ML20197H870

TMI-2 Rept Mgt & Safety Allegations:Vol II 'Mystery Man Allegation.'

ML20197H870
Person / Time
Site:	Three Mile Island
Issue date:	11/16/1983
From:	Stier E GENERAL PUBLIC UTILITIES CORP.
To:
Shared Package
ML20197G961	List: ML20197G956 ML20197H809 ML20197H820 ML20197H870
References
FOIA-85-700 NUDOCS 8605190308
Download: ML20197H870 (15)

Text

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q THI-2 REPORT MANAGEMENT AND SAFETY ALLEGATIONS PREPARED FOR GPU NUCLEAR CORP.

BY EDWIN H. STIER PRINCIPAL STAFF:

GERARD K. FRECH MARTIN J. MILITA NOVEMBER 16, 1983 VOLUME II

" MYSTERY MAN" ALLEGATION 8605190308 860501 PDR

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!I DEANING OF THE PMASE " MYSTERY MAN" The origin of the phrase " mystery man" is founo in the opening statement of Robert Fiske, counsel for Babcock ano Wilcox (BW), in the case' of General Public utilities Corporation et al. v. The Babccck ano Wilcox C,nannny et al.

The cause or causes of the 1979 accident were the central issues of that lawsuit. In his cpeniry statement, Fiske allegeo that at the time the reactor i

coolant pumps were shut off (5:41 a.m.) the control room operators turneu on the high pressure injection thP1) punps full flow (1000 bpm), but, at approximately 5:45 a.m., some unknown person turneo them off. He observec that hao those pungs remaineo on there woulo have been no camage to the l reactor core. He further stateo that although extensive oiscovery hau been taken, he was not able to ioentify the inoivioual who turneo off high pressure injection and referreo to that inoivioual as the " mystery man in this case."'

WITtESES IDENTIFIED AS SCLIMS OF PARAS' " MYSTERY MAN" AlI FGATION The first refererce in the Parks afficavlt to witnesses in stoport of the allegation that Kunder was the " mystery man" is a statement that Chwastyk ano bernaro Smith have ioentifiec Kunder as the " mystery man" on several occasions.

r In his interview, Chwastyk stateo that he never hearc the term " mystery man" until a day or two prior to the release of tne Parks affloavit on March

'43, 1963. Chwastyk unoerstooo that the term relateo to the incivioual who was allegea to have shut oown the $1 punps curing the course of the accioent i

and that the phrase was useo in the GPU v. Bh litigation.0 he further stateo that he hao no knowleoge of anyone cperating the HPI punps; that he haa never ioentifiec Kuncer to anyone as the " mystery man"; ano, that he hao never ioentifiec Kuncer or anyone else as haviry shut cown the HP1 pupps_ curing the accioent.' .

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The only incident which Chwastyk coulo recall that might have been related to the allegations in the Parks affidavit was an incioent involviry a comment that Chwastyk maae to John Auger about Kunder. Kunder hao requestea that Auger cogile some information concerning events subsequent to the 1979 accident. Auger askeo Chwastyk when TMI-2 went to the loss-to-ambient cooling mode followiry the accioent. Chwastyk responoeo that Auger shoulo ask Kuncer, since Kunder haa ordeIeo the pumps shut down at the time of the accioent.

Chwastyk .was unsure whether he specified which pumps, but intenced to mean the reactor coolant pumps ano not~ the $1 punps 10 . He intenoeo his response to be flippant ano to suggest that he was not interesteo in sLpplyiny Auger with information since he was busy with another matter at the time. I bernaro Sn.ith, a GPU Nuclear e@loyee, has been at Three Mlle Islano since January 1,1968.h he statec that he hao never heaIo the phrase

" mystery man" until the release of the Parks afficavit.D Smith further aaviseo that he knew of no ccnnection between Kuncer ano the operation of the

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WI pumps durirg the accioent; that he hao never referzeo to Kuncer as the

" mystery man"; and, that the Parks afficavit is untrue with zespect to him.1" WITtESES ALLEGED TO HAVE DIRECT KNOW ELGL CF LHvASTYK/ SMITH COMENTS The Parks affidavit further alleges that Chwastyk or BernaIn Smith has ioentified Kuncer as the " mystery man" to a nunber of other people, namely, Joseph Smith, John Perry, Auger ano Werger.

Auger has been employeo by Gr0N since October 5,1961, ano is presently assigneo to the TM1-2 Safety Review GroLp.D he describeo the same incident to which Chwastyk referzeo in his statement. Auger aaviseo that on March 4 or 7 he was prepariry information for a speech which Kunder was to glire. In

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researching TM1-2's transfer to an ambient heat loss cooling mode, he approacheo Chwastyk.16 Auger stated that in an "of f-the-cuff" manner Chwastyk said, "something to the effect of, tell Mr. Kuncer that we went on ambient heat loss mode of cooling when he turned off the punps." thwastyk cio not specify which pu@s, nor old he use the phrase " mystery man." In fact, Auger hao never hearo the phrase until the Parks aff20avit was releaseo. He further statec that he haa never nearc BernaIn Smith refez to Kunder as having been involveo with shutting down any punps or being the

" mystery man," nor hao he ever been tolo that Kuncer turneo off the hPI pumps.10 Joseph Smith, an egloyee of Gilbert Associates, an engineering consulting firm in Reading, Pa., has workea at Three Mile Islano for three years.D He statec that he first hearo the phrase " mystery man" af ter the Parks af ficavit was releasec.20 He oescribec the incicent involving Auger anc Chwastyk, (referreo to at,ove) as the only conversation in which he hearo either Chwastyk or Bernara Smith conunent about Kuncer having shut oown any pumps.

Although he placed the conversation in December, im or January, 1 1963, his description of it was the same as .other witnesses. when thwastyk l mace his comment concerning Kunder having shut oown pugs, Joseph Smith inferred that he was talking about the reactor coolant punps ano not the HP1 pugs.22 He oescribed thwastyk's coment as a "very casual jovial response."23 Perry has been a GPUN employee for approximately 14 months.24 he was present when Chwastyk maoe the comment cescribec above to Auger and believeo it to be a joke. At the time the coment was mace, Parks was present.25

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Perry further stateo that he never heaIn the phrase " mystery man"_useo by 1

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s either Cttwastyk or Bernaro Smith.26 Althoug) . Perry unoerstood that Kuncer had been involveo in the operation of the reactor coolant pumps during'the 1979 accioent, he had never heazu that Kuncer has connectea with the operation of the WI pumps.27 Werger in her unsworn statement recalleo a conversation near her cesk amcng Parks, harshall, Chwastyk, Febert Ryan ano a "cotple of other people."

She was not a party to the conversation but heard thwastyk comment that

" George Kunder turned of f the punps." She hao no idea which punps he was talking about, henger also claims to have hearc the phrase " mystery man," but has no ioea who said it or what the significance of the phrase is. No further details were provicea to assist in identifying this conversation.20 4

WITNESE.S ALLEGED TO HAVE INDIRECT KNOM. EDGE CF LHWASTYK/ SMITH f. DENT In his afficavit, Parks icentifies the following six inoiviouals as having indirect knowleoge that Chwastyk or Bernaro Smith have ioentifiec i'

Kuncer as the person who shut oown the safety injection punp: hobert Gumo, Ryan, Walter Marshall, Ronalo harren, Lelano Rogers ano possibly k.dwaro 1 l

Kitler. Parks states that he was present when those inciviouals were tolo about Chwastyk's or Bernaro Smith's coments.

