ML20196B146
| ML20196B146 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Mcguire, Catawba, Harris, Farley, McGuire  |
| Issue date: | 01/11/1988 |
| From: | Jordan E Committee To Review Generic Requirements |
| To: | Stello V NRC OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS (EDO) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20154D839 | List: |
| References | |
| REF-GTECI-093, REF-GTECI-A-47, REF-GTECI-NI, REF-GTECI-SY, TASK-093, TASK-A-47, TASK-OR NUDOCS 8802100081 | |
| Download: ML20196B146 (37) | |
Text
,
January 11, 1988 cH af r
X'f 4 f4 S E 0 MEMORANDUM FOR:
Victor Stello, Jr.
l Executive Director for Operations 1
FROM:
Edward L. Jordan, Chairman i
Comittee to Peview Generic Recuirceents SLBJEC;:
MINUTES OF CRGR MEETING NLt'PE9 127 The Comittee to Review Generic Requirerents (CRGR) met on Wednesday, December 23, 1987, from 1-6 p.m.
A list of attendees for this meeting is enclosed (Enclosure 1). The following items were addressed at the meeting:
l 1.
G. Arlotto, RES, P. Baer, RES, and N. Anderson, RES, presented for CRGR review the proposed resolution for LISI A-47 Safety Implications of Control Systems in LWR Nuclear Power Plants." The Comittee recomended forwarding the office package to the EDO following incorporation of CRGR coments. This matter is discussed in Enclosure 2.
l 2.
E. Rossi. NRR. and A. Spano, RES, presented for CRGR review the proposed resolution of GI.93 "Stean Binding of AFW Pumps." The Comittee recomended issuance of thc Generic Letter following incorporation cf CRGR coments. This matter is discussed in Enclosure 3.
3.
J. Roe, NRR, presented for CRGR review the proposed Policy Statement on Maintenance. The Ccmittee recomended forwarding the package with the inecrporated CRGR comments.
This matter is discut>cd in Enclosure 4 In accordance with the ED0's July 18, 1983 directive concerning "Feedback and C1csure on CRGR Reviews," a written response is required from the cognizant office to report agreement or disagreement with CRGR recomendations in these minutes. The response, which is required within five working days after receipt of these meeting minutes, is to be forwarded to the CRGR Chaiman and if there is disagreement with the CRGR recomendations, t0 the EDO for decistormaking.
i Questions concerning these meeting minutes should be referred to Cheryl Sakenas
[
(492-4148).
% W1s, In
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E. C hadn y
Edward L. Jordan, Chaimen i
Cemittee to Review Generic l
Requirements Distribution: (w/o ene.)
Enclotures:
Central File ~~
J. Johnson (w/ enc.)
l As stated FDR(NRC/CRGP)
B. Doolittle (e/ enc.)
i S. Treby J.Conran(w/ enc.)
i cc:
See next page W. Little CRGRCF(w/ enc.)
M. Lesar J. Heltenes (w/eoc.)
CRGRSF(w/ene.)
C.-Sakenas-(w/ enc.)
. /]/
OFC : AEOD:CRGR : A DgD
- C/J.W..pHKEOD :
......:/LJordan
..... :.... t...,..1 :
NAME :CSal C&
temes :
1/ //88 1/9/88 DATE :
1/N/88 OTFICIAL RECOPD COPY EE03/h6E/
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2-l cc w/ enclosures:
Comission (5)
SECY CRGR Members i
Office cirectors Regional Administrators W. Parler G. Arlotto r
R. Baer N. Anderson E. Rossi A. Spaim J. Roe j
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l B
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LIST OF ATTENDEES i
CRGR MEETING h0. 127 I
l Decer.ber 23, 1987 i
i CRGR MEM8ERS
- t
[. Jordan R. Bernero T. Martin D. Ross l
l J. Scinto t
J. Sniezek i
OTNERS I
C. Helteens l
C. Sakenas E-CMramal l
M. Wegner G. Quittschreiber l
S. Black R. Bosnak A. Thadani I
T. Speis l
S. Newberry i
R. Kendall
{
J. Mauck i
G. Arlotto R. Beer A. Szekiewicz N. Anderson E. Butcher E. Rossi j
B. Sheron Y. Hodge
{
K. Kniel i
T. Gwynn l
C. Berlinger J, Craig J. Wenniel A. Spano
- 6. Cwalina J. Zwolinski l
i J. Jankovich l
l l
l i
I i
i
-m f to the Minutes of CRGR Meeting No. 127 Droposed Rssolution for U51 A-47. "Safety Imalications of Control Systems 7 n LWR Nuclear Power )lants l
