was not always kept up to date on the emergency classification level currently in effect and as late as 1300 hours0.015 days <br />0.361 hours <br />0.00215 weeks <br />4.9465e-4 months <br /> thought the Site Area l Emergency ECL was in effect. A General Emergency ECL had been declared at 1045.

This would not have happened if the IFO had provided more information to the reception center manager. If the reception center had a radio tuned to the ERBS station they would have known the ECL. However, ERBS broadcasts were only simulated for this exercise.

The mass care facility, located at the Memorial High School in Manchester and operated in conjunction with the reception center, was appropriately staffed by the Red Cross and volunteers.

The decontamination facility was well arranged and furnished. However, more

. directional signs for evacuees would be helpful. At least eight showers each for men and women were available but were in the same locker room area. Some privacy was, however, maintained in each shower stall through the use of opaque plastic out there

- were no females trained and available for monitoring and decontamination. Proper dosimetry and survey equipment were available in sufficient quantity.

I Nine Manchester firemen were well trained in monitoring and decontamination procedures, but ten are required by the plan. A METTAG system with numbered red, yellow, and green tags were used for keeping decontaminated people separate from others. The tag numbers were used as a control for contaminated clothing and vehicier.

I

Rsesption Canter, Mass Cara and Dacontamination 54 Procedures for change of clothes and washing of decontaminated skin areas were cemonstrated. Washing of the vehicles was not demonstrated because of freezing weather. Vehicles would be washed down in the parking lot during warmer weather and taken to a bus wash during freezing weather. Contaminated clothes were bagged and then tagged with the red portion of the METTAG. Wash water from vehicle washdown would go to the storm sewer; shower water would go to the sanitary sewer system.

About 750 to 1200 people could be monitored in the first 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> with the staff assigned by the plan. The Manchester plan indicates that Manchester would serve as host to communities with a resident and transient population of 25,857. Even if only 20% of this population (5,171) arrived at the reception center, the plan, procedures, and staffing '

levels demonstrated at the exercise would not be sufficient to monitor these evacuees within about a 12 hour1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> period as specified in FEMA-REP-1 planning standard element J.12. It is recommended that the plan be revised to provide sufficient trained staff to '

ensure capability to monitor the expected number of evacuees at the reception center within a 12-hour period.

The Manchester local plan suggests a 1 inch per second movement of the detector probe. This rate will lead to unnecessarily long lines. The movement of the probe can be at least as fast as 3 inches per second as specifiec in the State plan.

Salem was selected as a second reception center for demonstration of activation and resources only. Although staffing was not an objective, the local DHS Director, Red Cross personnel, firemen, policemen, and volunteers participated.

This reception center was clearly capable of fulfilling all the resource requirements of a reception center. Participants were enthusiastic and took their responsibilities seriously. A need for better understanding by the DHS and the Red Cross was evident as shown by some confusion about their respective roles in providing for feeding of evacuees. This was recognized by the participants who discussed the problem and means of correcting it.

Deficiency l

1. Descriptiom Only about 750 to 1200 people could be monitored in the first 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> with the staff assigned by the plan.

The Manchester plan indicates that Manchester would serve as host to communities with a resident and transient population of ,

25,857. Even if only 20% of this population (5,171) arrived at the j reception center, the plan, procedures, and staffing levels

demonstrated at the exercise would not be sufficient to monitor ,

these evacuees within about a 12 hour1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> period as specified in l

FEMA-REP-1 planning standard element J.12. (FE M A-RE P-1, Rev.1, II, J.12)  ;

Recommendatiom It is recommended that the plan be revised to i provide sufficient trained staff to ensure capability to monitor the l

Rsception Csnter, Mass Cars end Dacontaminction 55 expected number of evacuees at the reception center within a 12- ,

hour period. l l

Areas Requiring Corrective Action

1.

Description:

The Red Cross liaison person at the Manchester reception center arrived late and did not interact with the manager. (FEM A-REP-1, Rev.1, II, E.2, A.I.b)

Recommendatiom Staffing and operating procedures should be reviewed and, if necessary, revised to ensure timely arrival of the

- Red Cross representative and required interaction with the manager.

2.

Description:

The reception center manager was not always kept up to date on emergency classification levels and the changing situation. (FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1, II, D.3, A.1.b)

Recommendation: A radio tuned to the ERBS station should be available and the IFO should be in touch with the reception center manager by telephone or ARES with periodic updates.

3.

Description:

The Manchester local plan suggests one inch per second movement of the detector survey probe. The State plan specifies three inches per second. (FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1, II, K.5.a, P.4)

Recommendation: The Manchester plan should be changed to conform to the State plan. This will help to avoid unnecessarily long lines at the decontamination center.

l Areas Recommended for Improvement

1.

Description:

Road signs guiding evacuees to the Reception and Mass Care Centers were not durable or numerous enough. Some of I . the road signs were blown over, and they were also too small, l

Recommendation: Better directional signs should be developed for

. directing of evacuees to reception and mass care centers. Signs l

should be of durable quality, plainly displayed, strategically

! located, and easily readable.

{ 2. Recommendattom More directional signs for evacuees at the f decontamination facility would be helpful.

Recommendatiom Additional directional signs should be developed for directing evacuees at the decontamination facility.

Rockinghtm County COC cnd Staging Area 56 2.1.8 Rockingham County EOC and Staging Area The EOC is located at the Rockingham County Dispatch Center (RCDC), which is a continuously staffed facility with all the necessary furniture, displays and other equipment for sustaining continuous operations. The RCDC receives immediate notification through the State Police and is the warning point for all the plume EPZ communities. Operating also as an EOC, it controls operations of the staging area for buses under the Compensatory Plan for nonparticipating communities and for participating communities which request additional buses.

Communication systems available are a direct line (NAS) to the State EOC, .

Sheriff's Police radio, Fire Net radio, ambulance radio, and commercial telephone.

County-wide repeater stations provide areawide coverage. All communications systems worked well throughout the exercise. .

Full staffing for EOC operations requires the addition of only two persons and was accomplished promptly. Staff persons from the utility and the NHCDA also arrived in support of staging operations. These people handled distribution of dosimeters and provided excellent briefings on the purpose and use of dosimeters to the staging area and EOC staffs, and to bus drivers (see Section 2.1.4 concerning the need for training of bus drivers in the use of dosimetry). Each person issued a dosimeter was required to demonstrate a full understanding of its use. Dosimeter use appeared to be well understood. However, it was observed that because the dosimeters took a long time to be sent from the IFO in Newington, the first bus driver to be dispatched was not issued dosimetry. (The first bus was dispatched to the Winnecunnet High School in Hampton at 1108.) Dosimetry should be provided to all evacuation route bus drivers. It is recommended that a review of the procedure of keeping the dosimeter supplies and equipment in Newington be conducted. Keeping equipment and supplies at the Rockingham County Sheriff's Office would eliminate this problem.

One of the eight buses that arrived and was logged in was low on fuel. Although the State Transportation Resources Coordinator made arrangements for refueling of the bus, it returned back to its company instead of continuing with the exercise. Further-more, the Rockingham County Staging Area was only able to provide gasoline fuel and was not equipped to provide diesel fuel. The State should ensure that buses that arrive at l the Rockingham County Staging Area can be provided with sufficient fuel to complete  :

their routes.

Transportation for transit-dependent persons in nonparticipating towns is 1 arranged by the Resources Coordinator at the State EOC. The Resources Coordinator .

directs the staging area operations and mobilizes buses by contacting the bus companies; the number of buses required is determined based on population numbers for each town which are available in the State Compensatory Plan procedures (see Section 2.1.1). Buses -

are then sent to the Rockingham County Staging Area at the Brentwood complex (see Section 2.1.4). The staging area is activated by the IFO Controller (see Section 2.1.2).

Buses were not promptly pre-staged at the RCDC at the Site Area Emergency classification level, as called for in the Compensatory Plan (see Section 2.1.4). Only one bus arrived prior to the General Emergency ECL declaration and initial Evacuation Order. The second bus arrival occurred several minutes after the RCDC received the

1 Rockinghtm County EOC and Staging Area 57 l

declaration of General Emergency ECL. The first bus was sent out about 24 minutes after the order to dispatch a bus to Hampton. Maps arrived at the RCDC with the dosimeters so the first bus was dispatched without a map. It is recommended that maps be stored ,at the Rockingham County Sheriff's Office to ensure that all bus drivers are Issued maps in a timely fashion prior to departure. The maps distributed were often of poor quality (see Section 2.1.4).

The second bus was held up for about 45 minutes because of a paperwork problem. The first bus arrived, with a Sheriff's deputy escort, at Winnecunnet High School at 1140, at about the same time the bus requested by Seabrook arrived at the Seabrook EOC. The timely arrival was only possible because the need for dosimetry was

' made secondary to prompt departure. The third bus arrived at the RCDC at 1119 and l

i was dispatched to Hampton Falls before the delayed second bus, about 21 minutes after the departure of the first bus, and about 30 minutes after evacuation orders were issued. The State should ensure that those buses serving nonparticipating communities within two miles of the plant'are pre-staged at the RCDC as rapidly as possible af ter the declaration of Site Area Emergency. The pre-staging problem also affects the ability of the State to respond to requests for transportation resources from participating communities (see Section 2.1.4).

The staging area can accommodate more than 300 buses and is located immediately adjacent to the Sheriff's office and jail. The State Compensatory Plan was available for reference by the EOC staff. Staging operations are managed from a van equipped with mobile communications equipment which worked well as an operations center for this exercise. However, no signs were posted in the staging area that provided directional information to the bus drivers. It is recommended that signs be posted to identify the various points in the staging area (i.e., command vehicle location, bus receiving / logging / marking point, parking area, briefing area, etc.)

A deputy sheriff was in charge of managing bus operations at the Staging Area.

This individual was assisted by two other deputies. Additional deputies and volunteers can also be made available according to need. Drivers were briefed when they arrived at the shging area and dispatch logs were kept as buses were deployed to their local EOC assignments. Orders for the dispatch of buses originated from the Resources Coordinator at the State EOC and buses were dispatched on verbal orders from the staging area manager. Orders from the State EOC and IFO were received at the Sheriff's Office communications center and these in turn were relayed to the dispatcher by runner.

I However, this means of communication could potentially conflict with normal communications needs of the Sheriff's Office. Consideration should be given to providing

l. a separate direct communications link between these facilities to eliminate possible conflicts with law enforcement needs for the Sheriff's radio.

During the exercise it was observed that only one bus guide arrived and a roster of bus guides was not available at the Rockingham staging area. Therefore, it could not be determined whether a sufficient number of trained guides would be available. The State should demonstrate commitments from an adequate number of bus guides and show evidence that those guides have been adequately trained to carry out their emergency assignments. There should be a guide for each bus or group of buses going to the same destination.

l

Rockinghtm County EOC and Sttging Arao 58 it was also observed that the maps provided to bus drivers could have been of better quality. Better quality maps should be available to ensure that bus drivers can easily understand their travel routes and ultimate destination.

A detailed discussion of State Compensatory Plan activities is presented in Section 2.1.4.

Deficiencies

1.

Description:

It was observed that because of the late arrival .

(1118) of dosimeters from the IFO in Newington, the first bus driver to be dispatched was not issued dosimetry. The first bus was dispatched to Winnecunnet High School in Hampton at 1108. .

(FEM A-REP-1, Rev.1, II, K.3.a,b)

Recommendation: Dosimetry should be provided to all evacuation route bus drivers. It is recommended that a review of the procedure of keeping the dosimeter supplies and equipment in Newington be conducted. Keeping equipment and supplies at the Rockingham County Sheriff's Office would eliminate this problem.

2.

Description:

One of the eight buses that arrived and was logged in was sent back because it was low on fuel and the Dispatch Center chose not to refuel it although the State Resources Coordinator had made arrangements for the fueling. The Rockingham County Staging Area was only able to provide gasoline fuel and was not equipped to provide diesel fuel. (FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1, II, J.10.g)

Recommendation: The State should ensure that buses that arrive at the Rockingham County Staging Area can be provided with sufficient fuel to complete their routes.

3.

Description:

Maps arrived at the RCDC with the dosimeters (see Def.1), so the first bus was dispatched without a map. (FEMA-REP-1, II, J.10.a)

Recommendation: Maps should be stored at the Rockingham County Sheriff's Office. .

4.

Description:

Only one bus guide arrived at the Rockingham County staging area during the exercise and a roster of bus guides was not .

available. Therefore, it could not be determined whether a sufficient number of trained guides would be available. (FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1, II, A.2.a, J.10.g)

Rockinghrm County EOC cnd Staging Area 59 Recommendation: The State should demonstrate commitments from an adequate number of bus guides and show evidence that those guides have been adequately trained to carry out their emergency assignments. There should be a guide for each bus or group of buses going to the same destination.

Area Requiring Corrective Action

1.

Description:

Communications to the Rockingham County staging area from the State EOC or IFO were received at the Sheriff's Office communications center and then delivered to the bus dispatcher by runner. This added use of the Sheriff's means of communication could potentially conflict with normal communica-tions needs of the Sheriff's Office. (FEM A-REP-1, Rev. 1, II, F.1.d)

Recommendation: Consideration should be given to providing a separate direct communications link between the IFO and RCDC facilities to eliminate possible conflicts with law enforcement needs for the Sheriff's radio.

Area Recommended for Improvement 1..

Description:

No signs were posted in the Rockingham County staging area that provided directional information to the bus drivers.

j Recommendation: Signs should be posted to identify the various l points in the staging area (i.e., command vehicle location, bus receiving / logging / marking point, parking area, briefing area, etc.).

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{

l Brantwood EOC l 60 l 2.2 NEW HAMPSHIRE LOCAL EOCS )

2.2.1 Brentwood EOC The Brentwood EOC is located in the communications center of the Brentwood Volunteer Fire Department. The EOC was small and cramped and lacked furniture. The Civil Defense Director did not have a filing cabinet for his records. Most of the staff were required to stand for extended periods due to the cramped conditions. These problems reduced the efficiency and effectiveness of the staff. It is recommended that the Brentwood EOC be upgraded by providing additional space and furniture so that staff .

members can operate in a more efficient and effective manner. Lighting was adequate.

The three telephone lines in the EOC, generally were adequate for handling communications. However, the adequacy of available telephone lines for handling .

regular EOC communications while concurrently receiving calls from transit-dependent persons requesting transportation assistance was not sufficiently demonstrated. A study should be carried out at the Brentwood EOC to determine the number of telephone lines required to handle both kinds of activities. Noise was adequately controlled during the exercise. However, noise could be a problem in the cramped space at the EOC.

Telephone headsets would ensure that telephone conversations could be easily carried on and understood. Operations could be improved by acquiring telephone headsets for use during emergency activities.

Backup electrical power is available. There is a kitchen in the facility. Cots, linens, blankets, cooking equipment, and shower facilities, including hot water, are not available to support an extended, continuous operation. Homes of some of the EOC staff members may be available to supply the needed facilities. It is recommended that cots, linens, blankets, cooking equipment, and shower facilities be made available so that extended, continuous operations can be supported.

Maps showing the plume EPZ, evacuation routes, and access control points were posted. Maps showing relocation centers and population by evacuation area were available, but were not posted. Maps showing relocation centers and population,by evacuation area should be posted so as to be visible to staff in the operations area of the Brentwood EOC.

Communications systems at the Brentwood EOC were generally. adequate. The primary communication system with the IFO was the low-band civil defense radio.

Telephones served as backup. The same systems were used to communicate with other -

local EOCs. Commercial telephone was used to call Exeter Hospital and the Swasey Central School. The close proximity of the Brentwood EOC to the school (one-fourth mile) made personal contact an adequate backup system. An ambulance with fire and

• medical radios was available at the EOC providing backup communications wit:* the hospital. Conferencing capability was not available with the current telephone setup.

Discussion with EOC staff indicated that conferencing capability would enhance communications capabilities. Consideration should be given to obtaining call conferencing capabilities for the telephone system at the Brentwood EOC.

Brentwood EOC 61 There was no hard-copy device for transmitting messages to and from the Media Center. Brentwood may want to consider obtaining such capability to expedite providing advance copies of any written news releases to the Media Center if the Selectmen elect to issue such releases.

At about 1547, the Liaison Officer at the IFO contacted Brentwood requesting the EOC to maintain contact with Manchester Reception Center. The Brentwood EOC attempted to contact the Reception Center via the Civil Defense radio and was informed that radio contact with the Reception Center was not possible via the Civil Defense radio. The status of the communications links, if any, between the Brentwood EOC and the Manchester Reception Center should be determined and all organizations made aware of their status.

At about 0821, Rockingham County Dispatch telephoned the Brentwood Police J

Chief to inform him that an Alert ECL had been declared. The Police Chief used a written call-down list to notify key EOC staff. By about 0825, the Police Chief had completed his contacts. He noted that the Transportation Officer was ill and would be unable to report to the EOC.

The Brentwood EOC Initiated activation procedures at about 0835 with the arrival of the Chairman of the Board of Selectmen. Fire Department tone-alert radios and pagers were utilized to activate EOC staff. The Civil Defense Director had made radio contact with the EOC prior to his arrival at approximately 0843 hours0.00976 days <br />0.234 hours <br />0.00139 weeks <br />3.207615e-4 months <br />. Upon arrival and briefing by the Chairman of the Board of Selectmen, the Civil Defense Director named an alternate Transportation Officer. He also named an Acting Health Director at the EOC at around 0911, because the Health Officer listed on the duty roster was on call at the Exeter Hospital. By about 0845, status boards were in place and were i

being used. With the arrival of the Fire Chief at approximately 0853, the EOC was fully staffed, and was declared operational. The Civil Defense radio was used to inform State Civil Defense Headquarters in Concord that the EOC was operational. All required positions were staffed and exercise participants indicated that the syste:n for receiving a j call directing activation and the system for call-up staff can be implemented at any l time.

The ability to maintain round-the-clock staffing was demonstrated by presentation of a coster. In general, the staff displayed adequate knowledge and training.

The Civil Defense Director was effectively in charge of the Brentwood EOC with l

l . oversight authority by the Board of Selectmen as specified in the local plan. Periodic briefings were held to update the EOC staff on the emergency situation and appropriate staff were involved in making decisions. Copies of the New Hampshire State plan and the Brentwood plan were available for use by the EOC staff. In addition, each key EOC staff member had folders containing written procedures for their particular position.

l Messages logs were kept, but there was no message reproduction capability. Each staff l

member should have a copy of all messages affecting his/her area of responsibility. Such

! distribution would require the procurement of message reproduction capability. Access l

to the EOC was controlled by the stationing of a Brentwood police officer at the front l

door. Security badges were issued, and a corresponding sign-in roster was kept.

l i

l

Brentwood COC 62 The EOC was notified of the Alert'ECL by the initiating call at about 0821 and later by a status report from the Incident Field Office (IFO) via Civil Defense radio at approximately 0940. In addition, the Liaison Officer at the IFO called the Brentwood EOC at about 0940 and briefed the Civil Defense Director. The notification of the Site Area Emergency ECL was received at about 0954 via Fire radio, with the Civil Defense radio repeating the same message at approximately 0957. Notification of the General Emergency ECL was received via Civil Defense radio at approximately 1047 with the IFO Liaison Officer calling to brief the Brentwood EOC at around 1048. Protective action recommendations were received for sheltering at about 1148 and for evacuation at approximately 1327. In each case, the EOC was notified of protective action recommendations via both Civil Defense radio and a telephone call from the Liaison Officer at the IFO.

At about 0921, an individual called the Brentwood EOC claiming to be a liaison -

officer and requesting the Civil Defense Director's name. The Civil Defense Director did not recognize this individual's name, so he consulted his New Hampshire Emergency Management roster and did not find the individual's name listed. The Civil Defense Director then contacted the IFO to report this occurrence. The IFO returned his call at about 0923 with information that the individual in question was a military liaison officer who should not have contacted the Brentwood EOC at that time. The Civil Defense Director showed good judgment in handling this problem.

Coordination was maintained with Swasey Central School on a routine basis when emergency status changes were relayed to the EOC.

The Brentwood EOC does not have any responsibility for dose assessment or the development of protective action recommendations.

The Brentwood EOC does not have a primary role in the decision to activate the public alerting system. However, at about 1415, the Civil Defense Director determined that the simulated instructional EBS message, which should have followed the simulated siren sounding, had not conveyed instructions that transit-dependent persons in Brentwood were to call the Brentwood EOC for transportation assistance. The Civil Defense Director realized that transit-dependent persons in Brentwood were not aware l of. the vehicles being provided for their evacuation and the Civil Defense Director l ordered that a message directing transit-dependent persons to call the Brentwood EOC be broadcast (simulated) over the Brentwood public address / siren system.* While an innovative and commendable solution, the simulated message should have been preceded by a sounding of the siren alert system, alerting people to the subsequent instructional '

message. In addition, the procedure demonstrated during the exercise is not specified in the plan. It is recommended that the Brentwood plan and procedures be amended to allow for the broadcast of instructional messages over the local public address / siren

• system after coordination with the IFO in situations in which the State's EBS messages

• A review of copies of EBS message forms available from the IFO indicated that a message instructing transit-dependent persons in participating local jurisdictions to l telephone their local EOCs to request transportation assistance and giving them the appropriate telephone numbers was never prepared.

Brsntwood EOC 63 are either incomplete or are not broadcast and after the Brentwood sirens have been sounded.

The EOC had sufficient dosimetry equipment (both direct reading and TLDs) for eighteen persons plus partial equipment for another twelve persons. Low-range (0-200 mR), mid-range (0-20 R), and high-range (0-200 R) dosimeters were available along with recordkeeping cards and a charger for the dosimeters. Appropriate instructions were issued by the RADEF officer each time a dosimetry set was issued. There was an adequate supply of KI at the Brentwood EOC. The RADEF officer was knowledgeable in its use, and knew the dose level at which authorization for exposure in excess of the general population PAGs is required. The EOC staff were aware of decontamination procedures and the location of the decontamination center in Manchester. Measures could be taken to secure the EOC from plume infiltration. Plastic was taped across one

~

of the bay doors in a demonstration of this capability. In addition, the RADEF officer took periodic readings of rediation levels in the vicinity of the EOC.

J A traffic control point was initially established at Route 101 and North Road to monitoc traffic in response to the restrictions in beach access and was later moved due to simulated heavy traffic volume. According to EOC staff, resources are adequate to cover all traffic control functions, but could be improved if the Police Department, which is responsible for traffic control, had traffic cones and barriers to assist them.

These supplies should be acquired for the Brentwood Police Department. Expected traffic volumes were discussed but the staff noted the lack of coordination with the l

Rockingham County Complex concerning the volume of traffic anticipated when the County Complex is used as a staging area in the event of a radiological emergency.

Brentwood should coordinate with the State and Rockingham County to determine the anticipated traffic volume attributable to the staging area at the Rockingham County

Complex.

The Brentwood EOC staff indicated that appropriate resources were available to clear impediments to evacuation. Town road equipment was brought to the EOC before 1130 by the Road Agent. This action was at the direction of the Civil Defense Director and in anticipation of the need to remove impediments to evacuation. This capability was demonstrated in the simulated removal of a fallen tree on Route 111A in response to i

controller message number 10 injected at about 1247.

l The Rockingham County Nursing Home is within the Brentwood town limits.

According to exercise participants, this special facility has its own emergency preparedness plan which does not require participation by Brentwood. However, the local plan does not mention the existence of this special facility. The plan should recognize the existence of the nursing home and account for the potential impacts of the implementation of the home's plan on Brentwood's emergency response activities.

The 3 Ponds Campground in Brentwood has been included in the local plan and, according to the plan, campers are expected to evacuate in their own vehicles. Exercise participants indicated that the camp had been taken into consideration during the development of evacuation routes. Frequent contact with the management of the campground was demonstrated.

l I

Brsntwood EOC 64 The Civil Defense Director, with the approval of the Board of Selectmen, decided to order evacuation (simulated) of Swasey Central School at about 1250. Since school was not in session on the day of the exercise, contacts with school officials were simulated. Initial telephone contact had been made with the school shortly after 0900 and it had been determined (simulated by controller message number 2) that one-hundred-fifty students and fourteen staff were in attendance. The decision to evacuate the school was implemented by telephoning (simulated) the principal of the school. Since the school is only about one-quarter of a mile from the EOC, personal contact provided an adequate backup means of notification. The EOC staff undertook actions to provide buses, guides, and police officers for traffic control in support of the school evacuation.

At approximately 1157, two actual buses, which had not been requested by Brentwood, arrived at the Brentwood EOC. These buses had been lost for nestriy forty-five minutes. They had been dispatched to the Rockingham County Complex, but had not .

been given clear maps or instructions (see Section 2.1.4). The buses were held at the Brentwood EOC during a series of telephone calls between the Civil Defense Director, the Brentwood Board of Selectmen, and the State Transportation Director in Concord.

By about 1230, Brentwood was informed by the State that it could use the buses which were subsequently used to simulate the evacuation of the Swasey Central School, commencing at around 1254. Guides were used to direct the bus drivers and at around 1306, the IFO was notified that the students had been evacuated to the Manchester Reception Centsr.

The EOC staff had a list of special-needs persons and their locations. The Civil Defense Director reviewed the special-needs requirements with the Transportation

~

Coordinator beginning just after 1015 and determined that thirteen persons required special medical tra:.sportation. However, according to the local plan there are no known special-needs persons in Brentwood. The local plan should be amended to indicate that an up-to-date list of special-needs persons is maintained at the Brentwood EOC.

Independent of controller message number 2 regarding the number of students to be evacuated, the EOC staff showed good foresight by considering the needs of a special education class of eleven students at Swasey Central School. At about 1042, Brentwood personnel informed the IFO of these special transportation needs and at about 1053 was informed by the IFO that their request had been forwarded to the State EOC (see Section 2.1.2). The use of town resources for the transportation of persons with special-needs was discussed when consideration was given to taking the seats out .of the Town's recreational bus and using it to transport persons confined to wheelchairs. At approximately 1130, the IFO reported to the EOC that there were no vehicles available that could evacuate persons confined to wheelchairs (see Section 2.1.2). The only special ,

vehicles that might be available were for life-support purpose only. The EOC staff did not consider use of the town bus an acceptable alternative to the assistance requested from the IFO, but in order to effect the evacuation of special-needs persons, the Civil ,

Defense Director ordered the bus to be used for the evacuation, commencing at about 1132. The Local Liaison Officer at the IFO contacted the Brentwood EOC at about 1150 to inform them that three vans were available to transport persons confined to wheelchairs. However, stretcher-bound persons would still need to be transported on the Town recreational bus which is not specially equipped to transport such persons. In summary, the Brentwood EOC staff requested transportation for local special-needs

BrGntwood EOC 65 persons from the IFO and took reasonable actions to provide makeshift transportation on their own. The State took over one hour to confirm that vans to evacuate persons confined to wheelchairs could be made available (see Sections 2.1.1,2.1.4). Brentwood had to use its modified, makeshift town recreational bus (simulated) for stretcher-bound persons. Although these arrangements may have been sufficient, Brentwood must coordinate with the State to ensure that adequate transportation, specifically designed for all classes of special-needs persons can be made available in a timely manner.

The EOC staff had a list of transit-dependent persons and claimed that it is updated monthly. At about 1153, the Civil Defense Director contacted the IFO requesting five buses and one special education bus be prestaged at the EOC for the evacuation of transit-dependent persons. It was not observed whether the Transportation Coordinator had contacted the bus companies to arrange for the dispatch of preassigned buses prior to requesting assistance from the IFO as specified in the local plan.

The bus that was to arrive at the Brentwood EOC for purposes of satisfying the exercise objective of demonstrating the ability to supply buses never arrived (see Section 2.1.4). Brentwood should coordinate with the State to ensure that an adequate supply of buses can be made available. A list of names of transit-dependent persons was distributed to the Transportation Coordinator who developed ad hoc evacuation bus routes in about fifteen minutes. Guides were assigned (simulated) to the five ad hoc routes developed.

Brentwood does not have a primary responsibility for media relations.

Deficiency

1. Descriptiom The adequacy of the three available telephone lines for handling regular EOC communications while concurrently receiving calls from transit-dependent persons requesting transportation assistance was not sufficiently demonstrated at the Brentwood EOC. (FEM A-REP-1, Rev.1, II, H.3, E.6, J.10.d)

Recommendatiom A study should be conducted to determine the number of telephone lines required to handle both regular EOC communications and telephone calls from transit-dependent persons requesting transportation assistance.

Areas Requiring Corrective Action

1. Descriptiom The Brentwood EOC is small and cramped, and lacked furniture; most of staff members were required to stand for extended periods. These problems reduced the efficiency and effectiveness of the staff. (FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1, II, H.3)

Brgntwood EOC 66 Recommendation 1: The EOC should be upgraded by providing l additional space so that staff members can operate in a more efficient and effective manner.

Recommendation 2: The EOC should be upgraded by providing additional furniture so that the staff can operate in a more efficient and effective manner.

2. Descriptiom Maps showing relocation centers and population by evacuation area were available but were not posted at the ~

Brentwood EOC. (FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1, II, J.10.a, b)

Recommendation: Maps showing relocation centers and population ' ,

by evacuation area should be posted so as to be visible to staff in the operations area of the Brentwood EOC.

3.

Description:

At about 1547, the State Liaison Officer contacted the EOC requesting the EOC to maintain contact with the Manchester Reception Center. The EOC attempted to contact the Reception Center via the Civil Defense radio and was informed that radio contact with the Reception Center was not possible on the Civil Defense radio. (FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1, II, F.1)

Recommendation: The status of the communications links, if any, between the Brentwood EOC and the Manchester Reception Center should be determined and all organizations made aware of their status.

4.

Description:

When the Civil Defense Director realized that the simulated instructional EBS messages had not informed transit-dependent persons in Brentwood of the vehicles being provided for their evacuation, he ordered that a message directing transit-dependent persons to call the Brentwood EOC be broadcast -

(simulated) over the Brentwood public address / siren system. The simulated message should have been preceded by a sounding of the siren alert system, alerting people to the subsequent instructional message. In addition, the procedure demonstrated during the l exercise is not specified in the plan. (FEM A-REP-1, Rev.1, II, ,

E.6)

Recommendation: The Brentwood plan and procedures should be ,

amended to allow for the broadcast of instructional messages over the local public address / siren system after coordination with the IFO in situations in which the State's EBS messages are either incomplete or not broadcast until af ter the Brentwood sirens have been sounded.

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(

Besntwood EOC 67

5.

Description:

There has been a lack of coordination with the Rockingham County Complex concerning the traffic volume anticipated when the County Complex is used as a staging area in the event of a radiological emergency. (FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1, II, J.10.g,1)

Recommendation: Brentwood should coordinate with the State and Rockingham County to determine the anticipated traffic volume attributable to the staging area at the Rockingham County Complex.

e

6.

Description:

The Rockingham County Nursing Home is within the Brentwood town limits. According to exercise participants, this special facility has its own emergency preparedness plan which does not require participation by Brentwood. However, the local plan does not mention the existence of this special facility.

(FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1, II, J.10.g)

Recommendation: The plan should recognize the existence of the nursing home and account for the potential impacts of the implementation of the home's plan on Brentwood's emergency response activities.

7.

Description:

The Civil Defense Director reviewed the special-needs requirements with the Transportation Coordinator and determined that thirteen persons required special medical transportation. However, according to the local plan there are no known special-needs persons in Brentwood. (FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1, l II, J.10.d, g)

Recommendation: The local plan should be amended to indicate that an up-to-date list of special-needs persons is maintained at the Brentwood EOC.

l

8.

Description:

The Brentwood EOC staff requested transportation for special-needs persons from the IFO and took reasonable actions to provide makeshift transportation on their own. The State took over one hour to confirm that vans to evacuate persons confined to wheelchairs could be made available, Brentwood had to use its f

modified, makeshift Town recreational bus (simulated) for stretcher-bound persoas. (FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1, II, J,10.d, g)

Recommendation: Brentwood must coordinate with the State to ensure that adequate transportation, specifically designed for all

• classes of special-needs persons can be made available in a timely manner.

. _ _ . . _= .

BrGnt. rood ECC 68 Areas Recommended for improvement

1.

Description:

Due to the eramped space, noise could be a problem ,

et the Brentwood EOC. Telephone heedsets would ensure that telephone conservations could be easily carried on and tinderatoed.

Recommendation: The acquisition of telephone headsets for 14e during emergency respfanse activities at the Brentwccd EOC should be considered. ,

2.

Description:

The Brentwocd EOC lacked the facilities and equipment needed to support extended, continacts operations.

Homes of some of the EOC staff members may t:e available to '

supply the needed facilities.

Recommendation: Cots, linens, bitnkets, ecoking equ!pment and shower facilities with hot water should be made available in order to support extended, c6ntinuous operations in the EOC.

3.

Description:

Discussions with EOC staff indicated that call conferencing capability would enhance communications ,

capabilities at the Brentwood EOC.

Recommendation: Consideration should be given to obitini: g call conferencing capabilities for the telephone system at the .

Brentwood EOC.

4.

Description:

There was no hard-copy device for transmitting messages to and from the Media Center.

Recommendation: Brentwood may want to cons! der obtaining hard-copy transmission capability to expedite providing advance copies of any written news releases to the Media Center if the Selectmen elect to issue such releases.

5.

Description:

There was no message reproduction capability. Each staff member should have a copy of all messages affecting his/her area of responsibility. , ;

i Recommendation: Message reproduction capability should be procured for the Brentwood EOC. .

6.

Description:

According to EOC staff, resources are adequate to cover all traffic control functions, but could be improved if the ,

Police Department, which is responsible for traffic control, had traffic cones and barriers to assist them.

Recommendation: Traffic cones and barriers should be acquired for the Brentwood Police Department.

5

--r .e . . , _ . - . , .

)

Crasniend Eoc l 69 l 2.2.2 Greenland EOC Located in the Town Office Building, the Greenland EOC wra a spacious, functional, and efficient facility providing support resources such as furniture and lighting. Space was adequate and noise was adequately controlled. Kitchen, sanitary, and sleeping facilities were all adequate to support 24-hour operations. The radio dispatch ecom was well-equipped and separated from the main operations room. This separation assisted in controlling noise levels. The emergency classification level was posted and the status board was clearly visible and properly maintained. The backup power generator was switched on early in the exercise and functioned well all day. Maps of the plume EPZ, evacuation routes, access control points, and radiological monitorings points were posted. However, maps showing relocation centers and population by evacuation area were not posted but were available in the plan. Copies of these two maps should be posted in the Greenland EOC operations room.

The primary communications link with the IFO was the CD radio with commercial telephone serving as a backup. The Media Center could be contacted _by commercial telephone. The local school could be contacted by telephone or by personal contact, if necessary, since the . school is near the EOC. No problems were experienced with any communications including the newly installed RACES backup radio. However, there was no hard-copy device for transmitting messages to and from the Media Center.

Greenland may want to consider obtaining such capability to expedite providing advance copies of any written news releases to the Media Center if the Selectmen elect to issue such releases. The Dispatch Officer handling communications was extremely cepable, efficient, and knowledgable. All messages from the IFO were accurately recorded and quickly delivered to the operations room; coordination between the communicator and tin message runner was good. The adequacy of available telephone lines for handling regular EOC communications while concurrently receiving calls from transi'.-dependent persons requesting transportation was not sufficiently demonstrated. A study should be carried out at the Greenland EOC to determine the number of telephone lines required to handle both activities.

Initial activation of the EOC began at about 0820 with a call from the l Rockingham County Police Dispatcher to the Greenland Police Chief who in turn notified I

the CD Dircetor. According to EOC staff, a notification call can be received at any time. The CD Director used a written call list to notify the rest of the EOC staff. This

staff notification procedure is the one specified in the plan. The EOC was fully staffed

! by approximately 0940. All staff were generally knowledgable and well trained. Twenty-

!* four hour staffing capability was demonstrated by presentation of a roster as well as l actual afternoon shif t changes by both Selectmen and Radio Dispatch Officers. Incoming i

staff were pecperly briefed as to the status of the emergency situation and generally

• • displayed adequate training and knowledge.

! The CD Director effectively managed the overall emergency response activities

! of the EOC staff with assistance and ultimate oversight by the Board of Selectmen as designated in the plan, a copy of which was available for reference. Periodic briefings l

were held and staff, as appropriate, were involved in making decisions. Tha staff had I written procedures to follow. Appropriate actions were taken in response to information received from the IFO. All messages were properly recorded and distributed to the t

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Grasniand EOC 1

70 1

staff. Access control and security were maintained. Emergency operations were well managed with participants generally executing their functions effectively and in a timely manner.

The Greenland EOC has no responsibilities with respect to dose assessment and the development of protective action recommendations.

Public alerting by sounding the siren system and the responsibility for disseminating public instructions over the EBS radio are State functions. At about 1100, a call was received from the IFO that a General Emergency ECL had been declared and a simulated siren sounding occurred at about 1105. Traffic control and radiation .

monitoring personnel were directed to report to the Greenland EOC. At about 1330, a message recommending evacuation was received from the IFO. By about 1340, the Greenland Central School had been notified by telephone (simulated) and personnel for -

traffic control and radiological monitoring hav. been dispatched. The Liberty Campground in Greenland can accommodate a small, seasonal, transient population. The Civil Defense Director indicated that the camp would be called by telephone, as specified in the plan, to ascertain any evacuation or transoortation assistance needs.

