ML20148H285
| ML20148H285 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Oconee, Mcguire, Catawba, McGuire, 05000000 |
| Issue date: | 01/22/1988 |
| From: | Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards |
| To: | Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards |
| References | |
| REF-GTECI-A-09, REF-GTECI-A-24, REF-GTECI-A-44, REF-GTECI-A-46, REF-GTECI-EL, REF-GTECI-IS, REF-GTECI-SC, REF-GTECI-SY, TASK-A-09, TASK-A-24, TASK-A-44, TASK-A-46, TASK-A-9, TASK-OR ACRS-2543, GL-83-28, GL-85-07, GL-85-7, IEC-78-08, IEC-78-8, IEIN-87-035, IEIN-87-35, NUDOCS 8801270187 | |
| Download: ML20148H285 (42) | |
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SUMMARY
/ MINUTES OF THE ACRS SUBCOMMITTEE MEE11NG ON GENERIC IT[MS l 1. p g,/
DECEMBER 16, 1987 WASHINGTON, DC INTRODUCTION The ACRS Subcommittee on Generic Items held a meeting on Wednesday, December 16,1987, at 1717 H Street, N.W., Washington, D.C., to continue its discussion on the effectiveness of the NRC Staff process that deals with Gencric Issues and Unresolved Safety Issues (USIs).
The entire meeting was open to public attendance.
Mr. Sam Duraiswamy was the cogni: ant ACRS Staff Engineer for this meeting. A list of documents submitted to the Subcommittee is included in Attachment A, and a copy of the presentation schedule for the meeting is included in Attachment B.
ATTENDEES ACRS:
C. J. Wylie (Acting Subcommittee Chairman), J. C. Ebersole, C. Michelson, F. J. Remick, and D. A. Ward.
Sam Duraiswamy (Cognizant ACRS Staff Engineer)
Principal NRC Speaker:
H. Pastis Principal Duke Power Co.
Speakers:
N. Rutherford, J. Thomas, R. Gill, P. Guill, and R. Sharpe EXECUTIVE SESSION Mr. Wylie, Acting Subcommittee Chairman, convened the meeting at'12:15 p.m.
and stated that the purpose of the meeting was to hear presentations from and hold discussion with representatives of the Duke Power Company with respect to:
Various steps involved in implementing the resolution of Generic Issues and/or USIs.
Current status of implementation of generic and plant-specific issues, or other NRC requirements 'et the Duki plants.
ggg12 B7 880122 DESIGNATED ORIGINAL 4
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SUMMARY
/ MINUTES December 16,'1987 GENERIC ITEMS Factors that have contributed to delays in implementing the resolution of issues.
Duke Power Company's position on the Integrated Safety Assessment Program (ISAP)andIntegratedLivingSchedule.
Interaction between the Duke Power Company and the NRC project managers.
z Duke Power Company's opinion on the effectiveness of the overall process of dealing with Generic Issues and USIs.
Contribution to plant safety resulting from the implementation of the resolution of Generic Issues and USIs.
He stated that based on the discussion of the above items, the Subcommitteo will gather information for use by the ACRS in responding to a request by the NRC Chairman Zech on the effectiveness of the NRC Staff's process that deals with Generic Issues and USIs.
He said that the Subcommittee had received neither written comments nor requests for time-to make oral statements from members of the public.
DUKE POWER COMPANY PRESENTATION Discussion of the History of Selected USIs - Mr. J. Thomas Mr. Thomas discussed briefly the history associated with the origination and resolution of certain Generic Issues and USIs.
Generic Issue A-24, Qualification of Class 1E Safety Related Equipment:
The history associated with this issue is included in Attachment C.
Pages 1 and 2.
Mr. Thomas stated that based on some concerns raised by the Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS) in' November 1977, the NRC Staff initially issued'IE Circular 78-08 in April 197' requesting the 8
licensees to perform a review of the status of the environmental 8
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SUMMARY
/ MINUTES
. December 16, 1987 GENERIC ITEMS qualification of equipment in their plants.
Subsequently, the NRC Staff issued several bulletins and NUREG documents, providing clarification and informing the licensees about the criteria to be used by the Staff in reviewing this matter.
In February 1983, 10 CFR Part 50, Paragraph 50.49 was issued, establishing requirements for environmental qualification of electrical equipment important to safety. Also, in June 1984, Regulatory Guide 1.89, "Environmental Qualification of Electric Equipment Important to Safety for Nuclear Power Plants," was issued to describe qualification methodology acceptable to the NRC Staff.
In February 1987, SECY-87-32 was issued to explain how the NRC policy will be applied to deficiencies associated with equipment qualification.
Mr. Thomas stated that it took about ten years to resolve this issue.
There are several factors, such as the following,, contributed to the delay in resolving this issue.
i Lack of conmunication between the industry and the Staff.
Lack of ccemunication among the industry as well as among the NRC Staff.
NRC Staff's inability to provide clear guidance as to what is expected of the industry to deal.with this issue.
Misinterpretation of the NRC requirements by the industry due to ambiguity.
Mr. Thomas stated that the industry is still facing sore problems in 1
implementing the resolution of this issue due to lack of communication and understanding.
Consequently, the Nuclear Utility Group arranged periodic meetings with the NPC Staff responsible for equipment qualification to discuss various factors.
Such meetings had been i
helpful in understanding what needs to be done to comply with the requirements deline.ated in 10 CFR 50.49.
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SUMMARY
/ MINUTES 4-December 16, 1987 GENERIC ITEMS Stating that when issuing requirements the NRC Staff sometimet deliberately makes it ambiguous so as to preclude the possibility of being overly specific, Mr. Ebersole asked whether the industry feels that the NRC criteria should have been more prescriptive. Mr. Thomas responded that early guidelines provided by the Staff were very prescriptive. However, they were developed by the Staff without much contribution from the industry.
As a result, industry had misinterpreted the Staff guidelines. He believes that the industry as well as the NRC Staff had to share the blame for lack of ccmunication and understanding.
Lack of coordination within the industry also contributed to the problems in effectively dealing with the equipment qualification issues.
Proper interaction between the NRC Staff and the industry would have avoided several problems', especially thoso on j
communication and understanding.' He believes that they are making real progress in dealing with this issue as a result of improved interaction between the NRC Staff and the industry groups.
However, they st111 have problems that need to be dealt with.
Mr. Ebersole asked what sort of problems that they still have to deal with.
Mr. Thomas responded that some of the auditors have (.ifficulty in understanding the documents in the file associated with some old plants and some utilities have difficulties in explaining what is in the file or producing proper documentation because the personnel who used to deal with those files had left or reassigned.
