ML20196F081

Govt Brief in Opposition to Appeal of Lilco from LBP-87-32.* Certificate of Svc Encl

ML20196F081
Person / Time
Site:	Shoreham File:Long Island Lighting Company icon.png
Issue date:	02/26/1988
From:	Casey S, Latham S, Zahnleuter R KIRKPATRICK & LOCKHART, NEW YORK, STATE OF, SOUTHAMPTON, NY, SUFFOLK COUNTY, NY, TWOMEY, LATHAM & SHEA
To:	NRC ATOMIC SAFETY & LICENSING APPEAL PANEL (ASLAP)
References
CON-#188-5713 LBP-87-32, OL-5, NUDOCS 8803020029
Download: ML20196F081 (481)

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Tu UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Before the Atomic Safety and Licensino Acceal Board

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In ':he Matter of )

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LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY ) Docket No. 50-322-OL-5 (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station,

) (EP Exercise)

)

Unit 1) )

)

GOVERNMENTS' BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO APPEAL OF LILCO PROM LBP-87-32 KIRPATRICK & LOCKHART TWOMEY, LATHAM & SHEA 1800 M Street, N.W. 33 West Second Street Washington, D.C. 20036 Riverhead, New York 11901 Attorneys for Suffolk County Attorneys for the Town of Southampton Richard J. Zahnleuter Executive Chamber, Room 229 Capitol Building Albany, New York 12224 Attorney for Mario M. Cuomo Governor of the State of New York February 26, 1988 kgg3020029080226 g ADOCK 050003 2 PD D h

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l TABLE OF CONTENTS Page I. INTRODUCTION ........................................... 1 A. The Licensing Board's Partial Initial Decision................................... 1 B. LILCO's Appeal .................................... 7 II. COUNTERSTATEMENT OF THE FACTS ......................... 11 A. The Exercise Request .............................. 11 B. The Planning Phase ................................ 13 C. CLI-86-ll and the Admission of Contentions ....... 16

1. CLI-86-11 .................................... 16

2. Admission of Contentions EX 15/16 ............ 17

3. FEMA's Reconsideration Motion ................ 20

4. FEMA's Unsuccessful Interlocutory Appeal ..... 22 III. CONTENTIONS EX 15/16 WERE PROPERLY ADMITTED ........... 25 IV. THE BOARD'S INTERPRETATION OF APPENDIX E, S IV.F.1, IS CORRECT............................................. 29 A. LILCO Cannot Complain That the Board Treated the "As Much . . . as is Reasonably Achievable" Language of Section IV.F.1 as an Independent Criterion of Appendix E ..................................... 30 B. The Board's Interpretation of the "As Much As" Language is Correct .................. 34 C. LILCO Would Not Have Been Assisted If the Board Had Interpreted Footnote 4 of Section IV.F.1 ................................. 38

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1. The Exercise Failed to Test Major Observable Portions of LILCO's Plan........... 38

2. The Exercise Failed to Provide a Basis to Verify the Response Capabilities of Key Personnel.............................. 41 D. The Board Was Correct in Finding That FEMA and the NRC Staff Had Presented No Persuasive Views on the Exercise's Compliance with Appendix E ................................... 43

1. Deference to FEMA is Not at Issue Because FEMA Made No Appendix E Determination ..................... 44

2. The NRC Staff Views on the Scope of the Shoreham Exercise are Entitled to No Weight .................... 48 V. THE LICENSING BOARD PROPERLY RULED THAT THE FOUR OMISSIONS FROM THE EXERCISE WERE SIGNIFICANT ..... 51 A. The Failure of the EBS Station to Participate in the Exercise ....................... 52 B. LILCO's Failure to Ask Additional School Districts to Participate ................... 58 C. The Failure to Test Ingestion Pathway Procedures ................................ 61 D. The Lack of Participation by Special Facilities ........................................ 64 VI. CONCLUSION ............................................ 67 4

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l Table of Authorities R Pace Cases Guard v. NRC, 753 F.2d 1144 (D.C. Cir 1985) .......... 8 Union of Concerned Scientists v. NRC, 735 F.2d 1437 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 18, 24, 469 U.S. 1132 (1985) ................................. 25-27, 28 Nuclear Reculatory Commission Decisions Lona Island Lichtina Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power -

Station, Unit 1), LBP-88-2, NRC 1, 5, (February 1, 1988) ................................... 52-53, 66 ,

Lona Island Lichtina Co. (3horeham Nuclear 23-24, 25 Power Station, Unit 1), AIAB-861, 25 NRC.129 (1987) .. 28, 33 Lono Island Lichtina Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power 21-22, Station, Unit 1), LBP-86-38A, 24 NRC 819 (1986) ...... 25, 33 Lona Island Lichtina Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power 16, 18, Station, Unit 1), CLI-86-11, 23 NRC 577 (1986) ....... 23, 24, 27 Philadelohia Electric Co. (Limerick Generating Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-778, 20 NRC 42 (1982) .. 33 Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority (North Coast Nuclear Plant (Unit 1)), ALAB-648, 14 NRC 34 (1981) .. 33 Statutes 42 USC S 2239(a) ..................................... 27

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Reculations 10 CFR S 50.47(a)(1) ................................. 31, 32  ;

10 CFR Part 50.47(a)(2) .............................. 28 10 CFR S 50.47(b) .................................... 46 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E ............................ passim 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, 5 IV.F ................... 57 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, 5 IV.F.1 .................. passim l l

10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, S IV.F.3 ................. 3, 9, 35 44 CFR Part 350 ...................................... 46 44 CFR S 350.2(j) .................................... 46 49 Fed. Reg. 27,734-36 (1984) ........................ 36, 37, 39 47 Fed. Reg. 29,252 (1982) ........................... 39 45 Fed. Reg. 55,413 (1980) ............................ 36, 47 Other Authorities NUREG 0654/ FEMA REP-1, Rev. 1 (November 1980) ........ 47 FEMA Guidance Memorandum PR-1 ........................ 46 FEMA Guidance Memorandum EV-2 ........................ 42 FEMA Guidance Memorandum EX-3 (Draft) ................ 47 I

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I UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Before the Atomic Safety and Licensino ADoeal Board

)

In the Matter of )

)

LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY ) Docket No. 50-322-OL-5

) (EP Exercise)

(Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, )

Unit 1) )

)

GOVERNMENTS' BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO APPEAL OF LILCO FROM LBF-87-32 I. INTRODUSTlQH A. The Licensino Board's Partial Initial Decision LILCO has appealed from the Licensing Board's Partial Initial Decision, Lono Island Lichtino Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), LBP-87-32, 26 NRC__ (December 7, 1987) (here-inafter, "PID").1/ The Licensing Board concluded that Contentions EX 15/16 were correct in alleging that the February 13, 1986 exercise ("Exercise") of the LILCO Emergency Plan ("Plan") for the Shoreham Nuclear Power Station failed to meet NRC regulatory requirements for the initial exercise of an offsite emergency plan. The Board determined that because the Shoreham Exercise 1/ The Licensing Board has issued a second decision related to the Shoreham Exercise. Lono Island Lichtino Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), LBP-88-2, NRC (February 1, 1988)

("LBP-88-2"). In LBP-88-2, the Board found multiple fundamental flaws in LILCO's Plan. LILCO has noticed an appeal from LBP-88-2.

The Governments will address LILCO's LBP-88-2 appeal in a subsequent brief.

failed to test certain portions of LILCO's Plan, the Exercise did not satisfy the criteria for a "full participation" exercise for a near term operating license ("NTOL") plant, as set forth in 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, 1 IV.F.1. PID at 2.

LILCO asks the Appeal Board to reverse the PID and to find that the Exercise satisfied Appendix E requirements. Appeal Brief of Long Island Lighting Company on Contentions EX 15 and 16, Jan. 19, 1988 ("LILCO Brief" or "LILCO Br."). The Governments (Suffolk County, New York State, and the Town of Southampton) submit this brief in opposition to the LILCO appeal.2/

Section IV.F.1 of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E provides as fol-lows:

4 A full participation exercise which tests as much of the licensee, State and local emergency plans as is reasonably achievable without mandatory public parti-cipation shall be conducted for each site at which a power reactor is located for which the first operating license for that site is issued after July 13, 1982.

This exercise shall be conducted within two years be-fore the issuance of the first operating license for full power (one authorizing operation above 5% of rated power) of the first reactor and shall include participation by each State and local government with-in the plume exposure pathway EPZ and each State with-in the ingestion exposure pathway EPZ.

. The referenced footnote 4 provides:

l 2/ The Governments submit herewith an Appendix containing portions of the record relied upon by the Governments. LILCO already has submitted various record documents -- including its direct testimony and the FEMA and NRC Staff testimony. Egg Attachments to Appeal Brief of Long Island Lighting Ccmpany on l Contentions EX 15 and 16. These documents are not produced again in the Governments' Appendix. Rather, the Governments' Appendix

contains the Governments' direct testimony on Contentions EX 15/16

! (NY Ex. 1), pages from the trial transcript, and miscellaneous I

other documents cited herein.

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. -o "Full participation" when used in conjunction with emergency preparedness exercises for a particular site means appropriate offsite local and State authorities and licensee personnel physically and actively take part in testing their integrated capability to ade-quately assess and respond to an accident at a com-mercial nuclear power plant. "Full participation" in-cludes testing the major observable portions of the onsite and offsite emergency plans and mobilization of State, local and licensee personnel and other re-sources in sufficient numbers to verify the capability to respond to the accident scenario.

Contentions EX 15/16 allege that there is no basis upon which reliable conclusions could be drawn about the implement-ability of the LILCO Plan, because during the Exercise major portions of the Plan and LILCO's ability to implement it were not demonstrated or evaluated and because the response cap-abilities of personnel and entities essential to Plan implemen-tation were not demonstrated or evaluated. Taken together, the two contentions make the fundamental point that one cannot derive "reasonable assurance" from an inadequate test. Egg PID at 10.

The Licensing Board heard extensive testimony concerning what was, and what was not, tested during the Exercise, the significance of the omissions, and the meaning of the term "ful) participation." Egg PID at 8-9. The Licensing Board determined that the regulation can sustain only one interpretation -- that the initial exercise at an NTOL site must be more comprehensive in scope than subsequent biennial exercises required by Section IV.F.3 of Appendix E for sites wi.th operating plants:

(P]aragraph 1 (of Section IV.F) states that the ini-tial exercise is to "...(test) as much of the licensee, State and local emergency plans as is reasonably achievable without mandatory public parti-cipation...." No similar requirement is placed on sub-sequent exercises. Clearly, paragraph 1 states re-quirements for State and local participation in initial exercises which are unique to those exercises.

Thus it appears that the definition of "full parti-cipation" found in footnote 4 applies to both initial and biennial exercises, and that paragraph IV.F.1 places certain requiremento on initial full participa-tion exercises that do not apply to biennial full participation exercises.