i The proposed resolution of A-47 was summarized by G. Arlotto, RES, and I
N. Anderson, RES (slides attached).
They stated that the proposed resolution l
i would involve a limited numver of requirements which would provide for overfill l
protection, automatic initiation of emergency feedwater, and for plants designed by Combustion Engineering would improve emergency procedures for cmall-break l
LCr:As.
The conclusions of the studies performed on the four nelected plants were discussed.
The NUREG sussarizing the work done on the B&W design reassessment to date was discussed.
It was concluded by A. Thadani, NRR, that notMng in this document J
affected the proposed resolution fot A-47.
However, it was noted the.t the B&W t
design reassessment, for example in the area of instrumentation anti control, i
I continues and the results of this further work are not corrently available.
i
)
Thus, it is possible that come potentf ai conflicts could result from this j
ongoing work.
After discussion of the proposed resolution of A-47, the Ocamittee supported the forwarding of the office package, subject to the following recossendations:
i 1
1.
To clarify and make explicit the regulatory framework or basis for the l
proposed action; f
i 1
2.
To issue the Generic Letter for public coraent; l
j I
i, 3.
To include a sensitivity analysis on the alternativ7s considered;
- o tesolve the legal concerns cn specific wording;
{
4.
i S.
Place the burden on licensees to identify differences; and
)
6, To clarify the generic letter with regard to points raised during the meeting.
j RES agreed to proceed on this basis and will submit a proposed revision for CRGR final concurrence.
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i SAFE'Y IPPl!CATIOPS OF C0h'TPOL SYSTEFS 1
1 CPGR PRESENTATION i
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DECEMBER 23, 1987 l
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PRESENTATION Ol'TL!NE l
0 INTRODUCTION l
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SUMMARY
OF PROPOSED RESOLUTION I
O ACRS REVIEW AND COMMENTS f
.I i
0 BACKGROUND ~
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j 0
INSTRUMENTATION DEFINITION i
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0 A l47 PROGRAM OBJECTIVES
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ASSUMPTIONS AND PROGRAM SCOPE LIMITATIONS
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O PEV!EW APPROACH 1
)
0 PROGRAM OVERVIEW i
I O
CONDUCT Of STUDY i
0 CONCLllSIONS OF STUDY
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l 1
0 GENERIC APPLICABILITY J
J 0
REGULATORY ANALYSIS FOR PROPOSED SAFETY ENHARCEMENT 1
O PP0 POSED RESOLUTION
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3 j
0 METHOD OF IMPLEMENTATION l
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IPTRODUC710N i
0 US! A 147 IS A PROGRAM TO EVAL l LATE THE EFFECTS OF NON-SAFETY GRADE I