Further, he believes that they are spending a lot of money and' time in resolving paper issues and not safety issues.
He believes that audit follow-ups and enforcement activities are on issues associated with documentation rather than on actual safety issues.
USI A-46, "Seismic Qualification of Equipment in Operating Plants":
Mr. Thomas discussed the issues associated with USI A-46 and the efforts taken by the industry in resolving them (Attachment C, pages 3-11).
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SUMMARY
/ MINUTES. December 16, 1987 GENERIC ITEMS f
Mr. Thomas stated that based on the valuable experience gained in dealing with the Generic Issue A-24, "Qualification of Class 1E Safety Related Equipment," the industry decided to get together and try to work with Nr,C Staff to resolve USI A-46 rather than just react to the actions proposed by the Staff. As a result, Seismic Oualification Utility Group (SQUG), represented by 40 utilities, was established to assess this issue and to determine a practical and cost-effective way to achieve a resolution.
High-level management of the NPC Staff has been very cooperative and has been a major contributor / participant in SQUG activities since its inception.
SQUG com91eted a pilot program to evaluate the seismic performance of eight classes of equipment.
This program wat reviewed by the NRC, its corsultants, and an independent panel of earthquake experts. After extensive work, SQUG concluded that the seismic qualification issue is not a significant safety concern as perviously thought.
However, the NRC Staff had difficulty in accepting this conclusion.
Consequently, the Seniar Seismic Review and Advisory Panel (SSRAP), consisting of seismic experts who were agreed upon and chosen by the NRC and SQUG, was formed to review the conclusions r.eached by SQUG.
Based on its review, SSRAP supported the findings of SOUG for the first eight classes of equipment.
Subsequently, the SQUG approach has been more or less documented as being the r.esolution to USI A-46.
He said that early involvement by the industry and good communication between the Staff and the industry had contributed in achieving a realistic resolution to this' issue.
Mr. Thomas stated that prior to the formation of SQUG, several issues, such as cable tray hangers, pipe hangers, snubbers, etc., had been implemented without actually understanding the issues.
Such an approach is not good fcr the safety of the plants.
Even though it takes'some time for implementing certain issues, he believes that the technical aspects of the issues should be understood clearly prior to implementation.,If it is not understood thoroughly, they may not know whether it has been done right.
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SUMMARY
/ MINUTES December 16, 1987 GENERIC ITEMS Mr. Michelson commented that USI A-46 resolution requires that licensees walk through their plants to ensure that nonseismically qualified equipment are anchored properly and will not fall on essential equipment during a seismic event. However, if it falls on a water source and releases the water, the licensees are not required to trace the water path to make sure that it will not affect the electrical instrumentation and control systems.
He believes that USI A-46 resolution is very narrow.
He suggested that utilities take some initiatives on their own and try to trace the water path to make sure that it will not have adverse effects on electrical and control systems. Mr. Thomas responded he believes that a lot of work is being done to look at the consequences of water intrusion on electrical systems.
To achieve a timely resolution of an issue', the scope of an issue should be defined realistica'lly.
He believes that USI A-46 resolution is realistic.
Mr. Michelson commented that spurious actuation of fire protection system during a seismic event and its consecuences have also not been addressed by SQUG.
He believes that it is still an cpen issue a'nd needs to be looked into.
I Mr. Michelson commented that several operating incidents indicate that equipment qualified to withstand water environment has been really j
ineffective when subjected to such an environment. These incidents raise some concerns and questions on the adequacy of the cualification of the equipment.
Mr. Thomas responded that there had been some incidents associated with water at Duke plants.
However, none of them were serious enough to cause any common-mode problems.
Mr. Michelson asked whether the walk-through performed so far in certain plants show that such a process is effective and worthwhile.
Mr. Thomas responded that one of the tnings that is essential to make the walk'-through process successful and effective is proper training of the personnel who perform the plant walk-through. Without a successful
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SUMMARY
/ MINUTES December 16, 1987 GENERIC ITEMS training program, he does not believe that the process will be j
effective.
Mr. Michelson asked whether they have found any surprising things during the plant walk-thrcugh that has been completed so far. Mr. Thomas responded that during the walk-through at the Zion nuclear plant, they have found that some safety-related equipment were not anchored.
Mr. Michelson commented that the approach being used by SQUG in plant walk-through seems to place more emphasis on structurally oriented
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problems than on equipment functional problems.
Mr. Thomas responded that it was a conscious decision made by SQUG.
If the equipment is anchored properly, it is not expected to fall down and get damaged during a seismic event.
If it stays up during a sefsmic motion, they expect.that it will perform its intended function.
Station Blackout Mr. Thomas stated that USI A-44, "Station Blackout," is another issue where the industry has involved extensively to achieve a realistic and j
fast resolution.
They have major efforts under way in resolving this issue. They have been interacting extensively with the NRC Staff on this matter.
This is another indication that major issues could be resolved realistically and faster with proper comunication and better
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coordination between the industry and the NRC.
4 Reactor Trip Switchgear Mr. Thomas stated that in July of 1987, the reactor trip switchgear at the McGuire plant failed to trip during testing.
This type of breaker is widely used in the nuclear industry.
Realizing the significance of this problem, the NRC sent an investigation team to analyze the problem.
Subsequently, Informatio'n Notice 87-35 was issued to inform the licensees about.this problem. An agreement between the NRC Staff and the industry was reached on the approach to be used to investigate this
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SUMMARY
/ MINUTES Decembe'r 16, 1987 GENERIC ITEMS problem.
Investigations were performed by Westinghouse and also by the Franklin Institute.. During these investigations, there has been extensive interaction with the NRC Staff.
This issue was resolved within about 6 months, and NRC issued a Bulletin recently requiring the licensees what needs to be done to take care of this problem.
Mr. Thomas stated that extensive coordination and communication between the industry and the Staff contributed to the faster resolution of this issue. Also, the Staff did not try to force a resciution for implementation prior to giving a chance to the industry to undarste.nd the problem.
Current Status of Implementation of Issues at Duke Plants -
Mr. N. Rutherford Mr. Rutherford discussed the status of implementation of Generic Issues, USIs, TMI Action Plan Items, and plant-specific issues at the Duki Power Company's plants (Attachment C, pages 12-16).
Mr. Rutherford stated that they plan to implement the resolution of USI A-9, "Anticipated Transients Without Scram," by 1989 in McGuire and Catawba.
For' Oconee, they have submitted to the NRC Staff a generic design concept for approval. Once approved, it will be implemented.
He does not believe that implementation of the resolution of the ATWS issue will have significant benefit to plant safety.
