ML20197E072
| ML20197E072 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Mcguire, Catawba, McGuire, 05000000 |
| Issue date: | 05/07/1986 |
| From: | Jabbour K Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| NUDOCS 8605150159 | |
| Download: ML20197E072 (25) | |
Text
%, UNITED STATES
[ g NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 5 p WASHINGTON, D. C. 20555 0 7 MAY l?C6
% ...../
Docket Nos.: 50-413/414 and 50-369/370 LICENSEE: Duke h er Company FACILITIES: Catawba and McGuire Nuclear Stations
SUBJECT:
SUMMARY
OF MEETING WITH DUKE POWER COMPANY ON (1) HYDROGEN CONTROL MEASURES, (2) STANDBY SHUTDOWN FACILITY TESTING, AND (3) NUCLEAR SERVICE WATER SYSTEM TESTING General On April 8,1986, the NRC staff met with Duke Power Company's (DPC) representatives to discuss the above subjects. A meeting agenda is included as Enclosure 1, and a list of attendees as Enclosure 2.
Introduction .
Regarding the hydrogen issue, the NRC staff stated that the Catawba Unit I full power license, issued on January 17, 1985, contained a three-part condition concerning: (1) operability of glow plug igniters, (2) operability of air return fans and ice condenser doors, and (3) survivability of essentia!
equipment for a spectrum of accidents. Subsequently, the Commission issued a new hydrogen rule (10 CFR 50.44), applicable to BWRs and PWRs with ice condenser containments, that became effective on February 25, 1985. The new rule required that the hydrogen control ~ system must be capable of handling without loss of containment structural integrity an amount of hydrogen equivalent to that generated from a metal-water reaction involving 75 percent of the fuel cladding surrounding the active fuel region. By letter dated March 29, 1985, DPC responded to the license condition and advised the staff of its l position that the design features of the Catawba and McGuire nuclear stations meet the requirements of the final rule and that no schedule for compliance is required to be submitted pursuant to the rule. By letter dated December 17, 1985, the staff transmitted to DPC its Safety Evaluation Report (SER) of the I hydrogen issue along with a request for additional information (RAI) on the air return fans and ice condenser door survivability. By letter dated April 2,
The purpose of the meeting was to allow DPC to present its position on how it conforms to the rule, and for the NRC staff to discuss the areas which may l require additional information.
i l
The second agenda item was the result of a question raised by the NRC Manage-t ment Team during the Catawba Unit 2 Site Readiness Review, on February 21, 1986, 8605150159 860507 9 PDR ADOCK 0500 P
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concerning the limited operations which can be conducted from the standby shutdown facility (SSF) to bring the plant to a cold shutdown condition.
The third agenaa item concerned the inadequacy of the Nuclear Service Water System (NSWS) preoperational test at McGuire Unit 2.
Discussion Following introductory remarks, DPC presented several viewgraphs (Enclosure 3).
The first viewgraph shows that from a PRA standpoint, the hydrogen contribution to the overall plant risk is extremely small. The third viewgraph identified DPC's position on the operability of glow plug igniters in a spray environment.
After a brief discussion, the NRC staff and DPC representatives agreed that no further action need be taken on this issue. Regarding the operability of air return fans and ice condenser doors, DPC presented the fourth viewgraph of
. Enclosure 3 in support of its position. DPC's position was that the fans will operate continuously and will not trip, and that the doors will survive the differential pressure caused by the hydrocen burns. The staff disagreed with DPC's position and presented a viewgraph (Enclosure 4) in support of its position. After a brief discussion, the NRC staff and DPC representatives agreed that DPC should provide: (1) a more detailed evaluation of fan response to the differential pressure transient to demonstrate continuous operation, and (2) a detailed evaluation of door failure modes, especially the lower inlet doors.
Regarding the survivability of essential equipment for a spectrum of accidents, DPC presented the fifth viewgraph of Enclosure 3 in support of its position.
DPC concluded that the analysis performed was conservative and independent of the accident sequences. The staff disagreed and presented a viewgraph (Enclosure 5) in support of its position. Af ter a brief discussion, the NRC staff requested DPC to provide a plan toward the resolution of the equipment survivability issue. The attendees agreed to meet in ahcut two weeks to dis-cuss DPC's response and a schedule for compliance with the hydrogen rule. DPC indicated on viewgraph 6 of Enclosure 3 that Regulatory Guidance is nonexistent (i.e., no SRP and no RGs) regarding the analytical assumptions, acceptable methods, and engineering interpretations related to this issue. On viewgraph 7, s DPC listed the various parameters which affect the analysis results.