CONTROL SYSTEM FAILURES ON PLANT SAFETY O
THE PURPOSE OF THIS PRESENTAT!ON IS 'TO:
PRESENT THE STAFF PROPOSED RESOLUTION TO US! A 147 SEEK CRGR RECOMMENDATION TO ISSU(PROPOSED RESOLUTION FOR PUBLIC COMMENT f
DESCRIBE THE RELATIONSl!!P BETWEEN USl A t7 AND BWOG I
REASSESSPENT PROGRAft l
O RES. NRR. AEOD, AND OGC HAVE CONCURRED IN Tile PROPOSED RESOLUTION O
DETERMINE TO BE A CATEGORY !! ACTION O
PROF 0 SED ACTIONS ARE BACKFITS AS DEFINED IN 10 CFR 50.109 O
DOCUMENTS TO FE ISSUED FOR PUBLYC C0PPENTS ARE:
i l
TECliNICAL FINDINGS REPORT (NUPFG 1217)
I J
REGULATORY ANALYS!S (NUREG 1238) 1 FROP3 SED GENERIC LETTER i-
3 SU>iMARY OF FROPOSED PESOLUTION l
0 LIMITED NIJMBER OF RE0VIREMFFTS O
PPOVIDE OVERFILL PROTECTION (All PLANTS) l l
0 PPOV1DE Pt'R10DIC VERIFICATION OF OVERFILL PROTECTION (TECH SPECS) 0 PPDv!DE DIVEPSE AUTOMATIC INITTATION OF FFW (OCONFE ONLY) 1 0
IPPROVE EPEPGENCY PROCEPltPES F0P SFLOCA l
(CE PLANTS W!TH 1.0W HEAD PUMPS) l l
o--
(
4 A
l A-47 ACRS.PFVIEW
)
l i
(NOVEMBER 6, 1987) l t
- l LETTER IN PREPARATION, NOT YET RECEIVED 1
e ENDORSED STAFF RECOMMENDAT!0NS i
I i
i SUGOESTED CLARIFICATIONS FOR THE OVD FILL PROTECTION REQUIREMENTS W0llLD LIKE TO SEE SCOPE EXPH.'DED l
SE!SMIC EVENTS OPERATOR ERRORS SYSTEM INTERACTIONS l
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5 UNRESOLVED SAFETY ISSUE TASK A - 47 BACKGROUND O
COMMISSION APPROVES A-47 AS A USI DECEMBER 1980 O
TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE CONTRACTS STAPTED MAY 1982 O
TASK /CTION PLAN APPPOVED SEPTFMBER 1987 0
TECHNICAL WORK COMPLETED JANUARY 1986 0
PROPOSED RESDLUTION PACMAGE COMPLETE SEPTEMBER 39F6 0
A-47 PACKAGE ISSUED TO CPGR NOVEMBER 1987 0
FINAL RESOLUTION OF A-07 april 1989' ANTICIPATED L
i
G "SAFETY IMPLICATIONS OF CONTROL SYSTEPS" 0
INST 9UMENTA110N SYSTEMS COMPPISE TWO BASIC GROUPS l
SAFETY-GRADF PROTECTIO!' SYSTEMS A.
PEACTOR TRIP SYSTEM l
E.
EMERGENCY CORE COOLING SYSTEMS C.
OTHER SAFETY SYSTFM f!.E.
PS!V, EFW, PPESStlPE REllFF)
!I.
t'ON-SAFETY GRADE C0t'TFCL SYSTEMS A.
mal?'TAlt' PLANT PRESSURE AND TEPP LIM!TF DURIFG SHUTDOWN, START-UP AND NORPAL POWER l
OPERATION P.
INCLUDES CONTROLS F0P:
PRESS, TEMP, LEVEL, FLOW l
AND YESSEL INVENTORY C.
NOT REllED UPON TO PPOTECT THE REACTOP OR MITIGATE ACCIDENTS l
0 USI A-47 FOCUSED ON GROUF 11.
l 1
}
l l'SI A-47 OBJECTIVES
- 1., IDENTIFY 1F CONTROL SYSTEM FAllllRES COULD:
1 i
0 CAllSE TRANSIEFTS OR ACCIDENTS TO PE MORF SEVERE THAN j
Til0SE IDENTIFIED IN THE FSAP(S) 0 ADVERSELY AFFECT ANY ASSUMED OR ANT!CIPATED OPE'ATOR R
l ACTION DURING THE COUPSE OF TRANSIENTS OR ACCIDENTS 0
CAUSE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATI0F SAFETY LIMITS TO PE EXCEEDED.
O CAUSE TRANSIENTS OR ACCIDENTS TO OCCUR AT A FREQUENCY IN EXCESS OF THOSE ESTABLISHED FOR ABNORMAL OPERATIONAL TRANSIENTS AND DESIGN PASIS ACCIDEt'TS,
?.
VERIFY THE ADEQUACY OF CURRENT LICENSING DESIGN PE0VIREMENTS (SRP SECT 10f! 7.7) 3.