He believes that implementing the provisions (i.e.,
improving the reliability of the reactor trip switchgear) of the generic letter that was issued as a result of the Salem ATWS incident might result in more benefit than implementing the overall ATUS resolution.
Stating that for Oconee Units 1-3 the implementation of the THi Action Plan item associated with the control room design is scheduled for 1990, Dr.
Remick. asked why it takes such a long time for implementing this issue. Mr.
Rutherfor'd responded that they have priori.tized all the modifications to be S
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SUMMARY
/ MINUTES December 16, 1987 GENERIC ITEMS done at Oconee and attempted to implement first those that are expected to provide more benefits. Mr. Thomas stated that any modification to. a control room should be performed such that it will not interfere with the plant operation. Making too many changes in the control room during plant -
operation may have some impact on the safe operation of the plant.
Mr. Ebersole asked whether they have to update the drawings, procedures, etc., when mak.ing modifications. Mr. Rutherford responded that they have to update the drawings, operating procedures, training manuals, etc., as appropriate, when making changes to a plant.
Mr. Ward asked when prioritizing the modifications, how they decide which items receive the high priority. Mr. Rutherford responded that several factors are considered when assigning priority rankings; he is not sure of all the details.
One of the significant factors considered in the prioritization process is the contribution to plant safety.
If a modification is expected to improve plant safety, it will definitely receive a high priority.
Mr. Ward asked whether Duke thinks that sharing control rooms and other facilities between units is a good idea. Mr. Rutherford responded that there are some advantages as well as disadvantages in sharing certain systems and facilities among units. One of the advantages is that they will have an experienced operating crew available who could be used to relieve other crew, if necessary. One of the disadvantages is that if there is a malfunction in a shared system, it will affect both units that are sharing the same system.
In response to a question from Mr. Michelsen regarding the instrunentation for detection of inadequate core cooling, Mr. Rutherford stated that Duke Power disagrees with the importance of this instrumentation.
Based on the results of the PRA, they believe that this instrumentation is not necessary.
They believe that proper training of the operators and the use of subcooling
SUMMARY
/ MINUTES December 16, 1987 GENERIC ITEMS l
core-exit thermocouples would be sufficient to deal with the inedequate core cooling issue.
Mr. Michelson commented that he does not believe operators could be trained to ceal with the events that have not yet foreseen.
Inadequate core cooling j
instrumentation will definitely help the operators to detect this problem early so as to prevent severe consequences.
Dr. Remick asked why Oconee Units are far behind in implementing several of the TMI Action Plan issues and also the resolution of some other Generic Issues and USIs.
Mr. Rutherford responded that Oconee being an older plant and also a B&W plant has to make a large number of modifications.
As a result, it is slightly behind in implementing certain modifications. Ms.
Pastis, NRC Project Manager for Oconee, stated that Oconee being an older plant has to backfit all of the modifications.
On several issues, the Staff has to meet with the licensee on several oc.casio'ns to come up with a mutually agreed upon approach to implement these issues.
Things of this sort have contributed to the delay in implementing certain issues at the Oconee plant.
Mr. Ebersole commented that several plants extend sensitive circuits, using extension cords, from the control room terminal boards to various' regions of the plants to provide remote shutdown capability. These extension cords are vulnerable to fire, and it is very difficult to provide adequate protection for these extensions.
He believes that it is a bad practice and the licensees should eliminate such extensions. Mr. Thomas responded he believes that there should be a plant-by-plant evaluation to determine whether these extension cords have really degraded the plant safety.
If they are found to be detrinental to plant safety, they should be eliminated.
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SUMMARY
/ MINUTES December 16, 1987 GENERIC ITEMS Factors That Have Contributed to Delays In Implementing the Resolution of Issues - Mr. R. Gill Mr. Gill discussed briefly various factors that have contributed to delays in implementing the resolution of generic issues and/or USIs (Attachment C, pages 17-24).
Some of the factors contribute to delays in implementing resolved issues are:
Comunication Post-Implementation Review changes in NRC interpretation of requirements changes in NRC reviewers backfit considerations Pre-Implementation Review establishing acceptable solution minimizing backfit concerns Utility Modification Process design review-scheduling resource requirements outage planning post-implementation testing Interaction With NRC Project Managers Mr. Gill stated the proper comunication within the industry, within the NRC Staff, and between the industry and the NRC Staff plays an important role in successfully implementing the resolution of issues.
Lack of proper comunication had resulted in poor implementation history.
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SUMMARY
/ MINUTES December 16', 1987 GENERIC ITEMS Misinterpretation of the original NRC requirements had also resulted in delays in implementing the changes.
Changes in the NRC technical reviewers also contributed to implementation i
delays.
New reviewers ask different questions and raise different issues.
Responding to these new concerns is a time-consuming process.
Changes to the original NRC requirements after mutually accepted by the industry and the NRC Staff had resulted in delays.
Mr. Michelson asked whether the situation is getting better or worse.
Mr.
Gill responded he believes that it is getting better.
Mr. Rutherford stated that the number of issues to'be dealt with now is more manageable than it was three or four years ago.
Consequently, the industry as well as the NRC Staff are able to do a better job in dealing with these issues.
Mr. Michelson commente'd that he is surprised to see that the industry has not.
formed a group to interact with the NRC so as to deal with various generic issues and USIs.
Mr. Rutherford responded that in the future NUMARC is expected to provide more leadership.to deal with these issues.
Mr. Ebersole asked whether Duke Power thinks that more prescriptive NRC regulations would help the industry. Mr. Rutherford responded that he is not in favor of prescriptive regulations.
He believes that the NRC and the industry should work together and define the issues clearly so as to have a better understanding of what needs to be done.
With reference to a statement made by Mr. Gill that good interaction with the NRC Project Managers plays an important role in successful implementation, Mr. Wylie asked whether the interaction between the Duke Power Company and the NRC Project Managers associated with Duke plants is effective. Mr. Gill responded he believes that the interaction with the NRC Project Managers has been effective.
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SUMMARY
/ MINUTES December-16, 1987 GENERIC ITEMS Comments on the Effectiveness of the Resolution Process of Dealina With Generic Issues and USIs - Mr. Rutherford Mr. Rutherford provided the following comments on the resolution process associated with Generic Issues and USIs:
Solve a limited number of issues at one time so that they can be handled effectively.
Do not repeat the "wish-list" approach used after the TMI-2 accident.
Maintain good communication between the NRC and industry te define issues properly and develop an optimum solution.
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Use best-estimate methods, where appropriate, to define problems and achieve solutions.
Ensure that all parts of proposed resolutions provide real' contribution to plant safety.