PID at 13.

The Board then turned to assessing the Shoreham Exercise against the standard set out in the regulation. At the outset, the Board determined that it would not consider the significance of omissions from the Exercise when testing of the particular omitted function or entity had been, in the view of the Board, l

' precluded' as a result of actions by the Governments. Applying this stringent test (erroneously, in the view of the Govern-ments)3/ to disqualify from consideration, at the threshold, many of the omissions alleged in Contentions EX 15/16, the Board 3/ LILCO argued that the "as much . . . as is rea.sonably achievable" language of Section IV.F.1 must be interpreted in the light of the political and legal climate on Long Island at the time of the Exercise. LILCO Ex. 12 at 16; LILCO Proposed Findings  ;

of Fact and Conclusions of Law on the February 13, 1986 Emergency Planning Exercise for Shoreham, dated Angust 3, 1987, (hereinafter cited as "LILCO Findings at ") at 52-35. The Licensing Board determined that the regulation permits political exceptions to its mandates, thus excusing, for example, LILCO's failure to sound the sirens or to broadcast a test EBS message. PID at 23-27. The Governments disagree. There is nothing in the language of the regulation that would permit such an interpretation. The fact that LILCO did not undertake such activities - which are routinely  !

carried out at other exercises (NY Ex. 1 at 41-42) and which do not require "mandatory public participation" -- underscores the deficient scope of the Exercise.

still determined that the Exercise had failed to test four major observable portions of the LILCO Plan, even though test.ng of those four portions was reasonably achievable without mandatory public participation. PID at 50.1/

First, the Board determined that the Exercise should have included participation by WALK Radio, LILCO's lead emergency broadcast system ("EBS") station and authentication by WALK of the LILCO-drafted EBS messages. In reaching this conclusion, the Board noted that there was no evidence that Suffolk County prevented WALK's inclusion in the Exercise, and that LILCO had conceded that WALK's participation would not have involved man-datory public participation. PID at 26-27. The Board also re-jected LILCO arguments that the omission of WALK Radio from the Exercise was unimportant and that testing communications with WALK Radio was a mechanical activity. Id. at 27-28.5/

Second, the Board found that LILCO, despite a specific FEMA request to seek the participation of more school districts, I/ LILCO asserts that the Licensing Board "rejected literally

, dozens of criticisms . . . of the exercise's scope . . . (while it] agreed with (the Governments) on four points." LILCO Br. at

3. LILCO's efforts to attempt to minimize the limitations of the Exercise do not withstand scrutiny. Number counting is dangerous but when one reviews the Board's discussion of Exercise omissions (PID at 21-50), it is clear that the "four points" identified by the Board were found to be significant (agg discussion in Section V below) and that "dozens of criticisms" by the Governments were not rejected.

! 5/ In light of the multiple communications difficulties subsequently identified by the Board in LBP-88-2, there is no basis for LILCO's argument that communications testing is unimportant to an assessment of the implementability of LILCO's Plan. Egg, gtgt, LBP-88-2 at 3-4, 10-11, 48, 52-53, 63-64, 251-52.

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. asked only one school district to participate in the Exercise.

The Board ruled that LILCO had failed to meet its burden of proof on the school participation issue:

There is not?.ing in the record that indicates whether the schools would have participated if asked. Indeed, we have only Mr. Daverio's speculation, elicited by Staff counsel, on the reasons LILCO management decided not to issue the invitation when asked to do so by FEMA, and the probable response of the schools had an invitation been issued. LILCO has the burden of proof. See 10 CFR 2.732. It has not been established that the school participation which did take place was all that was reasonably achievable. Consequently, we must conclude that greater participation was reason-ably achievable.

PID at 40-41 (footnote omitted).

Third, the Board found that ingestion exposure pathway testing had been excluded from the Exercise. The Licensing Board noted that ingestion pathway objectives could have been tested, and that the "major factor dictating that they be excluded was the guidance emanating from (NRC) Staff" to focus on the 10-mile plume EPZ. PID at 44. The Board found the failure to test ingestion pathway procedures fatal, given the language of the regulation:

Paragraph IV.F.1 clearly requires, in addition to testing as much of a plan as is reasonably achievable, that each State within the ingestion exposure pathway EPZ participate in the initial full participation exercise. Thus both Connecticut and LERO, substituting for New York, should have been included and the exer-cise scenario should have included ingestion pathway objectives. It is unfortunate that these objectives were excluded on the suggestion of the Staff. Nonethe-less, that circumstance cannot alter the fact that this exercise did not meet the requirements of para-graph IV.F.1 in this respect.

PID at 44 (footnote omitted).

Fourth, the Board found that the LILCO Plan provisions re-lating to special facilities were inadequately tested. The Board noted that FEMA had testified in earlier proceedings that it would evaluate the level of coordination between LILCO and adult and nursing homes; moreover, FEMA witnesses testified that evaluation was necessary "because such coordination constitutes a major observable portion of the plan." PID at 49. The Board concluded:

(T]he level of coordination between LERO and the special facilities should be evaluated . . . and such evaluation must include an evaluation of LERO's abil-ity to communicate with special facilities. Further, we agree that an evaluation of the preparedness of the ambulance and ambulette companies should have been in-cluded. No showing has been made that a test of these aspects of the plan was not reasonably achievable.

Consequently we conclude that such an evaluation should have been a part of this exercise in order to satisfy the requirements of paragraph IV.F.1.

PID at 49. -

B. LILCO's Acceal LILCO urges rev9rsal of the PID on a multitude of grounds, ranging from assertions of error in the Board's initial admis-sion of Contentions EX 15/16, to the Board's allegedly improper interpretation of Appendix E, to the alleged "immateriality" of the omissions from the Exercise. LILCO's arguments can be summed up simply: LILCO. believes that Appendix E requires no more comprehensive exercise for an NTOL site than for an oper-ating plant; LILCO's Exercise was as comprehensive in design as exercises previously held for operating plants in FEMA Region II; and, accordingly, the Licensing Board should have deferred to the expertise of FEMA in designing the Exercise and should have found that the Shoreham Exercise met the NRC's requirements.

LILCO's arguments do not withstand scrutiny. First, the Licensing Board articulat:ed clear bases for its conclusion that Appendix E requires an N;lOL exercise to be more comprehensive than subsequent biennial exercises. The Licensing Board care-fully examined the regulation -- and its regulatory history --

and also sifted an extensive evidentiary record. The Board could have found, on the face of the regulation -- particularly the "as much as" and "ingestion pathway" language that applies only to NTOL exercises -- that the regulation meant exactly what it said. That would have been fully consistent with Guard r.

NEC, 753 F.2d 1144, 1146 (D.C. Cir.), which cautions that words in a regulation must not be interpreted "as meaning something other than what those words . . . may rationally convey."5/ In 1/ If the Licensing Board had ignored the requirements that initial exercises: 1) test as much as is reasonably achievable without mandatory public participation; and 2) include participation by responders within the ingestion exposure pathway, it would have done "violence to the plain meaning of the provision (at issue)." Guard, 753 F.2d at 1149, cuotino Deukmeiian v. NRC, 751 F.2d 1287, 1310 (D.C. Cir. 1984). The Governments emphasize that while this appeal focuses on the Appendix E requirements for an NTOL exercise, they do not concede that the Exercise would have (footnote continued)

. -a fact, however, the Board looked carefully at the regulator, history and determined that that history supported the conclusion that the NRC intended NTOL exercises to be more i

comprehensive than subsequent biennial ones. PID at 11-19. And the Board similarly took into account the evidence that initial exercises at a site should logically be more extensive than subsequent exercises, given the fact that prior to the initial exercise there is no "track record" regarding the likely ade-quacy of the plan in question or the capabilities of the person-nel responsible for plan implementation. PID at 17-19. LILCO presents no bases for this Board to reverse.

Second, contrary to LILCO's assertions, there was extensive evidence to document that the Shoreham Exe.*cise omitted testing i many significant features that are routinely tested at other exercises. For example, it is common for EBS radio stations actually to participate, for more than one school district to participate, and for there to be actual communication and co-ordination with special facilities. NY Ex. 1, at 41-42, 66-68, 100 n.46; Tr. 8663 (Kowieski). Thus, while FEMA may have gone about designing the Exercise according to its standard practice, the actual scope of what was tested did not equal in some respects what is done at other plants.

Third, it was proper for the Board to admit Contentions EX 15/16. An exercise of sufficient scope is a material factor (footnote continued from previous page) satisfied the Appendix E, S IV.F.3 requirements for a biennial exercise. However, that issue is not presented on appeal.

in the NRC's assessment of whether there are fundamental flaws in a plan. If an exercise is of deficient scope, it cannot provide meaningful data regarding the. adequacy of a plan. Five Licensing Board judges and three Appeal Board judges ruled that Contentions EX 15/16 were admissible. LILCO provides no basis for a different ruling.

Fourth, the Board did not err by failing to give greater deference to the expertise of FEMA and the NRC Staff. The Board did defer to FEMA, particularly where FEMA made factual findings. Egg, 1232, PID at 9 n.6, 24, 37-38, 49-50. But on the question of the meaning of Section IV.F.1, no deference was owed or could be givent FEMA admitted that it never gave any consideration to whether the Shoreham Exercise (or any other exercise for that matter) satisfied Appendix E, and FEMA offered r.o opinion whether the Exercise complied with NRC regulatory r equireme.nts . The NRC Staff testimony which was presented was brief and conclusory and provided no probative basis for ruling in LILCO's favor.

Fifth, the Board did not fail to assess the materiality of the omissi~ ens in the centext of the NRC's regulatory structure.

Both in prehearing orders and in the PID, the Board affirmed that the omissions would prevent the NRC from making a reason- ,

able assurance finding. The Board's materiality findings are l clear.

These arguments are discussed in more detail in Sections III-V below. To set these arguments in the proper context --

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and to respond to certain statements by LILCO which are not entirely accurate -- we describe in Section II the factual cir-Ecumstances leading to the Shoreham Exercise, the litigation

-arising from it, and the admission of Contentions EX 15/16 into

, the Exercise proceeding.

II. COUNTERSTATEMENT OF THE FACTS LILCO's Brief contains numerous statements implying that

4. the Exercise was intended to comply with the requirements j

Appendix E, 5 IV.F.1. for a full participation exercise. Izgi, LILCO Br. at 1, 5, 8, 40. In fact, it is clear from the record that no one -- not LILCO, not the NRC Staff, not FEMA -- gave the particular requirements of Appendix E, 5 IV.F.1, any consid-eration until after the Governments' had filed their conten-tions. This failure to consider Appendix E is discussed below.

