ML20196F608
| ML20196F608 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Seabrook  |
| Issue date: | 11/28/1988 |
| From: | Conklin C, Ruscitto D NRC, NRC OFFICE OF INSPECTION & ENFORCEMENT (IE REGION I) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20196F595 | List: |
| References | |
| OL, NUDOCS 8812140030 | |
| Download: ML20196F608 (21) | |
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UNITED STA1ES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY C0f911SSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of )
Docket Nos. 50-443 OL PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF 50-444 OL NEW HAMPSHIRE, g al. Off-site Emergency Planning (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2)
AFFIDAVIT OF CRAIG J. CONKLIN AND DAVID G. RUSCITTO 5 Craig J. Conklin and David G. Ruscitto, being first duly sworn, hereby affim that the response to the cuestions set forth herein are true and correct h' to the best of our knowledge and belief:
Q1: Please state your full name, employer, and occupation.
A1. (Conklin) My name is Craig James Conklin. I am errployed by the United States Nuclear Regulatory Comission. My duty station is in Region I, which is located in King of Prussia, Pennsylvania. I am a Senior Emergency
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Preparedness Specialist in the Facilities Radiological Safety and Safeguards Branch of the Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards. I have over 20 years experience in nuclear plant operations.
(Ruscitto) My nane is David Guy Ruscitto, I am employed by the Nuclear Regulatory Comissinn as a Senior Resident Inspector at Seabrook Station.
Q2. (Conklin, Ruscitto) Gentlemen, what is the purpose of this affidavit?
A2. (Conklin, Ruscitto) This affidavit addresses the question whether the Licensing Board should grant the Joint Intervenors' rotion to reopen the record to admit a late *i'ed contention challenging certain aspects of Applicants' radiological crorgency response plan for the Seabrook Station.
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, Specifically, this affidavit responds to an order issued by the Licensing Board on October 25, 1988, in which the Board solicited the views of the parties as to whether the Joint Intervenors' motion raised a significant safety issue which likely could have led to a materially different result -
had it been considered initially.
Q3. Gentlemen, have you reviewed the Joint Intervenors' motion to reopen the record and late-filed contention?
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iu tt.wed Applicants' response to the Joint Intervenors' motion as well as the responses of the Joint Interve:, ors' and Applicants to the Licensing Board's October 25, 1988 order. For the reasont made clear by the responses to the questiens which follow, it is the Staff's position that the Joint Intervenors' f motion does not raise a significant safety issue.
Q4. The Joint Intervenors' motion is based upon the results of an exercise conducted by Applicants on June 27-29, 1988 and observed by the NRC Staff.
Did you observe that exercise?
A4. (Conklin) Yes. I observed the exercise in Applicants' Emergency
. Operations Facility (EOF) as an NRC/ FEMA RAC member. Primarily I was involved with accident assessment, dose assessment, and protect've action ,
recor:rendations as made by both the Applicant and the State of New HampshireintheIncidentFieldOffice(IFO),whichisalsolocatedinthe EOF. I had extensive contact with other NRC observers in the EOF, as well as other observers at the end of the exercise to discuss exercise findings.
(Ruscitte) I was a mer.ber of the NRC inspection team, and as such my duties were principally operations oriented. Initially, I observe (. the
drill from the simulator (Control Room). Following the loss of coolant accident (LOCA), I moved to the Technical Support Center (TSC).
- 05. What was the purpose of the exercise?
A5. (Conklin) The purpose of this exercise was to evaluate the major portions of Applicants' emergency plans am; implementing procedures. Among the areas which to which our attention was directed were the adequacy of the tiraing and the content of implementing procecures and nethods; the effectiveness of emergency equipment and communications networks; the public notification system; and the perfomance of emergency organization personnel. The exercise was designed to test as ruch as is reasonably achievable without mandatory public participation. Prior to the exercise, the New Hampshire Radiological Emergency Response Plan (NHRERP), the, Seabrook Plan for Massachusetts Conw. unities (SPMC), and Applicants' emergency plans and implementing procedures were reviewed. Subsequent to i
the plan reviews, an exercise is conducted to test the implementation of the F.ajor portions of these plans and implementing procedures.
