ML20247C109
| ML20247C109 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | McGuire, Mcguire  |
| Issue date: | 05/17/1989 |
| From: | Hood D Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| To: | Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| References | |
| TAC-72747, NUDOCS 8905240345 | |
| Download: ML20247C109 (17) | |
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May 17, 1989 Docket Nos. 50-369 and 50-370 LICENSEE: Duke Power Company FACILITY: McGuire Nuclear Station, Units 1 and 2 l
SUBJECT:
SUMMARY
OF APRIL 13, 1989 MEETING REGARDING 1B STEAM GENERATOR l
TUBE RUPTURE EVENT OF MARCH 7, 1989 - MCGUIRE NUCLEAR STATION, UNITS 1 AND 2 (TAC 72747)
On April 13, 1989, the NRC met in Rockville, Maryland with Duke Power Company (the licensee) to discuss the McGuire Unit 1 steam generator tube rupture (SGTS) that occurred March 7, 1989. Meeting attendees are listed in.
Viewgraph slides and handouts used during the licensee's presentations are show in Enclosure 2.
A discussion of the Unit 1 SGTR is given in Licensee Event Report 369/89-04 dated April 20, 1989, and in NRC Inspection Reports 50-369/89-06 and 50-370/89-06, "McGuire Augmented Inspection Team (AIT) Report", dated April 10, 1989.
Accordingly, details of the event are not repeated here.
Because of the failed mechanical tube plug at North Anna Unit 1 on February 25, 1989, and because of B&W's letter of September 6,1988 that certain plugs fabricated from Inconel 600 material may be susceptible to stress corrosion cracking, Duke also discussed the status and plans regarding use of mechanical (ribbed and rolled) plugs at McGuire. All B&W ribbed plugs of the suspect heat (Heat No. W592) will be removed from Unit 1 service prior to restart and all B&W rolled plugs from Heat No. W592-1 in the hot leg tubes of Unit I will be eddy current tested before restart.
McGuire does not have any Westinghouse mechanical plugs of the suspect heat numbers.
Laboratory examination of removed tube specimens and bssociated engineering analysis to determine cause of the tube failure were identified to be in initial phases and no results were available during the meeting.
The licensee discussed several changes to the Station's emergency and abnormal operating procedures which will be made.
As shown in the viewgraphs, several changes to A0Ps have been or will be completed prior to Unit i restart, and
'several changes to E0Ps will be completed by June 30, 1989 once the new plant simulator is available for validation.
At the conclusion of the meeting the NRC and Duke agreed that certain actions would occur prior to final decision regarding restart. The actions include:
(1) Further meetings and reporting regarding cause of tube failure and translation of these results into effective corrective actions; (2) Further meetings regarding tube plugs; Of 8905240345 890517,
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4 2-(3) Completion of procedural changes for entry conditions into Emergency Operating Procedures as proposed during the meeting; and (4) Completion of certain items from the NRC's Augmented Inspection Team Report of April 10, 1989, to be determined from the licensee's discussions with the Team Leader.
The licensee also discussed present schedules for restart by May 4,1989. It was acknowledged, however, that present reschedules are tentative, subject primarily to the results of laboratory examinations of the affected tubes and related engineering analyses. The NRC noted that in order to support a May 4 restart date, the licensee's report from item (1) above would be needed by April 26,1989.
Item (1) was perceived to be the most limiting schedular
- item, rth Darl S. H
, Project Manager Project Directorate II-3 Division of Reactor Projects I/II
Enclosures:
As stated cc w/ enclosures:
See next page L
1
' et t:
.. May 17, 1989 (3) Completion of procedural. changes for entry conditions. into Emergency Operating Procedures as proposed during the' meeting; and (4) Completion of certain items from the NRC's Augmented Inspection Team Report of April 10, 1989, to be determined from the licensee's discussions with the Team Leader.
The licensee also discussed present schedules for restart by May. 4,1989.
It was acknowledged, however, that present reschedules are tentative, subject primarily to the results of laboratory examinations of the affected tubes and related engineering analyses. 'The NRC noted that in order to support a May 4 restart date, the' licensee's report from item (1) above would be needed by April 26, 1989.
Item (1) was perceived to be the most limiting schedular item.
9 Darl S. Hood, Project Manager Project Directorate 11-3 Division of Reactor Projects I/II
Enclosures:
As stated cc w/ enclosures:
See next page l
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[MCGUIREMEETING
SUMMARY
]
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1-3 D:PDII-3 MRood DHood:bd Q Matthews 05/g /89 05/g/89
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McGuire Nuclear Station CC*
Mr. A.V. Carr, Esq.