The documents discussed here pertaining to the Exercise request are contained in the Governments' Appendix.

l A. The Exercise Recuest i

On November 14, 1984, LILCO sent proposed exercise objec-l: ,

tives to the NRC. LILCO asked the NRC to review the objectives, to transmit them to FEMA, and to arrange for an exercise.1/

i 1/ Letter from J.D. Leonard, LILCO, to H.k. Denton, NRC, l November 14, 1984 ("SNRC-1107"). LILCO asserts that its "efforts to conduct the required exercise of the Shoreham plan began in November 1984 when it asked the NRC to request FEMA to schedule a full oarticination exercise of the Shoreham plan." LILCO Br. at 8 (emphasis added). The words "full participation" appear nowhere in the letter.

To the extett, however, that LILCO now deems the exercise l (footnote continued) 1 t

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It was not until June 20, 1985, that the NRC requested FEMA to schedule an exercise of the LILCO Plan. The NRC stated in this request that "an exercise of the LILCO plan could yield meaningful results, even though such an exercise may not satisfy all of the requirements of NRC's regulations."8/ The NRC re-quest went on to state:

In determining those portions of the LERO plan that might be appropriate for inclusion in an exercise at this time, we suggest that FEMA emphasize evaluation of the functional areas of emergency preparedness re-lated to the demonstration of response capabilities within the plume exposure (10 mile) Emergency Planning Zone.9/

On October 29, 1985, FEMA responded to the NRC request.

FEMA-outlined two exercise options for the NRC to choose from, including a limited exercise and one which "would ir a *si functions and normal exercise objectives."lE/ The um. unose the more expansive option and reiterated that it had requested FEMA i

to schedule "as full an exercise of the LILCO Local Emergency (footnote continued from previous page) demonstrations proposed in this letter to be a "full participation" exercise, it should be noted that ingestion pathway and recovery and reentry objectives were included. Further, LILCO's 1984 objectives called for LILCO to "simulate using sirens, EBS, and tone alert radios." SNRC-1107, Attachment at 3 (emphasis added). This makes suspect LILCO's claim (LILCO Br. at

45) that it was Suffolk County's 1111 ordinance that led to the decisions to simulate siren sounding and EBS activation.

8/ Memorandum from E.L. Jordan, NRC, to R.W. Krimm, FEMA, June 20, 1985.

9/ Ibid.

10/ Letter from S.W. Speck, FEMA, to W.J. Dircks, NRC, October 29, 1985.

Response Organization plan as is feasible."ll/

Contrary to LILCO's assertions, there is nothing in any of the correspondence between LILCO, the NRC, and FEMA prior to the Exercise to indicate that the planned exercise was "contemplated as the final step in the NRC-required process for review and approval of the offsite radiological emergency response for Long Island Lighting Company's Shoreham Nuclear Power Station . . . . " Egg LILCO Br. at 7. The term "full participa-tion" is nowhere mentioned in this correspondence. If anything, tne correspondence between the NRC and FEMA indicates the tenta-tive and experimental nature of the Exercise and the limited focus of the activities to be tested -- functions and normal exercise objectives.within the 10-mile plume exposure EPZ.

B. The Plannino Phase Once FEMA had agreed to conduct the F.xercise, LILCO repre-sentatives met frequently with FEMA to plan the Exercise, and to decide which of the standard FEMA objectives would be demon-strated and how. It is undisputed that no one involved in this planning process gave any consideration to whether the Exercise being planned would or would not meet the criteria set forth in Appendix E.

Neither Mr. Daverio nor Mr. Behr, the lead LILCO persons in developing the Exercise, ever attempted to determine whether the Exercise satisfied Appendix E. Further, they were unable to recall any discussion concerning the Appendix E full participa-11/ Letter from W.J. Dircks, NRC, to S.W. Speck, FEMA, November 12, 1985.

. s tion requirements with either FEMA or the NRC Staff. Tr. 5984-87 (Behr, Daverio). Similarly, FEMA personnel testified that they never attempted to make such a determination, since FEMA's focus was on its own regulations and guidance. Tr. 7514, 7523 '

(Kowieski); 111 Tr. 7624 (Keller); 7552 (Kowieski). There was no probative evidence that the NRC representative on FEMA's

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Regional Assistance Committee ("RAC") had made any determination that the Exercise met regulatory requirements. Egg Tr. 8862-64 (Schwartz). Egg also Section IV D.2 below. There was no discussion or determination by the RAC concerning whether the Exercise met the requirements of Appendix E. Tr. 7530-31 (Keller).

Notwithstanding the foregoing, LILCO persists in claiming that since the Shoreham Exercise was designed in accordance with FEMA's usual practices, and since FEMA attempted to design the Exercise to be equivalent to other exercises run in FEMA Region II, the Exercise must be deemed to comply with Appendix E. The evidence developed at the hearing demonstrates that LILCO is wrong.

First, FEMA Region II had never before designed or run an initial exercise for an NTOL site. Tr. 7544 (Kowieski, t

Baldwin); 7232 (Baranski); agg also Tr. 8380 (Keller). Thus, the fact that the Shoreham Exercise was intended to be like other exercises previously run by FEMA in Region II is not dispositive on the issue whether the Shoreham Exercise met .

regulatory requirements for an NTOL exercise, t

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Second, the Exercise as executed differed from other Region II exercises. FEMA intended, for instance, that the lead EBS radio station participate, as occurs at all other exercises.

Tr. 7553 (Kowieski); 7630 (Keller). It was not until after FEMA completed its evaluation of the Exercise in April 1986 that FEMA found out that a simulator -- not WALK Radio -- had been contacted during the Exercise. Tr. 7556-57, 7559 (Baldwin).

Similarly, consistent with other exercises, FEMA wanted more than one school district to participate in the Exercise.

Tr. 7607-09, 7614 (Kowieski). In fact, however, LILCO declined even to attempt to obtain grcater school participation, despite the fact that FEMA advised LILCO before the Exercise that the limited school participation presented a potential problem.

Tr. 7607 (Kowieski). FEMA also intended to evaluate public information activities during the Exercises (as was done at that time for all other Region II sites), until this objective was removed at LILCO's request. Tr. 7542-45 (Kowieski). Moreover, LILCO simulated its contacts with special facilities--contrary to the usual FEMA Region II practice. Tr. 8663 (Kowieski); NY Ex. 1 at 100 n.46. In short, ac a result of LILCO decisions to simulate so many activities and communications during the Exer-cise, the "designed scope"12/ of the Exercise differed from the scope of the Exercise as it was actually conducted. As FEMA 12/ Throughout its brief, LILCO makes frequent reference to the "design" or the "designed scope" of the Exercise as an issue.

Egg, RASA, LILCO Br. at 6, 24, 26. The issue at the hearing was the scope of the Exercise which actually occurred. "Design" is irrelevant, except to the extent that design actually impacted i scope.  ;

witness Mr. Kowieski put it: "Whatever we asked for, and what-ever was demonstrated, are two different things." Tr. 7635 (Kowieski).13/

C. CLI-86-11_and the Admission of Contentions

1. CLI-86-11 On June 6, 1986, the Commission ruled on procedural motions before it pertaining to the conduct of the post-Exercise litiga-tion. Lono Island Lichtino Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), CLI-86-ll, 23 NRC 577 (1986) ("CLI-86-11"). The Commission rejected a LILCO proposal that the Licensing Board exclude contentions which did not "demonstrate" a fundamental flaw in the LILCO Plan. The commission concluded that such a proposal had the potential to require premature evidentiary decisions. CLI-86-11, 23 NRC at 581. Instead, reasoning that "only fundamental flaws are material licensing issues," the Commission directed the Licensing Board to admit only those con-tentions which (1) pled "that the exercise demonstrated funda-mental flaws in LILCO's plan, and (2) . . . provide (d) bases for the contentions which, if shown to be true, would demonstrate a fundamental flaw in the plan." 14 13/ LILCO asserts that "(a]t least three of the four respects in which the PID found the scope of the February 1986 exercise deficient -- EBS activation, public school participation and ingestion pathway -- spring directly from the spoiler actions of  !

state and local governments." LILCO Br. at 2-3 n.4. This statement is untrue. Ingestion pathway activities were excluded because the NRC suggested that the Exercise focus on the 10-mile plume EPZ. Tr. 7525, 7539 (Kowieski); Egg PID at 44. LILCO made the decisions not to ask either WALK Radio or more schools to participate. Tr. 7565, 7584, 7607 (Kowieski); 6847 (Daverio).

2. Admission of Contentions EX 15/Li On August 1, 1986, the Governments filed their conten-tions.ld/ Contentions EX 15/16 allege that because major por-tions of the LILCO Plan and LILCO's ability to implement them were not demonstrated or evaluated during the Exercise, and because many of the persons and entities essential to Plan implementation did not participate, or participated only to a limited extent, the Exercise results precluded a finding that there is reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures could and would be taken.ll/

LILCO filed a 148-page pleading detailing its objections to the Governments' contentions.ll/ LILCO objected to Contentions EX 15/16 on the grounds that they challenged the Exercise scenario, and that a failure to test or review some part of the Plan does not demonstrate a flaw in the Plan itself. Sag, e.g.,

LILCO's Objections at 7, 29, 48, 73, 82, 100. The NRC Staff also objected to admission of Contentions EX 15/16.11/

The Governments responded to LILCO's and the Staff's objec-

[5/ Emergency Planning Contentions Relating to the February 13, 1986 Exercise, dated August 1, 1986.

15/ In a separate contention, Contention EX 18, the Governments focused exclusively on whether the Exercise met the specific requirements set forth in Appendix E,Section IV.F.1.

11/ -LILCO's Objections to Intervenors' "Emergency Planning Contentions Relating to the February 13, 1986 Exercise", dated August 15, 1986 ("LILCO's Objections").

11/ NRC Staff Response to Proposed Emergency Planning Contentions Relating to the February 13, 1986 Exercise (filed by Suffolk l County, the State of New York and the Town of Southampton), dated August 15, 1986.

tions on August 25, 1986.18/ The Governments pointed out that the basic assertion made by Contentions EX 15/16 "is that the Exercise results provide no reliable basis upon which to make a reasonable assurance finding." Governments' Response at 16-17, 144. The Governments argued that under the ECE decision,19/

they were entitled to be heard on the validity and sufficiency of the Exercise results, and FEMA's evaluation of the results, because both are material factors in the NRC's licensing of Shoreham. Id. at 17-18. The Governments also discussed the pleading standard set forth in CLI-86-ll:

according to the clear guidance of CLI-86-11, if a contention alleges that the exercise revealed or demonstrated a fundamental flaw --that is, somethina which orecludes the reasonable assurance finding re-quired by Section 50.47 (a)(1) -- and pleads a specif-ic basis for that allegation, it is admissible.