Q6. Did you document your observatione in a written report?
A6. (Conklin, Puscitto) Yes we did. Inspection Report 50-443/A8-09 (!R 88-09) documents our observctions and findings. IR 88-09 discusses the pre-exercise activities of Applicants and the NRC Staff, describes significant exercise scenario events, identifies activities ibserved, and documents the NRC Staff's observations during the exercise NRC Staff observers were statiened in all major facilities, including t1e Control Reeve, Control Room Simulator Operations Support Center (OSC) Technical Support Center (TSC), Ernergency Operations Facility (EOF), and the Media
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Center. Additionally, supervisory and senior technical staff observed <
several of these areas to obtain an integrated analysis of perfomance.
The NRC observation team concluded that although some specific findings were identified as exercise weaknesses, the performance of the emergency response staff provides reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures een and will be taken to protect the health and safety of the !
i public in the event of an accident. ;
Q7. What was the basis for this conclusion?
A7. (Cocklin Ruscitto) The NRC evaluates several key areas when making a determination that a licensee's perfomance is adequate to protect the health and safety of the public. These include: recognition of emergency conditions; classification of these conditions into emergency action . ,s levels; timely notification of offsite authorities; timely notification of augr.entation staff and subsequent activation of emergency response facilities; techni;a) assessment; offsite dose projections, assessments and subsequent protective action recomendations; and overall comand and control. The NRC observation team concluded that good comand and control was demonstrated; that plant conditions were quickly recognized and classified; that erergency response facilities were activated prceptly; and that protective action recomendations were prompt and conservative.
In addition, it is recognized that in the case of full-participation exercises, e significant offsite release must occur as part of the scenario to test offsite response. That precludes the ensite response organization from successfully mitigating the accident, i.e. . . exercise controllers must artificially prevent the response organization from
taking actions which would terminate a release until offsite objectives are satisfied. With this in mind (i.e., that a major release must occur),
the primary focus of the observers shifts to evaluations of protective action decisioreaking. The response toward mitigation of accidents is also separately evaluated through the operator licensing process.
Exercise "weaknesses" are classified as areas which need fur'her evaludion and possibly corrective action by th 1<**er id**+ e' the results of the evaluation. Areas were identified in this exercise which fall into that category. Specifically, concerns were raised by the ,
observers in the TSC and EOF regarding identifying the extent of core damage and decisions trade by the licensee in the mitigation of the accident. The tern "questionable" was used in IR 88-09 to characterire the concerns of the observers regarding specific examples of enginsering decisions made by the TSC and EOF staff. By this characterization, we did not intend to imply that these decisions were unacceptable, but rather to indicate that they should be further evaluated by Applicants to determine whether they were appropriate in the circumstances.
- 08. At Page 5 of IR 88-09, it states that the "Technical Support Staff (TSC) '
and Emergency Operations Facility (EOF) staff displayed quectionable enginer. ring judgerrent and/or did not recognize or address technical concerns." What are the bases for this stetement?
AC. (Conklin,Ruseitto) IR 68-09 documents the items considered as exercise weaknesses related to questionable engineering judgement.
- 09. Why did the Staff conclude in IR 88-09 that the faiiure of TSC or EOF personnel to question "a release of greater than 7000 curies per second with only clad damage ard no core uncovery" was an example of "questionable engineering fudgement"?
A9. (Conklin) It should first be understood that a release rate of greater than 7000 curie'. per second was necessary to test the adequacy of dose h
projections ar,d protective action recorrnendations for c'fsite response.
