ML20196F591
| ML20196F591 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Seabrook  |
| Issue date: | 11/28/1988 |
| From: | Berry G NRC OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL (OGC) |
| To: | |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20196F595 | List: |
| References | |
| CON-#488-7592 OL-1, NUDOCS 8812140023 | |
| Download: ML20196F591 (12) | |
Text
11/28/88 75 7 %
e v i i r-h.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
,88 DEc -1 P3 :17
.EFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD
,1r:I.
e n.o In the Matter of
)
Docket Nos. 50-443 OL-01 FL:CLIC SERVICE C0l'PANY OF 50-444 OL-01 NEWHAMPSHIRE,e,t_al.
On-site Emergency Planning and Safety Issues (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2)
NRC STAFF RESPONSE TO LICENSING BOARD ORDEP OF OCTOBER 25, 1988 INTRODUCTION.g
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On September 16, 1988, the New England Coalition On Nuclear Pollution
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(NEChP), the Seacoast Anti-Pollution League (SAPL), the Town of Hampton, h
and the Massachusetts Attorney General (collectively "Joint Intervenors")
Ch/3 filed a "Motion To Admit Exercise Contention Or, In The Alternative, To Reopen The Record."
The motion was opposed by Applicants on the grounds that (i) the Board lacked jurisdiction to entertain the motion; (ii) a balancing of the five factors governing admission of late-filed contentions weighed against admission of the Attorney General's contention; and (iii) the motion did not satisfy the standards governing motions to reopen, particularly the requirement that a significant safety or environmental issue be presented.1/
The NRC Staff opposed Joint 1/
See Applicants' Respor? To Motion To Admit Exercise Contention Or, In The Alternative, To Reopen The Pecord (September 28,1988).
~
GG121400P3 001120ADOCK ObOOO443
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o Intervenors' motion on the ground that a balancing of the five factors militated against admission of the proffered late-filed contention. 2_/
October 25, 1988, the Licensing Board issued an order, stating:
We find that additional briefing and affidavits are necessary with respect to th_at part of the motion seeking to reopen the record.
We will consider these briefs and affidavits to detemine whether a significant safety issue has been raised and whether a materially different result would be or would have been likely had the newly proffered evidence been considered initially.
Memorandum Order (Directing Additional Briefing And Affidavits) at 1 (October 25,1988) (enphasis in original).
Fursuant to that order, on November 8 and 9, 1988, respectively Applicants and Joint :ntervenors W
filed their responses to the Board's orde,'.- U This response addresses Uk[hh the Board's order and the submissions filed by Acolicants and Intervenors.
DISCUSSION
[
,m At the outset, it is necessary for the Staff to make two observations.
First, the Staff does not contend that Joint Intervenors' motion must meet the standards set forth in :0 C.F.R. I 2.734. Ratbr, as p,
noted in a previous filing $/, the Staff agrees with Joint Intervenors that because the energency planning exercise conducted by Applicants in June 1908 is "material" to the licensing decision, those standards are 2/
See NRC Staff Response To Joint Intervenors' Hotion To Admit Exercise
~
Gntention Or, In The Alternative To Reopen The Record (October 3, 1988)("October 3StaffResponse").
3/
See Ap)1icants'
Response
To Board Order Of October 25, 1988 TDTrect' ng Additional Briefing And Affidavits) (November 8, 1988)
("Applicants' Response"); Menorandum Of Joint Intervenors In Response To October 25, 1988 Order Of Licensing Board (November 9, 1988)
("Interverors' Response").
4/
See October 3 Staff Response at 2, n.1.
0 3
inapplicable to the instant motion.
See Union of Concerred Sc0
't v.
NRC, 735 F.2d 1437,1443-44 (D.C. Cir.1984).
Neverthe'ien.
. que;ted by the Board, in this response the Staff discusses whether Joint Intervenors' motion raises a "significant safety or environmental issue" sufficient to warrant a reopening of the record as is required under 10 C.F.R.
,,'34(a)(2).
For the reascris stated herein, the Stef' concludes that it does not.
Second, Joint Intervenors nisapprehend the process the Board is to employ in detenntning whether the motion to reopen raises a safety or environmental issue.
According to Joint Intervenors, it is improper for b
the Board to direct the parties to submit additional briefs and affidavits L
to assist it in resolving this question.
Joint Interventors' Motien at 3-4.
In their view, a motion to reopen must be granted "once the
. :: M^$1
.lg threshold showing has been made that the evidence, if assumed to be true, presents a significant safety issue."
M. at 4.
Section 2.734 neither requires nor contemplates that the pres 'fing officer is to assume the truth of the evidence proffered in support of the motion to reopen.