PROPOSE. IF NECESSARY, ADDITIONAL rit'!DELINES TO ASSUPE THAT N'UCLEAR POYFR PLANTS DO NOT POSE UNACCEPTABLE RISV DUE TO NON-SAFETY GPADE CONTPOL SYSTEM F.5!LUPES.
E - - - - - - - --- - - - - - - - -
g ASSUMPTIONS AND PP0GRfM SCOPE LIMITATION O
MilllMUM NUMBER OF SAFETY CPADE PROTECTION SYSTEMS ARE AVAILABLE, IF NEEDED, TO TRIP PEACTOR AND INITIATE OVER PRESSURE PROTECTION SYSTEMS OR ECCS, 1
0 P01ENTIAL EFFECTS OF COMMON CAUSE EVENTS (SUCH AS EAP.THOUAKES, FLOOD, FIRE, SAE0TAGE, OR UPERATOR ERROPS OF OMISSION OR COMMISSION),
WEPE EVA,LUATED IN A LIMITEP MANNER BY EVALUATING SELECTED MULTIPLE l
- FAILURES, l
l 0
TRANSIENTS DU31NG LCO AND ATWS EVENTS WEPE EXCLUDED FPOM SCOPE, O
PLANT-SPECIFIC DESIGNS WEPE APPPOPPIAlFLY PODIFIED TO C0PPLY WITH IE FULLETIN 79-77 ("LOSS OF NON-CLASS IE i
l INSTPUPENTATION A?!D C0f1 TROL POVEP SYSTEM FUS DUPING CPERAT10?J")
l AND FUPEG-0737 (TMl ACTION PLAN)USl A '47 i
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REVIEF APPc0ACH 0
PEPFORMED DETAllED REVIEW 0F FOUR PLANT DESIGNS, ONE FOR EACH NSSS SlJPPLIER BtW - OCONEE (REVIEW PY OPNL) l CE - CALVERT CLIFFS (REVIFW BY ORNL) l GE - BROWPS FEPRY (PEVIEW BY INEL)
W - H. B. ROBINSON (FEVIEW BY INEL)
O EVALUATED ALL MANllAL Af!D AllTCFATIC FON-SAFFTY GPADE C0t!TPOI.
i SYSTFMS THAT lllTERFACE WITH THE PPIMARY REACTOR FLt!!D SYSTEP 1
AND THE STEAf1 AND FEEDWATER SYETEPc l
0 INCLUDED BOTH NSSS AND FOP CONTROL EYSTEMS.
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,a CONDUCT OF STUDY 1.
PERFORMED STUDIES AND DEVELOPED CONCLUSIONS FOR REFERENCE PLANTS 2.
REVIEWED DESIGN VARIATIONS OF EACil PLANT GROUP 3.
ASSESSED GENERIC APPLICABILITY OF REFERENCE PLANT STilDY 4
DEVELOPED GENERIC CONCLUSIONS FOR EACH PLANT TYPE 5.
SELECTED ALTERNATIVES FOR PLANT IMPROVEMENTS 6.
ASSESSED VALUE IMPACT OF ALTERNATIVES 7.
SELECTED PROPOSED PLANT CHANGES ON BASIS OF VALUE IMPACT 8.
EVALUATED PROPOSED CHANGES TO 10 CFR 50.109 Giui6(Lines
.-- -e 13 CONCLUSION OF STUDY 0
! RESULTS OF REFERENCE PLANT ANALYSIS CAN BE GENERALLY APPLIED
, ; TO ALL PLANTS OF THAT CLASS, i
O CONTROL SYSTEM DESIGN OF PLANTS BY THE SAME (NSSS) SUPPLIERS ARE FUNCTIONALLY SIMILAR, 0
TRANSIENTS RESULTING FROM THE FAILURE OF THE SAME NON-SAFE 1Y cRADE CONTROL SYSTEM ON DIFFERENT PLANTS OF THE SAME NSSS SUPPLIER 1
,ILL PRODUCE SIMILAR OR BOUNDING TRANSIENTS.
