ML20202A906

Application for Amend to License DPR-45,changing Surveillance Requirements for HPCS Pumps.Functional Test Will Verify That Each Pump Operates at Flow Rate Greater than or Equal to 50 Gpm Design Flow Rate

ML20202A906
Person / Time
Site:	La Crosse File:Dairyland Power Cooperative icon.png
Issue date:	04/01/1986
From:	Taylor J DAIRYLAND POWER COOPERATIVE
To:	Zwolinski J Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Shared Package
ML20202A910	List: ML20202A906 ML20202A915
References
LAC-11494, NUDOCS 8604110086
Download: ML20202A906 (7)

Text

D DA/RYLAND h [k COOPERAT/VE

• P.O BOX 817 2615 EAST AV SOUTH

• LA CROSSE. WISCONSIN 54601 (608) 788 4 000 April 1, 1986 In reply, please refer to LAC-11494 DOCKET NO. 50-409 John Zwolinski, Director BWR Project Directorate Division of BWR Licensing U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555

SUBJECT:

DAIRYLAND POWER COOPERATIVE LA CROSSE BOILING WATER REACTOR (LACBWR)

PROVISIONAL OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-45 APPLICATION FOR AMENDMENT TO LICENSE

REFERENCES:

(1) DPC Letter, Linder to Crutchfield, LAC-8629, dated September 29, 1982.

(2) DPC Letter, Taylor to Crutchfield, LAC-8679, dated October 29, 1982 (3) DPC Letter, Taylor to Zwolinski, LAC-11136, dated September 16, 1985.

(4) 10 CFR 50, Section 50.90 Gentlemen:

In References 1 and 2, DPC proposed Technical Specifications on Emergency Core Cooling Systems, which substituted specifications in the standard format for existing specifications. The NRC reviewed the submittal and requested a revision to the DPC proposed requirements. DPC submitted revised specifications in Reference 3. The NRC has requested an additional change. Therefore, in accordance with the provisions of Reference 3, an application to amend Provisional Operating License No. DPR-45 for the La Crosse Boiling Water Reactor is hereby filed with three (3) signed original applications, together with thirty-seven (37) copies. This change spells out in the surveillance requirements for the High Pressure Core Spray Pumps that a functional test will verify that each pump operates at a flow rate greater than or equal to 50 gpm, which is the design flow rate.

The following list is a summary of the changes to the original proposal amendment, including those contained in Reference 3:

1. Additions to surveillance requirements, including testing the HPCS pumps to demonstrate they will run when started manually, if and only if a full scram signal exists, checking that they supply 50 gpm each,. and performing a valve lineup on HPCS and ACS during each refueling outage prior to startup.

2. Requiring more stringent applicable conditions for low pressure core spray mode of HPCS.

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WPl.6.9 8604110086 B60401 PDR ADOCK 05000409 p PM I

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ohn Zw31inaki, Director April 1, 1986 BWR Project Directorate LAC-11494

3. Clarification of bases for ACS regarding system capability.

4. Deletion of Section 2.4.7, which is to be superceded by 4/5.2.23.

Finding of no significant hazards We have reveiwed the hazards considerations referenced in 10CFR50, Sections 91 and 92, and have determined that with these criteria no significant hazards considerations result from these proposed changes. 10CFR50.92 (c)(1-3) provide the questions for review of significant hazards considerations. They are repeated here for reference.

(1) Involves a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated; or (2) Creates the possibility pf a neo or different kind pf accidens from any accident previously evaluated; or (3) Involves a significant reduction in a margin of safety.

1. Operation of LACBWR, in accordance with the proposed changes, will not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously analyzed.

The additional surveillance. requirements are to be performed during reactor shutdown conditions and will add further assurance that HPCS and ACS systems will perform as designed if called upon. The existing design specification states that the HPCS system shall be capable of manual start only if a full scram signal exists, but no surveillance was required to demonstrate this feature. Addition of the surveillance requirement will both demonstrate that the pumps can be started manually and that the design criteria specifying that a full scram signal must exist for the pumps to run if started in manual is met. Therefore, addition of these surveillance requirements will not increase the probability or. consequences of an accident previously analyzed.

Requiring the low pressure core spray mode of HPCS to be operable during Operational Condition 4, without the exceptions listed in the previous submittal, can only increase the probability it will be available to mitigate the consequences of an accident. This more stringent requirement cannot increase the probability of an accident.

Clarification of the bases for ACS and deletion of Section 2.4.7 are strictly administrative type changes. The former results in a clear statement of the design capabiity of the ACS system. The latter eliminates redundancy. Therefore, neither of these administrative changes affects the probability or consequences of any type of accident.

2. Operation of LACBWR, in accordance with the proposed changes, will not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously analyzed.

Performing the additional surveillancesHon this installed equipment during reactor shutdown cannot create a new or different kind of accident. The more stringent WPl.6.9 l

John Zwolingki, Director April 1, 1986 BWR Project Directorate LAC-11494 applicability requirement for the low pressure core spray mode of HPCS does not require operation in any new manner; just operability during additional conditions. .