Gummo has been employeo by GPUN since 3;1y 27,1961.29 He stateo that he has no knowledge from any source regarciny Kunoer's participation in the operation of the W1 punps during the 197!r accident or Kunder being a " mystery man. " The only relevant information of which Gumo was aware was a conversation between Parks and himself the day before the Parks afficavit was publicly released. In that conversation, Parks criticizea GPUN for having terminated King's employment while keeping kunder, who hao " cost tSe company a i 1 -

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great oeal of money." Parks oio not specify in what sense kunoe'r hao cost the company money.31 Ryan, an enployee of B&W for 29 years, has been assigned to Three Mlle Island for approximately 16 months.31 He has no knowledge of Kunder having been identifica as a " mystery man," or having any connection with the termination of WI pumps ourirg the 1979 accident. Furthermore, he has no 1

knowledge of thwastyk or Bernara Smith making comments connecting KLrider with the 1979 accioent. 3 i

Marshall, a GPU employee, has been assigneo to Three Mile Islano since l

February , 1977.34 _ he stated that he first learneo of the phrase " mystery 4

man" from a hashington Post article some time in March,1963. He has no knowleoge with respect to any comment by Chwastyk or bernarc Smith regarcing i 1

the " mystery man" ano has no knowleoge concerning any comments about hunder having been involvec with the cperation of the W1 pumps curirt the 1979 accioent. 6 Marshall remembereo one specific conversation, scnetime curiry 4

the month of March with Chwastyk, Bernara Smith anc Parks. In that conversation, Kuncer's name was mentioneo in connection with the operation of l

the reactor coolant pumps at the time of the accident, but there was no ciscussion concerning the WI punps.

t Warren has been employed by GPuh for approximately 5-1/2 years ano has i

been assipeo to unit 2, Plant Ergineering Department at Three Mile I

Islanc.36 Warren stateo that he has never hearc about Chwastyk or Bernara Smith ioentifying George kuncer as the " mystery man," nor has he hearo anyone associate kuncer with the operation of WI punps durirg the 1979 accioent.

j Rogers has been enployeo by B&W since 1972 ano has been assigneo to Three

- Mlle Islano for that entire time. O Hestateothathehasneverbeato . .

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01wastyk, Bernard Smith or anyone else oiscuss Kunder in connection with the operation of the HPI punps curirg the 1979 accioent ano has never heard Chwastyk, Bernara Smith or anyone else characterize Kuncer as the " mystery man."41 He further stated that he has never hearc from any third party that either Chwastyk or Bernarc Smith identifiec Kunder as operating the WI pumps.42 Kitler has been employed by Bechtel for approximately ten years. He has been assigned to Three Mile Islano for approximately one year.43 He stateo

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that he has never he'aro anyone discuss conenents by Chwastyk or Bernara Smith concerning Kunder's activities during the 1979 accident.44 Additionally, he has never hearc from anyone that Kunder hao anything to do with the operation of the HPI pumps during the 1979 accioent.4 Kitler 010 not remember having hao a ciscussion with Parks on the above sub J ect as is describec in the Parks af fidavit.46 ANALY515 0F EVILEM.E RELATED TO HP1 PUMP 5 The services of Davio Taylor, a technical consultant, were obtaineo to assist this investigation in cetermining whether there is any information other than the Parks affidavit that connects Kuncer with the operation of the WI pumps or otherwise identifies Kunder as the " mystery man" of Fiske's cpening statement. Taylor is thoroughly familiar with the investigations, ciscovery, testimony, technical analyses anc reports relating to the operation of the HP1 punps curirg the accident. He was retaineo from April 1980 tnrough

&nuary 1983 by the law firm of Kaye, Scholer, Fierman, Hays & Handler which represented GPU in the litigation against Bd. In the process of st.pporting l this litigation effort, Taylor has reac ano digesteo all significaist cocunents l

i relateo to the accioent, has reviewed the relevant depositions, anc has conducted stuales and written reports on various facets of the accioent, includiry the WI sequence. Aoditionally, he has revieweo the following reports and other occuments:

1. " Investigation into the March 28, 1979 Three Mile Islano Accioent by Office of Inapection ano Enforcement," Investigative heport ha. 50-320/79-10, NLA.G-0600, July 197!r.

2. " Analysis of Three Mile Islano - thit 2 Accident," Nuclear Safety Analysis Center, NSAC-80-1 (NSAC-1 Revisec) March 1960.

3. "Three Mile Island - A Report to the Comissioners ano the Public,"

Nuclear Regulatory Lomission, Special Inquiry Grotp (MC-51G),

Volume Il Part-2, "The Accident ano Its Analysis".

4. " Preliminary Lalculations helateo to the Accioent at Three Mile Islano," Los Alamos Scientific Laboratcry, NUEG/Ch-1353 (LA-627MS), March 1960.

5. " Analysis of the Three Mile Islanc Accioent ano Alternative Sequences," Battelle, Columbus Laboratories, hlfttdW-1219, January 1980.

6. " Analysis of Reactor Coolant System Make-lp Durirg the Three Mlle Islano LJnit 2 Event," EDS Nuclear, Report No. 02-0370-D22, December 29,1982 (GPU v. B&W trial exhibit GRJ-2223).

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7. GPU Nuclear Technical Data Report, TDR-044, "Annotatea Sequence of Events, March 28, 1979," February 6,1981. ,

8. GPU Nuclear Technical Data Report, TDR-045, "Accioent Transient Mooeling Analysis," August 1,1979.

9. babcock & Wilcox " Task 27 Analysis Results," Novenbel 16, 1979, (GPU v. B&W Trial Exhibit GPU 2222).

10. Nuclear Regulatory Comission " Review of B&W v. GPU Trial Court Recorc," March 28, 1983.

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11. Memoranoum (with attachments) from Henry Myers to Freo Cotabs, "Coments on Review of B&W v. GPU Trial Court becora (11),"

. April 5,1963.

t At our request, Taylor reviewea the trial testimony ano all other relevant sources of information relating to the perioo when, according to Fiske's allegation, the HP1 punps were shut off by a " mystery man." Baseo on  !

this review, Taylor has zeached two conclusions that are sipificant to this I investigation: first, there is no evidence inoicating cirectly or inoirectly that Kunder was involved with the operation of the WI punps during the

$ relevant perioc; seconc, Kunoer was twgentially involveo with the cecision to shut off the last two reactor coolant pumps at approximately 5:41 a.m.#7 i

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During this investigation, GF4)N retained B&W to perform an analysis of key system responses during the perico covereo by the " mystery man" l allegation. B&W concludea, " Full W1 acuation dio not occur at the time the i

'A' loop RC [ Reactor Coolantj punps were trippeo (5:41 a.m.). 46 PARKS' EXFRLS&.D ATTITI.OE T0hARD Kl#OER Parks states in his affidavit that he was frustrateo with George Kuncer as PORC chairman and threateneo to write to the newspapers identifying Kunder as the man who shut off the safety injection punps. Parks further states that Chwastyk pursuaded him not to do so.