O IMPPOVEMENTS MADE AFTER THE TMI-2 EVENT FOR THE AUXILLARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM AND FOR OPERATOR INFORMATION AND TRAINING GREATLY AID IN PEC0VERY OF COMPLEX TRANSIENTS, l
4 1
1
- n,.n-g CONCLUSICN (CONT'D) 0 PLANT TRANSIENTS RESULTING FROM CONTROL SYSTEM FAILURES CAN BE ADEQUATELY MITIGATED BY THE OPERATORS PROVIDED THAT FAILURES DO NOT COMPROMISE OPERATION OF THE MINIMUM NUMBER OF PROTECTION SYSTEM CHANNELS.
(EXCEPTIONS NOTED RECOMMEND PROCEDURE. AND OPERATOR : TRAINING AT CE PLANTS).
O TRANSIENT OR ACCIDENTS RESULTING FROM CONTROL SYSTEM FAILURES ARE LESS SEVEPE THAN, AND B0UNDED BY THE TRANSIENTS AND ACCIDENTS ANALYZED IN THE FSAR.
HOWEVER, 0.F. EVENTS WERE -
NOT ANALYZED IN THE FSAR.
0 PWR PLANT DESIGNS WHICH HAVE REDUNDANT COMMERCIAL GRADE (0R BETTER) DVERFILL PROTECTION SYSTEMS (FROM MAIN FEEDWTER OVERFEED EVENTS) AND SATISFY THE SINGLE FAILURE CRITERION WERE DETERMINED TO BE ADE0VATE.
0 HWR PLANT DESIGNS WHICH HA'/E COMMERICAL GPAPE (OP BETTER) OVERFILL PROTECT)nN SYSTEMS (FROM MAIN FEEDWATEP OVERFEED EVENTS) WEPE DETEPMINED TO BE ADEQUATE.
O BASED ON THE CONCLUSIONS, SOME SAFETY ENHANCEMENTS ARE PROPOSED l
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GENERIC APPLICADILITY 0
FOCUS ON THE SIGNIFICANT FAILl!RE SENARIOS IDENTIFIED DUPING REVIEW, i
0 ASSESSMENT BASED ON ENGINEERING CHAPACTERISTIT.3 EVALUATIONS CONDUCTEDBYINELANDORkL,ANDSTAFFANDCONiPACTORJUDGM.ENT, 0
RESULTS OF REVIEW 0F THE REFERENCE PLANT If, CONSIDERED APPLICABLE TO PLANTS OF Tile SAME VENDOR IF:
1.
MAJOR FLUID SYSTEMS APE FUNCTIONAL!.Y SIMILAR TO THE REFERENCE PLANT 2,
POWER-TO-VOLUME' RATIO AND VARIOUS VOLUME-TO-FLOW RATIOS ARE SIMILAR TO THE REFERENCE PLANT, 3,
THERMAL-HYDRAULIC TRANS!ENTS ANALYZED F0P THE REFERENCE PLANT APE SIMILAR TO OP CONSIDERED MOPE SEVERE THAN TRAFSIENTS ON OTHER PLANTS OF THE SAME CLASS, 4,
DIFFERENCES IN DESIGN OF CONTROL SYSTEMS AT OTHER PLANTS ARE NOT SIGNIFICANT EN0 UGH TO SUBSTANTIALLY ALTER THE FAILURE SCENARIOS THAT WEPE IDENTIFIED,
~
5, DIFFE;ENCES IN DESIGN OF PROTECTION SYSTEMS AT OTHER PLANTS ARE NOT SIONIFICANT EN0 UGH TO SUBSTANTIALLY ALTER FAILURE SCENARIOS THAT WERE IDENTIFIED,
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REGULATOPY ANALYSIS FOR PROPOSED SAFETY ENHANCEMENTS 0
USED EXISTING PRAs 0F REFERENCE PLANTS 0
SELECTED APPROPRIATE EVENT TREES FROM PRAs 0
MODIFIED EVENT TREE INITIATING FREQUENCIES PY ADDING.
