ML20195D383
| ML20195D383 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Shoreham File:Long Island Lighting Company icon.png |
| Issue date: | 06/20/1988 |
| From: | Case D, Latham S, Zahnleuter R KIRKPATRICK & LOCKHART, NEW YORK, STATE OF, SOUTHAMPTON, NY, SUFFOLK COUNTY, NY, TWOMEY, LATHAM & SHEA |
| To: | NRC ATOMIC SAFETY & LICENSING APPEAL PANEL (ASLAP) |
| References | |
| CON-#288-6558 OL-3, NUDOCS 8806230108 | |
| Download: ML20195D383 (97) | |
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8 g June 20, 1988 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 8
Before the Atomic Safety and Licensino Acceal Board 8 )
In the Matter of )
)
LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY ) Docket No. 50-322-OL-3
) (Emergency Planning) g (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, )
Unit 1) )
)
g SUFFOLK COUNTY, STATE OF NEW YORK AND TOWN OF SOUTHAMPTON BRIEF ON APPEAL OF THE LICENSING BOARD'S MAY 9, 1988 PARTIAL INITIAL DECISION ON SUITABILITY OF RECEPTION CENTERS g KIRKPATRICK & LOCKEART TWCMEY, LATHAM & SHEA 1800 M Street, N.W. 33 West Second Street Washington, D.C. 20036 Riverhead, New York 11901 Attorneys for Suffolk County Attorneys for the Town of Southampton Richard J. Zannleuter, Esq.
Executive Champter, Room 229 Capitol Building Albany, New York 12224 g Attorney for Mario M. Cuomo Governor of the State of New York g June 20, 1988 8
TABLE OF CONTENTS Pace I. INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 I II. STATEMENT OF FACTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 A. Procedural Background. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 l B. The Present Reception Center Plan. . . . . . . . 8 C. Issues Before the Licensing Board. . . . . . . . 11 III. THE LICENSING BOARD ERRED IN ITS FINDINGS ON THE PLANNING BASIS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 A. The Licensing Board Applied the Wrong Standard in Accepting the Use of Sheltering Data to Determine the Need for Monitoring Capacity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
- 1. The Board Condoned LILCO's Reliance on Sheltering Data and l
Required No Independent Analysis of Monitoring Needs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
- 2. LILCO Did Not Meets Its Burden on the Planning Basic Issue . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 B. The Board Misconstrued and Ignored Relevant Precedent. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
- 1. San Onofre . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
- 2. The Shoreham Exercise Decision . . . . . . . 26 i l
i C. Conclusion on the Planning Basis . . . . . . . . 28 J IV. THE LICENSING BOARD COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR BY RULING IN THE ABSENCE OF FEMA FINDINGS. . . . . . 29 I
! A. The NRC's Regulations Require that a
! Reasonable Assurance Finding must be Based on Consideration of FEMA Findings. . . . . 30 I
]
( B. No FEMA Findings Exist Permitting a Reasonable Assurance Finaing . . . . . . . . . . 32
- i-3 l ,
0 V. THE LICENSING BOARD DID NOT ARTICULATE A BASIS FOR RESOLVING THE ISSUE OF EVACUATION 8 SHADOW CAUSED BY LOCALLY UNWANTED LAND USE . . . . . 34 VI. THE BOARD ERRED IN STRIKING PROBATIVE EVIDENCE CONCERNING THE LILCO REGISTRATION PROCEDURES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 g VII. CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 8
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l TABLE OF AUTHORITI_ES i
Federal Cases Pace Amer. Fed of Govern. Emo. Local 1135 v. F.L.R.A.,
829 F.2d 683 (8th Cir. 1987). . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 Bruce v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n of Conroe, 837 F.2d 712 (5th Cir. 1988). . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 Greater Boston Television Coro, v. FCC, 444 F.2d. 841 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied, j 402 U.S. 923 (1971) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 H2rth Germany Area Council v. F.L.R.A.,
805 F.2d 1044 (D.C. Cir. 1986). . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 Nuclear Reculatory Commission Decisions
])
Cincinnati Gas and Electric Co. (Wm. H. Zimmer Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 1), ALAB-727, 17 NRC 760 (1983) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 Lono Island Lichtina Comoany (Shoreham Nuclear
] Power Station, Unit 1), LBP-88-13, NRC (Partial Initial Decision on SuitabTIIty of-~~
Reception Centers) (May 9, 1988). . . . . . . . . . . . passim Lono Island Lichtina Comoany (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), LBP-85-31, 22 NRC 410
]- (1985). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7,8,17 Lonc Island Lichtino Comoany (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), LBP-88-2, 27 NRC 85 (1988). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24,26-28 b Lona Island Lichtino Comoany (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1, LBP-86-36, 24 NRC 561 6,18,21 (1986). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Lono Island Lichtino Comoany (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), ALAB-855, 24 NRC 792 2,3,12, 18-19,21
() (1986). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Lono Island Lichtino Company (Shoreham 3,11,17-Nuclear Power Station Unit 1), ALAB-832, 23 NRC 135 (1986) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2,6,7,11,12
(
,8
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l Northern State Power Co. (Prairie Island g Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2),
ALAB-104, 6 AEC 179 (1973). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 Pacific Gas and Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units land 2), ALAB-776, 19 NRC 1373 (1984). . . . . . . . . . . . . . - . . . . 31 8 Pacific Gas and Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-781, 20 NRC 819 (1984) . . . . . . ... . . . . . . . . . . . 31 Philadelphia Electric Co. (Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-836, 23 NRC 479 8 (1986). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 Public Service Co. of New Hamoshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-422, 6 NRC 33 (1977). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 l$ Southern California Edison Co. (San Onfre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 and 3), (L1-83-10, 17 NRC 520 (1983) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24-25 Texas Utilities Electric Co., (Commanche Peak Steam Electric Station, Units 1 and 2) LBP-84-10, g (9 NRC 509 (1984) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 Unoublished Shoreham Orders 1
1 Memorandum to Board and Parties from Samuel J. Chilk, Secretary of the Commission (June 23, 1987) . . . . . . 18 g
i Memorandum and Order (Ruling on LILCO's Motion to Strike Testimony of Papile et al.) (June 17, 1987). . . 37 Memorandum and Order (Rulings on LILCO Motion to Reopen Record and Remand Coliseum Issue) (Dec. 11, 8 1986) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 Reculations 10 CFR S 2.732. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 10 CFR S 50.47(a)(1). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 10 CFR S 50.47(a)(2). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3,29,30,32 8
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I Other Authorities NUREG-0654/ FEMA Rep. 1, Rev. 1 (November 1980)
S J.12 . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . passim Restatement (Secondi of Contracts, S 202(3) (1985). . . 25 B
B B
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STATEMENT OF ERRORS OF LAW OR FACT THAT ARE THE SUBJECT OF THIS APMAL l
Pursuant to 10 CFR S 2.762(d)(1), Suffolk County, the State i
of New York and the Town of Southampton set forth the following statement of errors of law or fact that are the subject of this appeal.
I
- 1. The Licensing Board found LILCO's planning basis to be "defensible" even though it was derived from sheltering data. PID at 24-26.
}
- 2. In violation of 10 CFR S 50.47(a)(2), the Licensing Board ruled in LILCO's favor without reviewing any FEMA findings on the suitability of LILCO's reception centers or monito-ring procedures. Suffolk County, State of New York, and Town of Southampton Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on the Suitability of Reception Centers
! (September 14, 1987), at 11-18; PID at 93, 108-109.
i
- 3. The Licensing Board failed to articulate any reasons for its rejection of the Governments' position concerning the evacuation of the population surrounding LILCO's reception centers. PID at 75-77.
)
- 4. The Licensing Board struck testimony proffered by the Governments on LILCO's registration procedures on the ground
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that suct; testimony was outside the scope of the remanded 8 issues, even though the adequacy of LILCO's registration procedures constituted an explicit element of the Licensing Board's concl:2sions. PID at 99-100 and Memorandum and Order
$ (Ruling on LILCO's Motion to Strike Testimony of Papile, et al.) (June 17, 1.187), at 4.
- 0 f
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June 20, 1988 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Atomic Safety and Licensina Acceal Board l.
)
5 In the Matter of )
) )
LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY ) Docket No. 50-322-OL-3
) (Emergency Planning)
(Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, )
Unit 1) )
)
SUFFOLK COUNTY, STATE OF NEW YORK AND TOWN OF SOUTHAMPTON BRIEF ON APPEAL OF THE LICENSING BOARD'S MAY 9, 1988 l PARTIAL INITIAL DECISION ON SUITABILITY OF RECEPTION CENTERS
)
1 l I. INTRODUCTION l
Suffolk County, the State of New York, and the Town of Southe pton (the "Governments" or "Appellants") submit this brief on appeal from the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board's May 9, i
1988 Partial Initial Decision on Suitability of Reception Centers, LBP-88-13 (the "Partial Initial Decision" or "PID").
l
)
The crux of this case involves LILCO's effort to satisfy Section J.12 of NUREG 0654, which requires the following:
)
Each organization shall describe the means for register-ing and monitoring of evacuees at relocation centers in host areas. The personnel and equipment available
)
should be capable of monitoring within about a 12-hour period all residents and transients in the plume expo-sure EPZ arriving at relocation centers.
LILCO has failed several times to meet this requirement due to its inability to designate and retain adequate facilities and develop eppropriate monitoring procedures. In its most recent efforts to meet Section J.12, LILCO designated three of its own operating facilities, located in the Nassau County villages of Bellmore, Roslyn and Hicksville, as "reception centers." Under the current verston of the LILCC Plan, evacuees will be directed to report to these three reception centers for radiological monitoring, registration, and, if necessary, decontamination.1/
During the litigation engendered by LILCO's previous failed efforts to satisfy Section J.12, the Appeal Board issued two opinions which were of particular significance in shaping the course of this proceeding. The first was ALAB-832, 23 NRC 135 (1986), in which this Board remanded the reception center issue to the Licensing Board to determine "whether there were any factors" which might make the reception centers unsuitable. 23 NRC at 162 (emphasis supplied). The second was ALAB-855, 24 NRC 792 (1986), in which this Board upheld the Licensing Board's rejection of LILCO's reception center planning basis (i.e., the number of people expected to arrive at the reception centers) 1/ Although the litigation below was based upon Revision 8 of the LILCO Plan, the most current version of the LILCO Plan --
Revision 10 -- similarly directs evacuees to report to LILCO's three facilities located in Bellmore, Roslyn, and Hicksville.
LILCO Plan, OPIP 4.2.3., at 2 (Rev. 10).
) i
because it was founded on data reflecting the number of people who have' sought shelter during natural disasters, rather than on an estimate of those persons who would require monitorina in a radiological emergency -- which is the basic function of the reception centers under LILCO's Plan. ALAB-855, 24 NRC at 801.
l l
On remand, eleven issues concerning the suitability of LILCO's reception centers were identified for resolution before the Licensing Board. During hearings before the Licensing Board, it became clear that LILCO had "ot changed its fundamental approach to estimating the number of people who would arrive at
! the reception centers (i.e., LILCO continued to use sheltering l data). Furthermore, FEMA proffered no findings concerning the suitability of LILCO's reception centers or monitoring proce-dures. Yet, despite the absence of a rational planning basis and pertinent FEMA findings, the Licensing Board found the three LILCO reception centers suitable in every respect.
The Licensing Board's holding on the suitability of LILCO's
] 'eception centers is in error and must be reversed. Specifi-t cally, the Licensing Board committed the following four fundamen-l tal errors:
O
- 1. The Licensing Board found LILCO's planning basis to be "defensible" even though it was derived from sheltering
$ data. PID at 24-26.
1 8
- 2. In violation of 10 CFR S 50.47(a)(2), the Licensing 8
Board ruled in LILCO's favor without reviewing any FEMA findings on the suitability of LILCO's reception centers or monitoring procedures. Suffolk County, 8
State of New York, and Town of Southampton Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on the Suitability of Reception Centers (September 14, 1987) 8 at 11-18; PID at 93, 108-109.
- 3. The Licensing Board failed to articulate any reasons 8
for its rejection of the Governments' position concern-ing the evacuation of the population surrounding LILCO's reception centers. PID at 75-77.
8
- 4. The Licensing Board struck testimony proffered by the Governments on LILCO's registration procedures on the 8
ground that such testimony was outside the scope of the remanded issues, even though the adequacy of LILCO's registration procedures constituted an explicit element 4 of the Licensing Board's conclusions. PID at 99-100, and Memorandum and Order (Ruling on LILCO's Motion to Strike Testimony of Papile, et al.) (June 17, 1987) at 8
4.
8 Each of these four errors precludes a reasonable assurance find-ing and thus requires reversal in its own right. Moreover, 8
)
because the Licensing Board's conclusions on the other issues admitted for litigation were dependent on the Board's planning basis and evacuation shadow conclusions, the entire proceeding must be remanded.1/
II. STATEMENT OF FACTS The reception center proceeding which is the subject of this appeal has a long history. A brief review of that history and t..e nature of the present LILCO reception center plan will serve to place the Licensing Board's Partial Initial Decision and its errors in context.
A. ProceUural Backaround Testimony on LILCO's reception centers was first heard in August 1984. At that time, LILCO had opted for a scheme which divided the "relocation center" functions described in Section
) 1/ For example, the adequacy of the planning basis affects the Licensing Board's decision on the traffic problems which might develop as a result of the LILCO facilities' location, as well as the Licensing Board's decision on the adequacy of LILCO's j staffing provisions. In fact, the Licensing Board itself explicitly recognized the critical nature of the planning basis when it stated "other matters, for example, staffing l requirements, space requirements and traffin flow, all hinge to a l considerable extent on the number of people and vehicles that can i
be expected to come to the reception centers." PID at 5-6. In fact, in discussing traffic issues, the Licensing Board stated 3 "it was apparent from the outset that a principal element of J disagreement about traffic focused on the planning basis that defined the number of evacuees that would have to be accommodated at the reception centers rather than the intrinsic capacity of the highway systems to carry traffic " PID at 28.
i _
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i J.12 between two types of facilities - "reception centers" for t
registering, monitoring, and decontaminating evacuees, and "congregate care centers" for providing evacuees with food, ,
shelter and other services. At that initial hearing, LILCO
> offered evidence on the concept behind the receptiora centers, and ,
identified over 50 proposed congregate care centers. However, LILCO was unable to identify any actual facilities willing to
~
serve as reception centers. LBP-86-36, 24 NRC 561, 564 (1986).
In light of this omission, the Licensing Board found that-the lack of an identified reception center constituted a void in the record. Tr. 14806-07 (Laurenson). The record was thereafter closed on August 29, 1984, with that void unfilled. Eg.g LBP 36, 24 NRC at 564.
)
- On January 28, 1985, the Licensing Board granted LILCO's !
motion to reopen the record for the purpose of designating a facility which, according to LILCO, had agreed to serve as a .
reception center for evacuees during a Shoreham emergency -- the
, Nassau Veterans Memorial Coliseum (the "Coliseum") located in '
Nassau County. After declining to permit discovery, the Licen-l l sing Board held a hearing on June 25 and 26, 1985, to determine i
l whether the Coliseum was "functionally adequate" to accommodate ,
the number of evacuees that might be expected to arrive in the event of a Shoreham radiological emergency. Sig ALAB-832, 23 NRC at 159-62.
? !
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Following the hearing, the Licensing' Board issued a Conclud- :
ing Partial Initial Decision ("Concluding PID"), in which it found, among other things, LILCO's "overall procedures for processing evacuees at the Coliseum to be conceptually adequate."
l The Licensing Board also found, however, that LILCO had not adequately specified the number of people who would arrive at its
- reception center, making it impossible to evaluate the adequacy '
of the Nassau Coliseum. As a result, LILCO's Plan was found deficient in that respect. LBP-85-31, 22 NRC 410, 417-19 (1985).
- Both LILCO and the Governments appealed the Concluding PID.
The Governments contended on appeal that the Licensing Board erred by limiting the Nassau Coliseum proceeding to the "tunc-l tional adequacy" of the facility and by denying discovery on ,
matters relevant to LILCO's proposed use of the Coliseum. On March 26, 1986, the Appeal Board held for the Governments and l
remanded the reception center proceeding. ALAB-832, 23 NRC at 160. In doing so, the Appeal Board brcadly defined the issue for t resolution in future reception center proceedings as "whether there were any factors -- including the location of the Coliseum relative to the various portions of the EPZ -- that might make that facility unsuitable to serve as the sole reception center
) for EPZ evacuees." ALAB-832, 23 NRC at 162 (emphasis supplied).