The RADEF Officer was knowledgeable and capable of handling the dosimetry equipment assigned to the Greenland EOC. The supply of both 0-200 mR and 0-200 R dosimeters was adequate and there was a charger for the dosimeters. TLDs and recordkeeping cards were available. However, the mid-range (0-20 R) dosimeters specified in the plan were not available. Mid-range dosimeters should be procured and made available at the Greenland EOC. Appropriate instructions were issued along with the dosimeters. An adequate supply of KI was available and appropriate staff were aware of the procedures for its use and the maximum dose allowed without authorization. Equipment logs were kept and field workers were closely monitored while outside the EOC. The RADEF Officer set up a decontamination operation in the fire station adjacent to EOC. All returning field workers were monitored and checked for contamination and were directed to wash before reentering the ~EOC.

Protective actions were implemented by the Greenland EOC upon receipt of recommendations from the IFO. The EOC received a shelter order at about 1149 for both the general public and the local school followed by an evacuation order at about 1330. Police and fire personnel were promptly dispatched to the two primary traffic control points when a general evacuation was recommended. Expected traffic volumes were discussed. A felled tree (simulated) blocking a principal evccuation route was promptly removed. ,

In-place sheltering was ordered for the school in response to the shelter recommendation from the IFO; evacuation was ordered for the school in response to the '

evacuation recommendation. EOC staff simulated contacting the principal of the Greenland Central School and simulated (see Section 2.1.4) securing buses for the anticipated number of students to be evacuated. Telephone and personal contact, respectively, would be used as the primary and secondsry means of communication with the school. Route maps were available for bus drivers who would be used for school evacuation; maps could be distributed to the bus drivers when they are dispatched to the EOC from which they would be directed to the school.

Cecsaland EOC 71 No other special facilities institutions are located within the Greenland municipal boundaries.

The EOC has compiled a list of ten individuals with special needs. The list included the location of each individual as well as a description of each person's special need. Individuals would be notified by telephone and bus transportation would then be arranged for them. However, according to the local plan, there is no known special-needs population in Greenland. The plan saould be amended to reflect the actual situation, that a confidential list of special needs persons and their special needs is ,

available at the Greenland EOC.

With the exception of a small, seasonal YMC A day camp, other transit-dependent -

individuals in this community were not specifically identified. However, four telephone lines were available to receive requests for evacuation transportation assistance.

Exercise partleipants indicated the managers of the day camp would be nctified by telephone or personally contacted, and provided with emergency instructions and transportation assistence as requested. Since no list of randomly selected names was distributed to the person responsible for developing ad hoc bus routes, the development of routes and route assignments, and the assignment of guides for evacuation of transit-dependent Individuals could not be observed at the Greenland EOC.

Although media relations are not a function of local EOCs, two newspaper reporters arrived at the Greenland EOC during the exercise. The first reporter arrived at about 0830. A Selectman took the reporter to a separate location and was absent for a short time without interfering with EOC operations. A second reporter arrived at about 1500 and conducted a brief interview with the Civil Defense Director and the Health Officer outside the EOC. They explained the general opera.tions and the decontamination procedure.

Deficiencies

1.

Description:

The adequacy of available telephone lines for handling regular EOC communications while concurrently receiving calls from transit-dependent persons requesting transportation was not sufficiently demonstrated. (FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1, II, H.3, E.6, J.10.d)

Recommendation: A study should be conducted to determine the number of telephone lines required to concurrently handle both regular EOC communications and the receipt of telephone calls from transit-dependent persons requesting transportation assistance.

2.

Description:

The mid-range (0-20 R) dosimeters specified in the plan were not available at the Greenland EOC. (FEM A-R E P-1, Rev.1, II, K.3.a) ,

Gessniend EOC 72 Recommendation: Mid-range (0-20 R) dosimeters should be procured and made available at the Greenland EOC.

Areas Requiring Corrective Action

1.

Description:

Maps showing relocation centers and population by evacuation area were not posted in the Greenland EOC but were available in the plan. (FEM A-REP-1, Rev.1, II, J.10.a, b)

Recommendation: Maps showing relocation centers and population by evaceut!on area should be posted in the operations room at the Greenland EOC. .

2.

Description:

There was a list of ten special-needs people available at the Greenland EOC. According to the local plan, there is no known special'needs population in Greenland. (FEMA-REP-1, Rev.

1, II, J.10.d)

Recommendation: The plan should be amended to specify the actual situation that a confidential list of special-needs persons and their special needs is available at the Greenland EOC.

Area Recommended for Improvement

1.

Description:

There was no hard-copy device at the Greenland EOC for transmitt!ng messages to and from the Media Center.

Regommendation: Greenland may want to consider obtaining such capability to expedite providing advance conies of any written news releases to the Media Center if the Selectmen elect to issue such releases.

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Kingston EOC 73 2.2.3 Kingston EOC The Kingston EOC, located in the Kingston fire / police station, was an adequate facility. A status board was visible and updated. The emergency classification level was posted. Maps showing the plume EPZ with labeled sectors, and access control points were posted. However, maps showing evacuation routes, relocation centers, and population by evacuation area, although available, were not posted. These three maps should be posted. The adequacy of the single telephone line in the Kingston EOC for handling regular EOC communications while concurrently receiving calls from transit-dependent persons requesting transportation assistance was not sufficiently demonstrated. Even with the expected installation of three additional telephone lines i

within the next three months, the adequacy of available telephone lines for handling both these activities concurrently remains to be demonstrated. It is recommended that a

~

study be carried out at the Kingston EOC to determine the number of telephone lines required to handle both activities. Noise levels were high but did not interfere with communications. Planned remodeling should reduce the current noise level by relocating (Mio communications to a room separated from the operations area. The EOC can support etended operations. Showers and a kitchen were available. Portable bunks can be brought in if required. Backup power is available and tested every month but it was not demonstrated during the exercise.

With the exception of telephone communication noted above, the Kingston EOC had adequate communications capabilities. The primary communications link to the IFO was via the multi-band CD radio. Backup communications with the IFO could be provided with commercial telephone which also served as a link to the Media Center. A RACES radio was also available for backup use. Communications with local police and the fire department was via the Rockingham County radio dispatch. Schools could be contacted via the police radio or by telephone. The hospital could be reached by

! telephone or ambulance radio. There was no hard-copy device for transmitting messages to and from the Media Center. Kingston may wait to consider obtaining such capability to expedite providing advance copies of any written news releases to the Media Center if the Selectmen elect to issue such releases.

Notification of an Alert ECL was received at the Kingston Police Department at about 0818. After verification of this call, the Civil Defense director was contacted by both radio pager and telephone backup. The Civil Defense director arrived at the EOC promptly and proceeded to activate selected staff members using a written calllist. The Kingston EOC was activated at about 0843. When notification of the Site Area

. Emergency ECL was received at around 0952, the remainder of the EOC staff were contacted and told to report to the EOC. This procedure is in accordance with the local plan. According to EOC staff, the emergency worker notification procedure can be

. Implemented at any time through a system of pagers with telephone backup. The EOC was fully staffed by approximately 1016. The staff generally displayed an adequate knowledge of their responsibilities. Twenty-four hour staffing was demonstrated by a coster listing two 12-hour shif ts and by a list of alternates in the local plan.

As specified in the local plan, the Civil Defense Director was effectively in cha ge of Kingston's emergency operations. He gave staff briefings when plant corditions changed, consulted of ten with appropriate staff members in making decisions,

Kingston EOC 74 and directed or approved specific actions. Multiple copies of the Kingston plan were available at the EOC, and each staff member used a procedural checklist.

Communications were generally handled efficiently, with appropriate distribution of messages to staff members. However, incoming messages were not always written on the standard message forms. The staff should be trained to use the standard message forms. In addition, ihe time at which messages were received was sometimes confused with the time of occurrence of the event described. The staff should be trained in message recording so that these two times are clearly distinguished and properly recorded. Separate message logs were used for communications from the IFO and the Rockingham County Sheriff's Dispatch. IFO messages were written onto a log sheet visible to all EOC staff members. Access to the Kingston EOC was controlled by keeping the doors locked and issuing color-coded name badges.

Dose assessment activities are not a local EOC responsibility.

Kingston simulated alerting and notification functions. The simulated siren sounding was coordinated with the State. Protective action recommendations for sheltering and evacuation were re'ceived from the IFO at approximately 1152 and 1333, respectively. Following receipt of each call, EOC staff followed standard procedures for alerting and notification. Vehicles were dispatched (simulated) to alert and notify the hearing impaired as described in the plan. Schools and the single factory in Kingston were notified (simulated) at the Alert ECL. Telephone notification was followed by early dismissal of schools (simulated). The factory was instructed about sheltering and evacuation. Police cars equipped with speakers simulated supplemental notification to both park areas and the transit-dependent persons. People in parks were requested to evacuate and the transit-dependent persons were to telephone the EOC. Such supplemental notification could enhance the existing notification procedures, but it is not described in the local plan. Kingston should review how well this supplemental notification procedure works and then make any necessary changes in the local plan.

All EOC staff and police and fire emergency workers tire given annual training in dosimetry and were issued both 0-200 mR and 0-100 R dosimeters and a TLD. However, the midrange (0-20 R) dosimeters specified in the plan were not available. These dosimetces should be procured and made available at the Kingston EOC. The supply of thirty dosimetry kits appeared adequate, but if too many emergency workers, such as bus guides, were to arrive at the Kingston EOC, there might not be enough kits. It is recommended that the maximum number of dosimetry kits needed be determined. If more dosimeters are needed either they should be obtained or a determination should be '

made that the current supply can be made adequate by limiting the number of dosimetry kits issued at t!'e Kingston EOC while ensuring adequate monitoring of all areas.

Appropriate instruction sheets were issued and a dosimeter charger was available. -

Recordkeeping cards were distributed. However, EOC staff failed to read their dosimeters and record readings on their record forms. EOC staff should be trained to read their dosimeters regularly and to record their readings on the dosimeter record forms.

An adequate supply of KI is available and is under the control of the Civil Defense Director who is also the RADEF Officer. The Civil Defense Director was aware

Kingston EOC 75 of maximum allowable exposures for emergency workers without authorization to exceed the General Population Protective Action Guidelines (PAGs) and when to send personnel and equipment for decontamination.

After the declaration of a General Emergency ECL but prior to the evacuation order, police officers were . dispatched from the Kingston EOC to monitor traffic flow from towns already being evacuated. Upon receipt of the evacuation order, the Police Chief promptly activated (simulated) the four traffic control points designated in the Kingston plan. A driver was actually dispatched to drive to each of the four points and returned within approximately fifteen minutes indicating that in the event of a real emergency, timely activation would be possible. The Police Chief gave an adequate discussion of the procedures that would be used to direct traffic at the traffic control points. EOC staff indicated that appropriate resources were available to keep evacuation routes clear. The capability to remove impediments to evacuation was i

demonstrated by the simulated removal of a fallen tree by a road crew under the direction of the Road Agent.

Good planning was demonstrated at the Kingston EOC when, prior to the evacuation order, staff at the EOC determined ambulance, van, and bus needs, and arranged with the IFO for meeting anticipated transportation needs. However, a roster of bus guides was not available at the EOC. The edequacy of guides affects both the evacuation of schools and the evacuation of transit-dependent populations. Without the roster, the adequacy of the provisions for this vital evacuation function could not b.e assessed. An up-to-date roster of bus guides should be maintained at the EOC.

The Superintendent of Schools has jurisdiction over both the Kingston and Newton schools. He was present at the EOC during the exercise. He indicated that if schools were in session, the number of students in classes would be determined by telephoning the principals at the request if the Civil Defense Director or Police Chief.

The Superintendent of Schools further noted that he would order an early dismissal of the schools upon being informed that an Alert ECL had been declared. Dismissal of schools at the Alert ECL, although not specifically called for in the Kingston plan, is consistent with Section IV.K which lists the School Superintendent's procedures. However, there is a concern among school staff that a request for buses in excess of the number normally available to the school system could not be met (see Section 2.1.4). This situation could occur in a rapidly escalating emergency where students had to be transported home in less that the regular three hour dismissal time.

As stated in the exercise objectives, the dispatch of one actua'. bus was requested by the Kingston EOC. This bus never arrived at the Kingston Ect; (see Section 2.1.4).

Kingston should coordinate with the State to ensure that an adequate supply of buses can be made available. Based on message forms available at the IFO, Kmgstor did not contact the IFO to clarify the situation and request another bus. The Kingston EOC staff should be trained to repeat requests to the State for buses and other transportation assistance, if these resources do not arrive at the EOC within a reasonable time.

Parents of children in the day care centers were contacted by telephone (simulated) and requested to pick up their children. This procedure is inadequate and contrary to the plan. All parents might not be available. Although the plan provides for

-- - ~ .

Kingston EOC 76 a request for transportation assistance from the State in the event that the planned local  ;

resources are insufficient, parents are never mentioned as providing a means of evacuating day care centers. The evacuation of day care centers should be carried out in accordance with the procedures established in the local plan and instructions to parents should be included in the public information brochure.

There are no special facil'.ty institutions in Kingston.

The Director of Nursing Services at the Kir.gston EOC had a list of special-needs persons, indicating, for example, that two people needed ambulances. The list included current addresses and described the special need. However, the plan states that there is ,

no known special needs population in Kingston. The plan should be updated to reflect the actual situation. The Director of Nursing Services discussed her approach to acquiring these ambulances. Vehicles that would be used to transport special-needs persons ,

Included vans and ambulances both of which are equipped with two-way radios. Special-l needs persons would be contacted by telephone. EOC staff contacted (simulated) organizations with which letters of agreement have been signed. An adequate number of simulated (see Section 2.1.4) wheel chair vans and ambulances were obtained through requests to the IFO. Ambulance attendants or firemen with ambulance attendant training would be dispatched from the EOC along with the ambulances / vans to direct the drivers from the EOC to the residences of special-needs persons. As the procedure was simulated, this dispatch was not observed.

In response to a controller's message, the evacuation of a mobility-impaired, oxygen-dependent person was simulated. The IFO was contacted and instructed Kingston I

to send the simulated evacuee to the hospital in Exeter in a direction against potential l heavy flow of' traffic of evacuating vehicles. Appropriate EOC staff discussed the situation, including a discussion of oxygen-tank usage time, and decided to route the person to a different hospital in a direction going with traffic flow. This sequence of events demonstrated a good ability to make decisions at the Kingston EOC.

The evacuation of transit-dependent people was simulated in response to simulated calls from forty families with about one-hundred and one members who requested transportation assistance for evacuation. These requests were from the people on the EOCs list of transit-dependent people. The EOC staff determined the number of buses needed for evacuation based on the available list of transit-dependent persons.

Contact with the bus companies expected to provide vehicles for the evacuation of the transit dependent was simulated. These companies have letters of agreement with the State. However, based upon discussions with the Timberlane Transportation Company, it -

appears likely that the required number of bus / driver pairs noted in the letter of agreement may not be available at all times (see Section 2.1.4). Kingston should coordinate with the State to determine whether the number bus / driver pairs actually

'available is adequate for the evacuation of transit-dependent persons at all times.

Pickup routes for transit-dependent persons had been prepared in advance and the simulated evacuation of transit-dependent persons was completed with an estimated completion time of under two hours. However, the devel.opment of ad hoc bus routes was not demonstrated. Discussions with EOC staff indicated that there had been little training in the development of ad hoc bus routes for the evacuation of transit-dependent persons. Appropriate EOC staff should receive such training.

n

I Kingston EOC l

77 Media relations are not a responsibility of local EOCs. rcess were permitted in the Kingston EOC to listen to staff briefings. No press briefings were held and the press were referred to the Media Center for more specific information.

Deficiencies 1.

Description:

Adequacy of the single telephone line in the Kingston EOC for handling regular EOC communications while concurrently receiving calls from transit-dependent persons requesting trans-portation assistance was not sufficiently demonstrated. Even with the expected installation of three additional lines within the next three months, the adequacy of available telephone lines for handling both these activities concurrently remains to be

~

demonstrated. (FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1, II, H.3, J.10.d)

Recommendation: A study should be conducted to determine the number of telephone lines required to handle both regular EOC communications and the receipt of telephone calls from transit-dependent persons requesting transportatfor. assistance.

2.

Description:

The midrange (0-20 R) dosimeters specified in the local plan were not available at the Kingston EOC. (FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1, II, K.3.a,b).

Recommendation: The midrange (0-20 R) desimeters specified in the local plan should be procured and made available at the Kingston EOC.

3.

Description:

'1 he supply of thirty dosimetry kits appeared

! adequate, but if too many emergency workers, such as bus guides were to arrive at the EOC, there might not be enough dosimetry kits. (FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1, II, K.3.a, 0)

Recommendation: The maximum number of dosimetry kits needed should be determined. If more dosimeters are needed either they should be obtained or a determination should be made that the current supply can be mcde adequate by limiting the number of kits issued at the EOC while ensuring adequate monitoring of all areas.

4.

Description:

The Kingston EOC staff failed to read their dosimeters and record readings on their record forms. (FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1, II, K.3.b)

Recommendation 1: EOC staff should be trained to read their

( dosimeters regularly.

l l

[

l Kingston COC 70 Recommendation 2: EOC staff should be trained to record their dosimeter readings on the dosimeter record forms.

5.

Description:

A roster of bus guides was not available at the Kingston EOC. The adequacy of guides affects both the evacuation of schools and the evacuation of transit-dependent populations. Without the roster, the adequacy of the provisions for these vital evacuation functions could not be assessed. (FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1, II, J.10.d, g; K.3, a, b)

Recommendation: An up-to-date roster of bus guides should be -

maintained at the Kingston EOC.

6.

Description:

The dispatch of one actual bus was requested by the -

Kingston EOC. This bus never arrived at the Kingston EOC. Based on message forms available at the IFO, Kingston did not contact the IFO to clarify the situation and request another bus. (FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1, II, J.10.g)

Recommendation: The Kingston EOC staff should be trained to repeat requests to the State for buses and other transportation assistance, if these resources do not arrive at the EOC within a reasonable time.

7.

Description:

Parents of children in the day care centers were contacted by telephone (simulated) and requested to pick up their children. This procedure is inadequate and contrary to the plan.

All parents might not be available. Although the plan provides for a request for transportation assistance from the State in the event that the planned local resources are insufficient, parents are never mentioned as providing a means of evacuating day care centers.

(FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1, II, J.10.g)

Recommendation 1: The evacuation of day care centers should be carried out in accordance with the procedures established in the local plan.

Areas Requiring Corrective Action

1.

Description:

Maps showing evacuation routes, relocation centers, and population by evacuation area, although available, were not posted in the Kingston EOC. (FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1, II, J.10.a, b) l l

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Kingston EOC 79 Recommendation: Maps showing evacuation routes, relocation centers, and population by evacuation area should be posted.

2.

Description:

The Director of Nursing Services at the Kingston EOC had a list of special-needs persons. However, the plan states that there is no known special-needs population in Kingston.

(FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1, II, J.10.d)

Recommendation: The plan should be updated to reflect the actual situation with respect to the existence of special-needs persons in Kingston.

^

Areas Recommended for Improvement

1.

Description:

There was no hard-copy device for transmitting messages to and from the Media Center.

Recommendation: Kingston may want to consider obtaining hard copy transmission capability to expedite providing advance copies of any written news releases to the Media Center if the Selectmen elect to issue such releases.

2.

Description:

At the Kingston EOC, incoming messages were not always written on the standard message forms.

l Recommendation: The staff should be trained to use the standard

! message forms.

3.

Description:

At the Kingston EOC, the time at which messages were received was sometimes confused with the time of occurrence of the event described.

~

Recommendation: The staff should be trained in message recording so that the time messages are received and the time of the event described in the message are clearly distinguished e.nd properly recorded.

4.

Description:

Police cars equipped with speakers simulated supplemental notification to both parks and transit-dependent persons. People in parks were requested to evacuate and the

~

transit-dependent were to telephone the EOC. Such supplemental notification could enhance the existing notification procedures, but it is not described in the local plan.

! Recommendation: Kingston should review how well this supplemental notification procedure works and then make any necessary changes in the local plan.

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East Kingston EOC 80 l

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2.2.4 East Kingston EOC The EOC facility was adequate to handle an emergency response operation.

There is sufficient furniture, space and lighting, and noise is sufficiently controlled. The However, a new facility can support extended operations and backup power is available.

EOC facility is being completed at this time. A status board was clearly visible and updated regularly. The emergency classification level was also posted at the EOC entrance door. Some required displays were posted including maps showing evacuation routes and access control points. Maps depleting the plume EPZ, population by sectors, and relocation centers were neither posted nor available in the FOC, operations areas. ~

This information should be posted to ensure efficient emergency operations.

The East Kingston EOC has sufficient communication capabilities with the -

exception of the limited number of telephone lines, to insure that messages could be received and sent.

After notification of the Alert ECL was received on the police radio network, all other communications with the IFO/Newington and Rockingham County Dispatch Center were received on New Hampshire Civil Defense (NHCD) radio net.

Telephones served as the backup communications system and were used to transmit messages back to these locations. Hand-held transceivers were available for the police and fire nets. Four telephone lines are available in the EOC and EOC staff believes that the existing telephone system is sufficient. However, the adequacy of available telephone lines for handling regular EOC operations concurrently with calls from transit-A dependent populations requesting transportation was not sufficiently demonstrated.

study should be carried out at the East' Kingstor. EOC to determine the number of telephone lines required to handfe both of these kinds of activities. There was no hard-copy device for transmitting messages to and from the Media Center. East Kingston may want to consider obtaining such capability to expedite providing advance copies of any written news releases to the Media Center if the Selectmen elect to issue such releases.

Initial activation of the East Kingston EOC coincided with notification of the Alert ECL. At 0822 the backup CD Director and a town selectman arrived at the town hall to open the EOC. Staff responded to a pager message to activate the EOC. Both persons used up-to-date call lists to fully activate additional staff. The proper Alert ECL notification verification procedure was followed. EOC staffing for the first shift was completed by 0900. Twenty-four hour staffing was demonstrated by presentation of a roster. Adequate training and knowledge were displayed by all participating EOC staff.

The EOC Director designated in the plan effectively managed the activities of the emergency staff. Detailed activities were delegated to the backup CD director. .

Both managers conducted periodic briefings, involved appropriate staff in decision making and maintained good management control over the EOC. Operational plans and checklists were used for reference and staff anticipated activities. Messages were ,

recorded on preprinted forms, but procedures were not well defined for routing and handling of messages among EOC staff. Procedures for routing and handling messages should be developed, implemented, and documented in the East Kingston local plan.

This EOC has no dose assessment responsibilities. Dose assessment is a State responsibility.

Esst Kingston EOC 81 East Kingston relles on a public alerting system that is comprised of sirens and EBS (and ERBS) messages. This community does not play a primary role in the decision for activation of the alert and notification system. During the exercise, siren soundings and accompanying ERBS messages were all simulated by the IFO/ State EOC.

Radiological exposure control equipment and training were generally adequate for the participating EOC staff. Direct-reading dosimeters, TLDs, and K1 were available at the East Kingston EOC. The RADEF officer was aware of decontamination procedures but personnel entering the East Kingston EOC subsequent to the order for in-place sheltering were not monitored for contamination. A radiological monitoring survey

~

should be done to all personnel entering the EOC while a sheltering or evacuation order is in place.

- Protective action recommendations were implemented by the East Kingston EOC The after an evacuation decision had been received from the State at 1335.

establishment of traffic and access control points were actually demonstrated and would be staffed until the State Police arrived. The EOC has appropriate resources and/or agreements with State or private agencies to keep evacuation routes clear. A message i simulating an evacuation route blockage was injected by the exercise controller. The Road Agent responded appropriately and reported that the obstruction had been removed. Assistance would be requested from the State Highway Department to remova impediments on State Route 107.

A number of activities involving the evacuation of special populations were demonstrated. EOC staff simulated calling local public and private schools.

Communications with the sebools consisted of telephones. EOC staff would be sent to these schools for backup communications. Following an evacuation notice at 1355, two buses were requested from a bus company to evacuate a public and a private school.

When one bus arrived at the EOC, the Transportation Coordinator served as a guide for the bus driver (see Section 2.1.4). Local firemen had been placed on stand-by to serve as guides for any additional buses that might be requested. The bus route to a school was actually demonstrated and observed. Traffic conditions on the route were monitored by police stationed at designated traffic and access control points.

The town of East Kingston has two other special facilities in addition to its schools. Detailed emergency procedures are not in place in East Kingston plan for managing the alert and notification, communications and protective actions at two institutional facilities, a YMCA camp and the Rosenberg Conference Center. These facilities receive intermittent use. Currently, any emergency response to these facilities l

would be developed on an ad hoc basis. In East Kingston, emergency procedures should be developed for the YMCA camp and Rosenberg Conference Center and included in the town plan.

Special-needs persons have been identified. Information on the address and special need of each individual are available and stored in a computer. According to the local plan, there is no known special-needs population in East Kingston. The plan should be amended to specify the actual situation that a confidential list of special-needs persons and their special needs is available at the East Kingston EOC. Simulated telephone calls were made to these persons and their special transportation needs were

East Kingston EOC 82 considered. During the exercise, the Transportation Coordinator requested extra ambulances to go on stand-by for assisting in the transport of special-needs persons.

Although a letter of agreement was in place, the ambulance company which was notified was unable to respond .(see Section 2.1.4). Consequently, privately owned vans were simulated to have been arranged for evacuating the three special-needs persons.

According to the plan, transit-dependent local residents are expected to request evacuation assistance by telephone. However, no calls were received during the exercise. Following notification plans are in place to develop routes and volunteer firemen would pick up these individuals and return them to the EOC for bus evacuation to the reception center. No list of randomly selected names was distributed to the -

person responsible for developing ad hoc bus routes. Therefore, the development or routes and route assignments and the assignment of guides for the pickup of transit dependent persons was not observed at the East Kingston EOC.

During the exercise, one member of the media arrived at the EOC. This individual was denied access and the EOC Director did not provide any information.

Deficiencies

1. Descriptiom The adequacy of available telephone lines for handling regular EOC operations concurrently with calls from transit-dependent populations requesting transportation was not sufficiently demonstrated. (FEM A-REP-1, Rev. 1, H, H.3, E.6, J.10.d)

Recommendatiom A study should be carried out at the East Kingston EOC to determine the number of telephone lines required to handle both of these kinds of activities.

2.

Description:

Detailed emergency procedures are not in place in East Kingston plan for managing the alert and notification, communications and protective actions at two institutional facili-ties, a YMCA camp and the Rosenberg Conference Center. These facilities receive intermittent use. Currently, an emergency response to these facilities would be developed on an ad hoc basis. (FEM A-REP-1, Rev.1, II, J.10.d, J.10.g)

Recommendattom In East Kingston, emergency procedures should be developed for the YMCA camp and Rosenberg Conference Center and included in the town plan. .

Areas Requiring Corrective Action

1. Descriptiom Maps depicting the plume EPZ, population by sector, and relocation centers were neither posted nor available in the EOC operations area. (FEM A-REP-1, Rev.1, II, J.10.a, J.10.b)

Enst Kingston EOC 83 Recommendation: Maps illustrating the plume EPZ, population by sector, and relocation centers should be posted in the East Kingston EOC to ensure c.fficient emergency operations.

2.

Description:

Messages were recorded on preprinted forms, but procedures were not well defined for routing and handling of the messages among EOC staff. (FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1, II, E.5)

Recommendation: Procedures for the routing and handling of messages should be developed, implemented, and documented in the East Kingston local plan.

3.

Description:

Personnel entering the East Kingston EOC subsequent to the order for in-place sheltering were not monitored for contamination. (FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1, II, K.5.a)

Recommendation: A radiological monitoring survey ahould be done to all personnel entering the East Kingston EOC whl.e a sheltering or evacuation order is in place.

4.

Description:

Special-needs persons have been identified.

Information on the address and special need of each individual are available and stored in a comptuer. According to the local plan, there is no known special-needs population in East Kingston.

(FEM A-REP-1, Rev.1, II, J.10.d)

Recommendation: The plan should be amended to specify the actual situation that a confidential list' of special-needs persons and their special needs is available at the East Kingston EOC.

• 1 l

l l Area Recommended for Improvement

1.

Description:

There was no hard-copy device for transmitting messages to and from the Media Center.

Recommendation: East Kingston may want to consider obtaining hard-copy transmission capability to expedite providing advance copies of any written news releases to the Media Center if the Selectmen elect to issue such releases.

e

l Nxw Castle EOC 84  ;

2.2.5 New Castle EOC The New Castle EOC is located in the fire station. The facility had adequate i

. furniture, space, and lighting to support emergency operations. Backup power was not available but a generator has been ordered. Backup power should be provided for the New Castle EOC; the installation and operation of the generator must be confirmed.

Although there is a kitchen, bunks and showers were not present. Extended operations would require these additional amenities but homes of some of the EOC staff members may be available to supply the needed facilities. Bunks and showers should be provided to support extended operations at either the New Castle EOC or an adjacent facility. A status board was in place and was updated with significant events. The emergency "

classification level was posted. Maps of the plume EPZ with sectors labeled, current evacuation routes, and access control points were not available. These three maps should be made available and should be posted in the operations area. A map of relocation ,

centers was available but not posted. This map should also be posted in the operations area. New Castle's population is located within one square mile and a map showing population by evacuation area was not necessary for effective planning.

The communications equipment at the New Castle EOC was adequate and able to support most necessary communications. The primary communication link with the IFO consisted of a low band CD radio with two meter radio as backup. In addition, both high band and ultrahlgh band radios were available. A RACES volunteer provided additional radio Jupport. The Media Center could be contacted through the IFO. Commercial telephone was the primary communications link with the New Castle Elementary School; personal contact by car served as a backup. Telephones and police radio were available for contacting hospitals and telephones would be used to call ambulance companies.

There was no hard-copy device for transmitting messages to and from the Media Center. New Castle may want to consider obtaining such capability to expedite providing advance copies of any written news releases to the Media Center if the Selectmen elect to issue such releases. The adequacy of available telephone lines for handling regular EOC communications while concurrently receiving calls from transit-dependent persons requesting transportation was not sufficiently demonstrated. A study should be carried out at the New Castle EOC to determine the number of telephone lines required to handle both kinds of activities.

Activation of the New Castle EOC proceeded in accordance with the plan. The notification that an Alert ECL had been declared was received by the New Castle Police Chief via radio 'from the Rockingham County Police Dispatcher at about 0831. The police chief then used radio pagers to notify other emergency workers to report to the EOC. Full staffing was completed by around 0900, in general, staff members were -

knowledgeable in carrying out their duties and written procedures were followed. Round-the-clock staffing capabilities were demonstrated by the presentation of a roster.

Sufficient additional staff were available to provide two shifts. -

The EOC was effectively managed by the Civil Defense Director. Message logs were maintained and a copy of the plan was available for reference. The Civil Defense Director, the Fire Chief, and the Police Chief were involved in making decisions.

Briefings were not held for the entire staff to inform them of the progress of the

emergency. Periodic briefings should be held to update the entire staff on the

N2w Ccstle EOC 85 emergency situation. Additional briefings should be held to update the entire staff on l significant changes in the emergency situation. Messages were not handled efficiently '

and were not distributed to all appropriate staff members at the EOC. Additional training is recommended to improve the efficiency of message handling and to ensure that messages are distributed to all appropriate staff members.

The New Castle EOC does not have a primary responsibility for dose assessment and the development of protective action recommendations.

The primary responsibility for public alerting and notification rests with the State which is responsible for activating the sirens and informing the public via EBS.

However, following the decision to order a general evacuation at about' 1330, New Castle, on its own initiative, undertook a simulated door-to-door alerting and notification of residents by police and fire personnel to inform them of the emergency situation and inquire about their needs, to identify unlisted special-needs persons, and to provide backup for telephone calls from transit-dependent persons. Such door-to-door alerting and notification could enhance the existing alerting and notification procedures, but it is not described in the local plan. New Castle should review how well the door-to-door alerting and notification procedure works and then make any necessary changes in the local plan.

The Civil Defense Director and the radiological officer were knowledgable about radiological exposure control. Suffielent supplies of dosimeters, permanent record dosimeters, recordkeeping cards, and KI were available. There was a charger for the dosimeters and instructions were given in the proper use of radiological exposure control instruments. The Civil Defense Director was aware of decontamination procedures.

Notification of the recommendation to take shelter was issued at about 1153. A recommendation for general evacuation was received from the IFO at approximately 1327 and the Selectmen made the decision to evacuate the town and the school at approximately 1330. The Selectmen had made a prior decision to evacuate New Castle whenever the City of Portsmouth was evacuated. This procedure is not described in the local plan. New Castle should review this procedure of evacuating New Castle whenever Portsmouth is evacuated with the State and make any necessary changes in the local plan. Also at this time, police were dispatched (simulated) to set up two traffic control points. According to EOC staff, appropriate resources were available to keep evacuation routes clear and were demonstrated by simulated response by highway and police personnel.

The provision of bus transportation for the evacuation of the school was not timely. As stated in the plan, the bus company was contacted for transportation to i

evacuate (simulated) New Castle Elementary School, the only school in New Castle.

When Informed that it would take over one hour for the bus to arrive, the request was canceled and a decision was made to use three private vehicles (simulated) belonging to EOC staff members to evacuate the 17 pupils from the school (see Section 2.1.4).

There are no special facilities housing institutionalized persons within the boundaries of New Castle.

l l

Nw Castle EOC 86 The Civil Defense Director indicated that there were no non-institutionalized mobility-impaired people in New Castle. This statement is consistent with the plan which also states that the Police Chief is responsible for maintaining a current list of special-needs persons. The Director also indicated that any additional special-needs people would be identified in the door-to-door notification . discussed above. This procedure should serve as a good i: heck on people not on the current list.

There are four telephone lines which could be used by transit-dependent residents to call the EOC for transportation assistance. In addition, the police and Town Hall telephones were made available for handling requests for transportation. State-controlled EBS messages would be the primary means of alerting the transit-dependent '

residents to call the EOC with the door-to-door alerting acting as a backup. No list of randomly selected names was distributed to the person responsible for developing ad hoc bus routes. Therefore, the development of ad hoc bus routes and route assignments, and ~

the assignment of guides for the pickup of transit-dependent persons was not observed at the New Castle EOC.

Media relations are not a required function of the New Castle EOC. Since no news media representative came to the EOC, the Selectmen had no opportunity to exercise their option of dealing with the local news media.

Deficiency

1.

Description:

.The adequacy of available telephone lines for handling regular EOC communications while concurrently receiving calls from transit-d' pendent e persons requesting transportation was not sufficiently demonstrated. (FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1, II, H.3, E.6, J.10.d)

Recommendation: A study should be conducted to determine the number of telephone lines required to handle both regular EOC communications and telephone requests for transportation assistance from transit-dependent persons.

Areas Requiring Corrective Action

1.

Description:

Backup power was not available in the New Castle ~

EOC during the exercise but a generator has been ordered.

(FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1, !!, H.3)

~

Recommendation: Backup power shoul'd be provided for the New Castle EOC; the installation and operation of the generator must be confirmed.

2.

Description:

The New Castle EOC operations area did not have maps of the plume EPZ with sectors labels, current evacuation

NIw Castle EOC 87 routes, and access control points. A map of relocation centers was available but not posted in the operations area of the New Castle EOC. (FEM A-REP-1, Rev.1, II, J.10.a)

Recommendation: Maps showing the plume EPZ with sectors labeled, current evacuation routes, access control points, and relocation centers should be made available and should be posted in the operations area of the new Castle EOC.

3.

Description:

Messages were not efficiently handled and were not distributed to all appropriate staff at the New Castle EOC.

(FEM A-REP-1, Rev.1, II, E.5)

Recommendation: Additional training is required to " improve the efficiency of message handling at the New Castle EOC.

4.

Description:

The Selectmen had made a prior decision to evacuate New Castle whenever the City of Portsmouth was evacuated. This procedure is not described in the local plan. (FEMA-REP-1, Rev.

1, II, J.9).

Recommendation: New Castle should review this procedure of evacuating New Castle whenever Portsmouth is evacuated with the State and then make any necessary changes in the local plan.

Areas Recommended for Improvement

1.

Description:

The New Castle EOC did not have bunks and showers available to support extenddd operations but home.s of some of the .

EOC staff members may be available to supply the needed facilities.

Recommendation: Bunks and showers should be provided either at the New Castle EOC or an adjacent facility.

2.

Description:

There was no hard-copy device for transmitting messages to and from the Media Center.

j ,

I Recommendation: New Castle may want to consider obtaining l such capability to expedite providing advance copies of any written i,

news releases to the Media Center if the Selectman elect to issue j such releases.

l 3.

Description:

Briefings were not held for the entire staff to update i them on the emerge:tcy status.

-,,e

Nsw Castle EOC 88  !

Recommendation: Periodic briefings should be held at the New Castle EOC to update the entire staff on the emergency situation. Additional briefings should be held to update the entire staff on significant changes in the emergency situation.