Id. at 22 (emphasis added). The Governments pointed out that if the scope of an Exercise is too limited, its results will neces-sarily be too limited to provide a basis for a reasonable assur-ance finding -- and preclusion of a reasonable assurance finding

, is the definition of a "fundamental flaw" in CLI-86-ll. 14. at 28.

The Licensing Board heard oral argument relating to the ad-missibility of the Governments' contentions, including Conten-18/ Suffolk County, State of New York, and the Town of Southampton Response to the LILCO and Staff Objections to the Emergency Planning Contentions Relating to the February 13 Exercise, August 25, 1986 ("Governments' Response").

19/ Union of Concerned Scientists v. NRC, 735 F.2d 1437 (D.C.

Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1132 (1985) ("QCE").

1

tions EX 15/16. It was during this oral argument that counsel.

-for LILCO, in response to a question from Judge Shon, announced for the first time that LILCO intended the February 13 Exercise to be tha-licensing exercise for Shoreham required by the NRC regulations. Prehearing Conference (Sept. 24, 1986),

Tr. 16,550-52.

The Board admitted Contentions EX 15/16 on October 3, 1986.

The Board concluded that a "fundamental flaw in the plan" would be anything revealed by the Exercise which precluded a finding of reasonable assurance that protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency.3E/ Under this standard, Contentions EX 15/16, together with Contention EX 18,21/ with their allegations that the Exercise was insuf-ficient in scope to permit a reasonable assurance finding, were clearly admissible:

It is clear beyond cavil that if the Commission is to properly exercise its statutory responsibilities, it must act in making its reasonable assurance finding on an exercise that is not so fundamentally flawed that it cannot be relied upon. Becauce the scope of the emergency preparedness exercise and the manner in which it was conducted are material considerations in the licensing process, they are matters Intervenors may contest.

22/ Prehearing Conference Order (Ruling on Contentions and Establishing Discovery Schedule), dated October 3, 1986

("October 3 Order"). Since the October 3 Order is unpublished, a copy of it is included in the Governments' Appendix.

21/ The Licensing Board concluded that ". . . (Contention EX 18) is simply a clarification of certain matters admitted in Contentions EX 15 or Contention IX 16." It did not admit Contention EX 18 as a separate contention, although it did admit one of Contention EX 18's subparts as a separate basis for Contentions EX 15/16. Egg Oct. 3 Order at 12.

Oct. 3 Order at 6. The Board rejected arguments that for Con-tentions EX 15/16 to be admissible they would have to allege that the Shoreham Exercise scenario differed materially from other FEMA-approved exercise scenarios:

The correct requirement is that the emergency pre-paredness exercise meet the regulation (sic] standard of 10 CFR 50.47 and App. E. Whether the exercise 911 11 is not materially different from other FEMA-ap-proved scenarios at other nuclear plants is ir-relevant. It is the regulatory standard that must be met.

Oct. 3 Order at 7.

3. FEMA's Reconsideration Motion FEMA asked the Licensing Board to reconsider the admission of Contentions EX 15/16.11/ FEMA argued that the Licensing Board had erred in admitting the contentions because the conten-tions did not allege a fundamental flaw in the LILCO Plan gir 11 FEMA Motion at 6-7. FEMA also argued that exercise evalua-tion techniques are committed to FEMA's discretion, and that the Licensing Board can only look at exercise results. 14 A newly reconstituted Licensing Boardl3/ rejected FEMA's ll/ Federal Emergency Management Agency's Motion to Reconsider Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Prehearing Conference Order Dated October 3, 1986, and Memorandum and Supporting Affidavit in Support of That Motion, dated October 27, 1986 ("FEMA Motion").

LILCO supported FEMA. Ett LILCO's Response in Support of FEMA's Motion to Reconsider That Aspect of the Licensing Board's Prehearing Conference Order Permitting Challenges to the Scope of the February 13, 1986 FEMA Graded Exercise, dated November 10, 1986.

13/ The October 3 Order was issued by Judges Margulies, Kline, and Shon. A new OL-5 Exercise Board was created on October 7, 1966, comprised of Judges Frye, Paris, and Shon. Thus, a total of (footnote continued)

• O

-Mahion and reaffirmed admission of Contentions EX 15/16. Long Island Liahtina_CSA (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1),

LBP-86-38A, 24 NRC 819 (1986). The Board articulated several bases for its decision. First, the Board noted that under NRC regulations, exercises are provisions of an emergency plan.

Thus, to the extent the Exercise was deficient in scope, the Board reasoned this would constitute a flaw in LILCO's Plan.

24 NRC at 826. Second, the Board also specifically relied on Appendix E in admitting the two contentions:

Further, the regulation calls for a "full participa-tion exercise" to be conducted within a specified period prior to operation in excess of 5% of rated power, and provides guidance with regard to the scope of such an exercise. LILCO maintains that the

. February 13 exercise was such an exercise. . . .

It is beyond question that licensing hearings exist to permit the public to question whether the Commis-sion's regulatory requirements are satisfied by a given application. That is precisely what Intervenors are questioning here. So viewed, Contentions Ex 15 and Ex 16 are admissible.

Id. at 826-27. The Licensing Board addressed FEMA's concerns by stating that:

The issues litigable under contentions Ex 15 and Ex 16 are limited to whether the scope of the exercise meets the Commission's regulatory requirements for full participation exercises. FEMA properly takes no posi-tion on the issue. [ citation omitted) Indeed resolu-tion of this issue properly belongs to the NRC. While FEMA may be questioned on its evaluation of the exer-cise, it maj not be questioned concerning whether the (footnote continued from previous page) five Licensing Board judges (Judge Shon on two occasions) ruled that Contentions EX 15/16 were admissible.

cxercise meets NRC requirements.

Id. at 827.

4. FEMA's Unsuccessful Interlocutory Acceal FEMA next sought interlocutory review of the Licensing Board's admission of Contentions EX 15/16.21/ Again, LILCO supported FEMA.25/ Although the Staff had initially opposed the admission of Contentions EX 15/16, the Staff altered its posi-tion and stated:

At this juncture . . . the Staff acknowledges that the Licensing Board has supplied a reasonable foundation for its determination that Contentions EX 15 and 16 are admissible. The Staff no longer argues that the Licensing Board's decision should be reversed.dk/

The Staff recognized the link between the scope of a test and the reliability of the results of the test:

The ultimate issue to be litigated is whether "the exercise itself revealed any deficiencies which pre-clude a finding of reasonable assurance that protec-tive measures can and will be taken, i.e., fundamental flaws in the plan." CLI-86-ll, supra, 23 NRC at 581, 2d/ FEMA Petition for Leave to Appeal, Appeal Memorandum, Request for Expedited Consideration of Appeal of December 11, 1986 Order (ASLB No. 86-01-OL), and Request for Stay of That Order With Respect to Discovery Concerning Contentions EX 15 and 16 or Directed Certification to the Commission, dated December 31, 1986.

("FEMA Petition").

15/ LILCO's Memorandum in Support of FEMA's Appeal and Request for Certification of Issues Relating to Emergency Planning Exercise Design in Contentions EX 15 and 16, dated January 15, 1987.

25/ NRC Staff Response to FEMA Petition for Leave to Appeal, Appeal Memorandum, Request fer Expedited Consideration and Request for a Stay or Directed Certification of December 11, 1986 Licensing Board Order, dated January 20, 1987 ("Staff Response")

at 2 n.5. Egg also id. at 7.

e .-

It is the results of the exercise that must form the basis for a finding of "reasonable assurance." In assessirig whether the results of the exercise will support a finding of reasonable assurance, to some extent the overa11' adequacy of the scope of the exer-cise,also must be considered in order to determine whether the results-provide a sufficient test of the plan to form the basis of a finding of "reasonable assurance".

Staff Response at 15. The Staff also concluded that the litiga-tion of Contentions EX 15/16 threatened no impermissible intru-sion on FEMA's prerogatives. "Plainly," the Staff argued, "the Board is only looking at the exercise to see whether it provides the reasonable assurance that the plan can and will be imple-mented as set out in 10 CFR 550.47 (a)(2)". Id. at 18.

The Appeal Board determined that FEMA had failed to show the irreparable harm necessary to warrant interlocutory review.

Lono Island Lichtina Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), ALAB-861, 25 NRC 129 (1987). While it decided FEMA's Petition on procedural grounds, the Appeal Board also rejected FEMA's interpretation of the pleading standard set forth in CLI-86-ll (W]e do not agree with FEMA that the Commission's directive that the Board examine the "results" of the exercise forecloses any review of the scope or design of the exercise itself.

Such a reading of CLI-86-ll would effectively confer upon FEMA and the NRC staff, which jointly decide the elements to be tested, the unreviewable authority to determine that their sampling of observable elements of the LILCO plan was sufficient to satisfy Commission regulations. While FEMA's professional judgment as to what elements should be tested at the pre-license stage is entitled to substantial deference, the Commission's regulations plainly accord interested parties an opportunity to rebut FEMA's views on questions concerning the "adequacy and implementation capability" of the plan.

ALAB-861, 25 NRC at 139 n.38. Judge Edles concurred with the majority, but expressly found that Contentions EX 15/16 had been properly admitted.

The two contentions admitted by the Licensing Board allege essentially that the Shoreham exercise did not satisfy Commission regulatory requirements. I have no doubt that a failure to satisfy those requirements --

such as a demonstrated failure to conduct a full participation exercise in accord with Appendix E to Part 50 -- would constitute a fundamental flaw in the LILCO plan that could bear on a Commission determina-tion that there is reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of an emergency.

ALAB-861, 25 NRC at 141 (Edles, J., concurring).21/

Four facts clearly emerge from this procedural history of the admission of Contentions EX 15/16. First, the Licensing Board (and the Appeal Board as well) examined the admissibility of the contentions in the light of both MCS and CLI-86-11.

Second, the Licensing Board realized that the scope of an exer-cise is inextricably intertwined with the results of an exer-cise; one cannot speak authoritatively concerning the results of a test without knowing what the test actually tested. Third, the Licensing Board realized that a "reasonable assurance" 21/ Judge Edles also stated that any reading of CLI-86-ll as excluding Contentions EX 15/16 was without merit: "I join fully in our conclusion that the Commission's directive in CLI-86-ll that the Licensing Board examine the "results" of the exercise must be read to authorize the Board to look at the scope or design of the exercise to some degree." ALAB-861, 25 NRC at 142 n.6 (Edles, J., concurring).

O e 6

finding must be based on an adequate Exercise. Fourth, the Licensing Board agreed that Appendix E sets forth the criteria against which the Exercise must be measured.

III. CONTENTIONS EX 15/16 WERE PROPERLY ADMITTEQ As the discussion above demonstrates, five Licensing Board judges and three Appeal Board judges have considered whether it was proper to admit Contentions EX.15/16. Their three orders --

the October 3 Order, LBP-86-38A, and ALAB-861 -- set forth in detail why the admission was correct. In view of the extensive reasons already set forth in these orders detailing the bases for admission of the contentions, the Governments will make only a few additional comments.