Subsequent to the Appeal Board's ruling in ALAB-832, on Jut.e 16, 1986, the Nassau County Board of Supervisors formally with-drew the authority for LILCO to use the Coliseum as its reception f
6
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I center during a Shoreham emergency.. Three months later, by
}.
motion dated September 30, 1986, LILCO designated three of its own facilities to serve as reception centers in the event of a radiological emergency at Shoreham. These three facilities are
) the LILCO-owned operations centers at Hicksville, Bellmore and Roslyn. Each is located approximately 40 miles west of the Shoreham plant.
B. The Present Receotion Center Plan
) In the event of a radiological emergency at Shoreham result-ing in a release of radioactive substances with the potential to i
cause offsite contamination, the LILCO Plan provides that EPZ l
) residents in the zones downwind of the plant would be advised to l proceed to us.e of LILCO's three reception centers, to be moni-tored for contamination. LILCO Ex. 1 (Crocker et al.), Att. P, OPIP 3.6.1, at 2.3/ Contaminated evacuees would be sent to trailers located at the reception centers (one trailer each at Bellmore and Roslyn; two at Hicksville) for decontamination.
) LILCO Ex. 1 (Crocker et al.), Att. R., OPIP'3.9.2, at 9a-ll. All evacuees requiring congregate care (shelter, food, etc.) will
] 3/ This citation is to the written testimony of Douglas M.
r Crocker, Dale E. Donaldson, Diane P. Dreikorn, Edward B.
Lieberman, Roger E. Linnemann, Michael K. Lindell, Dennis S.
Mileti and Richard J. Watts on the Suitability of the Reception Centers. This testimony was submitted by LILCO with attachments A-T. At the hearing, this testimony was marked as LILCO Ex. 1.
Accordingly, hereinafter this testimony will be cited as "LILCO
) Ex. 1 (Crocker et al.)." Where the citation is to a specific attachment, the letters of that attachment will be indicated, and will be followed by a brief description of the attachment or pertinent part of that attachment ( n , Att. R, OPIP 3.9.2).
also be directed to proceed to the reception centers. LILCO Ex.
1 (Crocker et al.), Att. P, OPIP 3.6.1 at III-37.
Upon arrival at the reception centers, evacuees would be
] monitored, registered, and if necessary, decontaminated or sent to separate congregate care facilities. LILCO Ex. 1 (Crocker et al.), Att. P, OPIP 3.6.1 at III-37. Under the LILCO Plan, the monitoring of individuals arriving at each reception center would be conducted a' monitoring stations while the individuals remain in their vehicles. LILCO Exhibit 1 (Crocker et al.), at 40.1/
J Under LILCO's Plan, each of the monitoring stations is to be staffed with three people: two monitors to scan evacuees and a
) traffic guide to obtain vehicle swipes and record certain information. Monitoring would be conducted by having a monitor examine the head, shoulders, feet and hands of all evacuees arriving by private vehicle. LILCO Ex. 1 (Crocker et al.), at 40 l
l and Att. P, OPIP 3.9.2 at 9a. LILCO estimated that the average vehicle would have 2.8 occupants and that this procedure would l
I/ At the beginning of this reception center proceeding, Revision 8 of the LILCO Plan set forth a monitoring procedure whereby only the hands and feet of the driver of a vehicle would be monitored. This was a departure from earlier versions of the O LILCO Plan under which all arriving evacuees left their vehicles and were given scans of their entire bodies. Egg LBP-85-31, 22 NRC at 417-18. FEMA rejected the Revision 8 procedure as inadequate. FEMA Ex. 3, Att. 1, at 11-12; Tr. 18269-71 (Husar);
Tr. 18303 (Keller). LILCO then issued draft revisions of the Plan which altered its monitoring procedures to include the
$ monitoring of the head, shoulders, feet and hands of all evacuees. LILCO Ex. 1. (Crocker et al.), at 40. These draft revisions were the focus of the litigation and the Partial Initial Decision.
I ,
take approximately 100 seconds per vehicle. LILCO Ex. 1 (Crocker et al.), at 42.
The LILCO Plan originally called for evacuees arriving in buses to receive a whole body scan and a thyroid scan. LILCO Ex. 1 (Crocker et al.), Att. P, OPIP 3.9.2 at 9b, Att. R, OPIP 3.9.2 at 8. However, just prior to trial, LILCO changed the bus evacuee monitoring procedure so that bus evacuees would not receive a thyroid scan or a whole body scan. Instead, bus evacuees were to be monitored by scanning the head, shoulders, J hands and feet, followed by an "X pattern" scan across the front and back. LILCO Ex. 1 (Crocker et al.), Addendum; Tr. 17561-62 (Dreikorn). LILCO estimated that this newly-revised "X pattern" monitoring procedure would take about 60 seconds per person. M.
Given the foregoing, the adequacy of LILCO's reception center arrangement obviously depends in large part on the number of evacuees LILCO must monitor and, if necessary, decontaminate.
This issue -- how many persons must be expected to arrive at the reception centers for monitoring -- was referred to by all parties and the Licensing Board as the "planning basis" issue.
As its planning basis, LILCO assumed that about 30% of the EPZ population would arrive at the reception centers. In order to provide monitoring for arriving evacuees, LILCO declared that it l
l intended to establish a total of 63 monitoring stations at its three reception centers. On the assumption that it would take 100 seconds to monitor a vehicle and all of its passengers, LILCO
$ 1
8 asserted that it actually could monitor over 30% of the EPZ 8 population in 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> with these resources. LILCO Ex. 1 (Crocker et al.), at 4.1/
8 C. Issues Before the Licensino Board The Licensing Board began hearings concerning the reception 8 center issues on June 30, 1987. Those hearings continued until July 30, 1987. To focus the inquiry, the Licensing Board iden-tified a number of issues to be reviewed, including the number of 8 evacuees who might arrive at the reception centers (the "planning basis"); the adequacy of LILCO's proposed monitoring procedures; the staffing requirements of LILCO's reception centers; whether 8 transportation and traffic problems might develop as a result of the LILCO facilities' location and their distance from the plume EPZ; whether the facilities' location might create problems in 8 connection with the evacuation shadow phenomenon; and whether the 8
1/ If more than 30% of the EPZ population arrives at its reception centers, LILCO testified that it would attempt to cope with the excess demand by seeking assistance from the Institute g of Nuclear Power Operations and the Department of Energy to man additional monitoring stations and provide additional equipment.
LILC0 Ex. 1 (Crocker et al.), at 4. If available outside personnel were unable to handle the demand, LILCO represented that it would revert to a monitoring procedure in which not all arriving evacuees are monitored. Under this "fallback" g procedure, only the hands and feet of the vehicle driver would be monitored. If the driver is not contaminated, passengers in the vehicle from the same point of origin would also not be monitored (unless they request to be monitored), nor would LILCO monitor any other portions of the driver's body. Id.
distance of the LILCO facilities from the plume EPZ would
] increase evacuees' exposure to radiation. Siq PID at 4-5.5/
5/ These issues were derived from three sources. First, ALAB-
) 855 and the Licensing Board decisions identified the planning basis issue. ALAB-855, 24 NRC at 801. Second, the Appeal Board decision in ALAB-832 identified the following five issues:
(1) Whether transportation and traffic problems might 3 develop as a result of the LILCO facilities' location J and their distance from the plume EPZ; (2) Whether the LILCO facilities' location might create problems in regard to the evacuation shadow phenomenon; 3 (3) Whether the proposed use of the LILCO facilities for J reception center purposes requires authorization under state environmental law; (4) Whether health and safety problems might be caused through the use of the LILCO facilities as reception centers through the effect on the water supply; and (5) Whether the distance of the LILCO facilities from'the plume EPZ would increase exposure to radiation.
ALAB-832, 23 NRC at 162,n.105. Finally, the Licensing Board
, itself identified five additional issues:
J (1) The adequacy of LILCO's proposed monitoring procedures; (2) The adequacy of evacuation routes to the three LILCO facilities proposed as reception centers, including the effects of traffic congestion on the way to and in the
) vicinity of the facilities, and LILCO's Revinton 8 proposal to employ traffic guides on Nassau Launty roadways; (3) Staffing requirements for LILCO's reception center scheme; (4) LILCO's proposal to transport all evacuees traveling on buses to the parking lot next to its Hicksville facility, when that facility itself was also relied upon by LILCO to be the LERO worker relocation center; and (5) Whether the proposal to send evacuees to LILCO parking lots could or would ever be implemented in a way to (footnote continued)
s
)
On May 9, 1988, the Licensing Board issued its Partial Initial Decision, which concluded as follows:
Applicant's planning basis, traffic plan, reception 3 center locations, monitoring, registration and J decontamination procedures, staffing plans and provisions for handlir;g evacuees are adequate and satisfy the NRC's regulatory standards.
PID at 108. Given these conclusions, the Licensing Board ordered
] that:
the issues remanded by the Appeal Board in ALAB-832, issues raised by Intervenors and a population
) planning basis issue are resolved in favor of Applicant as described in this Decision.
y Id. As is demonstrated below, the Partial Initial Decision J contains four fundamental errors, each of which taints the entire decision, thereby requiring the remand of the entire proceeding.
III. THE LICENSING BOARD ERRED IN ITS FINDINGS ON THE PLANNING BASIS For reasons which need no detailed explanation, the planning
] basis issue is fundamental to resolving the adequacy of LILCO's proposed reception centers. Plainly, the number of people expected to arrive at a reception center governs such considera-O tions as how large the facility should be, how many people should (footnote continued from previous page) protect the public health and safety.
Sag Memorandum and Order (Rulings on LILCO Motion to Reopen Record and Remand Coliseum Issue) (Dec. 11, 1986), at 17-20.
8
! staff it, whether the roads lec _ing to the reception centers can
] handle anticipated traffic demand, and other such matters.
At the remand hearing, LILCO took the position that 30% of the EPZ population was an adequate planning basis. In support of this position, it cited a one and one-half page. memorandum, dated December 24,-1985, authored by Richard W. Krimm, FEMA's Associate Director of State and Local Program Support (the "Krimm Memoran-dum"). LILCO Ex. 1 (Crocker et al.), at 3-4, 9-10.1/ The Krimm Memorandum, which is affixed hereto as Attachment 1, is based on J an analysis cf the number of evacuees who sought shelter in prior emergencies. Tr. 18320-22 (Keller); NY Ex. 1 (Papile et al.), at 12.8/ Based on this analysis, the Krimm Memorandum purports to offer guidance on compliance with Section.J.12 by stating that
- 1/ LILCO also used the testimony of Mr. Dale E. Donaldson to support its planning basis. Donaldson testified that he was part
]-
i of a team that drafted a precursor document to NUREG-0654 and that the drafting team believed only a small percentage of the population of the plume exposure EPZ surrounding a nuclear facility would require monitoring. Egg LILCO Ex. 1 (Crocker et al.), at 8. Appellants exposed numerous problems with the na ds n testim ny, h wever, in uding the fa t that the D
precursor document did not contain any language similar to Section J.12; the precursor document did not address the number i of people who were likely to appear at reception centers; neither Donaldson nor any member of his team was on the committee which I developed NUREG 0654; and the NUREG 0654 committee never
'g consulted with Donaldson. Tr. 17444-17449 (Donaldson). The Licensing Board did not cite the Donaldson testimony in support of its decision on the planning basis. Instead, the Licensing
, Board relied solely on the Krimm Memorandum. PID at 24-25.
4 Accordingly, this Brief does not address the numerous problems
, with Mr. Donaldson's testimony.
O 8,/ The citation to "NY Ex. 1 (Papile et al.)" is to the written testimony of James D. Papile, James C. Baranski and Laurence B.
Czech Submitted on Behalf of the State of New York Regarding Reception Centers.
i
, Section J.12 of NUREG 0654 is met when planning and resources are provided to monitor 20% of the EPZ population. Attachment 1 (Krimm Memorandum).1/
In contrast to LILCO, Appellants presented an independent analysis of the planning basis. In particular, Suffolk County I offered evidence establishing that surveys using language based on LILCO's emergency messages demonstrated that if there is an i
l advisory for members of the populace to report for monitoring, hundreds of thousands of Long Island residents will seek monitor-ing at LILCO's reception centers, even though they may not have been ordered or advised to report. This phenomenon, whereby l members of the public report for monitoring though not told to do l so, was termed the "monitoring shadow" by the County's witnesses.
SC Ex. 13 (Cole et al.), at 13-18.l_0/ According to the County, I the effect of the monitoring shadow is that many times more than 30% of the EPZ population would likely arrive for monitoring at LILCO's reception centers. S.31 SC Ex. 13 (Cole et al.), at 16-
- 17. Similarly, the State witnesses for the New York State Radio-
)
2/ LILCO suggests that because the Krimm Memorandum calls for a '
20% planning basis, and because it has exceeded the guideline by r
using a 30% planning basis, it has met the requirements of l
Section J.12 and the prior Appeal Board decisions on the Planning 5 Basis. LILCO Proposed Findings, at 31; 311 LILCO Ex. 1 (Crocker
)
et al.), at 4-5. For the reasons discussed in this Brief, LILCO is wrong.
M/ This citation is to the written testimony of Stephen Cole, i Susan C. Saegert, James H. Johnson, Jr., David Harris, Martin Mayer, Gregory C. Minor and Steven C. Sholly on Behalf of Suffolk ;
) County Concerning the Planning Basis. At the hearing, this ;
testimony was marked as Suffolk County Exhibit 13. Accordingly, hereinafter this testimony will be cited as "SC Ex. 13 (Cole et al.)."
) ,
icgical Emergency Preparedness Group ("REPG") testified that prudent planning would require that LILCO plan for 100% of the EPZ arriving for monitoring. NY Ex. 1 (Papile et al.), at 8.11_/ '
The Licensing Board's decision on the planning basis issue was stated as follows:
k we conclude that a figure of 20% of the EPZ population,
)
expandable in extreme cases, is a defensible fiaure for the number of people for which planners must provide a ,
twelve-hour m:,nitoring capacity. l PID at 25 (emphasis supplied). The Licensing Board thus did not find the planning basis "correct" or "adequate," but only "defen-
! sible." The sole basis of the Licensing Board's "defensibility" i l
rationale is the finding that "We give great weight to the policies of FEMA and, fo'r that reason, to the guidance expressed in the Krimm Memorandum." PID at 25-26.
I A "defensible" position, however, is merely one which is capable of being defended. The Licensing Board's use of this
)
11./ FEMA relied on the Krimm Memorandum in arguing for a 20%
planning basis. FEMA Ex. 2 (Baldwin et al.), at 7. In addition to relying on the Krimm Memorandum, the NRC relied on the testimony of Lewis A. Hulman, who performed a "footprin*.
analysis" purporting to show that in 90% of all potential accidents, less than 20% of the population would need monitoring.
NRC Staff Ex. 5 (Hulman), at 5-7. The Governments attacked this analysis on a variety of grounds. Eg.g. SC Ex. 14 (Minor and Sholly). However, the Licensing Board did not resolve the validity or significance of the Hulman analysis in reaching its decision on the planning basis, because that analysis merely addresses the population fraction "at risk." PID at 25. In
) other words, the Hulman analysis addresses how many people might need monitoring, not how many would seek monitoring. PID at 10.
Accordingly, the Licensing Board discussion of Mr. Hulman's analysis is not addressed in this Brief.
) _ - - - - - - - -
l l
t i
term no doubt reflects its uneasiness with its conclusion. This !
is understandable, for the Licensing Board's acceptance of the -
20% planning basis is not supportable. In particular, the Licensing Board reached its erroneous conclusion by applying l improper standards and mischaracterizing precedent.
A. The Licensing Board Applied the Wrong Standard in Accepting the Use of Sheltering Data to Determine the Need for Monitorino Cacacity.