Ensure timely Staff review in accordance with the defined resolution.
Contribution to Plant Safety Resulting From the Implementation of the Resolution of Generic Issues and USIs - Mr. Rutherford Mr. Rutherford stated that implementation of the following has clearly contributed to plant safety:
Appendix R to 10 CFR Part 50 (Standby Shutdown Facilities).
High/ Low Pressure System Interface (Event V).
Generic Letter 83-28 associated with reactor trip switchgear reliability.
. Emergency operating procedure improvements.
Training improvements, 4
SUMMARY
/ MINUTES December 16, 1987 GENERIC ITEMS Analysis and disseminations of operating experience He stated that implementation of the following has provided questionable improvements to plant safety:
'ATWS.
Reactor vessel water level instrumentation.
Portions of Regulatory Guida 1.97.
Portions of equipment qualification.
Mr. Wylie asked whether any of the issues implemented at Duke plants were i
detrimental to plant safety. Mr. Rutherford responded that the approach used in handling TMI-2 Action Plan Items had the potential for an adverse effect on plant safety.
They spent major resources and time on implementing the changes resulting from the resolution of THI-2 Action Plan Items; during that
,peridd, they were not able to spend adequate resources on preventive maintenance, etc. Also, issues associated wit:e pipe hangers, snubbers, and plant security have some pdverse effect on plant safety, Duke Power Company's Position on ISAP and Integrated Living Schedule,
Mr. Rutherford Mr. Rutherford stated that Duke does not believe that an ISAP for Oconee Units 1-3 would be beneficial for the following reasons:
Necessary modifications have been made to take care of the deficiencies identified in the PRA conducted for Oconee plants.
Resolutions of the TMI-2 Action Plan Issues and other Generic Issues /USIs have-been more or less implemented.
Standby Shutdown Facility has been added.
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SUMMARY
/ MINUTES
- 15 '-
December. 16, 1987 GENERIC ITEMS Self-initiated audit is being conducted on systems at the Oconee units.
Recommendations of the B&W Owners Group Safety and Performance Improvement Program are being implemented.
1 He mentioned that currently Duke Power is having some discussions with NRR to determine whether certain elements of ISAP will be beneficial.
Mr. Rutherford stated that in response to Generic Letter 85-07, Duke noted that they.were developing integrated schedules for internal use only; since the number of regulatory related modifications have been declining, they did not plan to submit such a schedule to the HRC.
However, currently Duke is reexamining that previous decision to determine if there are benefits in developing and submitting to the NRC a formal integrated living schedule.
Mr. Wylie thanked all participants and adjourned the meeting at 4:08 p.m.
NOTE:
Additional meeting details can be obtained from a transcript of this meeting available in the NRC Public Document Room, 1717 H Street, N.W., Washington, D.C., or can he purchased from Heritage Reporting Corporation, 1220 L Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20555, (202) 628-4888.
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LIST OF DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED TO THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON GENERIC ITEMS DECEMBER 16, 1987 MEETING 1.
Presentation Schedule 2.
Memorandum from NRC Chairman Zech to D. Ward, dated September 18, 1986 3.
Minutes of the September 30, 1987 Generic Items Subcommittee Meeting 4
Information Associated with the Resolution of USI A-46, Seismic Qualification of Equipment in Operating Plants 5.
10 CFR 50.49, Environmental Qualification of Electrical Equipment Important to Safety for Nuclear Power Plants 1
6.
Transcript of the Commission Meeting held on October 21, 1987 j
7.
Presentation Material Provided by the Duke Power Company During the Meeting O
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ATTACHMENT A 4
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- PRESENTATION SCHEDULE -
ACRS SUBCOMMITTEE MEETING ON GENERIC ITEMS DECEMBER 16, 1987 ROOM 1046, 171'/ H STREET, N.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C.
ACRS CONTACT:
SAM DURAISWAMY 202-634-3267 NOTE:
? Presentation time should not exceed 50% of the total time allocated for a specific item.
The remaining 50% of the time is reserved for Subcomittec questions and answers by the Staff.
- Number of copies of the presentation materials to be submitted to the Subcommittee:
25 copies TOTAL PRESENTATION ITEM PRESENTER TIME ACTUAL TIME 1.
Executive Session 15 mins.
12:00N - 12:15p 2.
Presentation by the Duke Power Company 2.1 Steps Invc1ved'in DUKE POWER 180 mins.
12:15p - 3:15p Implementation Process /ISAP a.
By means of specific exampler selected as described below, illustrate and. discuss the nature and duration of the several steps involved in implementing the resolution of Generic Issues and/or USIs.
To the extent possible, select examples involving:
(1)long f
vs. short times for implementation, (2) difficult vs.
easy to implement, and (3) hardware fixes vs. procedural changes.
The number of examples should be selected to fit within the time allotted for presentation,
- b.
- What is the current status of implementation of; generic and plant-specific issues, or other NRC requirements, at the Duke plants.
- Discuss the factors that have contributed to delays in implementing the resolution of issues, r/
e
/TTAcHHRHT S
B-j
j PRESENTATION SCHEDULE. NOVEMBER 6, 1987 '
GENERIC ITEMS - DECMEBER 16, 1987,
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TOTAL l
PRESENTATION ITEM PRESET!TER TIME ACTUAL TIME 2.1(cont'd) d
- c. What is Duke Power Company's position on In-tegrated Safety Assessment Program (ISAP) and Integrated Living Schedule
BREAK 15 mins, 3:15p - 3:30p 2.2 Interaction with DUKE POWER 45 mins.
3:30p - 4:15p NPC/ Effectiveness of tho Process
- a. How effective is ycur interaction with the NRC project managers in establishing schedules for implementation, reviewing licensee proposals, etc.?
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- b. Do you think that the overall process, (iden,tification, prioritization, resolution, imposition, implementation, and verification) of dealing with generic issues and USIs is effective?
If not, what could be done to improve it?
2.3 Contribution to DUKE POWER 30 mins.
, 4 15p - 4:45p Plant safety Do you have any evidence (based on quantitative risk assessments) or opinions (based on judgment) relating to the increase in safety that can be attributed to the implementation of the fixes, resulting from the resolution of Generic Issues and USIs?
3.
Subcommittee Remarks 30 mins.