On y
the contrary, the Rules of Practice provide that a party may file a response in opposition to any motion.
More importantly, any such opposition filing may t'e _"accompanied by affidavits or other evidence."
M. (emphasis added).
Thus, there is ne merit to Joint Intervenors' argument that the Board has acted improperly in directing the parties to submit additional briefs and affidavits concerning that part of Joint Interverors' motion which seeks to reopen the record.
9
.a.
As explained in the following section of this response, Joint Intervenors' notion -- when viewed in light of the responses, affidavits, and other evidence submitted in opposition to the motion -- does not raise a significant safety or environmental issue.
Moreover, the contention suomitted in conjunction with the motion does not address a fundamental flaw in Applicants' orrite emergency plan.
Acccrdirgly, Joint Intervenors' notion to reopen must be denied and their late-filed contention rejected.
A.
Joint Intervenors' flotion To Reopen Does Not Raise A Sionificant Safety Or Environmental Issue The contention which Joint Intervenors seek to have the record reopened to admit states in pertinent part:
The present state of onsite emergency preparedness at Seabrook, as revealed by the results of the June 27-29, 1988 graded k
exercise does not provide reasonable assurance that adequate protective rneasures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency pursuant to 10 C.F.R. 9 50.47(d), and does not support a finding that low power operation "can be conducted without endangering the public health and safety of the public" pursuant to i 50.47(a)(3).
That exercise disclosed fundamental deficiencies in the onsite emergency plan (the Seabrook Statiot1 Radiological Emergency Plan, the "Plan") with respect to [several) planning standards [.]
Joint Intervenors Motion, Exhibit 1.
The gravamen of this contention is the allegation that the exercise described above revealed "fundamental deficiencies" in the ability of certain of Applicants' energency response personnel "to analyze station conditions and parameter trends and to develop potential solut *,,is for placing the reactor in a safe stable condition []"
M. at 2.
Joint Intervenors' motion to reopen and their contention and supporting basis is predicated upon an inspection
E/ issued by the NRC Staff on July 6,1988, which documented the report Staff's observations of the exercise. See M., Exhibit A.
1.
NRC Inspe Qion Report flo. 88-09 As the attached affidavit of Craig Conklin, a Senior Emergency Preparedness Specialist for the NRC, and Duld Ruscitto, the NRC's Senior Resident Inpsector at the Seabrook Statien, du: ribe:; in greater detail, the NPC Staff observed the emergency planning exercise conducted by Applicants in June 1500 and docurre.nted its observations in IR 88-09. See Affidavit of Craig J.
Corklin and David G.
Ruscitto at 11 A4-A6 (hereinafter "Staff Affidavit").
As Mr. Conklin explains, the purpose of the emergency planning aA exercise conducted by Applicants in June 1988 was to assess the efficacy of the major portions of Applicants' emergency plans and implementing procedures.
I_d. at 1 AS. S/ This exercise tested as many aspects of the plan as is possible without mandatory public participation.
M.
An:ong f
the areas to which specific attention is directed in this type of exercise are the following: the adequacy of the timing and content of implementing procedures and methods; the effectiveness of emergency equipment and crmnunications networks; and the performance of emergency organization personnel. M.
5/
See NRC Inspection Report No.
50-443/88-09 (July 6, 1988)
TEereinafter"IP.88-09").
p/
These emergency plans include are the New Harpshire Radiological Emergency nesponse Plan (NHRERP) and the Seabrook Pan For Massachusetts Corrnunities (SPMC). M.
During the course of its observation of such exercises, the NRC evaluates several key areas to determine whether an applicant's or licensee's performance provides reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of an emergency.
M. at i A7.
These factors include the ability of emergency response personnel to: recognize energency conditions and classify them in the appropriate emergency action levels; notify in a timely fashion offsite authorities and augnentation staff and subsequently activate emergency n ; r e.-c W 14 tier; < w cise ap; cpria'r tu ! r ical jutret re p rr'i ;
t offsite dose projections and protective action recomendations.
M.
In W.t short, the purpose of the test was to evaluate the connand, control, and A
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p connunication capabilities of the onsite evnergency response personnel.
M.
As is documented in Ip 88-09, the NRC Staff con:luded that the perfonnance of Applicants' onsite energency response personnel during the June 1988 emergency planning exercise provides reasonable assurance that adequate measures can and will be taken to protect the public health and safety in the event of an emergency at the Seabrook Station.
M. at 1 A6-A7; IR 88-09 at 1.
In particular, the NRC Staff concluded that Applicants' Emergency Operations Facitlity (EOF) and Techn: al Support Center (TSC) staff displayed good comand and control abi'ities; recognized and classified plant condit'ons quickly and correct'y;
activated emergency response facilities promptly; ard provided prompt and appropriate protective action recomendations.
