ML20153G058
| ML20153G058 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | La Crosse File:Dairyland Power Cooperative icon.png |
| Issue date: | 02/21/1986 |
| From: | Taylor J DAIRYLAND POWER COOPERATIVE |
| To: | Zwolinski J Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20153G064 | List: |
| References | |
| LAC-11430, NUDOCS 8602280001 | |
| Download: ML20153G058 (6) | |
Text
- -
D DA/RYLAND h
k COOPERAT/VE
- P.O. BOX 817 2615 EAST AV SOUTH + LA CROSSE. WISCONSIN S4601 (608) 788 4 000 February 21, 1986 In reply, please refer to LAC-11430 DOCKET NO. 50-409 Mr. John A. Zwolinski, Director BWR Project Directorate #1 Division of Licensing U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555
SUBJECT:
DAIRYLAND POWER COOPERATIVE LA CROSSE BOILING WATER REACTOR (LACBWR)
PROVISIONAL OPERATING LICENSE NO. DPR-45 APPLICATION FOR AMENDMENT TO LICENSE
REFERENCES:
(1) 10 CFR 50, Section 50.90.
(2) 10 CFR 170.12.
(3) DPC Letter, Madgett to Reid, LAC-4690, dated May 18, 1977.
(4) NRC Letter, Reid to Madgett, dated October 4, 1977.
(5) NRC Letter, Reid to Madgett, dated March 3, 1978.
(6) DPC Letter, Linder to Ziemann, LAC 6846, dated April 1, 1980.
(7) DPC Letter, Linder to Crutchfield, LAC-9687, dated March 20, 1984.
(8) DPC Letter, Taylor to Zwolinski, LAC-11395, dated February 4, 1986.
Gentlemen:
Dairyland Power Cooperative requests the substitution of the attached proposed Technical Specifications for the existing specifications. Therefore, in accordance with the provisions of Reference 1, an application to amend Provisional Operating License No. DPR-45 for the La Crosse Boiling Water Reactor is hereby filed with three (3) signed original applications, together with thirty-seven (37) copies.
Currently, the operating requirements for the LACBWR electrical power system are contained in Section 4.2.3.
The design of the electrical power i
system is described in Section 2.6.
This proposed change would delete Section 2.6 and add bases to Section 4.2.3, which would describe the electrical power systems to which the specifications 1:1 that section apply.
1 The purpose of this change is to clarify and correct the description of the electrical power systems and to place the affected sec i
more in the G602280001 86022i
- h IN [
~
PDR ADOCK 05000409 P
PDR iI
Mr. John Zwolin ki, Chisf Fabrusry 21, 1986 BWR Project Directorate #1 LAC-11430 format of standard technical specifications.
One of the corrections is deletion of mention of the rotary inverter as a power supply to the 120 volt AC Noninterruptible Bus IB.
As discussed in References 3, 4, and 5, a redundant, independent, and physically separated noninterruptible bus was added in 1977.
The requirement for independence and separation is discussed in the Safety Evaluation for Amendment 11 (Reference 5).
Since the power for the 120V Noninterruptible Bus 1A is supplied by the Reactor Plant 125V DC Bus via the 1A Static Inverter, the Rotary Inverter which is also supplied by the Reactor Plant 125V DC Bus could no longer be used to supply the 120V Noninterruptible Bus 1B or independency requirements would not be met.
As discussed in the proposed bases, the normal power supply for the 120V Noninterruptible Bus IB is the IB Static Inverter which is normally supplied by the Diesel Building 125V DC Bus.
Therefore, deletion of mention of the rotary inverter would have been appropriate at the time Amendment 11 was issued. The version of Section 2.6 issued at that time was not optimally worded. This proposed change will attempt to correct those inadequacies.
Reference 8 is an application for an amendment to Technical Specifications which incorporates a planned modification to the IC Noninterruptible Bus.
The portion of the proposed bases in this letter which discusses the Static Inverter 1C static transfer switch is requested to be effective upon completion of the planned modification, which includes installation of the static transfer switch.