It is clear from the statements taken from the witnesses ioentifieo by Parks that he expressed great frustration ano anger at the manner in which Kuncer cealt with procedures which hao been submitteo by Parks for P0fC approval.49 Parks' expressions of frustration cate from at least hovember or December 1962. 0 Parks threatened to communicate with the Paxton Herala, a local publication, ano to provice stories which were critical of Kuncer. Those threats occurreo during the last quarter of 1982.' Parks specifically stated that he would advise the Paxton Herald that George Kuncer had turneo

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off the pumps during the accioent.52 On December 23, 1982 an incioent occurred at the Site Operations Christmas luncheon which was indicative of Parks' feelings toward Kuncer.

Kunder came to the area of the luncheon for the purpose of speaking with King to resolve problems concerning PORC review of certain procedures in which King and Parks hac an interest. 3 Witnesses to the incident statea that Kuncer enterea King's office where King ano Parks were present. A confroI1tation then

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took place during which Parks threateneo to punch Kunder in the face. Kuncer lef t the office momentarily but returned to King's office when Parks hao calmed oown ano continued the oiscussion. After the confrontation, Parks returneo to his cesk ano stated that he was goiry to write to newspapers i l

accusing Kuncer of being the " mystery man" who oIcereo the punps shut off at J the time of the accident. This comment was hearc by Perry who believeo that Parks at that time was referring to the reactor coolant punps.55 In'oescribirs Parks' expressions of animosity towaro Kunoer, Lhwastyk differed somewhat from the Parks affidavit. Chwastyk stated that Parks mace threats of physical violence against Kunoer curiry the perico of late 1962 through early 1983. Although Chwastyk was unsure of Parks' seriousness in making such threats, he attempted to calm him.56 Chwastyk states that Parks never tolo him that he was goiry to advise the newspapers that Kuncer was

, involved in shutting off the H'I punps; however, Parks dio express an intention to report to the NFtL that Kunoer was responsible for shuttiry off

, "the pumps" during the accioent. Chwastyk assuneo that Parks was referring to the reactor coolant ptops ano tolo him that the information was a matter of public reccro.N Werger cescribec in general terms at least two ccnversations in which Parks wantec to "make public" information that Kunder was " responsible for shuttirg off the punps." She could not recall when they occurreo, but they involvec Parks anc Chwastyk speakirg "right across from" her desk. According to Werger, Chwastyk urged Parks not to ao it "enphasiziry that it won't oo any good. M D

KLNDER'S DENIAL CF PARKS' ALLEGATIONS .

Kunder was interviewed concernirg the allegations of his involvement with the WI punps at the time of the 1979 accident. He denies the allegations 4

contained in the Parks affidavit.N CONCLLSION It is clear from the evioence that Parks felt great personal frustration and anger because of the zejections ano comments made by P0hc to proceoutes i

which Parks hao participated in craf ting. He reacteo by thImatening to give aerogatory information about Kunder to the newspapers and, on Lecenter 23, 1982, threateneo Kunder physically. It further appears that Parks' hostility towaro Kunder may have begun as early as Novencer,1962 ano continueo into March, 1963.

There is absolutely no stoport for the allegations that Kuncer is the

" mystery man" or that he had any connection with shutting off the WI pumps ouring the 1979 accident. Every source ioentified by Parks for that proposition who woulo submit to an interview categorically denieo the j

information attributea to him by Parks.60 King, in a public statement, i cenied any knowleoge of the " mystery man." herger 010 not possess the j knowledge attributed to her in the Parks affidavit. She only claims to have heard the phrase curirg a conversation to which she was not a party. She has no idea of its significance or who might have said it. The allegeo sources of the allegations, Chwastyk and bernarc Smith, oenieo the information attributeo I

to them ano are corroborated by all the witnesses.

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Apparently, it was comonly believea that kunder hao been involved in the 1

decision to terminate the reactor coolant pumps, not the WI punps.during the 3

accident. No information outsioe the affloavit has been founo to link Kunoer to the termination of the WI pumps despite our review of exhaustive i

investigations datirb from the time of the accioent ano an analysis of the relevant information relating to the operation of the HP1 pumps during the accioent. Further, the recent be analysis of system response cata virtually establishes that the events underlying the " mystery man" allegation dio not even cccur.

The only two conversations which have been uncovereo in the course of this investigation tpon which some of Parks' allegations may be baseo are:

the consent made by Chwastyk to Auger curing which Parks was present, ano, the discussion oescribeo by Marshall which includeo Chwastyk, Bernard Smith ano Parks. However, the former conversation incluceo no reference to HP1 punps or l

" mystery man" and was clearly an off-hand remark intended to be flippant. The '

. latter conversation specifically oealt with Kunoer's role in shutting off the reactor coolant pumps at the time of the 1979 accident and not the WI punps.

Therefore, these conversations in no sense stoport the allegations in the Parks afficavit.

2 Parks threateneo on several occasions to give information to the newspapers ioentifying Kuncer as the " mystery man" or the man who shut down 4

! "the pumps." However, the first reference by Parks specifically to the HP1 l I punps in connection to Kunder is in his affidavit. No one witnessed Parks referring to the HP1 pumps when making threats against Kunder. It is also clear that Parks had participated in at least one discussion specifically 4

cealing with Kuncer's involvement with terminatire the reactor coolant pumps.

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Therefore, not only is there an absence of affirmative stoport for the allegations mace by Parks connecting kunoer with the operation of the HP1 pumps, but there is also reason to infer that Parks was confuseo about the details of the " mystery man" allegation. He may have mistakenly believeo, Lp to the time he prepared his affidavit, that the punps relevant to the " mystery man" allegation were the reactor coolant pumps, not the HP1 purrps.

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/** * %.g UNITED STATES I - '

i NUCLEAR REGULATORY C'MMISSION ~-

wam.imaron. o. c. aussa .

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cepies OrinsencTOn June 22, 1984 AND AUDITOn

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The attached infctmation is for our mbeting on June 27, 1984, regarding ff NBC policy when allegations of harrassnent and intimidation are received.

717 Because of the limited dictnbutim of SECY 84-65, I extracted the material that .

applies to our meeting. Miltionally, I m providing portions of the Richard Parks affidavit to GAP that documents his allega- '

tions to NFC of harrassnent and intimidatim and the response Parks received frcm NIC.

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ben Geo i W Mulley, In stigator Office of Inspector and Auditor

Attachment:

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1-THIGE MILE ISN' Accidelit without an end fhe s cle up o a oac ,

- - p= ' has been a major concern. But three b -

former TMI engineers say the,r safety concerns were often ignore ,

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TMI cfitics.who paid .;,.a pricej !

By Susan kit: Gerald . 3 y .

and Jim Detfen _g

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- g c r:r j I For months, Richard Parks, a - page s'esa  ? co .

senior engineer at the Three -

Mile Island nuclear plant, had complained aMut safety prob ~ p; - ALE! ~~ PHI A, PA. l lems in the cleanup. M'EP.Ef(8jgj%$

Then, on March 17.1983. Parks - '

was summoned to a meeting with UOT.!!~l!?! - 423 e7O Bahman Kanga, the top execu. ,jgggy* c 52,1c f.;

tive in charge of the cleanup of #

the damaged reactor. Kanga told. l Parks to keep quiet warninghtm '

that he could be "hu~.'Jiatedif '

he did not, federal ity 1gators later concluded. -

One weet after. that_ meeting, f Parks was snspendhd from his job. l Parks was not the only senior-cogineer who raised fundamen.

tal questions about whether the-c!einop was being rtru safely;'

larry King, director of site op-crations, and Edwin Gischel, di.1 rector of plant engineering, also !

voiced safety concerns to thetr-'

superiors. Like Parks, King and l GLschel each had major responsi i bilities in ensuring the safety of l ths 51 billion cleanup.  :

Like Parks, neither King nor )

Gischel works at TMI anymore.