Id. at 1 A7. 7/
This is not to say, however, that the NRC Staff considered or expected the perfonnance of the EOF and TSC staff to be flawless in every respect.
It did.70t.
The NRC Staff observed, basad on the infomation then available, several "weaknesses" during the course of the exercise.
These weaknesses included what the Staff regarded as "questionable engineering j udgr,ent" and are documented in IR 88-09.
A "weakness,"
Fr -c vees cet nrecs w ily (cestitute r
"f uner en' t.1 fl as' o-deficiency."
The latter is a "failure of an essential element of the N
[ emergency response]
plan" which "can be remedied only through a 4i significant revision of the plan." Long Island Lighting Company (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), ALA3-903, 28 NRC slip op, at 6 (November 10, 1988). El "Weelenesses," on the other hand, "are areas which need further evaluation and possibly corrective action by the licensee independent of the results of the Staff's evaluation." Staff Affidavit at 1 A7.
Thus, upon further review, a "weakness" may turn out to be a fundamental deficiency, a lessee deficiency, or not a deficiency at all.
The five examples of questionable engineering judgment identified in IR 7/
It should be noted that for a full-participation exercise to be
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meaningful, a significant offsite release must be assumed.
This is a necessary raat of the emergency scenario if the efficacy of offsite response plu, is to be tested. Consequently, in a full participation exercise, the onsite response staff is not pemitted to mitigate the
- accident, i.t.,
exerciie planners must artificially prevent the response orgarization from taking actions which would terminate a terminate a release until offsite objactives are satisfied.
I_d.
E/
Although ALAB-903 involved an offsite emergucy plan, the rationale i
of the decision is equally applicable to onsite plans.
88-09 fall into the last category.
M. at if A14-A16.
In other words, based upon additional information not available to the NRC Staff during the exercise, the NRC Staff now concludes that the engineering judgment exercised by the TSC and EOF staff was appropriate in the circumstances. El The reasons for this conclusion are set forth below.
2.
NRC Inspection Report No. 88-10 Based on the infomation then available to the Staff, IR 88-09 reported five exmples of
- questionable engineering judgment" on the part of TSC cr.d EOF personnel during the emergency planning exercise. As noted above, a "weakness" is an area where further evaluation is necessary and k
corrective action may be required.
Staff Affidavit at 1 A7; IR 88-09 at 4.)
F 5.
Thus, pending a final detemination as to the significance of the "weaknesses" observed by the NRC Staff, these items were regarded as "open items" and closed out in TR 08-10, the report for the succeeding inspection period.
See M. at 1 A16.
The Staff's findings are discussed b/
below.
a.
Failure To Question Release Rate
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One of the weaknesses observed by the Staff during the exercise was the apparent failure of the EOF or TSC staff to question "a release of greater than 7000 curies per second with only clad damage and no core uncovery."
IR 88-0g at 5.
The NRC observer expected the TSC and EOF staff to discuss and question the offsite readings given the known core darage.
Staff Affidavit at i A9.
This is because a release of this i
9/
This infomation and its significance is discussed in NRC Inspectinn Report No. 50-443/88-10 which was issued or. September 28, 1988.
-9 magnitude (7000 curies per second) is not possible given the conditions in the exercise scenario (i.e., clad damage with no core uncovery). M. El Sirce the NRC inspectors did not observe these discussions and Applicants did not address this subject at the exit meeting, the Staff believed it to be a valid weakness.
M.
The Staff did observe, however, that the EOF and (SC staff made prorpt and correct dose projections and assessments and made appropriate protective action recomendations based upon the given (7000 curies per second) release rate.
I d,.
As documented in IR 68-10, the Staff later discovered that "several
[TSC and EOF) staff members did question and/or cocinent on the mismatch k
between the reactor coolant activity and the release rate."
!R 88-10 at tM %d 10.
Thrt NRC Staff also discovered fron a review of previous exercise records that the release rate utilized during the June 1988 exercise was "recognized to be an unreal' ; tic number" by the TSC and EOF stuff.
However, the Staff had been instructed by the exercise planners "not to challenge the data" since it was needed "to test the offsite plans." M.
Had this information been available to the Staff during the exercise, the Staff would not have regarded the apparent failure to question a release rate of 7000 curies per second with only clad damage and no core uncovery 10/ A release rate of greater than 7000 curies per second was necessary to test the adequacy of dose projections and offsite protective action recomendations.
Specifically, this elevated release rate would exceed the protection action guidelines for both the plume pathway and ingestion pathway portion of the exercise.
Id.
This
<ould in turn require extensive protective action decisionmaling and offsitt response.
Id.
