ML20203K575
Text
{{#Wiki_filter:, to
- o'*" '
UNITED STATES 19 ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION e O '- DIRECTORATE OF REGULATORY OPERATIONS mEciou n - suit E eis s. / / 230 P E AC MT R E E ST R E ET. NORT HuvEST
- rcis o' AT t.a ur a, cEoncia acaos APR 101973 Mr's. 8aude S. Mill'er,,' Librarian -
Athens'Public Library Sonth'and Forrest _At ens Alabama. 35611' h i e LOCAL *PUBLIC DOCUMENT ROOM ~
- 7 Enclosed are the documents listed on Enclosure A relating to Tennessee Valley Authority, Docket Nos. 50-259, 260, 296.
This correspondence is submitted pursuant to arrangements made with the Public Proceedings Branch, Office of the Secretary, for use by the public. Where possible, these materials should be punched and filed in a folder labeled as follows:. .s. ~* .INSPF.'IIION FILE. ~ (Including Inquiry and Incident Reports) h .f f r Norman C. Moseley Director
Enclosure:
As stated cc w/ enc 1: Washington Public Document Room ,j Central Mail and Files Unit, Document Room Clerk, w/o documents p L RO Files, w/o documents rbI / P 8604300h286031y PDR po MORROW 85-ygg PDR I / a
O ' Ma fer. 3611e Dociament Bocess if lif hf, . t h Dalley Anatherity Docket No. 50-259/73-2 W Esemns Ferry 1 1. Letter to Tennessee Valley Authority dated March 15, 1973. 2. Letter fram Tennessee Valley Authority, J. E. C111 eland, dated April 4, 1973. 3. Inspection Esport 50-259-73-2. [flY'Of' g.$g 1.p. .p ~fa'jA" ' 'a: Y t l l l i i bec[;EnclosureA only w/ document NSIC OIS, OR State - Alabama .o .t/. orrice > R..O...:.I..I... #... ...R_O..:..I..I, j r' i' <j j SJShadinger:w 1R erwood suruut > 4)).01.7.3.. ..I.4IlV.1.7.3 - Dnt> Form AEC-318 (Rev.9 53) AECM 0240 ees .43-is.s ses.: eears I
7 ~- ~.. t V .i y IAtter from Tennessee Valley Authority APR 101973 50-259/73-1 dated April 4, 1973 50-259/73-2 ec w/ enc 1: ,J. 8. Henderson, RO J.'G. Kep'ple'ri RO RO:HQ.(6) Dird torate of Licensing (13), 9 DR Central' File's (2) .~ Regulatory Standards- (3) R. -..s v - a Incal PDR ~ NSIC OIS, OK State I l I g $ b i I 4 h ( e I l O b e l l l
6sM ? "M r i r, TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY CHATTANOOGA, TENNESSEE 37401 l 40
== PARTNE ASHip Mr. John F. O' Leary, Director Directorato of Licensing Office of Regulation U.S. Atomic Energy Ccamission Weahinston, DC 20545
Dear Mr. O' Leary:
TMNB8EE YALLE AUTHORITY - BROWS FIRE NUCI2AR PLANT UNIT 1 - DOCI M EO. 50-259 - FACILITY OPERATIEG LIC M SE DPR ABBORMAL OCCURRENCE REPORT BFAO-7426W The enclosed report is to provide details concerning Target Rock main steam relief valve (PCV l-19) which asperienced an extaMM blowdown on two occasions. This event occurred on Brouns Ferry } Nuclear Plant unit 1 on May 5 and 6,1774, and is submitted in accordance with Appendix A to Regulatory Guide 1.16, Revision 1, October 1973. Very truly yours, TENNESSEE VALI2Y AUTHORITY E. F. Thomas Director of Power Production Enclosure CC (Enclosure): i Mr. Norman C. E seley, Director Region II Regulatory Operations Office, USAEC 230 Peachtree street, NW., Suite 818 Atlanta, Georgia 30303 / ~ qa4 l ga n
r h ABNORMAL OCCURRENCE REPORT Report No. : BFAO-7426W Report Date: May 15, lW4 Occurrence Date: May 5 and 6, lW 4 Facility: Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant unit 1 Identification of Occurrence Target Rock main steam relief valve (PCv 1-19) experienced an extended blowdown on two occasions. Conditions Prior to Occurrence On May 5,1974, the reactor tripped from 92-percent powi. and main steamline isolation occurred as a result of a feedwater system startap test which was in progress. On May 6, the reactor again tripped and isolation occurred while being returned to the 92-percent power level to continue the feedwater system startup test. Description of Occurrence On Tuesday, May 7, plant management completed a thorough analysis of pressure and temperature traces following the two reactor isolations and scra=s which occurred on May 5 and 6. Their analyses showed that relief valve 1-19 apparently on both occasions did not fully resent. This resulted in blowdown of the vessel to approximately 500 psi within approximately 10 minutes. No excessive vessel stress was experienced. Upon identification of the valve calfunction, the decision was made to shut down the reactor and to replace and inspect the valve. Designation of Atmarent Cause of Occurrence There is no single apparent cause for the extended blowdown. The valve was completely disassembled and thoroughly inspected, and two abnormalities were found. Neither abnormality, acting independently, could cause the extended - blowdown. The first abnormality found was a leaking pilot seat. Examination of the seat revealed that, in two opposite quadrants, there was evidence of very slight wire drawing across the seat. The second abnormality was a very small burr found on the second-sta6e stem insert guide sleeve. The burr was a result of deformed metal on the stem insert guide, probably caused by a hard lich during initial valve asse=bly. The additive effect of the first-stage seat leakage and the second-ste6e stem burr could create a condition which would result in an extended blowdown. Analysis of Occurrence On May 5, Pcv 1-19 was open approximately 7.5 minutes. The vessel pressure droppgd from 1,062 psig to 550 psig which results in a coolant thermal transient of 73 F. This degree of thermal transient would not create any abnormal, unacceptable thermal stresses in the vessel.