All three men have complained to investigators with the US No.

. clear Regulatory Commision that .'I

• they lost their jobs in the cleanup i as o result of their outspokenness ,

about safety violations.

King, who worked for GpU Nt>

• clear Corp., TMI's operator, said I

he was abruptly suspended and barred from further entranca to i the plant in March 1983, just one l day before he was scheduled to discuss his safety concerns with !

• c TMl executive vice president. ,

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G!schel said be was forced to ~ s*gk'. 9A *. J.s ? *;; ;.

transfar from GPU Nuclear to ', '

r:.:c,;.:, e,  ;"; . f r; :

cnither General Public Utilities  ; ,, . '. J M:*- . , s,9' ' ' * .

subsidiaryin July 1983,amid per* * * ' 't. .S. . .-

"' J' sistent demands by corporate of. ,,-

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ficists that ha undergo a neuro. - . .' , y ". ,, ., 3 psych: logical examination. -

Officialswith GPUNuclearand '

Bechtel Power Corp., the' perent company of the prime contractor Parks,who questioned cleanup safety; the NRC - +-

said he was unfairly moved from b the cleanup, have told the .

NRC thr* uch of the thru engl. July, the NRC staff specifically chet and King were improperly-reers left for a valid reason.

Last lig a series cited the March 1983 meeting,say. treated by their superiors.But the; Bechtel moved Parks to another ing Kange threatened Parks with NRC staff concluded that the ac.

job site, they said; Gischel was The NRC and the UA Depart- retallation.Kanga,a Bechtel exec. tions of DU officials toward Gi transferred to a less demanding ment of labor have concluded utive who nolonger worksin the chel and King did not constitutt GPU J:b after he had suffered a that Parks had been harassed and cleanup, refused to talk to The harasment or retallation.

stroke;and King was fired on the unfairly removed from hisjob by , Inquirer about the Parks case.

. Four senior TMI officials in-ground that he had a profession, NRC investigators amid that Gis. Gee TMI on 8 A)

Becht,el offh Inja report in. , , ,1 ci c:nflict of interest. .

, t after th y hit radionetEsierts ci ttis' plint.

hr huru ha'd been properly fol.

~

- ter leaving thiNavy in 0ct ber 1977 1 In N vember 19g2, King sent a memo to his rks worked as an engineer and reactor lowed and documented. boss, John Barton, deputy director of the

. operator at four nuclear plants. In an affidavit hef filedLabor,Parkssaid the cleanup, stating that the tank's installation in March 1983 with While working on the construc' ion of the

. Midland nuclear power plant in Michigan,l the US.Departmentoactinghad chairman returned violated state and local laws. Barton of thetotask the met.no King force.

with a notation Bechtel

. Parks said, he had bnstled as he drove bYj engineer Tom Morris, appearedscrawled annoyed onby the bottom: "I don't need a i demInstrators protesting near the plant's Parks' concerns.'verks said Morris hed.CYOA told tcover your own a-1 memo from you.

l entrance. "These people are ao stupid." haj him,"'Stop telling us what we can't do and llt's not constructive and wastes your time

remembers having mutteretto himself. j start telling us what we can do.'"

l j  ; Parks first was assigned to the TMI clean 4 Morris said during an interview that his l.and mine." Late in 1982, f

.up in June 1980, when he worked for al wordshadbeenmaantontyssacommentary subcentractor on the project. He was trans.: on Parks' attitude. ** Parks at no time had , company seemed 1

.fIrred to another job site in late 1981, but he anything positive to say," he said.

treturned to the cleanup jn May 1982, when ' On Feb.17,1983. Parks' boss, larry King, 1983, even though the preparation he was hired as a senior engineer by Bech. I assigned him the job of reviewing a plan for ,

' til. He was assigned to the Unit 2 site testing the polar crane before it would be iown, work procedures for the polar crane.

to speed things along, Bechtel was using itsd to l l CPerations department, which was headed for that June. With King's concurrence,+and other jobs,thus bypassing time.co s

, by larry King, a top GPU Nuclear manager. ' use ,

- Parks' primary duty in the cleanup was tc . Parks issued a written reportjng l reviews rejecting the required by plant regu '

i make sure that newly installed equipment proposed test on the ground that TMI matter, safety tocause his department was respon.

l

. andchangestoexistingequipmentcomplied with federal and plant regulations governi procedures had not been followed. Parks said in h i

,' y~

ing the safe operation of a nuclear plant.i after he submitted his repo ~

represent his department on the Head 1.ift visor, Ed Kitler,on his way inside from the l bad been saytag Task Force - a group of Bechtel and GPU parking lot. According to Parks, Kitler said: i Nuclehr engineers and managers who were "'What the hell are you doing? ...You hav planning for the removal of the reactor. upper management p-ed off at you, to the bidePB l vessel's lid in June 1983. Much of the group's point where I've been asked what had to be iat a

- attention was focused on the repair cf the)' done to get you transferred off the site.'" by the rules l

Kitler, who no longer works st 11dl, could ;

polar crane, which would be used for the ^

' A certifiedletter l . job. i- . not be reached for comment.

i In attending the task-force meetings and Five days later, Parks was stripped of On Feb. 9,1983, Edwin Gischel, director of carrying out his related duties, Parks said, many of his sup&,y duties in the clean: plant engineering under King, was assigned j

he began to notice a pattern. In job after jobi up. ,the job of reviewing a safety evaluation of in preparation for the head lift. Bechtel;

{the poter crane,, Before the crane wa j disregarded TMI's written regulations and' TOU tieed to abide by the ru}e8' i , required safety reviews, Parks said. . 14rry King arrived at TMlin June 1980 as ;the lid off the reactor, it Parks said that when violations of proce.

dures were pointed out during the meetings: planteperations director, one of the key 2

, of the Head Lift Task Force,'Bechtel 3 and' GPU Nuclear management position ered by the deviations. Parks said their; ades of experience in engineering and nu..

l .

apparent disregard for proper operating pro. i clear power. King had a reputation as direct, blunt and cedures was contrary to his military train.

ing, which required that workdene. -

be Adone "byl capable of tallying subordinates to get a jo 1900 personnel evaluation by his

,. the book" at all times. .

supervisors at Gulf States Utilities Co. in

• Parks said his concerns had grown a's'he

' f:und other instances in which the cleanopi Imisiana had described him this way:

.-seemed to be proceeding without proper " Frank, hardnceed, operationally W'ented, tells it 11ke it is."

kcontrols: '-

For his first year and a half at'TMI, King

! - He said be found, for example,'that con. oversaw various cleanup activities, incluc

, trol room operators - who are responsible f .for maintaining the plant in a safe the Unit 2 complex. He said during an inter.

r

- were not advised of some cleanup jobs f l '

I 1 l..fromthat a separata command center, could directly i affect the status of vitalL view that he had cleanup but ,that he had quickl l Parks also said be had found that no one . In October 1981. GPU Nuclear' promoted, knew where to find documents showing what). King to be director of site operations - a .

equipment and plant systems had been serv.! top. management position with a $40,000 sala. l

, iced and tested when Unit 2 was opened inP ry and responsiblitty 7 illion annual for overseeing 300 em.

budget.