Specifically, this elevated release rate wculd cause the protective action guidelines (PAG's) to be exceeded for both the plume pathway and ingestion pathway portion of the exercise. This would in turn require extensive protective acM on decisionmaking and offsite response. A release of this magnitude is not possible given the cenditions in the exercise scenario, ,
1.e., clad damage with no core uncovery, n .:'C insnee+r" avne+M ' M TSC and EOF staff to discuss and question the offsite .=eadings given what g was known of core damage. The NRC inspectors did not observe these discussions, nor did Applicants address this subject at the exit meeting; therefore the Staff beliavet it to be a valid weakness. It was observed g by t% staff however, that the licensee performed prompt and correct dose ggg pre, Net f oi.: ar.1 assessments and ade appropriate protective action recom-
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mendations based u,9en the given release rat .
Q10. Why did the Staff conclude in IR 88-09 that the continuing efforts of the Seabrook personnel "to restore the Emergency Feedwater Pump after a large break LOCA" was an example of "questionable engineering judgement"?
A10. (Ruscitto) The finding concerning restoration efforts on the EFW pump was p'esentto by Mr. Jamison, cf Batte*1e National Laboratories, an NRC coittractor. At the time, I agreed that further inspection of this issue was war ranted. The concern in this regard was that efforts were being continued in ar. crea which would probably be of little value to Applicants in t;r r. ear tenn.
Q11. Wh: did ycu f.orclude, in IR 88-07 that "a questionable fix for the Contaid;ent Fuilding Sprev System
- Mas an example of "questionable en;ineering judg#ent" on the part of the Seabrook staff?
All (Fuscitto) Regarding the activities to provide an alternative flow path to the Containment Building System (CBS), my ec.ncern was with the m -
effectiveness of the proposed fix to provide any substantial reduction of containrreM pressure. As I stated in response to the preceding question, the "fix", as I understood it at the time, did not seem to be an effcetive response. At the conclusion of the exercise I felt further discussion of this issue was warranted.
Q12. Why did you conclude in IR 88-09 that the "lack of effort to locate and isolate the release path" on the part of the Seabrook personnel was an e nq11 19 "eve *,n ,n ie c-g ree r t ry judgr u t"?
e A12.(Ruscitto) My concern was that I observed no effort being made to locate
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r or isolate the leak. It was my view that this was a serious concern j requiring resolution.
Q13. In IR 28-09 you stated that "no effort was noted to blowdown Steam Generators to lessen the heat load in containment." Why did you consider this an example of "questionable engineering judpent"?
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Q14. Assuming these instances represented questionable engineering judgments, does any of these lapses reveal a failure of an essential element of the Seabrook onsite emergency plan?
A14.(Conklin,Ruscitto) No. As stated in the responte to Question 6, these '
problems were minor and isolated. They did not affect the ability of the TSC or EOF staff to recognize plant conditions and make proper event classifications; nor did they affect their ability to make appropriate protective action recomrrendations. In fact, as stated in our response to Questien 9, the EOF and TSC staff rade prompt and accurate dose assessment '
and subsequent protective action recorreendations based upen the given
release rate. The TSC and EOF staff properl; 'nd ccrrectly implemented their emergency plan.
Q15. Assuming these instances represented questionable engineering judgements, are these types of failures capable of being remedied without significantly revising the Seabrook onsite emergency plan? -
A15.(Conklin,Ruscitto) Yes they are. The weaknesses, identified art a result of operator perfomance, not plan design. None of the perfomance weaknesscs kes as a result of incomplete or incerrect plans or implementing procedures. Further, it is evident that the response
- f. rsonnel were well trained on the emergency plan a-d implementing ,
procedures.
Q16. u. Lctober 6, 1988, the i1RC Staff issued Inspection Report fio.
50-443/88-10. What was the purpose of the inspection documented in that
( ,. report? '
,, ..m qf$g) s A16.(Ruscitto)NRCInspectionReport 50-443/88-10 (IR 88-10) is the report for the routine inspections conducted by the Senior Resident Inspector during the period July 6-September 6, 1988. In an effort to close the open items listed in IR 88-09, the NRC Senior Emergency Preparedness Specialist (Mr.