4.

Description:

On its own initiative, New Castle undertook a simulated door-to-door alerting and notification of residents by police and fire personnel to inform them of the emergency situation, to inquire about their needs, to identify unlisted special- ~

needs persons, and to provide backup for the telephone calls from transit-dependent persons. Such door-to-door alerting and notification could enhance the existing alerting and notification '

procedures, but such procedures are not described in the local plan.

Recommendation: New Castle should review how well the door-to-door alerting and notification procedure works and then make any necessary changes in the local plan.

i e

i 1

N:wfistds EOC 89 2.2.6 Newfields EOC The Newfields EOC is located in the fire station. The facility is adequate to support emergency operations. Backup power was not available in the Newfields EOC at the time of the exercise, although a generator has been ordered. The backup power generator should be installed as soon as it becomes available. A status board was present and updated regularly. The plume exposure EPZ map and evacuation routes were posted. Although the locations of the reception centers and populations by evacuation area were available, these displays were not posted. Maps showing these locations should be posted. For noise control, the RADEF operations were located on another floor. It was necessary for the RADEF officer to go to the EOC operation area for briefings and situation updates.

The communications systems at the Newfields EOC included the telephone and CD radio. These systems interlinked the EOC with other EOCs and the State. The ham radio operator also was present and actually participated in the exercise when communication problems were experienced with the IFO/ EOF. Therefore, a break in the transmittal of messages did not occur. A tape recorder was present in the communications area to insure the accurate transcription of incoming calls. Only two telephone lines are available in the EOC. The adequacy of available telephone lines for handling regular EOC operations concurrently with calls from transit-dependent Individuals requesting transportation was not sufficiently demonstrated. A study should be carried out to determine the number of telephone lines required to handle both of these kinds of activities. Moreover, a hard-copy device was not available to transmit messages to the Media Center. Newfields may want to consider obtaining such capability to expedite providing advanced copies of any written news releases to the media center if the Selectmen elect to issue such releases.

The EOC staff was initially notified of an emergency situation by the police duty officer following a call from the Rockingham County Dispatch Center.

The Fire Chief opened the EOC at the Alert ECL notificatloa, although the official activation followed the Site Area Emergency ECL notification at 0955. EOC l

staff were notified by pagers and staff members began arriving between the Alert and Site Area Emergency ECL notifications. Staffing was complete by 1030 and ten different municipal organizations were represented. Participating staff displayed adequate training and knowledge in carrying out their assignments.

A roster was presented to demonstrate twenty-four-hour staffing capabilities.

Managemert of the EOC was achieved through good leadership, concise and informative belefings, and the involvement of primary officials in the decision-making process. The Individual in charge was specified in the plan. Copies of the State and local plans were available for reference and checklists were used by the EOC staff. The communications clerks kept message logs and used reference forms. Reproduction and distribution of messages was not necessary as the staff was kept up-to-date on all actions taken by the utility, State and members of the local EOC staff. Briefings and informal conferences were conducted on an individual basis.

N1wfields EOC 90 EOC staff have a limited role in public alerting. Staff are not responsible for siren activation and the development of instructional messages. However, the staff demonstrated a supplementary notification procedure and instituted a time management study of this procedure. A police cruiser and three fire trucks were dispatched to alert the public at 1000. Vehicle drivers were given route maps and told to simulate a stop at each residence on their route. Drivers were requested to assess how the local residents were responding to the shelter recommendation and determine special transportation needs. Door-to-door supplemental notification could enhance the existing notification procedures, but it is not described in the local plan. Newfields should review how well this supplemental notification procedure works and then make any necessary changes in -

the local plan.  !

EOC staff also telephoned a local school to alert them of the emergency situation. However, a local industrial facility, the Kingston Warren factory, was not .

directly notified by EOC staff of the emergency situation. Lack of prompt notification could reduce the ability of this facility to respond to an escalating emergency. EOC staff intend to include notification of this facility in their revised plan. The Newfields plan should be amended to insure prompt notification of all major industrial facilities.

The RADEF officer issued low-range and mid-range dosimeters, film badges or TLD's, and instructions to emergency field workers and the EOC staff. Dostmeters were zerood prior to their distribution. The number of dosimeters was adequate for the exercise participants. However, emergency worker radiological exposure control could not be assured for all Newfields emergency workers particularly those assigned to bus evacuation routes. The existing supply of dosimetry would be inadequate if all emergency workers were needed. Additional emergency worker radiological exposure control kits would be requested from the IFO as per the plan. The time between the request for these kits and their distribution could interfer with the timely dispatch of emergency workers in the field. The procedures and resources for radiological exposure control, particularly for guides and other field workers, should be demonstrated by Newfields' emergency workers.

Protective actions were carried out by the Newfields EOC staff and included activating resources to remove a simulated impediment to evacuation as well as implementing procedures for the evacuation of special populations. These actions were taken in response to the State's recommendations to shelter (1140) and to evacuate (1325) the residents of Newfields.

l l

During the exercise, there was a simulated response by EOC staff to removing an

• impediment on an evacuation route. The Road Agent activated the appropriate staff and l equipment necessary to remove a fallen tree.

This community does not maintain a police department and police officers. -

Local individuals could be deputized to assist in the management of evacuation traffic.

The State has the responsibility for access control.

Because the School Superintendent was not participating, the EOC staff carried out all school emergency management functions. EOC staff telephoned the school located within their jurisdiction. This call was not answered because schools were not in

l NIwfieids EOC 91 l

session on the day of the exercise. All other calls were simulated. Commercial telephones were the primary communication system available. EOC staff determined the simulated number of students in attendance and assigned one of three evacuation buses that were requested from a bus company. The bus company responded by saying they would simulate sending these buses. Route maps were available in the EOC and would have been given to individual bus drivers upon their arrival. EOC staff a!so contacted the IFO concerning their bus needs (see Sections 2.1.1, 2.1.2).

There are no special-facility institutions present in Newfields. Therefore, provisions for the transportation of this special type of. population were not part of the EOC activities.

Evacuation of special needs individuals was demonstrated by one example (see Sections 2.1.1,2.1.4) when an ambulance was requested from New Market to simulate transport of a local resident. Currently the local plan does not provide a list of special needs individuals.

According to the plan, transit-dependent individuals were to call the EOC and request transportation assistance. EOC staff made simulated provisions for the transportation of local residents in their bus requests. Route maps were available and a bus guide from the fire department was present. A house-to-house survey was carried out a second time following the evacuation order to assess the community's status prior to evacuating the EOC facility.

Media relations were not observed in the Newfields EOC.

Deficiencies

1.

Description:

Only two telephone lines are available in the EOC.

The adequacy of available telephone lines for handling regular EOC operations concurrently with calls from transit-dependent Individuals requesting transportation was not sufficiently i demonstrated. (FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1, II, H.3, E.6, J.10.d) l Recommendation: A study should be carried out to determine the i

number of telephone lines required to handle both regular EOC communications and requests for transportation from transit-

. dependent persons.

I

2.

Description:

Emergency worker radiological exposure control could not be assured for all Newfields emergency workers, particularly those assigned to bus evacuation routes. The existing supply of dosimetry would be inadequate if all emergency workers were needed. Additional emergeracy worker radiological exposure control kits would be requested from the IFO as per the plan. The time between the request for these kits and their distribution could interfere with the timely dispatch of emergency workers to the field. (FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1, II, K.3.a. K.3.b)

- _ - , - 1 -- -. ,. , , - , . --

N;wfisids EOC 92 Recommendation: The procedures and resources for obtaining the instruments for exposure control, particularly for guides and other field workers, should be demonstrated.

Areas Requiring Corrective Action

1.

Description:

Backup power was not available in the Newfields EOC at the time of the exercise although a generator has been ordered. (FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1, !!, H.3)

Recommendation: The backup generator source should be !nstalled in the Newfields EOC as soon as it becomes available.

2.

Description:

Although the locations of the reception centers and populations by evacuation area were available, these displays were not posted. (FEMA-REP-1, Rev, I, II, J.10.a, J.10.b)

Recommendation: Maps showing the location of the reception centers and populations by evacuation area should be posted in the Newfields EOC.

3.

Description:

A local industrial facility, the Kingston Warren Factory, was not directly notified by EOC staff of the emergency situation. Lack of prompt notification could reduce the ability of this facility to respond to an escalating emergency. EOC staff intend to include notification of this facility in a revised plan.

(FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1, II, E.6)

Recommendstion: The Newfields plan should be amended to insure prompt notification of all major industrial facilities.

Areas Recommended for Improvement

1.

Description:

a hard-copy device was not available to transmit messages to and from the media center. .

Recommendation: Newfields may want to consider obtaining hard- , l copy transmission capability to expedite providing advanced copies of any written news releases to the media center if the Selectmen elect to issue such releases. ,

2.

Description:

Door-to-door supplemental notification could enhance the existing notification procedures, but it is not described in the local plan.

Recommendation: Newfields should review how well this supplemental notification procedure works and then make any necessary changes in the local plan.

l N wton EOC 93 2.2.7 Newton EOC The Newton EOC had adequate furniture, space, and lighting. However, the noise level was difficult to control in the operations area due to the layout of the available space. Plans are underway to add a communication center for the radio dispatch and telephone equipment. The plans should be implemented as soon as possible. The EOC has a kitchen, but showers and bunk beds are not available. These amenities would be helpful if the EOC were operational for extended periods of time.

There is a 5,000 Watt backup generator, but a 10,000 Watt generator is on order and is expected to be installed soon.

Emergency classification levels were posted and a status board was clearly visible and kept up-to-date on significant events. Maps showing evacuation routes with access control points and population by sector were displayed. However, the plume EPZ map was not present and the map showing the relocation centers was not posted but available. All required maps should be posted in the Newton EOC to support effective emergency planning.

Communications activities were capably demonstrated. No problems were encountered receiving or transmitting messages. The IFO telephone was the primary system linking the EOC with other EOCs and the State, with the Civil Defense 2-way radio available as backup. Local schools and hospitals would be contacted by telephone with the CD radio as the backup. However, the adequacy of available telephone lines for handling regular EOC communications while concurrently receiving calls from transit-dependent individuals requesting transportation assistance was not sufficiently

~ demonstrated. A study should be carried out at the Newton EOC to determine the number of telephone lines required to handle both of these kinds of activities. A new base station with eight channels has been installed although it was not operational during the exercise. Two RACES operators participated in the exercise.

l There was no hard-copy device for transmitting messages to and from the Media Center. Newton may want to consider obtaining such capability to expedite providing advance copies of any written news releases to the Media Center if the Selectmen elect to issue such releases.

At 0822, Rockingham County notified the Newton police duty officer of an Alert ECL declaration. Key EOC personnel were contacted by pager or telephone. At 0836, the Chairman of the Board of Selectmen, who was also the acting Civil Defense Director, activated the EOC. Remaining staff were called by telephone using an up-to-date call list and full staffing was completed by 0930. Participating staff were well-trained and knowledgeable in all emergency response procedures. Twenty-four hour staffing was demonstrated by the presentation of a roster. A shif t change was also demonstrated.

The Chairman of the Board of Selectmen / Acting Civil Defense Director was effectively in charge as designated in the plan. Periodic briefings were held with'all key personnel and staff were directly involved in the decision-making process. The town plan, procedures and checklists were frequently referenced. Message handling was effective. Logs were kept and messages were distributed to appropriate personnel.

i Security was tightly controlled throughout the exercise. A security officer was stationed at the door of the EOC where all participants were signed in and issued badges.

N wton EOC 94 Public alerting and instruction was not initiated by the Newton EOC. Simulated sirens and ERBS messages were activated by the IFO/ State EOC. Telephone calls were placed by the EOC to local schools to inform them of the emergency status and State recommendations.

The radiological exposure control activities were capably demonstrated by the RADEF officer and his assistant. Dosimetry equipment (both direct-read dosimeters and TLDs) were distributed to all emergency workers, including bus guides, along with proper instructions for their use. Potassium iodide (KI) was also available at the EOC. The RADEF officers were aware of decontamination procedures and would establish a

" transfer station" for contaminated materials and vehicles, if needed. This area would be ,

fenced and guarded. EOC staff adequately handled a controller Inserted problem involving high dosimetry readings reported by a field worker. The EOC was not in the plume, and no measures were needed to be taken to protect EOC personnel against ,

exposure. However, EOC staff discussed the appropriate actions that would be taken if the facility were in the plume.

The Newton EOC carried out a number of protective actions including traffic control, removal of impediments to evacuation and the emergency transportation of persons with special needs.

Activation of access and traffic control points were well demonstrated by the Chief of Police at both the order to shelter and evacuate. The fire chief also deployed four rescue / fire teams to four locations and opened the Newton Junction sub-fire station which was staffed by an assistant RADEF officer and four fire personnel. The road agent demonstrated the abili,ty to keep evacuation routes open. A fallen tree was cleared within 15 minutes for one lane of traffic and both lanes were completely cleared of debris within one hour. The road agent has resources and staff to clear routes in bad weather, and to remove stalled or wrecked cars. EOC staff also responded to a potential motorcycle gang problem that was inserted by the controller. This problem was solved ~

by effort from the local police combined with a request to the State for National Guardsmen.

At 1250, EOC staff determined that an early dismissal would be simulated for all local schools. EOC staff actually called the Superintendent's office which had joint responsibility over both the the Newton and Kingston school districts. The Superintendent was located at the Kingston EOC during the exercise. Calls to Newton school principals were simulated. Buses were ordered, including a supplemental bus '

which was requested from the State. Buses were requested to report directly to the schools. Bus guides were not assigned and routes were not developed due to the bus -

drivers' familiarity with school locations. There was a simulated dispatch of local police to facilitate management of traffic congestion from parents and buses. EOC staff were concerned that traffic congestion could be a problem at one local school in particular. It .

is recommended that EOC staff should develop and test traffic control plans for their local schools. The bus which was to arrive as part of the exercise never arrived (cee Section 2.1.4). Newton should coordinate with the State. Based on message forms ,

available at the IFO, Newton did not contact the IFO to clarify the situation and request another bus. The Newton EOC staff should be trained to repeat requests to the State for buses and other transportation assistance, if these resources do not arrive at the EOC .

f

N;wten EOC 95 within a reasonable tima. Public messages were not developed by EOC staff to inform parents of the EOC plan for an early dismissal at local schools, Public messages should be developed and released to parents on the school emergency response.

There was list of special-needs people available at the Newton EOC. Simulated buses were requested from the IFO (see Section 2.1.4), routes were developed and guides assigned to evacuate these individuals. Some guides were actually present in the EOC.

It was estimated that the pick-up times for the special pcpulation could be completed in under two hours. EOC staff also demonstrated their capabilities to transport a mobility-impaired person. A vehicle was dispatched and a woman was taken to the Salem, New Hampshire Reception Center where she was given oxygen. EOC staff also notified a local institution, the Packer Meadows Home, of the evacuation recommendation.

Simulated provisions were developed to evacuate the residents of this facility by bus.

However, the Packer Meadows Home was not listed in the local plan. The specific procedures for the emergency notification, shelter and/or evacuation of institutions should be included in the town plan.

The EOC administrative staff determined that a town evacuation was appropriate. This decision was made before the State issued an evacuation recommendation for Newton. The EOC decision for an evacuation was issued at 1350 and local school and special facilities were requested to evacuate. The EOC notified the State of their decision and simulated buses were requested (see Sections 2.1.2, 2.1.4). No list of randomly selected names was distributed to the persons responsible for developing ad hoc bus routes. Therefore, the development of routes and route assignments and assignment of guides for the pick-up of transit-dependent persons was not observed in the EOC. However, EOC staff discussed how pick-up points could be used for evacuating transit-dependent residents.

Media relations were not observed in this EOC.

(

Deficiencies

1. Descriptiom The adequacy of available telephone lines for handling regular EOC commun! cations while concurrently receiving calls from transit-dependent individuals requesting transportation assistance was not sufficiently demonstrated. (FEMA-REP-1, Rev.

1,11, H.3, E.6, J.10.d)

Recommendattom A study should be carried out at the Newton EOC to determine the number of telephone lines required to handle

. both regular EOC communleations and telephone requests for transportation assistcnce from transit dependent persons.

2. Descriptiom The bus which was to arrive as part of the exercise never arrived. Based on message forms available at the IFO, Newton did not contact the IFO to clarify the situation and request another bus. (FEM A-REP-1, Rev.1, II, J.10.g)

N:utsn KOC 96 Recommendation: The Newton EOC staff should be trained to repeat requests to the State for buses and other transportation assistance, if these resources do not arrive at the EOC within a '

reasonable time.

Areas Requiring Corrective Action

1.

Description:

The plume EPZ map was not present and the rnap '

showing the relocation centers was available but not posted.

(FEM A-REP-I, Rev.1, II, J.10.a,b). -

Recommendation: All required maps should be posted in the Newton EOC to support effective emergency planning. .

2.

Description:

Newton EOC steff were concerned that traffic congestion could be a problem at one local school in particular.

(FEM A-REP-1, Rev.1,II, J.10.k)

Recommendation: Newton EOC staff should develop and test traffic control plans for their local schools.

3.

Description:

A public message was not developed by EOC staff to notify parents of the EOC plan for an early dismissal at local schools. (FEM A-REP-!, Rev.1, II, J.10.g)

Recommendation: Public messages should be developed and released to local parents on the school emergency response.

4.

Description:

A special facility, the Packer Meadows Home, was not listed in the Newton plan although a simulated evacuation was carried out at this facility during the exercise. (FEM A-R EP-1, Rev.1, II, E.6, J.10.d)

Recommendation: Procedures for the emergency notification, shelter and/or evacuation of local special facilities (i.e., the Packer Meadows Home) should be included in the Newton Plan.

Areas Recommended for Improvement .

1.

Description:

The noise level was difficult to control in the -

operations area due to the layout of the available space. Plans are underway to add a communication center for the radio dispatch and telephone equipment.

Recommendation: Plans to add a communication center for radio and telephone equipment should be implemented as soon as practical.

N:wton EOC 97 2.

Description:

Showers and bunk beds are not available. These amenities would be helpful if the EOC were operational for extended periods of time.

Recommendation: Showers and bunk beds should be made available at the Newton EOC to facilitate operations for extended periods of time.

3.

Description:

There was no hard-copy device for transmitting messages to and from the Media Center.

Recommendation: Newton may want to consider obtaining hard-copy transmission capability to expedite providing advance copies of any written news releases to the media center if the Selectmen elect to issue such releases.

S e e

m'=m _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ . _ . _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ . _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ .

City of Portsmouth EOC 98 2.2.8 City of Portsmouth EOC The Portsmouth EOC is located on the second floor of the Central Fire Station.

The EOC has adequate furniture, and lighting. Sufficient space was provided by the two rooms that were dedicated to emergency use. Extended use facilities and backup power are also available. A status board was prominently displayed and frequently updated. A map of the designated evacuation routes was available although it was not posted. The other required maps were neither posted nor available including the plume EPZ, relocation centers, and access control points. All of these required maps should be posted in the operations area of the Portsmouth EOC. .

The primary communications system consisted of the Civil Defense and fire station radios combined with the telephone. The commercial telephone provided the backup to the radios. Only two telephone lines were available. The adequacy of available telephone lines for handling regular EOC communications while concurrently receiving calls from transit-dependent individuals requesting transportation assistance was not sufficiently demonstrated. A study should be carried out to determine the number of telephone lines required to handle both of these kinds of communications.

There was no hard-copy device for transmitting messages to and from the Media Center. Portsmouth may want to consider obtaining hard copy transmission capability to expedite providing advance copies of any written news releases to the Media Center if the Selectmen elect to issue such releases.

The call initiating activation of the EOC was received by the Fire Chief at 0900. The EOC was operational by 0955 and fully staffed by 1030 following notifications of the Site Area Emergency ECL. Nine municipal offices were represented by personnel who participated in the exercise. Written call lists were available for notification of a first and second shift. The system that was demonstrated for activation and staffing was adequate and worked well.

Emergency operations management was effective. EOC staff, including the town Mayor, were actively involved in decision making and engaged in discussions. The town plan was available for reference, procedural checklists were utilized and message logs were maintained. While emergency managers who were present displayed good knowledge of off-site emergency planning, the number of participating staff was insufficient to manage the emergency operations in an actual event. For example, the CD Director also managed operations and radiological monitoring and record keeping.

Furthermore, message traffic was very heavy requiring additional assistance from the CD Director, and so some messages were not efficiently handled, leading to time '

delays. Currently aassigned duties of individual staff members should be reviewed and staff functions should be reassigned or additional staff trained to alleviate the work overload on select individuals. Additional EOC staff should be assigned to message '

handling and distribution. Security for the EOC operation area was inadequate. EOC security must be improved.

The Portsmouth EOC carried out public alerting functions by notifying local schools and institutions. EOC staff cooperated in developing information to be submitted to the IFO for release over the ERBS. This information contained protective action recommendation instructions for schools and the local residents.

City of Portsmouth EOC 99 Direct-read dosimeters and TLDs were available in the EOC. A kit containing 30 dosimeters and TLDs was observed and these materials were distributed to EOC staff.

Some participating EOC staff appeared to be uncertain about emergency worker radiological exposure control procedures and the use of personal dosimetry. Additional training in radiological exposure control should be provided for staff at the Portsmouth EOC.

A list of 120 supplemental emergency workers that had received radiological exposure control training was provided by a planning consultant in the Portsmouth EOC.

None of the persons included on this list were present in the EOC during the exercise., if all of these. persons, including bus guides, participated in an actual emergency the available supply of dosimeters and TLDs would be insufficient. The police officer dispatched to staff a traffic control point was not given dosimetry. Additional equipment w'ould be required. This is likely to affect the efficiency of dispatching field personnel. The Portsmouth EOC staff should demonstrate procedures and resources for radiological exposure control of all field personnel and supplementary staff.

Protective actions were carried out by the Portsmouth EOC as traffic control points were established, impediments to evacuation removed and evacuation planning completed. EOC staff discussed the evacuation recommendation received from the state and, based on their location at the edge of the EPZ, they recommended sheltering for their town residents and regular dismissal of schools.

EOC staff determined that 13 traffic control points would be needed to adequately manage the evacuation of this community, including two additional traffic control points that are not included in the list available in the town plan. The town plan should be amended to include all appropriate traffic control points. Barricades and cones were requested by the police representative from the Public Works Department at 0843.

The Public Works Director confirmed that the barricades (simulated) were in place by 0945. Twenty-eight police officers were dispatched in plain or private cars to these locations (simulated) at 1336. These officers were part of an 80-person force that was put on standby at 1105 to assist in pending emergency activities. One traffic control point was actually demonstrated. The officer who was dispatched to that assignment was given verbal instructions on the location of his assignment. Resources were simulated as being activated in order to keep evacuation routes clear. An impediment problem was injected by the exercise controller at the Portsmouth EOC.

The Superintendent of Schools participated as part of the EOC staff. The

. superintendent was assigned one EOC telephone line. School emergency planning was limited by the availability of only one telephone line in the Portsmouth EOC.

Consequently, the Superintendent of Schools was required to contact schools sequentially

. leading to an estimated time delay of one hour. The effectiveness of communications,for local schools should be improved by supplementing existing telephones at the Portsmouth EOC for simultaneous notification of schools. Alternatively, the Superintendent could be relocated to the school office where a school communication network is in place and a school liaison could be assigned to the EOC. At 1345 the decision was reached that the regular 1400 school dismissal would occur. Only students living in Rye and Greenland would have been affected by the simulated radioactive release and the decision was made to reroute to the reception center. School dismissal plans were transmitted to the IFO l for a public media release.

~ , , - - .- -- - --

City of Portsmouth EOC i 100

! The EOC personnel welfare director notified the hospital by telephone of the shelter recommendation which in turn notified the four local nursing homes of the

emergency situation. The EOC director requested that the hospital and the four nursing homes compile a census of special-needs ambulatory and nonambulatory people in their

- institutions and call back. This procedure was completed per provisions in the plan.

i Under the scenario, special-needs residents were sheltered and the logistics for their evacuation was not demonstrated. However, there is only one ambulance in town and ambulance transportation resources are already strained under nonemergency conditions. During the exercise, EOC staff requested 95 ambulances from the State IFO I for evacuating noninstitutionalized as well as institutionalized persons with special -

transportation needs. The IFO was unable to supply these resources (see Sections 2.1.1, j 2.1.4). Procedures must be developed to assure that persons who must be evacuated by

Ambulance will be provided with such service. Plans are being put in place for the voluntary registration of persons requiring assistance in the City of Portsmouth. These

individuals will be notified by telephone.

A controller's message for a request for the simulated transportation of a mobility-impaired person was given to the personnel at the EOC. An elderly woman j requested transportation out of the Portsmouth area. However, the type of i transportation was unclear and the health condition of the individual was unknown.

Under the shelter recommendation, the EOC staff advised her to remain in her home.

Should an evacuation be necessary, this individual would be contacted and transportation assistance provided.

l Management of the evacuation of transit-dependent residents was not

! demonstrated by the Portsmouth EOC staff. An evacuation did not take place in this community during the exercise. Moreover, no list of randomly selected names was

{ distributed to the person responsible for developing ad hoc bus routes. Therefore, the

! development of routes and route assignments and the assignment o' guides for the pickup i of transit-dependent persons was not observed at the Portsmouth EOC. Currently, EOC l staff have not specifically identified and listed available bus guides. This list is j necessary for effielently dispatching buses and drivers to evacuate transit-dependent residents. Bus guides should be identified and a list of these personnel should be available at the Portsmouth EOC. Moreover, bus guides should receive training in emergency evacuation procedures.

During the exercise, an evacuation bus was requested by EOC staff from the IFO l

for demonstration purposes. This request was made at 1416, about 45 minutes after the ,

+

! evacuation recommendation. EOC staff should more promptly assess their emergency i needs and request transportation assistance in a more timely manner. More efficient

! procedures should be implemented for requesting State assistance. Time , delays of up to ,

one hour should be factored into the ETE study. The IFO responded to the Portsmouth l bus request at 1458 and the bus arrived over one hour later at 1523. This was two hours after the evacuation order (see Section 2.1.4). In addition, the EOC staff expressed a

{ concern that the designated bus staging area for Portsmouth may be a problem due to

inaccessibility, traffic congestion, and lack of adequate space. An appropriate bus j staging area should be identified and this designated area recorded in the Portsmouth j town plan.

i

City of Portsmouth EOC 101 During the exercise members of the press were present and were given access to the Portsmouth EOC. A media briefing area would improve the effectiveness of emergency operations, particularly when interviews are being conducted. A separate area should be provided to carry out interviews and briefings with members of the press to reduce congestion in the emergency operations area.

Deficiencies

. 1.

Description:

Only two telephone lines were available in the EOC.

The adequacy of available telephone lines for handling regular EOC communications while concurrently receiving calls from transit-

. dependent individuals requesting transportation assistance was not sufficiently demonstrated. In addition, only one telephone line was available to the Superintendent of schools in the Portsmouth EOC. Consequently, the Superintendent of schools was required to contact schools sequentially leading to an estimated time delay of

. one hour. (FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1, II, J.10.g, J.10.k, H.3, G.4.a, E.6, J.10.b)

Recommendation 1: A study should be carried out to determine the number of telephone lines required to handle regular EOC communications and telephone requests from transit-dependent persons requesting transportation assistance.

l Recommendation 2: The effectiveness of communications for l local schools should be improved by supplementing existing telephones at the Portsmouth EOC for simultaneous notification of schools. Alternatively, the Superintendent could be relocated to

' the school office where a school communications network is in place and a schoolliaison could be assigned to the EOC.

2.

Description:

The number of participating staff was insufficient to manage the emergency operations in an actual event. For example, the CD Director also managed operations and radio-logical monitoring and record keeping. Furthermore, message traffic was very heavy requiring additional assistance from the CD Director, and so some messages were not efficiently handled,

f. leading to time delays. (FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1, II A.1.b, A.2.a)

Recommendation: Currently assigned duties of individual staff members should be reviewed and staff functions should be reassigned or additional staff trained to alleviate the work overload on select individuals. Additional EOC staff should be assigned to message handling and distribution.

3.

Description:

Participating EOC staff appeared to be uncertain j

- about emergency worker radiological exposure control procedures l

l i l f

I

City of Portsmouth EOC i 102 l

and the use of personal dosimetry. (FEM A-REP-1, Rev. 1, II, K.3.b,K.4)

Recommendation: Additional training in radiological exposure control should be provided for all staff at the Portsmouth EOC.

4. Descriptiom A list of 120 supplemental emergency workers that had received training was provided by a planning consultant in the Portsmouth EOC. If all of these persons, including bus guides, participated in an actual emergency the available supply of dosimeters and TLDs would be insufficient. The police officer .

dispatched to staff a traffic control point was not given dosimetry. Additional equipment would be required. This is likely to affect the efficiency of dispatching field personnel. (FEMA- .

REP-1, Rev.1, II, K.3.a, K.3.b)

Recommendation: The Portsmouth EOC staff should demonstrate procedures and resources for radiological exposure control of all field personnel and supplementary staff at the next exercise.

5.

Description:

Currently, EOC staff have not specifically identified and listed available bus guides. This list is necessary for efficiently dispatching buses and drivers to evacuate transit-dependent residents. (FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1, II, J.2)

Recommendatiom Bus guides should be identified, and a list of these personnel should be available at the Portsmouth EOC.

Moreover, bus guides should receive training in emergency evacuation procedures.

Areas Requiring Corrective Action

1.

Description:

In the Portsmouth EOC, maps of the plume EPZ, relocation center location and access control points were neither posted nor available. A map of the designated evacuation routes was available although it was not posted. (FEM A-REP-1, Rev.1, II, J.10.a,b)

Recommendation: All required maps including evacuation routes of the plume EPZ, relocation centers, and access control should be posted in the EOC operations area. .

2.

Description:

Security for the EOC operations area was inadequate. (FEM A-REP-1, Rev.1, II, D.3)

Recommendation: Security for the Portsmouth . ZOC must be

- improved.

City of Portsmedth EOC 103

3.

Description:

EOC staff determined that 13 traffic control points would be needed to adequately manage this community including two additional traffic control points that are not currently specified in the town plan. (FEM A-REP-1, Rev. I, II, J.10.k, ,

J.10.g)

Recommendation: The town plan should be amended to include all appropriate traffic control points.

4.

Description:

During the exercise, an evacuation bus was requested by EOC staff from the IFO for demonstration purposes. This request was made at 1416, about 45 minutes after the evacuation recommendation. EOC staff should promptly assess their emergency needs and request transportation assistance in a more timely manner. (FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1, II, J.9, A.2.a J.10.d)

Recommendation 1: More effielent procedures should be implemented for requesting State assistance.

Recommendation 2: Time delays of up to one hour should be factored into the ETE study.

5.

Description:

EOC staff expressed a concern that the designated bus staging area for Portsmouth may be a problem due to inace.essibility, traffic congestion, and lack of adequate space.

(FEMA-REP-1, Rev. I, II, 2.10.K, J.10.g).

Recommendation: An appropriate bus staging area should be identified and this designated area recorded in the Portsmouth town plan.

Areas Recommended for Improvement

1.

Description:

There was no hard-copy device for transmitting messages to and from the Media Center.

Recommendation: Portsmouth may want to consider obtaining

! hard copy transmission capability to exped,ite providing advance copies of any written news releases to the Media Center if the Selectmen elect to issue such releases.

2.

Description:

During the exercise members of the press were present in the EOC operations area. A media briefing area would improve the effectiveness emergency operations, particularly when interviews are being conducted.

I City of Poresmouth EOC 4

104 1

Recommendation: A separate area should be provided to carry out interviews and briefings with members of the press t.o reduce congestion in the emergency operations area.

l i

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i I

1 I

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i 4

O O I y

h

Saabrook EOC 105 2.2.9 Seabrook EOC The Seabrook EOC is located in the meeting room on the first floor of the Seabrook fire station. It is equipped with sufficient furniture, space, and lighting. There 1 are bunks, one shower, and kitchen facilities to support extended operations. Noise was

adequately controlled and backup power was available. The emergency classification

level was posted. There was a clearly visible status board which was appropriately l

updated. Maps of the plume EPZ with labeled sectors, evacuation routes, and relocation 4 centers were posted. A staffing chart and a map of roads in Rockingham County were also posted. A map of access control points was available and used during the exercise i but was not posted and a map of population by evacuation area was neither posted nor i available. These maps should be posted.

!* Communications capabilities were generally adequate. Civil Defense radio provided the primary communications link with the IFO, the other local EOCs, and the EOF. RACES was available as a backup to the IFO and the other EOCs. A 12-meter l

radio backed up communications with the EOF. The licensee could be contacted by I commercial telephones which also is a communication link with the EDS station, the Media Center, and local schools. The two ambulances located at the fire station have radios that could be used to communicate with hospitals; backup communications with I the hospitals would be by telephone. Messages received over the radios were clear.

Communications with bus drivers would be indirect from the EOC requiring contact by the EOC with the bus company garages / yards followed by radio contact between the

' company and the bus drivers. There were three external telephone lines available at the EOC, and eight lines available for internal communications. However, the adequacy of available external telephone lines for handling regular EOC communications' while I concurrently receiving calls from transit-dependent persons requesting transportation assistance was not sufficiently demonstrated. A study should be carried out at the Seabrook EOC to determine the number of telephone lines required to handle concurrently both regular EOC communications and the receipt of telephone calls from transit-dependent persons requesting transportation assistance. There was no hard-copy

. device for transmitting messages to and from the Media Center. Seabrook may want to consider obtaining such capability to expedite providing advance copies of any written news releases to the Media Center if the Selectmen elect to issue such releases.

! Initial notification of the Alert ECL was received by the Police Dispatcher at the i Police Station at about 0818. The dispatcher promptly notified ,the appropriate officials. At approximately 0822, the Fire Station was notified of the Alert ECL. After

- consultation with the Civil Defense Director, the responsible Selectwoman exercised her authority to activate the EOC after receiving notification of the Alert at approximately I 0905. Staff mobilization procedures were demonstrated using a written call list. A

}- staffing chart that was posted identifying the first and second shift personnel and

demonstrating the capability to maintain round-the-clock staffing. Staffing was completed by about 1120. All key organizations were represented at the Seabrook EOC except the Selectmen, who were in telephone communication with the EOC. The staff at the Seabrook EOC generally displayed adequate training and knowledge of their duties.

! The Seabrook EOC was managed by the Civil Defense Director who demonstrated good knowledge of the local plan. Appropriate staff were involved in making decisions i

i

Subrook EOC 106 but few briefings were held to update staff on the emergency situation. The individualin charge should be trained to conduct periodic briefings for the EOC staff. A copy of the local plan was available for reference. Access to the Seabrook EOC was controlled by a police officer stationed at the door of the EOC. The Seabrook EOC staff kept message logs, used written checklists, and showed the ability to make decisions and coordinate emergency activities.

The Seabrook EOC has no direct responsibilities for accident assessment or the development of protective action recommendations.

The Seabrook EOC does not have a primary responsibility for public alerting and .

Instruction. During this exercise, activation of the sirens and ERBS was to be simulated by the State. The Seabrook EOC received notification of simulated siren activations at approximately 1100, 1150, and 1330. It received notification of simulated ERBS .

messages and their centents at approximately 1108,1155, and 1335.

Fifty-five emergency worker radiological exposure control kits containing low-range (0-200 mR) and high-range (0-100 R) dosimeters, a TLD, instructions, and recordkeeping sheets were available at the Seabrook EOC. According to the local plan, 0-20 R mid-range dosimeters are to be available. The 0-20 R dosimeters specified in the local plan should be procured and made available at the Seabrook EOC. In addition, the instructions were for 0-20 R dosimeters. The instructions should correspond to the dosimeters actually contained in the emergency worker radiological exposure control kits. Four dosimeter chargers were available and were used by the RADEF officer to prepare the dosimeters for use. There was an adequate supply of K1 available at the Seabrook EOC. However, there were no written instructions available for distribution with the KI. Such instructions should be made available for distribution when K1 is distributed at the Seabrook EOC. Moreover, the police officer who was dispatched to demonstrate the staffing of a traffic control point did not come to the Seabrook EOC to pick up dosimetry. This officer did not realize that he should have taken dosimetry with him. Additional training in emergency worker radiological exposure control should be given to police officers in Seabrook.

Three bus drivers, one from Berry Transportation and two from Timberlane Bus Company

• arrived at the EOC without dosimetry. The latter two buses had not been dispatched in response to a request from the Seabrook EOC (see Section 2.1.4). All three bus driver! were given dosimetry and instruction sheets but were told that in an actual event they would not have been given dosimeters and that the guides assigned to their buses would have been supplied with dosimetry to keep track of radiation exposure. ,

• The drivers of these two buses indicated that they had gone to the Rockingham County Dispatch Center, from there to the Seabrook Nuclear Power Plant, and then to the l Seabrook EOC, arriving at the EOC at about 1135. They were never observed at the l Rockingham County Dispatch Center and given their route and time of arrival at the l Seabrook EOC, could not have been dispatched from Rockingham (see Section 2.1.4).