4145p - 5:15p ADJOURN 5:15p O
g B.8
HISTORY OF EQUIRENT QUALIFICATION ISSUE o
NOVEMBER 4, 1977 UCS FILES A PETITION FOR EERGENCY AND PBtDIAL RELIEF CONCERNIfE FIRE PROTECTION AND BNIR0fFBffAL QUALIFICATION OF ELECTRICAL COMP 0fB1TS o
APRIL 13,1978 NRC DENIES UCS REQUESTS, BUT ORDERS STAFF TO TAE CERTAIN ACTIONS o
JUNE 2, 1978 IE CIRCULAR 78-08 ISSUED REQUESTIfE' A REVIEW CF EQUIRENT QUALIFICATION STATUS -
NO RESPONSE REQUIRED o
rEBRUARY 8, 1979 IE BULLETIN 79-01 ISSUED WHICH RAISED j
IEC 78-08 TO BULLETIN STATUS EUS REQUIRItG A RESPONSE o
JANUARY 13, 1980 IE BULLETIN 79-01B ISSUED WHICH EXPANDED B E SCOPE OF IEB 79-01 Af0 SET FORE E E 1
NRC'S REVIEW CRITERIA (DOR GUIDELINES AfD NUREG 0588) o FEBRUARY 29,1980 NRC ISSUES SUPPLEPHITS TO SEPTEFEER 30, 1980 IEB 79-01B FOR CLARIFICATION OCTOBER 24,1980 o
MAY 23, 1980 NRC ISSUES M90RANDlN AND ORDER ESTAB-LISHIfE D0R GUIDEl.INES AND f0 REG 0588 AS REQUIREE NTS FOR MEETING GDC-4 o
AUGUST 29,1980 ALL OPERATIt0 LICENSES B0DIFIED REQUIRING IEB 79-01B CCFPLETE RESPONSES BY 11/01/80
/ rrACHMENT*
0 C-1
HISTORY OF EQUIPMENT GUALIFICATION ISSUE (CONTINUED) o OCTOBER 24, 1980 ALL OPERATING LICENSES MODIFIED REQUIRING:
- 1) ALL SAFETY-RELATED EQUIFENT TO BE QUALIFIED TO D0R GUIDELINES OR NUREG 0588 BY 06/30/82, AND
- 2) ESTABLISif1ENT OF A CENTRAL QUALIFICATION RECORDS FILE BY DEEMBER 1,1980 0
JUNE,1981 NRC C0FPLETES ISSUAtCE T SER'S o
JULY 7-10, 1981 NRC CONDUCTS INDUSTRY WORIGHOP 0
FEBRUARY 22, 1983 SECTION 50,49 0F 10CFR PART 50 RULE FOR BNIRONMENTAL QUALIFICATION OF ELECTRICAL EQUIFNENT IFFORTANT TO SAFETY o
JUNE,1984 REG, GUIDE 1.89 DESCRIBES QUALIFICATION METHODOLOGY ACCEPTABLE TO THE NRC STAFF FOR INDUSTRY CCFPLIANCE WITH 10CFR 50,49 o
OCTOBER 15,1984 PILOT AUDIT PROGRAM INITIATED o
MAY 22, 1985 IE INFORMATION NOTICE 85-40 DEFICIENCIES IN EQ TESTING AND CERTIFICATION PROCESS o
SEPTEMBER 22, 1986 GENERIC LETTER 86 ADDITIONAL GUIDELINES ON LIC94SEE ACTIONS AND NRC POLICY WITH REGARD TO ENFORCEFBff 0F 10CFR 50,49
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o FEBRUARf 6, 1987 SECY-87-32 EXAFPLES OF HOW POLICY APPLIED TO EQ DEFICIENCIES o
APRIL 10, 1987 J.M. TAYLOR MEF0RANDlN TO REGIONAL ADMINISTRATORS - FURTHER GUIDANCE ON APPLICATION OF EtFORCBEfT POLICY C-z
USNRC UNRESOLVED SAFETY ISSUE (USI) A-46 ADDRESSES SEISMIC QUALIFICATION OF OPERATING NUCLEAR PLANT EQUIFNENT l
o SAFE SHlffDOWN ftST BE ASSURED FOLLOWING A l
DESIGN BASIS EAREQUAKE.
o SAFE SHUE0WN (H0T OR COLD) itST BE MAINTAINED FOR A DEIEfNINED LEf6E OF TIME (PLANT SPECIFIC).
o IT IS ASSLNED THAT.THE EAREQUAE DOES NOT CAUSE A LOCA, o
IT IS ASSUED THAT A LOSS OF 0FF-SITE POWER
- OCCURS, o
llSI A-46 APPLIES TO PLANTS WITH CP APPLICATI00,4S DOCETED BEFORE OCTOBER,1972.
IT APPLIES TO 72 UNITS.
o USI A-46 ADDRESSES SPECIFICALLY ONLY ACTIVE EOMNICAL AND ELECTRICAL EQUlfMENT (NOT PIPING, CABLE TRAYS, HEAT EXCHAtEERS),
4 C-3
THE G0AL OF TE SQUG PROGRAM HAS BEEN TO MAKE THE BEST POSSIBLE.USE OF ACTUAL-EARTHQUAKE EXPERIENCE DATA TO RESOLVE USI A-46 o
DEVELOP A HISTORICAL DATA BASE ON TliE PERF0FNANCE OF EQUIPMENT IN CONVENTIONAL P0hER AND INDUSTRIAL FACILITIES DURING AND AFTER STRONG EARTliOUAKES.
o SHOW THAT TliE EQUIFNENT IN THOSE PLANTS IS THE SAME AS EQUlftENT FOUND IN NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS, o
SHOW lliAT THE DATA BASE EQUIPMENT WAS SUBJECTED TO STRONGER GROUND MOTION THAN SSEs FOR PLANTS OUTSIDE CALIFORNIA, o
DETEEMINE WHAT EQUIFFBE OR EQUIFFBE FEATURES PRESENT SIGNIFICANT RISIG IN AN EARTHQUAKE.