DPC's presentation regarding the limited operations which can be conducted from the SSF focused on the fact that nuclear equipment operators (who will maintain radio contact with the control room operators) will manually and locally operate the auxiliary feedwater system flow control valves CA 52 and CA 55 (See En-closure 6) to maintain steam generator B and C levels when the steam driven auxiliary feedwater pump is operating. These valves are located in the '
mechanical penetration roo'n of the auxiliary building.
DPC's presentation on the inadequacy of the NSWS preoperational test at McGuire Unit 2 focused on the fact that DPC performed the test on Unit 2 without con-sidering tnat Unit I was operating. This test was essentially the same as that performed on Unit 1 when Unit 2 was under construction. Thus, the full capacity of the system was not tested for the postulated Station Blackout /LOCA configur-ation (i.e., the test did not account for the cross-connected section in the common header from the standby nuclear service water pond). When DPC realized
. 0 7 MAY 1986
~
the test deficiency, they redid the test in late 1985 and early 1986 as described
~
in Enclosure 7. Catawba's NSWS piping layout is different from that of McGuire
, (See Enclosure 8). Because of the McGuire deficiency, DPC perfonned an analysis for Catawba to ensure that the NSWS pumps have adequate NPSH for a postulated Station Blackout /LOCA configuration and is planning a confirmatory test to verify the analysis.
Conclusion The NRC staff and DPC representatives agreed to meet in about two weeks
- to discuss DPC's response to the outstanding issues and a schedule for compliance ,
with the hydrogen rule (10 CFR 50.44).
\5\
Kahtan N. Jabbour, Project Mangager PWR Project Directorate #4 Division of PWR Licensing-A
Enclosures:
As stated cc: See next page t
- A meeting was scheduled on April 25, 1986. Subsequently, it was cancelled because DPC opted to provide on April 25, 1986, written responses to the outstanding issues and a compliance schedule in lieu of holding a meeting.
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PWR#4/DPWR-A PS DPWR-A PWR#4/DPWR-A KJabbour:lr J hoan g BJYoungblood Og/ /86 0,/1/86 0$/ p- /86 9- him - . . , - - . . ,
p MEETING
SUMMARY
DISTRIBUTION
.,mw -mv~~m, 0 7 !MY 1386 i@ Docket!Filoba NRC Participants
.NRC PDR T. Novak L PDR C. Rossi NSIC J. Milhoan PRC System G. Johnson PWR#4 Reading File J. Shapaker Project Manager K. Jabbour C. Tinkler M. Duncan W. Orders
' Attorney, OELD B. Debs J. Partlow L. Reyes
.E. Jordan G.-Lapinsky B. Grimes R. Pierson ACRS (10)
H. Bailey D. Hood K. Jabbour OTHERS bec: Licensee & Service List I
f i
i e _ s
Mr. H. B. Tucker Duke Power Company Catawba Nuclear Station cc:
William L. Porter, Esq. North Carolina Electric Membership Duke Power Company Corp.
P.O. Box 33189 3333 North Boulevard Charlotte, North Carolina 28242 P.O. Box 27306 Raleigh, North Carolina 27611 J. Michael McGarry, III, Esq.
Bishop, Liberman, Cook, Purcell Saluda River Electric Cooperative, and Reynolds Inc.
1200 Seventeenth Street, N.W. P.O. Box 929 Washington, D. C. 20036 Laurens, South Carolina 29360 North Carolina MPA-1 Senior Resident Inspector
. Suite 600 Route 2, Box 179N 3100 Smoketree Ct. York, South Carolina 29745 P.O. Box 29513 Raleigh, North Carolina 27626-0513 Regional Administrator, Region II U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission, Mr. C. D. Markham 101 Marietta Street, NW, Suite 2900 Power Systems Division Atlanta, Georgia 30323 Westinghouse Electric Corp.
P.O. Box 355 Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15230 Robert Guild, Esq.
2759 Rosewood Drive NUS Corporation Columbia, South Carolina 29205 2536 Countryside Boulevard Clearwater, Florida 33515 blmetto Alliance 1759 Rosewood Drive Mr. Jesse L. Riley, President Columbia, South Carolina 29205 Carolina Environmental Study Group 854 Henley Place Karen E. Long Charlotte, North Carolina 28208 Assistant Attorney General N.C. Department of Justice Richard P. Wilson, Esq. P.O. Box 629 Assistant Attorney General Raleigh, North Carolina 27602 S.C. Attorney General's Office P.O. Box 11549 Spence Perry, Esquire Columbia, South Carolina 29211 Associate General Counsel Federal Emergency Management Agency Piedmont Municipal Power Agency Roon 840 100 Memorial Drive 500 C Street '
Greer, South Carolina 29651 Washington, D. C. 20472 Mark S. Calvert, Esq. Mr. Michael Hirsch Bishop, Liberman, Cook, Federal Emergency Management Agency Purcell & Reynolds Office of the General Counsel 1200 17th Street, N.H. Room 840 Washingtor., D. C. 20036 500 C Street, S.W.