They are treated as nonarrivals at Rockingham.

l 1

L

Sacbrock EOC ,

107 Protective actions carried out by the Seabrook EOC included staffing traffic control points, and evacuating special populations. These actions were in response to an evacuation recommendation and to'a message inserted by the exercise controller.

The police officer who was dispatched to ddmonstrate the staffing of a traffic control point did not report to th'e Seabrook EOC.to receive Instructions on where to direct traffic once the traffic control point had been set up. At the traffic control point, the police officer directed traffic (simulated) out of the plume EPZ, but not by the procedure speelfled in the local plan. Police officers in Seabrook should be trained to report to the EOC to receive instructions concerning which routes to direct traffic to take prior to staffing the traffic control point assigned to them. The police also had responsibility for securing the beach areas following the General Emergency ECL.

- The Superintendent of schools did not participate in the exercise. EOC staff were aware of the plan procedures for notifying local public and private schools. The j public and private schools would be called by telephone and police cruisers would be used I as back-up for contracting the schools not reached by telephone. One local school (day j care / educational facility) had an outdated telephone number for the Seabrook EOC.

i Telephone numbers for the Seabrook EOC should be updated and provided to all local public and private schools. Following the evacuation notification at approximately 1105, buses were requested from a bus company to provide transportation for school evacuation. At about 1142, the requested school bus arrived at the Seabrook EOC (see 9

Section 2.1.4).

No special facility institutions are present in the community of Seabrook.

I The confidential list of special-needs persons called for in the local plan was not available at the Seabrook EOC during the exercise. Staff at the EOC indicated that time is needed to prepare the list. Furthermore, the resources required to notify and transport special-needs persons have not been fully identified. A survey should be conducted in Seabrook to Identify special-needs persons and their special needs. Based l

on this survey, the confidential list of special-needs persons and their special needs

! called for in the plan should be made available at the Seabrook EOC. In addition, based on this survey, the resources needed to both notify and evacuate special-needs persons should be determined and made available. The Controller at Seabrook injected a message l calling for the evacuation of a person requiring oxygen to Portsmouth. The Transportation Coordinator telephoned (simulated) the fire company ambulance to arrange for evacuation and alerted Portsmouth Hospital (simulated) that the special-needs evacuee would be arriving.

Tfie Controller injected a message that a number of transit-dependent persons at C speelfled locations had called the Seabrook EOC and requested evacuation l ** transportation. The numbers of buses and guides required to respond to these requests j

were determined and a bus was requested from a local bus company. Ad hoc evacuation l

l bus routes were developed. It was estimated that the evacuation of transit-dependent persons would take three to four hours. An adequate number of guides are available for i the projected number of buses needed for evacuation of transit-dependent persons.

However, employees of the Timberlane Bus Company that would be called by Seabrook Indicated that the company may not be able to supply a sufficient number of buses and I

Sacbrook EOC 108 drivers to meet Seabrook's requirements. Bus drivers may not be available or may work for several bus companles. Buses may be running charter routes (see Section 2.1.4).

Seabrook should consult with the State to ensure that adequate numbers of buses are available to supply local transportation re,quirements.

Seabrook does not have primary responsibilities for media relations. A reporter did arrive at the Seabrook EOC during the exercise and was allowed to observe EOC operations.

Deficiencies *

1.

Description:

The adequacy of the three external telephone lines for handling regular EOC business while concurrently receiving -

calls from transit-dependent persons requesting transportation assistance was not sufficiently demonstrated at the Seabrook EOC. (FEM A-REP-1, Rev.1, II, H.3, J.10.d)

Recommendation: A study should be conducted to determine the number of telephone lines required to handle concurrently both regular EOC communications and the receipt of telephone calls from transit-dependent persons requesting transportation assistance.

2.

Description:

Low-range (0-200 mR) and high-range (0-100 R) dosimeters were available at the Seabrook EOC. According to the local plan, mid-range (0-20 R) dosimeters are to be available.

(FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1, II, H.11)

Recommendation: The 0-20 R dosimeters specified in the local i plan should be procured and made available at the Seabrook EOC.

3.

Description:

The police officer who was dispatched to demonstrate the staffing of a traffic control point did not come to the Seabrook EOC to pick up dosimetry and did not realize that he should have taken dosimetry with him. (FEM A-REP-1, Rev.1, II, K.3.a,0.4.g)

Recommendation: Additional training in emergency worker -

cadiological exposure control should be given to police officers in Seabrook.

4.

Description:

The confidential list of special-needs persons called for in the local plan was not available at the Seabrook EOC during the exercise. Furthermore, the resources required to notify and transport special-needs persons have not been fully identified.

(FEM A-REP-1, Rev.1, !!, J.10.d,g)

1 Sanbro k EOC 109 Recommendation 1: A survey should be conducted in Seabrook to identify special-needs persons and their special needs. Based on this survey, the confidential list of special-needs persons and their special-needs called for in the plan should be kept at the Seabrook EOC, and the resources needed to both notify and evacuate special-needs persons should be determined and made available.

Areas Requiring Corrective Action

1.

Description:

A map of access control points was available and used during the exercise but was not posted and a map of

- population by evacuation area was neither posted nor available.

(FEM A-REP-1, Rev.1,11, J.10.a, b)

Recommendation: Maps of access control points and population by evacuation area should be posted at the Seabrook EOC.

2.

Description:

The police officer who was dispatched to demonstrate the staffing of a traffic control point did not report to the Seabrook EOC to receive instructions on where to direct traffic once the traffic control point had been set up. At the traffic control point, the police officer directed traffic (simulated) out of the plume EPZ, but not by the procedure specified in the local plan. (FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1,11, J.10.g)

Recommendation: Police officers in Seabrook should be trained to report to the EOC to receive Instructions concerning which routes to direct traffic to take prior to staffing the traffic control point assigned to them.

3.

Description:

One local school (day care / educational facility) had an outdated telephone number for the EOC. (FEMA-REP-1, Rev.

1, !!, J.10.g)

Recommendatiom Telephone numbers for the Seabrook EOC should be updated and provided to all local public and private

- schools.

.. Areas Recommended for improvement

1.

Description:

There was no hard-copy device for transmitting

! messages to and from the Media Center at the Seabrook EOC.

I

Recommendattom Seabrook may want to consider obtaining such capability to expedite providing advance copies of any written i news releases to the Media Center if the Selectmen elect to issue j such releases.

S rbro:k EOC 110 2.

Description:

At the Seabrook EOC, few briefings were held to update staff on the emergency situation.

Recommendation: The Individual in charge at the Seabrook EOC should be trained to conduct periodic briefings for the EOC staff.

3.

Description:

The instructions contined in the emergency worker radiological exposure control kits at the Seabrook EOC are for 0-20 R dosimeters while 0-200 mR and 0-100 R dosimeters are actually available in the kits. .

Recommendation: The instructions contained in emergency worker radiological exposure control kits at the Seabrook EOC should correspond to the dosimeters actually in the kits.

4.

Description:

At the Seabrook EOC there were no written instructions available for distribution with the KI.

Recommendation: Instructions for the use of K! should be available for distribution when K1 is distributed at the Seabrook EOC.

Strcthem EOC 111 2.2.10 Stratham EOC The Stratham EOC is located in the Stratham volunteer fire station. Emergency operations were set up on the second floor separated from the normal activities of the fire d'epartment on the first floor. There was adequate furniture, space, lighting, and two telephone lines. Noise was adequately controlled and backup power was available.

The facility has a kitchen but is not equipped with the bunks and showers needed to support extended operations. Bunks and showers should be made available to the Stratham EOC.

. A status board was clearly visible and was kept up-to-date. Emergency classification levels were posted. Maps of evacuation routes and relocation centers were available but were not posted and a map of the plume EPZ with labeled sectors was not

. posted. These maps should be posted in the Stratham EOC. The availability of maps showing access control points and population by evacuation area was not observed at the Stratham EOC. -

The Stratham EOC was equipped with both Civil Defense radio and a two-way fire department radio. The Civil Defense radio provided the primary communications link with other EOCs and the IFO in Newington. Telephones served as backups. There were two commercial telephone lines connected to four telephones. The adequacy of the two telephone lines for handling regular EOC communications while concurrently receiving calls from transit-dependent Individuals requesting transportation was not suffielently demonstrated. A study should be carried out to determine the number of telephone lines required to handle both activities. Local schools could be contacted by telephone or by personal contact, since all schools were within a few minutes driving time of the Stratham EOC. An intercom system was used to relay messages from the first floor to the second floor operations room. There was no hard-copy device for transmitting messages to and from the Media Center. Stratham may want to consider obtaining such capability to expedite providing advance copies of any written news releases to the Media Center if the Selectmen elect to issue such releases.

Initial notification of the Alert ECL was received at about 0818 at the fire 4

station from the Newmarket, New Hampshire central fire dispatch office. The call was verified. Pagers and telephones were used to notify key officials. Telephone calls were made using a written call list. According to exercise participants, the EOC could be activated at any hour of the day. The EOC was fully staffed by eleven persons at approximately 0910. The Civil Defense Director called a meeting to plan for a transition to a second shift. The capability to implement a shift change was demonstrated by presentacion of a roster, but a shift change did not actually occur. In general, the staff displayed adequate training and knowledge of their duties.

One of the Selectmen was in charge at the Stratham EOC as speelfled in the local plan. The Civil Defense Director handled the duties assigned to him effectively.

Periodic briefings were held and appropriate staff were involved in making decisions.

Copies of both the State and local plans were available and were referred to when necessary. The EOC staff kept message logs. Message handling procedures were efficient and, if appropriate, messages were reproduced and distributed. Access to the EOC was adequately controlled.

Strathem EOC 112 The Town of Stratham has no direct responsibilities for accident assessment or the development of protective action recommendations.

. In New Hampshire, the State is responsible for public alerting and notification activities. The Town of Stratham did not take any actions in these areas. The simulated siren /ERBS activation objective for the exeicise required that notification of the timing and content of simulated ERBS messages be received by the EOC in a timely fashion.

The Stratham EOC was notified of the 1000 simulated ERBS message which was logged at 1010. There was no simulated broadcast of sheltering-in-place instructions to the public, nor was there any indication that information had been received from the IFO on the 1150 simulated ERBS message ordering such sheltering in Stratham. The EOC staff -

was fully aware of the evacuation instructions issued in the simulated ERBS message issued at about 1335.

While the number of dosimeters ava'lable at the Stratham EOC was adequate, the dosimetr'y sets were only partially complete. Each EOC staff member was issued both a 200 mR dosimeter and a TLD along with appropriate instructions for their use.

However, the local plan states that 0-20 R dosimeters will also be available at the Stratham EOC. An adequate supply of 0-20 R dosimeters should be procured and made available at the Stratham EOC. The RADEF Officer was aware of decontamination procedures. Measures for protecting EOC personnel against exposure were demonstrated when ordered by Civil Defense Director.

The Stratham EOC staff carried out a number of protective actions. These actions included the establishment of traffic control points, activation of resources to keep evacuation routes clear, and the demonstration of procedures to evacuate special populations. The EOC was apparently not aware of the shelter in place instructions that were issued at about 1150 and did not separately issue orders to the Stratham population to shelter in place. Stratham was aware at approximately 1330 of the forthcoming 1335 evacuation order before it was issued (simulated) on ERBS. Schools had been ordered to evacuate before 1340. All police and road crews reported to the EOC before beginning their evacuation duties. Police were sent to the schools to provide assistance.

Evacuation of the population was completed by about 1450. The EOC staff did not evacuate.

Traffic control points were ordered promptly and expected traffic volume was discussed. A police officer was actually dispatched to a traffic control p,oint prior to the evacuation order. Resources are available to keep evacuation routes clear. A simulated activation of these resources occurred during the exercise when a police cruiser was

• dispatched to respond to a disabled vehicle at about 1210. A simulated removal of this vehicle was completed within about thirty minutes.

Actual and simulated telephone calls were made to local schools to notify them -

of the Site Area Emergency ECL. School population data were used by the EOC staff to determine the number of buses requested should an evacuation be necessary. The Berry Bus Company and Jan Car Bus Company were contacted by the LOC to request bus and van resources to meet antic! pated needs for school and transit dependent populations.

Simulated bus guldes were requested from the volunteer fire department. However, a list of guides and their telephone numbers was not available in the Stratham EOC.

Strachtm EOC

• 113 Guides have the responsibility for radiological exposure monitoring for both themselves and bus drivers. It could not be verified that the volunteer fire department members, who were to be the guides were available. The availability and use of and adequate number of guides should be demonstrated at the next exercise.

At about 1339 schools received a cimulated evacuation notification from the Stratham EOC. Telephones and radios were used for these communications. EOC staff provided logistical support to schools by arranging for buses, simulating bus guide asaignments, and dispatching police to the school sites for traffic control. However,a school bus which was tc, arrive at the Stratham EOC as pset of the exercise never arrived (see Section 2.1.4). EOC staff should coordinate with tne State. Based on message forms available at the IFO, Stratham did not contact the IFO (see Section 2.1.4) to clarify the situation and request another bus. The Stratham EOC staff should be tralned to repeat requests to the State for buses and other transportation assistance, if these rescurces do not arrive at the EOC within a reasonable time.

A computer listing of residents with special needs and a description of these needs was available in the EOC. Accordirg to the local plan, there is no known special-needs population in Stratham. The plan should be amended to specify the actual situation that a confidentiallist of special-needs persons and their special needs is available at the Stratham EOC. Telephones would be used to contact these persons. During the exercise, a demonstration of the transport 1 tion of a special-needs person was simulated in response to a controller's message. Because of a controller message, the EOC staff utilized a local backup ambulance service and instructed the driver to transport a person to the Exeter Hospital which was being used as a staging area. From there, this Individual would be transported to a Boston facility. However, the simulated evacuation of a special-needs Individual to the Exeter Hospital was carried out at a time when an evacuation order was in effect for EPZ communttles including Exeter. Plans should be developed to handle the specific conditions of the radiological emergency. Procedures should specify that evacuees are to be transported out of the areas being evacuated.

The evacuation of transit-dependent Individuals was not fully demonstrated. A list of 120 Individuals with addresses to EOC staff was distributed by the controller for developing ad hoc bus routes. A message was also inserted notifying the EOC of a simulated telephone call from one local resident requesting transportation assistance.

EOC staff estimated the bus needs of the transit-dependent po'pulation. The bus requests to two bus companies were combined with requests for school evacuation buses. Some route maps were observed in the EOC. Assignment and verification of bus guides was not

- demonstrated and has been discussed in Section 2.1.8, Rockingham County EOC and Staging Area.

. The Stratham EOC does not have primary responsibilities for media relations.

Deficiencies

1. Descriptiom The adequacy of the two available telephone lines for handling regular EOC communications while concurrently receiving

Strathrm EOC 114 ,

calls from special populations was not sufficiently demonstrated.

(FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1, !!, H.3, E.6, J.10.d) .

Recommendattom A study should be conducted to determine the number of telephone lines required to handle both regular EOC communications and the receipt of telephone calls from special populations requesting transportation assistance.

2.

Description:

Although the local plan specifies that both 0-200 mR and 0-20 R dosimeters are to be available at the Stratham EOC, ~

only 0-200 mR dos! meters were available. (FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1.

!!, K.3.a)

Recommendattom An adequate supply of 0-20 R dosimeters should be procured and made available at the Stratham EOC.

3. Descriptiom A list of guides and their telephone numbers was not available in the EOC. Guides have responsibility for radiological exposure monitoring of themselves and bus drivers. It could not be ,

verifled that the volunteer fire department members, who were to be the guides, are actually available. (FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1, II, 0.4.d)

Recommendation: The availability and use of an adequate number of guides should be demonstrated at the next exercise.

4. Descriptiom The requested school bus did not arrive. Based on message forms available at the IFO, Stratham did not contact the IFO to clarify the situation and request another bus. (FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1, II, J.10.g)

Recommendattom The Stratham EOC staff should be trained to repeat requests to the State for buses and other transportation assistance, if these resources do not arrive at the EOC within a reasonable time.

5.

Description:

A simulated evacuation of a special-needs individual to the Exeter Hospital was carried out at a time when an '

evacuation order was in effect for plume EPZ communities including Exeter. (FEM A-REP-1, Rev.1, !!, J.10.m)

Recommendation: Plans for the evacuation of special-needs persons should be developed to handle the specific conditions of a radiological emergency. Procedures should specify that evacuees are to be transported out of the areas being evacuated.

Stecchr;a EOC 115 Areas Requiring Corrective Action

1.

Description:

Maps of evacuation routes and relocation centers were available but were not posted and a map of the plume EPZ with sectors labeled was not posted in the Stratham EOC. (FEM A-REP-1, Rev.1, !!, J.10.a. J.10.b)

Recommendation: Maps of evacuation routes, relocation centers, and the plume exposure EPZ should be posted in the Stratham

. EOC.

2.

Description:

A computer listing of residents with special needs

. . and a description of these needs was available in the EOC.

According to the local plan, there is no known special-needs population in Stratham. (FEM A-REP-1, Rev.1, !!, J.10.d)

Recommendation: The plan should be amended to specify the actual situation that a confidential list of special-needs persons and their special needs is available at the Stratham EOC.

Areas Recommended for Improvement

1.

Description:

The Stratham EOC is not equipped with the bunks and showers needed to support extended operations.

Recommendation: Bunks and showers should be made available to the Stratham EOC.

2. Descriptiom There was no hard-copy device for transmitting messages to and from the Media Center.

Recommendation: Stratham may want to consider obtalning such hard-copy transmission capability to expedite providing advance copies of any written news releases to the Media Center if the Selectmen elect to issue such releases.

6

116 e

9 l

G

-. .- " - .-y._,

117 3 SCHEDULE FOR CORRECTION OF DEFICIENCIES AND AREAS REQUIRING CORRECTIVE ACTION Section 2 of this report lists deficiencies and areas requiring corrective actions with recommendations noted by the federal evaluators of this exercise. These evaluations are based on the applicable planning standards and evaluation criteria set forth in Section !! of NUREG-0654-FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1 (November 1980), exercise objectives, and the evaluation criteria provided in Section 1.5 of this report.

The Regional Director of FEMA is responsible for certifying to the FEMA Associate Director, State and Local Programs and Support, Washington, D.C., that any deficiencies and areas requiring corrective actions noted in the exercise have been corrected and that such corrections have been incorporated into the plan.

FEMA requests that the state and local jurisdictions submit the measures they have taken or Intend to take to correct deficiencies and areas requiring corrective actions. FEMA recommends that a detailed plan, including projected and actual dates of completion for implementing corrective actions, be provided if corrective actions cannot be instituted immediately.

FEMA has recently adopted changes in terminology regarding exercise inadequacies. The revised terminology is reflected in this report. The definitions of exercise inadequacles are as follows:

Deficiencies are demonstrated and observed inadequacles that would cause a finding that offsite emergency preparedness was not adequate to provide reasonable assurance that appropriate protective measures can be taken to protect the health and safety of the pubtle living in the vicinity of a nuclear power facility in the event of radiological emergency. Because of the potential impact of deficiencies on emergency preparedness, they are required to be promptly corrected through appropriate remedial actions including remedial exercises, drills or other actions.

Areas Requiring Corrective Actions are demonstrated and observed inadequacles of State and local government performance, and although their correction is required dering the next scheduled blennial exercise, they are not considered, by themselves, to adversely impact public health and safety.

Deflelencies were Identitled in this exercise. Both def!clencies and areas requiring corrective actions identifled in this exercise are summarized in Table 2.

Table 3 is a compilation of the current status of deficiencies and areas requiring corrective actions identified in the February 26, 1986 exercise. Table 4 lists the status of each of the 35 FEMA Core Objectives for each state and local jurisdiction by exercise year.

i TAaLE 2 Remedial Actions for Seabrook Station Nuclear Power Plant

• (February 26, 1986)

Page 1 of 75 Proposed Actual Deficiencies / Areas Requiring Corrective FDen-R EP-l .

Completion gew. 1, State (S) and 14 cal (L) Completion FEMA Ivaluation of Actions and RAC Recommendation Dat e Element Proposed Corrective Actions Date State and I.ocal Nesponse for Cervective Action new nampsbire Stata WBC Seficiencies

1. Desc ript ient h ability to fully A.4 semit f acilities and maintain staf fing N

co aromed the clock uns met adequately demonstrated for same functions by the St at e of hw Nampshire. The perseemel resources apparently are not adequate to cover all traffic and access cent rol functions simultaneously. h Public Works and Nighways representa-tive at the State EDC anticipated a conflict between their work setting up barricades for access control points, removing impediments to evacustion, and ahe need ier supplansetary bus drivers. Activating the Motional Cuard to assist in traf fic or access cent ral functions would reduce the available pool of bus drivers since some bus drivers are also members of the htimaal Cuard.

e e . 9 8

P TASLE.2 Remedial Actions for Seabroek Station lluclear Power Plant (February 26, 1986) Page 2 of M Proposed Ac t ual Deficiencies / Areas Se p iring Corrective FEMA-SEP-3, Completion Bew. 1 State (S) and lacal (L) Compl et ion FEMA Evaluation of t Actions and RAC Seceemmendation Date State and 1.ecal Response Date for Corrective Action Element Proposed Carrective Actions mecamenendatient Additional persommet resources as necessary should be identilied and documented in the State pl an to ensure that activating one resource pool does not significantly g deplet e the capabilities of another H re se.r ce pool in these areas where individuals are accounted f or in mare than one resource pool .

2. Besc ript ient The esercise did me.t E.S. E.6 demonstrate that there is the capability for providing an Alert signal and instructions to the public throughout the plume empr.s.4e EPZ withis 15 minutes because the EtBS system, which is separate from EBS, was not activated. The ERBS system is not yet fully operati mal. WOKQ, whic h i s t he ga t eway st at ion, ha s not twee ceanected to o be other satellite ,

st at ions and cammet yet activate tone alert radios.

Recomumendet isnt The ERES and ESS showIJ be iategrated and made operational. This integrated system shoutJ he demunsa rat ed at the meat caretise.

TASLE 2 Remedial Actions for Seabreak Station 18uclear Power Plant (February 26, 1946)

Page 3 of 15 FEteA-GEP-l, Proposed Actual Deficiencies / Areas Requiring Corrective Completion FEMA Evaluation el Completion Act sons and RAC Recosamendation Rev. I, State (S) and 14 cal (L) Date Proposed Corrective Actios.s Date State and Local Response for Corrective Action Element Descriptimmt Information about bus E.5, E.6, 3.

routes was not delivered in a timely J.IO.g fashion. The single ESSS message instructing transit-dependent popula- g tions in nonparticipating commmenities N on where they should pick up a bus was O issued at 1445. This message was issued over one hour after the decision to evacuate Rye, North Itampton, Eseter, South llampton, and Irensington. teoreover, this ERBS message was issued three and one-half hours after the decision to evacuate Itampton and Itampton Falls and one hour and forty-five minutes after the

• simulated evacuation of Seabrook was completed.

Becommendatian: Procedures should be developed in the Compensatory Plan to insure that ERES and EDS messages from the St at e to the nonpartici pat ing towns are issued in a timely fashion.

Transit-dependent individuals should be made aware of the routes that buses will tollow Inefore the buses begin to run t hese routes. The State should be aware al the time at which theses can

9 TABLE 2 Remedial Actions for Seabrook Station Nuclear Power Plant (February 26, IM6)

Page 4 of 75 Proposed Actual Deficiencies / Areas Sequiring Corrective FEMA-REP-1, Completion Actions and RAC Recoaumendation Rev. 1, State (S) and local (L) Completion FEMA Evaluation of for Corrective Action Element Proposed Corrective Actions Date State and 1.ocal Response Date be espected to arrive at the local staging area of each nonparticipating cosumunit y after depart ing from the St at e 's Rockingham County ataging ER85 messages should specify, g area. N for each community, when buses can be g espected to begin running Eneir routes for transit-dependent pickups. These messages should be monitored by each Sheriff's deputy staffing a local staging area. If the Sherif f's deputy observes that the ESS/ESSS messages for the community are not timely or are inaccurate, the deput y should relay messages through the d'-= i -

cator at the Rockingham County staging area to the State EOC in order to correct the problem.

4. Desc ri pt ient No ERBS messages E.5, E.6, inst ruc t ing the t rans it-dependent or J.10.d, mobility-impaired populations of J.10.g participating towns were ever simulated, so these people could not have called their local EOC to arrange f or evacuat ion t ransport at ion.

-1 TABLE 2 Remedial Actions for Seabrook Station gluclear Power Plant (February 26, 1986)

Page 5 of 75 Proposed Actual Deficiencies / Areas Requiring Corrective FEMA-SEP-l.

FEMA Evaluation of Completion Rev. 1, State (S) and Local (L) Compl et ion ACEions and RAC Recommendation Date State and Local Response Date for Corrective Action Element Proposed Corrective Actions Recommendatiaat ERBS/ERS messagas which instruct transit-dependent or '

subility-impaired residents of participating towns with regard to the procedures in effect in that town W w

should be issued before evacuation. N The time at which such messages must be issued, as well as the nature of the messages, depends upon the degree el preparation f or pick-up of transit dependent and mobility-impaired residents in the town to idiic h the message applies. Towns such as Seabrook (see Sec. 2.2.9), which require call-in and bus route development at the EOC, require that the message be issued well in advance of a possible evacuation order. Local EOCs should see that the staff member responsible for evacuating transit-dependent and mobility-impaired residents monitors and reviews copies of transportation-related ESS/ER8S messages to assure their timely issuance and conteitual accuracy.

l l

l 1

~ - , - e , , - +. , ~,, - ,n-.

TABLE 2 Remedial Actions ter Seabrook Station Nuclear Power P. ant

( F-brua ry 26, 1986) l' age 6 ol 75 Proposed Atsual Deficiencies / Areas R(quiring Corrective FEMA-REP-1, Complet ion FEMA Evaluat ion el Completion Actions and RAC Recommendation Rev. 1, State (S) and Local (L) Dat e Proposed Corrective Actions Date State and f.ocal Response for Corrective Action Element S. Reec ript ies: Several messages E.5, J.9, generated at the State EOC and J.10.d.

intended for broadcast to the public J.10.m contained contradictory and partly inaccurate information. For esemple, ra ERES message No. 4 called for both sheltering and evacuation in the towns of Seabrook. Hampton, and Hampton Falls. Anot he r message, which provided telephone numbers for resident s of nonpa rt ic ipat ing towns with special transportation or medical needs to call, contained an incorrect telephone number f or the IFO.

Rec h -tiant Procedures should be implemented to ensure that erroneous, conflicting, or conf using messages are not issued to the public.

TABLE 2 Remedial Actions for Seabrook Station Nuclear Power Plant (February 26, 1946)

Page 7 of 75 Proposed Actual Deficiencies / Areas Requiring Corrective FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 1, State (S) and Imcal (L) Complet ion FEMA Evaluation of Completion Actions and RAC Recommendation State and Local Response Dat e Element Proposed Corrective Actions Date for Corrective Action

6.

Description:

The Coast cuerd was not E.5, E.6, notified until 1012, although the J.10.c,

" Sit e Area Emergency" was declared at J.10.g 0941. The State EOC . at tempted to g

cont ac t the Coast Cuerd at 0829 at the N

" Alert," but contact was not made as, P a

apparently, an incorrect telephone number was called. Because the Coast Cuard is responsible for alerting the boating public, the esercise objective r of alerting the public throughout the plume esposure EPZ within 15 minutes was not met.

Recommendations The Coast Cuerd should be notified at the " Alert" level so t ha t notification of the boating public can begin promptly when ,

required. The call-up number should be verified to insure that proper l' contact is made in the future.

Further evaluation of the alerting of persons on boats will occur during the formal review of the alert and notifi-4 cation system pursuant to FEMA REP-10 "Cuide for the Evaluation of the Alert and Nutification Sy st ems for Nuclear Power Plants." Evacuation will be

! eval ua t ed during the FEMA and RAC review of evacuation time estimates.

- ~ n ---_ ___-__ - -____

4 . . .

TABLE 2 Remedial Actions for Seabrook Station Nuclear Power Plant (February 26, 1986)

Page 8 el 75 Proposed Actual Deficiencies / Areas Requiring Corrective FEMA-REP-1, State (S) and Local (L) Compl et ion FEMA Evaluation of Completinn Actions and RAC Recosusendation Rev. 1, Proposed Corrective Actions Date State and I.ucal Response Date for Corrective Action Element

7. Descriptions The ca pabili t y to J.10.4 demonstrate the organizational ability to effect an orderly evacuation of schools, which was an exercise objec-tive (D.8), was hampered by the extent U of simulated school participation. tn Since schools were not in session on the day of the esercise, school notification, and requests for an activation of school bus resources could not be evaluated.

Recomumendation The ca pabili t y to demonstrate the orderly evacuation of i schools should be fully tested when schools are in session or when sufficient school administrative staff are present.

Area Requiring Corrective Action Descriptions The extensively used F.1, C.4.b, 1.

telefax machine at the State EOC was 11.)

sometimes ove rloaded which prevented several hard copies of ERBS messages l Irom reaching the Media Center.

I i

Reconumenda t ion One or more addi-l tional hard-copy aransmission devices should be obtained for the State EOC to climinate delays in the trans-mission ut hard copies of messages.

I

TABLE 2 Remedial Actions for Seabrook Station Nuclear Power Plant (February 26, 1986)

Page 9 c1 75 FEMA-REP-1, Proposed Actual Deliciencies/ Areas Requiring Corrective FEMA Evaluation of Completion Rev. 1, State (S) and Local (L) Compl et ion Actions and RAC Recomumendation State and Local Response Date Element Proposed Corrective Actions Date for Corrective Action New Hampshire IFO Deficiencies

1.

Description:

The ability to meet the H.4, A.4 needs of the seven nonpar t ici pating H consnun i t ie s was not adequately demon- e strated at the IFO because of the lack of an adequate number of Local Liaison officers. The three Local Liaison officers who participated there as part of the State Compensatory Plan were al so listed in the State Plan as tilling other staf f positions for the second shift at the IFO or State EOC.

No roster was available in the Compes.-

satory Plan to demonstrate 24-hour staffing capability of Local Liaison officers for nonparticipating coassuni-ties.

Recomumendation The State should estimate the number of Local Liaison ulticers that would be required to handle the needs of the non pa rt ic i-pa t i ng comanun it ie s, and demonstrate that adequate staf fing of the IFO can be provided to carry out the functions of consnunit ies which do not or cannot respond in an emergency. The i dent i-lied Local Liaison officers should not tw part of the second shift at t he I FO or another facility.

TABLE 2 Remedial Actions for Seabrook Station Nuclear Power Plant (February 26, 1986)

Page 10 ol M FEMA-REP-1, Proposed Actual Deficiencies / Areas Requiring Corrective Completion Rev. 1, State (S) and Local (L) Ccapl et ion FEMA Evaluation of Actions and RAC Recoseendation Date State and Local Response Dat e for Corrective Action Element Proposed Corrective Actions

2. Descriptiont The number of telephone F.1.b lines in the IFO available f or use by the Local Liaison officers implement-ing the Compensatory Plan were insufficient to handle the potential g N

incoming and outgoing calls that would N be made during an emergency.

Recommendation t The State should conduct a st ud y to determine the optisusa nuseber of telephone lines that would be needed to handle incoming and outgoing calls to and f rom nonpartici-pating conununi t ie s. If it is determined that they are needed, the telephone lines should be installed and demonstrated at the next exercise.

Areas Requiring Corrective Action

1. Desc ri pt ion: The status board in the H.3 IFO was not updated rapidly enough and events were not kept in chronological order. This caused probl ems for the IFO staff in recognizing and responding to situations rapidly.

Necosamenda t i on: Creat e r at t ent inn should be paid to updat ing the st at us Imard in a more timely lashion and ensuring that events are post ed chronologically.

i I

TABLE 2 Remedial Actions for Seabrook Station Nuclear Power Plant (February 26, 1986) Page 11 of M Actual l

Proposed Completion FEMA-REP-1, FEMA Evaluat ion of Deficiencies / Areas Requiring Corrective State (S) and local (L) Completion Dat e Rev. 1, State and Local Response Actions and RAC Recomunendation Proposed Corrective Actions Date Element for Corrective Action At the IF0, the one F.I, C.4.b,

2. Desc ri pt ion N.3 telefaa machine which was available

- was often overloaded and therefore insufficient to handle the number of g hard-copy transmissions going to the N St at e EOC and the audia center. co One or more Recoasmendation additional telefaz machines should be obtained for use at the IFO to expedite the timely transmission of hard-copy messages.

Under the Compensatory E.5

3.

Description:

Plan, the IFO Local Liaison officers had responsibility for relaying and assuring the timeliness and accuracy of messages which were passing through the IFO among the State EOC, partici-community EOCs, and the pating resident s/of ficials of nonpartici-pa t i ng conununi t i es . These dut ies were not properly completed during the exercise.

1

, l

TABLE 2 Remedial Actions for Seabrook Station Nuclear Power Plant (February 26, 1986)

Page 12 of 75 Proposed Actual Deficiencies / Areas Requiring Corrective FEMA-REP-1, Completion FEMA Evaluat* ion of Completion Actions and RAC Recosamendation Rev. 1 State (S) and Local (L) State a'nd Local Response Date Element Proposed Corrective Actions Date for Corrective Action Recommendations Although the Local Liaison officers at the IFO do not have the responsibility of formulating and issuing ERBS/EBS messages, they should assume and execute the respon-H sibility of prompting the State EOC to N issue appropriate instructional mes-

• sages to the public to insure that transit-dependent residents of non-participating casununities are properly advised how to obtain transportation assistance (also see Section 2.1.6 of this report).

4. De sc ri pt ion: There was need for F.1 additional telephones at the IFO for use by the State Police, National Cuard, and the Coast Guard.

Recosamenda t i on

• Additional telephones should be obt ai ned for use by IFO st at f.

Radiological Health State EOC Deficiencies Nune.

Areas Requiring Corrective Action Nune.

TABLE 2 Remedial Actions for Seabrook Station Nuclear Power Plant (February 26, 1986)

Page 13 of 75 FEMA-REP-1, Proposed Actual Deficiencies / Areas Requiring Corrective FEMA Evaluatinn of Completion Rev. 1, State (S) and IAcal (L) Complet ion Actions and RAC Recommendation Date State and 1.ocal Nesponse Date for Corrective Action Element Proposed Corrective Actions New Hampshire EOF Deficiencies I. Desc ri pt ions The availability of K.3.a g

sulficient dosimeters for emergency workers designated in the all y

plan should be reviewed and additional equipment should be purchased as necessary. For example, the 0-20 R mid-range dosimeters indicated in the pl an were not available for field monitoring teams dispatched from the IF0/ EOF. Instead, they had 0-5 R dosimeters. This is not optimal.

Also, additional dosimeters would be needed to supply emergency workers deployed to the field from the Rockingham Staging Area, New Castle, Newfields, and Port sasut h EOCs, if all workers were required in any eme r ge nc y.

Recommendati on s The adequacy of current dosimeter supplies should be evaluated in comparison to emergency worker resource needs at each location from wh ic h emergency workers may be deploy 41 t o assignment s in the 10-mile

. . O e

. e o e-9 TABLE 2 Remedial Actions for Seabrook Station Nuclear Power Plant

( Fe brua ry 26, 1986)

Page 14 ul 15 iciencies/ Areas Requiring Corrective FEMA-REP-1, Proposed Actual Rev. 1, State (S) and Local (L) Complet ion FEMA Evaluat ion of Completion Actions and RAC Recosunendation Dat e for Corrective Action Element Proposed Corrective Actions Date State and Local Hespnnse EPZ. Additional dosimeters should be purchased if necessary or existing supplies of dosimeters should be redi st ribut ed based on emergency worker assignments specified in the Field teams should be provided g plan. W with CDV-715s, CDV-M2 a f u T @iva- w lent), and 0-200 R dosimeters for backup.

Areas Requiring Corrective Action

1. Descri pt ions The only available C.4.a telefax equipment was jointly used by the EOF and the IFO. In addition to experiencing some mechanical problems, the telefax machine was o f t en in use for transmitting to the media center and for receiving weather re po r t s .

Therefore, it was sometimes not available when IF0/ EOF staff wanted to use the telefan as a backup means of consnunic a t i on to t ransmi t technical data to the State EOC.

Recosamenda t i on s Additional telefan capabi li t y consistent with the ex pec t ed level of use at the IF0/ EOF should he in st alled.

m TABLE 2 Remedial Actions for Seabrook Station Nuclear Power Plant (February 26, 1986)

Page 15 al 75 Proposed Actual Deficiencies / Areas Requiring Corrective FEMA-REP-1, Complet ion FEMA Evaluat ion of Completion Actions and RAC Recosamendation Rev. 1, State (S) and Local (L) Date Proposed Corrective Actions Date State and I.ocal Response for Corrective Action Element

2. Desc riptions Although internal I.10 consuun ica t ions and information exchange between utility and State personnel at the EOF was generally excellent, there was a problem (based g on observations made at the IFO) esperienced by IFO personnel in y

obtaining some information from the ut ility at the EOF. Despite repeated requests, information on isotope composition in the plant stack releases was not provided by the EOF to the IFO until about two hours after the releases started around 1330. By this time the information was superfluous.