o O
C -4
BE FLNCTIONS OF THE SEISMIC EXPERIENCE DATA BASE ARE:
o TO PRWIDE A REALISTIC ASSESSMENT OF BE EARTHQUAKE RISK TO POWER FACILITIES l
o TO DETEfNINE hHAT TYPES OF SEISMIC DAMAGE TYPICALLY OCCUR IN POWER FACILITIES o
TO DETEfNINE TENDENCIES FOR SEISMIC DAMAGE TO VARIWS TYPES OF FACILITIES AND THEIR STRUCTURES, SYSTEMS, EQUIPENT, AND COWONENTS i
o TO DETERMINE hHAT IS TYPICALLY NOT DAMAGED 4
e t
C-f
SQUG CONCLUSIONS o
SEISMIC RESISTANCE OF STANDARD NWER PLANT EQUlffEST, WHEN PRDPERLY ANCHORED, WAS VERIFIED DURING THE PIL0T PROGRAM, o
EXPLICIT, SEISMIC QUALIFICATION OF THIS EQUlfEENT IS t0T JUSTIFIED, i
o SEISMIC QUALIFICATION IS NOT A SIGNIFICAfff SAFETY CONCERN, THEREFORE, FURTHER ACTION IS t0T REQUIRED, 9
8 6
9 4
a C-6
FORMATION OF THE SENIOR SEISMIC REVIEW AND AWISORY PAEL (SSRAP) -
o PURPOSE OF SSRAP REVIEW:
o PROVIDE AN INDEPENDENT ASSESSMENT BY EXPERIENCED SEISMIC EXPERTS T SOUG RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS, l
o PPWIDE APPROPRIATE REC &NENDATIONS FOR USE OF THE SQUG RESULTS o
WPBERS OF SSRAP ifRE AGREED UPON AND CHOSEN BY SOUG AND NRC t
e 4
9 C-7
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vw *v
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AN EXTENSIVE REVIB4 BY AN INDEPENDENT PAtEL,-
THE SSRAP, SUPPORTED THE FINDINGS OF SOUG FOR THE FIRST EIGHT CLASSES OF EQUIFMENT o
EQUIFtENT INSTALLED IN NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS IS GENERALLY SIMILAR AND AT LEAST AS RUGGED AS THAT INSTALLED IN CONVENTIONAL POWER PLANTS, o
EIS EDVIPMENT, WHEN PROPERLY ANCHORED AND WITH S&E RESERVATIONS, HAS AN INHERENT SEISMIC RUGGEDNESS AND HAS A DEMONSTRATED CAPABILIlY TO WITHSTAND SUBSTAtRIAL SEISMIC MOTION WITHOUT STRUCTURAL DAMAGE, o
FUNCTIONALITY AFTER THE STR006 SHAKIt0 HAS ENDED HAS BEB1 DEMONSTRATED TE ABSENCE OF RELAY CHATTER DURItG' STRONG SHAKING HAS t0T BEEN DB10NSTRATED, o
WITH SEVERAL IMPORTANT CAVEATS AND EXCLUSIONS, IT IS THE SSRAP JUDCfENT THAT BELOW CERTAIN SEIS11C MOTION BOUNDS IT IS UNNECESSARY TO PERF0FM EXPLICIT SEISMIC QUALIFICATION OF EXISTING EQUIWENT, o
THE EXISTING DATA BASE REASONABLY DEMONSTRATES THE SEISilC RUGGEDNESS OF THIS EQUIFMENT UP T0 THESE SEISMIC MOTION BQJNDS.
REFERENCE:
SENIOR SEISMIC REVIEW AND ADVISORY PANEL (SSRAP), "USE OF PAST EARTHQUAKE EXPERIENCE DATA TO SHcw SEISMIC RUGGEDESS OF CERTAIN CLASSES OF EoVIPMENT IN NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS" (FEBRUARY,198/4),
C-8 e
A GENERIC IWLEENIATION PLAN IS BEING DEVELOPED TO RESCLVE A-46 ON A PLANT SRCIFIC BASIS IT INCLUDES:
o DEVELOP LIST OF EQUIPW NT REQUIRED FOR SAFE SHUTDOWN.
0 C& PARE WITH SQUG GENERIC EQUIPMENT LIST, o
REVIEW EQUIFMENT DETAIL:
o EQUIPE NT LOCATION o
PHYSICAL DATA o
AN G0 RAGE DETAIL o
IDENTIFY EQUIPMENT WHI G CAN BE SCREENED USING EXPERIB1CE DATA, o
IDENTIFY EQUIFENT hHIG CAN BE SCREENED USING OBER EANS, o
TEST DATA o
ENGINEERING JUDGWNT o'
EXCLUSIONARY RESTRICTIONS WHICH CAN BE OVERC0fE 0
REDJCE PLANT EQUIFMEKI LIST T0:
o EQUIFPalT THAT IS FOTENTIALLY VULNERABLE o
EQUIFENT THAT FALLS OUTSIDE THE LIMITS OF THE SQUG DATA BASE o
EQUIPENT WITH FUNCTIONALITY IN QUESTION o
DETEFMINE PROCEDURES FOR QUALIFYING EQUIFENT THAT CANf0T BE SCREENED o
ANALYSIS o
SHAKE TABLE TESTIf6 o
REPLACBENT o
STRUCTURALf0DIFICATION o
DOCRENT TE RESULTS c-9
SQUG PROGRAM OUTLINE I
o SCREEN ESSENTIAL EQUIRENT LIST
~
o COVERED IN SQUG PROGRAM o
0THER DATA AVAILABLE (EXPERIENCE, TEST) o ENGINEERItG JUDGTR o
DOCLNENT SEISMIC RUGGEDtESS OF EQUIRENT o
ASSIGN RUGGEDNESS LEVELS WHICH CAN BE JUSTIFIED o
IDENTIFY EXCEPTIONS /VULfERABILITIES FOR EACH l
EQUIPt'BfT CLASS o
DEFINE DATA'NEEDS, IF ANY o
C&PLETE/ REVIEW EPRI PROGRAMS, DEVELOP ANCHORAGE INSPECTION GUIDELINES o
AN0iORAGE o
TEST DATA ASSIMILATION o
DEVELOP SIWLIFIED APPROACH FOR DETEPNINING REQUIR'D SEISMIC RUGGEDNESS IN NUCLEAR PLANTS o
ELEVATIONS LESS THAN 40 FEET o
HIGHER ELEVATIONS o
ATTEWT TO LIMIT SCOPE OF RELAY FUNCTIONALITY REQUIREENTS ON GENERIC BASIS o
DEVELOP PLANT WALK-THROUGH GUIDELINES AND TEAM o
PERFORM "TEST" WALK-THROUGH o
DEVEl.0P PLANS FOR SQUG f9EER IWLEKf6ATION 1
0 SEMINARS o
GENERIC SQUG TEAM APPROACH o
SSRAP/NRC AUDIT c jo e
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L_
UNRESOLVED SAFETY ISSUES STATUS ITEM STATUS A-3, 1-5 0CONEE
- TECH SPECS TO CLARIFY TUBE STEAM GENERATOR LEAKAGE LIMITS TO BE TUBE INTEGRITY SUBMITTED 1
MCGUIRE - COMPLETE CATAWBA - COMPLETE A-9 OCONEE
- AWAITING NRC STAFF APPROVAL ATWS OF GENERIC DESIGN CONCEPT MCGUIRE - IMPLEMENTATION BY 1989 j
CATAWBA - IMPLEMENTATION BY 1989 A-46 OCONEE
- AD0PTING SQUG PROGRAM IN SEISMIC RESPONSE TO GENERIC LETTER
{
OVALIFICATION 87-02 MCGUIRE - NOT APPLICABLE CATAWBA - NOT APPLICABLE i
O e
e C-12j
TMI ACTION PLAN ITEMS STATUS ITEM STATUS I.D,1 0CONEE
- UNIT 1 63% COMPLETE, UNIT 2 CONTROL ROOM 45% COMPLETE, UNIT 3 60%
DESIGN REVIEW COMPLETE - IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETE ~BY 1990 MCGUIRE - UNIT 1 98% COMPLETE, UNIT 2 94% COMPLETE CATAWBA - UNIT 1 COMPLETE, UNIT 2 WILL BE COMPLETED FIRST REFUELING OUTAGE I.D 2 OCONEE
- SYSTEM INSTALLED, NRC STAFF SAFETY PARAMETER REVIEW TO BE COMPLETED DISPLAY SYSTEM MCGUIRE - SYSTEM INSTALLED, NRC STAFF REVIEW IDENTIFIED SEVERAL MINOR MODIFICATIONS TO BE IMPLEMENTED.
