ML20203D159

Proposed Tech Specs Re Main Control Room Emergency Ventilation Air Supply Sys Capacity Test.Safety Evaluation Encl

ML20203D159
Person / Time
Site:	FitzPatrick
Issue date:	04/15/1986
From:	POWER AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK (NEW YORK
To:
Shared Package
ML20203D143	List: ML20203D138 ML20203D151 ML20203D159
References
NUDOCS 8604220044
Download: ML20203D159 (6)

Text

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ATTACHMENT I TO JPN-86-18 Proposed Change to the Technical Specifications Regarding Main Control Room Emergency Ventilation Air Supply System Capacity Test New York Power Authority James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant Docket No. 50-333 DPR-59 hh P

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3.11 (cont'd) 4.11 (cont'd) ventilation air supply fan and/or filter may be b. Di-octylphtalate (DOP) test for particulate out of service for 1 month, filter efficiency greater than 99% for particulate greater than 0.3 micron size.

2. The main cent.rol room air radiation monitor shall be operable whenever the control room c. Freon-112 test for charcoal filter bypass as emergency ventilation air supply fans and a measure of filter efficiency of at least filter trains are required to be operable by 99.5% for halogen removal.

3.11.A.1 or filtration of the control room ventilation intake air must be initiated. d. A sample of charcoal filter shall be analyzed once a year to assure halogen

3. The control room emergency ventilation system removal efficiency of at least 99.5%.

l shall not be out of service for a period exceeding 7 days during normal reactor 2. Operability of the main control room air intake operation or refueling operations. In the radiation monitor shall be tested once/3 months.

event that the system is not returned to service within 7 days the reactor will be 3. Temperature transmitters and differential shutdown in an orderly manner and in the Cold pressure switches shall be calibrated once/

Shutdown Condition within 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> or if operating cycle.

refueling operations are in progress, such operations will be terminated in an orderly 4. Main control room emergency ventilation air manner. supply system capacity shall be tested once every 18 months to assure that it is 110 % of the design value of 1000 cfm.

l Amendment No.

l 238 1

JAFNPP 3.11 & 4.11 BASES A. Main Control Room Ventilation System One main control room emergency ventilation air conducted in accordance with manufacturers' supply fan provides adequate ventilation flow recommendations.

under accident conditions. Should one emergency ventilation air supply fan and/or fresh air The purpose of the emergency ventilation air filter train be out of service during reactor supply system capacity test is to assure that operation, the allowable repair time of 1 month sufficient air is supplied to the main control is justified, based on the 3 month test inter- room so that a slight positive pressure can be val. maintained, thereby minimizing in-leakage.

The 3 month test interval for the main control B. Crescent Area Ventilation room emergency ventilation air supply fan and dampers is sufficient since two redundant Engineering analyses indicate that the temper-trains are provided and neither is normally in ature rise in safeguards compartments without operation. adequate ventilation flow or cooling is such that continued operation of the safeguards A pressure drop test across each filter and equipment or associated auxiliary equipment across the filter system is a measure of filter cannot be assured.

system condition. DOP injection measures particulate removal efficiency of the high C. Battery Room Ventilation efficiency particulate filters. A Freon-ll2 test of charcoal filters is essentially a Engineering analyses indicate that the temper-leakage test. Since the filters have charcoal ature rise and hydrogen buildup in the battery, of known efficiency and holding capacity for and battery charger compartments without elemental iodine and/or methyl iodine, the test adequate ventilation is such that continuous also gives an indication of the relative operation of equipment in these compartments efficiency of the installed system. cannot be assured.

l Laboratory analysis of a sample of the charcoal I filters positively demonstrates halogen removal D. Emergeno Service Water System

! efficiency. These tests art.

l The ESWS has two 100 percent cooling capacity l pumps, each powered from a separate standby power supply. The ESWS utilizes lake water to the cooling system of the emergency diesel generators. The system will also supply water l to those components of the RBCLCS which are required for emergency conditions during a loss of power condition. These include ECCS pumps and area unit coolers.

Amendment No.

243

ATTACHMENT II .TO JPN-86-18 Safety Evaluation for the Proposed Change to the Technical Specifications Regarding Main Control Room Emergency Ventilation Air Supply System Capacity Test i

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New York Power Authority James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant Docket No. 50-333 ,

DPR-59

'I. Description of the Proposed Chango A new Section (4.11.A.4) has been added to the James A.

FitzPatrick Technical Specifications. The new section requires that an emergency ventilation air supply system capacity test for the Main Control Room be performed every 18 months to assure that it is 110 percent of the design value o' 1000 cfm.

In addition, a new paragraph has been added to the Bases section on page 243 to describe the purpose of the test. The proposed amendment also includes an administrative change on page 238 for clarity.

II. Purpose of the Proposed Change In response to NUREG-0737, Item III.D.3.4, " Control Room Habitability Requirements", the Authority evaluated the James A.

FitzPatrick Plant Control Room against the criteria provided. The results of this evaluation were submitted to the NRC in Reference 3. The FitzPatrick Control Room pressurization rate based on zone volume and makeup air supplied is approximately 0.4 volume changes per hour. As defined by SRP 6.4 Item II.3.C.2, this condition would require periodic (every 18 months) verification that the makeup capacity is 110% of the design value. In Reference 3, the Authority committed to perform this periodic test and the proposed change is in accordance with this commitment.

III. Impact of the Proposed Change The proposed change would result in an additional surveillance requirement to ensure that the Control Room is maintained at a slightly positive pressure. This would minimize in-leakage and protect the control room operators against the effects of an accidental release.

Operation of the FitzPatrick plant in accordance with the proposed amendment would not involve significant hazards considerations since it would not:

1) involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated because an additional surveillance requirement is being added;

2) create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously evalueted because the change only requires additional surveillance;

3) involve a significant reduction in margin of safety, since, on the contrary, this change would help assure that control room operators would be adequately protected against the effects of accidental release of toxic and radioactive gases, and that the plant could be safety shutdown under design basis accident conditions.

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, IV. Implementation of.the Proposed Change The proposed change will not adversely impact the ALARA, Security or Fire Protection programs at the FitzPatrick plant, nor will it impact the environment.

V. Conclusion The change, as proposed, does not constitute an unreviewed safety question as defined in 10 CFR 50.59, that is, it (a) will not increase the probability or the consequences of an accident or malfunction of equipment important to safety as evaluated previously in the safety analysis report; (b) will not increase the possibility of an accident or malfunction of a different type than any evaluated previously in the safety analysis report; (c) will not reduce the margin of safety as defined in the basis for any technical specification; (d) does not constitute an unreviewed safety questiot r and (e) involves no significant hazards considerations, as defined in 10 CFR 50.92.

VI . - References

.l. JAF FSAR Section 9.9.3.11

2. JAF SER

3. PASNY letter, J. P. Bayne to T. A. Ippolito, dated August 13, 1981 (JPN-81-60)

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