The proper standards for an analysis of the planning basis were articulated in key decisions rejecting LILCO's efforts to justify a planning basis based only on the number of evacuees who might require shelter. At the outset of the reception center
) litigation, LILCO advocated a 20% planning basis derived from ,
- estimates of the number of people who would require shelter in a Shoreham emergency -- not the number of people who might seek monitoring regardless of needing shelter. The logical inconsis- e tency of this position was inescapable, and the Licensing Board i
l then with jurisdiction thus properly rejected LILCO's approach:
)
LILCO did not justify how this nomber (20% of the EPZ population) could be related to the number of persons who might seek monitoring. The Board finds that the number of cersons expected to seek shelter in the event of a disaster is not necessarily the same as the number of cersons who micht seek monitorino in the event of a radiological accident.
)
l l LBP-85-31, 22 NRC at 417 (emphasis supplied). At the request of the Appeal Board, the Licensing Board subsequently clarified this holding, reasoning as follows:
This left the question of radiological monitoring of the evacuees arriving at the reception center open and unanswered. The need for monitoring and the need for shelter arise from different reason- +u evacuees, and
- i. indeoendent analysis is needed to f " ni ate a planning basis for the total number needing s m v .ce.
l Clarifying Decision on Romand (Monitoring of Evacuees), LBP 36, 24 NRC 561, 570 (emphasis supplied). Thus, given the illt a . ..
of basing the number of people who might seek monitoring on an analysis of those who might seek shelter, the Licensing Board then with jurisdiction over LILCO's reception center proposal had
}
no choice but to conclude that monitoring estimates could not be based on sheltering data, and that an independent analysis was required.
}
LILCO appealed this Licensing Board decision, but to no avail. The Appeal Board also found it incongruous to base an
}
estimate of the number of individuals who would seek monitoring on an analysis of who might seek snelter. In fact, the Appeal Board stated:
}
LILCO's planning estimate simply failed to take into account that radiological accidents produce a category 1 of individuals who require monitoring and decontamina-
/ tion, even if they do not require sheltering.
) -le-
8 ALAB-855, 24 NRC at 797. The Appeal Boad further stated:
8 Surely, the need of evacuees for monitoring and decon-tamination services does not hinae to any extent upon whether they have been able to make their own sheltering arrangements.
8 * * *
- It seems highly probable that many individuals who manifestly should be monitored as a matter of caution will both wish and be able to obtain sheltering at other g than a facility supplied by LILCO or another participant in the emergency response plan.
ALAB-855, 24 NRC at 800 and n.31 (emphasis supplied).
s Accordingly, the Appeal Board upheld the Licensing Board's rejection of a planning basis derived from sheltering data and found that the Licensing Board was justified in imposing on LILCO the duty of estimating how many evacuees would seek monitoring indepencent of any sheltering needs. M. at 801.12_/ The Appeal Board concluded that LILCO could attempt to justify a 20%
O planning basis on remand, but noted that the it "appears to us to be of dubious validity." M.
$ Thus, the law of this case made two standards abundantly clear: (1) LILCO's planning basis should result from an indepen-dent analysis not based on sheltering data and (2) LILCO had the
$ burden of proof in persuading the Licensing Board that its planning basis figure was accurate. The Licensing Board applied neither of these standards in analyzing the planning basis.
8 12,/ LILCO sought Commission review of ALAB-855, but LILCO's petition was denied. Memorandum to Board and Parties from Samuel J. Chilk, Secretary of the Commission (June 23, 1987).
8
)
] 1. The Board Condoned LILCO's Reliance On Sheltering Data and Required No Indeoendent Analysis of Monitorino Needs.
In relying on the Krimm Memorandum to find that a 20% plan-J- ning basis was "defensible," the Licensing Board did the very thing it could not do -- it relied on sheltering data to reach a conclusion about monitoring behavior. The Krimm Memorandum D explains the derivation of the 20% figure by noting that while "previous experiences" in unspecified emergencies are "not conclusive," "research" shows that "anywhere from 3 to 20% of the 0 evacuees arrived at relocation centers or shelters." Sag Attach-ment 1, at 1. It is apparent from the face of the Krimm Memorandum and from the testimony on cross-examination, however, 8 that the 3-20% range in the Krimm Memorandum is derived from the l number of people who have sought shelter, not monitoring, in l previous emergencies. Attachment 1 (Krimm Memorandum); Tr.
18320-22 (Keller); NY Ex. 1 (Papile et al.'), at 12.13_/
f l
l ,< The Krimm Memorandam concludes that because people will want to allay their concerns about radiation, the upper bound of the 3 13_/ Indeed, most of the emergencies which provide the basis for the sheltering data were natural disasters, not technological g emergencies. Furthermore, Mr. Keller of FEMA testified that, in j fact, the actual statistics demonstrate that a range of from 3 to
! 15% of all evacuees attempt to seek shelter at relocation centers and that he understood the 20% figure to include a "fudge factor," implying that the additional 5% was meant to account for those requiring monitoring only. Leg e Tr. 18321-23 (Keller).
Exactly how this "fudge factor" was arrived at, what it 8 represents, and whether it has any validity could not be
- explained by FEMA. Egg Tr. 18356-61 (Husar). Nor is there any mention of such a consideration on the face of the Krimm Memorandum. Egg Attachment 1 (Krimm Memc,randum) .
$ 1 l
E l
l to 20% shelterina range is appropriate to determine the number of people who will go to reception centers for monitorina. Sg.eq Attachment 1. There is no explanation given, however, as to why the upper bound of those seeking shelter in previous emergencies provides valid insight into the number of people who will arrive for monitoring in a radiological emergency. Furthermore, it is clear that the Krimm Memorandum is not based on any technical analyses, reports, or studies of the number of people who will seek monitoring. Tr. 18316-17 (Keller); geg q Attachment 1 (Krimm Memorandum).
In short, the Krimm Memorandum is founded on precisely the kind of data and reasoning which have previously been rejected by the Appeal Board, and falls far short of the "independent analy-sis" which is required. Sie LBP-86-36, 24 NRC at 570. The Krimm Memorandum therefore runs afoul of this Board's prior ruling that sheltering data cannot provide the basis for the number of people who will seek monitoring. ALAB-855, 24 NRC at 800-801.
) The Licensing Board attempted to avoid this conclusion by stating that "the Krimm Memorandum is based upon figures for those reporting to shelters, but we recognize that those figures were adjusted upwards in a manner consistent with the best judg-ment of an emergency planning professional." PID at 25.
Although articulated as a defense of its reliance on sheltering data, this statement actually reveals the Licensing Board's refusal to comply with the Appeal Board's earlier ruling (and the
)
k l
l apparent rejectic of its own prior ruling) that the reception
) center planning basis should not be based on sheltering data.
The fact that for some unexplained reason the sheltering number was adjusted slightly upward as a "fudge factor" (agg Tr. 18356-
) 61 (Husar)) does not make the figure any more reliable. An arbitrary adjustment of an arbitrary number cannot form the basis for a reasonable assurance finding.l4_/
- 2. LILCO Did Not Meet Its Burden on the Plannino Basis Issue In rejecting LILCO's 20% planning basis and requiring inde-pendent analysis of the number of people requiring monitorina, the Appeal Board squarely placed the burden of proof on LILCO to l justify an appropriate planning basis. ALAB-855, 24 NRC at 800-801.l_5/ Thus, to meet its burden of proof, LILCO was required to establish the reliability of its planning basis by a preponde-l rance of the evidence.li/
): 14/ Similarly, the fact that LILCO chose to increase the 20%
planning basis to a 30% planning basis does not make LILCO's l
! number more reliable. Since the 30% planning basis figure is arbitrarily derived from an invalid 20% figure, the 30% figure is likewise arbitrary and invalid.
]
l_5/ The applicant typically bears the burden of proof. See 10 CFR S 2.732; Philadelohia Electric Co. (Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-836, 23 NRC 479, 518 (1986).
li/ To satisfy its burden of proof, LILCO, as the applicant, must "appreciate and rebut, by a creconderance of the evidence,
) all the implications of all issues raised by intervenors." Texas Utilities Electric Co. (Comanche Peak Steam Electric Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-84-10, 19 NRC 509, 531 (1984) (emphasis supplied).
I l
l l LILCO, however, conducted no independent examination on the planning basis issue. Rather, LILCO relied heavily on the Krimm Memorandum, in which sheltering data was used to derive a 20%
planning basis. LILCO Ex. 1 (Crocker et al.), at 3-4, 9-10.
This approach falls far short of an independent analysis of monitoring capacity needs and is simply a repackaging of the old approach that has already been rejected.l.1/
In light of these facts, LILCO simply cannot be found to have met its burden of proof. Indeed, the Licensing Board recog-nized this when it found the 20% figure merely "defensible." To show that a position is defensible one need only show that it is capable of being defended -- not that it has been proven. This
] distinction is not mere semantic quibbling; there is a substan-tial difference between simply supporting one's point with evidence and proving one's point by a preponderance of the evidence.18,/ The fact is that the Licensing Board did not 12./ LILCO's 30% planning basis is, in any event, patently a incredible in light of the fact that during the February 1986 J exercise scenario, 95,000 people were advised to report to the reception centers for monitoring. NY Ex. 1 (Papile et al.), at 8-9; Tr. 19204 (Kantor). The 1985 estimated summer population of the EPZ is approximately 160,000. LILCO Ex. 1 (Crocker et al.),
at 42. Thus, under the February 1986 exercise scenario, nearly 60% of the EPZ population was ordered to report for monitoring.
l_8_/ A standard of proof or review requiring that a proposition be merely "defensible" is one of the lowest burdens known to the law. In reviewing decisions of the Federal Labor Relations Authority ("FLRA"), Courts uphold the FLRA if the determinations
, are "reasonably defensible" -- a standard which the courts have J characterized as a "deferential standard of review." Amer. Fed.
! of Govern. Emo. Local 1336 v. F.L.R.A., 829 F.2d 683, 685 (8th
! Cir. 1987); g_qg also North Germany Area Council v. F.L.R.A., 805 F.2d 1044, 1050 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
)
i require LILCO to establish the reliability of its reception ,
) center planning basis by a preponderance of the evidence. Thus, the Licensing Board has failed to apply the proper burden of l 1
proof as required by the NRC's rules and case law.
I B. The Board Misconstrued and Ionored Relevant Precedent In issuing its Partial Initial Decision in favor of LILCO, the Licensing Board also misconstrued NRC precedents which suggest that a planning basis larger than 20% is required. In
) particular, the Licensing Board misinterpreted the case of Southern California Edison Co. (San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 and 3), CLI-83-10, 17 NRC 528, 536 n.12 (1983),
) and the decision issued by a separate Shoreham Licensing Board (the "Frye Board") concerning LILCO's February 1986 exercise of its Plan. Lono Island Lichtino Comp s (Shoreham Nuclear Power
) Station, Unit 1), LBP-88-2, 27 NRC 85 (1988).
- l. San Onofre San Onofre provides the Commission's only statement on the appropriate scope of a reception certer planning basis. In that decision, the Commission observed that Section J.12 of NUREG 0654:
)
l l
l$
1 requires relocation centers capable of registering and monitoring all residents and transients in the plume 1
$ exposure EPZ. . . . (Emphasis supplied).19/
The Licensing Board dismissed this statement on the grounds
$ that:
we believe the Commission was merely restating in abridged form the guidance offered in the
$ NUREG document and that the words of the document itself, all residents and transients in the EPZ arriving at relocation centers, properly govern.
PID at 13. In doing so, however, the Licensing Board has distor-ted plain and unambiguous Commission language in order to support its conclusion. The Board articulated no valid reason for such a distortion, other than its "belief" that the Commission meant something other than what it said. The Board's disregard for the plain meaning of the Commission's statement in San onofre must be rejected.22/
19/ This Board addressed, but did not rely upon, this language
$ in ALAB-855, 24 NRC at 799. However, it should be noted that this Board believed the Commission language in San Onofre to be "clear cut." Id.
22/ The Licensing Boards distortion of the Commission's language contradicts the widely accepted rule that in matters of
$ interpretation, plain words should be given their plain meaning.
See Bruce v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n of Conroe, 837 F.2d 712, 714 (5th Cir. 1988) ("a basic canon of statutory construction is that words should be interpreted as taking their ordinary and plain meaning.") (quoting United States v.
Scrimoeour, 636 F.2d 1019, 1022-23 (5th Cir. 1981)). See also
$ Restatement (Second) of Contracts, S 202(3) (1985) ("unless a different intention is manifested, (a) where language has a generally prevailing meaning, it is interpreted in accordance with that meaning . . . . ").
g
- 2. The Shoreham Exercise Decision The Licensing Board also dismissed the precedent of the Frye Board decision. At the reception center hearing, LILCO argued ,
that it would be able to prevent any significant monitoring shadow through the dissemination of good emergency information to the public, which the public would presumably follow. Egg LILCO Ex. 1 (Crocker et al.), at 14, 19, 25-26. In discussing its rejection of the Governments' contention that numbers of people vastly in excess of LILCO's planning basis would seek monitoring at the reception centers, the Licensing Board stated that:
We must again caution, as we did in our earlier PID, that confused or conflicting information (or instruc-tions) could cause a monitoring shadow that would lead to the swamping of the monitoring capacity, and we note that the results of the exercise hearino [LBP-88-2, 27 NRC 85, February 1, 1988] are not such as to ci /e creat confidence that communication to the oublic will be clear and concise. Nevertheless, if one assumes that orocer communication is indeed possible and will be required before licensing, we believe that provision of monitoring capacity for 20% or more of the EPZ popula-tion within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> will satisfy the guidance expressed in NUREG 0654, II. J.12.
PID at 25-26 (emphasis supplied). The Licensing Board thus made the completely unwarranted assumption, that there would be ade-quate communication of emergency information to the public in the event of a Shoreham accident which would serve to diminish any i
potential monitoring shadow.
)
i i
l l
1 This unwarranted assumption flies in the face of the Frye Board's finding that there were fundamental flaws in LILCO's Plan with respect to communications with the public.2_l,/ Thus, for example, the Frye Board noted that:
Although we found flaws related to prompt dispatch of Traffic Guides and training, the great bulk of these flaws relate to communications. Breakdowns in communica-
\ tion occurred within LERO as well as between LERO/LILCO
) on the one hand and the public and media on the other.
Errors occurred not only with respect to procedures, but also with respect to the substance of the information transmitted. Confusino and conflictino information was furnished to the oublic, and erroneous information to the media. It is clear that much needs to be accom-
) plished if these problems are to be overcome.
l LBP-88.2, 27 NRC at 89 (emphasis supplied). Moreover, the Frye Board specifically found fundamental flaws in LILCO's ability to l provide emergency information and protective action recommen-
! dations to the public and to the media. Thus, the Board held
) that "confusing and conflicting information was promulgated during the Exercise." I.d. at 173. In addition to ruling that its finding "brings the (earlier 1985) PID's conclusion that an excess evacuation (i.e., the shadow phenomenon) could occur, into play (because] . . . a controlled evacuation, which is required by the Plan, probably could not be achieved," the .Frye Board
) concluded as follows:
) 2_1/ The Frye Board :LAned a "fundamental flaw" as a condition in which there is a lack of reasonable assurance that the public can be protected" (which it described as "a situation which the Commission is chartered to prevent"). LBP-88-2, 27 NRC at 92.
)
Y l
l t
Aside from the requirement that a controlled evacuation be achieved, we have concluded that the weaknesses
, demonstrated in the public information program demon-
! strate a fundamental flaw in LERO's capability to commu-
! nicate emercency information and orotective action recommendations to the oublic.
)
[ 27 NRC at 173, and n.48 (emphasis supplied).
1 The Frye Board's decision thus compels a finding that, until LILCO demonstrates to the contrary, LILCO's communications with i
the public are so inadequate that it can only be concluded that a monitoring shadow will exist. Accordingly, the Licensing Board's l assumption in its reception center Partial Initial Decision that l
proper communication between LILCO and the public will limit the monitoring shadow was entirely unfounded. As a result, the Licensing Board's acceptance of the 20% Planning Basis must be i reversed and remanded for further scrutiny.
l l C. Conclusion on the Plannino Basis In relying on the Krimm Memorandum and finding LILCO's l planning basis to be adequate, although only "defensible," the Licensing Board ignored the standards governing this case. The Licensing Board also misconstrued or ignored relevant precedent.
l The Board's decision on the planning basis must therefore be rejected.