CONTROL SYSTEM FAILURE SCENARIOS 0
ESTIMATED CORE-MELT FREQUENCIES AND RISK CONTRIBUTION FPOM PCDIFIED EVENT TREES 0
ESTIMATED COST OF IDENTIFTED MODIFICATIONS 0
CALCULATED VALUE-IMPACT FOR PROPOSED MODIFICATIONS i
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17 PP0 POSED RESULUTION 0
REQUIRE ALL PLANTS TO PROVIDE AUTOMATIC STEAM GENERATOR OR REACTOR VESSEL OVERFILL TRIP SYSTEF TO MITIGATE MAIN FEEDWATER
.0VERFEED EVENTS.
(M0ST PLANTS PROVIDE THESE FEATURES) 0 REQUIRE OVERFILL TRIP SYSTEM TO BE SEPARATED FROM THE MAIN FEEDWATER CONTROLS, (NOT REQUIPED TO DE SAFETY GRADE BUT SHOULD NOT BE POWERED FROM THE SAME PCWER SOURCES, NOT'
LOCATED IN Tile SAME CONTROL CABINETS Ari0 NOT ROUTED THROUGHTHESAME-FIREPROTECTIONAREAGASTHEMAINFEEDdTER CONTROLS.)
0 REQUIRE ALL PLANTS TO PERIODICALLY VERIFY OPERABILITY OF OVERFil.L TRIP SYSTEM.
O REQUIRE ALL B8W PLANTS TO PROVIDE AUTOMATIC INITIATION OF EFW, ON LOW STEAM GENERATOR LEVEL, (0CONCE IS ONLY PLANT WHICH DOES NOT HAVE THIS FEATURE) 0 REQUIRE ALL CE PLANTS (WITH LOW HEAD SAFETY INJECTION PUMPS)
TO REASSESS EMERGENCY PROCEDURES AND OPERATOR TRAINING AND MODIFY THEM (IF NECESSARY) TO ASSURE PLANT SHUTDOWN FOR ANY SB LOCA,
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METHOD OF !MPLEMENTATION O
IMPOSED BY GENERIC LETTER O
IMPLEMENTATION BASED ON PL' ANT LIVING SCHEDULE 0
GENERIC LETTER PROVIDES ACCEPTANCE GUIDELINES FOR PLANT SPECIFIC IMPLEMENTATION O
GENERIC SER PROVIDED FOR ACCEPTANCE REVIEW 0
GUIDANCE FOR OPE 1ATING PLANT PEVIEWS IS PART CF UFl A-47 PACKAGE 4
- ENCLOSURE 3 TO GENERIC LETTEP PPOVIDES GUIDANCE FOR OVERFILL PROTECTION AND TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS
- ENCLOSURE 4 TO GENEPIC LETTER PROVIDES A SAMPLE GENERIC SER
- ENCLOSURE 6 TO THE A-47 PACKAGE PPOVIDES A SAMPLE SH0LLY AMENDMENT
- ENCLOSURE 7 TO THE A-47 PACKAGE PROVIDES PROPOSED CHANGES TO STANDARD TECH SPECS FOR 88W AND CE PLANTS
BACKGf0lfND
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S Table 5.1 Summary of Alternatives 8
~__
3; Estimated risk reduction x
Core-melt Ccst Is f'
frequency Man-rem option Plant Industry V I *D I ",?
Alternative (plant year)
(30 years)
Upgrade overfill protection 6E-7 123
$150K-
$3-513M No f rom a 2-out-of-3 to 2-out-of-4
$1.3M s
2.
Upgrade overfill protection to 45-123
$150K--
$1.2M-No a reference plant design (i.e.,
$1.3M
$10M a 2-out-of-3) l 3.
Upgrade plants with no overfill 3600-3800
$100K -
$100K-Yes*
trip to a 1-out-of-1 or better
$500K,_
$500K l
on e'
(2-cut-o f-4)
None None Yes 4.
Issue information letter regarding results and assumption of overfill protection 1
For W FWR Plants 1.
Provido autom.stic shutoff of 6E-a 9
$45K
$2.3M No 4
AFW on steam generator high level.
2.
Issue information letter None None Yes regarding results and assumptions of overfill protection f
i 3.