Dr. John M. Barry Duke Power Company Department of Environmental Health P. O. Box 33189 Mecklenburg County.
i 422 South Church Street 1200 Blythe Boulevard Charlotte, North Carolina 28242 Charlotte, North Carolina 28203 l
I County Manager of Mecklenburg County Mr. Dayne H. Brown, Chief 1720 East Fourth Street Radiation Protection Branch 1
Charlotte, North Carolina 28202 Division of Facility Services
'l Department of Human Resources l
701 Barbour Drive Mr. J. S. Warren Raleigh, North Carolina: 27603-2008 Duke Power Company l
Nuclear Production Department Mr. Alan R. Herdt, Chief P,, 0. Box 33189 Project Branch #3 Charlotte, North Carolina 28242 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 101 Marietta Street, NW, Suite 2900 i
' J. Michael McGarry, III, Esq.
Atlanta, Georgia 30323
- Bishop', Cook, Purcell and Reynolds 1400 L Street, N.W.
Ms. Karen E. Long l
Washington, D.-C.
_20005 Assistant Attorney General L
N. C. Department of Justice f
Senior Resident. Inspector P.O. Box 629 c/o U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Raleigh, North Carolina 27602 Route 4, Box 529 i
Hunterville, North Carolina 28078 Mr. H. B. Tucker, Vice President l
1 Nuclear Production Department Regional Administrator, Region II Duke Power Company i
U.S. Nuclear' Regulatory Commission 422 South Church Street 101 Marietta Street, N.W., Suite 2900 Charlotte, North Carolina 28242 Atlanta, Georgia 30323
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hs. S. S. Kilborn Area Manager, Mid-South Area i
ESSD Projects
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Westinghouse Electric Corp 6 ration MNC West Tower - Bay 239.
P. O. Box 355 Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15230 I
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ATTENDEES 04/13/89 NAMES ORGANIZATION Darl S. Hood NRR/PD2 Janes Bongarra-NRR/DLPQ/HFAB H. F. Conrad NRR/ Materials Eng. Br.
C. Y. Cheng NRR/ DEST /EMTB K. R. Wichman NRR/ DEST /EMTB D. B. Matthews NRR/PDII-3 A. R. Herdt Region II/ Project Branch R. J. Eckenrode NRR/DLPQ/HFAB A. P. Gilbert NRR/DOEA/0EAB Albert Gibson' RII Dir.- Div. Rx Safety.
Sandy Lawyer RII OPB OPS Reactor Inspector Milton Shymlock RII, Section Chief, DRP-3A Peter K. Van Doorn RII/ SRI /McGuire
- Wm. H. Regan NRR/DLPQ/HFAB George Lapinsky NRR/DLPQ/LHFB Gus Lainas NRR/ADRII Reactors Robert Gill Duke Power Co.
Morris Sample Duke Power Co.
Wayne Hodges NRR/ DEST /SRXB Ashok Thadani NRR/ DEST Bruce Travis Du ke/McGuire Mary Boyd Duke Power Co.
R. W. Borchardt NRC/0ED0 G. B. Swindlehurst Duke Power Dave Baxter Duke Power Kulin D. Desar NRR/SRXB R. O. Sharpe Duke Power Hal B. Tucker Duke Power Chu-yu Liang NRR/SRXB Brooke Bradley Potomac News Service (WPCO-TV Charlotte)
Tony McConnell Duke Power
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%fe>< we 2-r DUKE POWER COMPANY McGUIRE NUCLEAR STATION STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE PRESENTATION TO NRC ST.UT APRIL 13, 1989 INTRODUCTION NRC / DUKE OVERVIEW OF EVENT T.L. McCONNELL EMERGENCY RESPONSE T.L. McCONNELL TSC Activation Enhancements Emergency Action Levels Radiation Release Definition EMERGENCY PROCEDURES R.B. TRAVIS ERG Deviation Document Safety Injection Initiation Other Procedure Enhancements STEAM GENERATOR TUBE RUPTURE W.M. SAMPLE Current Status Planned Investigations Planned Corrective Actions Steam Generator Tube Plug Status Steam Generator Tube Plug Planned Corrective Actions l
AIT ISSUES T.L. McCONNELL CLOSING REMARKS NRC/HBT/TLM 1
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McGUIRE NUCLEAR STATION UNIT 1 SGTR EVENT - MARCH 7, 1989 Event characterization and approach to mitigation:
During the initial transient the operators quickly diagnosed the failure mechanism, took expeditious corrective actions, safely shut down the reactor and promptly established reactor coolant system inventory control. The reactor coolant system pressure was then quickly decrease 6 to control leakage into the faulted S/G.