]
)
In addition, the Board's error on the planning basis also
) requires that its decision on issues related to traffic and staffing be reversed and remanded as well. Remand on these two issues-is warranted because the Board's planning basis finding
) was the linchpin of its decision on these issues. Thus, for example, the Board did not analyze the traffic consequences resulting from traffic scenarios introduced by the Governments
) which were based on higher traffic demand, because the Board had already accepted LILCO's planning basis. PID at 29.2_2,/ The Licensing Board's error in the planning basis decision thus
) tainted the traffic and staffing issues that were litigated and j contested below, and those issues must be remanded as well.
IV. THE LICENSING BOARD COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR BY RULING IN
, THE ABSENCE OF FEMA FINDINGS The Partial Initial Decision wholly fails to address the absence of FEMA findings regarding the adequacy of the three LILCO operations centers to serve as reception centers for the l
l general public.23/ The Appellants specifically raised this issue 22/ The significance of the planning basis is further illustrated by the Licensing Board statement that "it was apparent from the outset that a principal element of traffic focused on the planning basis that defined the number of evacuees that would have to be accommodated at the reception centers '
)
rather than the intrinsic capacity of the highway system to carry traffic." PID at 28. Similarly, the Licensing Board acknowledged that the issues concerning the adequacy of staffing are dependent on "the number of people" to be m,onitored. PID at 96.
23/ The Licensing Board's only discussion of FEMA findings is
) the statement that "although the Board would have preferred to have FEMA's review of LILCO's revised procedures in the record, the weight of evidence indicates there is nothing unworkable or (footnote continued)
)
in their proposed findings and briefed the Licensing Board both on the pertinent facts and regulatory requirements. See Suffolk County, State of New York and Town of Southampton Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on Reception Centers, at '
11-18 (September 14, 1987). In particular, regulations clearly establish that FEMA findings concerning the adequacy of the reception centers are central to any "reasonable assurance"
) determination under 10 CFR S 50.47(a)(1). Thus, the Licensing Board's failure to reach the issue of the absence of FEMA findings constitutes clear and reversible error.
A. The NRC's Regulations Require That A Reasonable Assurance Finding Must Be Based on Consideration of FEMA Findinos The fundamental standard against which the adequacy of l
LILCO's propsed reception centers must be weighed is the i requirement ot 10 CFR S 50.47(a)(1) that there be "reasonable assurance that adeq' tate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency." The NRC regulations l
l set forth in mandatory language the requirement that the reason-able assurance finding be based on a review of FEMA findings:
l The NRC will base its finding on a review of IFEMA1 findinos and determinations as to whether State and local emergency plans are
, adequate and whether there is reasonable assurance that they can be implemented.
)
(footnote continued from previous page) fundamentally wrong with its current monitoring proposal." PID at 93.
10 CFR S 50.47(a)(2) (emphasis supplied). The language of Section 50.47(a)(2) is unequivocal and leads itself to no contrary construction. Accordingly, the absence of FEMA findings precludes a reasonable assurance finding.
Under NRC case law, preliminary or interim FEMA findings may be, in certain circumstances, a sufficient basis for a Licensing Board's reasonable assurance finding. Egg Pacific Gas and Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2),
ALAB-781, 20 NRC 819 (1984); Pacific Gas and Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-776, 19 NRC 1373 (1984); Cincinnati Gas and Electric Co. (Wm. H. Zimmer Nuclear Power Station, Unit No. 1), ALAB-727, 17 NRC 760 (1983). Yet, these cases further hold that preliminary FEMA reviews and findings are sufficient to comply with Section 50.47(a)(2) only "as long as such information permits the Licensing Board to conclude that offsite emergency preparedness provides ' reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency.'" ALAB-776, 19 NRC at
) 1379; agg ALAB-781, 20 NRC at 828-29. Here, however, there were no FEMA findings - preliminary, interim or otherwise --
submitted to the Board.
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B. No FEMA Findings Exist Permitting a Reasonable Assurance Findina It is beyond dispute that there were no FEMA findings of any kind on which the Licensing Board could base ny reasonable assurance finding concerning the suitability of LILCO's reception centers. Indeed, FEMA took the position that it could offer no findings prior to an exercise of the reception centers. Thus, FEMA's witnesses submitted virtually no substantive direct testi-mony (a copy of the FEMA direct testimony is affixed hereto as ), and that which was submitted took a noncommittal position until such time as an exercise occurs. In particular, the FEMA direct testimony unequivocally stated that "the adequacy of these facilities as reception centers would have to be reviewed in a future exercise." Attachment 2 (FEMA testimony),
at 6.21/ In fact, at the hearing, the FEMA witnesses testified 21/ The need for such an exercise was highlighted by Mr. Keller's testimony concerning the tour which the FEMA witnesses took of the proposed reception centers:
Well, I would characterize it as we toured the operations centers, because they were not set up as reception centers yesterday . . . .
We went to the facility as it is used in its day-to-day operation. In other words, LILCO was using it as an area to do its normal gas and electric function. So, I wouldn't call it a reception center because the cones weren't set up, the reception center personnel weren't there. We did have a LILCO representative with us who did explain what it would be in the event, and we had the colored maps I guess we call them, right.
But, it wasn't really a reception center that I saw yesterday. I saw the trailers which (footnote continued)
that they had not reviewed LILCO's draft revisions, including 3 LILCO's proposed new monitoring procedures. Tr. 18269 (Husar);
Tr. 18305 (Keller).25_/ Likewise, in both their direct testimony l
and under cross-examination, the FEMA witnesses testified j
) unequivocally and repeatedly that they were able to make no findings -- preliminary or otherwise -- as to the adequacy of the l proposed reception centers, and they offered no opinion whatso-
) ever on the matter. Attachment 2 (FEMA testimony), at 6, 18; Tr.
18271-72 (Husar); Tr. 18342 (Baldwin). Thus, no FEMA "informa- I tion" exists on the record which could even be considered to l
) constitute FEMA findings, preliminary or otherwise. Indeed, the only existing FEMA findings on LILCO's proposed reception centers are the negative findings in the RAC review of Revision 8 of the
) LILCO Plan.26_/
(footnote continued from previous page) will be used for decontamination. I saw the areas that the evacuees would be directed to.
I saw the flow paths.
But I didn't see a reception center yesterday.
Tr. 18337 (Keller).
25/ While there was some limited FEMA testimony elicited on cross-examination concerning LILCO's procedures, it was largely irrelevant and most of its was negative to LILCO's case. Indeed, i Mr. Keller specifically stated that he was unable to determine at the time whether LILCO's proposed monitoring procedures were adequate; but he nonetheless noted that the procedures as he understood them were controversial. Tr. 18309-10 (Keller).
26_/ The NRC did submit Revision 8 of the LILCO Plan to FEMA with a request that it be reviewed by the Regional Assistance Committee ("RAC"). FEMA Ex. 3. That review was completed on December 15, 1986 and submitted to the NRC on December 30, 1986.
Th's RAC found the portion of the LILCO Plan pertaining to LILCO's
- sception centers and Section J.12 "Inadecuate." With respect to (footnote continued)
)
The Licensing Board, however, ignored the testimony of the
) FEMA witnesses that FEMA findings on the adequacy of the recep-tion centers could only be made after a FEMA-graded exercise of ,
proposed sites set up as reception centers. Likewise, it
) ignored the mandate of Section 50.47(a)(2) that a reasonable assurance finding be based on a review of FEMA findings. Accord-ingly, the Licensing Board's finding of reasonable assurance is
) based on a legally deficient record requiring reversal and remand for the purpose of considering FEMA findings -- whenever they may be issued.
)'
V. THE LICENSING BOARD DID NOT ARTICULATE A BASIS FOR RESOLVING THE ISSUE OF EVACUATION SHADOW CAUSED BY LOCALLY UNWANTED LAND USE J
t At the trial below, Appellants submitted evidence esta-blishing that LILCO's three reception centers are situated in densely populated neighborhoods and commercial areas. Sig SC Ex.
15 (Johnson and Saegert), at 18; NY Ex. 5 (Hartgen and Pillspaugh), Atts. 3-6. Moreover, Appellants submitted evidence that should the reception centers ever become operational, people from the communities surrounding the reception centers would perceive the reception centers themselves as a threat, or in
$ sociological terms, a locally unwanted land use ("LULU"). The l
(footnote continued from previous page) the three facilities themselves, the RAC made no findings on adequacy, stating that adequacy must be evaluated at a future
$ exercise. M., Att. 1, at 11. The RAC found LILCO's monitoring procedure to be inadequate on the ground that it was contrary to Section J.12 to monitor drivers only, rather than all arriving evacuees. Sig M. , Att . 1, at 12.
Governments then showed that in the event of an accident at
) Shoreham, people in the communities surrounding the reception centers would evacuate. SC Ex. 15 (Johnson and Saegert), at 17.
These additicnal evacuees would then put demand on the roads
) surrounding the reception centers, further delaying and complica-ting the arrival of EPZ evacuees. Id. at 18.
) The Licensing Board summarized the testimony presented by both sides on the issue of whether the public perception of the reception centers as LULUS would cause an evacuation. PID at 75.
The Board, however, made no explicit findings as to whether people who live around the reception centers would evacuate in the event of an emergency. PID at 77. This is reversible error, for licensing boards have a duty not only to resolve contested issues but also "to articulate in reasonable detail the basis for the course of action chosen." Public Service Co. of New Hamoshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-422, 6 NRC 33, 41 (1977), cuotino Northern States Power Co., (Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Plant, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-104, 6 AEC 179 l
e (1973). This requirement exists so that both the Appeal Board and the parties can comprehend the foundation for the licensing board's rulings and engage in a reasoned review of the licensing board decision. Northern States Power Co., ALAB-104, 6 AEC 179 at n.2; Seabrook, ALAB-422, 6 NRC at 41.2_7,/
2_1/ Of course, there are limits to a licensing board's
] obligation to explain its decision. For example, a licensing board decision need not refer specifically to every proposed finding proffered by the parties. Seabrook, ALAB-422, 6 NRC at (footnote continued)
]
).
Because the Licensing Board found in favor of LILCO, we must
) presume that it resolved the question of whether LILCO's recep-tion centers constitute LULUS against Appellants. Yet, the Licensing Board did not articulate any basis for resolving the
) issue; thus this aspect of the case must be therefore be reman-ded. Furthermore, by failing to articulate any decision concerning evacuation from around the reception centers, the
) Licensing Board made it impossible to determine the size of the evacuation shadow.28/ Since evacuation shadow also effects the Licensing Board's analysis of traffic concerns, that issue must
) also be remanded.
VI. THE BOARD ERRED IN STRIKING PROBATIVE EVIDENCE CONCERNING THE LILCO REGISTRATION PROCEDURES As part of the direct testimony of James D. Papile, James C.
Baranski and Lawrence B. Czech, the State of New York submitted testimony concerning the adequacy of the recordkeeping and regis-tration procedures incorporated as part of LILCO's reception center monitoring plan. NY Ex. 1 (Papile et al.), at 22-23.
Among other things, the state witnesses' testimony focused on the importance of recording the names of all who arrive at -he recep-
)
l (footnote continued from previous page)
- 41. However, the reviewing court "must not be left to guess as j to the agency's findings or reasons." Greater Boston Television Coro, v. FCC, 444 F.2d. 841, 851 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert denied, 403 U.S. 923 (1971).
} 2_8/ "Evacuation shadow" refers to the tendency of people outside the defined zone to risk to evacuate even though they are not advised to do so. Thus, when residents flee from around the reception centers, they contribute to the evacuation shadow.
t
tion centers, and not just the names of those who are found to be contaminated (LILCO's proposed procedure). Id.
LILCO moved to strike this testimony on the grounds that:
(1) recordkeeping is not an issue admitted by the Board; and (2) there is no regulatory basis for the recordkeeping requirements in the Papile testimony. LILCO Motion to Strike Testimony of
) Papile et al. (April-18, 1987). The Appellants opposed LILCO's motion to strike on the grounds that adequate monitoring is a clear regulatory rt.quirement under Section J.12, and the adequacy
) of recordkeeping is inextricably intertwined with the issue of I adequate monitoring. Response of the State of New York to the i
j LILCO Motion to Strike Testimony of Papile et al. (April 30,
) 1987).
The Licensing Board granted LILCO's motion and struck the State's registration testimony, holding that it "does not i materially relate to the matters at issue in this proceeding."
l Memorandum and Order (Ruling on LILCO's Motion to Strike Testi-mony of Papile et al.) (June 17, 1987), at 4. However, in a complete about-face from its earlier ruling, the Licensing Board treated registration as an issue in the Partial Initial Decision.
PID at 99-100. Indeed, the Board specifically recognized the registration issue, for it stated:
) Applicant's planning basis, traffic plan, recep-tion center locations, monitoring, recistration and decontamination procedures, staffing plans
} , -
and provisions for handling evacuees are adequate and sat.'.sfy NRC's reculatory standards.
Id. at 108 (emphasis supplied).
Given the explicit recognition in the Partial Initial Deci-sion that registration was an issue, the Licensing Board's ruling striking the State testimony on that issue is clearly in error.
It is fundamental to any notion of due process and reasoned dispute resolution that probative evidence must be admitted.
There was simply no basis to strike the State's testimony l concerning registration, and the Board's decision on registration
! must therefore be reversed and remanded for further evidentiary hearings.
VII. CONCLUSION For the reasons stated above, the Licensing Board Partial
( Initial Decision must be reversed.
1
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Respectfully submitted, E. Thomas Boyle
) Suffolk County Attorney Building 158 North County Complex Veterans Memorial Highway Hauppauge, New York 11788
)
M Christopher M. McMurray David T. Case Ronald R. Ross KIRKPATRICK & LOCKHART 1800 M Street, N.W.
South Lobby - 9th Floor Washington, D.C. 20036-5891 Attorneys for Suffolk County 4 T T._
Fabian G. Palomino '
Richard J. Zahnleuter Special Counsel to the Governor l
' of the State of New York Executive Chamber, Room 229 Capitol Building Albany, New York 12224 Attorneys for Mario M. Cuomo l
Governor of the State of New York
\
l Jre/L /1 4 a l- &
Stephen B. Latham '
i Twomey, Latham & Shea Post Office Box 398 33 West Second Street Riverhead, New York 11901 t
l Attorney for the Town of f Southampton
ATTACHMENT 1
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1 T 3* Federal Emergency Management Agency
,' / Washington, D.C. 20472 DEC 24 ;gg .. , g
. /a g MDOPMEX.M FCR NDI Division Chiefs iQ)
' " *3 Flot:
s Q W. Kr'
- - l Assistant Associate Director State and Iocal Prograns j ,
and Support SUB.TECr:
Chidance on NURITA654/FD4A-REP-1 Evaluation Criterion J.12 3 bis mmorardtra provides integretative guidance on NURfr,-0654/FD4A-REP-1 protective respcnse evaluation criterion J.12:
Each organization shall describe the means for registering and monitorirg of wacuees at. relocation centers in host areas. De personnel and equipnent available should be capable of rxnitoring within about a 12-hour period all
' residents and trar.sients in the pitane exposure EP2 arrivirg at relocation centers.
De question arises as to the percentage of the evacuees that eculd reason-ably be expected to arrive at a relocation center (s). Previous experience 3
J gathered on evacuation responses to a variety of natural ard techno1cgical emergencies is not ecoclusive. Research into this matter, however, has revealed that anywhere fran 3 to 20 percent of the evacuees arrived at relocation centers or shelters. For radiolcgical energencies, it is rea-sonable to assume that additional evacuees, to allay their concerns ard fear over radiaticn, will go to relocation centers whether or not they 3
J have been exposed to radiation. Bus, the percentage of potential evacu-ees for radiological emergencies may be closer to the upper end of the 3 to 20% range.
ne cugiwate care issue is reviewd as a part of all At mic Safety and Licensing Board hearirgs, alth: ugh it has never been fonnally litigated at 3 such a hearing. Re ecogregate care facility capacity in the vicinity of J
nuclear pcwer plants is usually cited as beiro betwen 5 and 15 percent of the estimated number of evacuees. With these percentages in mind, it is apparent that there is significant diversity in the frame of reference sur-rounding this , issue.
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The guidance provided below is based on the followirg factors: (1) Past experience with evacuations regardless of the nature of the mergency, (2) inclusicn of fear and uncertainty factors asscciated with radiological emergencies ard (3) percentage of potential evacuees for wwate care facilities cited in ASLB hearirgs.