Upgrade overfill pretection
<1E-10 Insignifi-
$250K-
$8M-No from 2-out-of-3 to 2-out-of-4 cant
$1.3M
$24M
' Applicable to the Oyster Creek plant.
x
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3 Table 5.1 (Continued)
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Estimated risk reduction Core-melt Cost Is M
frequency Man-rem option l
Alternative (plant year)
(30 years)-
Plant Industry l
4.
Take action to upgrade overfill No j
protection (except for three very j
j early plant designs) 5 tX:
4 5.
Provide automatic closure of 1
steam block valves f
i i
Case 1 - For steam dump to
<1E-10 Insignifi-
$65K*
- 43. 4M*
No l
condenser cant
}
l Case 2 - For atmospheric dump IE-7 20
$123K-
$6.5 -
No
$1.2M
$37M l
a 4
6.
Modify ADV controller logic 1.5E-7 20
$123K-
$6.5M -
No
$1.2M
$37H No l
7.
Take action to upgrade pressurizer l
PORV system 8.
Issue information letter on None None No potential everpressure j
vulnerabilities 1
9.
Issue information letter on IE-8 2
None None No j
control system failures that could exacerbate SGTR i
i
,i 1
i
- For instrumentation only.
If additional isolation valves are needed to replace or mo lify the existing j
valves the cost would be substantially greater.
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4 l
Table 5.1 (Continued) f v
1 I
A 5
}4 9
Estimated risk reduction Core-melt Cost is I
g g
frequency Man-rem option g
Alternative (plant year)
(30 years)
Plant Industry ho 3
For BAW PWR Plants 1-J j
1.
Test overfill protection system 3-E6 450
$100K
$300X No*"
]
monthly
).
4
~
~
l 2.
Test overfill prctection monthly 7E-6 1000 S200K
$600K
.Yes**
5
}
and provide logic modification i
3.
Upgrade overfill protection Case 1 - Provide an additional SE-6 1300
$100K -
$300% -
Yes**
independent feedwater flow
$1.3M
$3.9M l
termination Case 2 - Provide a 2-out-of-3 8E-6 1200
$300K -
$1M - 12M Marginal **
j or a 2-out-of-4 system
$600K
($5M max.)
[
]
4 Take action to upgrade overfill None None No protection on plants that provide redundant overfill protection 5.
Automatic initiation of AFW to 2E 155 - 070
$150K
$450K Yes**
minimize loss of steaa generator 9E-6 g
cooling on Icss of power 4
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- Applicable to Oconee plants.
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Table 5.1 (Continued)
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Estimated risk reduction 23 Core-melt Cost Is frequency Man-rem option Alternative (plant year)
(30 years) vi ble?
Plant Industry For CE PWR Plants f
L Automatic overfill protection 4E-6 570
$100K
$1.5M Yes (feedwater pump or feedwater isolation valve closure trip) i 2.
Improve operator procedures 8E-6 850
$10K
$70K Yes to permit safe shutdown following an SBLOCA 4w f
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19 NRC MANPOWEP ESTIMATES TO JMPLEMENT A-47 ANTICIPATE THAT MOST P.EVIEWS WILL BE CONFJPMATOPY AFD MINIMAL TECHNICAL INPUT WILL BE EXPENDED TECHNICAL MANWEEKS l
4 BWRS 8 WEEKS WESTINGHOUSE 5 WEEKS B8W 8 WEEKS u-CE 35 WEEKS PROJFCT MANAGEMENT MANWEEKS ALL VENDORS 30 WEEKS TOTAL STAFF MANWEEKS =
66 WEEKS) (ABOUT 2.0 FTEs) l r
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. to the Minutes of CRGR Veetina No. 127 Proposec Policy Staterent on Maintenance TFt proposed Folicy Statement was sunn:arized ty J. Roe, NRR (slides attached).
He nnted that selected plants, not all plants, would be assessed over a two-year period.
Current thinking is that these team evaluations will visit approximately 80 percent of the reactor sites in a 1 1/2 year period. A specific activity during these team visits will be an assessment of NPRDS it.plementation and use.
It was noted that no change in the NRC enforcement
(
policy was sugge:ted or implied and, in fact, it was indicated that enforcement action will be taken in cases where inadequate maintenance was identified.