CATAWBA - SYSTEM INSTALLED, NRC STAFF
' REVIEW IDENTIFIED SEVERAL MINOR MODIFICATIONS TO BE IMPLEMENTED II.B.1 OCONEE
- VENTS INSTALLED, AWAITING RCS VENTS NRC STAFF APPROVAL OF TECH l
- SPECS, MCGUIRE - COMPLETE CATAWBA
-COMPLETE II D,1 -
OCONEE
- TESTING COMPLETE, RESPONSES RELIEF AND TO SECOND ROUND OF STAFF SAFETY VALVES QUESTIONS TO BE SUBMITTED 02/88 MCGUIRE - TESTING COMPLETE, AWAITING NRC STAFF SER CATAWBA - TESTING COMPLETE, RESPONSES TO NRC STAFF QUESTI0,NS TO BE. SUBMITTED 01/88
TMI ACTION PLAN ITEMS STATUS (CONTINUED) j ITEM STATUS II F.1 OCONEE MONITORING INSTALLED, ACCIDENT AWAITING NRC STAFF APPROVAL MONITORING OF TECH SPECS MCGUIRE - COMPLETE CATAWBA - COMPLETE II.F.2 OCONEE INSTRUMENTATION INSTALLED, INSTRUMENTATION PROCEDURES FOR RX VESSEL FOR DETECTION WATER LEVEL TO BE IN PLACE 0F ICC EARLY 1988, TECH SPECS TO BE SUBMITTED EARLY 1988 MCGUIRE - COMPLETE CATAWBA - COMPLETE GENERIC ANALYSIS APPROVED, II.K.3.5 OCONEE AUTO TRIP PLANT SPECIFIC INFORMATION OF RCP's SUBMITTED TO STAFF FOR REVIEW MCGUIRE - COMPLETE CATAWBA - COMPLETE II,K,3'31 OCONEE SBLOCA ANALYSIS SUBMITTED COMPLIANCE WITH TO STAFF FOR REVIEW 10 CFR 50,46 MCGUIRE - COMPLETE CATAWBA - COMPLETE I I I. A,1,2 0CONEE INTERIM EOF IN USE, EMERGENCY SUPPORT PERMANENT E0F AVAILABLE IN FACILITIES LATE 1988 MCGUIRE - COMPLETE CATAWBA - COMPLETE C-iq.
t
TMI ACTION PLAN' ITEMS STATUS (CONTINUED)
I
\\
JTEM STATUS III.D.3.4 0CONEE
- CERTAIN MODIFICATIONS CONTROL ROOM REMAIN TO BE IMPLEMENTED HABITABILITY MCGUIRE - COMPLETE CATAWBA - COMPLETE R G 1.97 0CONEE
- STAFF REVIEW RECEIVED (5 ITEMS STILL UNDER REVIEW),
MODIFICATIONS TO BE INSTALLED BY 1990 MCGUIRE - STAFF SER RECEIVED (2 ITEMS STILL UNDER REVIEW),
MODIFICATIONS TO BE INSTALLED BY 1989 CATAWBA - STAFF SER RECEIVED (ITEM STILL UNDER REVIEW),
REMAINING MODIFICATIONS ARE i
INSTALLED o
4 e
i C -15
.c
~
j
SUMMARY
OF TYPICAL OPEN ITEMS 0
GENERIC LETTERS 83-28 GENERIC IMPLICATIONS OF SALEM EVENT-87-06 PERIODIC VERIFICATION OF, LEAK TIGHT INTEGRITY 0F PRESSURE ISOLATION VALVES 87-12 LOSS OF RHR WHILE RCS IS PARTIALLY FILLED 0
IE BULLETINS 85-03 MOV TORQUE SWITCH SETTINGS 87-01 THINNING 0F PIFE WALLS IN NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS 87-02 FASTENER TESTING TO DETERMINE CONFORMANCE WITH APPLICABLE MATERIAL SPECIFICATION 1
O PLANT SPECIFIC j
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION REVISIONS ISI/IST PROGRAMS ISI/IST RELIEF REQUESTS APPENDIX R EXEMPTION REQUESTS COMMITMENTS IN LICENSEE EVENT REPORTS C -/6
FACTORS CONTRIBilTitE TO del.AYED l
IFPLDENTATION OF ISSUES o
C0FMJNICATICN IS BE EY o
POST-IFPLEENTATION REVIEW o
GAfEES IN NRC INTERPRETATION OF REQUIREFBiTS o
GAfEES IN NRC REVIEWERS o
BAQGIT CONSIDERATIONS o
PRE-IFPLDEfffATION REVIEW 0-ESTABLIS'HES ACCEPTABLE SOLLITION o
MINIMIZES BA071T CONCERNS o
TIMEl.Y o
UTILITY MODIFICATION PROCESS IS EXIDGIVE o
DESIGN o
REVIEW l
0 SGtDULItE 0
RfSOURCEREQUIRENNTS o
OUTAGE PLANNItE o
POST-IPPlBENTATION TESTING o
INTERACTIONW/tsCPROJECTMANAGERS C -/ 7 4
RCS VENTS TMI ACTION PLAN II,B 1 o
ORIGINAL DESIGN DESCRIBED DURING ftGUIRE LICB4 SING PROCESS o
NRC REVIBED DESIGN AND OPERATING PROCEDURES DURING LICENSING PROCESS (COWLETE 02/83) o GL 83-37 DATED 11/01/83 PROVIDED MODEL TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS o
VERIFICATION OF FLOW REQUIRED BY MODEL TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS o
TECHNICAL REVIEWER QUESTIONS PIPING DESIGN, FLOW LOSS, PRESSURE DROPS o
DUE DEVELOPED METHCD TO WRIFY FLOW w/o HARDWARE CHANGE o
LICENSE AENDMENT ISSUED CCTOBER 1987 O