Washington, D. C. 20472 Brian P. Cassidy, Regional Counsel Federal Emergency Management Agency, Region I.
J. W. McCormach POCH Boston, Massachusetts 02109
a .
- Catawba (amendments) cc:
Mr. Heyward G. Shealy, Chief Bureau of Radiological Health South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control 2600 Bull Street Columbia, South Carolina 29201 County Manager of York County York County Courthouse York, South Carolina 29745 Attorney General o P.O. Box 11549 Columbia, South Carolina, 29211 e
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I l Mr. H. B. Tucker ,
Duke Power Company McGuire Nuclear Station l
cc:
Mr. A. Carr Dr. John M. Barry Duke Power Company Department of Environmental Health P. O. Box 33189 Mecklenburg County 422 South Church Street 1200 Blythe Boulevard Charlotte, North Carolina 28242 Charlotte, North Carolina 28203 Mr. F. J. Twogood County Manager of Mecklenburg County Power Systems Division 720 East Fourth Street Westinghouse Electric Corp. Charlotte, North Carolina 28202 P. O. Box 355 Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15230 Chairman, North Carolina Utilities Comission'
. Mr. Robert Gill Dobbs Building Duke Power Company 430 North Salisbury Street Nuclear Production Department Raleigh, North Carolina 27602 P. O. Box 33189 Charlotte, North Carolina 28242 Mr. Dayne H. Brown, Chief Radiation Protection Branch J. Michael McGarry, III, Esq. Division of Facility Services Bishop, Libennan, Cook, Purcell Department of Human Resources and Reynolds P.O. Box 12200 1200 Seventeenth Street, N.W. Raleigh, North Carolina 27605 Washington, D. C. 20036 Senior Resident Inspector c/o U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Route 4, Box 529 Hunterville, North Carolina 28078 Regional Administrator, Region II U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission, 101 Marietta Street, N.W., Suite 2900 Atlanta, Georgia 30323 l
L. L. Williams l Operating Plants Projects
! Regional Manager Westinghouse Electric Corporation - R&D 701 i
P. O. Box 2728 Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15230 ,
l i
l
i Enclosure 1 AGENDA FOR MEETING WITH DUKE POWER COMPANY CATAWBA AND MCGUIRE NUCLEAR STATIONS APRIL 8, 1986 INTRODUCTION HYDROGEN CONTROL MEASURES (A) OPERABLILITY OF GLOW PLUG IGNITERS (B) SURVIVABILITY OF AIR RETURN FANS AND ICE CONDENSER DOORS (C) SURVIVABILITY OF ESSENTIAL EQUIPMENT FOR A SPECTRUM OF ACCIDENT SEQUENCES STANDBY SHUTDOWN FACILITY TESTING MCGUIRE NUCLEAR SERVICE WATER SYSTEM TESTING e
. , - -, , . - ~ , , ,
Enclosure 2 LIST OF ATTENDEES NRC Duke Power Company T. Novak H. Tucker C. Rossi N. Rutherford 4
J. Milhoan A. Sudduth
- G. Johnson R. Gill J. Shapaker H. Barron C. Tinkler W. Orders B. Debs
. L. Reyes G. Lapinsky R. Pierson H. Bailey D. Hood K. Jabbour 8
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Enclosure 3 CONTAINMENT HYDROGEN MITIGATION CATAWBA NUCLEAR STATION PERSPECTIVE LOCA FAILURE OF ECCS SYSTEMS CORE UNCOVERY CORE OVERHEAT CORE REFLOOD PRIOR TO MELTING l
l REFLOOD RATE " SLOW" HYDROGEN RELEASE TO CONTAINMENT i
HYDROGEN MITIGATION SYSTEM CATAWBA NUCLEAR STATION ISSUES OUTSTANDING IGNITER PERFORMANCE IN SPRAY EQUIPMENT RESPONSE TO UPPER COMPARTMENT BURNING EQUIPMENT SURVIVABILITY IN LOWER CONTAINMENT
8 g e y HYDROGEN MITIGATION SYSTEM CATAWBA NUCLEAR STATION DUKE POSITION ON IGNITER PERFORMANCE m
IGNITERS HAVE NEVER FAILED TO IGNITE HYDROGEN IN TESTS TURBULENCE CREATED BY SPRAY ENHANCES IGNITION 4
IGNITERS NOT EXPOSED TO SPRAY DIRECTLY l
l
4 S
HYDROGEN MITIGATION SYSTEM CATAWBA NUCLEAR STATION d DUKE POSITION ON FANS AND DOORS OUR ANALYSIS SHOWS NO UPPER COMPARTMENT BURNING NOT SENSITIVE TO TEMPERATURE l
RECENT ANALYSIS SHOWS D/P EFFECTS NOT
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NO EFFECT ON OPERABILITY l