.i. i -2 Analysis of Occurrence (continued) On May 6, PCV 1-19 was open approximate 4 9 minutes. The vessel pressure dropp y from 1,034 psig to 525 psis, which resulted in a thermal transient of 76 F. This degree of thermal transient would not create any abnormal, unacceptable thermal stresses in the vessel. Corrective Action Administrative procedures are being changed to ensure that offsite plant management is adequately notified during off shift periods to enable informed judgments in returning the unit to service following significant events such as these. Failure Data Valve data: Target Rock Corporation - Model 67F - Relief valve Size 6" inlet - 10" outlet Design pressure - 1,200 psi; setpoint 1,100 psig +_11 psi Capacity - 800,000 lb hr saturated steam; serial No. 72 Failures - See BFAO-7 9W S 91kg nouk!yp; aim,, L
s, t s tr.s-; AEc, Atlanta ~ 7' ;" em " ut j. ?- I; ; ~-; iO.O J. R. Calhoun 3185 a
- Lg, 8
,cw! x I us. N 702 EB-C l l =~_ E nw Yow Cal Thought you might be interested in the attached TVA announcements. i I 1 JRC: CHB Attachments I [ - Y ' F, p',
- 'Y'?e
- v. _
NMM M MMM-UW I ( ~ 6.~ irr o. m.m sse. u l h 1 l 1 i i i w /
.2 i r; 'g v l 1 aNNESSEE VALLEY AUT..OAITY CHATTANOOGA, TENNESSEE 37401 40 / M3 $9'W8%M 7 3 c: Cf PARTNE ASHip ~ V 3 F. 0%ary, Director Mr. Joh: S Directprate of Licensimyg Office of De ation / U.S. Atomic Ene C seion W ington, DC 5
Dear Mr. 0 % ary:
] TEEMERAISt VALLEY AUFEDRITY - EROWN FERRY NUCLEAR FIANT UNIT 1 - DocEsT 30 50-259 - FACILITY OPERATIE LICIEBE WR ABEDMAL OccUnauncI REP 0ar RFAo-7$ 3v 1 The enclosed report is to provide details concerning significant. vibration in torus and torus-ring header upon opening relief,%['[h] during startup testing which occurred on Browns Ferry Buclear Plant j unit 1 on November 18, 1973, and is submitted in accordance vie Appendix A to Regulatory Guide 1.16, Bevision 1, October 1973., / Very truly yours, l TEENESSEE VALI2Y AUTBoRITY I i E. F. Thomas l Director of Power Production 1 l En-losure CC(Enclosure): \\ ^ ) 1 Mr. Noriaan C. Moseley, Director Region II Regulatory Operations Office, USABC ass-poesktree street, W. Atlanta, Georgia 3o303 1 1 b $LP } \\' l
l a. j e ABNOINAL OCCURRENCE REPOltP Report No.: BFAo-7343W Report Date: November 28, 1973 Occurrence Date: November 18, 1973 Facility: Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant 1 Identification of Occurrence Significant vibration in toms and toms-ring header upon opening relief valves during startup testing of unit 1. Conditions Prior to Occurrence Se reactor was at apprnvimately 35-percent power during the startup test program. Description of Occurrence During testing of relief valves on November 8, significant noise was heard amanating from the toms and dryvell when the relief valves were opened. The noise associated with two valves was significantly greater than from the others. On November 11, a dryvell and toms entry was made to inspect for possible change; none was found but it was noted that one relief valve discharge pipe had vibrated against floor grating within the dryvell. Clearances were increased to eliminate this interference. On November 18, with special instmme:J.t..or installed on the to m s to measure acceleration and deflection, the relief valves were again opened. The deflection measured was more than desirable but st1.U vithin the range predicted by General ' Electric Company. During these tests, it us noted that three tons support feet were not in full contact with their support pads. At this time, the conditions were reported as an abnomal occurnace. Designation of Apparent Cause of Occurrence Torus vibration as a result of relief operation is an expected phenomenon. However, during inspection on November 19, it was discovered that nine toms support saddle feet were not in full contact with their support pads. Lack of contact may be the cause of the excessive vibration. Continued inspection is being conducted. Corrective Action The space between the tons support saddle feet and the support pads will be mMmmad as necessary to ensure proper contact and support for the toms. Additional vibration testing will La perfomed following this corrective work. Se design fix arrived at for unit 1 will also be applied to units 2 sad 3
m o TENNESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY CHATTANOOGA, TENNEf*SEE 37401 . zy v 8.w. _., am n m;, M Mr. John'I.bary, Director 1 Directorate of Licensing Office of Regulation U.S. Atomic tiergF Ccamnias on Washinston, DC 2054 V
Dear Mr. O' Leary:
TREEERAM YALLE AIF1'HORITY - BROW 8 FERRY NUCLEAR PLArf INIT 1 - i DOCIET M. 50-259 - FACILITY OPERATIlm LICEBSI DPR AMORMAL OCCURIN CE REPORT BFAO-7349W The enclosed report is to provide details concerning reactor sg; (,.p ] steen relief valve PCV-1-18 bellows seal leakage alarm indi ,c e; i light indicatai bellows leakage which occurred on Broiens Fe '. t Plant unit 1 on December 25, 15P73, and is submitted in accor m '4 _( W ir A to Regulatory Guide 1.16, Revision 1, October i n + ** l Very truly yours, Tenmamm VALLEY AUTHORITY E. F. Thnmas Director of Power Production Enclosure CC (Enclosure): _ Mr. Norman C. Moseley, Director _... Region II Regulatory Operations Office, USAEC .s. a': W 5teektree Street, NW. !/ i Atlanta, Georgia 30303 $f;fl [ w& y nf __ _ __._.~ ______.___._____,
ABNORMAL OCCURRENCE REPORT Report No.--BFAo-7349W Report Date--January 4, 1974 Occurrence Date--December 25, 1973 Facility--Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant unit 1 Identification of Occurrence Reactor main steam relief valve PCV-1-18 bellows seal leakage alarm indicating l light indicated bellows leakage. 1 Ccuditions Prior to Occurrence Reactor was at 50-percent thermal power following a scheduled outage. PCV-1-18 was one of three replacement valves installed during the outage, w Description of Occurrence The bellows seal leakage alarm indicating light for PCV-1-18 was observed to indicate bellows leakage. I Designation of Atmarent Cause of Occurrence The exact cause of the occurrence cannot be determined until the pressure switch and bellows assembly are removed from the steam header. Suspected causes are a failed pressure switch, leaking pilot valve bellows, or bellows thread leakege. The relief valve will be removed from the header, disassembled, and the component parts tested at the earliest opportunity. Analysis of Occurrence The pilot valve section of the Target Rock safety / relief valve is a small, low-flow pressure sensing and control element which actuates the main valve. The key element of the pilot valve is a machined bellows which acts as a combination piston, spring, and hermetic seal. Leakage past the bellows is monitored by a pressure switch and indicating light. If the bellows chamber is leaking, the popping pressure of the valve is shifted to a higher value depending on degree of leakage; and the valve will no longer operate as a pressure-activated safety valve at the original setpoint. However, the valve retains its capability to function for automatic blowdown and manual operation. The capacity of the other safety and relief valves is such that the unit may be safely operated with one relief valve inoperable. I Corrective Actica l The relief valve PCV-1-18 will be removed and replaced with another valve at the earliest opportunity, should it be determined that the bellows is defective. If the pressure switch is found to be defective, it will be changed out and the valve will remain on the header.