Conklin) conducted a follow-up onsite inspection on September 21, 1988 during which time he performed additional inspection follow-up with Applicants' personnel related to the EP Drill. All items opened in an NRC j inspection report must 5 closed in a subsequent NRC inspection report.
! For open items, further followup inspection is required to detemine the acceptability of the issue. The issue may have been in actual weakness which has since been corrected or may have been regarded as a weakness
- because the inspector lacked certain material infomation.
The wording in IR 88-09 concerning "questionable engineering judgement" gives a misleading impression regarding the safety sfcr.ificance of the items requiring followup. It was always my intention to conduct routine followup on all of my findings in order to detemine all the facts relating to each areas of concern. It should be pointed out that to avoid interference with the conduct of the exercise, unanswered questions must 9 rursued af't+ +Ea overehe is corplotad. Theen issues are romally left as open items and do not necessarily indicate that a deficient condition exists. It does mean that additional infomation is needed.
Q17. Joint Intervenors claim that the followup of the open items concerning the TSC and EOF staff's "questionable engineering judgement" was assigned to inspectors who had not observed them. Are they correct? ,
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- f. A17.(Conklin) No. The follow-up of the items identified during tt.e exercise and documented in IR 88-09 was not assigned to a "new" inspector who had
?ot observed these items. The inspectors who performed the followup were myself as the lead inspector for all emergency preparedness activities at Seabrook, and Mr. Ruscitto, the Fenior Resident Inspector for Seabrook. I was present at the exercise and have been intimately involved with all aspects of both the onsite and offsite emergency plans, as well as '
i scenario development and review. I acted as a RAC observer in the EOF during the exercise. As suc'. . I provided the coment concerning the elevated release rate. Additionally, I met with the team leader and supervisors and extensively discussed exercise observations and findings.
I also provided extensive input concerning the preparation of IR 88-09.
The examples listed in IR 8%09 were provided by ryself, Mr. Ruscitto and Mr. Jamison of Battelle t'ational Laboratories.
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018. In IR 88-10, the Staff closed out each of the open items referred to above, concluding that "[w3ith respect to the above identified weaknesses, the exercise inspection confirr:ed that the TSC/ EOF staff possesses adequate capabilities to protect public. health and safety." Please explain what appears to a coriplete reverscl of the position taken by the Staff in IR 88-09.
A18. (Conklin, Ruscitto) The change is attributable to the information obtained by the NRC Staff durSg the fcDow-up inspection. Had this information been known to the Staff at the time IR 88-09 was issued, the findings regarding "questionable engineering judgement" would not have been made.
L, The closure of the "weakness" listed in IR 88-09 does not indicate a b reversal of the position originally expressed by the NRC Staff [
Designating these weaknesses as "open items" necessaril/ implies that further intpection follewup is required. No final conclusion was made to the effect that the TSC and EOF staff did not possess acceptable engineering judgment. On the contrary, the Staff concluded in IR 88-09 that the perfomance of the TSC and EOF Staff satisfied the evaluation criteria. Several minor items, none of which were safety significant, ,
required resolution. The resolution of these items did not affect the overall finding of adequate performance. After conducting followup activities, it was detemined that although some of these activities were ir.itially perceived to be potential weaknesses, no weakness in fact existed.
019. Applicants have stated that the staff's findings in IR 88-10 with respect to the open items discussed above
- wholly confims the position taken by the Applicants in their [ September 28, 1988 response to Joint Intervenors' motion] and the affidavits filed therewith and confim the lack of any significant safety issues." Are Applicants correct?
A19. (Conklin, Ruscitto) Yes. We agree with the Applicants' conclusion on page 14 of their September 28, 1988 submittal that none of the above issues presents a significant safety issue. We do not find any infomation in the affidavits of Messrs. Sessler, Kline, or MacDonald with which we disagree.