The onsite plant assessments are scheduled to begin in April 1988.
A CRGR comment on the Policy Statement was that it focused very tightly on repair. A proposed solution was to modify the Policy Statement so that the prescribed maintenance program includes "... repair, surveillance, diagnostic evaluations, and preventive measures...."
Further, Minor modifications were-suggested in the section entitled "Definition of Paintenance" in order to clearly highlight the extent of supporting functions needed for an effective maintenance program. Another suggested change was to note the role that consensus industry standards play in defining an effective maintenance program.
Since the NRR package was received late by CRGR members, it was agreed to defer developing a CRGR pcsition cr. the package until the next day.
In a conference call on December 24,.987, the CRGR agreed to support the forwarding of tho Maintenance Folicy Statement with the changes noted above. Mesrs. Ross, Bernero Scinto and Jcrdan participated in this telephore conference. Mesrs.
Snierek and Martin were not available.
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MAINTENANCE POLICY STATEMENT t
i CRGR REVIEW
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j DECEMBER 23, 1987 i
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o INDUSTRY INITIATIVES ARE BEING IMPLEMENTED I
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o WIDE VARIATION IN EFFECTIVENESS i
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NEEDED MAINTENANCE NOT BEING ACCOMPLISHED OR NOT PERFORMED I
o EFFECTIVELY AT SOME PLANTS h
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5 HIGH PERCENTAGE OF FAILURES FROM IMPROPER PERFORMANCE OF o
MAINTENANCE l'
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MAINTENANCE / OPERATIONS INTERFACE INADEQUATE o
MAINTENANCE-RELATED CHALLENGES TO SAFETY SYSTEMS IS EXCESSIVE o
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CONTENT OF THE POLICY STATEMENT
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POLICY o
BACKGROUND t'
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o POLICY STATEMENT l
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ADDITIONAL INFORMATION l.
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o DEFINITION OF MAINTENANCE o
FRAMEWORK FOR MAINTENANCE PROGRAMS 1
COMPONENTS, SYSTEMS; AND STRUCTURES o
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o NRC ASSESSMENT ACTIVITIES I
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ENFORCEMENT l
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A_L COPPONENTS, SYSTEMS, I
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AVAl_ABLE TO ?ERFORM l
lNTENDED FUNCTION i
l PROMPTLY REPAIRED l
PRESCRIBED 1AINTENANCE ?ROGRPM l
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ADDITIONAL INFORMATION l
l DEFINITION OF MAlHTENANCE l
o AG6REGATE OF FUNCYl0HS TO ASSURE SAFETY I
o INCLUDES SUPPORTING FUNCTIONS l
FRAMENORK o ESTABLISH PROGRAM DBJECTIVES
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o DEVELOP AND IMPLEMEhr PROGRAM j
o PROGRAM EVALUATION o FEEDBACK l
COMPONENTS, SYSTEMS AND STRUCTURES i
o MAINTENANCE PROGRAM FOR ALL COMPONENTS, j
SYSTEMS AMD STRUCTURES l
o COMMEMSURATE MITH ITS IOGPORTANCE TO SAFETV j
o FOCUS PRIMARY ATTENTION ON SPECIFIED ITEMS L
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m m.. JyL},ht ?inute of CPGR Meeting flo. 127 Prrroseif Aesoliation for GI-93,
' Stihihrding of AFW Furrps" l
E. Possi NRR, sumarized the tecptied Generic Letter addressing resolution of GI-93. He stated that the purpose c' this Generic Letter was to closecut IE Bulletin 85-01 and instruct licensees to continue mor.ituring programs for AFW backleakage.
The Comittee discussed the proposed resolution and supported issuance of the Generic letter following incorporaticn of the following reconsnendations:
)
1.
Clarifyletterastobatactionsorprogramslicenseesshouldhavein place.
2.
Clarify the regulatory caalysis with regard to points raised during the rneeting.
3.
Require licensees to provide response to letter within a 90-day time l
3 pericd.
3 One CRGR member provided a dissenting opin hn on the resolution of this l
Generic letter (attached).
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