! Guidance The State ard local radiolcgical emergency preparedness plans should include provisicns at relocatico center (s) in the fonn of trained personnel and equipment to monitor a minimLa of 20 percent of the estimated population to be evacuated. ,
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For highly improbable radiolcgical releases involving high levels of radiation encanpassirg a relatively large area, it may be necessary to monitor a greater nLEber of evacuees beyond 20 percent of .the population. In such a situaticn, State ard local goverments wxid be expected to develop ard
) implement ad hoc respcnse measures, supplemented, if needed, by Federal ard private sector resources. -
Any questicns or ecocerns abcdt this guidance should be directed to Mr. Bill Mc.t tt at 646-2857.
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? i i' Federal Emergency Management Atency
' Washington, D.C. 20472 l
OCT 2 21985 ,
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MEMCRANDLN FOR: Marshall E. Sa rs Osief, Pol velgpent Bean W [. * !
FKM Cra . W1 f C11ef, Field ope ions Brand l SLW ECT:
Policy Determination Ccncerning NUREG-0654 Element J 12
'Ihe attached October 4,1985 letter frcan Joe Keller, of the Idaho National f Engineering Iaboratory (INIL), to Stewart Glass, Regiersal Counsel of FD%
Region II, was received in this office and in Regien II on October 16, l 1985. Although Mr. Keller asks his questions in w c.ection with theMr. Glass I
Shoreham plan review, the issue is also applicable to other plans. l has requested that since this really involves %.s policy questions, Could you the respcnse be coordinated at Hewers in We have attaded a copy of the this office. ,,
f please answer Mr. Keller's ques'tions? October 8,1985, We FD% finding on Re l for Shoreham. 'Ihat finding is referenced in Mr. Keller's letter. '
would appreciate it if you could address this issue soon so that the FEMA witness panel could have an answer before they have to testify on the Revision 5 finding. No hearing date has been set en this material but it is probable that the panel (Kowieski - FDM, McIntire - FDM, Keller - INEL and Bal& tin - Argonne National Iaboratory) will have to give testimx1y. ,
Attachment i
As Stated l
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g Westinghouse Idaho L Nuclear Company. Inc.
Box 4000 Idaho Falls. Idaho 83403 JHK-57-85 October 4. 1985 Stewart M. Glass, Esc. ,
Regional Counsel Federal Emergency Management Agency Region !!
26 Federal Plaza l
Dear Mr. Glass:
Subject:
Clarification of NUREG 0654 Element J.12 l . I celieve tnat clarification is rcouired as to tne meaning or NUREG 0654
- l. element J.12. Since it is very likely tnat the FEMA witness canel will again have to accear oefore tne ASLB on the Shorenam emergency orecaredness issues, I would like to see tne answers to tne following questions:
1
- 1. Is tnere an NRC position on the numoer of evacuees wno mignt arrive at a reception center (s) for monitoring and if so wnat % of tne EPZ cooulation shoula be used in ene olanning orocess?
- 2. More 1moortantly, wnat is the FEMA cosition on tne same cuestionst i raise tnis issue for two reasons. First, curing the Indian Point ASL3 nearings I recall a NRC Comission Ruling wn1cn you suocitec as eacxgrouna material, wnich stated that 100% of tne EPZ occulation must ce considerea wnen acolying the 12 nour time frame of element J.12. Unfortunately I can l not recall if this statement was in tne cocy of the Ruling or in one of the indivicual ooinions Jocended to the Ruling. The location of the statement would have consideraole
Dearing on the issue. Secona,
wnile the RAC nas founa the LILCO olan inaceauate with resoect to element J.12, the reason for the inadecuacy is not tne inacility to monitor arriving evacuees within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />. The ASLB, on page 10 of tne Concluding Partial Initial Decision on Emergency Planning, has founc the LILCO olan to oe defective occause of the failure to adequately olan for the monitoring and
/ registration of memoers of tne general ouolic arriving at tne receotion The 20% of tne EPZ oooulation used in olanning for sneltering is
( center.
aooarently accootaole out the ASLB coints out that the numoer seeming l monitoring is not necessarily the same as enat seeming shelter.
) .
Stewart M. Glass, Esq.
I Page 2
)D JHK-57-85 October 4, 1985 While the immediate concern is for the requirements to be used in the review of the LILCO plan, this issue effects the review of all plans.
Therefore the FEMA position, and to a somewhat lesser degree the NRC
) position, should be known and clearly defined.
I thank you for your help in obtaining a definitive position on this issue.
) Sincerely,
//
J. H. Keller, Staff Scientist Special Programs
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cc: M. Lawless - FEMA R. Kowieski - FEMA -
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4 l:S UNITED STATH OF AMERICA g NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board In the Matter of )
_g LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY ) Docket No. 50-322-OL-3
) (Emergency Planning)
(Shoreham Nuclear Power )
Station, Unit 1 )
DIRECT TESTIMONY OF THOMAS E. BALDWIN, IBOR W. EUSAR
$ JOSEP9 E. KELLER S -
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Q.1. Please state your name and business address.
A. Thomas E. Baldwin - Argonne National Laboratory, 277 Main Street, Second Floor Port Washington, NY 11050 A. Joseph H. Keller - Idaho National Engineering Laboratory Westinghouse Idaho Nuclear Company, Inc.
P.O. Box 4000 Idaho Falls, ID 83401 A. Ihor W. Husar - Federal Emergency Management Agency 26 Federal Plaza New York, NY 10278 Q.2. Do you have statements of professional qualifications?
A. Yes. Our statements of professional qualifications are attached to this testimony.
Q.3. When did the panel members first become involved in emergency planning in general and specifically when did they first become involved in a review of the radiological emergency planning as it
) relates to the Shoreham Nuclear Power Station?
)
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A. With respect to Messrs Baldwin and Keller, these questions'were addressed in the FEMA prefiled testimony in these proceedings dated April 17, 1984.
Mr. Husar first became involved in emergency planning'while serving in the U.S. Army on active duty as a Military Intelligence Officer from 1968 to 1972. From 1972 to 1979, Mr. Husar, after joining Career Federal service, specialized
) in security planning, working for several Department of Defense agencies. In 1979, he joined the Defense Civil Preparedness Agency, one of five predecessor agencies of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). With that agency, in the New York office, Mr. Husar monitored and evaluated nuclear attack plans of state and local governments. After FEMA was formed in July 1979, Mr. Husar continued involvement in emergency planning. From 1980 to 1982, Mr. Husar was responsible for the FEMA S
review of off-site radiological emergancy
) -
preparedness for commercial nuclear power plants in New Jersey and New York. During that time, he served as Chairman, Regional Assistance Committee (RAC).
In 1983, Mr. Husar was selected as Branch Chief, National Preparedness Programs. In that capacity, he was responsible for Federal government preparedness programs in FEMA Region II. In that capacity Mr. Husar was responsible for assisting Federal Agencies in the Region in 3 developing plans for national security
) emergencies.
In June 1986, Mr. Husar was reassigned to the FEMA Region II Natural and Technological Hazards Division as Supervisory Natural and Technological i
Hazards Programs Specialist. At that time, he J was also appointed as RAC Chairman. Mr. Husar first became involved in a review of radiological emergency planning as it relates to the Shoreham Nuclear Power Station on October 6, 1986, based on a request from the Agency's headquarters to review LILCO plan revisions 7 and 8. Mr. Husar, in his capaci+y as RAC Chairman, oversaw the technical review and consolidation of the RAC review of Revision 7 and 8 of the LILCO Transition Plan.
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, Since the consideration and transmittal of the RAC Review of LILCO's Transition Plan, Revision 6, 7 and 8 on December 19, 1986 to FEMA L . Headquarters, Mr. Husar's involvement from that date to the present has centered around required
. actions in connection with the two Shoreham ASLBs (OL-5 and OL-3).
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In the following testimony, FEMA has assumed that the reopened record will cover issues similar to those initially raised by CONTENTION 24.0 and by the factors temanded to the hearing Board by ALAB-832 with regard to Reception Center issues. FEMA has, however, transposed the latest version of the LILCO plan, i.e. Revision 8, into the conceptual setting of the above issues. In addition, the four additional issues accepted in the December 11, 1986 Board Order will be addressed below.
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CONTENTION 24.0
. ISSUE: There are no relocation centers available for a
- significant portion of the anticipated evacuees.
ANSWER: Revision 8 of the LILCO plan separates the functions of a relocation center into reception center functions and sheltering functions. This testimony will only address the reception center functions which are registration, radiological monitoring, and decontamination, if necessary.
As stated in the RAC review of Revision 8 of the plan, there are three reception centers designated for the general public. The following three LILCO facilities have been' designated (OPIP l
4.2.3): Bellmore,'Hicksville, and Roslyn Operations Centers. No letters of agreement are needed for the use of these facilities in an emergency, since these facilities are owned by LILCO. The facilities identified in the original contention (i.e., Revision 3 of the LILCO plan)
' f were not owned by LILCO and thus~ required letters of agreement for their use. It in FEMA's position that there are now recesbion centers specified for the general public. However, as stated in the RAC review, under element J.12, the j adequacy of these facilities as reception centers would have to be reviewed in a future exercise.
Such a review would involve a visual inspection of the facility, completely set up as a reception center, for a general verification against the plan description.
The RAC review of Revision 8 also states, under element J.12, that there are no reception centers l specified for many of the evacuees from special I facilities (special population reception centers). See OPIP 3.6.5 pages 22-37.
With regard to the number of evacuees to be planned for in an emergency, NUREG 0654 element J.12 states:
Each organir.ation shall describe the means for registering and monitoring evacuees at relocation centers in host areas. The .
personnel and equipment available should be
- capable of monitoring within about a 12-hour period all residents and transients in the
]
CONTENTION li (Continued) plume exposure EPZ arriving at relocation
) centers.
The issue which must be addressed is the definition of an acceptable value for the "all... arriving" phrase within element J.12. In the earlier hearings on this issue before the OL-3 Board, the FEMA witness panel
) testified that, based on experience gained from natural disasters, the number of people that seek temporary sheltering is in the range of 10-15 % of the population instructed to evacuate. The number of people seeking monitoring, regardless of their need for temporary sheltering, may be larger than the
) number of people who would seek sheltering.
it is FEMA's position that a 20% figure is a Therefore reasonable figure to be used as a planning basis for compliance with NUREG 0654 element J.12 for monitoring within about 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />. This position has been stated in the December 24, 1985 letter from R. Krimm to NTH
) Division Chiefs, a copy of which has been served on all parties by FEMA counsel. The approximate 12-hour period for the radiological monitoring of-evacuees is a recommended target for planning purposes and for evaluating monitoring capabilities.
) U.slike the element on monitoring, NUREG-0654 sets no time parameters for the performance of decontamination activities. Good health physics practice would indicate that decontamination of any contaminated evacuees would be done as soon as is feasible. NUREG-0654 also establishes no parameters for the numbers of
[) people which the decontamination facilities should be .
I able'to accommodate.
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- REMAND ISSUE'A ISSUE
- The location of the three reception centers
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and their distance from the plume EPZ
/ boundary might cause transportation and-L' traffic problems.
L ANSWER: FEMA has no position on this issue. The NRC will sponsor a witness to address this issue. .
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ISSUE: .The location and distance of the~three e reception centers from the plume EPZ. boundary I
/ might cause problems due to the shadow i evacuation phenomer.on. !
ANSWER: FEMA has no position on the issue as stated.
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REMAND ISSUE C ISSUE: The proposed use of the three reception l
centers requires authorization under State
.- environmental laws. .
ANSWER: FEMA has no position on this issue, except i that FEMA is not aware that any other nuclear power plant.in New York has had to have authorization under State environmental laws for the reception centers in the respective Plans for the v.arious sites.
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REMAND ISSUE D ISSUE: The decontamination activities, if needed, which will be accomplished at the reception '
centers, might create health and safety problems"by contamination of the public water ,
supply.
ANSWER: Revision 8 of the LILCO plan (OPIP 3.9.2, Section 5.2.11) states that contaminated liquid wastes which have been contained wil'1 be transported to the Shoreham Nuclear Power Station.(SNPS) for disposal. If containment is not possible, the liquid waste will be diluted and dispersed. [
The fact that decontamination is necessary is a result of a radioactive release which ;
contaminates personnel and/or vehicles.- i There are two ways in which contamination can ;
be brought to the Reception Center, First, evacuees and/or their vehicles intercept a ,
portion of the airborne plume which would have otherwise deposited on the fixed surfaces in the plume path. Second, contamination could be picked-up by ;
evacuees or their vehicles from an area previously contaminated by plume passage. l The act of' reporting to a reception center for monitoring and decontamination does not ;
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it merely facilitates the movement of a portion of the radioactive material which was released to the environment by the ,
- incident -
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A potential threat to a water supply l (underground aquifer) is not caused by the ;
j process of decontamination of personnel and ;
y vehicles. If a threat exists, rain or snow
) falling on the surface of the land mass, -
which would also have been contaminated I by the plume passage, would have a much greater potential for contamination of the :
aquifer. The problem, if any, created by the l disposal of decontamination solutions is j
) trivial when compared to potential problems resulting from leaching of radioactive material deposited on the fixed surfaces in !
I the plume path. j i
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REMAND ISSUE D (Continued)
It is FEMA's position that the method proposed for the disposal of liquid waste generated by the decontamination of offsite personnel and equipment is generally acceptable. The plan lacks specific details
) on the size of containment tanks and how and
/ where the disposal of uncontained liquids will occur. However, it should be noted that the LILCO plan contains about the same detail as other plans approved by FEMA Region II for other nuclear power sites in the region.
In addition, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), Region II office, issued a letter stating that, in essence, the method proposed in Revision 8 of the LILCO plan is an acceptable means of dealing with
) contaminated liquid wastes generated by J decontamination of offsite personnel and vehicles in an emergency. In the draft revision of the EPA Manual of Protective Action Guides and Protective Actions for Nuclear Incidents (EPA-520/1-75-001) dated
) June 27, 1986, the statement is made on page J 7-36; "Do not Hanin (emphasis added) efforts trying to contain contaminated wash water",
when discussing the control of surface contamination on persons and equipment.
This statement is in agreement with the previous EPA Region II letter.
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REMAND ISSUE E ISSUE: The distance between the boundary of the plume exposure EPZ and the designated reception centers will unacceptably increase the radiation exposure of contaminated individuals.
ANSWER: The three reception centers designated in Revision 8 of the LILCO pl.an are approximately 40 miles from the SNPS (page 4.2-1, line-5), which means that they are all approximately 30 miles from the boundary of the plume exposure EPZ. In addition, all three reception centers are located southwest of the SNPS. The distance and direction from l the plant are similar to those of the previously designated reception center, tb3 l Nassau Colesium.
In the review of plans, FEMA uses NUREG-0654 element J.10.h to evaluate the acceptability li of the location of reception centers.
l Reception centers are to be at least 5 miles and preferably 10 miles from the boundary of the 10-mile EPZ (15 and 20 miles from the plant site). Beyond 20 miles some consideration must be given to the delay I which might result from increased travel time. However, the delay will not typically result in a medically significant increase in I exposure. Reception centers in the 20 mile i range are preferable in order to reduce the
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potential for the need to relocate the center
, in the event of a worse case incident, l
' A survey of reception centers and their distances from the EPZ boundary at other nuclear power plant sites indicates that there are numerous reception centers designated for other nuclear power plants at distances comparable to those identified for Shoreham (see S. Glass letter dated February 12, 1985 to M. Miller, copies to the service list).
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REMAND ISSUE E
-(Continued)
During the earlier stages of these '
proceedings, FEMA did not find that the distance to the then designated reception center was unacceptable, notwithstanding the
- desirability of having a suitable facility (s) i closer to the EPZ boundary. Since the three newly designated reception centers are approximately the same distance from the EPZ t
boundary as the previous reception center, there is no reason to find that these new reception centers are unacceptable _due to distance from the EPZ.
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l BOARD ISSUE 1 l
l ISSUE: The evacuation routes to, and in the vicinity j of, the proposed reception centers will cause unacceptable traffic. congest!.on.
j ANSWER: FEMA has no position on this issue. NRC will
,. sponsor a witness to address this issue.