December 1975 - information that he' 'ployees and a $2 min September 19g2, Bechtel took over most

- thought would be helpfulin certain cleanup l

tasks.

managerient functions in the cleanup from i But Parks' biggest worries were about the CPU Nuclear. After the change, King said, j

violations in the repair of the polar crane, he clashed more and more with Bechtel j

, he said. , . . . . . . . . . . managers over what he saw as the contrac. .

l As early asJanuary 1983, Parks has told tor's blatar.t disregard for TMI regulations.

federal invesugstors, he believed that he For example, King ssid TMi engineers had was being harassed for raising questions i installed a sawage holding tankin 1982 with. '

l

, during task force meetings about procedural J out obtaining the necessary permits from violettons and safety shortcuts. At the meet.. local authertties or the state Department of I

ings, he said, he insisted that his department . Enytronmental Resources. The tank collect.

~ could not approve.use,of the crane anlass , ed water from the showers used by workers i

vr, w.

m - -. -

. '~

Parks.'Kiiidn~d Gisc'hel complain'ed'a' bout .

. safety on numerous occasions before they

+

• - M 4 t- * - - --* ' ~ left TMI, according to affidavits and sworn .

TML from 1 A statements on file mth the federal govern.

ment. Parks and King have appeared before

.volved in the cases of Parks King and Gis, a U.S. House subcommittee that investigated i .ch:1-including William Kuhns, chairman, i the cicanup;all of General Public Utilities have complained to the NRC.- Corp. (GPU), of Each has argued that shortcuts were taken

! Parsippany,NJ.,theownerof TMlasrefused ], to hurry one of the tasks most important to

,13 be interviewed by The Inquirer.

The four,and ether officials'df CPU Nucle. ; the cleanup -the repair of a 400. ton device, ar and Bechtel, said the cases had been ; called a polar crane," that is crucial to

, thoroughly investigated by the companies, { major cleanup wk.The three engineers said there was no l'. which concluded that the engineers had not .been misrested. They said'they asw no .guaranteethatt violated during its repdir. If the crane mal.

', Purpose

-Regardless ofto howdiscussing the NRC definesthe the matters further. ;i.Junctioned,they warned,a heavy load could treatment of Parks, King and Gischel, their s come crashing down on sensitive equipment i experiences and criticisms raise serious '.,inside the reactor building,posably tngger.

.! . questions about the safety of tho' cleanup r! oPeretion. A review by The Inquirer of thou. :, lag another g sands of pages of documents shows a history I.,ranicety.Because of the three engineers' maplaints, of safety violations since the cleanup began l m, ajor cleanup work was delayed for more in the days after the March 28,1779,

~ accident ' than a year while the NRC invesessted. In a at Unit 2. - ,

fwritten report in September 1933, the NRC

' ****"*d "**Y " ** '"d successfully ' ' ' * " ' to' Probleins cited by NRC *

-*. In Julf, the crane was use

' The NRC has cited at least 140 instances of l* lift the 1% ton lid off the damaged reactor problems at TMI, including lapses in radia. ; vessel in properation for removing the in.-

thn protection for workers, inadequate (tensely radioactive fuel inade ~'

• the reactor plant security, fireeafety violations, inade r 8"-But after the crane was used, plant inspec.

quote environmental monitoring and is c pr:per handHg of radioactive materials, [ tors found in August and September one set of brakes on the crane's hoist was not works The agency has issued 42 " notices of viola '

tion"-fornalletters of criticism-toTMI 4 ing propwly. .) . An internal GPU Nuclear report issued in m nagers for these infractions. .

.Through the end of last year,TMI records I, October said the problem had hi.4 be.

, show, there had been $93 documented cases i,cause plant engineers, not wanting to wait

!;r which a cleanup worker's skin had been : nine to 10 weeks for the manufacturer tobship the

, contaminated by radioactive matertals. la i." homemade" parts for the brakes in 1982.

. " Amengthesafetyproblemst' :vmented The" then installed the brakes in violation records on file with the NRw are these: r of correct safety procedures and mytews,

• Radioactive particlesleakedintotheair I the m put sew,,

t (utside TMI in January 1982 because drain William Travers, the top NkC official at plugs in the plant's air filtration' system the plant to oversee the cleanup, said during

' w re missing.TM1 engineers had learned of i

the problem in June 1980. But instead of . thean crene's interview that if both sets of brakes on.

hoist had failed during the sensi.

' being reseeled with carbon.eteel plugs, as tive lifting of the reactor lid.

required by plant specifications,the drains .steellid could have dropped. ,th,e massive wm coveed with tape. It was exactly that kind of potetitial accident

• Contaminatedwaterfromastoragetank ]thet Parks, King and Gischal had warned tear the reactor complex leaked onto the a might happen u plant rules were not fol.

ground in January 1932 and August 1983. 0- -

ladioactive substances. such as cesium.. h'*'utbythetimethelidwaslifted.thethree D

'l arentium, cobalt and tritium have beeno wm no longw working at Three ected repeatedly in the groundwater near g,g l

' :*

• More than 600 gallons of concentrated ,

, sulfuric acid spilled onto the ground outside ' Newfounddoubts

. Unit 2 on Jan.13,1981, after a control room , RichardParksusedtobe.anneyed whenev.

Operstor turned the wrong valve. One ree. .er he saw people protesting nuclear power,

, son for the mirahe was that plant engineer. As a career worker in nuclear power, he was .

ing drawings were out of date -a recurring e problem in the cleanup,  ! what certain they that the protesters were talking about. . did not know -

' ** TMI engineers installed a sewage hold. ! . Parks had enlisted in the Navy in August ing tank for waste water in 1982 without 6 1970, joining its nuclear-power progam. pur. -

. obtaining a permit from the state Depart. , ing seven years in the service, he had served ment of Enytr.smental Resources or troinlocal authorities. Radioactive particles later T .on two nuclear subm l were discovered in the tank's sewage,which >*.and the George C. Marshall. He had taughtnuclear. p

' was being trucked to a treatment plant in r school in Ballston Spa, .N.Y. .. ..

. . /

J lancaster.

m

'Itit five 40 ton conente st;bs that protect the . ary to take's phone cad from his boss. Barton.

King said d: ring as intamcw that Batton reacter vessel and other eqtipsent. Gischel had questioned Eng cbo2t Gir.hel's rejec-MNeed to approve the plan because he be tion of.1he polarcrane plan.11arton had

, lieved that the craos should first be tested with a less sensitive losd. particularly since ; sou,nded' Whatupset; King the hell is <G:schel aid. doing?"' King new brakes had been 12sulted. .* quoted Barton as saying. "'I ought to fire his

. In an affidavit later Sled with tlie NRC, ,_,,-

Cischel said;"In reviewing the document,I : Barton refused to be interviewed.

realised that management was trying to pull i ,

o fast one" by using the crane to lift the 40 ~

i ton slabs without testing it first. - Locked Otli O's Feb.10, lys3, Gischel sent a memo to I At the end of the workday on f'eb. 24.

l King in which he concluded that the pro ; I Barfon calleJ King to his office. King said

• Posed use of the polar crane "is technica~ly . James Troet!!ger, a GPU Nuclear p rsonnel t;nacceptable to plant engineeri"8 official, was already present.

Gischel,50, who earnec 540.000 a year at . ' Barton asked King whether he was part.