Rec - ndation: Since the stack flow rate could be variable, it is recosamended that specific information on the radionuclide concentrations and makeup of stack releases be prompt l y provided by the EOF to the IFO.

s . . .*

f 1

TABLE 2 k.:.sedial Actions for Seabrook Station Nuclear Power Plant (February 26, 1986)

Page 16 ut 75 FEMA-REP-1, Proposed Actual Deficiencies / Areas Requiring Corrective Completion Actions and RAC Recosusendation Rev. 1, State (S) and Local (L) Compl et ion FEMA Evaluation of Proposed Corrective Actions Date State and t.ocal Response Dat e for Corrective Action Element New Hampshire IFO Deficiencies None.

6*

u Area Requiring Corrective Action u

!. Desc ri pt ion When earl y field data 1.10 appeared to verify dose projections, further use of field teams for dose projection confirmation was minimal.

Recosamendationt More aggressive use should be made of field teams and fieli data for continued support of dose calculations.

2.

Description:

State field monitoring I.8 teams were not effectively utilized in tract.ing the plume and taking air samries. All three state teams were der 4oyed to the same location. One team was situated in the plume for sis minutes and was not inst ruct ed to take an air s am pl e. The a.2ence of air sample data was not questioned by the IFO dose assessor uneil it became apparent near the end of the esercise

TABLE 2 Remedial Actions for Seabrook Station Nuclear Power Plant (February 26, 1986)

Page 17 of 75 Proposed Actual Deficiencies / Areas Requiring Corrective FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 1, State (S) and IAcal (L) Compl et ion FEMA Evaluation of Completion Actions and RAC Recoasmendation Date State and I.ncal Restamse DAt e for Corrective Action Element Proposed Corrective Actions that releases were decreasing. Only one s ampl e was taken. Low but positive results should have been obtainable by all three NH DPHS field teams.

H W

Recommendation The State field teams should be trained to carry out com-plete monitoring procedures including air sampling before proceeding to a low background area for further instructions. Also, dose projection estimates and data should be supple-mented with aggressive use of field teams and field data.

Field Monitoring Teams Deficiencies None.

, e . e

, . . . e.

?

TABLE 2 Remedial Actions for Seabrook Station Nuclear Power Plant (February 26, 1986).

Page 18 at 75 Proposed Actual Deficiencies / Areas Requiring Corrective FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 1, State (S) and Local (L) Compl et ion FEMA Evaluation of Completion Actions and RAC Recosamendation for Corrective Action Element Proposed Corrective Actions Date State and Local Response Dat e Area Requiring Corrective Action

1. Descri ption: New Hampshire field 1.7, 1.8 monitoring teams arrived at the EOF and were provided with all of the g

types of equipment specified in the plan except a Ludlum-19 micro R meter, y and the equipment available for team No. 3, although adequate, differed from that identified in the plan.

Recosamendatien t The numbe r of field monitoring instruments and the availability of equipment for each of the field monitoring teams should be reviewed and checked for consistency with the inventory contained in the St at e Plan.

O

TABLE 2 Remedial Actions for Seabrook Station Nuclear Power Plant (February 26, 1986)

Page 19 ol' 15 Deficiencies / Areas Requiring Corrective FEMA-REP-1, Proposed Actual Rev. 1, St at e (S) and local (L) Compl et ion FEMA Evaluat ion of Completion Actions and RAC Recosasendation Date for Corrective Action Element Proposed Corrective Actions Date State and Local Response Field Implementation of the State's Ability to Satisfy Combined Participating and knparticipating Community Needs According to the Compensatory Plan g

Deficiencies u 0%

1. Desc ript ion Serious questions arose J.10.g at the exercise regarding the ability of the State to provide buses for transportation of special populations, including school children, mobil it y-impaired, and otherwise transit-de penden t populations. Driver resources were not sufficient to meet the transportati'no requirements.

Rec - ndations The State should review the availability of buses and drivers and develop adcquate backup resources and methods for recalling vehicles to make up the short f all that would exist for a range of emergency scenarios. A pool of reserve drivers should be developed.

TABLE 2 Remedial Actions for Seabrook Station Nuclear Power Plant (February 26, 1986)

Page 20 ol 75 Deficiencies / Areas Requiring Corrective FEMA-REP-1, Proposed Actual Rev. 1, State (S) and lmcal (I.) Complet ion FEMA Evaluation of Completion Actions and RAC Recomunendation Element Proposed Correctipe Actions Date State and Local Response Da t e for Corrective Action

2.

Description:

Several of the local J.10.g communities were unable to obt a i n , ,

through procedures specified in their local plan, the single prearranged bus called for to satisf y the esercise objectives. These communities g 4.a requested a bus f rom the State through "

the IFO. These actions by the local comununit ie s were consistent with the procedures called for in the Com-pensatory Plan.

Recomumendation The state should coordinate with local jurisdictions and bus companies to develop pro-cedures ensuring that prearranged buses actually can be provided to participating local jurisdictions in response to requests for bus trans-po rt at ion assistance made directly to bus companies from local EOCs. The procedures by which local EOCs request and receive bus resources directly should from bus companici be demonst rat ed at a future esercise.

I

TABLE 2 Remedial Actions for Seabrook Station Nuclear Power Plant (February 26, 1986)

Page 21 ol 75 Deficiencies / Areas Requiring Corrective FEMA-REP-1, Proposed Actual Rev. 1 State (S) and local (L) Completion FEMA Evaluation of Completion Actions and RAC Recommendation Date for Corrective Action Element Proposed Corrective Actions Date State and Local Response

3. De sc ri pt ion: The c-nities that J.10.g failed to receive a bus did not place an additional request for buses to the IFO. The State was, therefore, not fully auare of the entent of the problem with delivery of buses to Ul Co part icipat ing comanunit ies.

Recommendation: The State and local comanunities should consistently impl emen t procedures for coniirming the arrival of transportation resources at local EOCs and the evacuation of people dependent upon these resources.

4. Descript f on Bus drivers consistently J.10 3 em pe r ienced problems in getting to where they would have been needed.

They were unfamiliar with alternate

• routes and experienced difficulties because of the poor qual it y of phutocopied maps. One of the bus drivers made wrong turns and required prompt ing to eneplete his route. One ut the buses that arrived at the Rockingham County Dispatch Center was unable to continue because it was low on fuel. Some at the evacuat ion and other bus rout e maps d i s t r ibut ed at

, e ,s. .

9 TABLE 2 Remedial Actions for Seabrook Station Nuclear Power Plant

( Fe brua ry 26, 1986)

Page 22 of 75 Deficiencies / Areas Requiring Corrective FEMA-REP-1, Proposed Actual Rev. 1, State (S) and Local (L) Completion FEMA Evaluation of Completion Actions and RAC Recoassendation Dat e for Correct (ve Action Element Proposed Corrective Actions Date State an,f 1.ocal Response the Rockingham County Staging Area were il legi bl e, some provided insufficient detail to specify the route clearly, and some did not include adequate addresses for the g

locations at which evacuees were to be te) picked up.

Recosamendat ion it The State should review the State Compensatory Plan to ensure that reserve buses and drivers are available to replace buses that do not arrive or cannot continue after arrival.

Recmdation 23 Maps of the routes from the points of origin of buses to the Rockingham County Staging Area shoutd be made avaiIable ta the drivers of buses that are to be staged at the Rockingham County Staging Area.

c

_ _____m

TARLE 2 Remedial Actions for Seabrook Station Nuclear Power Plant (February 26, 1986)

Page 23 of 75 Deficiencies / Areas Requiring Corrective FEMA-REP-1, Proposed Actual Rev. I, State (S) and Local (L) Compl et ion FEMA Evaluation of Completion Actions and RAC Recommendation State and Local Respunse Dat e for Corrective Action Element Proposed Corrective Actions Date Rec - dation 3t Evacuation route bus drivers should receive additional training in running evacuation bus routes originating from the Rockingham County Staging Area.

H' Recommendation 4: The l egibil i t y, g

level of detail, and address information on maps of bus routes from the Rockingham County Staging Area to local staging areas of the c - nity pickup and evacuation bus routes should be improved to provide adequate guidance to bus drivers and guides.

5. Desc ri ption: The two bus drivers of K.3.a Timberlane Rus Company who were interviewed at the Seabrook EOC (where they had mistakenly arrived - see Sec.

2.2.9) stated that they had not been trained in the use of dosimetry.

TABLE 2 Remedial Actions for Seabrook Station Nuclear Power Plant (February 26, 1986)

Page 24 of 75' Deficiencies / Areas Requiring Corrective FEMA-REP-1, Proposed Actual Rev. 1 State'(S) and local (L) Compl et ion FEMA Evaluation of Completion Actions and RAC Recomunendation Dat e for Corrective Action Element Proposed Corrective Actions Date State and Local Response Rec tient Dosimetry and a person trained in its use must be provided for each bus.

= .

6. Desc ri ption The State Compensatory A.l.a.

Plan was not adequat el y prepared for A.I.b g e

two of the seven nonparticipating comununit ie s: Emeter and North Hampton, which on the day before the exercise, voted not to participate in the esercise. Bus route maps and narrative desc ri pt ions 01 bus routes also were not available for the participating c - nities of Brentwood, Creenland, Kingston, East Kingston, New Castle, Newfields, Newt on , Po r t smou t h , St rat ham, or

'Seabrook.

Recosamendat ion s The State Compensa-tory Plan should be revised to anticipate the nonparticipation of any of the local jurisdictions in the Seabrook Plume EPZ.

d TARLE 2 Remedial Actions for Seabrook Station Nuclear Power Plant (February 26, 1986)

Page 25 of 75 Proposed Actual Deficiencies / Areas Requiring Corrective FEMA-REP-1, State (S) and local (L) Compl et ion FEMA Evaluat ion of Completion

. Actions and RAC Receamendation Rev. 1 ,

Proposed Corrective Actians Date State and I,ocal Response flat e for Carrective Action Element l 7. De sc ri pt. ion A supply of ambulances J.10.d, sufficient to meet the transportation J.10.g needs of special-needs persons could not be dispatched through the IFO.

Although the St at e Compensatory Plan g

allowed for prestaging and Jaspatch o' &

ambula nc e s from the Rockingham County r4 5tagista Area, the State did not use or demovestrate this procedure.

Rec e dations The State, in eensultation with the local jurisdic-tions. should conduct .i s t a.J y to determine the demand for setnelances and specially-equipped vans to be used for evacuation in muc h t i.e same way that it should estimate bus needs.

The s' aging and dispatch of antaulances from the Rockingham Cous.t y Staging Area shosId f.e elemonstrated at the next esercise to ens

• ire that, aander the provisions of the State Com-pensatt,ry Plan, the State can evacuate persens who require ambulances and special vasis.

Areas Requiring Corrective Action YOU.

. $ . e

. ...m , - . . , , ,s .

. 4_

-e e , ,

4 Tart.E 2 Remedial Actsons for Seekrook Station lisclear Pdmer Plant (ret >ruary 26, 1986)

Page 26 of 75 Proposed Actual Deficiencies / Areas Pequiring Corrective FFNA-R EP-1, Completion kev. 1, State (S) and 14 cal (L) Completion FEMA Evaluation of Actions and RAC Eecoassendation laat e for Corrective Action Element Proposed Corrective Actions Date State and Local Response State Police Access Cetrol-Deficiency

1. lae sc ri pt ient State Police Troop A A.4, J.10 )

e alone have sufficient does not personnel to control access to the $

entire 10-mile EPE perimeter. During a the caercise it was determined that 44 State Police c,fficers would be required to staff all access control points. This would have enhausted the Stat e Police Troop A tesources of the j day shift and some of the night shift.

Even witte help f rom other troops, the force could be seriously depleted and law enf orcement possibly sepaired.

Recesusendatien t Plans for the stalling of access control points should be reviewed and revised as necessary to include arrangements for obtaining supplementary staffing resources in a timely manner without using second shift personnel on the first shift.

_. ._ m _ _ - . - _ _ _ . . _ _ _

'l TARLE 2 Remedial Actions for Seabrnak Station Nuclear Power Plant (February 26, 1986)

Page 27 of 75 Proposed Ac t ual Deliciencies/ Areas Requiring Corrective FEMA-REP-1, Completion Actions and RAC Recommendation Rev. 1, State (S) and local (L) Compl et ion FEMA Evaluarion of Proposed Corrective Actions Date State and I.ocal Response Date for Corrective Action Element Areas Regesiring Corrective Action

1.

Description:

During the esercise J.10.j,F.1 there were some problems with breakup of radio communications between State g

Police troopers and the IFO. n V

Reco h tion: The adequacy of the State Police communications between the IFO and the State Police of ficers etationed at access and traffic control points in the EPZ should be studied and improved.

2. Desc ript ion: State Police troopers J.10.a.

indicated that better maps were J.10.j needed, especially for troopers who are not f amiliar with the area.

Receamendaties: Retter maps should be prepared and made available for t roopers not f amiliar with the area to ensure prompt staf fing of access and traffic control points.

e .. . .

TABLE 2 Remedial Actions for Seabrook Station leuclear Power Plant (February 26, 1986)

Page 2R of M PEMA-REP-1, Proposed Actual Deficiencies / Areas Requiring Corrective FEMA Evaluation of Completiese Rev. 1 State (S) and local (L) Completion Actions and RAC Reconnendation Dat e Element Proposed Corrective Actions Date St ate 4 4 Local Response for Corrective Action tendia Belatione Deficiency

1. Desc ri pt ion Lack of coordination C.4.s g

between the media center and the State &

EOC led to confusing and conflicting w instructions f or the public and caused a credibility problem with the media.

There was also a wrong telephone number given in an ERES message for ,

persons with special needs to call. "

This same wrong telephone number also appears in the public information brochure.

Recommendation: One telefan machine at the State EOC is not sufficient for all the hard-copy needs. Inst allation of a second telefan machine that would be dedicated for media and ERRS use should be considered. Releases to ERBS should be coordinated with releases to the Media Center so that teth news sources have the same in f o rmat ion at the same time. Also, the Covernor's aide at the State EOC command table should coordinate with

-- . . _ - . - --. ~ . . ._ .

TABLE 2 Remedial Actions for Seabrook Station Nuclear Power Plant (February 26, 1986)

Page 29 of 75 FEMA-REP-1, Proposed Actual Deficiencies / Areas Requiring Corrective completion Bev. 1 State (S) and I,ocal (L) Completion FEMA Evaluation of Actions and RAC Recosssendation Date for Corrective Action Element Proposed Corrective Actions Date State and f.ocal Resgense the Covernor's aide in the Media Center, especially before an ERBS message release and coincident brieling at the Media Center. The validity of all telephone numbers ,

referenced in ER8S messages should be ,

H k

verified. m Areas Requiring Corrective Action

1. Desc riptient A large map of the plume C.4.s EPZ was not available until midway through the exercise and when it became available it was not used ef fectively by the State spokesperson to demonstrate the protective actions l

I that were under way.

Rec - Jatient A map of the plume I - EPZ should be readily available at the hedia Center and State spokespersons should be trained in the use of this

1. map to better c -nicate the content and locations of protective action i

recommendations.

s TABLE 2 Remedial Actions for Seabrook Station Nuclear Power Plant (February 26, 1986)

Page 30 of M Deficiencies / Areas Requiring Corrective FEMA-REF*l, Proposed Actual Rev. I, State (S) and Local (L) Completion FEMA Evaluation of Completion Actions and RAC Recoassendation Date for Corrective Action Element Proposed Corrective Actions Date State and Local Response

2. Descriptioet While the Covernor's C.4.a, 0.1 Press Sec re ta ry at the Media Center demonstrated overalt knowledge and capability as chief spokesperson for the State, there were occasions when and/or g additional pre pa ra t ion e information would have improved his u effectiveness. This was es pecially true when questions arose during media briefings on the evacuated ypulation figures.

Recommendatians Additional training should be provided to the Covernor's Press Secretary and/or information flow procedures reviewed and improved in order to improve the effectiveness of the Covernor's Press Secretary.

The increased participation by the I iniCD PIO in meJia briefings would help to support and supplement the i information provided by the Covernor's Press Secretary, i

1 1-TABLE 2 Remedial Actions for Seabrook Station bluclear Power Plant (February 26, 1986) '

Page 31 of 75 Deficiencies / Areas Requiring Corrective FEMA-REP-1, Proposed Actual Rev. 1 State (S) and local (L) Completion FEMA Evaluation of Completion Actions and RAC Recoassendation Proposed corrective Actions Date State and t.ocal Response Date for corrective Action Element

3. Descriptions The State PIO early in C.4.s the esercise incorrectly informed the media that nonparticipating towns were in fact participating which caused a credibility problem.

H Rec - datlans The PIO staff at the ,k State EOC should be trained to insure that the correct information is avail-able to the PIO who is responsible for briefing the media.

1

4. Desc ription Although the rumor C.4.c P.4 control system demonstrated during the exercise at the Media Center worked well, it is not the system described in the State Plan.

Recommendations if it is intended to pe rmanentl y use the rumor control system demonstrated during the esercise, the plan should be revised to describe this system.

Reception Center, Mass Care and Decontaminalion a

b e .

1 e

TABLE 2 Remedial Actions for Seabrook Station Nuclear Power Plant

( Fe brua ry 26, 1986)

Page 31a of 75 L

Deficiencies / Areas Requiring Corrective FEMA-REP-1, Proposed Actual Actions and RAC Recosamendation Rev. 1, State (S) and Local (L) Cooplet ion FEMA Evaluation of Completion for Corrective Action Ele ,ent Proposed Corrective Actions Date State and Local Response Date Deficiency J.12

1. Desc ri ption: only about 750 to 1200 people could be monitored in the first 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> with the staff assigned by the plan. y co lhe Manchester plan indicates that Manchester would serve as host to communities with a resident and transient population of 25,857. Even if only 20% of this population (5,171) arrived at the reception center, the plan, procedures, and staf fing levels demonstrated at the esercise would not be sufficient to monitor these evacuees within about a 12 hour1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> period as specified in FEMA-REP-1 planning standard element J.12.

Recommendatient It is recommended that the pl an be revised to provide sufficient trained staff to ensure ca pabili t y to monitor the expected number of evacuees at the reception cent er wit hin a 12-hour period.

-- m 148b

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1 I

(

I i

e i

\

TABLE 2 Remedial Actions for Seabrook Station Nuclear Power Plant (February 26, 1986)

Page 32 of M Proposed Actual Deficiencies / Areas Requiring Corrective FEMA-REP-1 Completion Rev. 1, State (S) and Local (L) Compl et ion FEMA Evaluation of Actions and RAC Recosamendation State and Local Response Date Element Proposed Corrective Actions Date for Corrective Action Areas Sequiring Corrective Action

1. Desc ript ion: The Red Cross liaison A.I.b, E.2 person at the Manchester reception center arrived late and did not p ,

interact with the manager. ,

Rec - h tion: Staffing and operating procedures should be reviewed and, if necessary, revised to ensure timely arrival of the Red Cross representative and required inter-action with the manager. .

2. Desc ript ion: The reception center A.l.b, D.3 manager was not always kept up to date on emergency classification levels and the changing situation.

Recosamendation: A radio tuned to the ERBS station should be available and the IFO shoul d be in touch with the recept ion center manager by telephone or ARES with periodic updates.

G TABLE 2 Remedial Actions for Seabrook Station Nuclear Power Plant (February 26, 1986)

Page 31 of 75 Deficiencies / Areas Requiring Corrective FEMA-REP-1, Proposed Actual Rev. I, State (S) and local (L) Complet ion FEMA Evaluat ion of Completion Actions and RAC Recoasmendation Proposed Corrective Actions Date State and Local Response Date for Corrective Action Element

3. Descriptions The Manchester local K.5.a. P.4 pl an suggests one inch per second movement of the detector survey probe.

The State plan specifies three inches per second.

H Recosamenda tion The Mancheater plan y

shoutd be changed ta conform to the State plan. This will help to avoid unnecessarily long lines at the decontamination center.

Rockingham County EDC and Staging Area Deticiencies

1. De sc ri pt ion It was observed that K.3.s, K.3.b because of the late arrival (1118) of dosimeters from the IFO in Newington, the first bus driver to be dispatched was not issued dosimetry. The first bus was dispatched to Winnecunnet High School in Hampton at !!08.

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.. s TABLE 2^ Remedial Actions los *eabrdok Station Nuclear Powir Plant i 1 O~

^

. (February 26, 1986) h A

JL _* ,M

't-Deficiencies / Areas Requiring Correct ive FEMA-REP-l. ,

Proposed g Actual Ac tions and RAC Recommendation Rev. 1, State-(S) and Local (L) Compl et ion FEHA F, val (dation of Completion for Corrective Action Element Proposed carrective Actions Date State anO Idal Response i ' ' Dat e s . , g. , ,

A Dosimetry should be +-

f ' ,.,,

Recommendatient "a provided to all evacuation route bus drivers. It is recoassended that a

• review of the procedure of keeping the '

dosimeter supplies and equipment in Keeping g Newington be conducted. .

4 < u equipuent and suppliea at the

. Rockingham County Sheriff's Office la? '

would eliminate this problem. \' ,

s . ,

a

2. De scri pt ions One of the eight buses J.10.g

• 1 that arrived and was logged in was 1 sent back because it was low on fuel - ,

• ~

and the Dispatch Center chose not to ,

[

refuel it although the State Resources Cuordinator had made arrangements f or N l' the fueling. The Rockingham County

• Staging Area was only able to provide gasoline fuel and was not equipped to .

provide diesel fuel.

7 ,

4 *

, a

's Recomusendatient The State sh$uld '

- ensure that buses that arrive at'the I Hockingham Count y Staging Area c'en be , ,,

provided with sufficient fueli to '

complete their routes. i-

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,k

TABLE 2 Remedial Actions for Seabrook Station Nuclear Power Plant (February 26, 1986)

FEMA-REP-1, Proposed Actual Deficiencies / Areas Requiring Corrective FEMA Evaluation of Completion Rev. 1, State (S) and local (L) Cornpl et ion Actions and RAC Recomumendation Date State and Local Response Dat e for Corrective Action Element Proposed Corrective Actions

3. Desc ri ption Hape arrived at the RCDC J.10.a with the dosimeters (see Def. 1), so the first bus was dispatched without a map.

g Recomumendati on Maps should be stored at the Rockingham County Sheriff's '

y Office.

4. De sc ri pt ion Only one bus guide A.2.a.

arrived at the Rockingham County J.10.g staging area during the esercise and a roster of bus guides was not avail-able. 1herefore, it could not be determined whether a sufficient number of trained guides would be available.

Recosamendat ion The State should demonstrate comuni t ment s from an adequate number of bus guides and show

' evidence that those guiden have been adequat ely t rained to carry out their emergency assignments. There should i

be a guide for each bus or group of buses going to the same destination.

. . 4 e

TABLE 2 Remedial Actions for Seabrook Station Nuclear Power Plant (February 26, 1986)

Page 36 of 75 Proposed Actual Deficiencies / Areas Requiring Corrective FEMA-REP-1, Completion Rev. 1 State (S) and Local (L) Completion FEMA Evaluation of Actions and RAC Recoassendation State and Local Response Date for Corrective Action Element Proposed Corrective Actions Date Areas Requiring Corrective Action

1. Description Comununicat ions to the F.1.d Rockingham County staging area from g

the State EOC or IFO were received at tn the Sheriff's Office communications center and then delivered to the bus dispatcher by runner. This added use of the Sherif f's means of comununica-tion could potentially conflict with normal consnunications needs of the Sheriff's Office.

Recommendetion: Consideration should be given to providing a se pa ra te direct communications link between the IFO and RCDC facilities to eliminate possible conflicts with law enforce-ment needs f or the Sherif f 's radio.

Y

TABLE 2 Remedial Actions for Seabrook Station Nuclear Power Plant (February 26, 1986) Page 37 of M Proposed Actual Deficiencies / Areas Requiring Corrective FEMA-REP-1, Completion State (S) and Local (L) Completion FEMA Evaluation of Actions and RAC Secosamendation Rev. 1 State and Local Response Date Proposed Corrective Actions Date for Corrective Action Element NEW HAMPSHIRE lACAL SOCS Brentwood EDC Deficiency H H.3, E.6,

[

1. Descript ion The adequacy of the three available telephone lines for J.10.d handling regular EOC coannunic at ions s.hil e concurrently receiving calls from transit-dependent persons requesting transportation assistance was not auf ficiently demonstrated at the Brentwood EOC.

Rec % tion A study should be '

i conducted to determine the number of telephone lines required to handle ,

both regular EOC comanunications and telephone calls f rom t ransit-dependent persons requesti,ng transportation '

i assistance.

. ,m_ _

TABLE 2 Itenedial Actions for Seabrook Station Nuclear Power Plant (February 26, 1986)

Page 38 of F5 FEMA-REP-1, Propcaed Actual Deficiencies / Areas Requiring Corrective Completion Rev. I, State (S) and local (L) Comp'. et ion FEMA Evaluation of Actions and RAC Recoaumendation State and Local Response Dat e for Corrective Action Element Proposed Corrective Actions 9 ate Areas Requiring Corrective Action

1. Descri pt ion: The Brentwood EOC is H.3 small and cramped, and lacked turni-ture; most of staff members were required to stand for estended u periods. These problems reduced the

• efficiency and effectiveness of the staff.

Rec m dation It The EOC should be upgraded by providing additional space so that staff members can operate in a more efficient and effective manner.

Recosamendation 2: The EOC should be upgraded by providing additional furniture so that the staff can operate in a more elficient and effective manner. ,

2. Descript ion: Maps showing relocation J.10.a, centers and population by evacuation J.10.b area were available but were not .

posted at the Brentwood EOC.

Recommendation: Maps showing reloca-tion centers and population by evacus-tion area should be posted so as to be vi s i bl e to staff in the operations area ni the Brentwood EOC.

TABLE 2 Remedial Actions for Seabrook Station Nuclear Power Plant (February 26, 1986)

Page 39 of 75 Deficiencies / Areas Requiring Corrective FEMA-REP-1, Proposed Actual Actions and RAC Recosamendation Rev. 1, State (S) and Local (L) Completion FEMA Evaluation of Completion for Corrective Action Element Proposed corrective Actions Date State and I.ocal Response Dat e

3. Descri pt ioet At about 1547, the State F.I Liaison Officer contacted the EOC requesting the EOC to maintain contact with the Manchester Reception Center.

The EOC attempted to contact the g

Reception Center via the Civil Defense radio and was informed that radio y contact with the Reception Center was not possible on the Civil Defense radio.

Recommendaties: The status of the coassunications links, if any, between the Brentwood EOC and the Manche st er .

Reception Center should be determined ,

and all organizations made aware of their status.

4. Description When the Civil Defense E.6 Director realized that the simulated instructional E8S messates had not informed transit-dependent persons in Brentwood of the vehicles being provided for their evacuation, he ordered that a message directing t ran si t-de pendent persons t o call the Brentwood EOC be broadcast (simulated) over the Brentwood public address /

siren sy st em. The simulated message

a .

TABLE 2 tenedial Actions for Seabrook Station Nuclear Power Plant (February 26, 1986)

Page 40 of 75 Deficiencies / Areas Requiring Corrective FEMA-REP-l. Proposed Actual

.Rev. 1, State (S) and local (L) Complet ion FEMA Evaluation of Completion Actions and RAC Recommendation Element Proposed Corrective Actions Date State and Local Response Date for Corrective Action should have been preceded by a j

sounding of the siren alert system, alerting people to the subsequent '

instructional me s s'ag e. In addition, the procedure demonst rated during the esercise is not specified in the plan.

s ta N

Recommendations The Brentwood plan and procedures should be amended to allow for the broadcast of in st ruc-tional messages over the local public address / siren system after coordina-tion with the IFO in situations in uhich the State's EBS messages are either incomplete or not broadcast until af ter the Brentwood sirens have been sounded.

I

)

5.

Description:

There has been a lack of J.10.g, ,

roordination with the Rockingham J.10.i County Comptes concerning the t raf fic volume anticipated when the County j Comptes is used as a staging area in l

the event of a radiological emergency.

Recommendation Brentwood shouId coordinate with the Stat e and Rocking-ham Count y to det ermi ne the antici-pated traffic volume attributable to the staging area at the Rockingham

< County Cumptes.

TARLE 2 Remedial Actions for Seabrook Station Nuclear Power Plant (February 26, 1986)

Page 41 of 75 Proposed Actual Deficiencies / Areas Requiring Corrective FEMA-REP-1 Completion Rev. 1, State (S) and Local (L) Completion JEMA Evaluation of Actions and RAC Recommendation State and Local f(esponse Date for Corrective Action Element Proposed Corrective Actions Date

6. Descri pt ion: The Rockingham County J.10.g Nursing Home is within the trentwood town limits. According to exercise participants, this special facility has its own emergency preparedness g

plan which does not require participa- t.n tion by Brentwood. However, the local oo plan does not mention the existence of this special f acility.

Recommendations The plan should recognize the esistence of the nursing home and account for the potential ,

impact s of the implementation of the home's plan on Brentwood's emergency response activities.

7. Desc ription: The Civil Defense J.10.d.

Director reviewed the s pecial-needs J.10 3 requirements with the Transportation Coordinator and determined that thirteen persons required special

' medical transportation. However, according to the local plan there are no known special-needs persons in Brentwood.

Recommendation: The local plan should t be amended to indicate that an up-t o-date list of special-needs persons is maintained at the Brentwood EOC.

, e . .

TAmt.E 2 Remedial Actions for Seabrook Station Nuclear Power Plant (February 26, 1986)

Page 42 of M Proposed. Actual Deficiencies / Areas Requiring Corrective FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 1, State (S) and Local (L) Compl et ion FEMA Evaluation of Completion Actions and RAC Recosumendation State and Local Response Dat e for corrective Action Element Proposed Corrective Actions Date

8. Descri ption: The Brentwood EOC staf f J.10.d.

requested transportation for special- J.10 3 needs persons from the IFO and took reasonable actions to provide make-shift transportation on their own.

g The State took ove r one hour to La confirm that vans to evacuate persons confined to wheelchairs could be made available. Brentwood had to use its modified, makeshift Town recreational

. bus (simulated) for stretcher-bound persons.

Recommendations Brentwood must coordinate with the State to ensure that adequate t rans port at ion, specifically designed for all classes of special-needs persons can be made available in a timely manner.

m . _ _ . .. . _ . _ _ - _

TABLE 2 Remedial Actions for Seabrook Station Nuclear Power Plant (February 26, 1986)

Page 43 al 75 Deficiencies / Areas Requiring Corrective FEMA-REP-1, Proposed Actual Rev. 1, State (S) and Local (L) Completion FEMA Evaluation of Completion Actions and RAC Recoaumendation Date for Corrective Action Element Proposed Corrective Actions Date State and Local Response Creenland ROC Deficiencies

-1. Description The adequacy of H.3, E.6, g

available telephone lines for handling J.10.4 m regular EOC comununicat ions while o I concurrently receiving call s from t ransi t-de pendent persons requesting transportation was not sufficiently demonstrated. .

Recesumendaties: A study should be conducted to determine the number of telephone lines required to concur-rently handle both regular EOC comusunicat ions and the receipt of telephone calls from transit-dependent persons requesting transportation assistance.

2. Desc ript ion: The mid-range (0-20 R) K.3.a dosimeters specified in the plan were not available at the Creenland EOC.

Rece M ation: Mid-range (0-20 R) dosimeters should be procured and made available at the Creenland EOC.

e 8 e s

TABLE 2 Remedial Actions for Seabrook Station Nuclear Power Plant (February 26, 1986)

, Page 44 of 75 Proposed Actual Deficiencies / Areas Requiring Corrective FEMA-REP-1, Completion Rev. 1, State (S) and local (L) Completion FEMA Evaluation of Actions and RAC Recommendation Date State and Local Response Dat e for Corrective Action Element Proposed Corrective Actions Areas Requiring Corrective Action

1. Descri ption: Maps showing relocation J.10.a.

centers and population by evacuation J.10.b area were not posted in the Creenland e EOC but were available in the plan. cm W

Recosamendatient Maps showing relocation centers and population by evacuation area should be posted in the operations room at the Creenland EOC.

2. Descriptions There was a list of ten J.10.d special-needs people available at the Creenland EOC. According to the local plan, there is no known special-needs population in Creenland.

Recommmendations The plan should be amended to specify the act ual situa-tion that a confidential list of special-needs persons and their special needs is available at the Creenland EOC.

s TABl.E 2 Remedial Actions for Seabrook Station Nuclear Power Plant (February 26, 1986)

Page 45 of M Deficiencies / Areas Requiring Corrective FEMA-REP-1, Proposed Actual Rev. 1, , State (S) and Imcel (L) Compl et ion FEMA Evaluation of Cumpletion Actions and RAC Recommendation Date for Corrective Action Element Proposed Corrective Actions Date State and 1.ocal Response Kingston EOC Deficiencies

1. Descript ion: Adequacy of the single H.3, J.10.d g

telephone line in the Kingston EOC for handling regular EOC communications $

uhile c oncurrentl y receiving calls from transit-dependent persons requesting transportation assistance was not sufficiently demonstrated.

Even with the espected installation of three additional lines within the nest three months, the adequacy of avail-able telephone lines for handling both these activities concurrently remains to be demonstrated.

Receamendation A study shoul d be ca.ad uc t ed to determine the number of telephone lines required to handle both regular EOC communications and the recei pt of telephone calls from t ran si t-de pendent persons requesting transportation assistance.

I i

4 4 9 9 e

l TABLE 2 Remedial Actions for Seabrook Station h ciear Pouer Plant (February 26, 1986)

Page % ul 75 Deficiencies / Areas Requiring Corrective FEstA-REP-1, Proposed Actual kev. 1, State (S) and local (L) Complet ion FEMA Evaluation of Completion Actions and RAC Recommendation for Corrective Action Element Proposed Corrective Actions Date State and I.ocal Response flit e

2. Seecription: The midrange (0-20 R) K.3.a.

dosimeters specified in the local plan K.3.b uere not available at the Kingst on EOC.

Recommendation: The midrange (0-20 R) g e

dosimeters specified in the local plan should be procured and made available at the Kingston EOC.

3. Descri pties: The supply of thirty K.3.a.

dosametry kit s appeared adequate, but K.3.b if too many emergency workers, such as

• bus guides were to arrive at the EOC, there might not be enough dosimetry hits.

Rec h aties: The masimum number of dosimetry hits .needed should be determined, if more dosimeters are needed either they should be obtained or a determination should be made that the current supply can be made adequate by limiting the number of hits issued at the EOC while ensuring adequate monitoring of all areas.

TABLE 2 Remedial Actions for Seabrook Station 18eclear Power Plant (February 26, 1986)

Page 47 of FS Proposed Actual Deficiencies / Areas Requiring Corrective FEsta-REP-1 FEMA Evaluation el Completion Bew. 1, State (S) and I.acal (L) Completion Actions and RAC Recommendation State and Local Response Dat e for Corrective Action Element Proposed Corrective Actions Date

4. Seecri ptient The Kingston EOC staf f K.3.b failed to read their dos imet er s and record readings on their record forms.

Receaumendetien 1: EOC ataff aboutd be e

trained to read their dosimeters ~

regularly.

Secommendation 2: EOC staff should be trained to record their dosimeter readings en the dosimeter record forms.

5. Desc ripties: A roster of bus guides J.10.d, 31 uns not available at the . Kingston K.3.a. b EOC. The adequacy of guides affects both the evacuation of schools and the evacuation of transit-dependent populat ion s. Without the roster, the adequacy of the provisions for these vital evacuation functions could not be assessed.

Rec h tient An up-to-date roster el bus guides should be maintained at the Kingst on EOC.

a a e e e TABLE 2 Remedial Actions for Seabrook Station Nuclear Power Plant (February 26, 1986)

Page 48 of PS FEMA-REP-1, troposed Actual Deliciencies/ Areas Requiring Corrective completion Rev. le State (S) and local (L) Completion FEMA Evaluation of Actions and RAC Recommendation Dat e for Corrective Action Element Proposed Corrective Actions Date State and I.ocal Response

6. teocriptient The dis pat ch of one J.10.g actual bus was requested by the Kingston EDC. This bus never arrived at the Kingston EOC. Rased on message forms available at the IFO, Kingston did not contact the IFO to clarify the e

situation and request another bus.

Becommendation: The Eig s t on EOC stafI smould be trained to repeat requests to the State for buses and other t rans port at ion assistance, if these resources do not arrive at the tDC within a reasonable time.

F. anacript ion: Parent s of children in J.10.g the day care centers were contacted by telephone (sinulated) and requested to pick up their children. This proced-ure is inadequate and contrary to the plan. All parents night not be avail-able. Although the plan provides for a request for t rans port at ion assist-ance from the State in the event that

~

the planned local resources are insuf-licient, parents are never mentioned as providing a means of evacuating day care centers.

1 s

TABLE 2 Benedial Actions for Seabrook Station Isuclear Pouer Plant (February 26. 1946)

Page 49 of 75 Proposed Actual Deficiencies / Areas Sequiring Corrective FDGA-REP-1, Completion Rev. I, State (S) and Local (L) Completion TEMA Evaluation of Actions and EAC Reccamendation Date Element Proposed Corrective Actions Date State and Local Response for Corrective Action Reconnendation 13 The evacuation of day care centers'should be carried out in accordance with the procedures established in the local plan.

e Areas Seguiring Corrective Action m

1.