et s Failure Data Manufacturer--Target Rock Corporation Hampstead, Long Island, New York TypeValve--Safety /reliefvalve Model 67F Pilot oparated Size--Inlet Flange = 6" I Outlet Flange = 10" Serial No.--35 f Setpoint--1,090 psi l Capacity--800,000 lb/hrsaturatedsteam l i S f i t ~ 4 2 i l 1, f i a t 4 i i I I i l )
n y s'ENNEOPEE VALLEY AU a HORITY CHATTANOOGA, TENNESSEE 37401 +g. g/f 4 ; % C M Q 'c.'i sms = Q .~ Mr. John 4*LTEPy Director Directpra of Licen j Off$c's of Regulation U,$. Atcenic hergy saio 8--M aston, DC 20545
Dear Mr. O' Leary:
TENIESSEE VALLEY AUTHORITY BRO % INS FERRY NUCLEAR PLANT WIT 1 - DOCERT NO. 50-259 - FACILITI OPERATIXl LICEMBE DPR AIBORMAL OCCURRENCE REPORT BFAO-749W The enclosed report is to provide details concerning amin a pighe*jy pressure relief valve PCV l-41 that failed to resent after 4 '! ?l. lifted at.yyicaimately 1,080 psig which occurred on Browns l"( Nuclear Plant unit 1 on February 12, 1974, and is submitted accordance with App 3ndix A to Regulatory Guide 1.16, Revisi ~17""' October 1973 Very truly yours, TEinetm VALLET AUTHORITY E. F. Thomas Director of Power Production Enclosure CC (kclosure):
- 4. Esuman C.140seley, Director y'
Regiae Il Regulatory Gerations Office, UC/A S Pensittree Street, W., Suite 813 2 Atlanta, Georgia 30303 '~ l p x
ABNORMAL OCCURRENCE REPORT Report No.: BFAO-749w Report Date: February 22, 1974 Occurrence Date: February 12,1774 Facility: Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant unit 1 Identification of Occurrence Main steam pressure relief valve PCV 141 failed to reseat after having lifted at approximately 1,080 psig. Conditions Prior to Occurrence The reactor was in the shutdown condition following reactor isolation as a result of high temperature in the main steam pipe tunnel. High tunnel temperature occurred because of reduced ventilation flow. The reduced flow resulted from shutting down ventilation fans to calibrate a reactor building ventilation controller. Descript' ion of Occurrence During blowdown of reactor pressure following main steamline isolation valve closure, pressure relief valve PCV 1-41 on the main steam header failed to reseat. Designation of Aeparent Cause of Occurrence PCV 1-41 actuated a number of times during the pressure blowdown following j isolation. The exact cause of failure to resett is not known at this time. The valve will be disassembled and inspected with the manufacturer's representative present to determine cause of failure t,o reclose. Before its failure to reclose, this relief valve had been manually operated at least two times during startup testing and eleven times during torus testing. Since this relief valve has the lowest setpoint of all the relief valves, it has operated in all of the automatic pressure actuation situations. Only one other valve has been operated automatically by pressure actuation. Analysis of Occurrence All plant systems performed their intended functions in the expected manner ) after the relief valve failed to reclose. The average rate of change of the reactog vessel and coolant did not greatly exceed the normal cooldown rate of 100 F. an hour as expressed in Section 3.6. A.1 of the technical specifications. Preliminary calculations indicate that the blowdown did not contribute significantly to the vessel usage factor. The preliminary calculations show the following:
. o. Vessel flange and studs--No effect on usage factor Vessel shell--Usage factor = 0.00003 Feedwater nozzle--Usage factor = 0.00017 All other plants operating parameters were within satisfactory limits, and no safety limits were exceeded. Corrective Action The failed valve was replaced with a new relief valve. Disassembly of the failed valve when perfor=ed will supply information for use in determining preventive measures if needed. After fully determining the cause of the valve failure, we will supply this information by amending this report. Failure Data TargetRockCorporation,Model67F, safety /reliefvalve Size: 6 inch inlet; 10 inch outlet 1,200 psi design pressure Setpoint' 1,080 psig + 11 psi i Capacity 800,000 lb/hr saturated steam i I Serial No. 55 U i 1 n.1 o 1
ENCLOSURE ABNORMAL OCCURRE! ICE REPORT Report No.:.BFAo-7436w Reprart Date: June 7, 1974 Occurrence Date: May 28, 1974 Facility: Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant unit 1 Identificati3n of Occurrence Spill of approximately 12,000 gallons of potentially contaminated water to an uncontrolled area, unit 3 condensate backwash receiver tank room. Conditions Prior to Occurrence Valves 2-HCV-2-747 and 2-HCV-2-748 were removed and blerus were installed before startup of unit 1. This was part of interface between units 1 and 2 to prevent contaminated water from unit 1 getting to unit ;!. Work Plan 1634 R1 had been issued to remove interfacc b'lanks and install rbove valves to connect units 1 and 2 condensate systems. Description of Occurrence When pipefitters loosened the flenge on the blank for 2-HCV-2-747, water floved out in a gush. The pipefitters left the pipe tunnel without retightening the flange bolts. This allowed approximately 85,000 gallors of water to be lost from unit 1 CST to pipe tunnel. ~ The pipe tunnel overflowed to the units 1 and 2 condensate backwash receiver tank room. Overflow from the pipe tunnel also flowed to unit 3 condensate backwash receiver tank room which.is outside the controlled area. Designation of fuenrent Ceuse of Occurrence The cicerance for hold order 3454 did not specti'y to close 1-HCV-2-74'7. The flange uns not partially loosened as was requested by the shift engineer. Inunediate Action ~ ~ The pipetitter generel fore: nan t.long with an assistent unis operator returned to the tunnel to (1) close velve 1-HCV 2-747 which had been inadvertently left open and (2) retighten the flance on blank 2-HCV-2-747. Health physics employees and chemicel laboratory employees were requested to start sampling the unit 3 sumps and the water in unit 3 condensate bac!crech receiver tank room. Inspection was made cf pipe sleeves from pipe tunnel to unit 3 reactor building. Inspection showed no leshs of contaminated water. Health physics employees roped off unit 3 condensate backwash receiver tank room until an analysis could-be ande of the spilled water. k ~
2 t Subncouent Action Samples were taken of all the sumos in unit 3 reactor and turbine buildines as well as the water in unit 3 backwash receiver tank room. Isotopic analysis of above samplce showed that all e.rcan listed above were below the relcase limits on an MPC basis, Irregardless of the ebove findings, water from unit 3 condensate backwash receiver pump room which contcined most of the uater leakin6 to the unit 3 arce. was pumped with a ter:porary pu=o to a floor drain in the unit 2 nrea. It then flowed to the floor drain collector tank in the radwaste building. Corrective Action A written procedure was prepared to imolement removing interface blanks er.d inst =11 h valves 2-HCV-2-747 end 2-HCV-2-748. This procedure was folloued o and work was successfully completed on l'ay 30, 1974 The operations Supervisor held a discussion with all parties concerned on :hy 29, 1974 He stressed that greater care muut be exercised in clearance for work to be done. Discussion was also held with the Shift Engineer by the Planu Superintendent. e i 4 9
o D Ltr to Tennessee Valley Authority fm N. C. Moseley dtd 02 1974 DISTRIBUTION: H. D. Thornburg, RO RO s LIQ (4) Directorate of Licensing (4) DR Contral Files
- PDR
- Local PDR
- I; SIC
- DTIE, OR
- State
- To be dispatched at a later da.e 9~ J i
J 0 f Q /L k I 6 h. / ' 3* - }pf y B-K t r* l s r,'Q U c. G l' - ish. Mr. John G. Davis, Director Directorate of F.cgulatory Operations United States Atonic T.nergy Co:. ission Recion II - Suite 818 230 Peachtree Street,:N. Atlanta, Georgia 30303
Dear Mr. Davis:
8* [e This is in further response to your June 30, 1972, letter RO:II:JGD 50-259, 50-260, 50-296, 50-327, and 50-323 concerning verification that the udl thicknesses of certain valves noot the requirements of specified codes and standards. is confined to our Browns Ferr/ ::uclear Plant only; a secarate This resconse . response is being prepsred for Sequsych Nuclear Plant valves. Representatives of the T/A Divisica of Desig have discussed infornally with representctives of I.I:C Directorates of Licensi and Regulato:/ 0,: orations (P.egion II) the extent of a Browns ng Ferry valve thic%ncos verification progran, and we cov vich to propose formally the following plan: Where no records exist of minir.un vall thichness vill perform a nee.surenent of cast valves in unit 2 , ve reactor cool.r.t pressure boundary; these ex cinstiens vill be limited w valvos larcer then two-inch !IG in water lines and larcer than four-inch IP3 in ste.m lines. In addition, within three years, after June 30, 1972, ve vill =ecsure the corresponding valves in unit 3. We vill utilize r.cacuring procedures which are consis-tent with itens (1) cnd (2) of your June 30, 1972, letter. These procedures have been incorporated in a process specification, a copy of which is enclosed, and the procedures have been included in T/A Construction Specific. tion G-27 as a standard. be accepted under itens (3), (4), or (5) of yourValves which cannot letter vill be repaired as directed in item (6) of your letter. In order to provide a larger nsrgin than indicated by iters (3) of your letter, if er.y vdve vitll thickness h is found in units 2 or 3 to be not more thnn two percent P' M, over the specified ninicus vall thicknees, the related v
.s -e-D E C 1 '::L Mr. John G. Davis 1 valves in unit 1 vill be checked at the first available opportunity nnd vill be subjected to tha r.easurenent and acceptance procedures described in the preceding. Ultrcsonic neasurer.cnt instruments and calibration material are bein.g secured and training of personnel in this technique is undervuy. Ve expect to be ready to begin on unit 2 no later than December 15, 1972. We believe that nessurement of all valves in units 2 and 3 (66+ percent samplins) vill provide the level of confidence required to guarantee thr.t all valves in the Browns Ferry plant meet the standards and specifications under which they vore purchased. I Ve have not received a reply to our letter of Septenber 29 to you, and this proposal is based on our requested exclusions of forced valves entirely r.nd all cost valves under two-inch IPS l in Vater service and four-inch IPS in stens cervice. Ve agree to radify the neope of minsureuents stated in this letter if any s-of these exclusions are not Cranted. Unit 1 is und2rcoing preoperational testing under tight schedule to =ect the scheduled fuel losiing date of February 1,1973 Since ceasure ent of ur.it 1 vould involve r2noval of insulation to perr.it access to valves, ve sish to keep requirenents for measurenent to a mininuu. Since unit 1 is in en advanced stage of construction, an early dacision vould be creatly appreciated. Very truly yours, J. E. G111 eland Assistant to the l'anager of Power .ftt RHD:CTL:EJ Enclosure / CC: J. R. Calhoun, 905 EB-C ,/ R. T. Hathcote, Erovr.s Terry'/ l N. B. Hushes, LO3 TPE-C ,e R. H. I.'Arquis, 629 : EE-K / ,J. R. Parrish,_101,U3-K. j ( E. F. Thonas,1005 EB-C J. E. Watnen, 818 PRS-C s-G. Willis-s, Jr., 831 PRS-C l / 12 72--JRP :EF . OC4.B.<A..Meawar. 404 US-X 6
TENN ESSEE V AL@dY A0a. cwGao 0 0 CHATTANOOGA, TENNE 2sEE 37401 r ~ y Mr. John G. Eavis, Director Directorate of Feralstory Operations United States Ate =ic Inergy Cc ission Region II - Suite S:.S 230 Peachtree Street, W. Atlanta, Georgia 30303
Dear Mr. Davis:
This is in further response to your June 30, 1972, letter RO:II:JGD tiO-259-( 50-260, 50-296, 50-327, and 50-328 cencerning verificatics that the vall thicknesses of certain valves meet the his response requirements of specifie:i ecdes and standards. is confined to our Ec~ ns Terry Nuclear Plant only; a separate v response is being prepared fer Sequcyan Nuclear Plant valves. Representatives of the TVA Divisien of Design have discussed informally with representatives of AE0 Directorates of Licensing and Regulater/ C;erntions (Region II) the extent of a Browns Ferry valve thickness verification program, and we nov vish ( to propose fer: ally the folleving plan: 6 g Where no records exist of =ini=.:= vall thickness, we vill perfor= a ceasurenent of cast vdves in unit 2 reactor coolant pressure boundsry; these exa:inaticus vill be linited to valves larger than two-inch IFS in water lines and larger than fcur-inch IPS in steam In addition, within three years, after June 30, lines. 1972, ve vill ceasure the corresponding valves in unit 3. We vill utilize neasuring procedures which are consis-tent with ite=s (1) and (2) of your June 30, 1972, letter. These procedures have been incorporated in a process ' specification, a ecpy of which is enclosed, and the procedures have been included in TVA Construction Valves which cannot J Specificatien G-29 as a standard. be ' accepted under itens'(3), (h), or (5) of your letter vill be repaired as directed in item (6) of your letter. In order to provide a larger cargin than indicated '.f any valve vall thickness by item (3) of your letter, is found in units 2 or 3 to ..e not'nore than tw percent over the specified mininus vall thickness, the rel'ated k cA
^ o. _y_ Mr.' John G. Davis December 1, 1972 / ) velves in unit 1 vill be checked at the first available opportunity and vill be subjected to the ceasurement and acceptance procedures, described in the preceding. Ultrasonic mea' ure=ent instruments and calibration s material are being secured and nraining of personnel in this technique is underway. We expect to be . ready to begin on unit 2 no later than December.15, 1972. We believe that measurement of all valves in units 2 and 3 (66+ percent sa=pling) vill provide the level of confidence required to guarantee that all valves in the Browns Ferry plans meet the standards and specifications under which they were purenased. =e-- Oc/.Q# ' We have not received a reply to our letter of September' 29 to you, and this prepesal is base.d en our requested exclus4.ons of forged valves entirely and all cast valves under two-int:h IPS in water service and four-inch IPS in stess service. We agree to modify the sec;e of messure=ents stated in this letter if ag of these exclusions are not granted. {\\ Unit 1 is undergoing preeperatienal testing under tight schedule to r.eet the scheduled fuel loading date of February 1,1973. Since ceasurement of unit 1 vould involve re= oval of insulation to permit e.ccess to valves, ve wish to keep requirements for measurenant to a =inicu=. Since unit 1 is in an advanced stage of construction, an early decision vould be greatly appreciated. Yery truly yours. J. E. Gilleland l '! Assistant to the Manager of Power en i .I Enclosure ,j 'i !~ I I 'a j I,l'. t e e ghe -w
- e.. en p ese g
?' . \\'.'t.... . ;. s. '..s.'.:.
- d.... h r * *..O e..
Si?C[M;'" s n::t *T.t Y: sir;(.y ::: ::'.:g:r :..:;.n y } 4; 1.0 .eCO.W i This specifi. cation d: fines th2 requirenente, procedurce and doctr.entatio.: necc:ssary to provide assurance that pressure retainin.; part: or co_ pat. ente mast mininu.t we.ll thichnen:. a.. : pacified by the appropriate code, standard or design specificati.cn, as applicabic. I 2.0 imms 2.1 ' Direct Physical Measurement 2.2 Ultrasonic Measurement s. 30 P?OOF.PE3 31 Direct Physical Measurement 3 1.1 Thi: tr.etbed =sy be u ed alo:.e or in con, junction with the ultra:cuic ~ ceasure aent meched. t 3 1.2 Direct phy:ical =accure=act r.ny be e.ccoupli:hed by the use of micro-meters, caliper:. dial indicators or cc binations of these teasurini, devices. s e c_ 313 Accuracy of the nea: urin 3 tecle, devices or in:truments shall be cali-brated assinct certified naacure=ent standard which have knc:n valid relationship to national standards. Ii 32 Ultrasonic !!ae.nurement 3 2.1 Ultraconte e.ea:urc=ent shnll be accomplishad using the t'ra:isait-receive pulse echo r.ethod employing cauip:2nt,hich ha:: accuracy of neasures?nt within 2;l2 of the thicknes; being :naanurad. r 3 2.2 Equipm3M. shall b2 calibrn.ted on stop wedge calibration blocks, on a j calibratirn step thickness which i: within.1 inch of the thic'.e.nas: [* being seasured. The calibration bloch material nhall be cade frcm the j sese "P" nuabar (.'.s identified ln A5:3 Code Section G, parageph Q-il.1 or ndi-ll.1) as the m terial bein;; =22:ured. For purposas of this :peci.fication, ? nu bara 1. 3, k and 5 are considered en'tivalent. j Uhen material arailability per :its, th' calibracic:. bloch ca'teria.1 shn.L1 s g be r.ade frou the c.nc tr.aterial type and predact for:t as the r.aterital be-in.3 lacasured. <>r; a 0 . 4 p* '1 -9 < :1.