9 C.iB e
6
POST-ACCIDENT SAhPLING SYSTEM TMI ACTION ITEM II B 3 o
DUE DESIGNED THE SYSTEM TO PROVIDE THE ABILITY TO OBTAIN REACTOR C00L#ff SAFPLES IN THE EVENT OF A DEGRADED CORE ACCIDENT o
NOT IffiBOED TO BE ABLE TO RELIABLY DEM)NSTRATE ACCURATE SAMPLE '
RESULTS UNDER NORMAL PLANT OPERATIt6 CONDITIONS o
ORIGINAL DESIGN DESCRIBED DURING FtGUIRE LICalSliE PROCESS o
NRC DETEININED ACCEPTABLE APRIL 1981 o
FOST-IPPLBENTATION INSPECTION - APRIL 1984 o
REGION DECLAPE SYSTEM tET OPERABLE -
o NOT CAPABLE OF PERF0W.IfE FUNCTION o
LACK OF OPERATIONAL TEST DATA o
DUE MODIFIED SYSTEM DESIGN TO ALLOW VERIFICATION OF OPERATION WITH N0fEAL REACTOR COOLANT SATLES g
9
Q SAFETY PARAElER DISPLAY SYSTEM MAY, 1980 - t0 REG-0660 - IDENTIFIED NEED FOR SPDS JULY,1980 - NJREG-0696 - FUNCTIONAL CRITERIA FOR SPDS NOWNBER,1980 - t0 REG-0737 - SNCIFIED SPDS EARLY 1981 - tilS-1 OL SEPTIMBER,1981 - BOREG-0835 - SPECIFIElf ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA EYED T0tOREG-0696 DECEMBER,1982 - SUPPLEENT 1 TO NUREG-0737 - EXPANDED CRITERIA FOR j
SPDS EARLY 1983 - ttiS-2 OL MAR 04 28 AND 29, 1984 - DUE SUEMITTED THE DESCRIPTION OF TE CATAWBA AND MCGUIRE SPDS JULY 1984 - CNS-1 OL NOVEMBER,1984 - SPDS IWLEENTED ON BOTH MCGUIRE UNITS AS REQUIRED BY A JUfE 15,1984 COWIRMATORY ORDER DECEMBER 18, 1984 - RAI ON CATAWBA SPDS PARAETER SEL$CTION JANUARY 23, 1985 - RESPONSE TO DECE E ER 18,1985 RAI SUBMITTED APRIL 1,1985 - SPDS IWLEENTED ON CATAWBA UNIT 1 PER NPF-35 MAY 14 At015,1985 - ONSITE SPDS AUDIT BY NRC SEPTE N ER 10 AND OCTUBER.31, 1985 - RESULTS OF AUDIT TRAN911TTED FOR CATAWBA LNIT 2 C -Zo a
j NONNER 7,1985 - RESULTS OF AUDIT TRANSilTTED FOR MCGUIRE NOVENER 27,1985 - RESPONSE TO AUDIT RESULTS SUEfillTED (PARANTER SELECTION)
FEBRUARY 26,1986 - SPDS SER RECEIVED ON MCGUIRE FEBRUARY, 1986 - SSER - 5 ISSUED FOR CATAWBA, B0EbFABOVESER'S G0 BEYOND PREVIOUS NUREG & SRP CRITERIAs CNS-2 OL MARCH 25,1986 - BACKFIT IDENTIFIED BY DUKE JUNE 13, 1986 - BACWIT CLAIM REJECTED BY BE NRC MARCH 26,1987 - APRAL OF BACWIT DENIAL SUBMITTED MAY 7, 1987 - LETTER FROM J. H. SNIEZEK A000WLEDGES BACW IT APPEAL
'I JUEN29-JU[Y1,1987-MCGUIRESITEVISIT l
SEPTEMBER 4,1987 - NRC LETTER DENIES BA0(FIT APFAL DUE OWES RESPONSE TO NRC O
C-2I a
RC PlW TRIP TMI ACTION PLAN II.K,3,5 1
o INITIAL EFFORT PERFORMED BY WESTINGHOUSE OWERS GROUP O
GL 83-1@ TRANSMITTED CRITERIA FOR RESOLlfTION LV RC Ft W TRIP i
i i
o DUKE RESPONDED april 1983 AND MARCH 1984 0
GL 85-12 TRAN911TTED CRITERIA FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF RC PlW TRIP i
o DUE RESKt4DED IN LETTERS DATED AUGUST 1985, JUfE 1986, t00EER 1986 o
NRC COWLETED REVIEW A0 GUST 1987 I
G G
C-22
RG 1.97 POST-ACCIDENT MONITORING INSTRlNENTATION o
MJREG-0737 SUPPLEENT 1, GL 82-33, DECENER 1982 o
DUE RESPONSE MARCH 1984 o
INTERIM TER ISSUED FEBRUARY 1986 o
DUKE RESPONSE PROVIDED APRIL 1986 o
TER ISSUED JULY 1986
.o SER ISSUED MARCH 1987 o
TWO OPEN ITEMS TO BE RESOLVED BY STAFF o
DUE REQUIRED TO UPGRADE WR STEAM GENERATOR LEVEL 1
o DUKE I$ INSTALLING ALL RG 1.97 INSTRlNENTS IN 1988 EXCEPT SG W/R WHICH WILL BE INSTALLED BY 1989 i
C -23
AWS/AMSAC
..-t o
JULY 1984,10 GR 50,62 ISSUED o
GL 8%6 "QUALITY ASSURANE GUIDANCE FOR ANS" DATED APRIL 1985 o
WCAP-10858 "AMSAC GENERIC DESIGN PACKAGE" SUmlTTED JULY 1985 o
STAFF SER ISSUED JULY 1986
.o DUE SECIFIC DESIGN SUmlTTED JANUARY 1987 WITH SUPPLEENTAL INFORMATION PROVIDED IN APRIL, JUNE, SEPTEMBER, OCTOBER 1987 o
NRC SER ISSUED NOVENER 1987 o
DUE IWLEMNTATION SCHEDULE -
McGUIRE BY 1989 CATAWBA BY 1989 1
I c -24
.