The starting point for any discussion of the admissibility of Contentions EX 15/16 must be the D.C. Circuit's MCS decision. MC1 was brought after the NRC passed a rule which would have insulated exercises from review in adjudicatory proceedings.- In concluding that the NRC had exceeded its authority in promulgating the rule, the HC1 court held that "once a hearing on a licensing proceeding has begun, it must encompass all material factors bearing on the licensing decision raised by the requester." MCE, 735 F.2d at 1443.

The issue whether an exercise demonstrates that an emergency plan can and will be implemented is precisely the issue which the MC1 court believed should be examined in a hearing. In fact, the hcl court determined that the evaluation of emergency planning l

exercises formed an issue particularly susceptible to meaningful review in a hearing:

Where, as with preparedness exercises, the decision involves a central decisionmaker's consideration and weighing of many others (sic) persons' observations and first hand experiences, questions of credibility, conflicts, and sufficiency surface and the ordinary ,

reasons for requiring a hearing come into the picture.

[W]e do not believe that evaluations of emergency preparedness exercises fall within the category of determinations that might be excepted from a section 189(a) hearing because they do not lend themselves to the hearing process. In evaluating the exercises, the Commission does not just review on the scene reports by NRC staff observers. Rather, the Commission is called upon to consider and weigh evidence presented by FEMA, the licensee, and state and local officials as well as its staff in assessing whether the exer-cises demonstrate that adequate emergency preparedness plans can and will be implemented.

Id. at 1450. The point of evaluating an exercise is to deter-mine whether it shows that the emergency plan is capable of -

being implemented. Such an inquiry cannot be artificially limited to examination of the exercise events in a vacuum, l totally sealed off from the context of what 11 beino tested.

Put another way, the NRC cannot make a "reasonable assurance" finding on the basis of an exercise if it is unaware of what has

-- or, more importantly, what has H21 -- been exercised. Pre-

• t sumably, the exercise requirements outlined in Appendix E were put in the regulation for this very reason: to ensure that the exercise results and FEMA's evaluation of those results flow from the type of test which, if properly executed, will generate

the data (including the FEMA finding) which the NRC needs to make its reasonable assurance finding.28/

Notwithstanding ECE, the Licensing and Appeal Board de-cisions, and the logic flowing from ECE -- all leading to the conclusion that intervenors must be allowed to challenge whether the required exercise has in fact occurred -- LILCO persists in its attempts to divorce the "results" of an exercise from the "scope" of the exercise, the results of which are being scrutinized. Thus, LILCO argues that QgE and CLI-86-11 both dictate that the only issue admissible for litigation is the "exercise results," without reference to the scope of the exer-cise. LILCO Br. at 3, 24.

Such a rigid compartmentalization defies HCE, the NRC's regulatory scheme and common sense. The actual exercise (the "test") is the necessary predicate to the FEMA (and the subse-quent NRC) evaluation of the results of the test. The results of the exercise can only be viewed and assessed meaningfully against the backdrop of what the exercise actually tested. To grant a right to a hearing over the "results" of a test, while 9

28/ FILCO implies that ECE precluded litigation of issues such as f

Contentions EX 15/16. LILCO Br. at 3, 4-5, 13-14, 22-23. That is not true. The ECS court stated that its ruling -- dealing only with the Atomic Energy Act ("AEA") hearing requitement -- did not preclude the NRC's adoption of a fundamental flaw criterion. 735 F.2d at 1448. The QCE court did not impose such a standard.

Indeed, it expressly noted that the fundamental flaw criterion, if adopted by the NRC as a substantive standard, would still need to pass muster under the arbitrary and capricious standard. Id. at 1448 n.20. The Governments submit that rejection of Contentions EX 15/16 would have been arbitrary and capricious in the extreme, not to mention in derogation of the AEA hearing requirement. Egg 42 USC S 2239(a).

l simultaneously prohibiting any discussion of the nature of the  !

test, would be to grant an empty right.22/

It is undisputed that FEMA's evaluation of the emergency exercise is one of the material factors upon which the NRC relles in making a licensing decision. Egg QGS, 735 F.2d at 1445 and n.14. FEMA's conclusions about an exercise are pre-sumptively valid. Egg 10 CFR S 50.47(a)(2). In a licensing l

n proceeding, however, FEMA's findings are rebuttable. Id.

Clearly, this grant of the right to rebut FEMA's findings would ,

also be an empty grant if the challenger were forestalled from any inquiry into or disagreement with the data base from which FEMA drew its conclusions or upon which FEMA based its findings.

Finally, LILCO urges that the Board's admission of Conten-tions EX 15/16 was in derogation of the deference and presump- {

tion of validity which is due FEMA's "design" of an exercise. ,

LILCO Br. at 25-26. LILCO cites ALAB-861 for the proposition that such deference is required. Id. at 26, citino 25 NRC at 139 n.38. Three responses are in order. First, even assuming j deference is required, the Governments have the right to attempt I to rebut FEMA's position. 10 CFR S 50.47(a)(2). Second, the l

cited ALAB-861 statement concerned the deference that might need i to be given in reaching a final substantive decision regarding whether the Exercise satisfied Appendix E,Section IV.F.1; the

{

ALAB-861 deference statement had nothing to do with whether ,

21/ The Governments do not contend that they have the right to '

urge that the Shoreham Exercise was required to meet standards in excess of Appendix E. By the same token, however, the Governments -

do have the right to allege noncompliance with Appendix E.  !

l 1

admission of Contentions Ex 15/16 was correct. Third, the evidence in the record demonstrates that it would have been inappropriate to give deference to FEMA's design of the Exercise because FEMA admitted that it did not even consider Appendix E in~ designing the Shoreham Exercise (or any other exercise for ,

that matter). This evidence is discussed in Section IV.D.1 below; to avoid repetition, we will not address the matter ,

further here.dS/

IV. THE BOARD'S INTERPRETATION OF APPENDIX E. S IV.F.1, IS CORRECT The Licensing Board ruled that the "as much . . . as is reasonably achievable" language of Section IV.F.1 constituted an independent criterion of Appendix E. When the Board found that the Exercise had not satisfied that criterion, it decided that it did not need to deal with other arguments which had been made, such as whether "major observable portions" of LILCO's Plan had been omitted from the Exercise. PID at 19. LILCO urges reversal of this holding on a number of grounds, alleging that the Board misread Section IV.F.1 and its regulatory history, and that the Board should have interpreted footnote 4 of Section IV.F.1.

LILCO's complaints are without basis. First, LILCO itself 1S/ LILCO urges that Contentions EX 15/16 could have been admitted only if they alleged that the Shoreham Exercise "was framed in any but the usual manner . . . ." LILCO Br. at 4. Egg also id. at 14, 15, 26. LILCO's argument assumes that the "usual manner" complies with Appendix E. The facts demonstrate, however, that FEMA has never attempted to construe Appendix E. Egg Section IV.D.1 below. Thus, the "usual manner" standard urged by LILCO is probative of nothing.

argued that the "as much as" language of Section IV.F.1 consti-tuted an independent criterion of the regulation; it ill-behooves LILCO now to make new arguments in contravention of its prior position. Second, the Board's interpretation of the "as much as" language was rational in light of the unambiguous words of the regulation and the regulatory history. Third, if the Board had interpreted footnote 4 of Section IV.F.1 and applied it to the Shoreham Exercise facts, the result would not have been favorable to LILCO; rather, it would have revealed additional reasons why the Exercise failed to satisfy Appendix E. Finally, the Board did not err in giving little deference to FEMA or the NRC Staff  :

regarding the meaning of Section IV.F.1: FEMA candidly admitted that it never attempted to construe that regulation; and the Staff ~ witnesses demonstrated little knowledge of either Appendix E or the Shoreham Exercise.

A. LILCO Cannot Complain That the Board Treated the "As Much . . . as is Reasonably 4 Achievable" Language of Section IV.F.1 as an Indeoendent Criterion of Accendix E LILCO argues that the Board erred in interpreting the "as much . . . as is reasonably achievable" language as a criterion '

independent of the footnote 4 definition of a "full participa-tion" exercise and independent of the "ultimate ' reasonable assurance' standard of $ 50.47(a) . . . . " LILCO Br. at 27.

LILCO's complaint is groundless, since LILCO itself urged that  :

the "as much as" language constituted such a separate criterion. L LILCO's Contention Ex 15/16 testimony contained the fol-lowing interchange:

( i

l

7 l

Q. What, in your view, does the term "full participation" mean?

A. (Daverio, Behr) According to our readina of NRC reaulations, there is a three-prong test first, testing 'as much of ,

ihm licensee,-state and local emeroency olans as is reasonably achievable without mandatory public participation;' second, testing 'the maior observable nortions of the onsite and offsite emergency plans;'

and third, mobilization of emergency personnel and resources 'in sufficient numbers to verify capability to respond to the accident scenario.'

LILCO Ex. 12 at 8 (emphasis in original). The testimony then devotes a separate discussion to why, in the view of LILCO's wit-nesses, LILCO had satisfied ths "as much as" test. Id. at 16-18. l Similarly, LILCO's Proposed Findings before the Licensing Board I devoted specific attention to the "as much as" criterion. LILCO Findings at 52-55.

t LILCO is being less than forthcoming now when it argues that t l

the Board was required to merge the "as much as" analysis with an analysis of footnote 4 and the section 50.47(a)(1) reasonable l

l assurance standard. LILCO Br. at 27. LILCO itself proposed the i

very type of analysis ultimately employed by the Board. The t Board apparently adopted LILCO's "three-prong test" and, having found that LILCO did not satisfy the first prong -- the "as much as" standard -- the Board was not obligated to proceed )

further.31/

I 31/ The Board's interpretation of the regulation did not reduce  :

footnote 4 "to mere surplusage." Ett LILCO Br. at 33. Rather, i the Board stated that having found one basis for upholding Contentions EX 15/16, it was not "necessary to address (footnote continued) ;

l

Further, it is inappropriate for LILCO to argue (LILCO Br.

at 28-32) that the Board's analysis omitted a critical step (1112, some explicit consideration of the interrelationship of footnote 4 and S 50.47(a)(1) with the "as much as" criterion) in view of the fact that LILCO never made this argument to the Licensing Board. LILCO is now arguing that the Licensing Board "jump (ed) to the conclusion that the regulation that bears on the contentions is 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix E" and that the Board failed to consider how the reasonable assurance test of 10 CFR 550.47(a)(1) might affect the interpretation of Appendix E, and that this is the "essential" inquiry. Ett LILCO Br. at 28.