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-is- g BOARD ISSUE 3 ISSUE: The staffing requirements for the new system of three reception centers have not been adequately addressed. '
ANSWER: Revision 8 of the LILCO plan (OPIP 4.3.2 Attachment 2) lists the number of staff that will be assigned to the three general public reception centers. Attachments 3 - 5, of the same procedure, show a map of the locations of the assignments of the various staff. In addition to the monitoring teams shown on the layouts for each reception center, there are 12 additional mon'i tors assigned to the Hicksville center to monitor evacuees arriving by bus.
The RAC review of Revision 8 of the LILCO plan found that element J.12 of NUREG 0654 was inadequate, partly because of the Procedure proposed for monitoring arriving vehicles and their drivers. The process of evaluating the number of personnel required to perform the proposed procedures would therefore appear to be fruitless.
It should be noted that based on the proposed procedures for monitoring bus evacuees, essentially the same procedure which was included in previous versions of the plan and found to be acceptable, the number of monitors assigned does not meet the 12 hour1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> provision of NUREG 0654 element J.12, as explained below. The number of evacuees arriving at a reception center for monitoring is still under discussion and is the subject of an appeal to ALAB-855. The outcome of
! that appeal has nothing to do with the number
( of trained personnel needed to monitor bus
) evacuees for the following reasons: (1) The current version of the plan states that all evacuees using LERO supplied buses as evacuation vehicles will be transported to the Hicksville reception center for monitoring. (2) The plan also states that the
} buses will be directed to the entrance of the operations building where the monitoring will occur inside the main lobby (this area is l
separate from the monitoring areas designated for evacuees arriving in personal vehicles),
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BOARD ISSUE 3 (Continued)
(3) The planning basis in Appendix A page
} III-35 states that 8% of the year round population in residence do not have cars and could, therefore, require bus transportation for an evacuation.
If the assumption is made that the use of the
)- average population is reasonable, 8% of the 138,500 winter residents could need bus transportation and would therefore be driven to the Hicksville reception center for monitoring. This figure of 11,080 evacuees would need to be monitored within about 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> regardless of the percentage of the general population arriving at reception centers for which monitoring plans must eventually be made. Using the 90 second monitoring time per evacuee contained in OPIP !
) 3.9.2 Section 5.4.7.c the 12 monitors
/ ,,
. assigned to the bus evacuee monitoring area could monitor 5760 evacuees in the 12 hour1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br /> l period. If the additional time required for thyroid monitoring as called for in OPIP 3.9.2 Section 5.10.is added, the short fall in monitoring personnel is even greater.
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It should also be noted that the RAC review of Revision 8 of the LILCO plan, identified an additional basis for the inadequate finding for NUREG 0654 element J.12. The 1 plan did not designate reception centers for J many of the special facility populations and therefore the RAC could not verify the adequacy cf the 25 monitors assigned to monitor evacuees from these
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facilities.
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BOARD ISSUE 4 ISSUE: The proposal to transport all evacuees, using LERO buses for evacuation, to the Hicksville reception center is not acceptable since this facility has been designated as a relocation center for emergency workers and their families.
ANSWER: Revision 8 of the LILCO plan designates the
) Hicksville Operation Office as a Relocation Center (OPIP 4.6.1). However, on evaluation of the substance of the procedure, it is clear that this facility is intended as a congregate care center for LERO workers
) and/or their families (see Section 5.1.13).
It should be noted that the referenced section of the procedure has not been updated and still carries the superseded general population reception center designation within the body of the Section.
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From the diagrams within OPIP 4.6.1 and the
! discussion in OPIP 4.2.3 Section 5.6, FEMA l ' concludea that the bus evacuees are registered, monitored, and decontaminated if l necessary in areas separate from the areas used by the LERO workers and/or families. It
)
, is FEMA's position, that based on a review of
( the pertinent portions of the plan, there is
! nothing inherently unacceptable with the l proposed method of handling bus evacuees.
l However, it should be noted that the RAC review of Revision 8 of the LILCO plan,
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states that the adequacy of the three new recepti~on centers would have to be evaluated in a future exercise. Such an evaluation would involve visual inspection of the facility, completely set up as a reception
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t center, for a general verification against the plan description.
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BOARD ISSUE 7
.. ISSUE: The proposed method of monitoring the general public evacuees in the parking lots of the ,
J three receptioncenters can not be implemented in a way to adequately protect the public health and safety.
ANSWER: As stated in the FEMA response to BOARD ISSUE
). 3, the RAC review of Revision 8 of the LILCO plan found NUREG element J.12 to be inadequate, in part because of the proposed method of monitoring the evacuees arriving by personal vehicle. The evacuees arriring by personal vehicles are the concerns of this issue.
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Monitoring the evacuees in their vehicles in the parking lots does not enable the monitors to perform a complete "frisking" of the evacuees. Revision 8 of the plan calls for only monitoring the hands and the area around
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the drivers feet. Even if the monitoring personnel were to attempt to monitor all of the passengers, there would be areas i.e.,
backs of legs, backs, etc., which could not be monitored adequately while the evacuees are in their vehicles. It should be noted
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that for the case where evacuees become contaminated by immersion in the plume, localized contamination is not likely. Where ,
contamination is picked up from c.ontact with previously contaminated items, the possibility of localized contamination is
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more probable. It is not likely that medically significant contamination would be picked up by this later case.
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. 'g Ihpx_W..Hus.ar A native of Central New .'arsey. Mr. Husar entered the emergency preparedness field in April 1979, after working seven years in security and intelligence for DoD. when hired by the Defense Civil Preparedness Agency. New York field office. Serving as a
' field representative, he was responsible for providing emergency preparedness financial and technical assistance to New Jersey.
New York. Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands.
Mr. Husar has been employed by FEMA since its establishment and has served the New York Regional Office in many capacities. He was Chairman. Regional Assistance Committee (RAC) for state / local response planning surrounding nuclear power plants.
He was Acting Division Chief. Plans and Preparednesss. and has responded to Presidentially declared disasters throughout Region I'I . Mr. Husar performed a support role in.the Love Canal emergency, as well as Puerto Rico and New York State hurricane disasters.
Until the position was abolished in June 1986. Mr. Husar was Branch Chief. National Preparedness Programs. He was directly responsible for the management of Government Preparedness j (Special Access Programs) and National Preparedness Programs in
/ the region. He was Executive Secretary. Regional Preparedness Committee (RPC) and was' responsible for the Regional Emergency Response Team (RERT) plan development. He also served as l
Regional Individual Mobilization Augmentee (IMA) Program l Coordinator.
Currently. Mr. Husar is Supervisory Natural & Technological i Hazards Programs Specialist, in the Natural & Technological l
Hasards Programs Division (NTH). As a result of an Agency l
Reduction in Force (RIF) Mr. Husar was reassigned to this l position and was selected by the Acting Regional Director to h serve again as RAC Chairman. Mr. Husar is currently responsible
) for the day to day oversight of National Flood Insurance Program l (NFIP) in the region as well as technological hazards programs.
The latter program area includes off-site safety surrounding l commercial nuclear power plants and response planning for peace I time radiological accidents (including nuclear weapons accidents) and hazardous materials. In addition, he has retained h responsibility for the Regional Emergency Response Team (RERT)
/
Plan.
Mr. Husar graduated from Rider College. Lawrenceville. NJ in 1967 with a Bachelor of Arts degree in Secondary Education (History).
He has completed pre-candidate work for a Masters in Business
) Administration degree with Southern Illinois University.
)
l In 1984. Mr. Husar was nominated for and completed Executive
- Management training at the Executive Seminar Center. Kings Point. ,
! NY. He has been the recipient of several awards during his career in the Federal government.
l Mr. Husar is a Vietnam veteran, having served four years on active duty as an Army Intelligence Officer. He is currently a Lieutenant Colonel in the US Army Reserves.
He presently resides in Marlboro, New Jersey and married 18 l- years, and is the father of six children.
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t THOMAS E. BALDWIN Environmental Systems Engineer .
Energy and Environmental Systems Division (EES)
Argonne National Laboratory (ANL)
Garden City, New York
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Education Background Ph.D. 1973, Human Ecology and Demography, University of Cincinnati y M.A. 1969, Sociology and Human Ecology, University of Cincinnatl
) B.S. 1967, Sociology and Biology, Missouri Valley College Professional Experience 1983-present Environmental Systems Engineer, EES, ANL, Garden City,
) New York As Northeastern Regional Manager for support services provided by ANL under contract to the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), Dr. Baldwin is responsible for the scheduling and management of services furnished to the FEMA's
} Region I and II offices in Boston and New York City. He is experienced in reviewing state and local radiological emergency response plans and avaluating their capabilities to protect populations living in the emergency planning zones surrounding commercial nuclear power plants. Dr. Baldwin frequently served as a Federal observer and team leader at off-site radiological emergency preparedness exercises. He is responsible for
) the preparation and technical review of post exercise assessment reports detailing the results of these exercises.
1982-1983 Senior Demographer / Economist, Energy and Env!ronmental Analysts, Inc. (EEA), Environmental Consultants, Garden City, New York
)
Responsible for analyzing the demographic, economic and social aspects of energy and industrial projects. Consultant to the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, New York Public Development Corporation and Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner and Smith, Inc., in assessing the economic feasibility of a satellite telecommunications facility for New York. Consultant to Argonne National Laboratory, in the review of state and local off-site radiological emergency response plans for commercial nuclear l
power plants in New England, New York, and New Jersey. Responsible for expanding EEA's base of ellents who require assessments of economic return and the socioeconomic impacts associated with metropolitan development projects.
)
- THOMAS R. BALDWIN 2 Professional Experience (Cont'd) 1981-1982 Manager of Economics,' Dravo Van Houten, Inc. (DVH),
Consulting Engineers, New York, New York Energy Economics - Managed marketing and project evaluation analyses of the oil and gas industry leading to corporate investment decisions. These studies were prepared both for internal use by Dravo Corporation and for clients of DVH.
Industrial Development Economics -
Developed proposals for the financial / economic feasibility of marine engineering projects that ranged in size from limited, privately financed projects to large foreign regional development programs.
Reviewed and evaluated cargo forecasts and projections of regional economic growth used to obtain World Bank financing for container and bulk handling facilities proposed for the Port of Montevideo, Uruguay. Analyzed forecasts of the economic return from agro-industrial facilities proposed for the Port of Conakry, Guinea.
1979-1980 Senior Economist, PRC Harris, Inc., Consulting Engineers, Lake Success, New York l
Energy and Environmental Studies - Analyzed the demand for low pressure gas L reserves in rural upstate New York based on demographic trends and economic forecasts I
of future residential, commercial and industrial growth. Conducted the cost-benefit l analysis of erosion protection measures for the U.S. Corps of Engineers project to l protect commercial and residential developments along the Indian River Inlet in Delaware. Evaluated existing socioeconomic impact models for use by the Corps of Engineers Passale River Basin Study Group. Analyzed the economic ben 4 fits of I
improving the channel to accommodate larger fishing vessels in the Woodelef t Canal at Freeport, Long Island.
l Industrial Development Economics -- Project Manager for Terminal Construction t
Corporation's site / financial feasibility study for the development of a wholesale food I
distribution center in the Hackensack Meadowlands, New Jersey. Directed regional planning and socioeconomic analysis of growth related to the proposed development of a large agro-industrial port planned for Damletta, Egypt. Technical responsibilities to these studies included the determination of optimal phasing and evaluating the economic teturn on investment from the proposed projects.
1972-1979 Social Economist, EES, ANL, Chicago, Illinois Socioeconomic impact A-ments - Responsible for demographic, economic h and sociological analyses undertaken as part of a variety of research projects sponsored
, by the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE). These studies examined the socioeconomic impacts of changes in employment, population size and demographic composition that are associated with the construction and operation of large-scale energy projects.
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L L THOMAS E. BALDWIN 3 .
F Professional Experience (Cont'd)
Responsibilities required in-depth experience with regional economic and demographic '
pro}ect techniques, including export-base, input-output, and cohort surviui methods.
The construction of social surveys, use of population sampling methods, multivariate regression techniques and statistical analysis of population composition were also an integral part of this work.
LDC Energy Assessments -- Developed the socioeconomic component of Argonne l
National Laboratory's role in the International Energy Development Program sponsored by DOE. Prepared detailed, country-specific energy assessments for a number of
- countries. Specific responsibilities included the identification of socioeconomic issues l and problems, policy analysis, the development of research methodologies and interaction l with foreign representatives. Experience with the application d econometric models to planned and subsidized economies. Knowledge of spscific econometric methods for estimating fuel-specific energy demand as a function of price elasticities was also used in this research.
i Environmental Pollution Damages -
Joint Argonne National Laboratory / <
University of Chicago, Department of Economics project sponsored by the National Science Foundation (NSF) to analyze relationships between environmental pollution and the regional economy. Several studies were completed. These included: a survey of Chicago coal users to determine the costs of conversion to other fuels, an inventory of building materials to estimate the costs of solling due to air pollution, and a multivariate regression residuals analysis that displays the geographic distribution of relationships ,
between sociceconomic characteristics of the population and air quality in the Chicago l SMSA. Experience developed in the course of these studies included survey construction and sampling, economic cost-benefit analysis, and the use of air quality display models.
Professional Society Activities American Association for the Advancement of Science
, American Sociological Association Population Association of America ,
Publications: Journal Articles and Book Contributions Stenehjem, E.J., and T.E. Baldwin, A Framework for Detailed Site-Specific Studies of Local Socioeconomic impacts from Energy Development, in Progress in Socioeconomicss
)
1977. E. A!!en and A. Crawford, eds., Ann Arbor Science Press. Ann Arbor, Michigan (1977).
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THOMAS E. BALDWIN 4 Publications: Technical Reports Nagle, J. and R. Whitfield, Indian Point Nuclear Power Stattw Verification Analysis of County Radiological Emergency Response Plans, Argonne National Report, ANL/EES-TM-228 (May 1983). T.E. Baldwin vs responsible for the management and technical review of this report.
Baldwin, T.E., et al., Economic and Demographic issues Related to Deployment of the Sate!!ite Power System. ANL/EES-TM-23 (October 1978).
Baldwin, T.E. and Roberta Poetsch, An Approach to Assessing Local Sociocultural impacts Using Projections of Population Growth and Composition, ANL/EES-TM-24 (August 1977).
) Baldwin, T.E., et al., A Framework for Detailed Site-Specific Studies of Local Soefoeconomic Impacts from Energy Development, ANL/EES-TM-8 (December 1976).
Baldwin, T.E., A Socioeconcmic Assessment of Energy Development in a Small Rural County: Coal Casification in Mercer County, North Dakota, ANL/AA-5 (August 1976).
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Baldwin T.E., et al., Allocating Projected Emissions to Subcounty Areas, Vol.13 of Guidelines for Air Quality Maintenance Planning and Analysis: U.S. EPA Report EPA-450-4-74-014 (November 1974).
Rennedy, A.S., et al., Air Pollution / Land Use Planning Project: Phase !! Final Report,
) Vol.1-3, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency Report EPA-450/3-74-028 A, B, C (May 1974).
Norco, J.E., R.R. Cirillo, T.E. Baldwin, and J.W. Gudenas, An Air Pollution Impact Methodology for Attports and Attendant Land Use, ANL/ES-22 (January 1973).
Publications: Conference Papers (speaker's name is under!!ned)
Baldwin, T.E., Commercial Nuclear Power: Emergency Plans, the Regulators and the Public, paper presented to the New York Chapter of the American Institute of Chemists (September 18, 1985). ,
Stenehjem, E.J., T.E. Baldwin, and J.E. Metzger, Local Socioeconomic Impacts of Coal Development in the Midwest, Paper 12.2, Proc. 5th National Conference on Energy and the Environment Cincinnati (October 1977).
Baldwin T.E., J.C. Bosch, Jr., and R.R. Cirillo, Projecting Regional Air Pollution Using Traditional Planning Variables, Proceedings of the APCA Specialty Conference: "Long-
! Term Maintenance of Clean Air Standards"(February 3,1975).
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4 THOMAS E. BALDWIN ,
5 Publications: Conference Papers (speaker's name is under!!ned) (Cont'd) y Baldwin, T.E., Objectives and Decisions: How Do We Draw the Lines?, Paper presented
) at the Regional Seminar on Land Use issues sponsored by the Bi-State Metropolitan Commission, Geneseo, Illinois (January 15, 1975).