License Amendment 41 revised the technical specification on reactor coolant chemistry. This submittal requests a minor change in the wording of Specification 4.2.2.2 to help ensure that plant personnel will uniformly interpret the action necessary to be taken. Regulatory Guide 1.56 was consulted to ensure that the action required by the revised wording is in agreement with its guidance.
License Amendment 43 issued Technical Specification 4/5.2.2.5 on Safety Valves and bases for the new specification.
Several changes are requested in the wording of the bases. Revisions include changing pressures which were expressed in psia to psig, since a mixture was used and standardization is desired. A review of analyses showed that the turbine trip without bypass, as analyzed in Reference 6, results in a peak pressure slightly higher than the design basis main steam isolation valve closure transient, and so is more appropriate to be considered the normal most limiting pressure transient, even though it assumes one additional failure, that of the main steam bypass valve.
In neither transient does the reactor pressure reach 1390 psig, therefore the conclusion that the safety valve function is not expected to be required under the most limiting operational transient, remains valid. Therefore, the turbihe trip without bypass is discussed as the postulated most limiting pressure transient in the proposed revision. Also, the phrasology of the third sentence in the second paragraph is improved.
License Amendment 36 added Appendix I Technical Specifications. The new specifications changed the frequency of effluent monitor functional tests from bi-weekly to quarterly and the calibration frequency from each refueling outage to "R",
at least once per 18 months. The testing and calibration requirements for installed area radiation monitors specified in Item 9 of the WPl.6.9,
v
~
Mr.LJsha Zwolinski, Chief
.Fabrutry 21, 1986
{
- BWR Project Directorate #1 LAC-11430
-table entitled " Minimum Frequencies for. Testing, Calibrating, and/or Checking of Instrumentation" in Section 5.2.15 were not affected. This letter requests j
that the functional testing frequency for installed area radiation monitors also be changed from every 2 weeks to quarterly and the calibration frequency j
be changed from each refueling shutdown to at least once per 18 months.
]
Historically, there has not been a significant variance in each area radiation monitor's functional test results. Changing the calibration. frequency will j
put all radiation / radioactivity monitoring equipment on the same calibration 1
period and allow some scheduling flexibility, so that equipment which can be j
calibrated during operation does not have to be calibrated during refueling i
outages. The channel check frequency will remain as is.
Also included in this submittal is an updated - LACBWR Facility Organization chart, figure 6.2.2-1 of Technical Specifications.
Finding of no significant hazards-We have reviewed the hazards considerations referenced in 10 CFR 50 Sections 91 and 92 and have determined that with these criteria no significant-hazards considerations result from these proposed amendments.
(c)(1-3) provide the questions for review of significant hazards considerations.- They are repeated here for reference.
10 CFR 50.92 (c) i i
(1) Involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an I
accident previously evaluated;~or (2) Create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any.
accident previously evaluated; or (3) Involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety.
1.
Operation of LACBWR in accordance with the proposed amendment will not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.
l Moving the electrical system description from the design section to the j
bases for the operability specifications and updating the content were i
basically editorial changes. The requirements for operation and surveillance of electrical systems will not be changed.
Revising the wording of the reactor coolant chemistry specification is strictly an editorial change. The revised wording clarifies, without j
changing, the actions to be taken if the coolant conductivity and chloride concentration are above the normal limits.
l The change to the bases for the Safety Valve specification makes editorial l'
revisions and re-identifies the normal most limiting pressure transient as the turbine trip without bypass, instead of'the main steam isolation valve closure transient. The main steam isolation valve closure was j
historically the normal most limiting design basis pressure transient.
WPl.6.9 I t
I
!1-
~
.I
- Mr.'Jchn ZwolinIki, Chief F4brutry 21, 1986 BWR Projpct Directorate #1
' LAC-11430 The peak pressure predicted was higher than'that predicted for a turbine trip.