Description:

Maps showing evacuation J.10.a.

routes, relocation centers, and J.10.b population by evacuation area, although available, were not posted in the Kingston EOC.

Rec h atient Maps showing evacuation routes, relocation centers, and population by evacuation area should be posted.

I i

.e e e . .

TABLE 2 Remedial Actions for Seabrook Station Nuclear Power Plant (February 26, 1986)

Page SO of 75 Proposed Actual Deficiencies / Areas Requi ring Corrective FEMA-SEP-1, State (S) and local (L) Compl et ion FEMA Evaluation of Cumpletiuse Actions and RAC Recommendation Rev. 1 Proposed Corrective Actions Date State and I.ucal Response Date for Corrective Action Element

2. Descriptient The Director of IIursing J.10.d Services at the Kingston EOC had a list of special-needs persons.

However, the plan states that there is no knoun special-needs population in g Kingston. m N

Seceamendatient The plan should he updated to reflect the actual situation with respect to the -

esistence of special-needs persons in Kingston. .

East Kingston MC Deficiencies

1. Desc ri pt ient The adequacy of H , 11.3, E.6, availalte telephone lines for handling J.10.d regular EOC operations conc ur rent ly with calls from transit-dependent populations requesting transportation was put sufficiently denunstrated.

Reconnendatient A study should be carried out at the East Kingst on EOC to determine the number of tele Aane lines req.eird to handle both of these

• bisuls og act swities.

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TARI.E 2 Remedial Actions for Seabrook Station Nuclear Power Plant (February 26, 1986)

Page 52 of 15 Deficiencies / Areas Requiring Corrective PEle4-REP-l , Proposed Actual Actions and RAC Recommendation Rev. 1 State (5) and local (L) Completion FEMA Evaluation of Casplation Element Proposed Corrective Actions At e State and I. oral Response Dat e for Corrective Action

2. Smocri pt ient Ilessages were recorded E.5 on preprinted torms, but procedures were not well defined for routing and handling of the messages among EOC staff.

H m

Receamendatient Procedures for the e routing and handling of messages should be developed, implemented, and documented in the East Kingston local plan.

3. Descripties: Personnel entering the K.S.a ** '

East Kingston EOC subsequent to the order for in place sheltering were not munitured for contamination.

Rec - d-tion: A radiological munitoring survey should be done to all personnel entering the East Kingst on EOC while a sheltering or evacuation order is in place. .

4. Desc ript ion: Special-needs persons J.10.4 have been identified. Inf ormat ion en the address and special need of each individual are available and stored in a comptuer. According to the local pl an , there is no known special-needs geputat ion in East Kingston.

l TABLE 2 Ramedial Actions for Seabrock Station Nuclear Power Plant (February 26, 1986)

Page 53 of 15 Proposed Actual Deficiencies / Areas Sequiring Corrective FEftA-SEP-1 FEMA Evaluation of Completion Rev. I, State (S) and IAcal (L) Completion Actions and RAC Recommendation State and I.ocal Respecse Dat e for Corrective Action Element Proposed Corrective Actions Date 5ecomendatient The plan should be amended to specify the actual situa-tion that a confidential list of special-needs persons and their special needs is available at the East W

Kingston EOC. N O.

IIew Castle EOC Deficiency

1. Desc ri pt ient The adequacy of H.3, E.6, available telephone lines for handling J.lo.d regular EOC coanunic at ions while concurrently receiving calls from t ransi t-de pendent persons requesting .

transportation was not sufficiently demonstrated.

Beceammendat ient " A study should be conduc t ed to determins the number of telephone lines required to handle bot h regular EOC communic at ions and telephone requests for transportation -

as si st ance from transit-dependent persons. ,

e

• e e

d - * , , ,

TAGLE 2 Remedial Actions for Seabreak Station leuclear Power Plant (February 26, 1986)

Page 54 ol 7%

FEseA-aEP-1, Proposed Actual Deficiencies / Areas Requiring Corrective Completium Rev. 1 State (5) and Iscal (L) Complet ion FTJeA Evaluat ion of Actions and RAC Sec - dation Date State and I.ocal sespouse Dat e for Corrective Action Element Proposed Corrective Actions Areas Sequiring Corrective Action

1. Beecriptient Rockup power was not N.3 available in the 18ew Castle BDC during

+

the esercise but a generator has been ordered.

H Secommendatient Backup power should be provided for the New Castle 80Cl N

the installation and operation of the generator maast be confirmed.

2. Descriptient The Itew Castle EOC J.10.a operations area did not have maps of the plume EPZ with sectors labels, current evacuation routes, and access control points. A map of relocaties centers was available but act posted in the operations area of the Isew Castle EOC.

accommendatient loops showing the plume EPZ with sectors labeled, current evacuation routes, access cost rul points, and relocation centers sbauld be made available and should be posted in the operatiums area of the new Cast le I:st.

TABLE 2 Benedial Actions for Seahreek Station Nuclear Power Plant (February 26, 1986)

Page $$ el IS Proposed Actual Deficiencies / Areas Requiring Corrective FDIA-SEP-1, State (S) and local (L) Complet ioe FE m Evalmation el Completion Actions and RAC Receamendation Rev. 1 Proposed Carrective Actions Date State and Local Response D.st e for Corrective Action Element ,

3. teocripties: Messages were not E.5 efficiently badled and were not distributed to all appropriate staff at the Iaew Castle EOC.

g Recommsedaties: Additional training is eequired to improve the ef ficiency y

of message mandling at the llev Castle EOC.

4. Drecript ion: ne Selectmen heJ made e J.9 prior Secisies to e<ecwete New Castle ehemewer the City of Por t smout h ws erwecuat eJ. his precedece is not descriped in the local plan.

Eccomesdat ien t abew Cast &e should review this paecedure of evac ut ing New Castle e.heaewer l' art sw h is evacweted with the State aud them este any nece ssary changes la the local plan.

. . # 4

g TAGLE 2 Benedial Actions far Seabroek Station Nuclear Pouer Plant (February 26, 1984)

Page 16 of 75 PO E-SEP-1, Proposed Actual Defaciencies/ Areas Seguiring Cetrective Completion Rev. 1 State (S) and Incal (L) Compl et ion FDu Evaluation of Actions and RAC Recomussodation State and I.ocal Response Date for Carrective Acties Element Proposed Corrective Actions Date neutieles BBC .

Deficiencies e

1. Saecriptient only tuo telephane lines N.3, E.6, e

are available in the BBC. The J.10.4 adequacy of aweitable telephone lines U

ior hand 1ing regalor SDC operations ,

concurrently sith calls from transit-dependent individuals requesting transportation uns not sofficiently demonstrated.

Seceousandsties: A study should be carried out to determine the number of telephone lines regesired to handle -

both regular EOC communications and requests for transportation from transit-dependent perseas.

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D A I 2

TABLE 2 Remedial Actions for Seabrook Station Nuclear Power Plant (Fe brua ry 26, 1986)

Page 59 of PS Deficiencies / Areas Requiring corrective FEMA-REP-1, Proposed Ac t ual Actions and RAC Recommendation Rev. 1 State (S) and Local (L) Completion FEMA Evaluation of Cumpletion for Corrective Action Element Proposed Corrective Actions Date State and I.ocal Response Dat e

3. Seecriptient A local indust rial E.6 facility, the Kingston Warren Factory, was not directly notified by EOC staf f of the emergency situation. Lack of prompt notification could reduce the ability of this facility to respond to e an escalating emergenc y. EDC staff y intend to include notification of this facility in a revised plan.

aeceansadetient The sewfields plan should be amended to insure prompt notification of all major indust rial facilities.

newton Ecc Deficiencies

1. Beac ri pt ient The adequacy of N.3, E.6, available telephone lines for handling J.10.4 ,

regular EOC communic at ions while concurrently receiving calls from transit-dependent individuals requesting transportation assistance was not sufficiently demonstrated.

, e

- - - _ = =

o e o e-TASLE 2 Remedial Actions for Seabrook Station leuclear Power Plant (February 26, 1986)

Page 60 of M FEleA-REP-1, Proposed Actual Deficiencies / Areas Reaguiring Corrective Completion Bew. 1, State (S) and lacal (L) Completion FEMA Evalustion of Actions and RAC Recosumendation State and I.ocal Response Date for Corrective Action Element Proposed Corrective Actions Date Secommendation: A study should be -

carried out at the leewton EOC to determine the number of telephone lines resguired to handle both regular EOC communications and telephone g

restuests for transportation assistance f rom t ransit-dependent persons. ]

2. Beec ript ion: The bus iAic h was to J.10.g arrive as part of the esercise never arrived. Based on message forms available at the IFO, 18ewton did not cont ac t the IFO to clarify the situation and respuest another bus.

Receamendetion The Itewton EOC staf f should be trained to repeat reagues t s to the State for buses and other transportation as si st ance, if these resources de not arrive at the EOC within a reasonable time.

Areas Sep iring Corrective Acties

1. De sc ri pt ions The plume EPZ map was J.10.a.

not present and the map showing the J.10.b relocation centers was available but nut post ed.

TABLE 2 Remedial Actions for Seabrook Station Nuclear Power Plant (February 26, 1986)

Page 61 of 15 Proposed Actual Deficiencies' Areas Requiring Corrective FEMA-REP-1, Completion Actions and RAC Recommendation Rev. 1, State (S) and local (L) Completion FEMA Evaluation of Element Proposed Corrective Actions Date State and Local Response laat e for Corrective Action Receamendatient All required espa should be post ed in the Newton EOC to support et fective emergency plwning.

2. Reecriptient Newt on EDC staff were J.10.k traffic congestion e concerned that could be a problem at one local school $

in particular.

Recommendetien8 Newton EOC staff should develop and test traffic control plans for their local schools.

j 1. Reec ri pt ient A public message was not J.10 3 developed by EOC staff to notify parent s of the EOC plan for an early dismissal at local schools.

Receamendatient Public messages should be developed and released to local parents on the school emergency response.

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TABLE 2 Remedial Actions for Seabrook Station Nuclear Power Plant (February 26, 196a) . .

g j Page 62 ol 75 Proposed Actual DeficiencienfAreas kequirir.g Corrective FEMA-REP-1, Completion Actions and RAC Recommendation Rev. 1,' State (S) and Local (L) Completion FEMA Evaluation of Element Proposed Corrective Actions Date State and Local Response Date for Corrective Action

4. De sc ri pt ion A special facility, the E.6, J.10.d Packer Headows Home, was not listed in '

the Newton plan although a simulated \

s 3 evacuation was carried out at this .

f acility during the exercise. 1 g

s e pa -

} a

,Recuamendation:

• s_~ 'o s

Procedures (ur the z

emergency notification, shelter and/or evacuation of local special facilities (i.e., the Packer Headows Home) should be included in t he Newton Plan. .

City of Portsmouth EOC -

• i Deficiencies

1. De sc ri pt ion: Only two telephone lines J.10.g, (

were available in the EOC. The J.10.k, H.3, adequacy of available telephone lines C.4.a. E.6, for handling regular EOC communica- J.10.b tions while concurrently receiving calls from t ransi t-de pendent individ-uals requesting transportation _

s TABLE 2 Remedial Actions for Seabrook Station Nuclear Power Plant (February 26, 1986) Page 61 of 75 Proposed Actual Deficiencies / Areas Requiring Corrective FEMA-REP-l, Completion State (S) and Local (L) Completion FEMA Evaluation of Rev. 1, State and Local Response Dat e Actions and RAC Recomunendation Proposed Corrective Actions Date for Corrective Action Element assistance was not sufficiently demonstrated. In addition, only one telephone line was available to the Superintendent of schools in the Portsmouth EOC. Consequently, the g Superintendent of schools was required m D'

to contact school s sequentially leading to an estimated time delay of one hour.

Recosamendat ion 18 A study should be carried out to determine the number of t elephone lines required to handle regular EOC communications and telephone requests from transit-de pendent persons requesting

• transportation assistance.

Recomendat ion 2: 1he effectiveness of c omumani ca t i on s for local schools should be improved by supplementing existing t el e phones at the Port smouth EOC for simultaneous notification of sc hool s. Alternatively, the Su pe ri nt endent could be relocated to .

the school office where a school comanunicalions network is in place and a school liaison, could be assigned to the EOC.

e ., , . .

TABLE 2 Remedial Actions for Seabrook Station Nuclear Power Plant (February 26, 1986)

Page 64 os 75 Deficiencies / Areas pequiring Corrective FEMA-REP-1, Proposed Actual Rev. 1, State (S) and Local (L) Completier. FEMA Evaluation of Completion Actions and RAC Recomumendation Proposed Corrective Actions Date State and i.out Re= tense Date for Corrective Action Element

2. Desc ri pt ion! The number of A.A.b. A.2.a part ic ipat ing staff was insufficient to manage the emergency operations in an actual event. For example, the CD Director also managed ope rat ions and e4 radiological monitoring and record keeping. Furthermore, message t raf fic h was very heavy requiring additional assistance from the CD Director, and so some messages were not efficiently handled, leading to time delays.

Recommendations Currently assigned duties of individual staff members should be reviewed and staff functions should be reassigned or additional staff trained to alleviate the worlt overload on select individuals.

Additional EOC staff should be assigned to message handling and di st ribut i on.

3. Descriptiont Partici pat ing EOC staff K.3.b, K.4 appeared to be uncertain about emergency worker radiological exposure

• control procedures and the use of personal dosimetry.

Reconumendat ion Additional training in ..3iological exposure control j

should bc provided for all stall at t he Port smout h EOC.

m ,

TABLE 2 Remedial Actions for Seabrook Station Nuclear Power Plant (Februa ry 26, 1986)

Page 65 ol 75 Deficiencies / Areas Requiring Corrective FEMA-REP-1, Proposed Actual Rev. 1, State (S) and Local (L) Compittion FEMA Evaluation of Completion Actions and RAC Recsamendation Dat e for Corrective Action Element Proposed Corrective Actions Date State and f.ocal Response

4. De sc ri pt ion A list of 120 K.3.a. K.3.b supplemental emergency workers that had received training was provided by a planning consultant in the Portsmouth EOC. If all of these g

persons, including bus guides, participated in an actual emergency $

the available supply of dosimeters and TLDs would be insufficient. The police officer dispatched to staff a traffic control point was not given dosimetry. Additional equipment would be required. This is likely to af fect the efficiency of dis pa tching field personnel.

Recommsendat i on s The Po rt smouth EOC st al t should demonstrate procedures and resources for radiological exposure control of all field .

personnel and suppl emen t a ry staff at the next exercise.

5. Desc ri pt ion: Cu rrentl y, EOC staff J.2 have not specifically identified and listed available bus guides. This list is necessary for efficiently dispatching buses and drivers to evacuate t ransit-dependent residents.

• e . .

TABLE 2 Remedial Actions for Seabrook Station Nuclear Power Plant (February 26, 1986)

Page 66 of 75 Proposed Actual Deficiencies / Areas Requiring Corrective FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 1, State (S) and Local (L) Completion FEMA Evaluat ion el Completion Actions and RAC Secomunendation State and Local Response Date Element Proposed Corrective Actions Date for Corrective Action Recommendation Bus guides should be identified, and a list of these personnel should be available at the Port smouth EOC. Moreover, bus guides should receive training in ewrgency g

evacuation procedures. cp La Areas Requiring Corrective Action .

1. Desc ri ptions in the Portsmouth EOC, J.10.a.

maps of the pl'une EPZ, relocation J.10.b center location and access control points were neither posted nor available. A map of the designated evacuation routes was available although it was not po st ed .

Recommendations All required maps including evacuation routes of the pliune EPZ, relocation centers, and access control should be posted in the EOC operations area.

2. De sc ri pt ion Security for the EOC D.3 operations area was inadequate.

Recomumendationt Security for the Port smuuth EOC must be improved.

~

TABLE 2 Remedial Actions for Seabrook Station Nuclear Power Plant (February 26, 1986) .-

Page 67 nl 75 FEMA-REP-1, Proposed Actual Deficiencies / Areas Requiring Corrective Complessun Actions and RAC Recosamendation Rev. 1, State (S) and local (L) Complet ion FEMA Evaluatiosi of Proposed Corrective Actions Date State and 1.ocal Response fl.at e for Corrective Action Element

3. Desc ri pt ions EOC staff determined J.10.g.

that 13 traffic control points would J.10.k ,

be needed to adequately manage this cossmunit y including two (2) additional traffic control points that are not g

currently specified in the town plan. oo Recommendation The town plan should be amended to include all appropriate traffic control points.

4. Descriptions During the exercise, an A.2.a, evacuation bus was requested by EOC J.9, st a f l' tros the IFO for demonstration J.10.d purposes. This request was made at 1416, about 45 minutes after the evacuation recomunenda t ion. EOC staff should promptly assess their emergency needs and request transportation assistance in a more timely manner.

Recommmendation !! More efficient procedures should be impl emen t ed for requesting State assistance.

Recosamendation 2: Time delays of up to one hour should be factored into the ETE study.

.. . e . .

TABLE 2 Remedial Actions for Seabrook Station Nuclear Power Plant (February 26, 1986)

Page 68 of 75 Deficiencies / Areas Requiring Corrective FEMA-REP-1, Proposed Actual Actions and RAC Recomunendation Rev. 1, State (S) and local (L) Completion FEMA Evaluation of Completion for Corrective Action Element Proposed Corrective Actions Date State and Local Response Date

5. De scri ptions EOC staff empressed a J.10.g, concern that the designated bus J.10.k staging area for Portsmouth may be a problem due to inaccessibility, traffic congestion, and lack of adequate space.

e co An Recosamendation An appropriate bus staging area should be identified and this designated area recorded in the Port smouth town plan.

Seabrook EOC Deficiencies

1. Description The adequacy of the H.3, J.10.d three enternal telephone lines for handling regular EOC business while concurrently receiving calls from t ran si t-de pend ent persons requesting transportation assistance was not sufficiently demonstrated at the Seabrook EOC.

TABLE 2 Remedial Actions for Seabrook Station Nuclear Power Plant (February 26, 1986)

Page 69 of M Deficiencies / Areas Requiring Corrective FEMA-REP-1, Proposed Actual Rev. 1 State (S) and Imcal (L) Compl et ion FEMA Evaluation of completion Actions and RAC Recomumendation Date for Corrective Action Element Proposed Corrective Actions Date State and Local Response Recommendation A study should be conducted to determine the number of telephone lines required to handle concurrently both regular EOC consnunic at ions and the receipt of g

telephone calls from transit-dependent g persons requesting transportation assistance.

l

2. Descri pt ions Imw-range (0-200 mR) and H.!!

high-range (0-100 R) dosimeters were I available at the Seabrook EOC.

According to the local plan, mid-range (0-20 R) dosimeters are to be available.

Recommendation: The 0-20 R dosimeters specified in the local plan should be procured and made available at the Seabrook EOC.

3. Desc ri pt ion: The police officer who K.3.a 0.4.g was dispatched to demonstrate the staffing of a traffic control point did not come to the Seabrook EOC to pick up do,imetry and did not realize that he should have taken dosimetry with him.

• e .

• t . ,

TABLE 2 Remedial Actions for Seabrook Station Nuclear Power Plant (February 26, 1986)

Page 70 of 75 FEMA-REP-1, Proposed Actual Deficiencies / Areas Requiring Corrective Completion Rev. 1, State (S) and Local (L) Compl et ion FEMA Evaluation of Actions and RAC Recomunendation Date State and Local Response Dat e for Corrective Action Element Proposed Corrective Actions Recosamendations Additional training in emergency worker radiological es po su re control should be given to police officers in Seabrook.

g

4.

Description:

The confidential list of J.10.d.

special-needs persons called for in J.10 3 $

the local plan was not available at the Seabrook EOC during the exercise.

Furthermore, the resources required to notify and transport special-needs persons have not been fully identified.

Recosamendation 1 A survey should be conducted in Seabrook to identify special-needs persons and their special needs. Based on this survey, the confidential list of special-needs persons and their special-needs called for in the plan should be kept at the Seabrook EOC, and the resources needed to bot h not i f y and evacuate special-needs persons should be determined and made available.

3 TARLE 2 Remedial Actions for Seabrook Station Nuclear Power Plant (February 26, 1986) Page 71 of 13 Proposed Ac t ual Deficiencies / Areas Requiring Corrective FEMA-REP-1, Completion State (S) and local (L) Complet ion FEMA Evaluation of l

Actions and RAC Recommsendation Rev. 1 State and Local Response Date Element Proposed Corrective Actions Date for Corrective Action Areas Requiring Corrective Action

1. Descript ion: A map of access control J.10.a.

points was available and used during J.10.b the esercise but was not posted and a g map of population by evacuation area 00 co was neither posted nor available.

Recomunendat ion s Maps of access control points and population by evacuation area should be post ed at the Seabrook EOC.

2. Descri ption: The police of ficer who J.10.g was dispatched to demonstrate the staffing of a traffic control point did not regort to the Seabrooit EOC to receive isist ruc tion s on where to direct traffic once the traffic control point had been set up. At the traffic control point, the police olficer directed traffic (simulated) out of the plume EPZ, but not by the procedure specified in the local plan.

3ecomumendations Police officers in Seabrook should be trained to report to the EOC to receive instructions concerning which routes to direct traf fic to take prior to staffing the traffic control point assigned to them.

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. 3 TABLE 2 Remedial Actions for Seabrook Station Nuclear Power Plant (February 26, 1986)

Page 74 of M Proposed Actual Deficiencies / Areas Requiring Corrective FEMA-REP-1 FEMA Evaluation of Completion Rev. 1, State (S) and Local (L) Compl et ion Actions and RAC Recoammendation State and Local Response Date Element Proposed Corrective Actions Date for Corrective Action

4. Desc riptions The requested school bus J.10.g did not arrive. Based on message forms available at the IF0, Strathan did not contact the IFO to clarify the situation and request another bus.

H Recommsendatioe t The Strathan EOC e e

staff should be trained to repeat requests to the State for buses and o'.he r t rans po rt at ion assistance, if these resources do not arrive at the EOC within a reasonable time.

5. Description A simulated evacuation J.10.m of a special-needs individual to the Emeter Hos pi tal was carried out at a time when an evacuation order was in elfect for plume EPZ communities including Exeter.

Recosamendation: Plans for the evacuation of special-needs persons '

should be developed to handle the specific conditions of a radiological emergency. Procedures should specify that evacuees are to be transported out of the areas being evacuated.

e TABLE 2 Remedial Actions for Seabrook Station Nuclear Power Plant (February 26, 1986)

Page 75 al 75 Deficiencies / Areas Requiring Corrective FEMA-REP-1, Proposed Ac t u al Actions and RAC Recomusendation Rev. 1, State (b) and Local (L) Complet ion FEMA Evaluation of Completion Proposed Corrective Actions Date State and Local Response Dat e for Corrective Action Element Areas Requiring Corrective Action

1. Desc ri pt iont Maps of evacuation J.10.a.

routes and relocation centers were J.10.b available but were not posted and a map of the pl ume EPZ with sectors [

N labeled was not posted in the Strathan EOC.

Recousmendatioet Maps of evacuation routes, relocation centers, and the plume exposure EPZ should be posted in the Stratham EOC.

2. Description A compute r listing of J.10.d e residents with s pecial needs and a description of these needs was available in the EOC. According to the local plan, there is no known special-needs populatite in Stratham.

Recomumenda ti on s The plan should be amended to specify the actual situation that a confidential list of special-needs persons and their special needs is available at the St rat han EOC.

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.n TOSLE 3 Deficiencies and Areas Regefring Corrective Actione - Seabrook Station leuclear Power Plant Page 4 of 3)

Objecttwe Subse-IsUREC-0654 quena5y Cer ec ive Tested Actgun Previously FDtA- REF- 1 Enescise Identtiled FEMA Esercise Rev. 8 (Emercise Verlised Current issue Descript ion Date issue Objective Objective Reference Jurtedletion Action Taken Date) (i.e., tesults) St at us The Coast Guard was not 2/26/86 N/A 1, 13 A.B. D.2 E.S. E.6, 16ew Hampshire I O.

nottiged until 1032, J.10.c.

although the " Site Area J.10.g Emergency" was declared at 0948. The State EOC attempted to contact the Coast Guard at 0829 at the

" Alert," but contact was not made as, apparently, an tacorrect telephone number was called. Because the Cuant Cused is responsible for alerting the beating g g

public, the esercise objec- m stve of alerting the public throughout the plume espo-sure EFE within 15 minutes was not met. ( 2. l . l . 6-D)

DEFICIEleCT 19 D.S J.10.d New Hampshire I

7. The capabtllty to demon- 2/26/86 N/A strate the organisational ablitty to effect an orderly evacuation of schools, which was an esercise objective (D.8),

was hampered by the eatent of simulated school partt-ctpation. Stace schools were not in session on the day of the esercise, school notiftcatton, and requesta for an activation of school bus resources could not be evaluated. ( 2.1. l . 7-D)

DtFICIENCY

'

• e .

• . e e . .

TABLE 3 Def Sciencies and Areas Requiring Corrective Actions - Seahtook Station Nuclear Power Plant Fame S of 1%

ublective Suboe-IIUREC-0654 quently carrective Previously FEMA-REF-l Tested As a ton Esercise Identified FEN 4 Esercise Rev. I (Emercise Verfiled current lasue Description Date Issue Objective Objective Reference Jurisdiction Action Taken Daar) (I.e., Besults) status

8. The entensively used tele- 2/26/B6 N/A 4, 5 A.4, 3.1 F.I. New Hampshire i fas machine at the State C.4. b M.)

EUC was sometimes over-loaded which prevented several hard copies of EBBS messages from reaching the Media Center. (2.1.1.1)

9. The ability to meet the 2/26/86 N/A 2 A.2 N.4, A.4 New Hampshire l needs of the seven nonpar-ticipating communttles was not adequately demonstrated at the IFO because of the p

lack of an adequate number @

N of Local Liaison officers.

The three Local Liaison officers who participated there as part of the State Compensatory Flan, were also listed in the State Plan as filling other staff positions for the second shift at the IFO or State EuC. he roster was avall-able in the Compensatory Plan to demonstrate 24-hour staffing capability of Local Llatoon officers for nonpartSc8pating communt-tles. ( 2.1. 2.1 -0)

IEFICIENCY

10. The number of telephone 2/26/86 N/A 4, 5 A.4, B.I F.1. b New Hampshire I lines in the IFO available for use by the local Llal-son officers implementing the Compensatory Flan were' lasutilclent to handle the potential lacoming and out-golag calle that would be made during an emergency.

I (2.1.2.2-D) le.FICIENCY

TatLE 1 Deficiencies and trees nequiring Corrective Act tons - Seabrook Station teoclear Power Plant Page 6 of M Objective

• Subse-HUGEC-0654 quent8y Currec: ave Previously FEMA-REP-l Tested Ac ton 9 Esercise Identified FEMA Esercise Rev. 1 ( F.ne r c ise Verfiled Current tasae pesertation- Date lasue Objective Objective Reference Jurisdicties Action Taken that e) (i.e., Nesults) Status ll. The seasue board in the IFO 2/26/86 N/A 4 A.4 N.) New Hampshire I osa mot upJeted rapidly enough and enant s were not kept in chronolustral a esder. This cowsed prob-tema ser the IFO sesff la recastmastas and respoeding i re stewastone empfday.

(2.1.2.14

12. At the IFO the one telef ax 2/26/06 N/A 4, 5 A.4, B.I F.4, New Naepshire 1 mac hine eAlch was available C.4.b. N.3 6-*

ums often overloaded and @

tieerefore insuffletent to "

handle the nueher of hard-copy transelssione going to the State EOC and the media center. ( 2. l . 2. 2 )

13. Under the Caepensatory Plan 2/26/96 N/A 3, 5 A.3', B.3 E.S flew Hampshire i the IFO local Liaison officers had responalbality for relaying and assuring the steellness and accuracy

' of messages which were passing through the IFO among the State EOC.

participating community Euce. and the residents /

officials of nonpartict-pating raamunttles. These d+stles were not properly complet ed during the e s e r c i se. ( 2.1. 2. 3 )

14. There was need for 2/26/B6 N/A 4. 5 A.4. 3.1 F.1 New Hampshire I additional telephones at the IFO for use by the State Police, National Cuard, and the Coast Guard.

( 2.1. 2. 4 )

. . e .

e . e i .

TABLE 3 Deficiencies and Areas Requiring Cerrective Actions - Seabrook Station Ihsclear Power Plant rage F of 3%

objeeItwe Subse-MultEC-0654 quently Corrective Previously FEMA-REP-1 Tested Act ton Esercise Identified FEMA Eserclee Bee. I (fsercise Verilled Current Issue Description Date issue Objective Objective Reference JurtsJtetton Action Taken Date) (i.e.. Results) St at us

15. The availablitty of sufft- 2/26/86 N/A 20 D.9 s.3.a New #ampshire I clent doeteetere for all eme rgenc y workers deets-sated in the plan should be reviewed and additional equipment should be pur-chased as necessary. For esample, the 0-20 R eld-r aaste doelmeters tod8cated in the plan were not avat!-

able for field monitoring teams 48spatched from the IFU/ EOF. Instead, they had 0-5 R doeleeters. This to not optimal. Also, addt- g tienet dosteeters would be needed to supply emergency workers deployed to the field from the Rockinghee Staging Area. New Castle.

Neuttelds, and Portesouth Eoce, if all workers were required in any emergency.

(2.8.3.2.5-D) DI!FICIENCY 1%. The only available telefas 2/26/96 N/A 4. S A.4. B.8 C.4.s IIrw Nampshire I equipment was joint ly used ty the EOF and the IFO. In addttten to espertenctag eene mechantcal problems, the telefas machine was often in use for trans-citting to the media center end fut receiving weather r e por t e. Therefore. 4 was sometimes not available when IFu/LOF staff wanted to use the telefas as a tackup erane of commasa t ca-tion to transett technical data to the State EUC.

( 2. 5.1. 2.1 )

T ASt1 3 Defleteactes and Areas Requiring Corrective Actione - Seabrook Statlee Nuclear power Plant Page a of I5 objectave Subse-IluREG-0654 quently Corrective Previously FDIA-BEF-8 Tented Actton Enertime Identified FFMA Eseretoe Rev. 1 (Emercise vertiled Currest lesse Description Date Issue Objective Objective Reference Jutledtetton Action Taken pate) (i.e., sesulte) statem

17. Although laternal caemunt- 2/*6/06 N/A 5, 10 3.1, D.8 I.80 New Hampehire 4 catione and information eschange between utility and $ tate personnel at the Euf was generally escel-lent, there was a problem (based on observations made at the 8701 espertenced by IFO personnel la obtelatng some talermetten free the ut ilit y at the EOF.

Despite repeated requeste, informatten se isot ope 80 compostaten to the plant etack releases was not O provided by the EOF to the IFO matti about two heure efter she releases started around $110 By this stee the interest ten was emper-fluous. ( 2.1.1.2. 2 )

89. When early field data 2/26/06 N/A 3, 6 A.3, C.t. I.% New Naapehire 3 apoeered to verify dose S C.3 project &ene, further see of field adams for dose pre-jection conf i rmat t om was stateel. 82.1.3.3.5)

19. State field manitoring 2/26/56 N/A 3, 6 A.), C.I. l.S New Hampshtte t ,

r teams were not effectively 8 C.3 mattered in usacksas the f plume awl taking att g samples. All three state tease were deployed to the same location. Ove tese use attuated to the plume l

. for ela stnutes and was not j

Instructed to t ab a se air j sample, ihe absence of alt -1 i

1 e * , ,

s e e .,

TAtl.E 3 Def tetencies and Areme Requittag Corrective Actions - Seabreelt Stetten Ituclear power Plant Pose 9 of n Objecttwe 5=bme-IIpaEC-06%4 . quesely Cossecttwe Previemely FWGA-NEP-t Tested ArtIon tuercise Identified FDBA Emescime Rev. I (Esercise Weleted cargee Date Issue objective Objective Reference Justseletaw Action Takse pate) ( i .e. , men.el s e) St at ue lease teesc ript ive sample dat a was not geoe-tiened by the IFO dose assesser esat t i it become apparent near the end of the easselse that releases were decreasing. Only one sample was taken. tow but poettive results should have been obtainable by all three 90tDeMS field tease.

( 2.1. 3. 3. 2 )

N/A 7. S C.2, C.3 f.7, 1.8 New Naapehtra I

23. New Wampshire field mont-toring tease arrived at the 2/26/06 y

g Eor and were provided with all of the types of equipment spectfled in the plan escept a landlem-19 micre a meter, and the-equipment available for team 10 0 3 although ade-quate, differed free that identtiled to the plan.

( 2. I . 3. 4.1 )

15, 10 New Naepehire I

28. Sortees queettone arece et 2/26/06 N/A D.4. D.F. J.lG.g the esevelse resandtag the 19 D.8 ability of the State to provide buses for t ransper- .

tation et special popula-tlans. tecludtag scheel children, mobility-lepaired, and ot he rwi se a e ansi t-dependent popeIa-tions. Dr i ve r resoestree wese not sufficient to meet the transpostatten require-erats. ( 2.1. 4. 8 -D)

IWFICIFieCY

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,E Pase 12 of 3) 14tiJ S tef tetencies and Asees togetting Cerevetive Acetene - Seebresh 4tattee touclear Peeec Plant Objactive 5ebee-geent1y CesrectIve IIMBEC-CeS4 Actsea Tested Presteesty Pksta-DEP-3 heiIsee Cesseet (Eme r e t se Iseretee Identtiled FIBtA Eseactee Rev. 8 pat e) (i.e.. Reselts) St at ue Dat e lesee 84jecstwo objecs t wo gefereoce Jertodactise 4ettee Taten

%some Beeceipstee treetened, Creeeland, stagotan, rest Einkstee.

soev Centle, Newftelde, newson, Per t emoet h.

Steethem, or Seabrer.h.

e(2.l.4.6-D) DrF6titserY 3 2/26/96 h/A 19 9.F J.00.d. Nee Ileepshire

27. A supply of ambulances suf- J. lu.s ficteet to seet the treme-pettatlan meeds of special*

needs petsene cowld oss be dispatcDed threeSh the IP3.

A lt ha.ch the Store roepen- N satesy Flam allowed for prestastag and dispeten of sentances free the RechIaghao Count y Seogiog Area, t he State #14 set woe or demonst rate thta pseced-I ore. (2.8.4.7-D) DFFICIEIICT I 9.4, A.2 A.4, Ilow teampshire

20. State relice Tseo , & does 2/26/96 II/A IT, 2 J.10.)

met alone have outitcaent pereenmal to centeet access to the entiae td-elle Ert pe r t eet er. 4=elag the esercise it wee deteralmed t hat 44 State Pellte efficers weeld be regelred to staff att access teatrol potete. This weeld have enhaweted the Staae Police Treep a sweeerces of the day ettet and some of the anight ohlit. Even with help free other troepe, the force es.e a d be aestosely depleted and law enforce-

' meat poestbly tapatred.

(2.l.S.1-D) DEFICatalCT e e # 9

- .* e . e a .

TAtLE 1 Def Sciencies and Areas Requiring Correct twe Act tone - Seabreek Stat ten Iheclear Power Plant Page Il et 35 Objecttwo Subse-NUSEC-0654 quentty Corrective Prevlawaly Ft36A-REP-l Tented Actten Esercise Identified FEpeA Eserclee Rev. 5 (Esercise vertised Current issue Descriptsee Date issue Objective Objective Reference Justseletton Actton Taken Dat e) (8.e., Nesults) Status

29. Deering the esercise there 2/26/86 N/A 5 S.I J.lo.j, New Nampehire g were some problems with F.I breakup of redte communica-tiene between State Police troopere and the IFO.

( 2. l . 5.1 )

10 State Police troopers 2/26/86 N/A 12 0.6 J.10,e, New Naapshire g ladicated that better espe J.lo.J were needed, especially for troopers who are not festitar with the area.

( 2. 8. 5. 2) 14 O

31. 1.ack of coordinatten 2/26/86 N/A 3, le, A.3, 0. 3 C.4.s slew Nampshire u bet ween the media center 24 1.1 and the State EDC led to confustag and conflicting instructlene for the public and caused a credibility problem with the media.

There was aise a wreas t e le phone number steem in se LRSS message for persons with special needs to call.