Baldwin, T.E., Community Structure and the Adaptation of Municipal Finance, paper presented at VI!! World Congress of the International Sociological Association Toronto,
) Ontario (August 26, 1974).
Kennedy, A.S. and T.E. Baldwin, The Feasibility of Predicting Point Source Emissions Using industrial Land Use Variables: A Path Analysis, Paper 74-145, Proc. 67th Annual l Air Pollution Control Association Meeting, Denver (June 1974).
Kennedy, A.S., and T.E. Baldwin, Clean Air Through Urban and Regional Planning, Proceedings of the Third International Clean Air Congress, Dusseldorff, Germany (October 1973).
l Croke, K.G., A.S. Kennedy, and T.E. Baldwin, Research Problems and Issues in the Application of Land Use Controls to Environmental Protection, Proc. Interagenc_y Cong.
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on the Environment, Lawrence Livermore Laboratory, U.S. AEC Report CONF-721002,
! pp.153-157.
l Internal Reports to Sponsors (unpublished) ,
Baldwin, T.E., E. Tanzman, A. Smith, W. Gasper, P. Becherman, K. Lerner, Post Exercise Assessment, February 13, 1986, Exercise of :he Local Offsite Radiological Emergency Response Plan, LILCO Transition Plan for the Shoreham Nuclear Power Station at
)> Shoreham, New York Federal Emergency Management Agency, Region II (Draf t: March 7, 1986).
- Gasper, W., T.E. Baldwin, A. Smith, Post Exercise Assessment, November 13, 1985, l Exercise of the Radiological Emergency Preparedness Plans of the State of New York y and Oswego County for Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation's Nine Mile Point Nuclear
) Power Station at Seriba Oswego County, New York, Federal Emergency Management Agency Region !!(Draft; January 10, 1985).
Gasper, W., T.E. Baldwin, Y. Klein, A. Smith, Post Exercise Assessment. September 26, 1985, Exercise of the Radiological Emergency Preparedness Plans of the State of New York, Monroe County and Wayne County for the Robert E. Ginna Nuclear Power Station,
) Federal Emergency Management Agency, Region 11 (D >cember 16, 1985).
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THOMAS E. BALDWIN 6 r
Internal Reports to Sponsors (unpublished) (Cont'd)
( Baldwin, T.E., G. Kaszynski, F. Kay, Post Exercise Assessment, June 5,1985. Exercise of
) the Radiological Emergency Response Plans of the State of New Jersey, Ocean County
- and Ocean County Municipalities for the Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station, j Federal Emergency Management Agency, Region !!(August 22, 1985).
Rospenda R., T.E. Baldwin, Post Exercise Assessment, April 23,1985. Remec'fal Exercise of the Radiological Emergency Response Plans for the State of New Jersey, Salem
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- County and Six Localities for Public Service Electric and Gas Company's Salem Nuclear
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Generating Station Hancocks Bridge, Salem County, New Jersey, Federal Emergency Management Agency, Region !! (June 19, 1985).
l Baldwin, T.E., Review of the Massachusetts Radiological Emergency Response Plan for :
the Seabrook Station Nuclear Power Plant, revision dated October 1984, Federal Emergency Management Agency, Region !(June 18, 1985). ;
Baldwin, T.E., A. Smith, Post Exercise Assessment, April 10, 1985, Remedial Exercise of the Radiological Emergency Preparedness Plans of New York State and Westchester. l b ,' - Rockland, Orange and Putnam Counties for the Indian Point Nuclear Power Station, j
- Federal Emergency Management Agency, Region II(May 10, 1985). ,
I Baldwin, T.E., Review of the New Hampshire Radiological Emergency Response Plan for the Seabrook Station Nuclear Power Plant, revision dated December 1984. Federal ,
Emergency Management Agency, Regior. !(March 26,1985).
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Baldwin, T.E., P. Becherman, S. Curtis, W. Gasper, R. Rospenda, Post Exercise Assessment, November 28, 1984, Exercise of the Radiological Emergency Preparedness l Plans of New York State and Westchester, Rockland, Orange and Putnam Counties for l the Indian Point Nuclear Power Station, Federal Emergency Management Agency, Region l 11 (February 27,1985). !
l Rospenda, R., T.E. Baldwin, S. Curtis, Post Exercise Assessment. October 23, 1984, l l Exe'cise of the Radiological Emergency Response Plans of the State of New Jersey, Q Salem Cour:ty and Six Localities, and Cumberland County and Two Localities for Public
) Service Electric and Gas Compan,Vs Salem Nuclear Generating Station: Hancocks Bridge, Salem County, New Jersey; Federal Emergency Management Agency, Region !! (February 19, 1985). ;
Baldwin, T.E., Review and Analysis of Population Estimates for the Boothbay Harbor Region, Maine for the Maine Yankee Nuclear Power Plant, Wiscasset. Maine; Federal
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t Emergency Management Agency Region I(January 7,1985).
l Baldwin, T.E., Review of the LILCO Transition Plan for the Shoreham Nuclear Power Station. Rev.1; Federal Emergency Maaagement Agency Region 11 (September 7,1984). i
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THOM AS E. BALDWIN . 7
. i internal Reports to Sponsors (unpublished) (Cont'd) :
Levenson, J., A. Smith, S. Curtis, and Y. Klein, Post Exercise Assessment, October 26.
l' 1983. Exercise of the Radiological Emergency Response Plans of the State of New l Jersey, Salem County and Six Localities, and Cumberland County and Two Localities for l Public Service Electric and Gas Company's Salem Nuclear Generating Station near Penns Grove Salem' County, New Jersey; Federal Emergency Management Agency, Region !! '
(February 6,1984). -
Smith, A., T.E. Baldwin, J. Levenson, and J. Opelka, Post Exercise Assessment. .
September 28, 1983, Exercise of the Radiological Emergency Preparedness Plans of the !
State of New York and Oswego County for Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation's Nir's l Mile Point Nuclear Station at Scriba, Oswego County, New York; Federal Emergency i L Management Agency, Region !!, (December 23,1983).
Baldwin, T.E., kwew of the LlLCO Transition Plan for the Shoreham Nuclear Power Station Rev. 4 Federal Emergency Management Agency, Region !! (November 4,1983). :
South, A., Y. Klein, T.E. Baldwin, and P. Becherman, Post Exercise Assessment, August c 24-25, 1983, Exercise of the State of New York Radiological Emergency Response .
- . Interim Plan for implementing Compensating Measures for Rockland County for the Indian Point Nuclear Power Station; Federal Emergency Management Agency, Region !! .
(September 26,1983). !
Klein, Y., A. Smith, T.E. Baldwin, and J. Tatar, Post Exercise Assessment, May 24,1983,
\ Exercise of the Radiological Emergency Response Plans of the State of New Jersey, ;
Ocean County and Ocean County Municipalities for the Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating .
Station: Federal Emergency Management Agency, Region !!(September 16,1983). I Klein, Y. and T.E. Baldwin, Post Drill Assessment, August 23,1983, Federal Emergency 1 Management Agency Observed Drill of the Westchester County Bus Evacuation i Procedures for the Indian Point Nuclear Power Station; Federal Emergency Management
- Agency, Region 11 (September 15, 1983).
Smith, A., T.E. Baldwin, and Y. Klein, Post Exercise Assessment, June 22,1983 Exercise '
\ of the Radiological Emergency Preparedness Plans of the State of New York. Monroe ,
Ccunty, and Wayne County for the Robert E. Ginna Nuclear Power Stations Federal l Emergency Management Agency Region 11(August 30 and October 12, 1983).
Klein Y. and T.E. Baldwin, Post Exercise Assessment. May I4,1983. Exercise of the i
}
Radiological Fmergency Response Plans of the Stats of New Jersey Ocean County and l Ocean County Municipalities for the Oyster Creek Nuclear Generating Station, Federal '
Emergency Management Agency, Region !!(August 5.1983). !
,y
)
8' I
g THOMAS E. BALDWIN 8 Internal Repcrts to Sponsors (unpublished) (Cont'd)
Baldwin, T.E., Y. Klein, et al., Post Exercise Assessment, March 9,1983, Excrcise cl the
& Radiological Emergency Response Plans of New York State and Westchester, Rockland, Orange and Putnam Counties for the Indian Point Nuclear Power Station; Federal Emergency Management Agency, Region II (April 14, 1983).
Barisas, S., K. Lerner, C. Saricks, T. Baldwin, J. Opelka, D. Hulet, Review of the Orange.
g Putnam and Westchester County, New York Radiological Emergency Response Plans for the Indian Point Nuclear Generating Station; Federal Emergency Management Agency, Region II (April 6,1983).
Opelka, J., D. Poyer, and E. Levine, T. Baldwin, Post Exercise Assassment, Exercise of the Radiological Emergency Response Plans of the States of New Jersey and Delaware and County and Local Jurisdictions Affected by the Salem Nuclear Generating Station; Federal Emergency Management Agency, Region II(February 28, 1983).
Baldwin, T.E., and G. Kaszynski, Interim Findings, Joint State and Local Radiological Emergency Response Capabilities for the Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Station,
$ Vernon, Vermont; Federal Emergency Management Agency, Region I (September 27, 1982).
Baldwin, T.E., and G. Kaszynski, Final Exercise Report, Februarv 18, 1982 Joint State and Local Radiological Emergency Response Exercise for the Vermont Yankee Nuclear
'g Power Station, Vernon, Vermont; Federal Emergency Management Agency, Region !
(August 23, 1982).
Baldwin, T.E., and G. Kaszynski, Final Exercise Report, February 6,1982, Joint State and Local Radiological Emergency Response Exercise for the Connecticut Yankee Atomic Power Station, Haddam Neck, Coratecticut; Federal Emergency Management Agency, l$ Region I (August 1982).
Baldwin, T.E., Review of the New Hampshire Radiological Emergency Response Plan; l Federal Emergency Management Agency, Region I(June 1982).
l ll j
Baldwin, T.E., Review of the Vermont Radiological Emergency Response Plan; Federal Emergency Management Agency, Region I (June 1982).
l l Baldwin, T.E., Outlook for Engineering Services in the Oil and Gas Market; Dravo Van Houten, Consulting Engineers (June 1981).
lt Baldwin, T.E., A Qualitative Assessment of Economic Change in Queens County, New York; Citibank, N.A. (March 1981).
- 8
Tif0M AS E. BALDWIN , 9 Legal Testimony Testimony before the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Atomic Safety and Licensing Board in the Matter of Emergency Planning of Long Island Lignting Company for the Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1, Docket No.
5 0-322-O L-3. Preparation of written testimony April 17, 1984 and August 7, 1984; Depositions June 29, and August 9,1984; Oral cross examination July 10-13 and August 14-10, 1984.
l'
t 1 ,
JCSEPH H. IELTER PEOFESSICNAL CUALIFICATICtG h Educaticn:
Bachelor of Science in Chemistry, Washington Cbilesge, Chestertown, MD, 1956.
} Master of Science in Inorganic (23danistry, Pennsylvania State
) University, University Pad., PA, 1958.
Graduata Assistant in Chemis,try, Pennsylvania State Univesity, University Park, PA, 1958-61.
Professimal Positions: 1961-1966
}.
Assistant Professor of Oministry at Idaho Stata University, Pocatello, ID. Respcrisibilities includei teaching courses in freshman cisemistry, quantative analysis, instrumental analysis, advanced inorganic chemistry ani laboratory r=44h4=try.
),, 8/66 - 10/73 Enqpicyed at the Idaho National EnJineering Imboratory in Idaho '
Falls, ID (then called the Naticmal Reacter 'hstin:y Station) .
'me sita is government owned and administered try *he Depaw of Energy Pomeard, and Development Agency. I was onployed by one i of the operating ornitracters, initially Idaho Nuclear Corp.
/ followed by Allied chemical corp. My position wins a tatnical I
cria in the ressertti and devalz- ct area of fission product a behavior and prepartions.
10/73 - 6/74 Euployed as researdi scientist by Nuclear Envisum ird Services divisicn of SAI, Irc., Idaho Falls, ID. resocrisibilities includsi ceritract support on parfonnance g==== rad wasta p.Owin;r v4:=att in a BHR and analysis of sources of inplant radiatim exposure to whT,.
6/74 - 12/78 i
Engloyed as scientific ani engineering supervisor by Allied
) c5=4m1 Cw.wutica at the Idaho Naticnal EngineerinJ Iabcratory. Respczisibilities included supervision of a research laboratory involved with analysis of fission product levels in irradiated nuclear fuel specimens ani analysis of the fission product crritant of sangles of the worlds 1st' known natural i
fission reactor ani the supervisicn of an analysis labcratory for
- envi4w-c4 sangles. Cbnductea cxmtract research in support of l NRC.
)
) l l
l l
I
. i 12/78 - present Employed as scientist by Allied @=4ml Corp., Docen Nuclear ;
Idaho Co., Inc., (after 7/3/79), and 1%stirxjhcuse Idaho Nuclear j cmpany, Inc. (after 3/1/84), at the Idaho National Engineering ;
Iaboratory. Pasponsibilities include research and dem1,ent ;
contract support to NRC ard M .
i Attended N orientaticn training course on Radiolcgical Emn-M Preparedness PlanninJ for DOE Centract Personnel.
Experience:
Prove existence of previously unsgized airborne radioicdine species to be hypoiodeus acid.
Developed m 14rq device to differentiate various chemical forms of a4% radioicdina.
Developed inorganic adr N to rer.afn airterna radicioline.
Measured gaseous fissicn products in affluents an:1 process streams in 5 BHR's statice.
Performed affluent and envisu-ital measurements to assess icdim-a:w-milk dcse pathway at BHR's.
Made affluent and envi&u-uial measurements of radiciodine at a 1+amatical plant to aaaaaa envisuuur.utal ivet.
Analyzed fuel r imans to determina accurately the fission yields in the fast flux regicn of the neutron irpe.iacm.
Analyzed fuel specimens to es e ahl4ah b%. or conversion ratio in 'Ih-U fuels fran the light water breeder s v g c.a.
8 Developed a aamn1ing device for airborne 14 C and3H in nuclear plant effluents and process streams.
Participated in envi6w -uital g vg.am to maanure movement of radiew14daa thrux;n process equiptent in MiR's so that the
$ predictive W = can be evaluated.
Responsible for technical evaluation of mevrial SIR off-gas systems.
Evaluated applicability of off-site, real-time inst =umentation to
.$ determine the magnitude of unmonitored releases in accident situations.
8
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I Evaluated soil to vegetation transfer of stable cesium and strontium.
Reviewed current state of knowledge en scaversf_rx3 in the envimwit a4*mm radioicdine by rain or snow.
Testified as FINA witness at Indian Point and Shoreham ASIB hearing.
Adjunct facility member at FINA Eningscy Management Institute.
l Publications:
l .
J. H. Keller, F. A. Duce, ani F. O. Cartan, "Retention of Iodine en Selected Particulata Filters and a Porous Silver Membrana Being Ccnsidered for the IDIT Maypack", IN-1078, May 1967 W. J. Maeck, D. T. Pence, and J. H. Keller, "A Highly Efficient Inorganic Ad_^2 for Airborne Iodine Species (Silver Zeolite)
Developnent Studies", IN-1224 October 1968 R. L. Nebekar, J. H. Keller, L. T. Iakey, D. E. Black, W. P. Pal i m, and R. E. Schindler, "Centainment Behavior of Xenen and Iodine Under Sin 11ated Icss-of-Coolant W aant Conditions in the CcntaminatienhLuinaticn Experiment", IN-1394, June 1971 B. Weiss, P. G. Voilleque, J. H. Keller, B. Kahn, H. L. g ger, A. Martin, and C. R. W4114 !w, "Detailed Measurements of I in Air, Vegetation, and Milk Around 'Ihree Operating Reactor Sites", NCREU-75/021, March 1975 W. J. Maeck, F. W. Spraktes, R. L. Trap, and J. H. Keller, "Analytical Results, F; - =ded Nuclear Ccnstants and Suggested Correlations for the Evaluaticn of OKID Fissicn Prtduct Cata", at IAEA internaticnal Symposium on the Oklo Ehencmencn, Liberville, Gabcn, IAEA-SM-204/2, June 1975 W. J. Maeck, W. A. Emel, L. L. Dickersen, J. E. Del.nore, and R. L. Trap, "Discrepancies and J. H.-its Keller, E. A.2p,'Ibamal Regarding Pu Fissicn Yields and the Use of
- ki as a Burnup Mcnitor", ICP-1092, D+Mer 1975 l
N. D. Dyer, E. B. Nai=+=4 %, J. H. Keller, and B. G. Mates, "Prrmhives Source Term Meastu.rurut PrtcJram", 'IREE-1178, '
Octci:er 1977 . .