e l ',;.t. f a.ch t..:'. p.vh: vue.'.5J 3 'o ? ha:. ' iv. 20: cri c.. m' car te 1 ::.:rr. e.; by enlibcr.tir; e.. the ci:cp uu!;j etlib.2 tion block :.hd then check.* r,; for r spt i.t-J.iility c..1. securcef ca e. carved curfac : which h:
- e. r..d i n:.
equal ta or leaa th in thth of ti.c ite:t to be = enc..: red and of th:: ner. - thicknus as that step calibrated r..2inr.t on th-stop ucdse calibr:t!en blo:k. (This tect need only be made one ti=e for each probe.) 3 2.4 All detail:: of the test equipment unod, tricludine, tect conditiota:, shall be recorded for each tcat perfomed. C.lycerine sh:H be u::d us a cc.p'.s 325 calibration of the equip.,ent ch211 te perfor ed et 3c9.sb once for e ch ites or c=ponent o.nd shall cl o ha perfer:31 at least onca for cach thic': ness range specified in paragraph 3 2.2. 4.O f A n 4.?
- v=".. *.9.:
1.'*".1, *Q Lb i r
===.r=.. e= w g m.p2r. . u _ .2,.. m.... h.1 At least tuo c2esuracant shall be tchen in each ouadrant o" iters bein; neasur.:J. For p=p: and ec.lyc:, this require =ent shall apply :Sp.).ritely tg the beiv, nech and :: eld or flan;:e ends. For ; ap.:ses of orien+.ation, O chan be considered tcp dead center uhen leching irto run:: of th iters or companents, and for branches shall b2 the es:is paranel to and in the direction of fic r, vi-h degree e:: 12 tion cloc'crisa. Prior to measure-
- cnt, tempornr/ m2. rhin; shall t2 p12ced on the iten or c==ponent naar the point of r.e curetant indicating correct location.
L 9 The mini== thichna:s fer each quairant ch '11 be racorded and identified with thu iten, lo:at t.cn and nethod of r. ensure-ment. The results shall be record?d.separanely for each iten, on the _ppecpriate fc= for the-mec::urement =ethod used. t 43 The minin= wall thichas:::: at veld ends shall be naasured ir ediately i adjacent to the weld preparation. I t 4.4 For valves larger th. 4 inch nominal pipe sica, enNicient measu'rd:sents shall be made to detsmine that t.5c util thici2wss di encion at ucid cuds does not reditee the befy wall thichness to less thin that required for l minir.ua body rall' thickne: vithin a region closer to the outside sur-face of the neck than one mininu= body unll thicknes.-:, t, measure
- alon6 the run direction.
S.0 P.~'a-r.m..r e.. r:.r. e :m :r. wr... t1.T. : m r.e.3 ,.~ A.. i.-..._ i j 51 Person cl p-tefermins ultrasonic thickness measure.::ints shill be quali-fied in accor. dance with 16tTf-TC-la. i j 5.2 The test con:11tions and surfacc finich shall ba judged cenptabic by level II cr level III p:;rsonn:1. i 1 h
- i
,i e v y'.. T*'ep;ted by (/:.v.J
- .. ?.%..
, ( t I m I ' '!.py c wed d, .,0.:a u _, s) 41-e..m_w)._._ C*? f
\\'. bs..., d.~..... ,e.,,, h.,9.i,h.,1G'i t
- a. i.
..i s \\ .i i L T111CIC:533 !.'FidDCF'.2'T Fi:CCED l ULTPASO'!IC iT.ii:0D Part identification F.anufacturer Reference code or standard Mihi.:ran design thickness Body Weld End F.sterial specification cal ;;rade Prof.uc h fo.~._ (cacting, forgin;;, etc.) Equipment make and nodel Proba typ2 and sice Freglency ~f .ibration step thic1=cs3 ranSe .~ Couplant ty;e i Special equip. ant n.ttacic.rmts I Measure:.:ent loce. tion- .i l Valve.- ptt-m:: Pine l l 'J-Id Eni!l: Eod r tic @ Ueld "r.Iil T.civ. ?! :ch Il 7_. 1 f 90 I p-l l 4 2 l I 1 i -i O 1 i 1 I 4 2 .... ~ I I l i i t)o 1 / r-. - l i 2 + t. l s '.o 1 { _p. .. _., _ = =
r. ,.ge, ..~.i..a.-t*. \\.,.......,. .r, q t.* m. a t...t T THICi2fdm f ??Stri'*i"22 E!C. O'1D t o (/ DIIEl' PitTSICAL IMHOD I Tart idec.tific:. tion 1:. rtaf:.cturcr 1 P.crerence code or standard Ueld End Bodv .:.4ni 'r. design thic':: ness 2bi6c and grade 1aterial cpecif1: Product fore.(castin, forcing, etc.) Type of nessuring device (s) s Mecsurement location: 3 i it f [j Fine L __ ~ ^ Pur.rs ( Valves s j l f oJ.y 1.sch End S Lj. i a Bod.v Is~ech l Er.d .i ji 4 h.. I ) I' li 1 I L 2 l L._ T t l ,~ l m _-?$ w_ ,N_ 0 1 R 1 ~_ I [ \\ i l 1 J l y _ _. , j B,1 i t I' 1 i 2 ,f l I
==
-.e f n ) jl. ( I i -w--.....- f J ..l . i..-.-. 2 i
- o 5r_ce-c. [i.qc.! G'N.'.9 s...._..a c
l n:ct _k" n'D.:( Ca' e Val'/c 'INichnen:- _ _1 c__a_c ure:.e.n..t_ _. c a. ti_o_n_.s. _.. _ __. _ __ _ i cart CMECzCO uv CATE asu ' by t__ C_=_.:.:.:.: ___b' =.-~. - y 8 i f 1Aa A wh a / n* ,n@.Ip,. j RW e cy ?W fp 'F s g < *, s - 1.;m /_)~;y-r;;'% f r ( () / _.; - - )-{1 p r s. '\\ + n g,e _/_/._< r - 7 g.I 77f k D+y' '*g Ij'P/
- h ih