LILCO never argued below in its findings that 10 CFR S 50.47 was a limit on Appendix E. The focus of LILCO's briefs before the Licensing Board was on what Appendix E required; the supposed "essential" inquiry -- the inquiry LILCO n2w emphasizes -- is nowhere to be found in the findings and conclusions LILCO submitted to the Licensing Board.}2/ For this reason alone, the Appeal Board should disregard the LILCO arguments at pages 28-32 of the LILCO Brief.dd/

(footnote continued from previous page)

Intervenors' (footnote 4) arguments in support of their reading (of Section IV.F.1)." PID at 19. The Board did not abuse its disc r e.cion . If the Board had ruled on the Governments' other arguments, it would have identified additional bases for finding that the allegations in the contentions have been proven. Ett Section IV.C below.

12/ Ett LILCO's Findings; Ett 1112 LILCO's Reply to Intervenors' and NRC Staff's Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on the February 13, 1986 Shoreham Emergency Planning Exercise, dated September 25, 1987.

L

Even if this Board decides to address the merits of LILCO's new argument, however, the Board must uphold the PID. LILCO is wrong when it asserts that the Board proceeded in disregard of Appendix E's relationship to the NRC's overall regulatory struc-ture. To the contrary, the Board proceeded in the Exercise litigation with the understanding that Appendix E set forth the type of exercise which was necessary before valid predictive t

findings of plan implementability could be made. Indeed, in admitting Contentions EX 15/16 for litigation, the Board made +

clear that if there had not been an exercise of the scope i

required by the regulations, then there would be no basis to make the necessary reasonable assurance finding. Oct. 3 Order l i

at 5-6;21/ agg Section II.C.2 above. Egg also LBP-86-38A;

• ALAB-861.

Because the Board addressed the importance of Appendix E compliance on October 3, 1986, and articulated the linkage of Appendix E to the reasonable assurance standard, it h

i 33/ Egg, g g , Philadelohia Elec. Co. (Limerick Generating  !

Station, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-778, 20 NRC 42, 47-48 (1982)  ;

("Simply stated, an adjudicatory decision is usually the product i of the arguments raised by the litigants. A party cannot be heard 1 to complain later about a decision that fails to address an issue -

no one sought to raise"); Puerto bico Elec. Power Authority (North '

! Coast Nuclear Plant, Unit 1), ALNJ-648, 14 NRC 34, 37-38 (1981) [

("It scarcely is fair for a party to seek relief from a trial tribunal on one theory and, if unsuccessful, then to mount an appeal on a discrete theory founded on additional asserted facts l which, although available at the time, had not been given to that tribunal.").

21/ The Board's awareness of the linkage of Appendix E to the i reasonable assurance standard was demonstrated by the fact that  ;

the Board excluded contentions alleging omissions and problems l which, in its view, were minor, ad has, or easily correctable.

Egg, Ez2A, Oct. 3 Order at 16 (denying admission of Contentions EX 25, 27); id. at 15 (rejecting Contention EX 23). <

i  !

t

was under no obligation to do so again in the PID, particularly since LILCO had not raised the issue in its proposed findings. .

Finally, LILCO mischaracterizes the PID's "as much as" 4 holding as standing for the proposition that an NTOL exercise must include "literally everything ' reasonably achievable with-out mandatory public participation' . . . . LILCO Br. at 4; agg also id. at 32, 36 n.37, 43. The Board did no such thing.

The Board dealt with specific omissions in the Shoreham Exercise and in each instance found the documented omissions to be important. Egg Section V below. Where particular omissions were not found to be important -- such as the bus omission (PID at 30-32) -- the Board found them to be insignificant from an Appendix E perspective. It is clear, therefore, that the Board did not create the "literally everything" standard as LILCO alleges -- the Board considered the "as much as" criterion in the context of whether particular omissions were important to a judgment whether the Exercise was comprehensive enough to provide a basis to reach an overall conclusion on plan imple-mentability.

B. The Board's Interpretation of the "As Much As" Lancuace is Correct LILCO argues that the Board erred in its interpretation of the "as much as" language in Section IV.F.1. In particular, LILCO urges that the regulatory history of Appendix E reveals an intent that exercises for NTOL sites are to be of the same scope as exercises for operating sites. LILCO Br. at 33-36. LILCO's arguments must be rejected.

O a First, the Licensing Board was correct in ruling that ,

Section IV.F.1-5, on its face, reflects a differentiation between exercise requirements for NTOL sites versus operating plant sites. Egg PID at 11-13. Indeed, one would need to ignore ex-press provisions of Section IV.F.1 (the "as much as" language, as well as the language that an NTOL exercise "shall include partic-ipation by each State and local government within the plume exposure EPZ and each State within the ingestion pathway EPZ")

which are not found in the biennial exercise portions (S IV.F.3) of the regulation, in order to find that NTOL exercises and biennial exercises are to be of identical scope. The Board pro-perly declined to ignore the patent distinction made by the regu-lation between exercises for NTOL sites and other exercises.

Second, the Board had rational bases, supported by evidence in the record, for concluding that the Commission intended that NTOL exercises be more comprehensive than biennial exercises.

Prior to the initial exercise at a site, there is no "track record" regarding the capabilities or preparedness of personnel who would respond to an emergency at that nuclear power plant site. Absent such a track record, it makes sense that the initial full participation exercise be complete. NY Ex. 1, at

25. Indeed, even the Staff witness agreed that an NTOL exercise needs to test more objectives than a subsequent biennial exer-cise. Tr. 8832-34 (Schwartz)! 111 1112 Tr. 6139-40 (Hockert)

(for the first full participation exercise, if a demonstration is reasonably achievable, it should be performed). This is particu-larly critical for Shoreham because most of the implementation of the Plan is dependent upon LILCO personnel whose everyday work does not include emergency response. Indeed, the NEC itself has relied upon just such a factor. Thus, in 1984, in reducing the exercise frequency for offsite plans (but not for a licensee's onsite plan) from annually to once every two years, the NRC noted that State and local government personnel have experience in responding to emergencies on an everyday basis. 49 Egdt Eggt 27,734, 27,735, col. 1 (1984). Utility personnel lack such experience.

Third, the regulatory history supports the Board's inter-pretation that an NTOL exercise must be more comprehensive than biennial exercises for operating plants.31/ When Appendix E was enacted in 1980, it referred to "full-scale" exercises. 45 Egdi Eggt 55,413, col. 1 (1980). It specified exercise frequency requirements for operating plant sites (in Section IV.F.1.a) and for NTOL sites which had no operating plants (in Section IV.F.1.b). For hath kinds of sites, the "full-scale" exercise needed to "test [] as much of the licensee, State, and local emergency plans as is reasonably achievable without manda-tory public participation . . . . 45 Fed. Eggt 55,413, col. 1 (1980). This made sense in 1980, since for both NTOL and oper-31/ Contrary to LILCO's assertion (LILCO Br. at 37), the Governments did not urge the Board to ignore regulatory history.

Rather, the Governments devoted significant discussion in their findings to the regulatory history. Egg suffolk County, State of New York, and Town of Southampton Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on the February 13, 1986 Shoreham Exercise, dated August 17, 1987 ("Governments' Findings") at 105-06, 110-18.

c- _ -_ _ _ . _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ - - _ _ _ _ - - _ - - _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

f I

ating plant sites, there was no track record of performance as of i 1980.. '!

In 1984, the NRC amended Appendix E. In lieu of "full-scale" exercises, it substituted the term "full participation i

exercises". 49 h Rah 27,736, col. 1 (1984). As in the 1980 version, the new Appendix E contained frequency requirements for exercises, both for-NTOL sites (in Section IV.F.1) and for operating sites (in Section IV.F.3).- Like the 1980 version, the ,

1984 version required that an exercise for NTOL plants "test () as much of the . . . plans as is reasonably achievable without (

mandatory public participation." 49 h Ram. 27,736, col. 1-2

• i (1984). In the 1984 version, however, the "as much as" language did not apply to operating plants as it had in the 1980 version. l l

131 49 h Rab 27,736, col. 2 (1984). This is evidence that l

the Commission. intended full participation exercises for NTOL

]

sites like Shoreham to be more complete than full participation j t

exercises for operating plant sites. Indeed, in relaxing the

{

exercise frequency .)quirement from one to two years, the NRC I i

noted that at oneratina plants, it had, by 1984, experience at I about 150 exercises. 131 49 h Ram. 27,735, col. 1 (1984).

While the commission did not expressly link the operating plant i exercise experience to deletion of the "as much as" language for operating plant exercises, the stated rationale for the rule change supports the view that this motivated its action.

In short, the Licensing Board's interpretation of Section IV.F.1's "as much as" language is supported by the lan-g guage of the regulation, the testimony in this proceeding, and by a rational f.nterpretation of the regulatory history.36/ There is no legitimate basis for reversing the considered decision of the Licensing Board.

C. LILCO Would Not Have Been Assisted If the Board Had Interoreted Footnote 4 of Section IV.F.1 LILCO complains that the Board erred in failing to interpret the term "major observable portions" in footnote 4 of Section IV.F.1. LILCO claims that if the Board had done so, it would have had to rule for LILCO. LILCO Br. at 32-33.

Exactly the opposite is the case. If the Board had inter-preted footnote 4 (as the Governments had asked it to; Egg Governments' Findings at 86-99), the Board would have found addi-tional reasons why the Exercise failed to comply with Appendix E.

1. The Exercise Failed to Test Major Observable Portions of LILCO's Plan Footnote 4 of Appendix E requires that "the major observable portions" of the offsite plans be tested. The regulation does 36/ The Governments must correct one inaccurate LILCO assertion relating to the 1984 rulemaking record. LILCO claims that a comment filed by the New York State Department of Health "shows a

, total absence of planned ingestion pathway exercises for

facilities in New York State." LILCO Br. at 35 n.36. In fact, the New York comment points out that relaxing the rule would not afford relief to the State because the proposed "partial l participation" exercises would still include ingestion pathway and l recovery / reentry so that "most states will have a major role in all exercises." LILCO Att. F at 3. Thus, every exercise marked

! "X" on the chart attached to the letter would include State l

participation for ingestion pathway and recovery / reentry. The State comment does not, therefore, support LILCO's interpretation of the rule. Further, it is inappropriate for LILCO to raise this State comment on appeal. State witnesses testified on Contentions EX 15/16 but LILCO never asked any questions about the State comment, much less marked it as an exhibit.