Thus, it was necessary to employ an elevated release rate to acTomplish one of the primary objectives of the
- exercise, i.e.,
to evaluate the adequacy of proter.tive action decisionmaking and the performance of offsite response personnel.
See M. at 1 A7.
to be an example of questionable engineering judgment.
See Staff Affidavit at i A21.
b.
Efforts To Repair _ Emergency Feedwater Pump The second weakness noted in IR 88-09 was the continuing efforts on the part of the TSC to restore the emergency feedwater pump (EPW) after a large break loss of coolant accident (LOCA) had occurred.
IR 88-09 at 5.
The NRC Staff's concern in this regard was that efforts were being continued in an area which would probably be of little value to Applicants in the near tenn.
Staff Affidavit at 1 A10.
In other words, given the marginal benefit of the activity, the investment of time and effort did h
not appear to be warranted.
There was never any concern on the part of YM the NRC Staff that this effort would make matters worse or result in other b"i[lh higher priority itens being overlooked or ignored.
M.atTA22.
Joint Intervenors' affiant, Mr. Po' lard, does not cuntrovert this point.
See Joint Intervenors' Response Affidavit of Robert Pollard at 2-4.
c.
"Questionable Fix" For The Containment Building The third weakness noted in IR 88-09 was the "questionable fix" proposed for the Containment Building Spray system IR 88-09 at 5.
The NRC Staff questioned the effectiveness of the proposed "fix" to provide any substantial pressure reduction in the Containment Building because the discharge of the safety injection (SI) pump recirculation Ifne would be re-routed to the containnent spray nozzles.
Staff Affidevit at 1 A10.
The recirculation flow from one SI purp is about 40 gallons per minute (gpn), which is insignificant compared to the nonnal Containment Building spray (CBS) pump flow of over 3,000 spm.
Id.
During the subsequent review and follow-up on this item, the NRC Staff met with the TSC Manager
to discuss the rationale behind the proposed corrective action and determined "that the engineering judgment and n.ethodology involved in the proposed system and operating procedure changes were accepteble." See IR C8-10 at 9.
Joint Intervenors' affiant, Mr. Pollard, does not present any evidence which contradicts this fact.
See Joint Intervenors' Response, Affidavit of Robert Pollard at 4-5.
d.
Lack Of Effort To Locate And Isolate Release Path The fourth weakness noted in IR 88-09 was the "lack of effort to locate and isolate the release path."
IR 88-09 at 5.
The NRC St; ff reached this conclusion because it observed no effort being made to locate 4
or isolate the leak. Staff Affidavit at i A12. This apparent failure was ci deemed a serious concern requiring resolution.
M.
During the Staff's k
follow-up on this item, it learned the emergency response staff had in fact empioyed in a timely manner indirect neasures -- such as remote temperature and pressure and sump level indicator readings -- to provide an alternative assessment of potential leakage paths.
IR 88-10 at 9.
The NRC Staff was not aware of these activities during the exercise. M. Had the NRC Staff been aware of them, the apparent lack of effort to isolate release path would not have been deened a example of questionable engineering judgment.
e.
Lack Of Effort To Blowdown Steam Generators The fifth and final example of "questionable engineering judgment" noted in IR 38 09 was the failure "to blowdown steam generators to lessen the heat load in containment."
IR 88-09 at 5.
The Staff's concern in this regard was that the TSC staff failed to depressuri:n (i.e., hot blowdown) the steam generators as called for by the energency operatirs
procedures.
Staff Affidavit et i A13.
During the exercise the NRC Staff observer discussed this matter briefly with the Emergency Operations Manager but was unable to reach a conclusion as to the propriety of skipping that step. M. Subsequently, the NRC Staff learned that the TSC staff postponed depressurizing the steam generators until the results of a steam generator secondary side sample were available.
IR 88-10 at 10.
Based on this information, the engineering judgment exercised by the TSC staff appear.
':c.
L t.. r. reasonabic cr.d appropriate.
M. : W 'r Affidavit at 1 A25.
However, it is the Staff's position that Applicants' otherwise adequate emergency operating procedures should be revised to k
provide better guidance as to when the procedural step calling for
' *Ni3 depressurization of the steam generators can be omitted.
M.; IR 88-10.
>3
_ CONCLUSION
~EN For the reasons stated herein, the Joint Intervenors' motion to reopen the record does not raise a significant safety or environmental issue and their late-filed emergency planning exercise contention does not reveal the existence of a fundamental flaw in Applicants' emergency preparedness plans.
Accordingly, the motion to reopen should be denied and the emergency planning contention should not be admitted for litigation.
pectfully submitted, h 4
Gr g s c r.
Counsel f fir S aff i
Dated at Rockville, Maryland b
this 28th day of November 1988