.l 7- .l __ _ _ .__.. !.1.L Y: il j I 1 / ky* N //s 4 5 ns , Y~~O M ).SW g f @I 4i MC '. j$6' , _tmin. req. = I ll ]LP.oL_ Pin.Th.?cs.l. Fin.Th.. Fos'. Min."hl, F 4 i 1 9! ves_'cn.L L?ox.jdin,"t. Eog. "* -2S. Ms_ "' M.,Eos J"& 1 i _DESCRIPTIC1 i21.5___. ____..,315 0 135. I(1)A - EE'El F.ADI'.5 AT ; h5 ...- _..215 n . _. 31. 5 . ',,_....,!,_. m' l 40 ..135. ! d j v.iT.ER.SEC.TIO:i.UITE 12CK. 5...- 215* ! 315... l 'E dd 45 135l I 0 _ 35 L_,_,.[2].d_i3.12 (2)B - AEoVE CROTCH OR 0 1 o l PORT II TEESECTEI,,ygcK_ hs .11801_.._I27._o o 0 ~go._i o o i (3)c - EAsuSE A THICK._.o !270o - ~.._, '.1_8. 0. !I 2'[c0 40_ .S_T..A.I!.C.E. L.._.F.R.o. :.!. IE.CK....,0_... 4 2 AT DI go ! l18co o co i 1 (3)D - SA:2 AS (3)c ! 8.c _o i_ .q.27_o0 l o! 1 i j _l o.o__ .co.... -7 1 i 0' I 0 2800 '270 I i' 1,(4)E - MID'.TAY 3E3m _90 i2700 oo 1.Bo o l-l l CEI;TER LIIE & SEAT g '_.8 0... _ ..2700 0 i l 4_.- (4)F SAE AS (4)E .o. o 4 0! 0' 270 o ' 18 0 ',1 4 go l I t l 0 ' _180, i 0 (5)G - IEAR SEAT Rr;G ._90 j i eno 1800 _ _ L,.... L 0 (5)H - SA!S AS (5)G _ 90.... ._180 .i i._ 1 6 .I goo 1800 t i s I i I J
't.:c i ficat i on 5.:;.1.1 (01.-- r no;c cr 1 1.o 1~re c e.= : choaccr Arit'en.!!:. p q _vulve _ rr, ann,.,, -_ M e.kr;ej.sJpes'a gm nt.pcaticya. _ q go, cuce n o r., occ _,M r' ed by .= g 4 -p@ F Nr L(i) 'k[r (/ n@ .-.=b,-7,/1 f M@ ~R S g = m. 79 FLNT \\\\E56 DE.SiGM m-EMI,DE51Ghl ~ i i 12D_2*ec. = ' Pos. kun.2.! Pos. 731.3.! Pos. Min.2. Pos.) tin.m.!_Pos._ Min.2.! os. Min P _315 3 l ...IssCRIPTIon i35! I225 ,(1)L - ECRET THICK.EEIG_k5_. I13e ! ! 225 h !315 hs ~ l BADIUUO_EAcc:.G_322LL i __ ___l! 225.!_._ _315. -m (2)M - Ec:CET THICK.kWAY 45 135_ 225 ' 315i.__[.__ 0 ThJ E'U&FITU Ermt h50 133 315 ; . J_ _ 1 s 135. .!225..j._.. (3)N - BOMET THICK.ABOVE 45 0' i 0 id i 225 315 ' 0 RADIUS.TO'FLG_ ' h5 135f 225 i 315 ' f .(4)P - THICKIESS OF ._45 _.,_ I 225 L315 ' I NF34D A5 ' 135.___. 5 I l 1 i \\ t S i -5
j e i.:netix_.1.*.o I rece.::. _... __ c e t : A - ..m-. .,JoJCCT.C' Locat, ions. IcoIntion.'nive t Thickne: !.'_c_asurer.r i carc cascaro.., ~ ca'c -~
- .'ea -
'd by _t ) l, ll / - /*//. Igo' /. // \\ J,.;f p / L ,S70 . g,' '// gy. a dg t $/ M f e '., \\ 4 4 y .l .# { /x' / N ./ J i j k i c@ e, iy f tr. req. = Pos. I*.n.'t. Min.S.__.Pos !:f.n.S. Pos lf.n.Th....Pos.. LM.E.._Pos. Pos.'!'h.S. Pos. Mn.h ' t 6 u Fos. !"n '3.' Pos. !"n.S. i Po sdf.n.?:. 225 .(1)A h50 APART AT Jt2?C9 45 f 90 135.. _ __ j 180.L DESCRI?f!O.I i 225 '180 i 135 l 90 'a_nmp;_r_tage h5 i i i I 15 L I 3
- 270.L I
i i 4, .(.1)A -COITIERTED levo I l 315 l I .Of _..f.._99 180$ ! 2k = _180 b2Nf (2)C -900 APART AT b - !___90$,. _ i _.~7, ,BACK OF F1.CHIIED API.A.,__0 _ ' ll .(2)F - Sles AS (2)C l,.o j _,,,',i 90 / ,180 _,.1270,, ,j 0 i co u 180 270 l o fi, .__90 _[,,_,,,,180 {,_ 3F, ______f__ ' f
- (3)D 3 Inc. 90 APART l'
EIWAY_FF.0U.Q._0E_.20ET_ 9_0 -[.180fu_ _lEgL I _.. ___., l. j 180?.[._____ p.270 .90 ij !(3)E - SALS AS (3)D _ _._d_.90 !_. J 180_! ___a lW '. 90.f! 135 180 - 225 ~ k5 180 225 _.. l'. .(4)s - 5 IccATIO:s 45 l 9_0_ 135 !h5 0 l' APART t
4 cu2JEoS As ;.vtai:.1 to i racece.., s.u,. nt T.uce. tion: .Arirc Check Va' c .Thic!me::s I.ea. ur c
- ^
o^ \\ t.keastfred by 1-hE
- i*,,
-& q l \\\\,0 I ,/ I i. t I I // ,i 6 -9J
- {...
, i } I j ACTE.RhlfGE BONhET -t j DES Gh3 t c' ',b t= 1l
- s. '
-f--- ! pM L g I --+ e--
- n
[ l .._(o.9 . 'l. I,' 9 T7;y E.-.f[s,y% dl'NQ:. Dn --glj-j-{,H9LA'..lLy,y: - L. j I Jia me -1 L '- + - j!- ).o' 'i 4. f -f' / h. (' - ' J i /,;flf. '/ E f l ^ j;' II' fA g ICO C ?. s tm. reo. = rT Pos. h.2. Po s. Idr 'Ih. Po s. Mh'!h. Pos. f4n,3,,, . SCRIPTION Pos. !Cn.2. Pos. Min.S. Po s. Min.'Ih. Po s. Min i t I __2.70..._.. ; 0j i
- 90 180_
( .O f, (1)A 4 IDc. 90 IO l 90o 180 270 - ..'[ APART .i! 0* i ! 90 t 1800 270 g, ..(1)B - 4 IOC. 90 0I I ) l l 90 - __180 270 ^ 0 !00 j E APART 0 l' ,(2)c - 3 Icc. 90 90 180 270 0 0 1
- 90
'180_- 270 0 APART 0 ll 0 270 [(3)D 4 Ioc. 90 APART _ O 90 180 0 I O 90 . 270.0 0 180 5 IAT TARGEIIT_OF RADIUS.w_ g, ~. 1 e I ^ - -,
- a t e>ulir 3 o Prced::.:.. t........,...
t 5UOJCCT __M a r..:.tre.a:e_t._L.e.e..t t i..e. n.s... _ _Ecl;c t...Va.l.r.e tiATE CHECKED Sv - _ich _.cn: 'Th i catt
- .'casure'd by 8
0 (.. ) f L. -__.. _.i i l p1 / r g! l .(J 7.I I m._.n. q*-~.*- e.. ) I W* l.' si ) l .qy y7 7 ./ / ~y p ' u.a,- e l 'o "d70 h -- 90 D O3 ~ / n / G n,<, y, a, ~ ,' r@E />/ C2 / ' a, K -- " ~-- F j v / E2a_s s v l ~ @A ELEV5T10N i _g tr.in. reg; = i Fo?.[!dnp._ Fos. Min.t. _P.os. _ tun lIh. i Po s. ' !".:1.3. I F.e. s. i "n.b. _P.o. s. M.in._2. Ib.s_. M.i.n.!Ih. I j Po_s !_M.. n."h...! DESCR1?fION 0 j (1)A h IOC. 90 APART 00 90 '1_800 '270 0 0 2J0 I _180 r I 90 AT tai!EI:T OF RADIUS !00 0-0 l 0 ! 90...* _ r 180 2,'[0 0 (1)B 4 IOC. 900 APART! 0 I 0 0 7 -- 9.0 ~ ! .180... _270.....,.,,.. i I AT TAHE rr OF RA..DIU..S. i O 0 !O i ! o00! 180 270 l (2)C 4 IOC. 90o 180o 2.7.00 APART I h
- 90 i y
O ' 18_0 _'-._ m.._ 270 (3)D - 3 Icc. go jo 1
- 90 o
l00 ? i 90j ! 1800; 23 APART 1800 i; 220o (4)E 4 Ioc. 900 AFART 0 ! 90 0 i 0 90. ! ,180 0 0 270 l 0 i 0 22,n:EEd BOLT - HOIIS d0 ~> \\ I l 4 i 1 t { I l (.