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not say that some or part of the major observable portions must be tested or that all major observable portions must be tested over a series of exercises. Rather, the regulation states that "thg major observable portions" are to be tested in a full participation exercise. The unambiguous meaning of such language is that all major observable portions of the plans must be tested for an exercise to satisfy Appendix E.31/

The evidence presented at trial leaves no doubt that the functions omitted from the Shoreham Exercise related to major observable portions of the Plan. Only the Governments offered direct testimony on that subject; the Governments' witnesses testified that the Exercise omissions highlighted in Contentions EX 15/16 (with the exception of omissions related to buses and the Coast Guard) did relate to major observable portions of LILCO's Plan.38/ On cross-examination, FEMA's witnesses agreed 31/ The 1984 amendment to Appendix E supports this interpretation. The 1984 amendment was prompted initially by a 1982 rulemaking petition which urged a two-year exercise cycle and full participation exercises which "test all major elements of the j integrated plans." 47 Fed. Reg. 29,252, col. 3 (1982) (emphasis i

added). The 1984 rulemaking granted this petition. 49 Fed. Reg.

27,735, col. 1 (1984).

38/ Egg NY Ex. 1, at 31-32, 42 (EBS system is a mcjor observable l portion of LILCO Plan); id. at 55 (LILCO public information program is a major observable portion); id. at 70 (school preparedness is major observable portion); id, at 88, 114 l (capability to implement protective actions for special facility residents constitutes major observable portion of LILCO's Plan);

14. at 150 (ingestion pathway activities constitute major observable portion of LILCO Plan); id. at 155 (recovery and l reentry is major aspect of LILCO Plan). Egg also Tr. 7231 l (Baranski) (recovery and reentry a major observable portion); 7142 l (Baranski) (Section IV.D.1 of Appendix E and NUREG 0654 underscore l that siren system is a major observable portion); 7151-56 l

(Baranski) (explains why sirens, tone alert radios, coordination

(footnote continued)

• O that some areas of omission related to major observable portions.39/

Accordingly, the evidence was essentially undisputed: major

-observable portions of LILCO's Plan were omitted from the Exer-cise. Moreover, the evidence established the importance of the particular functions and activities which were omitted from the Exercise, and the extensi.ve provisions in the LILCO Plan relating to those functions,40/ thus further supporting the significance of the omissions related to major observable portions of LILCO's Plan. Accordingly, had the Board interpreted footnote 4, it would have concluded that major observable portions of LILCO's (footnote continued from previous page) with EBS station, and airing test message constitute a major observable portion of a plan).

39/ Egg Tr. 7537, 7673 (Kowieski) (ingestion pathway and recovery and reentry are. major observable portions of the Plan); 7663-64 (Keller) (availability of transportation resources for special facility residents needs to be checked at some time because this constitutes a major observable portion of the Plan).

i 40/ NY Ex. 1, at 42-44 (describing the importance of an EBS l system to responding to a nuclear plant emergency); id. at 51-53 '

l (generally describing heavy emphasis in LILCO's Plan on public information activities); id. at 60-61, 66-68, 71-73, 78, 80, 81-82, 83-84, and NY Ex. 2, Att. 6 (describing numbers of schools that exist in the Shoreham 10-mile EPZ, the actions that would need to be taken for school children, the LILCO Plan provisions regarding schools, the normal emphasis on school testing generally insisted upon by FEMA, and the complexity of protecting school children); NY Ex. 1, at 85-86, 92-99 (describing numbers of special facilities in the 10-mile EPZ, the need for monitoring and l reception centers for special facility evacuees, and the actions that would need te be taken for special facility residents during an emergency, particularly actions by LILCO and special facility personnel); id. at 140-44 (description of Shoreham ingestion pathway EPZ and the LILCO ingestion pathway plan and the range of l

actions required thereunder); id. at 153 and NY Ex. 2, Att. 9 (description of LILCO's recovery and reentry plan and the types of recovery and reentry testing which are feasible).

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L

Plan were omitted from the Exercise, and that these omissions were significant, thus precluding a finding that the Exercise complied with Appendix E.41/

2. The Exercise Failed to Provide a Basis to Verify the Response Caoabilities of Kev Personnel-Footnote 4 of Appendix E also specifies that "full partici-pation includes . . . mobilization of State, local and licensee personnel and other resources in sufficient numbers to verify the capability to respond to the accident scenario." (Emphasis added). In the context of the Shoreham Exercise, one must substit.ute "LERO" or "LILCO" for "State, local. " Egg PID at 44.

Tnus, there had to be mobilization of "LERO, LILCO, and other resources in sufficient numbers . . . . In the context of Appendix E, the term "other resources" clearly includes other human resources, since the term is used in connection with the need to mobilize sufficient numbers of peoole to verify the 41/ In particular, it should be emphasized that the Board should have ruled that the omission of recovery and reentry testing was an additional reason that the Exercise was deficient in scope.

Recovery and reentry was not included in the Exercise, primarily because the NRC urged FEMA to concentrate on activities within the 10-mile plume exposure EPZ. Tr. 7675 (Kowieski). The evidence establishes, however, that recovery and reentry is a major observable portion of LILCO's Plan. (NY Ex. 1 at 152-155; FEMA Ex. 5 at 128; Tr. 7676-77 (Keller); 7673 (Kowieski); PID at 45) and that recovery and reentry activities could i: ave been included in the Exercise. Recovery and reentry activities have been included in other exercises. Egg NY Ex. 1 at 155. They could have been included in the Shoreham Exercise. The Board ruled that

! such testing was not reasonably achievable because final EPA guidance had not been issued. PID at 45-46. FEMA conceded, however, that recovery and reentry activities could be demonstrated despite the lack of EPA guidance. Tr. 7673-75 (Keller). Thus, recovery and reentry activities were "reasonably achievable" and should have been included in the Exercise.

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capability to respond to the accident scenario.f2/ Thus, for the Shoreham Exercise, if the Board had sought to interpret footnote 4, it would have had to identify the "other resources" who would need to respond and whether they were mobilized during the Exer-cise in sufficient numbers to verify their capability to respond to the accident scenario. The Board would have had to find that the failure to mobilize "other resources" was yet another defi-ciency in the Exercise.

Although it is undisputed that LILCO mobilized all LERO members during the Exercise, other personnel critical to the emergency response were not mobilized. For instance, WALK Radio personnel did not participate at all. Yet, unless the lead EBS station's personnel respond and follow notification procedures correctly, the public never will know what protective actions have been recommended and the actions cannot be effectively implemented. Setting aside the lack of siren testing and the fact that no EBS test message was aired, it remains undisputed that LILCO's ability to communicate with WALK Radio was not tested, and that there was no test of the capability of WALK Radio personnel to carry out the steps, even on a simulated j basis, of getting an EBS message broadcast within the required 15 l

minutes. Egg Section V.A below.

Other critica.'. response personnel were also omitted from the i

! 12/ Only the Governments submitted evidence on the meaning of the l

term "other resources" in the context of Appendix E. NY Ex. 1 at l 81. FEMA's recent guidance memorandum on school preparedness --

i GM EV-2 -- supports this interpretation, in its emphasis on the need for FEMA to contact school personnel in evaluating exercise performance. GM EV-2 is in the Governments' Appendix.

[

Exercise. Thus, there was almost a complete lack of school in-volvement, leading FEMA to admit that due to such lack of partic-ipation, FEMA could not verify the capability of schools to respond to an emergency. Tr. 7602-03 (Keller); agg Section V.'B below. Since the Exercise provided no basis for making the vori-fication of response capability required by Appendix E, it was of insufficient scope.33/

Therefore, if the Board had interpreted footnote 4, it would have found additional reasons why LILCO's Exercise was deficient in scope. Accordingly, LILCO has no basis to complain about the Board's lack of rulings on these issues.

D. The Board Was Correct in Finding That FEMA and the NRC Staff Had Presented No Persuasive views on the Exercise's Comoliance with Accendix I LILCO argues that the Licensing Board erred in failing to show deference to alleged FEMA and NRC Staff determinations that the Exercise satisfied Appendix E. LILCO Br. at 39-43. LILCO's arguments have no merit because: (1) the alleged FEMA determina-tion that the Exercise complied with Appendix E requirements never occurred; and (2) the NRC Staff testimony was so brief, conclusory, and lacking in substance that it was deservedly ig-nored by the Board.

43/ Additional critical response personnel were omitted from the Exercise. As discussed in Section V.D below and the PID at 47-48, with the possible exception of personnel at one or two nursing homes who may have made or received a telephone call, no officials l

from any special facility inside or outside the EPZ participated i in the Exercise. Absent moollization of such resources, there could be no verification whether they could respond to an accident.

1. Deference to FEMA is Not at Issue Because FEMA Made No Aooendix E Determination

.LILCO urges that the Board should have paid deference to FEMA's design of the Exercise and thus presumptively should have found that the Exercise, as designed by FEMA, satisfied Appendix E. In the course of making this argument, as well as elsewhere in its Brief, LILCO states repeatedly that FEMA either intended or believed that the Exercise satisfied Appendix E.44/

LILCO's argument must be rejected for a fundamental reason

-- it has no factual bacts. The FEMA witnesses testified that in <

the design and evaluation of the Shoreham Exercise, they never relied upon Appendix E. Tr. 7501-02 (Kowieski, Baldwin); 7513-14 (Kowieski, Keller); 7531 (Keller). Indeed, they expressly stated that they had ng opinion whether the Exercise satisfied the NRC's regulatory requirements. Tr. 7624 (Keller).

Thus, the situation presented on appeal is not one in which an expert agency, charged with interpretation and implementation of a regulatory scheme, has demonstrated through acts and prac-tice how it interprets a particular standard. Rather, this is a situation where the supposedly expert agency -- FEMA -- admitted that the necessary predicate for deference -- some interpretation of the disputed regulation -- does not exist at all.

LILCO implies that the "hundreds" of exercises supervised by 4 4./ E&, LILCO Br. at 1 (FEMA "intended" the Exercise "to be sufficient to satisfy the Commission's licensing requirements for nuclear plants . . . . "); id. at 40 (FEMA testified "that the 1986 Shoreham exercise was intended to constitute a full participation exercise and did constitute one in their judgment."); id. at 43 (FEMA witnesses testified that the Shoreham Exercise "constituted a full participation exercise in their view . . . .").

FEMA in the past, including the "numerous plants (which) have been issued operating licenses based on those exercises," provide evidence upon which this Board should find that the Shoreham Exercise satisfied Appendix E. LILCO Br. at 1. Egg also id. at 5, 15, 26, 40, 42. LILCO also makes non-record assertions about the alleged lack of ingestion testing at certain exercises in an attempt to argue that Shoreham emissions are not significant.

Egg LILCO Br. at 40 n.48. The Board must ignore LILCO's assertions. LILCO attempted to present "evidence" of what allegedly occurred at other exercises in an effort to prove that the Shoreham Exercise satisfied Appendix E. Such evidence was struck by the Licensing Board, because LILCO's witnesses were not competent to sponsor such testimony. Tr. 6085-93, striking LILCO EX 12 at 43-50 and Attachments Q and R. LILCO has not appealed the Board's action.45/ LILCO should not be permitted now on appeal to attenpt indirectly to present such evidence.