Q20. Attached to Joint Intervenors' response to the Licensing Board's October 25,19*8 order is an affidavit of Robert D. Pollard. Have you reviewed Mr. Pollard's affidavit?
A20.(Conklin,Ruscitto) Yes.
021. Let's take Mr. Pollard's concerns one at a time, starting with the failure of the TSC and EOF staff tn question a release of greater than 7000 curies per second with only clad damage and no core uricevery. Do you agree with Mr. Pollard that the affidavit of Mr. MacDonald and IR 88-10 are not ..
y sufficient to resolve this "weaknesses"? r +9 A21.(Conklin) I do not agree with Mr. Pollard that IR 88-10 and the affidavit of Mr. MacDonald are insufficient to resolve this weakness. In regards to his specific cornent et paragraph 30, I did not review ti s 3pecific logs that contained entries comenting on the mismatch during the exercise.
Although these logs were available at the time of the NRC exit meeting.
Applicants did not address the issues at that time. Consequently, the NRC Staff exited the meeting not knowing that Applicants hd additional information on this subject until a later date. IR 88-09 was issued without access to this inforriation. It is Applicants' responsibility to provide information which could clarify or correct inspection findings.
If the information had been reviewed at the time, this item would not have been identified as a weatness. As noted in IR 88-10, it is the Staff's conclusion that Applicants correctly assessed the release rate from the given data and rade conservative and prompt protective action recomendations.
022. Let's consider the second example of "questionable engineering judgement" identified in IR 88-09, i.e., continuing efforts of the Seabrook personnel "to iestore the F.r:ergency Feedwater Purp after a large break LCCA." Do you agree with Mr. Pollard that the affidavit of Mr. Kline and IR 8E-10 are not sufficient to resolve this "weaknesses"?
A22.(Ruscitto) Let ce preface riy response with the following. ThroughoJt Mr.
Pollard's affidavit, he refers to the "new inspector." Those issues which I identified and listed as open items in IR 88-09 were also closed by me in IR 88-10. No new inspector was assigned to close open items fuentified by me. Although the concern regarding the EFW pump repairs was identified g by another inspector, I was familiar with his concern and perfomed the followup in IR 88-10.
I provide the following amplification to my 88-10 closure paragraph b (4.e.(1)): I used the word steam generator cooldown, not reactor cooldown. '
As Mr. Pollard states at page 4 of his affidavit, the EFW system "would be required in the very long tem." I was not concerned that other higher priority items were overlooked as a result of this effort. Therefore, I
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do not agree with Mr. Pollard that my inspection findings reported in IR 88-10 and the affidavit of Mr. Kline do not adequately resolve this issue.
- Q23. Let's consider the third example of "questionable engineering judgement" identified in IR 88-09, i.e., the questionable fix for the Containrient Euilding Spray system." Do you agree with Mr. Pollard that the affidavit of Mr. Sessler and IR 88-10 are not sufficient to resolve this "weaknesses"?
A23.(Ruscitto) flo, I do not. With respect to the Containment Building Spray (CPS) system redificaticn, I refer to paragraph 14 of Mr. Pollard's affidavit. As I have previously stated there was no "second inspector."
I reviewed Applicants calculations and discussed the flow pa;h with them I
during and after the exercise. If any inconsistency exists as Mr. Pollard asserts, it is that the initial characterization of the issue in IR 88-09 failed to amplify the NRC concerns which involved the effectiveness of the low recirculation flow of the SI pump compared to the high flew of the CBS pump. IR 88-10 and Mr. Sessler's affidavit adequately addresses tht;,
issue.
Q24. Let's consider the fourth example of "questient.ble enginu. ring judgment" identified in IR 88-09, i.e., "a lack of effort to locate and isolate the release path." Do you agree with Mr. Pollard that the affidavit of Mr.
Kline and IR 88-10 are not sufficient to reselve this "weaknesses"?