TMI, has told the NRC that in a meeting Oe 4 owner of Quiltec Inc.,a nuclear engineering next day, several members of the b and uit . consulting firm, and whether former GPU Task Force criticised his positMn. He said Nuclear employees worked for the company..

Kanga, the cleanup director, had pounfad .

on tne table as he berated Gischel's vkws. !.Barton King's then answer toldtoKing boththat questicas he was was sus- yes.

Kessa refused to beinterviewed

• ** aba Gis ! pended for violating the company's ccnflict-chel, .. . .. f That night, when Gischel returned home ' ,cfinterest policy. King recalls attat Barton i from work, he found a certified i+.tter from. l got into King's car with him end escarted k

him to the plant gate. 'Iters, a security .

psychologist Willian Jenkins.The letter ad*

. vised Gischel to undergo neuropsychologt* ! . guard confiscated King's company badge so I cal evaluation for the benefit of his "beahh, 1i that he would be denied acces:, to the plant He would later complain to colleagues that stfety and career decision making." -

1 the timing of Barton's accusation see: sed Jenkins worked for Corporate $tressCon f. odd because Quiltec had been established a trol Services Inc., a psychological. counseling year and a half earlier and had never had service under contract with GPU Nuclear to I done business with TMI. It was difficult to screen pr%Iive TM1 workers and counse! ! understand, h: said, why such a conncction employees undergoing stress. j should result in his being suspended indeft-41schel had dealt with Jenkins before. He -

had niet with the psychologist in October ! -nitely and without pay.

He told investigators with the NRC that he

> 1982 to discuss his recovery frca a stroke , was especially disturbed when he learned

! hatt he had suffend that June. Gischel told _ , that the compeay'sinquitiaeintohis associa-NRC investigators that Jenkins had iTom - tion with the consulting firm had been ised him that their nesting would remain ' prompted by James Thiesing - a Bechtel confidenual. .

During the October 1982 cnnseling ses. 'L. ~ manager with whom K!ng had frequent dis-agreements over safety usues.

sign, G1schel said, Jenkins had suggested a k Both Troebliger.and Thiesing reicsed'to f n:uropsychological evaluatien, a test in 8 be interviewed. . .. - -

' tended to identify damage to the central j .

When King got home, he said, he tale-

' nervous syste:n that might casse problems 1. ' phoned Parks and asked him to go to T30,

• =

with memory and other ments! furetions. l . along with King's secretary,loyee Wenger,to Gischel told the NRC that he had decided pick up some papers from King's desk. King .

. against undergoing the test after his person. a 'said he had asked in particular for memos

} al physician told him that 1,t would serve so.f *. dealing with the head lift ar.d the crane.

k valid Gischelmedical purpose.

had talked to.Jenkies, severr.! Parks and Wenger went te King's offit7

' times that fall and winter. Butthatbynight theandtime gathered up King's pepers he ( Dand some personal belongings. As they wer i received the certificd letter, Gischel told,an about to leave, they recall, a plant security

! NRC investigator, he had put StressControl ' guard stopped them, and Jenkins out of his mind. *

. Parks said during an interview that tho' The latter was dated Feb. 10,1983 - the guard told *them he had been instructed by

, same day that Gischel had issued his memo . Barton that no one was to be allowed in King's

' critical of TMI's plans for the polar crane. office and that nothing was to be removed.

i "I believe that the pressure for the stress ' They left the office without taking anything.

l test was at best an effort to harass and When Parks and Wenger arrived at work -

intimidate me, or at the worst was retalia.. the next morning, they said, Klag's office tion for my dissent by branding me as men ' had been locked-and neither of theht.was tally unfit," Gischel said later in an affidavit : permitted to enter.

that was turned over to the NRC. -

,, .t ,

King. meanwhile, requested a meeting Complaining of haraS8titent

.with Philip Clark, executive vice president ,', -

of GPU Nuclear, to formally air his concerns

• Despite his sugension the day before,

(_ bout the cleanup. A meeting was arranged ! King met with Clark as scheduled to discuss ,

for Feb. 25. .

his safe ry cioneerns; he also met with Robert The debate over the use of the crane was Arnold, then GPU Nuclear's president.

still unresolved and, in fact, was becoming ! King's [ey was reinstated, but he was still more bested. King said he w:: called out of a ! suspenced. -

. training session one,moen, tag,in.midFebru<

Mar. p; ' i meseng <* K-g he i. Chwamyh th

. r, ha =d ashd'whe&whtoio;,,, arks wm .a arMid i he suu could not funy E"."ane.e

- use cosap.

m ui Kag we,ned ,s, h.vol e, ,,,g wia. nrs ,ians to n.e .e ,

"*d *** *d*9"*"3Y

~sm ned nterest ausg ui- day,Perw receiv

,=Arnhone,. ks vo % gg aoChweiyk. moponnMtto aformagara ed beaistier trying ai he w.n,o m to implicate Parks in th l article, ,efus to be ate, view. ,,, mis j longer assigned to Ine polargrene project.

a M-a a. as mona, ane, he

,$C '"**

.at fMlmi '"

am:dC,e **=*

i Pive days after King was suspended, his g .-- .

harassed by his superiors. Parks said in hislsocretary Wenger, was to antold by Barton affidavit she to affidavit that an NRC inspector at TMI had j" stay home," acco est. .

told him to contact the US Department oflmed wt2 the Labor. During the next 10 days in early March . '

Zabor if he wanted to file a complaint. 19h3, she was questioned by company person.

' later that day, Joseph Chwestyk, who bed been appointed acting directorof site jnel officials in three separate *moedags about statements she had made to other tions after King was suspended, caued to his amco. Chwestyk said he had waneg ' employees after King was W

' ' Parks that TMI ometals knew someone had j During Bon sessions,Wenger said

, gone to Me NRC, .. . . . jan interview, the DG managws had "Ipersonauythoughthewas in over l questions such as these: Did she1ake any of

his head and didn't know what was getdag I King's documents fro4 bis omes after he

into"Chwestyk said during aninterview.He w t as suspended? What did she know about

said he had advtsed Parks to get a lawyer. ,Jbe le ever uso sesany drugs at TMl? menos concerning the polar crene? Did company omcials had sug.

l

!.with Onseveral March 14 and Bechtel 15.including officials, Parks ' said, Wengerhe met lgested that she 30 to StressContret for coun ,

Charles According Sandford, a Bechtel to his affidavit, vice believed Parks president. jaeling to discuss her " involvement in the

j that he was not getting a sympathetic hear. .Zarry King situadon." She refused.

Wenger said she boueved that DU omcials ing from his superiors on the safety issues were worried that she " knew too much* .

, and that he was being punished prcfession.aHy*for 'Thuntire investigationcalling attention to them. He foi ;about the safety issue was a nightmare

. Iowed up 2e meetings with a letter to Sand.i f "

~ ford, in which he asked that thei or me, Wenger,40,

. view.*There said during was absolutely no basisan later. to in-

' intimidation against him be mopped. '

1 -

l Sandford refused to be intervkwed. -lvestigate On March me" 23, GPU Nuclear fired Wenger.

l In 2e meandme, Parks decided to meet.

' j with a " watchdog

• group inalmd Washington.Troebuger,thepersonnelmanager,statedinca for making " inconsistent and contre. *

(GAP). On March 13.1983, Parks told his story idictory statements" to company officials.

< to Thomas Devine, a GAP lawyer.