This same wrong telephone ,

number also appease in the public intermatten br e- ,

c hur e. (2.1.6.I-0)

IW.FICireCT 3 2. A large map of the plume 2/2e/56 N/A 4 A.4 C.4.s IIew Nampshire g i Er2 was not available matti eldway t hrough the esercise and when it became avail-able was not used effec-tivety by the $ tate spokes-peraen to demonetrate the pr ot ec t i ve act6ons that were underway. (2.I.6.8)

I

TABLE 1 Deficienctes and Areas Requiring Corrective Actless - Seabroek Station Nuclear'Pouer Flaat -Fase 14 of 1%

Objective Subse-IIUesc-0654 quent8y Coreec:8ve Tested Action Prevlonely FENA-REF-l guercise Identified FesA Esercles see. I (ksercise vertised Current Aceton Teken Dat e) (i.e., ses=Ita) St at us lease Descriptieg Date Issue Objective Objective Reference Juttadicaton 3

N/A 24 E.1 C.4.a. leew Neapshire

11. While the Covernor's Prese 2/26/86 0.5 Secretary at the seedia Center demonstrated overalt knowledge and capahtlity se chief spokesperson f or the State there were occasions when addittomat preparettom and/or leformattom would have improved ble effec-stveness. This was especially true when queettone arose during gg media briettags on the 0 0%

evacuated population figures. ( 2. I .6. 2 )

llew Nampehtre I

14. The State F10 early la the 2/26/96 N/A 24 E.1 C.4.a l

esercise Incorrectly leformed the media that moaparticipating towne were in f act participating which caused a credibility problem. ( 2.1.6.3) 3 26 E.1 C.4.c, llow Nampehtte 3%. Although the rumor control 2/26/96 N/A system demonstrated during F.4 the eseretse et the Media Center worbed well, it le i mot the system described la the State Flaa. (2.l.6.4) 3 A. I . b , Itew Nampehire

16. The Red Crees flatson 2/26/t6 N/A B A.l E.2 person at the Nanchester reception center arrived late and did not interact with t he manaser.

( 2.1. 7. I )

New Itampehire I

37. The reception center 2/26/96 N/A 3. 5 A.3, 8.5 A. I . b.

manager was not always kept D.1 up to date on emergency classification levels and the c hanit t ag si t uat t on.

( 2. t . 7. 2 )

e e s e

. . ,e . o , ,e .

_r- ,-

t i

TELE 3 Deficiencies and Areas Requiting Corrective Actions - Sea?arook Station Nuclear Power Plant Page li et 15 r ,

,- - oblective pp ' subse-t IIUREG-06S4 quently Cureec 3ve

/ 'Freviously FEMA-REP-1 Tested Ac a te.

Emer:8ee' MterJfted FEMA Esarcise Rev. 2 (Emeretse Vetlite) - Current Issue Description Dets leeue Objective Objective Reference Justodtction Action Taken Date) (i.e.. Results) Status *

'i

38. The Manchester, local plas ' 2/26/26 . It/in 27 D.ll K.S.a. IIeu Hampehire ' g suggests As Inch . pet , P.4 '{

second movemeae. of the s -*

detector survey probe. U=w , ,*

5 tats - plac spectitet - threc e ,+

laches per second. ~

(2.1.7.1)  %

9 * .

3!. It was observed. that 2/26/86 e IP/A 20 D.9' E.3.e. New Hampshtte# l because of the Isee attivat E.3.b (lll8) of doelmetere .from ,

+

the IFO in Neutagtoc. the i first bus driver to be s flepatched was not loseed dostmetry. The first bue y

i was dispatched . to

.. PJinnecuanet' High Schost in 4

[ Camptun ar-a108 ( 2. l . 8. 4- I \

g) DEFICIENCY

40. One or saa eight heaes that 2/26/96 N/A 4. IS A.4. b.4 J.lo.g pseu nampshire I atstved and use togged in was sent back because it -

was lov on fue1 and the w Elspatch Center chose not .h to refuel it alt hough the State Resources Coordinator had' made arrangemente for t he/ feeling. The Rocking-han County Staging Arew was only alle to proeide gasoline fuel and was not equipped to provide diesel fuel. ( 2. l .8. 2-D)

EVICIENCY

41. Msps arrived at the RCDC 2/26/86 WA IS D.4 J.80.e New Hampehtte I with the dos lw ters (see Def. 1), se the first bue was di s pat c hee without a map. ( 2. l.8. )-D) Ot FICIENCY

• .).

I I

I Page 16 of 15 TAttA 3 Deficiencies and Areen sequistag corrective Actions - Seabrook Station Nuclear Power Plant L

(*jectsee sub.e-quently Correttive IIUSEC-0654 Act ton Tested Previonaly PDtA-REP-l Vertiled current Rev. 4 (Emercise Esercise Identified FOIA Esercise Date) (i.e.. Results) St at us objective objective Reference Jurtsetetton Action Taken toene nescription Date losse i

A.t. A.2 A.2.a. New Nampshire

42. Only one bus guide arrived 2/26/96 N/A l. 2 J.IO.g at the Rockingham County stagtag area ductag the esercise and a rester of bus guides was not avell-able. Therefore, it could not be determined whether a sufficient number of tralmed guides would be available. ( 2. l . 8. 4-D)

DEFICIENCY l

F.I.d leev Nampehire

43. Communications to the 2/26/94 N/A 5 S.i o CD Rockingham County stestas area f rom the State EOC or IFO were received at the Shortif's Otitce commuatca-tiene centec and them dettvered to the bus dio-patcher by runner. This added use of the Sheriff's ,

evans of c - =1cetton could potentially conflict with aermal communications needs of the Sheriff's Ollice. ( 2. l .8. 8 ) I N/A 3. 45 3. l . D. 4 N.), E.6, Brentwood ca. The adequacy of the three 2/26/a6 J.10.d avaltable telephone lines for handitng regular EOC communicattone while concurrently receiving calls free tranett-dependent persone reque st-Ing transportattom assist-ance van not sufficiently demonstrated at the 3reatwond EOC. ( 2. 2. l .1 -D)

(WFICIFNCY l

= . . . . . .

• 9 e ,

TAtt.E 3 Dettelencies and Areas Requirinsi Correcttwe Acttons -- Seabrook Stattoe Nuclear Power Plant Page 47 of 3%

Objetilwe Subse-NUREG-Ob54 quently Careective Freetomaly FtMA-REP-t Tested Ac t son FEMA Eserclee Rev. 8 (Fuercise vertised Current Esercise Identified Objective Objective Reference Jurtsdicaton Action Taken Date) (i.e., acaults) St at us issue DrecrtPtton Date issue AS. The Brentwood EOC to smalt 2/26/86 N/A 4 A. 4 H.) Brentwood 3 and creeped, and tacked furniture; most of staff members were required to ~

stand for eatended periods.

These problems reduced the elitetency and effective-ness of the staff.

( 2. 2. I . B )

g

' 44. Maps shoulag relocatten 2/26/86 N/A 4 A.4 J.80.a. Brentwood centers and popularton by J.10.b evacuation area were to avaltable but were not O posted at the Brentwood

• EOC. (2.2.1.2) trent uned I

47. At about 1547 the State 2/26/86 N/A S 5.5 F.l Listson off8cer contacted the EOC requesting the EOC to es t at ain contact with the Manchester Reception Center. The EOC at t empt ed to contact the Reception Center via the Civil Defease radio and use informed that radio contact utth the Rece pt ion Center was not possible on the Civil Defense radio.

( 2. 2. I .3 )

1 TAst.E 1 Def tetenetes and Areas Requistag Corrective Actions - Seabrook Station Nuclear power plant Page 18 of 15-(4jectIve sub.e-NueEC-0654 quantty Currecttwo Provtously FDIA-BEP-1 Tested Actson Ese rcise Identitled FD64 Esercise Rev. 5 (Eseretse Werelled Custent Issue Desertption Date lasse Objective objective Reference

• Jertsdic(ton Action Taken Da t e ) (4.e., penults) Statue

48. When the Civil Defense 2/26/06 N/A 14 D.3 E.6 arentwood i Director realised that the slaulated instructional EBS messages had not informed transts-dependent persone in Brentwood of the vehtetes being provided for their evacuation, he ordered that a message directing transit-dependent persons to call the trentwood toc be broadcast (esmutated) over the N trentwood public oddrese/

etren system. The stou- $

lated message should have been preceded by a sounding of the stren alert systee, alerting people to the subsege*nt instructlonal message. In addition, the procedere demonstrated during the esercise is not spectised In the plan.

( 2. 2.1.4 )

49. There has been a lack of 2/26/06 N/A 3, IS A.), D.4 J.10.g. Brentwood I coordinatten utth the J.10.1 Rockingham County Comptes conc e rni ng the traffic volume anticipated when the County Comptes to used as a stastag stea to the event of a radiological eser-genc y. ( 2. 2. t . 5)

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TAat.E 3 Deitcleocles and Areas seguirlag Corrective Actions - Seabreak Station eseclear rower flaat Pase 20 of 35 Objec Ive Subse-IIUttG 4 54 g=eatBy Cesrective Previomely FestA-BEP-l Tented Acttun Esercise Identified FDeA Eserstee Rev. 1 (Emercise Verfiled Corrent Issue Description Date Issue Objective Objective Reference Justsetetten Action Taken Dete) (i.e. . Result s) st at ue

51. The adegeacy of available 2/26/86 N/A 4. IS 3.1. B.4 M.3. E.6 Creenland g telephone lines for J.10.d handitag regetar EOC com-musicattens while concur-seetly receiving calla free transtt-dependent persone requestlag transportation was not sufficieesty demon-strated. (2.2.2.1-D)

DEricItucY g

S4. The old-range (0-20 R) 2/26/96 N/A 20 D.9 E.3.a Creeeland desteetere spectited in the N plan were not available at to Cree.ia.d EoC.

g (2.2.2.2-D) DEFICIEsICY 4 A.4 J.10.s. Creenland I SS. Nape shoutng relocetten 2/26/06 N/A centers and populattom by J. 8 0. b evacuatten area were not posted in the Creenland EOC but were available in the plan. (2.2.2.5) -

g

56. There was a list of tem 2/26/06 N/A 18 D. 7 J.10.d Creenland special-needs people avall-able at the Greenland EOC.

According to the local plae. there la no known special-needa population la Creenland. ( 2. 2. 2. 2 )

N.1 Etageton I

52. Adequacy of the single 2/26/96 N/A S. SS 8. 5. B. 4 telephone itse to the J.10.d Elegaton EOC for handling regular EOC communications eshtte concurrently receiv-las calls free transte-dependent perseas request-tag transportatten assist-ance was not sufficiently demonstrated. Even with the espected inst al lat t en 6 4 0 9

• * * * - t <a . .

TABLE 3 Deficiencies and Areas Requiring Corrective Actione - Seabrook Station leuclear Power Flaat Page 28 of 35 Objective Subse-IsuREC-0654 quemt8y Corrective Previously FutA-REP-I Tessed Action Esercise Rev. I *(Emercise Westiled current Esercise Identitled FDeA Date lasue Objective Objective Reference Jurtseletion Action Taken Dat e) (i.e., Results) Status Issue Description of three additional lines utshin the nest three months, the adequacy of available telephone linee for handling bot h these activlales concurrently resalas to be denuestrated.

( 2.2.3.1-D) DEFICEFleCT I

S3. The midrange (0-20 R) doel- 2/26/96 N/A 20 D.9 E.3.a. Kingston meters specified in the E. 3. b local plan were not avall-able at the Kingston EOC.

( 2.2.3.2-D) (WFICIENCT w I

$9. The supply of thirty 2/26/84 N/A 20 B.9 E.3.a. Kingston doelmetry hits appeared E. 3. b adequate, but if too many emergency workere, such as bus guldes were to arrive at the enc, there alght not he enough desleetry hits.

(2.2.3.3-D) Id.FlCIEpsCT i

60. The Kingston EOC staff 2/26/86 II/A 20 D.9 . E. 3. b Kinsecon delled to read their doelmeters and record readings on their record forms. (2.2.3.4-D)

IW FICIEleCT i

el. A roster of bus guidea was 2/26/86 N/A 2, 45 A.2, 0.4 J.40.d. Kingston not available at the 19 0.8 J.80.g.

Kingston EOC. The adequacy E. 3. e .

of guides af f ects both the E. 3. h evacuation of schools and the evacuat ion of transit-dependent populat ions.

tilthout the roster, the adequacy of the prowlstone far these vital evacuation functions could not be assessed. ( 2. 2. 3.5-D) twFICIENCY

TAtlE 3 Def telencies and Arese Requiring Corrective Act tone - Seabroek Stat ton iguclear Power Plant rage 22 et 35 j

Objecttwe Subee-MIlttG-0654 quent8y Corsective Previously FIDeA-REP-1 Tested Actten-Bew. I (Esercise Verstled Current Esercise Identifled FilMA Esercise Action Taken Dat e) (i.e., Neoutta) St at us lasue Description Date Issue Objective Cbjective Reference Justodiction g

42. The dispatch of one actual 2/26/06 N/A 3, SS A.3, 0.4 J.10. g Kingston bus was requested by the King st on EUC. This bue never arrived at the Eingston Enc. Based on message forme avattable at the IFO. Kingston did not contact the IFO to clattfy the sit uat ion and request another bus. ( 2. 2. 3.6-D) f*FICIENCY i

ti. Parente of chtleren in the 2/26/06 N/A 45, 59 D.4. D.8 J.10 3 Kingston rg day care centere were H D

contacted by telephone

( s t nulat ed) and requested to plch up their children.

l i

This precedure to tsade-quate and contrary to the plan. All parents night not be available. Although the plan provideo for a request for transportation eaststance free the State in the event that the planned local resources are lasuffletent, parente are never mentioned as provid-ina a means of evacuating day caye centere. *

( 2. 2. 3. 2-D) Df F ICI E80CT 3

to. Naps shoutng evacuation 2/26/04 N/A 4 A.4 J.10.a. Kingston routes, relocasten centere. J.10. b and population by evacua-tion area, although avatt-able, were not posted in t he E t agaton EDC. ( 2.2.1. t )

e e I $

_-- - - . . . _ _ - . - _ . ~ . ..- .-.

. . .o .e , e a . .

TABLE 3 Deficiencies and Areas Requiring CorrectIvo Acalens - Seabrook Station Nuclear Power Plant Page 23 of M Object 8,e Subse-IIUREC-0654 quently Corrective Previously FDtA-REP-I tested Actten Esercise identitled FEMA Eseretse Rev. 8 (Emercise Vertised Current lasse Description Date lasme objective objecstve Reference Jur t set et ten Action Taken Data) (i.e., pesults) Status ti. The Director of Itur s t ag 2/26/86 N/A IS D.2 J.80.4 Etagston g Services at the Etagston Euc had a IIst of special-needs persons. Itoweve r, the plan states that there la no known special-neede populasson in Etagsten.

( 2. 2. 3. 2 )

66. The adequacy of available 2/26/04 N/A 5, 15 B. I . D.4 H , N. 3', East Etagaton I telephone lines for E.6, handling regular EOC J.10.4 operations concurrently with calls from transit dependent populatione u requesttag transportation was not suffletently demonstrated. ( 2. 2. 4. 5-D)

DEf tCIENCY

42. Desatted energency proced- 2/26/86 II/A 3, 43 A.3, D.2, J.lo.4, East Etagston I ures are not in place in 5 0.1 J.10.3 East Etagston plan for managing the alert and not1iicatIon, coensenico-tions and protective actions at two institution-at fact 18Ltem, a DICA camp and the Rosenberg Confer-ence Center. These factit-ties receive intermittent use. Currently, an ener-gency response to these iacttitles would be developed an an ad hoc

bests. (2.2.4.2-D)

E* FICIENCY

68. Naps depicting the plane 2/26/86 N/A 4 A.4 .J.lO.a. East Kingston I EFZ, population by sectur. J.lD.b and relocation centers were neither posted nor avall-able en the Enc operations area. ( 2. 2.4.1 )

- - . -- ~ - - - - _ ___

TAaLE 3 Deficienctes and Arese Sequltlag Corrective Actions - Seabrook Station lluelear Power Plant Page 24 of M Objective subse-IIUREC-0654 quently Corrective Previously FenA-aEP-8 Tested Actlen Esercise Identified FEMA Eseretse Rev. I (Eme rcise Vertiled Carrent Issue Descripaten Date Issue objective Objective Reference Jertsdiction Action Taken Dat e) (i.e.. Resulte) 5tatus N.3 a 6T. Nessages were recorded on 2/26/04 N/A 3. 5 A.3. B.I East Etageten preprinted forms, but procedures were not well def8med ier touting and j handitag of the messages among EOC staf f. (2.2.4.2) g

20. Persone.:t enterlap the East 2/26/86 N/A 20, 29 D.9. D.53 N.3 East Etnaston Eingsten Enc subsequent to E.5.a.

the order for in-place K.S.b sheltering were not mont-Eered ior centamtmation.

(2.2.4.3) PJ H

71. Special-neede persons have 2/26/96 N/A IS D.2 J.10.d East Kingston 3 O

been identitled. Informa-tten en the adJrees and special need of each individual are available and stored in a computer.

According to the local plan, there le no known special-neede populatten in East Klegaton. (2.2.4.4)

72. The adequacy of evallable 2/26/06 N/A 5. 15 s.t. e.4 N.3. E.6 esew castle 3 telephone linee for J. 8 0.4 handling regular EOC coe-musicattens while concur-rently receiving calle from transtt-dependent persone regiees t ing transportarten was not outfIctently demonstrated. ( 2. 2.5. 5-D) twrictracy 4 A. 4 N.3 Ilew Caette I

23. tock p power was not 2/26/96 N/A available in the New Castle Enc during the esercles but a generater has been ordered. ( 2.2.5.1 )

e a

. 9 .e e ,, ,

TAtt_E 3 Def tetencies and Areae Requiring Corrective Act tons - Seabroek Station iluclear Fuwer Flaat raae 25 of 35 Esb ject i ve Subse-1stfREC-0654 quentty Ces rec 3 ve Frestewely FueA-REP-1 Tested actten Enesclee idents c d pee 4 Esercise Rev. t (F.nescine vestiled Cug gent .

essue thscription Date issue objective Objective Reference Jurisdiction Acaten Taken tiete) (i.e.. Wesults) status

74. The New Caette EDC opers- 2/26/86 N/A 4 A.4 J.80.a leev Castle g atens area did not have maps et the plume EFE with sectors labels, current evacuattaa routes, and access cont ros pot et s. A map eef relocation centers ,

was available hut not posted in the operettoms area et the seew Caette EuC. (2.2.5.2)

A.3, S. N.) Isev Castle i

75. Ivessages ettleten By were handled not and 2/26/06 N/A 3, 5 y'

q' were not distributed to all appropriate staff et the new Castle 50C. ( 2. 2. 5. 3 )

76. The Selectmen had mede a 2/26/06 N/A 3, 15 A.), 9.4 J.9 Ilew Caette i prior dectaten to evacuate Iseu Castle whenever the City et Portsmouth one evacuated. This procedure is not described in the local plan. ( 2. 2.5.4) 77, only two telephone lines 2/26/06 N/A 5. 15 S.I. D.4 N.1, E.6, llewfielde I are available to the toc. J.80.d The adequacy et available telephone lines for handitan segular EUC operatIone concurrentty with calls from tranett-dependent IndIeiduaie requesting a ranspur a at ion was not aufttcteatly demonst r at ed. (2.2.6.8-D) leFICIFleCT

TABLE 3 Deftclencies and Areas Requistag Corrective Actleno - Seabreak Statten Ihselear Power Piset Fage 26 of 3)

Objective Suhse-IllieEC-0654 q eatly Corrective Frevtously FEsta-REP-t Tested Action Esercise Identlited PEsta Esercise Bew. I (Emercise Vertiled Current lesse Descripeten Inste issue Objective Objectlee Reference Juriedtetten Actles Taken lute) (i.e. , Beault s) 5tatus

23. Emersency worker radte- 2/26/06 N/A 20 0.9 E.1. a . Itewfielde g logical espesure control E.1.b could met be assered for att Newitelds emergency werkers, particularly these assigned to bus ev.cuattee r eent e s. The esteting supply of destestry would be inadequate il att emer-gency workers were needed.

AdJillenal emergency worker radlelegical espesure control hits would be PJ requested from the IFO as per the plan. The flee wtwee. t i,e r. ,.est for these bits and their dis-t r ibut ton could interfere with the timely dispatch of emergency workers to the field. (2.2.6.2-D)

IniFICIEleCY

29. Backup power was not 2/26/96 N/A 4 A.4 M.) Itewftelde 3 avattable in the Newitelde EIM: et the time of the esercise althemgh a genere-ter has been esdered.

( 2. 2.6. 0 )

fD. Althewah the locattene of 2/26/86 N/A 4 A.4 J.10.a. Itewfielde

• g the recepsten centers and J.10. b poputattens by evacuatSee area were available, these displays were not posted.

( 2. 2.6.2 )

5 0 $ $

- . . . . . t .e .

TABLE 1 Def tslencies and Areas Regelring Corrective Aca tene - Seabrook Stat tee lheclear romer Plaat rase 27 et 15 Objective Subse-IIgatC-06S4 geent5y Carretttwe Prestooely FDBA-RE P- 3 Tested Actton Esercise Identifled FDe4 Eserclee Rev. 8 (Emesclue . Verifled Carrent lesee Desertption Date lesse Objective objective Reference Jertedletten Action Taken Date) (i.e., senalse) states St. A local indesertet 2/26/06 m/A 13. 14 D.2. D.) E.6 neefselde g factitty, the Etagegen Warree Factory, een met directly settited by EOC '

etati of the . emergency siteatten. Lack of prompt nos8fScotten could redece the ability of this factitty to reopend to en escalattag emergency. EOC staff letead to teclude mettitrattee of this f acilit y to a resteed N plee. ( 2. 2.6.3) H C2. The adequacy of evallebte 2/26/06 m/A S. IS B.B. D.4 m.3. E.6 Isent en g telepheme Itees for J.10.d heedttes regolar EOC com-eenicattene ehtte concer-restly receletes calle free t rees t t-de pendent ledivid-eats regnesting transper-tasten aeststence ese met auffictently denometrated.

(2.2.7.5-D) DEFICIENCT

83. The bee ehach ese to arts,e 2/26/06 m/A 3. IS A.3. D.4 J.10 3 IIeet oe g ao part of the esercise never arrived. taoed en message forme avaIlable et the IFG, Newtes did met contact the IFO to clattfy the etteatles and request emother bus. (2.2.7.2-0)

DtFICifMCT

Taste 3 Detteteacles and Areas seguittes Carrecatee Acalone - sembreak Statlee Ihaclear Feuer Fleet Page 2e et M chjectto, Sebee-HUREC-06S4 quentip Corsectise Prestemely FWea-SEF-l Tested Actsee Bew. I ( Emer c ise verttted Cor rent .

• Emerclee identtfled Fena Eserctae (i.e., aeselts) stases Date Issue Objective objective Reference Jestedtesten Actsee Taten pate)

Issue Descripeten y

84. The pleen EFZ map wee est 2/26/04 W/A 4 A. 4 J.to.a. Newton present and the any ohewteg J.10. b the relocattee cesters wee avellable het met poeted.

( 2.2. 2.1 )

8 Eoc were 2/26/06 N/A 39 9.8 J.80.k stewton O b news e staff concerned that traffic conseettee cente he e probles at see local scheel to particator. ( 2. 2. 2. 2 )

8 m/A 14, 89 B.3, 8.8 J.10.g Iteween N 86 4 pebile message wee met 2/26/96 deveteped by Eoc staf f to eettfy pareste et the EOC pies for se early dioelseal at local scheels. (2.2.2.3) g C2. A special factitty, the 2/26/06 m/A IS D.2 E.6, saeuten Facher steadows Wees, esse J. to.d met Itened to the newtoa plea althemgh a etentated evacuatlee was carried est at this factitty dertog the esercise. ( 2.2. 2.4 )

a 2/24/96 m/4 5. IS, S.I. B.4 J. 8 0. g , Por t easet h as. Only two telepheme stees were avat tante to the Enc. 89 S.S J.80.k.

N.3, The adequac y of avallette telephone stees for C.4.a.

handlies regular EOC cem- E. 6, menteettens while concer- J.40.h reetly recetolog calls f ree treasta-dependent todteld-eats requestles transper-tattee assistance was met outiIcteetly demmentrated, le additten. only one tele-pheme time was evallable to the Sempe s taa endret et scheels to the Por t senet h EuC. Cemeegeestty, Ihe 5.perfetendeet et ac tie = I s e

• e o

• * -e . . ,, , ,

Ta4LE 3 Sef actencsee and Asese seqet las conrecttwe Actteme - Seabreak Stat tem therlaar poner Fleet Page 29 et 3)

Chjecttwe 5= hee-IR8 BEG 4M54 goeatly Correcatee .

Previamely FueA-3EP-t Tested Actten Esercise identifled F904 Eseretse Rev. I (Esercise Ver tited _ Corsent lesee Desertptten Bote lease Objective Objectlee Reference Jottadicties Actlee Tabee Dete) (i.e., pesette) 5tates mee reqetred to cont ac t scheele sequeettally lead-Ing to en est imat ed stee delay of one heer.

(2.2.8.t-D) eEFICIEuCY

89. The member of participettag 2/26/56 It/A 2. 3 A.2, A.3 K.t.h. partseneth 3 staff one insofficleet se A.2.s manage the emergency opera-stone en en actest event.

For eamepte, the CD Director also managed operettone med redlelegical N monitoring and record N beept ag. Forthermore, H message traffic mee very heavy regetstog addittamal assistence free the CD =

Dt ecter, and me some eessages mere met off4-ciently handled, leading to stor delays. ( 2.2.8. 2-0)

DFFtCIE30CT E.3.b. Fort eenet h I

90. Perstelpating Eoc steff 2/26/06 m/A 3, 20 A.3, 9.9 appeared to be encertete E.4 ehest emergency merker redsetegical espeeere contres procedores and the es of personat desteetry.

( 2.2.8.3-0) DEFICIFIICY k

- - - - _O__

1 9

YASLE 3 hef tetencies and Areas tegelsens Ceaseca tee actione - Seabrook Stattee thecteer poner Plant Page 10 et 1) obleestve Sehee-teasic-0654 quently Castective Freetemely FestA-eEP-3 Tested Actsom Esercise Identitled F9e4 Esercise se ,. 3 (psevelse vertised Cursent Isses Descripeten Bete lesse objective Objective Reference Jestedicaten Actlee Taken Dete) (8.e., Results) St at en

90. A list of 120 supptomestat 2/26/06 N/A 20 9.9 E.1.e. Port eamet h g emergency esorbegs that had E. 3.b recetoed testetrg one provided by a plaestas ceasettant te the Porte-mouth toc. If att of these pessens, tactedtog hee goides, participated to se .

actual emergency the aves &-

eble supply of des tant e rs

• and Tt.as tsould be leeufft-clema. The petice of ficer dispatched to staff a N traffic centrol potet use mot gives desteetry. Addt-80eemt egelpenet tseeld be required. Yhts to Ithely to effect the effletency of dispatchtes field persee-est. ( 2.2.5.4-D) aslFICIENCT g

C2. Corteet ly. EOC steff have 2/26/86 N/A t, 85 A.5, 3.4 J.2 per t eamet h met spectitcally identatted and Iteted evallable bus guides. This test to necessary for effletently dispatchlag besses and detwere to evacente

. treastt-dependent reet-dente. ( 2.2.8.5-0) tlE F tClf stCT e * * *

. . e- . , . . o . .

TASLE 3 hetIctenstes and Areas aeggtetas Corrective Aca tene - Seabrook Statlee thoclear Power Plant Page 31 et 35 Ch lec t I ve Subne-nesser-0654 quently Corrects,e Presteesty . FEBIA-REP-1 Tested Ac t Ian .

Eserclee Identtiled FEsta Esercles tee. I (Emeresse verstled cetrent lease tarscription Dat e Isene Objective Objective Reference Juttedictlee Action Tahen Date) (i.e., Resulte) 5tatue

93. to the Portseneth EOC, espe 2/26/06 N/A 4 A.4 J.80.a. Port eenet h 3 et the plume EF2, reloca- J.10.h stem center locatten and access concret potete were netther posted not avait-able. A map of the deelg-mated evacuatsee restes use avattable although it use met posted. (2.2.s.8)

94. Securtly for the EOC 2/26/06 N/A 2, 4 A.2, A.4 E3 Porteameth 3 operattems area wee leadequate. ( 2. 2. 8.2 ) to

95. EOC staff deterstmed that 2/26/06 N/A 2, 85 A. 2, D. 4 J.60.g. Fort ement h g y 83 traffic contret petete J.10.k would be needed to ade-gestely emeage thle coe-enmity incteding two addittemet traffic central points that are not cut-restly specified te the town plan. ( 2. 2.8.3 )

96. During the esercise, se 2/26/96 m/A 3, 15 A.3, D.4 A.2.e. Porteesuth 3 hoe wee J.9, evacuatten requested by Enc statt f rom

• J.10.d the IFO for demonstrattee purposes. This request wee maJe et 84l6, about 45 etautes after the evacua-tion receamendanten. EOC seaff should promptBy assese their emerseecy

" meeds and request transper-tas ten aselstance in a more timely manner. ( 2.2. 8. 4 )

Ta4LE 1 Deficiencies and Arese Requiring Cerrective Actions - Saabreak Statlee lheclear Power Plant Page 12 et 1) .

Objective 5 bse- ,

NefREC-0654 quently Corr ettwe Freetemely PDeA-REP-1 Tested Actten Eseresse Ideettfted Feen Esercise Rev. 8 (Emeresse Westiled Cassent Issue Descetysten Date Ise e objective Objective Reference Jertsetetten Actles Taken bete) (i.e. Results) States

97. Euc staff espressed a 2/26/04 N/A 4. 15 A.4. D.4 J.10.g. Por t emeet h g concers that the destpaeted J.10.k bee stagtes area for Portsmooth may be a problee due to teacceestbtltty, traffte congestion, sad lack -of adequate space.

( 2. 2. 8.% )

94. The adegeacy of the three 2/26/06 N/A 5. 35 S.I. D.4 u.1 Seabroeit g esternal telephone times J. 8 0.4 for headitag regular EOC beatness uhtte comemareetly receiving calle free transit-dependent yersene p regeesttag transportation seatstaece wee met sufft-ciently demonst rated at the seabroek EOC. (2.2.9.8-D) lirlCIENCY

99. B e resse (0-200 mR) and 2/26/06 m/A 20 B.9 N.ll Seabreak I htgle-range (0-800 m) desteeters were available at the Seabrook EOC.

According to the local plan, eld-range (0-20 R) desteetere are to be available. (2.2.9.2-D)

De.FICI F asC1 100. The petice of f Beer who wee 2/26/06 m/h 20 e.9 E.3.a. Seabreak i dispatched to demonstrate 0.4.g the staf f tag of a traf fic ca trol point did met come to the Seabreet EOC te plch up desinetty and did not reatise ahas he should have taken desteetry with him. ( 2.2.9.1-D)

REFICi tNCY l . .

l

w

. 4 .o . e. a. . .

Tatt.E 1 SeiScienstes med arose tegelttag Correctlee actlene = $ sabreek Stettee lhecteer Feuer Fleet Page 33 et 3)

Objecttee Sebee-autRC-96S4 quently Correcatee Prestamely FutA-REF-8 Tested Acttee Beerstee Identitled Feen Beerstee Bee. I (Emeretse tertitee Corrent losee Descripalee Sete losee Objerttee Objectlee Reference Jettedictlee Actlee Takee Date) (t.e., sesette) Statue Bil. The coefteenstal list of 2/26/94 m/A 3, 14 A.3, 9.7 J.IO.d. Sea %reak I special-eeede pereees J.10 3

. catted for le the local pies was met available et the Seabreek Eoc dettag the esercise. Furthermore, the sweeerces required to settfy med tronoport special-seede pereene have met been fully ideettited.

(2.2.9.4-0) DEFICItalCT N

t*,2. A sep of accese centro! 2/~.6/06 N/A 4 A.4 J.80.e. Seabreak I N po t et e wee avellable and J.10. b Ut need dettag the er,ercise but see met poeted and a map of pop =Battee by seec-eattee area was neither posted eer evettable.

( 2. 2.9. I )

133. The pettce of ficer who see 2/26/06 N/A 3. 11 A.3, 3.4 J.lo.g Seabreak i eiepetched to deseest ete St.e staf flag of a trefits centret penet did met report to the Seebesak ESC to recette teatrectlene so where to dtract tretite once the traffic centret potet had been set op. At the traf fic cent rol potet, the pettce efficer directed traffic (ele -

lated) eut of the plane EF2, but set by the pre-cedure spectiled to the local plan. ( 2. 2.9. 2 )

104. See becal echmet (day 2/26/96 Bla 5, 19 s. t . D.S J.to.g Seabreek I cere/edeces tenet f act tity) had en omedated telepheme o.aber for the Et sC.

( 2. 2. 9. 9)

r------------------ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - --

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ~ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - -- -- - - - -

Test.s 3 Def tsteacles and Areae Regetting Correctlee Actlene - Seabroek Stettee ihocteer Peeer Pt eet Page 34 of 31 chjecttoe Sehee-ImmeC-06*4 geset ty Carrect1ve

- Frewteesty FIBIA-SSP-1 Tested Actsee toerstee identified FEBRA Emeretos Ree. I (Emercise Verified Cearest lesee Descripaten Bete Isome objecutee Objective Reference Jertedicates actlee Tabee Bet e ) (i.e., seemite) st ea m.

I RC% The adegency of the see 2/2h/M m/A 5. 85 a.t. s.4 m.3, t.6 Strachen avattehle telephees lines J.50.4 for headtleg tegeter EOC caemme eettome ehtto concetreettF secelstog calle tree special r epele- i stame ese met softtelently deoenetrated. ( 2. 2.10. 8 - 4 B) DEFICIEeCT 9.9 E.3.e I 804. Although the local pies 2/26/M P/A 20 Strathan spectites that both 0-200 kJ

.A and 0-20 m deeleetete are to be asettable et the p

streches EoC. eety 0-200 ,

ma desteetere eure ovatt-ebte. ( 2. 2.10. 2-0)

DEFICiteCT 802. A teet af seidee eed their 2/26/M e/A 2, 20 A.2, 3.9 0.4.4 Strechen I telephone emebere one eet evettette to the sec.

Gutdeo have respeestbattty for redtelegical esposere meettertag et themselves i and bee dstvere. It could set he vertited that the f estemteer fire departeemt i members. eAs eere to be i the gotdes. are actually aesttente. (2.2.10.3-e)

Dt F ICIEeCT J. lo.s I 108. The requested scheel tem 2/26/M N/A 3. S. A.3, 8.I, Strathan did not arrtee. Based en 39 3.8 message teree ovellable et the IFO. St rathan did not coetect the IFO to clarlf y j the etteetIse med request meether hee. ( 2. 2.10.4-0)

DEFICiteCT e e # 6

i e e e ,

TAet.E 3 Dettelencies and Arese togetting Corrective Actless - Seabroek Stettee shoclear Power Plant Page 35 et 35 Objective Subse-puenc.0654 geoesty Corrective Previewety PEMA-BSP-t Tested Actsom Eseretee Ideactised PElan searcise Rev. I (Emeretae vestised Casseet tonee Descripales Dere lesee Obj ective Objective Reference Jettedicalme Acatee Takee Date) (i.e., seewite) States A,

109. A steolated evacuattee of 2/26/96 N/A 1. 10 A.3. S.I. J.10.e Stratham I a special seede todteldeal SS S.2 to the Emeter nespital was carsled out at a stem when ao evacuattoe order wee is effect for plume EFE comeuetttes Sectedtalt Eneser. ( 2. 2. 80.5-D )

IdrtCituCT 510. nape et evacuattee restee 2/26/06 N/A 4 4.4 J.80.a. Stratham I and

.er.

selecast

.v.ti.. ee centese

. .et .er.

J.80.b g

met posted and a esp of y the plume EFE with sectore teheted wee met posted to the Strathan EOC.

(2.2.10.8)

III. A computer llettes of 2/26/06 N/A 3. 18 A.3 B.2 J.80.4 Strathan I reendents with erectal eeeds and a descripttee of these needs use avattable to the EOC. According to the Recal plan. there to me heems special-meede pepelattee to Strathem. *

( 2. 2. 8 0.2 )

Tast.E 3 Def teteactes and areae tegelstas Corrective actions - sembreak Statten inacteer power Plaat Page 3Se of 3)

Objective Sebse-emese *454 geest t y Ceteec:ive prevtomeIy PEIGA-SEP-d Teeted Actise Eseresse Ideettfled Fagea Esercles see. 8 (tsercsee vestised Current losee Descstytten Date Isome Objecttee Objective Reference Jestedtettee acties Takee Dat e) (i.e.. Resents) statue 512. anny sheet 750 to 8200 2/26/e6 m/A 27 8.48 J.12 men uompshire a people could be mentrosed to the first 82 heere eith the staf f aestgeed by the plae.

The Manchestes plea tedt-c as es that staechestet useld aeswe as heet to commentales etch a rest-dent end treestent popete-sten of 25.817 Ewee if eely 20E of this pepela- U 33 teen (5.878) avsteed at the recepates center, the ples, precedeses, med statileg levels demon-esseted at the eserctee useld met he omfficient to meester these evacuees

• utthis sheet e 82 hour9.490741e-4 days <br />0.0228 hours <br />1.35582e-4 weeks <br />3.1201e-5 months <br /> perted as spectfled te FEna-tEP-8 pienetas esendeed eteneet J.82.

( 2. 0. 7. t -8) *EFICIteCT sertEs lasse avecespeteen leases described are Arese meestries Correettee acates. encept for those spectitetetty ideettfted as erftetemeten.