A24. (Ruscitto) No, I do not. With respect to isolation of the release h, Path, Mr. Pollard's affidavit implies that restoration of a CBS pump would gg ,
not have stopped the release. Depending on the location of the leak, the p, release could be stopped by reducing containment pressure to atmospheric. . .,
By removing the driving force behind the leak, radiation levels in some areas might be reduced to the extent that access could be restored.
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_ It makes good engineering sense to repair those items most easily '
repaired. While the scenario did not allow for CBS punp rapair, in a real ,
situation, I believe that repair of the CBS pump, if feasible (which it was), is the highest priority. I do not agree with Mr. Pollard and believe my followup inspection findings reported in la 88-10 and Mr.
Kline's affidavit are sufficient to resolve this issue.
Q25. Let's consider the fifth example of "questionable engineering judgment" ,
identified in IR 88-09, i.e., the failure to "blowdown Steam Cenerators to lessen the heat load in containment." Do you agree with fr. Pollard that the affidavit of Mr. Sessler and IR 88-10 are not sufficient to resolve this "weaknesses"?
A25. (Rusettto) No, I do not. The failure to "blowdown" steam generators was corrected in IR 88-10 to read "depressurize" steam generators. Although the docicient mado by tho t0F and TSC ttaff are understandable and App 1tennte enerw o operatirig procedures are adequate, I believe that it would be useful for Applicants to clarify their procedures to provide better guidance as to when procedural step 15 may be omitted.
026. Gentlemen. based on your responses to the preceding questions it is the NRC Staff's position then that none of the "weaknesses" documented in IR 88-09 raises a significant safety or environmental issue? .
A26. (Conklin, Ruscitto) Yes it is.
YQQ M 4 027. Gentlewn, dees this complete your affidavit?
I A27 (Conklin Ruscitto) Yes it does. .. * ',2 *- ^ f 44' N/Yi k .
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I do not. The failure to ' blowdown" stens gecerators was A25. (Rusef tto) Ro Although corrected in IR 88-10 to read 'depressurire* steam generaton.
the decisions ude by the EOF and TSC staff are widerstandable and App)fcants emergency operating procedures an adequate, I believe that it would be useful for Applicants to clarify their procedures to provide battar gefdence as to when procedural step 15 may be omitted.
OM Gentlemen. $>ased on your responses to the preceding questions. it is the NRC Staff's position then that none of the "weaknesses' docusented in 1R 884 raises a 51piffcant safety or envirtaneetal issue?
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AM. (Conklin, tscitso) Yes it is.
027. Sentlenen, does thfs coglete your afffdayit? ,
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A27 (conklin,Puscitto) Yes ft does. .t. . .
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PROFESS 10f!AL QUALIFICATIONS OF CRAIG J. CONKLIN I am fenior Emergency Preparedness Specialist, Emergency Preparedness Sectien, Facilitics padiological Safety ard Safeguards Branch, Division of Radiation Safety and Safeguards, United States Nuclear Regulatory Comission.
I am respersible for the eversight of inspection eetivities concernin0 ersite energency preparedness. As such, I have conducted dozens of inspections and f
been a tean leader or senior specialist for Region I plants. Additionally, I hve been the fW PegierPl Assistance Cer'nittee (RAC) member for FEMA Region I since November, 1987. Responsibilities in RAC include the participation with E FEMA and other RAC members in the review of the amergency plans and W+
implen'enting procedures for state and local governnents. I have held this position since November,1987. '
P I received a Bachelor of Science Degree from the University of New Haven l. , 'Si in 1983. The major curriculum area was Operations Management.
Prior Work History V 1986 - 1987 Emergency Preparedness Inspector Facilities Radiological Safety and Safeguards Branch. Responsible to Chief. Emergency L. Preparedness Section for conduct of onsite emergency preparedness inspections at several Region I power and research i
facilities. ,
1983 - 1987 Supervisor, Energy Consultants. Responsible for development of both onsite and offsite energency preparedness programs for several facilities including Waterford 3 Davis Besse. Limerick 1, and Seabrook.