.,m......... JJECT..,[.) E UU j<_d U'.,,IT.'C093 ,0. 1fIcat.igh (,,;, t, .. arg : 7. yal,,3_ _._ + @icl@e..!1.Jie.3s3rement,Lxa1,ien: ,y, cuccaco, o^'t E $7 Q f m .y e P-f .f I >g .. I W;l.77 j,a i .h..>) A I 9E;!b a. ~ _a 1 G.. = 7c V.'.ln 23.dy,.yl1 27 ' " -W _s._ 'b l I._.t.- 1 E fMi r~ k u c (pf E~all.Lpn C t .1 . A. ~~_b. 1W n I e 3G E'dW.llON
- tt::in. rea. =
- n....
Pos. Pn 2.t' y 7 .Mi 2.: .P. os. Min 2.; Pos. ; Min 2.! Pos. n ... Min 2.! g t ~- q i i Pos. Idn2.' Pc1. ' Min 2. Pos. Mi.n.2. t 1 n 0 0
- 180
.2. 70._ i. DESCR'PTION 90.0_,i 1 0 0 APART AT.. 0_ _.: r.18.0.0..... __ 2_7.0_ .(1)A 4 Ioc 90 a 0 I l 90.0 0 0 !. 90 , 180 270 !,._. s' 0 _TIDLTAUGHTI 0F RADIUS 0 9 27.0..!. j / I 0 , i, i(1)B - SAE AS (1)A 0 ,!.1.80_0 r 0 'L. _.. 90.0 l270 j ,fi 0 9.0. i..__..., _180 [ J o 0 . _.. j g 180 ' 270 !.___.a! Ii . (1)C - SA!G AS (1)A 0 0 0 0 7 3i '[ I j00 ! _._.: c[0 .270 ~; 90 ! l180 j I-I O 0 0 270 [,(1)D - SAE AS (1)A f l 0 . 90_ _'_ -180__ 0 l 0 180 270 f I,, 0 90 270* 0 APART 0 0 i' !(2)E - 3 Icc. 90 J 0.'_ -.18.0..._ 0 f 0 0 180 270 _. I I h_AT TANGET OF RADIUS 0 JO 0,_ 180 279 [(2)F SA!G AS (2)E Oo_ _ 90 } .] O.0. _ l -s 0 0 270 180 I L APART; O. ._90...._ _ 180 _.270 _y..___i l !(3)o 4 toc. 90 l [s_ ETnE..n_P._0.L.T.. n0.L. ES.. __ _. _! J 0 I 'l s }
/ ,- 0 7f.Q,I'h
- UNITED STATES Q Pi l
ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSICN N NN
- . *GDi.t.
%E3 CN la - issT E FB s d ,,,,,,,,,,[ 4 / 233 F E AC H? R EE ST at ECT. NOA T HWEST ,r mT.. cECam una DIRECTORATE OF REGUIATORY OFL%TIONS I"."@7"*'*"T 200T 2'l 5721 33 0-25 50-260 50-29p 50-327 50-328-50-390 50-391 Tennessee Valley Authority Attn: Mr. J..:.. Watson Manager of Power 818 Pover Building ~ / . Chattanooga, Tennessee 37401 y Gentlemen: Thank you for your letters dated M7 28', Y.eptenTer 29 and ON 1972, in response to our letter dated June 30, 1972, relative to verification of certain valve vall thi#nesses for the swa. Fc q.' Sequoyah and Watts Bar facilities. We have forva-ded your letters to Regulatory Operations, Headquarters for further cvaluation, and vill inform you of the results when available. 1 Very truly yours, ?.- b e-1 John G. Davis Director 9 l 1 ~. O
e } t ' ~.. ! TENNESSEE VALLC.Y AUT DRITY ~' CH ATTANOOGA. TENNcSsEE 37401 i ~ g L& G 5eptcc%er 20, 1W 7fr 6 1 i 1 4, Mr. John G. Davis, Director Directorate of Regulctory Operations United Str.tes Ato*:ic Frergy Co::::ission Region II - Suite 818' 233 Peachtree Street, !!'.T. Atlanta, Georgia 20Y,3 De..ar Mr. Davis: Tnis is in further response to your June 30, 1972, letter RO:II:JGD 10-255 5c-060, 50-295, Sc-327, and 50-328 con-cerning verificatien that he voll thict.ncsscc of certain lj valves meet the requirement,s of specified codes cnd stendards. Tnis response ic confined to our growns Ferry liuelear P1g only,; a separate respon.se is being prepared for Scq cy.ah P !!uclear Plant valves. l-Valves important to nuclee.r safety h ve been tabuletted, and j the enclosure denotes these ve.lves for chich TVA has records. j, f
- ncre recer'.s mny be review.d by your inspectors at the site at any tine after october 31, 19T2.
r f Inclu: led also in the'licting in the enclosure are valvec which had their vc11 thicknesses n.casured end witnessed, but for a which vc have no records of vall th:dnecces since this was not required by the codes and specifications under which these valves were purchaced. Fcr those valves for which records are not currently available, vc vill nctify you by October 31, 1972, of the plcns and tentative schedules for their implementation to demonstrate that the vall thichnesses of the supplied valves meet the requirc:ents of the specifications and codes under which they were purchased. A procedure for reasurement of the valves at the site vill be made available to your inspector after the above cited date. We belicve that yotr inquiry should not apply to forged-body valves since their vclls are nor..: ally thicher then required, and machining inherently insures a Creater dc5ree of uniformity than does the castin6 technique..We also believe that your inquiry should be limited to valves foer vater lines having L )@. {$Mf L ~ ( \\ v Lf An Equal Opportumty Employer l //
F s 2 Mr. John G. Davis Septe.ber 29, 1972 ( .i nominal pipe sizes grectei than two inches and to valves for steem lines having noninal pipe sizes creater th2n four inches. The feeducter systen is ec.pable of naintaining pressure vessel vater level for bre?As in lines snaller then these. Therefore r we propose to limit our verification progrcr. to ctst valves only and to veriP/ vfll thicknesses of valves lcrger than two inches no=inal pipe size in vs.ter lines and larger than four inches noni-nal pipe size in stee.n lines. We hope these responses vill be satisfactory. Very truly yours, a 1 g /, M g . E. Gilleland g Assistant to,the Manager of Power Enclosure ) i j I a k e 1 Y l 4
i + - Enelo..ure m, ..,.3-or,,,....-.... .e...,,.,n n, m>..., .n ... ~... Va'w' 'n'.o~ '.r'.'.'.' "... '.':..~u~:. n' '.'.'..",-'. v C v" '..':','.'" ~..'.'r'.' u". ' "0*.. C G~.~.2..r, _.t,"..v- ".. _ w.. ".... 2....- -
- m.. :u...n w. me c
~.~..'r:..n... e...w.... e. 1 u Valve Syctar and C1:ntity and Verification of 4:nntity Unit ol' Title i:ari No. Size (in. ) Wall Thic'.:nons Verified Verificatic, idCV 2-96 6-24 No ~ .:SN 2-86 12-26 No 4 373 7.0 V 2-80 1P.-26 No 5 372(1)57.Y30r'-
- a m sir.