Resee Ideettitcettee Code Ihneheres Identtiteattee member uhtch appeare se parentheses ef ter the leone descripeten. The first three er four digste refer to the sepest section o aber le ehtch the sesee to presented. The last digit refese se the spectile eumber of the gases ao listed to the seport section.

Psewtemely ideastfled tseems Itet applicable (m/A) elece the 2/26/06 enesclee use the first for Seabreak Stattee.

FEna Objectiees Free the test el Fassa's etendard 3% core objecatwee.

Eseretse Objecttwea From the tietseg of State's eserclee objecttwee as presented la this report.

Actlee fatees T*.ae actlee taken by the State med local jertsdica tene in reopease to the proposed actlene, objecatee 5ebeequeetly Teeted: tedicates eenether se set the seeectated objectives have been tested at a embeequeos esercise. Also provides the esercise date.

Corrective acatee vestiseds Deecsthee the seemits of the correcties actlene se observed destag a subsequent esesclee.

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Ib geneestrate the 9996 3 1 5/A A/4 E/& M/4 3 N/A N/A N/A I I I I I I I I t I t N/A N/A N/A N/A N/a n/a N/A esseelsettemet obtlity end s'eeeerces neces-sery se manage se esdesty seecoattom et att et past of the glose EFE.

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233 APPENDIX 1 ANALYSIS OF NEW IIAMPSHI E TRANSPORTATION RESOURCE REQUIREMENTS COMPARED TO RESOURCE AVAILABILITY

.A comparison of the bus, van, and driver resource requirements, as specified in the State Compensatory Plan and the Radiologice.1 Emergency Response Plans for the local governments in the Seabrook Staticin Plume Expesure Emergency Planning Zone, with the availability of these resources as provided in supporting letters of agreement that were in force on the day of the February 26, 1986 exercise of the plans was done.

The analysis showed that there were fewer buses ava'ilable than would be required to

' implement th'e plans for participating and nonparticipating communities. For example:

• There are fewer buses listed as available in the letters of agreement '

tMn are specified as required in the State Compensatory and local plans for Greenland, Portsmouth, Stratham, Newton, Exeter,

- Hampton, and Kensington.

• In every community except South Hampton, there are inconsistencies between the vehicle requirements identified in the State Compensatory and local plans and the availability of vehicles as provided in the letters of agreement that were in effect on the

, day,of the exercise.

'* , There ,are: shortages of 39 buses and 5 vans for participating l

commuiiltles, 6 buses and 3 vans for nonpseticipating communities; l a shbetage of 45 buses and 8 vans overall.

• There e,re fewer Crivers available than buses for five of the eleven compan.ir,s for which letters of agreement are in force. These five companies are a total'of 111 drivers short of the plan requirements for buses and vans.

• According to observer interviews oc the day of the exercise, letters of agreement are not reliable.- At both o'f'the two bus companies where interviews !aere held, bSs cordpany personnel said that fewer l ,

l drivers would participate in an actual event than the letter of agreement indicated (see notes h and i on the table).

• See tle table for further details of the analysis, l

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Federal Emergency Management Agency .

Region 1 J.W. McCormack Post Office and Court House

. Boston, Massachusetts 02109 June 2, 1986 Mr. Richard H. Strome St' ate Emergency Management Director New Hampshire State Civil Defense Agency State Office Park South

• j 107 Pleasant St.

Concord, NH 03301

Dear Mr. Strome:

We are enclosing two copies of the FEMA /RAC review of the New Hampshire Submissions of February 1986, (known by FEMA as New Hampshire Submission #2). In addition, we enclose a draft FEMA /

RAC review of the New Hampshire Submission of April 16, 1986 (designated as New Hampshire Submission #2A). This draft has received extensive RAC review and comments; however, we have not received final input from all RAC membe s. We hope to finalize the FEMA /RAC review of New Hampshire 2A within the next fourteen days.

Please call if you have questions.

Sincerely, 1

! Edward A. Thomas, Division Chief Natural & Technological Hazards Enclosures e

'O REVIEW 0F NEW HAMPSHIRE RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN Volume 5, Letters of Agreement F EM A-R E P.-1 Rating Comments  !

Element j l

A 3, C.4 1 Some letters are unsigned, some are missing, some fail to indicate with enough specificity what resources are available, and some are at variance with the resources called for in the State plan. Coments on specific letters follow.

The letter of agreement between New Hampshire Yankee Division of Public Service Company of New Hampshire and the States of New Hampshire and Massachusetts is evidently incomplete, and is unsigned.

The Interstate Civil Defense Compact is missing from the volume.

in the letters from New Hampshire hospitals, the letter from Catholic Medical Center refers to a previous letter of 1/6/84, not included in the volume. The agreement from Huggins Hospital is illegible.

In the letters from bus companies, the letter from Warbuaton (sic) Transportation, listed in the index, is missing. No letters a*e listed in the index, or included in the volume, from three other bus suppliers included in the State plan, Timberlane of Kingston, the Town of Durham, and Somersworth.

As described in the draft Februaay 26, 1986 Seabrook exercise assessment, the Dover School District has abrogated its letter of agreement. In the other eleven letters that are in force, there are several discrepancies between the numbers of vehicles and the numbers of daivers available and the numbers called for in the State plan from each company, and between the companies' and the State's planned allotment of vehicles to communities.

! For example, Jan-Car Leasing Company's letter of agreement states that 197 buses and 30 vans would be available, but they can only provide 150 drivers. The State plan calls for this company to provide 208 buses. Other companies have letters of agreement but no allocation in the State plan.

The letters of agaeement set forth the maximum number of buses and drivers available. Howevg,a , as described in the draf t exercise assessment, the number of buses and/or drivers given -

in the letter of agreement may not always be available.

REVIEW 0F NEW HAMPSHIRE RADIOLOGICAL EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN Volume 5, Letters of Agreement FEMA-REP-1 Rating Comments Element l

A.3, C.4 The State plan calls for a total of 551 buses and 22 vans and (Cont'd) the existing letters of agreement provide for 568 buses and 30 ans. However, the State should review and revise the allotment of buses and drivers and review the availability of resources at various times to ensure that local needs are met. The State should establish a surplus pool of buses and drivers, to cover for those resources may not immediately be available.

Memoranda of Understanding with the Coast Guard and the U.S.

Air Force are unsigned. Two letters listed, from FAA Concord Flight Service, and f aom New England Telephone Company, are cited as "on file" at NHCDA offices, but not included in the volume. There is no agreement listed or included with Boston and Maine Railaoad regarding the service going from Portsmouth to Seabacok.

The letter from the New Hampshire Towing Association is unsigned, and cites only a general willingness to " provide emergency tow-ing as needed." It lacks any commitment of specific numbers of vehicles or drivers. There are no letters of agaeement with specific towing companies.

The letter from the New Hampshire School Transportation Assoc-iation cites only a general willingness to " encourage school bus contractors and school dist"icts to wo*k coopeaatively...

in planning for and assisting in the State Emergency Response effort." No commitment of specific resources is given.

Letters from eight ambulance companies cite only a general

! willingness to " provide transportation service as requested,"

but lack any commitment of specific numbers of vehicles or personnel. The one letter that is specific, from Berlin Emeagency Medical Services, commits at most two ambulances to respond out of their service area, and cites significant limitations on their training and equipment to respond to a nuclear power plant accident.

PEVIEW 0F THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE COMPENSATORY PLAN FOR SEABROOK STATION FEMA-REP-1 Element Rating Comments A.I.b A Tne concept of operations is specified.

l A.l.d A Adequate.

A.I.e -

See State Plan RAC review comment.

A.2.a I The compensatory plan should include a matrix to show who has what responsibilities. The compensatory plan and state plan need to be fully integrated to show increased require-

• ments in the compensatory plan for various agencies.

A.2.b I The plan should state the legal basis for implementing the compensatory plan and for any special actions required by the Governor or his/her designee.

A.4 I The plan should include rosters which clearly identify people who are available and trained to carry out all the functions assigned to the agencies under the compensatory plan. For example, the Rockingham County Sherif f's Depart-ment does not appear to have the resources to perform all the assigned duties; i.e., communications center, bus staging area, local staging areas, and bus guides.

E .1 A? Generally adequate, but the implementation of the compensa-tory plan by the IF0 controller is unusual. It is recom-mended that the State Director be notified that contact could not be made or that local government is not capable of responding to the emergency and then that the State Di-rector direct the activation of the compensatory plan.

E.7 1 The ERBS message (p. 4-A-2) should allow for protective action for various ECLs, not just General Emergency. The

, message is to be issued "upon being advised that transporta-tion resources are available for towns for which compensatory actions are being taken," which could be at an ECL other than

• General Emergency. The message should also provide state how people within participating towns may obtain assistance. The bus aoutes should be included in local plans and in the pub-lic info mation brochures. If possible, the number of routes i should be reduced for the towns. The one phone number given in the message would not be sufficient to handle the expected volume of calls.

I

• Denotes cnanges from draft document ci"culated 4/30/86

REVIEW 0F THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE COMPENSATORY PLAN FOR SEABROOK STATION (Cont'd)

R FEMA-REP-1 Element Rating Comments l F .1. a , 1 A mechanism does not appear to be in place to activate the compensatory plan if (1) Rockingham County is unable to contact the town or (2) if the message is received but no action is taken by the town. The State may not be aware that no town action has been taken until the local liaison officers make their calls from the IF0, which is a delay of at least one-half hour from the initial notification attempt.

F.2 A The local liaison works through the EMS coordinator at the IF0.

H.3 I Adequate space was not available during the exercise of Febaua ry 26, 1986, for local liaison officers performing compensatory plan functions. For further details, see the exercise assessment.

H.4 I While activation of the IF0, including local liaison officers, appeaas to be timely, there is no assurance in the compensa-tory plan that a sufficient number of local liaison officers are available to perform all functions assigned to them. A roster of available personnel and phone numbers is recommended.

• H.10 A? Inventories need to include the quantities of each item.

See Section C.3 paragraph L-1-2.

H.ll 1 The communications resources for the local liaison officers to perform their duties are inadequate. In particular, since the public is to contact the local liaison officers, the num-ber of telephone lines available to the public is inadequate.

J.9 See State Plan RAC review comments.

J.10.a 1 The plan has been prepared in detail for only five of the seventeen communities. Maps and narrative listings of bus routes should be prepared for all communities to meet the contingency of any of them not participating.

J.10.c See State Plan RAC review comments.

• Denotes changes from draft document circulated 4/30/86

, REVIEW 0F THE STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE COMPENSATORY PLAN FOR SEABROOK STATION (Cont'd)

FEMA-REP-1 Element Ra ti n'g Comments J.10.4 I The Compensatory plan does not provide the local liaison l officer at the IF0 with information that local officials i have concerning the name, location and special needs of the  !

mobility impaired individuals. Generally, addressing the '

needs of mobility impaired individuals on an ad hoc basis as implied in the compensatory plan is inadequate. It is not clear from the plan what sources are to fulfill Hampton's i estimated need for 23 EMS vehicles. Also, see the exercise assessment for a discussion of the availability of ambulances and their allocation to communities.

J.10 9 I Strip maps or directions from the bus company to the Rock-ingham County Staging Area are not available. Maps con-tained in the Rockingham County Sheriff's procedures are not clear enough either for trips to local staging areas or for individual bus routes. The maps are variously insuffi-cient in detail or illegible due to photocopying. Please see the exercise assessment for further discussion of the maps and for a discussion of the availability of buses and

• daivers. Maps are not available for all communities. A method for establishing priority for resources should be developed. The need for local staging areas should be re-viewed. If local staging areas are used, what are the procedures if the area is affected by the pluine?

J.10.j A? The plan appears generally adequate regarding traffic and access control; however, it is not clear from the plan what resources will be used to supplement State Police Troop A, if necessary, to cover all traffic and access control points simultaneously. The available resources, including backup personnel from other Troops, should be specified in the plan, along with their allotment to traffic and access control points. The allotment should include contingent assignments to cover traffic control functions assigned to local police departments if they do not participate. A map showing the

• access control points needs to be included (both State and potential compensatory plan points).

J.10.k A? The time needed for resources to remove impediments to evacuation to arrive in compensatory plan communities may be too long. We suggest that vehicles which will remove impedi-ments be located in staging areas.

• Denotes change from draft document circulated 4/30/86

- ... - . - -. ._ . . . _ . - ~

i.

l PRELIMINARY RAC REVIEW i

i i 1 SEABROOK ETE PROGRESS REPORTS N05. 1-6 APRIL 9, 1986 i

e f

1 1

?

i'

}'

i 1

d

j. FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY i

i REGION I

John W. McCormack Post Office and Courthouse Boston, Massachusetts 02109 s

PRELIMINARY REVIEW SEABROOK ETE PROGRESS REPORTS NOS.1-6 RAC Comments on Progress Reports Nos. 1-6

1. Some components of the vehicle demand estimates used by KLD are not thoroughly justified. In Progress Report (P.R.) No. 1, p. 39, KLD acknowledges that they may have overlooked some vehicles in their vehicle demand estimates. However, they then claim that this omis-sion is offset by another omission, the failu;'e to adjust for double counting of residents who are at the beach. While the argument appears attractive (the omissions are, indeed, in opposite directions), it is not verified that the omissions are of comparable magnitude. Further, in P.R. No. 2, pp. 7-9, KLD reports the results of their field count of vehicle occupancy in the EPZ, with numbers typically ranging from 1.8 to 2.4 peasons pea vehicle. Then, despite presenting three good reasons why those counts, much lowe" than earlier estimates, make demographic sense, KLD adopts a factor of 2.8 on the weak grounds that they lack data for earlier in the summer season.

2. In P.R. No.1, pp. 40-50, KLD extensively describes how roadway capacities were dete* mined. But except for a few examples (p. 46), KLD does not indicate which links it judged to be of "high", " medium", or " low" design.

3. In P.R. No.1, p. 26, item 4, Demand Estimations, paragraph 3, Campgrounds, the report has stated that campers may be part of the beach population.

Since evacuation and sheltering are the identified protective actions it is "ecommended that a statement be provided that will provide for the evacuation of campers, and not shelter them, because adequate sheltering is not available. These reports also do not identify evacuation plans for seasonal residents in unwinterized houses.

4 To be consistent with Appendix 4 of NUREG-0654, Rev.1, separate evac-uation time estimates for special population groups a e supposed to be developed. Demand estimates for school children are presented (P.R.

No. 2, pp. 37), but not evacuation tinie estimates. The only information provided regarding population in medical-related facilities is provided i n P.R. No. 1, p. 33. KLD indicated that the data presented there needed to be verified. None of the latter progress reports indicates that such verification was undertaken. Further, no separate evacuation time estimates for this special population group were found in the subsequent reports. Finally, estimates of population without cars requiaing buses are not provided and need to be.

5. Page 3, report no. 2 sets up a Planning Basis of an accident that is immediately a Site Area Emergency which goes to General Emergency in 15 minutes and evacuation is ordered within another 10 minutes. This does not seem a aeasonable planning basis and it is not specified by Appendix 4 of NUREG-0654 which is intimate'd by the report. This will lead to inflated estimates of evacuation times for Seabrook where the early evacuation of beaches is intended and when spontaneous evacuation also should reasonably be expected (to some extent this is acknowledged i by the " Sensitivity Studies" of report no. 3).

i l

1 I

Seabrook ETE Progress Reports 1-6 Page 2 ;

6. Only current population estimates are assumed in the KLD analysis (e.d., l permanent population and employment population). If substantial growth I in this area is anticipated, then ideally the impact of future population increases on evacuation time estimates should be evaluated. Clearly, sub-stantial growth in employment is occurring in this area: in four years (1980-1984) employment has increased nearly 50% (see P.R. No. 2, p. 28).

7. On p. 32 of P.R. No .2, no justification is provided for assuming that "25% of the employees in Hampton and Rye work at the beach areas and 10%

of the employees in Seabrook, Salisbury, and Newbury work at the beach a rea s". These values may be correct, but some basis for them must be provided.

8. The wording of conclusion number 3, p.12, P.R. No. 3 should be changed because it is misleading. A substantial use of traffic management tactics (beyond those normally in effect) to expedite evacuation is already assumed in evacuation scenarios 1-10 as evidenced by the traffic management and control measures detailed in Appendix 1. Additional controls to these were tested in scenario 11 (and its derivatives) and these " additional controls" were found to be "not warranted by the associated marginal reductions in evacuation time".

9. As indicated in Comment no. 8,, the time estimates assume substantial traffic management tactics beyond what normally exists. If personnel resources are not available to implement these controls, then evacuation time will increase. KLD is cleaaly aware of this and describes meetings with local police chiefs to confirm the availability of these resources (p. 1, P.R. No. 5). Since availability of resources is critical to the success of the evacuation plan, it is suggested that KLD publish a list-ing of the available resources by jurisdiction, rather than simply assert that the police chiefs' input has been incorporated.

10. On pp.10-14, P.R. No. 4, KLD *ecommends identifying evacuation routes with road signs. In their comments about public information training and possible deterrence of tourists, they imply permanent mounting of the signs. However, evacuation routes marked for movement away from the Seabrook Station may not be the routes one would wish to have marked for evacuation f om other hazards.

11. A problem with the evacuation time estimates (ETEs) presented in P.R.

No.5 that could confuse many readers is that KLD sometimes apparently takes "2 miles," "5 miles," or "10 miles" literally (i.e., as geometric circles),

as in Tables 26, 27, and 28; and other times, they use the radii as short-hand for the ERPAs, as in Table 25. For visual help, KLD should include a map of the EPZ (like Figure 28) with 2 , 5 , and 10-mile circles super-imposed. And in their Tables, they should be more explicit in disting-uishing between literal circles and regions of approximate radius.

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. Seab ook ETE Progress Reports Nos 1-6 Page 3 i

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12. One value for Table 30 of P.R. No. 5 is questionable: the 6 hrs. 15 minutes ETE shown for Scenario 7, Region 5. Except for this value in l Table 30, all values for Region 5 Scenarios 1-10 are the same as all values for Region 5 Scenarios 1-10 in Table 27. Both columns are apparently supposed to represent evacuation time for the five-mile area around the plant; there should be no difference in the time estimate.

13. According to P.R. No. 6, one of the objectives in drawing up the major diversion route (a route designed to keep non-EPZ traffic from entering the EPZ) was to keep this traffic from mingling with evacuating traffic traveling to relocation centers. P.R. No. 6 states that this objective has been reached, in fact, portions of the major diversion route also serve as routes for evacuating traffic traveling to relocation centers and thus the two traffic flows will mingle. For example, according to P.R. No. 4, Appendix J, the community of Kensington in ERPA C is supposed to use I-93 northbound to reach its relocation center in Manchester.

However, I-93 is part of the major diversion route. Further, the same appendix shows that evacuees from north Exeter and Newfields are supposed to use Route 4 westbound to reach their relocation center in Manchester. This route is also part of the major diversion route. Other examples may exist.

14. This ETE assumes evacuation of all beaches as a protective action.

There is no consideration of wind direction, and plume direction.

Such an overly conse vative action may have an unfavorable impact on the evacuation of the beach population which must quickly leave the a"ea. Consideration should be given to not evacuating beach population which need not be moved until the seriously impacted population has evacuated, l

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Page 1 of 3 NEW HAMPSHIRE-2A Division Of Public Health Services (4/1/86)

FEMA-REP-1 ELEMENT RATING COMMENTS A.2.a E0C - Radiological Health Technical Advisor. Procedures /

Checklist do not include responsibilities with regard to the preparation of EBS messages, N.E. Radiological Health Compact, interface with DOE, laboratory analysis, etc.

A.1.6 During the Alert ECL, while the DPHS IF0 Coordinator is in transit to the IF0/E0F, the Director DPHS should avail himself of Seabrook Station Control Room information.

A.4 IF0/ EOF Accident Assessor Team, it is not clear if there are sufficient team members who are adequately trained to perform the functions outlined in the second paragraph of the first page (particularly for multiple shif ts). Are they sufficiently trained in making recommendations to l the DPHS Director on recovery / reentry in accordance with Appendix T?

D.4? Appendix U. The use of the phrase " Site Area Emergency" with State plant conditions appears to be a contradiction in terms in light of the NUREG-0654 definition of Site Area Emergency. This phrase should be changed.

E.1 Appendix H on page 1 provides for message verification by having "one or both" states read back the information.

Both states should read back the information as standard procedure to ensu e reception of the full message.

E.7 On pages 4 and 5 of Appendix U, public message items numbe- 1(7) and 2(7) are confusing in that some actions of the public are being enforced (restricted access and closu e and clearing of beaches and parks) while the news releases a e stating that no actions a e necessary on the part of the public. These messages should be rewo-ded to avoid confusion.

F.1.a Decontamination Administrator. Telephone numbers are missing from the Attachemnt I listing.

F.1.d  ; 1. It is not clear why the additional attachment, " Follow-Up Form" is included as part of the Decontamination Admin-istrator procedures. This follow-up form also reports release data in microcuries per second. It is suggested that since release rates are reported by the Seabrook plant in curies per second (aqcordidng to Appendix H), that this form also use curies per second -ather than microcuries per second for consistency and avoidance of erroneous information.

Page 2 of 3 NEW HAMPSHIRE-2A Division Of Public Health Services (4/1/86)

FEMA-REP-1 ELEMENT RATING COMMENTS F.1.d 2. Monitoring Team Coordinator. It would be helpful to (Cont'd) have a checklist item on establishing status of field monitoring team call-up and hand-off before the initial contact listed as enroute radio tests. Also, the wording of Item 9 on p. 2 is confusing and should be clarified.

(F.1.d.)

3. See coment of E.1.

F.1.e See comment 2 on F.1.d above.

H.7 1. Laboratory Supervisor. This brief checklist contains no listings or references to specific procedures, laboratory facilities or equipment (with the exception of references to " standard laboratory procedure," and to Appendix M for

" additional laboratory facilities").

2. Radiation Evaluation Equipment (pp 21, 22, 23, 33 of Appendix M). The State should have field monitoring equip-ment similar to that used by the utility. Also, see comment for Laboratory Supervisor. (H.7)

3. Appendix T. The instrument to be used to obtain the counts per minute should be specified.

H.12 Based on separate material eviewed (Radiation Evaluation Equipment, New Hampshire), the laboratory does not appear to be capable of handling anywhere near the number of t

samples which could be expected in an actual radiological l

eme gency with an off-site release.

I.7 Monitoring Team. It is not clear theat New Hampshire has

! six trained team membeas (3 teams of 2 each) to perform j the required surveys.

I j I.8 Monitoring Team. Since other revision materials (e.g. LAB l SUPVR-1) refer to ae-ial monitoring teams, it is suggested that this checklist either be expanded and branched to accommodate aerial monitoring team activities as well, or else a sepaaate procedure checklist be prepared for aerial monitoring. Item 14: teams should be instructed that they should move to a low radiation area before counting their aia sample cartridges, if necessary. Item 21: such a checklist of monitoring t,eam procedures should include an entry for personnel and wehicular monitoring team 1

decontamination at the termination of field activities.

Note that Appendices B and C and Attachment G referenced in this section are not part of the materials being reviewed.

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. Page 3 of 3 pages NES HAMPSHIRE-2A Division Of Public Health Services (4/1/86)

FEMA-REP-1 ELEMENT RATING COMMENTS 1.10 1. Laboratory Supervisor. Special laboratory procedures need to be developed for handling and analyzing samples during emergencies (e.g. contamination monitoring and

- sample screening).

2. Appendix A. Laboratory personnel other than the supervisor are not listed.

3. Laboratory Analysis Capability. Analytical times listed for milk and vegetation samples are unrealistically long for emergency situations. Shorter scanning procedures should be developed using higher minimum detectable act-ivities (MDA) For example, if the MDA of 500 pCi/l might be used for 1$1 1inmilktoconsidergg1ly1 lower the counting time for milk samples. The PAG for 2 in milk is 15,000 pCi/1.

1.11 ,

Monitoring Team. The plans should instruct the teams to locate the edges and centerline of the plume.

J.10.f DPHS IF0 Coo-dinator. At the General Emergency ECL does authorization for emergency workers to take K1 refer to the DPH monitoring teams o- to all local and state emer-gency workers? How would IF0/ EOF Radiological Health Technical Advisor implement this " authorization?"

l J.11 Appendix T.

J 12 The protocols developed by New Hampshire Department of K.5.a Public Health are quite good and improve the business of decontamination, monitoring and communications. Unfortu-nately there was nothing that assigned responsibility for medical control to the Seabrook area. If it is in place, please inform us who is making the decisions and what hospital is designated medical control for patients who are in need of acute care but may be contaminated.

M.1 1. How is the relationship of 100 cm2 ar-ived at, except for surfaces? What is the criteria for food / foodstuffs I

l like vegetables.

2. The specified 170 disintergrations per minute is an unusually low value.

0.5 See comments under 1.7 and A.4.

P.10 See coment F.1.a.

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GENERAL COMMENT

l l Appendix 0. The last two pages (0-8 and 0-9) are illegible.

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Page 1 of 2 pag;s NEW HAMPSHIRE-2A ROCKINGHAM COUNTY COMPLEX Rockingham County Nursing Home (dated 11/85)

FEMA REP ELEMENT RATING COMMENTS A.1.d . 1) ProceduresSection III, pp. F.4-3 and F.4-4. Items -

A through D do not specify a responsible individual.

2) Items F.1 and F.2 on page F.4-5 do not identify a responsible individual.

3) On pages F.4-5 and F.4-6, it is not clear who is responsible for items G.2 through G.5. If it is the Administrator, this should be placed as a separate heading similar to that for Director of Nursing and Social Services Director on page F.4-6.

E.1 On page F.4-3, Item A indicates that notification of an emergency will be received from the Rockingham County Dispatch Center. However, the Procedures for the Rocking-ham County Dispatch Center (RCDC) do not list the Rocking-ham County Nursing Home as one of the organizations that will be contacted by them. (E.1,F.1.a)

F.1 1. On page F.4-3, Item B does not list a telephone number for the State Taansportation Coordinator. Also no telepone number is listed on page F.4-7. ,

2. On page F.4-6, Item G.5 (top of page) should be more specific about which individual or agency at the State E0C should be contacted. The telephone number for this item is missing.

3.Section IV on page F.4-7. Telephone numbers are missing for State Transportation Coordinator and the Brentwood E0C. Names are also missing for contacts at NHCDA and Brentwood E0C. " State EOC in Concord" is inc-correctly placed in the "Name" column.

J.10 1) Recommend that the Rockingham County Nursing Fome plan for the use of their own resources to expedite evacuation, than request requiaed additional assistance from the State.

2) It may not be a good idea to plan on having relatives transport patients; all patients should travel together.

Leaving someone behind who is expecting a relative could be a paoblem. ,

3) The plan states that a numbea should be developed for those who can be taansported, which seems to imply that some patients cannot be moved. Aae the"e procedures for dealing with patients who must be left behind?

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. Page 2 of 2 pages NEW HAMPSHIRE-2A ROCKINGHAM COUNTY COMPLEX Rockingham County Nursing Home (dated 11/85)

FEMA REP ELEMENT RATING COMMENTS J.10 4) It should be established in advance where and to 1 (Cont'd) .

which building patients will be transported. Making calls during an emergency situation to find host facilities could be a problem.

P.2 Signatures and dates are missing on page F.4-7 and P.3 Section til on pages F.4-3 and F.4-4 shows two item Ds.

P .4 P.8 1) It is not clear where this plan fits into the overall NHRERP. It is not listed in the Table of Contents of the State plan, and is not listed as one of the special facilities in the local Brentwood, NH Plan.

P.10 See comments F.1.

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P'9* 1 NEW HAMPSHIRE-2A

, ROCKINGHAM COUNTY COMPLEX Rockingham County Jail Facility (dated 11/85)

FEMA REP ELEMENT - RATING COMMENTS A.I.a It is not clear where this plan fits into the overall NHRERP.

Although a statement on p. 1 indicates that this plan is contained in the State Plan procedures, it is not listed in the most recent copy (12/85) of the plan procedures. It is also noted that the Rockingham County Jail Facility is not included in the listing of institutional facilities in Appendix E (p. E-15) of the State Plan.

E.1 1. On page 3, it is indicated at the top of the page that F.1.a the Rockingham County Corrections Administrator will receive notification from the Rockingham County Dispatch or the Chief Guard. However, the procedures for the Rocking-ham County Dispatch Center (RCDC) do not list the dail Facility, the Corrections Administrator, or the Chief Guard as individuals or organizations that will be contacted by them.

2. On pages 4 and 5 same comment as #1 except applicable to Deputy Corrections Administrator and Chief Guard.

F.1 1. On page 6, the last paragraph indicates that assistance P.10 and support relative to radiation protection will be provided as necessary by the State f*om the IFO. However, there is no listing on p. 8 of individual or agency to contact at the IF0, and no phone numbea is provided.

l 2. On page 8, the home telephone numbeas aae missing for 4 some listings.

P.8 -

See comment A.1.a.

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NEW HAMPSHIRE-2A ROCKINGHAM C0'JNTY COMPLEX Rockingham County Dispaten Center (dated 12/85)

FEMA REP-1 ,

ELEMENT RATING COMMENTS

GENERAL COMMENT

These procedures appear unchanged from the earlier submittal and have the same date (12/85). ,

E.1 ) The hotification listing provided throughout these pro?edures iriclude only local communities. :;ow ever, the special facil-F.1.a ities emergency response plans for both the Rockingham County Nursing Home, and the Rockingham County Jail Facility indicate that they will be notified by the Rockingham County Dispatch Center.

F.3 In Appendix A, page A-2, the dl5 patcher's procedures should include a statement giving the scheduling and frequency of communications tests.

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Page 1 NEW HAMPSHIRE-2A Manchester, NH Radiological Decontamination Center FEMA REP-1 COMMENTS ELEMENT RATING X.5.a

1) Regarding the supply inventory Appendix F 7, would these supplies be stockpiled? Where would they be j K.5.b stockpiled? Who would deliver and set up?

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2) Instauctions on how to measure a record background levels appear to be missing.

The "decon" procedures aae so complete that the projected 0.1 0.4.c number of radiation monitors f aom the DPHS (10) would 0.5 require considerable assistance from local and other resourcas. However, there is no indication in the procedures tnat provisions have been made for training of radiation moni t ors .

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PRELIMINARY REVIEW SEABROOK ETE PROGRESS REPORT NO. 7 A. Evacuation Time Estimates for Transit Operations

1. In discussing the estimate of demand for transit service, on page 2, paragraph 2, the report notes that, "these figures do not take into account the effects of ride sharing with family, friends and neighbors who do have vehicles available." In my experience and judgement, these eff.ects would be massive and should be considered. It is hard to be-lieve that the people in the Seabrook EPZ wqould drive past their neighbors particularly when fleeing a danger. Additionally, the study has neglected the effects of spontaneous evacuation as well as the effect of people walking out of the EPZ. Both of these effects can be of major importance in reducing demand for transit service.

2. Page 2 - KLD acknowledges the problem of small sample size, but then gives only general statements about the resulting uncertainty in the estimates (the confidence interval is " apt to be large"). That un-certainty can and should be statistically calculated and reported.

3. Telephone - The results of the survey might evaluated in the context of census data regarding the number of households with 0,1,2,3 etc. vehicles to ensu*e that the survey results make sense. For example, the number of people estimated to be in households with no cars in specific communi-ties as shown in Table 39 might be compared with census data for those (

same communities.

4. It is not clear f rom this report (or Progress Report No.1) just who cov-ered in the telphone survey of the EPZ area which se"ved as the basis for developing the transit demand estimates. It is unclear whether summer tourists or transients were surveyed; some might require bus service.

Alternatively, the estimates based on this telephone survey may include persons with special medical needs (but who are not in special facilities) who are counted elsewhere.

5. KLD makes several adjustments to their calculations in the name of prudent conservatism (increasing population estimates by 50%; multiplying passen-gers per route by 1.2; counting bus occupancy as only 30 passengers). We have no quarrel with being prudent; but we wonder why those values were chosen, rather than some other? They should be better substantiated.

6. Page 8, 3rd paragraph - During an evacuation, this recommendation to fill buses to capacity has some merit. However, the stress factor to older and minor handicapped persons in changing buses and waiting for buses should be considered. To alleviate some of these problems, it may be advisable to provide radio communications on buses. The bus driver and the local transportation coordinator would then be able to communicate with one another to asce*tain the need for returning to the local trans-portation center, provide information on the numbe" of passengers picked up or waiting to be picked up, and any impediments to traveling specific routes. The bus "outes are not shown as part of the progress report nor are the local transportation centers. Presumably, these will be included in the plan.

1

Pages 3 Legible tables would be preferable. The tables in the progress 7 ,

report were of poor quality.

8. Page 9 - Why does Col. 6 use 36 passengers per bus instead of 30 as in Col. 4?

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9. Page 12 - The summary values of Tr (Xr) are inconsistent with the preced- j ing calculations.

10. Pages 13,16 - KLD bases their expectatico of numbers of buses available on information from State agencies, and thus concludes that the number l of buses available will be significantly greater than the number actually needed. While KLD's reliance on State-supplied information is defensible, they should be aware that the recent exercise assessment and plan reviews cast doubt on New Hampshire's estimates of the number of buses available.

Until the issue is resolved in the State plan, the question here should be considered still open.

11. It can be assumed there is substantial summertime-only employment in the EPZ (especially in the beach areas). Not all these employees will have their own vehicles and presumably will require bus service out of the EPZ.

It is not clear that this population group has been accounted for in these estimates.

12. Page 15 - The Statement that, "In New Hampshire, buses will travel froM their respective originating locations, as needed, to a central transpor-tation center within each community," is at odds with the New Hampshire Compensatory Plan, in which buses are to travel to the Rockingham County Staging Area before going to each community. Further, KLD's statement contradicts their prior statement on p.13 that, " Buses which arrive at the Staging Area early in the emergency would be dispatched to those communities which comprise the Region ordered to evacuate." Therefore, Staging Area preparation time should be added to New Hampshire times as it was to Massachusetts times. .

13. Because the reader is not told where the buses are to come from to provide evacuation service, one has no way of evaluating the bus mobilizatgion '

time estimates of pps. 15-16. Further, in the mobilization time discus-sion, KLD indicates that their current expectation is that the available numbea of transit vehicles exceeds the requiaed numbea by 257.. Again, the ,

reviewer is provided with insufficient infoamation to evaluate this state-ment.

14 Page 17 - KLD's estimate of inbound travel time should be reconsidered in light of the actual experierce of inbound buses in the recent exercise.

Perhaps an adjustment facto" should be applied for drivers getting lost or misdirected. Also, on page 17 a bus preparation time of 15 minutes is estimated. This estimate may actually be the lowest time estimate possible.

If instructions regarding routes to follow and use of dosimeters are to be j given during this time, the 15 minute estimate may be too short.

15. Page 18 - Does the 1985 Highway Capacity Manual (a page citation is needed)

( really indicate a passenger loading headway of only 2-4 seconds for special

! facility populations, including stowing of personal luggage?

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16. Page 18 - A S minute total. bus loacting time is estimated for persons in "special facilities". While this time may be appropriate for school children (grades K-12), it would appear to be too short for day-care facilities and health support facilities.

17. Page 22 - A statement is made that ambulance ar'ival r time should be based on that needed for ambulances coming from North Conway, NH, 90 miles away.

It seems unreasonable to bring in ambulances from 90 mile distance when ambulances are available so much closer in Massachusetts and Plaine. Ambu-lances from the North Shore of Boston are less than half the distance from Seabrook compared with North Conway.

18. Page 22 - It is estimated that the first buses to arrive at a local trans-po*tation center would arrive 1-1/2 hours af ter the order to evacuate. For buses al eady in EPZ communities, this time period would seem to be too long.

B. Su veillance of Evacuation Operations

l. The surveillance and towing plan assumes an assignment of responsibilities for va-ious emergency workers. There is a question as to whether those responsibilities are actually included in the State and local plans.

2. The plan for aerial surveillance requires a specific agreement to be reached with the planned-for helicopter or aircraf t services, and requires personnel to be trained in traffic suaveillance, in addition to the requirements given in the report.

': . The assignnent of State police to ground patrols must be specified in the State plans. Patrol routes need to be defined more specifically than in Fig. 36, i.e., by using a real aced map for the background, or by listing the route directions veabally.

4 Fixed-point suaveillance by traffic guides assumes taining and judgement beyond that specified in previous descriptions of traffic guides' responsi-bilities. Suc'1 training and responsibilities should be specified in local p10ns.

As noted previously in review of the New Hampshire letters of agreement (draf t review of New Hampshire Radiological Emergency Response Plan dated April 30,1986), there are no letters from specific towing services.

Therefore, it is questionable to assume that tow vehicles wil be readily available to clear obstauctions.

C. Confirmation Time

1. This component of the evacuation plan must also be included in the State plans if it is to be relied upon. Specific provisions must be made for the necessary personnel, telephones, and logal directories. Specific written proceaures must be developed, and personnel trained in tneir use, to select a stratified random sample and to interview non-evacuated re-spondents. This componant should be reviewed by a demographer.

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