1976 - 1983 Technician, ho_rtheast Nuclear Enejr y Company Millstone Unit 2.
Responsibilities included facilities planning, security, emergency planning, corrunications , engineering support and prirary and secondary chemistry.
1974 - 1976 Technician, Donald C. Cook Nuclear Power Station.
Responsibilities included prirary and sec'ondary chemistry and health physics. ,
1966 - 1974 U. S. Navy. $stved en a nuclear sutcarine and a submarine repai T shTp. Ceepleted the Nuclear Program and Submarine Trainirg, i
DAVID G, RUSCITTO STATEMENT OF PROFESSIONAL QUALIFICATION
SUMMARY
- Over thirteen years engineering experience. Extensive background in nuclear plant operatior.s. maintenance, engineering, inspection and training. Experience in fluid systen planning, design, construction, operations and maintet.ance.
FDl! CATION AFD Bachelor of Civil Engineering; Villanova University TPAINING: Villanova, PA; 1975
> U. S. Naval Nuclear Power School; Mare Island, CA and Idaho Falls, 10; 1976
.a d a.yij b;.; . Qualif ec h.y 4i. L A , o.o einwi,u a ...n,ueneral Eiem .
BWR)
Certified Examiner; USNRC; (Westinghouse PWR)
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4w:gQ EXPERIENCE:
1985 - Present USNRC Resident Inspector Office - Seabrook, N.H. -
Recident and Senfor Resident Iqspector l' Responsible for NRC Inspection Program at Seabrook Statten f during construction, preoperational testing, startup testing and operations. Periodically assigned to inspect other facilities in NRC Region I including research reactor at University of lowell.
1984 - 1985 USNRC, Region I Office - King of Prussia PA -
Operator Licensing Exa91nrr Conducted Itcensing examination for operator and senior operator candidates at Westinghouse PWRs throughout Region I. Developed, edministered and evaluated oral,
- written and simulator examinations.
1901 - 1984 U.S. Peace Corps - Ministry of Water Development t '
%blic of Kenya, Kilifi District - District Water Engineer Senior planning and design engineer responsible for administration of all water systen develepnent in district of 438,000 population. Conducted feasibility studies, route surveys, design cost estinates for projects serving l up to 00.000 persons each. Purchased materials, supervised construction and operation of projects.
1979 - 1981 United States Navy - USS Arkansas (CGN-41) -
Damage Centrol Assistant (Nuclear Engineer)
Qualified Senior Supervisory Watch, Engin^ering Duty Officer and Engineering Officer of the Watch. D2G Nuclear Propulsion Plant. P.esponsible for auxiliary and repair divisiens including all non-nuclear ships systems.
1976 - 1979 U.S. Navy - USS Nimitz (CVN-68) - Reactor Mechanical Division Officer (Nuclear Engineer)
Qualified Propulsion Plant Watch Officer and Fleactor Duty Officer. A4W/AIG Nuclear Propulsion Plant. Responsible for administration, maintenance, training and operation of RM Division. Supervised 120 enlisted men and 2 junior officers.
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UNITED STATES OF AMEkiCf.
'*,U FUCLEAR REGULATORY COPF.ISSION PEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD .68 DEC -1 P3:17 In the Matter of DocFet Nos. 50-443 OL-01 " "'
FUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF 50-444 OL-01 NEW HAMPSHIRE, g al,. On-site Emergency Planning and Safety Issues (SeabrookStatien, Units 1and2) l f CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that copies of "NRC STAFF RESPCNSE TO LICENSING BOARD ORDER OF OCTOBER 25, 1988" in the above-captioned proceeding have been served on the ,
following by deposit in the United States rail, first class, or as indic)ted by '
an asterisk, by deposit in the Nuclear Regulatory Comission's internal mail system, or as indicated by double asterisk by use of express mail service,
$y . this 28th day of November, 1988: .,. :, e -
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1 w w. 3*@@
Sheldon J. Wolfe, Esq., Chairman
- H. J. Flynn, Esq. ,
Administrative Judge Assistant General Counsel Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Federal Emergency Management Agency U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission 500 C Street S.W.