Therefore, this additional requirement cannot cause a new type of accident. The administrative type changes do not affect operation in any way and so cannot cause any type of accident.

3. Operation of LACEWR, in accordance with the proposed changes, will not involve a significant reduction in the margin of safety.

The additional surveillances are to be performed during reactor shutdown and so, will not involve a significant reduction in the margin of safety. Performing the surveillances will help ensure that the equipment will perform as designed if needed. Requiring the low pressure core spray mode to be operable during additonal conditions can only improve, not reduce, the margin of safety. The administrative changes will have no affect on the margin of safety.

For the above reason, a determination of no significant hazards consideration is justified for this application. A copy of the proposed revised pages is attached.

The numbering and pagination of the new specifications has been changed since the last submission, due to the issuance of License Amendment No. 44 in the interim.

As this license amendment application is a revision requested by the NRC to a previous amendment request, it has been determined to be exempt from any fee.

If there are any questions, please contact us.

Sincerely, DAIRYLAND POWER COOPERATIVE MM James W. Taylor General Manager JWT:LSG:mm Attachment WPl.6.9 Jchn Zwolinski, Dirsctor April 1, 1986 BWR Project Directorate LAC-11494-cc: J. G. Keppler, Regional Administrator U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Region III 799 Roosevelt Road Glen Ellyn, IL 60137 L. L. Smith, Director, Electric and Water Bureau Wisconsin Public Service Commission P. O. Box 7854 Madison, WI 53707 NRC Resident Inspector i J. Stang, LACBWR Project Manager P. Eng, NRC Region III STATE OF WISCONSIN )

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COUNTY OF LA CROSSE)

Personally came before me this A.M- day of MM , 1986 the above ncmed, James Taylor, to me known to be the/ person who executed the foregoing instrument and acknowledged the same.

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Notary Public, Crosse County Wisconsin My commission expires February 21, 1988 i

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2.4.4.3 The primary purification system piping, and valves from the reactor to the purification cooler and from the shc11 of the regenerative cooler to the forced circulation system, shall be capable of containing a maximum working pressure of 1400 psig at 595'F. Other primary purification system piping and components shall be capable of containing a maximum working pressure of 1400 psig at 150'F. The heat exchangers shall be provided with relief valves.

2.4.5 Seal Injection System 2.4.5.1 The seal injection system shall be capable of supplying the cooling and sealing water for the forced-circulation pump aeals and for the reactor control rod drive mechanisms.

2.4.5.2 The cooling and sealing water shall be provided at a pressure higher than reactor pressure by two positive displacement pumps arranged in parallel, with one pump normally operating and the other on standby. If one pump or its power supply should fail, the standby pump shall be started automatically.

2.4.5.3 Injection system water supply shall normally be provided by the condensate demineralizer system. An alternate water supply from the containment overhead storage tank shall be automatically admitted to the seal water system reservoir on indication of low level in the reservoir.

2.4.5.4 Continuous blowdown of reactor water shall be provided through each control rod drive upper housing to the forced circulation system.

2.4.8 Boron Injection System 2.4.8.1 The boron injection system shall be capable of injecting a minimum 17.8 weight percent of sodium pentaborate decahydrate solution directly into the reactor coolant to render the reactor subcritical in the cold clean condition with all rods out.

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l 5.2.3 The exterior surfaces of the LACBWR ventilation stack and the smoke stack of the conventional steam power generating station, Genoa 3, adjacent to the LA9BWR plant shall be inspected for structural integrity at an interval no longer than 5 years following the initial construction inspection, and at subsequent intervals no longer than 5 years apart. -

5.2.4 The reactor vessel shall be hydrostatically tested at 1400 psig after any of its gasketed joints have been opened and resealed. All hydrostatic tests shall be performed with the vessel at a temperature no lower than that specified in Section 4.2.2.4.

5.2.5 The forced circulation system controls and automatically-operated valves shall be tested for proper operation at each refueling shutdown with test intervals not to exceed 18 months.

5.2.6 The shutdown condenser system control valves shall be tested at least quarterly to demonstrate their operability. The integrated system shall be tested for proper operation at each refueling shutdown with test intervals not to exceed 18 months. In addition, the condenser tube bundle shall be pressurized to greater than 1250 psig and tested for leakage at each refueling shutdown.

5.2.9 The boron-injection system controls and the remotely-operated valves shall be tested for proper operation during cold shutdown but not required more often than every 92 days.

5.2.10 The door seals on the containment personnel and emergency airlocks will be visually inspected for degradation every 72 hours8.333333e-4 days <br />0.02 hours <br />1.190476e-4 weeks <br />2.7396e-5 months <br />.

5.2.11 The door seals on the containment personnel and emergency airlocks will be replaced periodically in accordance with manufacturers recommendations.

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