2-77 3-3 no . Det.in 2-74 3-3 No ', RV
- r 2-71 33-6 No
- 0 SV 2-70 6-6' No
'2c.re 2-66 6-2 No 2-65 6-22 Yes 4 371 & 3F2 ccire
- circ 2-54'-
6-4 No 4: ire 2-53 6-26 Yes 4 371 & 372 .. circ 2-43 6-23 Yes 4 371 & 372 e., - 2-29 6-24 No -;PX 2-16 3-2 No
- c.c...it 2-15 3-2 No Us;;3 10-154 6-24 No tJ:2 x lo-88 3 No
'::ia M lo-81 6-24 No ..;d TO 10- 46 6-24 Ko
- aC Spre.y lo-33 3-6 Yes 1
37-3 .c;.1 Spcay 10- 32 3-6 Ycs 1-BF-3 ' :a c lo-29 3-6 No . 43 10- 25 6-24 Yes 1 B7-3 .3:i2 10- 18 3-20 Yes 1 3?-3 1 37-3 R:3 10- 17 3-20 Yes . r.l.0 M 11-18 3-l.L No a 0.7LC 11-17 3-1g No GaA 11-16 3-lp No ..;!OU 12-63 3-4 Yes 1 3F-3 . 0.'C U 12-62 3-4 Yes 1 37-3 . dOU 12-46 3-6 No ..:.0 U 12-16 3-6 Yes 1 BF-3 NdOU 12-15 3-6 Yes 1 BF-3 t j e t 's t
e . ~. e. Ir. clos :. (conticuad) ) l l J Vctific'. tion of Q.:.ntity Ur.ic, of ' ye ,e Sys;cm and Qcantit/ c.nd c 25 tic ne. Uc. sin (f r.. '; i.'t.1 1 c. i e:.= a.:n vc:sec3d vc.:.iricc.:c. nc 13-22 3-6 Yes 1 e-3 OIC 13-16 3-3 Y4s 1 m-3 .0:c 13-15 ' 3-3 Yes 1 72-3
- S M 14-14 6-12 Ko
- S 14-13 6-12 Yes -
2 E-3
- 3 14-12 6-12 No
- 3; 14-11 6-12 Ko 20I 23-18' 3-14 No
~
- CI 23-16 3-10 to
- .00I 23-15 3-10 No t
a / J 4 4 1 1 I 1 9 i Iim t e e
[ s I UNITED STATES e ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION [(~., ~~~ 7 1 I xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx \\ A necia n - su.T c ata ---dM'# 230 P E AC Hr s g g ST n C ET. N OR ? M EST ,,M# ATta,.r4,croRGLA 30303 DIRECTORATE OF REGULATORY OPERATIONS In Reply Refer To: JimuP5Et;"5571 RO:II:JGD 50-259', 50-260 50-296, 50-327 - 50-328-Tennessee Valley Authority Attn: Mr. J. E. Watson Manager of Power 818 Power Building Chattanooga, Tennessee 37401-: Gentlemen: m m This letter relates to your reactors ferry 1r 2s>and 3 and 3 ~ Sequoyah 1 and 2. i q Information obtained during inspections conducted by the Directorate of Regulatory Operations, has disclosed that a number of f acilities have been equipped with valves with wall thicknesses below the minimum requirements specified by the applicable codes, standards and procure =ent specifications. In other instances, licensees have not been able to document whether or not their valvcs met minimum wall thickness requirements. Our survey o'f -this subject has disclosed that the =atter is not limited to any class of licensee or valve supplier. In light of the above information, you are requested to verify, through manuf acturing records or other suitable means, that valves important to nuclear safety installed or to be installed at your facilities meet the minimum wall thickness requirements of the specified codes or standardsy To the extent that verification records are currently available, you are requested to promptly accumulate those records at the plant site, and to advise this of fice within thirty (30) days of the date of this letter, of what records are availabic and when our inspector. may examine them at the plant site. vor g s (? (
q t a ], i /"'\\ ~. Tennessee Valley Authority June 30, 1972 i i In the event that records are not currently available, you are requested to advise this office within thirty (30) days, of your plans and schedules for demonstrating by suitable alternate means, that valves important to nuclear safety installed or to be installed at your facilities are I acceptable with respect to wall thickness. Records of conformance shall 'Je maintained current with inspections performed. The valves which require demonstration of acceptable wall thickness are the following: Each valve within the reactor coolant pressure boundary, as defined in subsection 50.55(e) (codes and Standard's) of 10 CFR 50, where the valve is: (a) over 1-inch nominal pipe size for pressurized water reactors; (b) over 11/4-inch nominal pipe size in s ater lines for boiling water reactors; l se l I /'~ ' (c) over 21/2-inch nominal pipe size in steam lines for boiling k _, water reactors. The following techniques are considered to be a sufficient demonstration of acceptab'le wall thickness. Alternate techniques may be offered, but there is.no assurance that they will be found acceptable: (1) Documented direct physical measurement of ac~tual wall thickness, with comparison to specified minimum wall thickness. l (2) Documented results of ultrasonic measurement of wall j thickness, with comparison to specified minimum wall l thickness, and documentation that the ultrasonic measure-ment. technique is demonstrated to have a maximum error l ~ i in repeatability and accuracy, of not more than 2% of I the wall thickness. 1 W ( I. e 8 I I
i s ~.. - [f\\. 1, Tennessee Valley Authority June 30,1972 l 1 (3) Wall thicknesses, verified by either of the above j techniques, to,be.not less than 90% of specified minimum wall thickness will be acceptable, provided i I that the documented mechanical characteristics of the material exceed the specification minimum by an amount sufficient to compensate for the measured reductica in-vall thickness. (4) "Specified Minimum Wall Thickness" as used above, means the wall thickness required by the relevant codes and standards (e.g., ASA B31.1 (1955); USAS B31.1.0 (1967); USAS B16.5; 1GS-SP-66) in effect on the date of the purchase orser. r (5) Certain of your valves may have, for procurement convenience, been ordered to ratings higher than actually required by service conditions. In such instances, you may, if you wish, provide for our revieu, an engineering justification for accepting \\ valves which do not conform to_ procurement specifi-cations, but do, in your opinion, satisfy service requirements. Such justification should be promptly transmitted to this office, in ten (10) copies. (6) In certain instances, you may Vish to repair valves found to have wall thickness below the specified minimum. In such instances you are requested to provide to this office j for our review, the proposed repair procedure, including a description of techniques to be used to verify the acceptability of the repaired components. Such a proposed j procedure should also be submitted in ten (10) copies. Acceptable documentation of conformance with the above requirements must be completed within three (3) years of 'the date of this letter. O Very truly yours. %%I sie.ig, J. c. c Johe G. 6Evis Director s, h~ / 6 's -}}