N. D. Dyer, J. H. Keller, R. L. Buntirq, B. G. Motes,
} S. T. Croney, D. W. Akars, C. V. W N ac, T. E. Ccx, R. L. Kynasten, S. W. Duce, D. R. Underwocd J. W. Tkachyk, "In-Plant Scurce Term Maasturasts at Ft. Calhoun Statien-Unit 1", NURED/CR-1040, July 1978
l J. L. 'Ir+i, S. W. Duce, erzi J. H. Kaller, "An Atmospheric l
Tritium and Ca2 hen-14 Monitorin; System", NUREG/CR-0386, September l 1978 l l N. C. Dyer, J. H. Faller, R. L. Bunting, B. G. Motes, S. T. Crensy, D. W. Akers, C. V. W Taae , T. E. Cox, R. L. Rynasten, S. W. Duce, D. R. Undezvood, J. W. Tkachyk, "In-Plant Source 'Dn:m Measurements at Zica Staticn",
NUREG/CR-0715, February 1979 J. J. Faller, L. W. McClure, M. Hoza, A. L. Ayers Jr. , R. Io, and L. W. Barrett, "Boiling Water Reactor Off-gas Systems Evaluation", NUREG/m-0727, June 1979 R. W. Benedict, A. B. C21ristanaan, J. A. Del Debbio, J. H. Kaller, and D. A. Rhacht, "Technical and Econcanic Feasibility of Zeolite
) Em"latim for KryyL wG5 St.u.-;ie", INICD-1011, Seg#amha* 1979 j l
J. H. Faller, B. G. Motas, D. W. Akers, T. E. Cox, S. W. Duce, and J. W. 'Dcactlyk, "Measurement of Xe-131, C-14 and Tritium in Air and I-131 Vegetation ani Hilk Around the Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station", NUREG/CR-1195, ENICD-1023, Hardi 1980 J. W. Mandler, S. T. Crtmey, N. C. Dyer, C. V. W 7ame ,
A. C. Stalker, B. G. M:rtas, J. H. Faller, T. E. Cox, D. W. Akars, J. W. 'Dcactlyk, and S. W. Duca, "In-Plant Source '14rm Measurements at Turkey Point Statica - Units 3 and 4", NURED/CR-1629, Sep*
- 1980 P. G. Voilleque, B. Kahn, H. L. Kreiger, D. M. McreP7, J. H. Kaller, ani B. H. Weiss, guaticn of the Air-Vegetatien-Milk Pathway for I at the Quad Cities Nuclear Power Staticn' , NUREG/CR-1600, November 1981
) W. J. Maeck, L. G. Hoffman, B. A. Staples, and J. H. Keller, "An a= - amant of Offsite, Real-Time Dose Measurement Systems for Emergency Situaticms", NURED/CR-2644, ENICD-1110, April 1982 L. G. Hoffman and J. H. Keller, "Characterizaticn of Soil to Plant Transfer Coefficients for Stable Cesium and Strcntium",
) NURED/CR-2495, ENICD-1105, Jttne 1982 P. G. Voilleque, L. G. Hoffman, ani J. H. Faller, 'Het Deposition Pmama for Radioicdines", NUREG/CR-2438, ENICD-llli, August 1982
) B. J. Salmcmscm, L. G. Hoffman, R. J. Honkus, and J. H. Kaller, "Guidance en Offsite Ermu.w.Ty Rr 'latico Measurement Systems -
Ihase 2 - Milk Pathway", WINCD-l~. 9, April 1984
l l
l l l W. J. Maeck, R. J. Hankus, J. H. Keller, and P. G. Voilleque, "Iaboratory Maastuau=nts of Parameters affecting Wet Deposition of Methyl IMMa", NUREG/CR-4041, WINCC-1023, September 1984 l
B. J. M1m'nscn, L. G. Hoffman, R. J. Monkus, and J. H. Keller, "Guidance cn Offsite Emm.gecy Radiation Measurement Systems -
mase 3 - Water arri Non-Dairy Focd Pathway", WINCD-1012, October 1984 B. J. Salurnson, R. J. Hankus, and J. H. Keller, "Guidance en g Offsite Emmywicy Radiation Meastunu=nt Systems - Base 1 -
Airborne Pelease", FINA-REP-2 (Rev.1), WINCO-1029, Wher 1985 Papers:
F. O. Cartan, H. R. Beard, F. A. Duce, and J. H. Keller, "Evidence for the Existance of Hypoidcus Acid as a Volatile Iodine Species B PrMW in Water Air Mixtures at Tenth AEC Air Cleanim Conference, New York, NY, August 1968, CCNF 680821 J. H. Keller, F. A. Duce, D. T. Pence, and W. J. Maeck, "Hypoidcus Acid: An Airborne Inorganic Ioiina Species in Steam-Air Mixtures g
at Eleventh AEC Air Cleanim Conference, Richland, WA, September 1970, CENF 700816 J. H. Keller, F. A. Duce, and W. J. Maeck, "A Selective Adsorbent M14rry for Differentiating Aihue Iodine Species at Eleventh AEC Air Cleanim Ctnference, Richland, HA, September 1970, CCNF 700816 g
J. H. Ke?.ler, T. R. 'Ihcmas, D. T. Pence, and W. J. Maeck, "An Evaluaticn of Materials and Techniques Used for Mcnitoring Air-Borne Radiciodine Species at Twelfth AEC Air Cleanim Ccnference, Oak Ridge, 'IN, August 1972, CDNF 720823 B J. H. Keuer, T. R. mcmas, D. T. pence, W. J. Ma ek, "Iosine Chemistry in Steam Air Atmosi t eres at Fifth Annual Health Physics Scciety Mi& rear Sumcosium, Idaho Falls, ID, November 1970 J. H. Keller, L. L. Dickerscn, F. W. Spartkes, and W. J. Maeck, Detaminaticn of the Natural Abundance of Krypton in the B AW at Am. Chem. Soc. Nuclear Chemistry and Techno1cov Division Meetim, Newport Beach, CA, February 1973 J. H. Kellor, "Icdine Species Meastuuue.ats", invited paper at Nuclear Safety Analysis Center Workshco en Iodine Releases in Reactor Accidents, Palo Alto, CA, November 1980 g
gI.VoillequeardJ.H.Keller,"Air-to-VegetationTransportof G
I as Hypoiodcus Acid", Health Physics 40, p 91-94, 1981 8
J. H. Kaller and L. G. Ecf%, "Prt:pcoed Federal Guidance on Emergency Manitoring in ths Milk Pathway", at 13th Annual National Conference on Radiation Cont::el, Little Rock, AK, May 1981 J. H. Faller, "Updata on Radiciodina Mcnitoring", at the 14th Annual National Conference on Radiation Control, Portland, MA, May 1982 J. H. Kaller, "Iodine M1irg Under Emergency Corditions",
invited paper at IEEE Nuclear Science Symposium, Orlando, FL, November 1984 1
i .
l l
6
)
i UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BEFORE THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD In the Matter of ) .
I
) Docket No. 50-322-OL-3 LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY ) ,
I (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, ) ,
! Unit 1) )
l CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that copies of "FEMA PREFILED TESTIMONY" in the l above-captioned proceedings have been served on the following by deposit in
! the United States mail, first class, this 10th day of April, 1987:
John H. Frye, III, (Courtesy Copy) Fabian G. Palomino, Esq.
Administrative Judge Special Counsel to the Governor Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Executive Chamber U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission State Capitol Washington, D.C. 20555 Albany, NY 12224 ,
Oscar H. Paris (Courtasy Copy) H. Taylor Reveley III, Esq.
Administrative Judge Hunton & Hilliams l
Atomic Safety and Licensing Board 707 East Main Street U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission P.O. Box 1535 Hashington, D.C. 20555 Richmond, VA 23212 Frede-ick J. Shon Jonathan D. Feinberg, Esq.
Administrative Judge New York State Department of
! Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Public Service U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Three Empire State Plaza Washington, D.C. 20555 Albany, NY 12223
Morton B. Margulies, Chairman Dr. Jerry R. Kline Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Atomic Safety and Licensing Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission East-West Towers, Rm. 430 East-West Towers, Rm. 430 4350 East-West Hwy. 4350 East-West Hwy Bethesda, Maryland 20814 Bethesda, MD 20814
[ Stephen B. Latham, Esq.
John F. Shea, III, Esq. Christopher M. McMurray, Esq.
Twomey, Latham & Shea Lawrence Coe Lanpher, Esq.
Attorneys at Law David T. Case, Esq.
P.O. Box 398 Kirkpatrick & Lockhart 33 West Second Street 1800 M Street, N.W.
} . Riverhead, NY 11901 9th Floor Washington, D.C. 20036 Atomic Safety and Licensing .
. Board Panel Joel Blun, Esq.
U.S. Nuclea. Regulatory Commission Director, Utility Intervention Washington, D.C. 20555 NY State Consumer Protection Board
}
Suite 1020 Atomic Safety and Licensing 99 Washington Avenue Appeal Board Panel Albany, NY 12210 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Dr. Monroe Schneider North Shore Committee P.O. Box 231
) Docketing and Service Section Wading River, NY 11792 .
Office of the Secretary U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Philip H. McIntire Washington, D.C. 20555 Federal Emergency Man &gement Agency 26 Federal Plaza Spence Perry, Esq.** New York, New York 10278
] General Counsel, Rm. 840 Federal Emergency Management Agency 500 C Street, S.W.
[ Washington, D.C. 20472 Robert Abrams, Esq.
l Attorney General of the State Mary M. Gundrum, Esq., of New York
} New York State Dept. of Law -
Attn: Peter Blenstock, Esq.
120 Broadway Department of Law 3rd Floor, Room 3-116 i New York, N.Y Two World Trade Center 10271 Room 46-14 New York, NY 10047
}
! Anthony F. Earley, Jr., Esq. MHB Technical Associates General Counsel 1723 Hamilton Avenue Long Island Lighting Company Suite K 250 Old County Road San Jose, CA 95125 Mineola, NY 11501
> 1
t County Executive Martin Bradley Ashare, Esq.
Suffolk County Executive Suffolk County Attorney County Executive / Legislative Bldg. H. Lee Dennison Building Veteran's Memorial Highway Veteran's Memorial Highway ,
Hauppauge, NY 11788 Hauppauge, NY 11788 Mr. Jay Dunkleberger Ms. Nora Bredes New York State Energy Office Shoreham Opponents Coalition Agency Build un 2 195 East Main Street Empire State Plaza .
Smithtown, NY 11787 Albany, New York 12223 ,
Ellen Blackler Mr. Robert Hoffmnan New York State Assembly Ms. Susan,Rosenfeld Energy Committee Ms. Sharlene Sherwin 626 Legislative Office Building P.O. Box 1355 Albany, NY 12248 Massapequa, NY 11758 Brookhaven Town Attorney Richard Bachman, Esq.
475 E. Main Street U.S Nuclear Regulatory Agency
.i Patchogue, NY 11772 7735 Old Georgetown Road Bethesda, MD 20814 i Y d4 d's William R. Cumming /
Federal Emergency Management Egency
}
3 l
l
]
1 l C0( F rfn June 20'/94988 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 0 da 21 P4 :43 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION e
Atomic Safety and Licensina Acceal Board 00CMf OFFIC'dd'h-l!iv BRAnc WL
)
In the Matter of )
)
LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY ) Docket No. 50-322-OL-3
) (Emergency Planning)
(Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, )
Unit 1) )
)
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that copies of SUFFOLK COUNTY, STATE OF NEW YORK AND TOWN OF SOUTHAMPTON BRIEF ON APPEAL OF THE LICENSING BOARD'S MAY 9, 1988 PARTIAL INITIAL DECISION ON SUITABILITY OF RECEPTION CENTERS have been served on the following this 20th day of June 1988 by U.S.
mail, first class.
Christine N. Kohl, Chairman Dr. W. Reed Johnson Atomic Safety and Licensing 115 Falcon Drive, Colthurst Appeal Board Charlottesville, VA 22901 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Alan S. Rosenthal Dr. W. Reed Johnson Atomic Safety and Licensing Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board Appeal Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Washington, D.C. 20553 John H. Frye, III, Chairman James P. Gleason, Chairman Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Atomic Safety and Licensing Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Washington, D.C. 20555
]
e.
Mr. Frederick J. Shon Lando W. Zech, Jr., Chairman Atomic Safety and Licensing Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 1717 H Street, N.W.
' Washington, D.C. 20555 Washington, D.C. 20555 Commissioner Kenneth C. Rogers Commissioner Kenneth M. Carr U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 1717 H' Street, N.W. 1717 H Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20555 Washington, D.C. 20555 Commissioner Frederick M. Bernthal Commissioner Thomas M. Roberts U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 1717 H Street, N.W. 1717 H Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20555 Washington, D.C. 20555 James P. Gleason, Chairman Dr. Jerry Kline Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Atomic Safety and Licensing Board 513 -Gilmoure Drive U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Silver Spring, Maryland 20901 Washington, D.C. 20555 William C. Parler, Esq. Edwin J. Reis, Esq.
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Richard G. Bachmann, Esq.
10th Floor U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 1717 H Street, N.W. Office of General Counsel Washington, D.C. 20555 Washington, D.C. 20555 William R. Cumming, Esq. Anthony F. Earley, Jr., Esq.
Spence W. Perry, Esq. General Counsel Office of General Counsel Long Island Lighting Company Federal Emergency Management Agency 175 East Old Country Road 500 C Street, S.W., Room 840 Hicksville, New York 11801 Washington, D.C. 20472 Elisabeth Taibbi, Clerk W. Taylor Reveley, III, Esq.
Suffolk County Legislature Hunton & Williams Suffolk County Legislature P.O. Box 1535 Office Building 707 East Main Street Veterans Memorial Highway Richmond, Virginia 23212 Hauppauge, New York 11788 Mr. L. F. Britt Stephen B. Latham, Esq.
Long Island Lighting Company Twomey, Latham & Shea Shoreham Nuclear Power Station 33 West Second Street North Country Road Riverhead, New York 11901 Wading River, New York 11792 Ms. Nora Bredes Docketing and Service Section Executive Director Office of the Secretary Shoreham Opponents Coalition U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 195 East Main Street 1717 H Street, N.W.
Smithtown, New York 11787 Washington, D.C. 20555
-2~
.' l Alfred.L. Nardelli, Esq. Hon. Patrick.G. Halpin New York State Department of-Law Suffolk County Executive 120 Broadway, 3rd Floor H. Lee-Dennison Building Room 3-118 .
Veterans Memorial Highway New York,'New York 10271 Hauppauge, New York 11788 MHB Technical Associates Dr. Monroe Schneider 1723 Hamilton Avenue North Shore Committee-Suite K P.O. Box 231 San Jose, California 95125 Wading River, New York 11792 E. Thomas Boyle, Esq. Fabian G. Palomino, Esq.
Suffolk County Attorney Richard J. Zahnleuter, Esq.
Bldg. 158 North County Complex Special Counsel to the Governor Veterans Memorial Highway Executive Chamber, Rm. 229 Hauppauge, New York 11788 State Capitol Albany, New York 12224 Mr. Jay Dunkleburger Mr. Stuart Diamond New York State Energy Office Business / Financial Agency Building 2 NEW YORK TIMES Empire State Plaza 229 W. 43rd Street Albany, New York 12223 New York, New York 10036 Mr. Philip McIntire David A. Brownlee, Esq.
Federal Emergency Management Agency Kirkpatrick & Lockhart 26 Federal Plaza 1500 Oliver Building New York, Ney York 10278 Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15222 Atomic Safety and Licensing Adjudicatory File Board Panel Atomic Safety and Licensing U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Board Panel Docket Washington, D.C. 20555 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 TQ 3-
' Ronald R. Ross i KIRKPATRICK & LOCKHART i 1800 M bcreet, N.W.
l South Lobby - 9th Floor Washington, D.C. 20036-5891