In 1980 (Reference 6), a report was submitted to the NRC on the-evaluation of a turbine trip transient, without the' bypass valve
~
functioning. The calculated peak pressure for this transient'slightly.
exceeded.that.for the main steam isolation valve closure, while remaining below;the setpoint of the lowest set' safety valve. Therefore, re-identifying the normal most limiting pressure transient in the bases for the safety valve specification is appropriate, but does not involve a significant increase in the probability or consequence of an accident.
Changing the functional test and calibration frequency for the installed -
area radiation monitors to match that for effluent monitors cannot cause a significant increase in the probability or. consequences of an accident.
This change only affects the normal area radiation monitors, not the post-accident monitors, which are covered by Specification 5.5.2.
These area radiation monitors have no automatic functions, except for alarm capability. Therefore, they cannot cause or change the consequences of an accident.
Insertion of the revised chart will serve to update Technical Specifications, but has no affect on minimum shift staffing specifications.
Therefore, it cannot cause or change the consequence of an accident.
2.
Operation of LACBWR in accordance with the proposed amendment will not create the possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any accident previously analyzed.
Updating and relocating the description of the electrical system fros the-design section to the bases for the electrical system does not change any mode of operation.
Carifying the working of the reactor coolant chemistry specification without changing the requirements cannot create the possibility of a new type of accident.
Neither the editing of the bases for the Safety Valve specification or the re-identifying of the normal most limiting pressure transient affects any mode of operation. Therefore, there is no possibility of creating a new kind of accident due to this change. The re-identifying of the normal most limiting pressure transient does not create a new type of accident, it merely re-identifies which previously analyzed normal pressure transient is the most limiting..
Changing the test and calibration frequency of area radiation monitors
'that have no automatic function, except for alarm capability, cannot create the possibility of a new type of accident. The area; radiation monitors are strictly monitors and have no control functions.
WPl.6.9 I
i
~ Mr. Jchn Zwolinski, Chief Fabruary 21, 1986 BWR Project Directorate #1 LAC-Il430 i
Insert of the revised organizational chart 'is strictly an administrative change. Minimum shift. staffing is not affected. The orga'nizational 4
changes do not affect any mode of plant operation and so cannot. create the possibility of a new kind of accident.
3.
Operation of LACBWR in accordance with the proposed amendment will not involve a significant reduction in the margin of safety.
~
Editorial changes do not affect any margin of safety.
Re-identifying the normal most limiting pressure transient in the bases of the safety valve specification does not, in itself, affect the margin of safety. The safety valve specification is not being revised. The difference in calculated peak pressure between the turbine trip without bypass transient and main steam isolation valve closure transient is slight, and adequate margin still remains between the calculated peak pressure and the low set safety valve setpoint.
Decreasing the frequency of testing and calibration of the area radiation monitors does not decrease the margin of safety, since the monitors have no safety function.
Since minimum shif t staffing is not being changed, revisions to the plant i
organization chart have no effect on the margin of safety.
1 Since all of the items in.this license amendment result in "no" answers to the three questions in 10 CFR 50.92, a no significant hazards consideration determination is justified.on this license amendment in the opinion of the licensee.
The license amendment has been reviewed by the appropriate review committees.
A check for $150 accompanies this letter to cover the required application fee per Reference 2.
If there are any questions, please contact us.
Sincerely, DAIRYLAND POWER COOPERATIVE pfffb$
f James W. Taylor, General Manager JWT:LSG:sks Enclosure Attachment WPl.6.9 -
Mr. Jchn Zwolin;ki, Chief February 21, 1986
- BWR Project Directorate #1 1AC-11430 cc:
J. G. Keppler, Regional Administrator John Stang, LACBWR Project Manager NRC Resident Inspector Mr. Clarence Riederer, Chief Engineer Wisconsin Public Service Commission P. O. Box 7854 Madison WI 53707 STATE OF WISCONSIN )
)
COUNTY OF IA CROSSE )
Personally came before me this o7[
day of
-:" =,, 1986 the above named, James Taylor, to me known to be the person who exe6uted the foregoing instrument and acknowledged the same.
l Notary Publie p Crosse County Wisconsin My commission expires February 21,- 1988.
WPl.6.9