When Parks returned home the day after l 'That same day, King lost his job at GPU i

' his trip to Washington, he found that his, Nuclear - fired on the ground that his l apartmentinMiddletown Pa hadbeen bro. involvement in Qnittee was a conflict of l

kan into. The railing on his second. floor , interest.

% aninterview smralisonthslater, -

, balcony had been puHed loose, and his front ' King contended that DG had been -faced t door' was unlocked, he said. .

wie only two options: take his safety con-Parks amid his stereo, television and omer cerns seriously, or " throw me out of the '

. valumbies were intact. But his personal p front gate." * '

• pers had lieen rmad. So far as he couW mu, "! bey threw me out the front gute" he as misdag. said.

ji nothing He phon w&d the Middletown Pouce Depen, t By coincidence, Parks chose that asses day I meat. An omcor came to his home and Ausg - March 23,1983 -to file a complaint and I* out a report,accortling to the pouce,On March 17 Parks met with Kanga. Ao.. affidavit with the U1 Department ofIab cording to an NRC report, tNeir 2% hourj sayingthatbehadbeenharassedandindal.

dated by MI officials after raising safety Isoeting focused in part on Kange's concerni that Parks would air his criticisms in pubuc.; concerns about the cleanup. While in Wash-The NRC later concluded that Kanga hadington, he also held a news conference at satters of GAP.

It was, or Parks, a difficult occasion.'!be ,

threatened Parks and told him he couM bel the

fired for putting Bechtel in a bad light.

Parks desertbed Kanga's message this way:, former Navy man who for years had resent.'

"He was counsoung me into being a sheep, ed antinuclear protesters found himself

, and lying down and keeping quiet. He '

saidl, amdavit,in his Shage mandingwhich befmhea do. group of reporters,

. clutch.

i thatoncebeforeanemplerestriedtoember, hed ausgadons of shortcuts and safety -

i rass Bechtel, and he was humiliated." - I violations in the TMI cleanup.

i During an interview, Kanga agreed to mik As he later recounted it, Parts was aware

' about cleanup issues, but he AarHaad to comi i

• ment on anything regarding the Parks case.: that be was petting his professional feture,,

i Parks saidin his affidavit that after his. his rity$38,myear job andsons of his two ycnns 2e financial on the line. seca-Parks said he had asked himself:"Why am

• ~ . .

i ! doint this?"

• l

~'

l And answered "I hve to"' ' v * ' -'~'^

• a -

On the. same day that Parks made his wanted to reassure Glachel that the compe- Arnold, Gifford anlWilson have told NRC concerns public. Arnold and Kanga sum. ny was not trying to "put the skids to Mr. investigators that they had no intention of moned other senter TMI managers together. G!schel for raising safety concerns." - stopping Gischel from testifying. They also ta discuss what had happened. Gischel at . . Glazer said during anint6rview thatit had said there was no relationship between their tended the meeting and took notes,which he been he, not GPU Nuclear officials,who had ettempt to reach a compromise with Gischel later showed to federal investigators. decided to send the letter to Giachelinform- and his plan to testify to the subcommittee i

j  ! At first, according to Gischels notes, Ar , ing him of the need for neuropsychological the next day.

j Gifford and Wilson refused to be inter-

! operate nold suggestedwith Parks. that TMI officials should co. ' testing. Glaser said he had decided to teu

. GPU N.' clear officials of Gischels response viewed about Gischet 1

i " Arnold began saying all should cooperate because he worried that Gischel might not In the end, Giachel decided not to testify

! be capable of safely carrying out his duties before the congressional panel. ,

[ fully factual and should if. Parks be careful, discusses candid anything with and f at the plant.

During the April 26 hearing, King told the j them," Gischel's notes said. " Keep track of. His concerns about safety at TMI overrode ' House subcommittee that Gischel had been any correspondence he requests, but OK to ethical considerations, Glazer said. He said pushed to underg'o neuropsychological test-give him copies." neither he nor Jenkins had done anything ing and that Wenger had been urged to go to Then the mood shifted. GIschel's notes i . wrong. ' StressControl for co===Han ,

On April 4, Gischel delivered to Arnold a : Rep. James Weaver (D., Ore.) said that quotedofBarton, sayicg Parks: deputy director of Unit 2, as l 22 page affidavit in which he detailed his sending employees critical of the TMI c l

J " Don't give hini anything. in fact, don't let ' concerns about safety issues and contended up to psychological counselors "sent a shiv-him back on the island.No one should speak ' that he was being harassed. Arnold turned ,er down my spine." .

the affidavit over to the NRC.

'" Ibis is kind of frightening " he said.fhe '

, to him." ..

"Many professionals within the nuclear Soviet Union does that."

ia.Gischel's

=- notes then quote Arnold as say, . industry wul brand me as a traitor for what I ;' . After the subcommittee's hearing -

f

~ ~ ~ ~

.. am about to report" Gischel wrote in the [only one it held on the TMI cleanup -

' aHe has no right to any of our internal . affidavit. "My family and I have discussed Gischel was contacted by William Kuhns, I

! correspondence. We are a private utility, this matter and prayed about it often. They '

i and they are private property." , support my view for the necessity of this 'GPU chaLmn and the top ex

, The following day, Bechtal suspended i disclosure, knowing full well that theitnext willl twoutility, months. and they talked rep

. Parks with pay from his job. most likely bring us financial ruin in a short ' i According to an NRC invesdgation of the time period." -

.'Gischel case, tne discussions once again c Psychologicaltest.wasissue .

tered on the company's demand that Gischen In March and April 1983, Gischel had many :

Thecongressionalhearing * *=ugigigestlytatyd,,g,

,,,, ge , _

contacts with Arnold, either in person or via 4 in Washington, the House Interior and conversation on May 9,1983, Kuhns threat-

, " personal and confidential" memos. In each ; Insular Affairs subcommittee on energy and ' ened to remove him from his job unless he

. ,.C88e g

' agreed to neuropsychological testing. be.

ns,{ official memorendums ofl talkcenteredonGischel's c . the environment. . . . .. chaired . . .- by

- Rep.. .Morris .-

K. he was considered a safety risk as a cause refusal to take the neuropsychological test i Udall (D., Ariz.), wa. . -s preparing;fo:r, en ens, April that had been recommended by StressControl. 26,1983, hearing on the safetyof the cleanup. result of his strokeIn a letter dated May'19 Arnold and bther GPU Nuclear officials A few days before the hearing,Gischel said, i G1schel that he would be reassigned to an-said the test was necessary to make sure that . he received a phone:can at home 'from. Ar* other1.ob if he did not take the test byJuly L i Gischel was not a safety risk because of his sold . , 4 - L .- . . . .

,: . q,.

, June 1982 stroks. . -

. According to notes that Gischel made of.

8 e ccamadon, which he pmid-According' to NRC findings. Arnold be. p e Arn Id indicated that he camhe3was after aware of the contacted detailsGlaze by Howard of Gischel's a caseN*3 8ep quW .-

7 Mr. Arn Idadvised me that Be and IGPU f psychologist and president of StressCont 1. t c ea 84 un1rying M we 2 me Arnold told Gischel that it was ae en r1 r to; understand and attempt to address:my-that he have the examinadon. ' concerns-up tolhis point," Gischel's notes In a March 28, 1983, memo to Arnold, 4 said."Buthe madeitclearthatifIaddressed

, G1schel wrote that he would undergo neur :. the .Udall comalties,~ that reconciliation tysychological testing only .if "you are Jo ?- would become. impossible.* .? a:py advise me that it is a condition of my contin C Gischel-told an NRC investigator that on ned employment." Even then, Gischel told ." the phone < he and Arnold had once again

.i .Arnild, he would take the test only if he y discussedwhetherhewculdagree to submit could select the person who administeredit. , - to the L-=.mM,ological testing. Giachel Arnold has told NRCinvestigators thstJie , said Arnold indicated that perhaps a com-

- decided, as company president, to take promise could be reached.