F Washington, DC 20555 -
Washington, OC 20472 - ., -
- r. #:Qj Dr. Jerry Harbour
- Philip Ahren. Esq.
Administrative Judge Assistant Attorney General Atomic Safety and Licensing Boarti Office of the Attorney General U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission State House Station Washington, DC 20555 Augusta, ME 04333
.. Dr. Emeth A. Luebke** Stephen A. Jonas Esq.**
- Administrative Judge Carol S. Sneider, Esq.
4515 Willard Avenue Assistant Attorney General
- Office of the Attorney General Chevy Chase, MD P0815 One Ashburton Place, 19th Floor Sheldon J. Wo1 fe, Esq.** Boston, MA 02108 Administrative Judge 1110 Wimbledon Drive George Dana Bisbee, Esq.
McLean, VA .2101 Assistant Attorney General Office of the Attorney General Thor.as G. Dignan, Jr., Esq.** 25 Capitol Street Robert K. Garl, !!!, Esq. Concord, NH 03301 Repes & Gra,$-
225 Franklin Street Boston, PA 00110
2 Diane Curran Esq.** Mrs. Anne F. Goodman, Chairman Hamon, Curran & Tousley Board of Selectmen 2001 S Street, NW 13-15 Newmarket Road Suite 430 Durhan, NH 03824 Washirgton, DC 20009 Hon. Gordon J. Humphrey Calvin A. Canney United States Senate City Hall 531 Hart Senate Office Building 126 Daniel Street Washington, DC 20510 Portsrouth, NH 02801 Peter J. Matthews, Mayor Allen Lampert City Hall I' Civil Defense Director Newburyport, MN 09150 Town of Brentwood 20 Franklin Michael Santosuosso, Chaiman Exeter, NH 03833 Board of Selectnen William Amstrong Cisil Defense Director Ashod N. Amirlan, Esq.
. :, /j N P6 Town of Exeter Tcwn Counsel for Merrimac ,~_
10 Front Street 145 South Main Street Exeter, NH 03833 P.O. Box 38 Bradford, itA 01835 Gary W. Holmes. Esn.
Holmes & Ellis Lobert A. Backus, Esq.**
k 47 Winnacunnet Road Hampton, NH 03842 Backus, Meyer a Solomon 116 Lowell Street
- v. k}
Panchester, NH 03106 J. P. Naceau Board of Selectmen Paul McEachern, Esq.**
10 Central Street Matthew T. Brock Esq.
I Rye, NH 03870 $haines & McEachern 25 Maplewood Avenue
- Judith H. Hizner, Esq. P.O. Box 360 Silverglate Gertner, Baker, Portsmouth, NH 03801 Fine, & Good ,
88 Board Street Charles P. Graham, Esq.
Boston, MA 02110 McKay, Murphy & Graham 100 Main Street Robert Carrigg, Chaiman Amesbury, MA 01913 Board of Selectren Town Office Sandra Gavutis, Chairman Atlantic Avenue Board of Selectmen North Harpton, NH 03870 RFD #1, Box 1154 Kensington, NH 038?7 Willian S. Lord Board of Selectren R. Scott Hill-Whilton, Esq.
Town Fall - Friend Street Lacculis, Clark, Hill Vhilton Aresbury, MA 01913 8 McGuire 79 State Street Newburyport, MA 01950
3 Atmic Safety and Licensing Docketing and Service Section*
Appeal Panel (5)* Office of the Secretary U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission Washington, DC 20555 Washington, DC 20555 Atmic Safety and Licensing Board Panel (1)
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission Washington, DC 20555 Gregory kl Fer Lh r Counsel fo iRC 5 ff i f
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