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, .S HYDROGEN MITIGATION SYSTEM CATAWBA NUCLEAR STATION DUKE POSITION ON EQUIPMENT SURVIVABILITY PREVIOUS WORK CONSERVATIVE -
ESSENTIALLY INDEPENDENT OF SEQUENCES NO ESSENTIAL EQUIPMENT EXPOSED TO BURNING EXCEPT CABLES 75% M/W REQUIREMENT ACCOUNTS FOR SEQUENCES
HYDROGEN MITIGATION SYSTEM CATAWBA NUCLEAR STATION 1
WHAT IS THE PROBLEM 7 i
NO REGULATORY GUIDANCE NO BASELINE ANALYTICAL ASSUMPTIONS OR TECHNIQUES NO AGREEMENT ON METHODS OR INTERPRETATION
' ^ ~ '
HYDROGEN MITIGATION SYSTEM l
CATAWBA NUCLEAR STATION ISSUES FLAME SPEED (BURN TIME)
IGNITION LIMITS m
BURN COMPLETION BASELINE RELEASE RATES METHOD TO DETERMINE RELEASE RATES REFLOOD RATE METHOD TO FORCE 75% M/W REACTION I
ONLY FIXED GUIDANCE IN RULE:
l MUST USE UP TO 75% M/W IN DETERMINING RELEASE f
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r O g HYDROGEN MITIGATION SYSTEM CATAWBA NUCLEAR STATION HOW DO WE RESOLVE 7 I. DECIDE WHETHER ADDITIONAL WORK IS WORTH IT II. DECIDE WHAT SPECIFIC ADDITIONAL WORK SHOULD BE DONE (AGREE ON SPECIFIC PARAMETERS FOR ANALYSIS)
III. DO IT
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' 8 CATAWBA NUCLEAR STATION 3 AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM iiii. iiiiE '. . ' W
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. Enclosure 7 McGuire event - Inadequate Pre-Op test in that cross-connected (both units) suction from SNSWP was not tested. Flow balance
^ testing was started on 1/27/86. Inadequate flow to some heat exchangers resulted. Indications that pumps would cavitate with FSAR flow values. Such cavitation could lead to pump failure without operator action and loss of heat removal capability.
Design Bases - e Train A of both units automatically aligns to low-level intake upon S signal (LOCA) of either units e Train B of both units automatically aligns to SNSWP upon S signal of either unit e Upon loss of lake (seismic) operators would manually align Train A to SNS'iP e Blackout (loss of offsite power) assumed for unit that does not have LOCA This results in ~ 15,000 gpm being required by LOCA unit and 6,000 gpm by blackout unit.
An analysis had been performed that assumed lower flows to two components during LOCA: 6,000 gpm to KC (FSAR had assumed 5,000 gpm).
Design review of alignment configuration.
On January 28, 1986, the 1A RN system was aligned as the LOCA unit and 2A had 6,000 gpm as the blackout unit for testing. ,
With the reduced flows (12,000 gpm total flow) established, the test was satisfactorily completed on January 29, 1986.
Establishing these flows during an actual event would have required operator actions, which had not been included in procedures.
The event was reportable due to the condition which could have caused a loss of decay heat removal capability. Under the combined LOCA, blackout, and seismic DBA. (Train B had not been tested but was expected to have provided similar results. Similar results would be expected had Unit 2 been the LOCA unit.)
l The event was not determined reportable until presentations were being reviewed on March 11, 1986. LER to be filed by 4/10/86.
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Summary of 1A RN Train Flow Balance 12/17/85 - Flow Balance from Low Level to verify system balance 1/27/86 -
Flow Balance from pond (most restrictive suction source) 1/28/86 - Flow Balance from pond with
. 1/29/86 6000 gpm to Unit-2 (Blackout Unit)
Tima Pump Flow Head app. 1000 11,250 157.2 2345 12,000 158.6 0008 12,000 158.6 0027 12,000 143.6 0058 12,100 -
130.9 app. 0120 12,000 158.6 2/28/86 -
Replaced 1A RN Flow Element with SS spool-piece 3/11/86 -
' Incident determined to be reportable 3/24/86 -
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