.. charge of the Gischal matter because he ' Gischel told investigators that~the phone l

,. call from Arneld was followed by a phone

' call from Wiulam Gifford, vice president in charge of communications for GPU Nuclear.

G1schel.again took notes on the converse- -

tion. He wrote: .

" Bill Gifford called me at home and 'said

• Mr. Arnold had asked him to call me to try 1o work out some details so that I wouldn't feel

an obligation to testify in next Tuesday's

Udan hearing." .. .

r. When Cischel went to work April 25 he

3. met with Gifford and John Wilson,a GPU 3 Nuclearattorney,in an attempt to reach an agreement on the company's demand that he

be tested. Discuss 6ons about  ;

the test contin-

, p. und into tha-evenine. - - -

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] 1 ;. 4 - tint 16 NovembiIr. the' NRC staff. replyizk '

to a question from Udall, said it had changed

'. Gisc'hel still refused. A few weeks after receiving that letter, he -told Kuhns hs., its mind. It.said that TMI managers had.

• ' ' would accept another position. ..t' deliberately circumvented administrative On July 1,1983. G1schel was transferred Procedures and that the motive for the cip.

from TMI to a non. nuclear job with MetrtM cumvention." appeared to be expediency,not

politan Edison Co., a GPU subsidiary ini confusion.".. .

. Reinding.

i - The change in position. stated in a letter t(

, '. 1 Udall's subcommittee, came after the NRC l MEiMuiry 0 .(( staff learned.of the malfunction of the

' brakas on the polar crane during the sum.*

'. In spring 1983.1he NRC began a twofo'd mer.' .

l investigation: to look into the safety al$ A few' weeks'ago,' the NRC sold.It hsid ti:ns raised by Parks. King and Gischel, andi begun another investigation concerning the l

ta determine whether TM1 officials had ha. ' safety of the polar crane. -

ressed the three men after they raised the,.! Both the Office of Investigations and the

, questions. c. NRC staff concluded that Parks had Beef.

InSeptember'1983 theNRC0fficehf!nvqs,,. harassed by Bechtel officials, with the

' tigations-an NRCinvestigative branch- .! knowledge of GPU Nuclear managemenC confirmed many of the safety alfegations.. The NRC staff concluded that Parks had raised by the three men.TM! mainagers had . been threatened and harassed by.Kanga.the' routinely taken shortcuts in the cleanup, th) Bechtel official who until recently headed l NRC investigators said. . .I ~

In a review of the Office of Investigationd' the entire cleanup operation.The NRC's findings are less cl report, the NRC staff .which oversees thdj the harassment allegations by King and Git. '

Office of Investigations - drew a different i ~ chel. . ,. f~ l c:nclusion in January 1984. It said that the The Office of Investigations found that procedural violations in the cleanup had/ King had been unjustly removed from his i een b relatively minor and that "there was, job and had not violated the company con.

. ., f i no evidence of. deliberate -circumvention".ok filetthe of.NRC interest rules. not disputing e . - -

-e But staff-though j

' plant rules. . -In all, there had been no "significant Jh/ King's account of events - concluded that

' crease in the risk to public health and safety,*. King had been rightfully discharged bei.

l because of the violations, the NRC staff cos6 cause of his involvement in an outside coq. '

i r*~T. h.c r, ... , .. .;, m , suly firm.The staff concluded ,that Kipg _

e t

• nec not beenarashea or retaliated against , "I wanted something challenging. They 8

because of his concerns about safety issues, wanted me buried in the middle of the Concerning Gischel, the NRC Office of Mohave Desert." Parks said of the transfer Investigations found that TM1 officials had he agreed to under the settlement. '

1 improperly pressured Gischel to take th,e After a few months on the job, Parks said, l g neuropsychological test; that GPU-paid psy. . he was demoted to a lesser position. Then, in I g chologists had divulged confidential medi. ,?, January 1984. Parks said, one of his bosses 1

! cal information to TM1 officials, and that, unjustifiably accused him.cf shoddy work l there was no basis to indicate that Gischet ' after oilleaked during the testing of one of l I should undergo the.-evaluation <- .. the plant's systems.

3 According to the investigator, Gischel'.s ' The next month.six months after his trans.

! stroke had left him with some visual and ; fer to California. Parks was laid off. Patks has

reading impairment, but nothing that would flied a suit in ' California Superior Court 6 impede his job performance. $ ..

against Bechtel, alleging that Bechtel violated

'Ibe NRC staff - though not disputing

.their agreement when it let Parks gas l Gischel's story-concluded that TMi's treat . Parks is now working as an engineer at the

. ment of Gischel did not constitute,harnss.' Perry nucisar station, near Cleveland. ~

ment and that it saw no connection between . ~' "' , '

. l( his raising safety concerns and the discus.

, siens about neuropsychological testing. The, 1 NRC staff also concluded that Glachel, hot f Arnold, had initiated the discussion of his I

testimony before Congress, in.the telephone

,

• conversations before the Udall hearings'.

StressControl is no longer under contract with GPU. u i . .. :--~, . e 3: .

-Parks, King.and Wenger also took thdir I

, complaints to the U.S. Department of Labo,r.  ;

Settlements . - -

l l

. On May 12,1983, the labor Departmeilt I ordered Bechtel to reinstate Parks to his job I and all.his previous duties.at Three. Mile .  !

, Island. -

.r ..-  !

' The next week Wenger,in response to her l

, complaint, reached an agreement with GPU

. Nuclear receiving $3,740 in back irages.She l was reas, signed to a clerical job away from i the nuclear station. - -- . . - , .  ; :' '

In October 1984, King settled his' complaint against GPU Nuclear. The company agreed to pay him an undisclosed amount of money . )

on the condition that he drop a civil suit he had filed against the company. Neither party

, would discuss the terms of the siettlement. .

• - Ter a year and a half after King was fired.

/ . King muclear said, he was industry. unablesaid Iast March.he to find he was a job in the being " blackballed" by the industry. ,, . .

1. : ,*'I thought I was a reallron man. I thought i ; I could handle asything," he said at the time. *But these guys run over you with,an iron tank. GPU is just too big. The message is

clear: An individual who goes against them

' just doesn't have a chance."

Iast summer, King 'was hired by the NRC '

as an inspector at the Oconee nuclear station i near Greenville, S.C.

• Parks said the harassment did not and at '

Three Mlle Island' . ~ ' '

i' After more than two months of negotiations i

between Parks' attorney and Bechtel lawyers in the spring of 1983, Parks was transferred in August 1983 to a coalgas2fication plant that . .

,Bechtel was building in Daggett, Calif.

' As part of the settlement Parks and Bechtel both said, they agreed not to talk to the news media about what had happened at TMI.-

. In exchange Parks would remain on the e' Bechtel payroll as an engineer at the Dag. l I

gett project. Bechtel also agreed to give Him

. .a $125+acnth raise. ..,,, ,J._., ..

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