At this point the operators and plant management felt that the plant was stable and in control such that a carefully planned and deliberate cooldown could Emphasis was placed on staying within procedures and not risking any occur.
equipment damage, Tech Spec violations or compromising core safety. This careful, analytical approach to pracing the plant in a safe, cooled down condition is evident in the attached transient graphs.
OVERVIEW 2338:38 Steam Line B Radiation Monitor alarmed.
s2340 Control Room Operators implement abnormal procedure for S/G tube leakage.
Operators take actions to address event:
boration, decrease load, starting second charging pump.
2345 Alert emergency clas'sification declared based on estimated 100 - 150 gpm primary to secondary leakage.
2346:50 Operations manually tripped the Reactor.
2347:18 Operators open injection valves NI-9 and NI-10 to increase charging capability.
2348 Minimum pressurizer level (* 8%) was reached.
s0000 With pressurizer pressure stabilized and pressurizer level increasing, Operators blocked safety injection.
s0025 Pressure in B S/G and NC cystem near equalization as observed by Station Manager & OPS Superintendent.
0132 TSC staffed and activated.
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0132 -
Maintained $1000 psig pressure prior to cooling down below s0330 425'F. Establishing required boron concentration for cooldown.
B S/G level maintained by blowdown to condentate system.
s0330 Started cooldown.
s0500 Reactor Coolant system temperature reached 425*.
Started depressurization.
N0530 -
Continued to cool down and evaluate cooldown method for 0830 ruptured S/G.
s0830 -
Held temperature and pressure for PORV low temperature 0930 overpressure protection calibration, s1015 Initiated S/G cooldown using backfill method.
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EMERGENCY RESPONSE TSC ACTIVATION ENHANCEMENTS
- REORGANIZE AUGMENTATION LIST IN TSC DIRECTIVE Corporate Communications Include Corporation Communications earlier in Notification process to prepare for media response Compliance Manager Notification made earlier to expedite a critical TSC function activation requirements.
Offsite Communications Notification made earlier to expedite transfer of communication l
responsibilities from Control Room to TSC.
Essential for TSC activation.
- 0FFSITE COMMUNICATIONS To State and Counties Train additional TSC offsite communicators to support the one hour notification requirements.
NRC Emergency Notification System (Red Phone)
Continuous communications via Red phone to be performed by Shift Manager (current SRO's) to enhance communication with NRC personnel.
l Press Releases Coordinate Press Releases through corporate communications and State and County Public Information Officers.
NRC Region II to review Press Releases prior to release.
- NRC SITE TEAM INTERFACE l
Event Briefing Team A briefing team consisting of key station personnel will brief any NRC team upon arrival at site.
- OTHER McGuire Safety Review Group (MSRG) Member Utilize MSRG member to document sequence of events during an actual emergency.
o EMERGENCY ACTION LEVELS Alert versus Site Area Emergency Major revisions are currently under way to enhance the decision making process involved in classifying events. This revision is scheduled to be completed July 1, 1989. All revisions are to be in compliance with NUREG 0654.
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9 STATEMENT OF CONCERN RADIATION RELEASE DEFINITION Apparent or perceived inconsistency in emergency notifications to states and counties and in news releases:
A.
Followup notifications to state and counties did not state that a release had occurred.
(The emergency notification had no place to indicate this.)
B.
Subsequent' news release stated that a release within operating limits had occurred.
Some personnel in State / County Emergency organization that became involved later in event were not aware of the early release.
C.
NRC questioned whether a conti'nuous release was occurring, concerned that news releases were potentially misleading.
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PRELIMINARY CRITERIA FOR REDEFINITION OF " RELEASE" RADIATION RELEASE DEFINITION 1.
Understandable by states, counties, and public.
2.
Fulfills public's perceived "need to know".
3.
Can be determined rapidly and unambiguously by plant personnel.
4.
Applicable to a spectrum of possible accidents.
5.
Meets regulatory requirements.
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PLAN FOR PROBLEM RESOLUTION RADIATION RELEASE DEFINITION 1
1.
New emergency notification form implemented 4/5/89 has a place to identify that a release'"has occurred".
2.
Duke has asked NRC for generic guidance to define " release" for emergency notification purposes.
(Re: 4/4/89 letter from H.B. Tucker to the Regional Administrator.)
3.
Duke will develop internal guidance to define " release". A thorough review will be conducted to include input from all appropriate groups involved with all 3 stations. This will include input from Radiation Protection, Emergency Planning, Plant Operations, and Corporate Communications. Appropriate management will decide regarding Duke's
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position.
4.
Duke's position will be presented to states and counties for their retriew by July, 1989.
5.
Duke's definition of " release" will be communicated to NRC after review by states and counties.
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