In sum, despite LILCO's repeated efforts to imply that the Board erred in not showing deference to FEMA, in fact the Board did not err at all on this issue. As evidenced in the PID, the Board showed deference to FEMA on factual issues and other j matters on which FEMA took a position. Egg, 22g2, PID at 9 n.6, 24, 37-38, 49-50. The Soard could not pay deference to FEMA on the interpretation of Appendix E, however, because FEMA itself l

l admitted that it had never interpreted or relied on Appendix E.

l l 45/ LILCO objected to the Licensing Board's ruling striking l LILCO's testimony and stated that it would make an offer of proof.

Tr. 6094 (LILCO counsel). No offer was ever made.

l

t LILCO's complaints that the Board failed to defer to the procedures set forth in FEMA guidance documents are similarly unavailing. The FEMA witnesses stated that the FEMA guidance memoranda ("GM") interpret what is required under FEMA's regula-tions, 44 CFR Part 350, not Appendix E to Part 50. Tr. 7501, 7502, 7523-24 (Keller); 7501, 7523 (Kowieski); 7501 (Baldwin).

Egg also Tr. 6198-99 (Daverio); 6220-21 (Behr).dk/ Further, only one of these documents, GM PR-1, even mentions the term "full participation exercise," and that reference is only in the context of ingestion pathway testing under 44 CFR S 350.2(j).

Tr. 6235 (Behr); agg LILCO Ex. 12, Att. E; NY Ex. 1 at 29.11/

Thus, the record does not support a finding that these GM were developed to ensure that an exercise meets NRC full participation exercise requirements.

In fact, the testimony which was provided undercuts' the relevance of these guidance materials. The LILCO witnesses d5/ The Governments demonstrated 3 the Licensing Board that Part 350 or 44 CFR is significant. lfferent from Appendix E to Part 50. Egg Governments' Finding o. 113-18. LILCO has not l argued on this appeal that Part 350's requirements are identical to those in Appendix E, although LILCO suggests that certain matters from 10 CFR S 50.47(b) are "mirrored in FEMA's regulations . . . ." LILCO Br. at 41. We note that FEMA's regulations contain no provision comparable to Section IV.F.1 for NTOL plants. Since FEMA's witnesses emphasized that their testimony pertained to what was required under FEMA's regulations, it is not surprising that they were unaware of differences in l

exercise requirements between NTOL and operating plants. Egg LILCO Br. at 19, 40.

37/ LILCO witness Behr testified that he believed GM PR-1 was

, intended in part to provide an interpretation of Appendix E.

l Tr. 6237-38 (Behr). He based this testimony on reading GM PR-1; he had discussed the matter with no one from FEMA. Tr. 6238 (Behr). A FEMA witness stated that he was not sure that GM PR-1 provided any such clarification. Tr. 7619 (Keller).

r suggested that the Board should consider draft GM EX-3 even though it was only a draft because they understood it to memorialize how FEMA, in_ actual practice, conducts exercises.

LILCO Ex. 12 at 12; Tr. 6821-23 (Behr, Daverio). Draft GM EX-3, however, states that the objectives for an exercise should be selected to "test a sionificant oorgi2n of the emergency response capabilities" and to "ensure that all major elements of the plans and preparedness (of) organizations are tested at least once every six years "

. . . . LILCO Ex. 12, Att. G at 3 (emphasis added). The FEMA practice conflicts with the NRC's regulation for NTOL exercises: a practice of testing "a significant portion of the emergency response capabilities" over six years cannot be reconciled with a - -ment to test "the major observable por-tions" of the off is, or to test as much of a plan as is reasonably achievable, or to include the participation of each State and local government in the plume EPZ and each State in the ingestion EPZ.dE/

dE/ LILCO also argues that NUREG 0654 5 II.N is authoritative guidance which supports the view that the Exercise satisfied Appendix E. Egg LILCO Br. at 38-39; agg LILCO Ex. 12 at 8-9 and Att. C. NUREG 0654 calls for an exercise to "test [] the integrated capability and a majot portion of the basic elements existing within . . . plans . . . " and to cover "all major elements of the plans . . . within a five-year period." LILCO Ex. 12, Att. C.

This argument must be rejected. First, the NUREG 0654 provision was adopted at a time when the NRC regulations did not even contain a definition of a "full scale" exercise, the term used in 1980. Egg 45 Fed, Eggt 55,413, col. 1 (1980). The NRC's 1980 rulemaking -- and its subsequent 1984 rulemaking -- contain not one word to the effect that NUREG 0654 contains guidance on the scope of Appendix E exercises.

(footnote continued)

(

9

l Finally, on appeal, LILCO suggests that this Board ignore the evidence of record and rely upon FEMA and NRC guidance mater-ials because of the allegedly "obvious oossibility that the expert regulators who wrote the guidance documents did not perceive any difference, for purposes of the definition of a full participation exercise, between initial and subsequent exer-cises." LILCO Br. at 38 (emphasis added). This Board cannot rely on such speculation. It was within the Staff's or FEMA's power to proffer witnesses who might have had the expertise and personal involvement to testify to these matters. They did not do so. LILCO's speculation on a point which could easily have been proved -- were it in fact correct -- should be rejected.

2. The NRC Staff Views on the Scope of the Shoreham Exercise are Entitled to No Weicht LILCO asserts tilat the Board failed "to pay due deference" to the views of the NRC Staff witnesses concerning whether the Exercise satisfied Appendix E. LILCO Br. at 39. ERR also id. at 42 (Staff witnesses "were legitimate experts with decades of experience and dozens of plant evaluations among them."). LILCO fails to address, however, the actual evidence that the Staff's l witnesses knew almost nothing relevant about the LILCO Plan, the l

(footnote continued from previous page)

Second, NUREG 0654 conflicts with Appendix E. NUREG 0654 speaks of testing "a major portion of the basic elements." The Board cannot accept the "a major portion" language as consistent with Appendix E's requirement to test "the major observable portions." Further, for NTOL sites, there is no means to reconcile NUREG-0654's five-year cycle with the requirement that the initial exercise test as much as is reasonably achievable, or that it include participation by each State and local government j

in the plume EPZ and each State in the ingestion EPZ.

1 l

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. c Shoreham Exercise, and Appendix E as applied thereto. It was therefore appropriate that the Staff's testimony received no special consideration.

The NRC Staff initially presented no testimony on Conten-tions Ex 15/16. At the Board's request (agg Tr. 7351), the Staff on June 5, 1986, filed brief testimony stating that the Exercise satisfied Appendix E. Egg NRC Ex. 1.19/

The Staff indicated that each emergency plan must be re-viewed individually, because what constitutes "full participa-tion" depends upon the particular details of the plan which is being exercised. The Staff indicated that since each plan is unique, the number of objectives which need to be tested to con-stitute a full participation exercise will vary from plant to plant. NRC Ex. 1 at 6. Despite their testimony that the nature of "full participation" varies from plant to plant, the Staff witnesses admitted that neither had done extensive review of the LILCO Plan. Mr. Weiss had reviewed only Volume I; he had not reviewed the three volumes of OPIPs or the evacuation plan.

Tr. 8793-97, 8815 (Weiss). Mr. Schwartz had not reviewed the Plan at all; he had been briefed about it several times.

Tr. 8783-85, 8815, 8847, 8855-56 (Schwartz). Mr. Schwartz ad-mitted that the briefings provided him with no detailed knowledge 19/ The Staff testimony consisted of only seven pages, the first four of which were devoted to a description of the witnesses' positions at the NRC. Egg NRC Ex. 1. LILCO's suggestion (LILCO l

Br. at 17) that the Staff filed "extensive testimony" on the Appendix E issue is not true.

, l

o O of the Plan.. Tr. 8856 (Schwartz).5E/ Given the fact that the Staff witnesses'had so little familiarity.with the LILCO Plan, they had no reliable basis for believing the Exercise was full participation. The Board would have erred if it had shown defer-ence to such testimony.ll/

Further, it was undisputed that neither of the Staff wit-nesses had ever attempted to make an Appendix E determination.

Tr. 8790 (Schwartz, Weiss). And, while Mr. Schwartz testified to a belief that it is regular practice for the NRC RAC member to review objectives and scenarios to assess whether Appendix E is satisfied, he presented no factual bases in support of this belief. Tr. 8862-64 (Schwartz).12/ Given the conclusory nature 1E/ Indeed, t:ese witnesses admitted they had reviewed few Shoreham-related materials in preparation for their testimony.

Egg, gig 2, Tr. 8767-72, 8782-83 (Schwartz, Weiss). Neither could I recall even reviewing Contentions EX 15/16. Tr. 8785 (Schwartz);

l 8787 (Weiss).

El/ The Staff's lack of knowledge about the details of the Shoreham Exercise was highlighted by questions regarding inge.e ion pathway testing. The Staff witnesses testified in response to LILCO questions that the Exercise had tested as much of the Plan as was reasonably achievable without mandatory public participation. Yet, they then admitted that they knew of no reason why ingestion pathway testing could not have been accomplished at the Shoreham Exercise. And they admitted that such testing would not have required mandatory public l participation. Thus, they admitted that they did not know whether l

l the Exercise had testod as much of the Plan as was reasonably achievable without mandatory public participation. Tr. 8864-67 (Schwartz, Weiss). Sag also Tr. 8867-71 (Schwartz, Weiss) i (acknowledging lack of knowledge about EBS radio station and l schools).

12/ It was suggested that an Appendix E compliance determination was made agh silentio by the NRC RAC member who reviewed the

! proposed Shoreham objectives. LILCO Ex. 12, at 13; NRC Ex. 1 at 5-6; Tr. 8862-63 (Schwartz). This suggestion has no merit. The NRC Staff witnesses obviously could have spoken with NRC Region I (footnote continued) l l

l --- -

O e of the Staff testimony, the Board properly gave little or no weight to their views.

V. THE LICENSING BOARD PROPERLY RULED THAT THE FOUR OMISSIONS FROM THE EXERCISE WERE SIGNIFICANT In Part IV of its Brief, LILCO argues that the Licensing Board erroneously concluded that WALK Radio, more schools, special facilities, and ingestion pathway demonstrations should have been included in the Exercise. LILCO Br. at 44-51. LILCO appears to be making two interrelated assertions. First, LILCO asserts that the Board never conducted some unspecified type of "necessary inquiry to relate its conclusions on Section IV.F.1. to the ultimate inquiry of whether the scope of the Exercise was so deficient as to preclude a reasonable assurance finding." LILCO Br. at 44.

Second, LILCO maintains that the Licensing Board failed to assess the "materiality" of the four specified omissions. Id. LILCO appears to argue that the "materiality" finding which the Licensing Board allegedly failed to make is whether the omitted elements constituted "major observable portions" of the LILCO Plan. Id.

LILCO's arguments must be rejected. As discussed in l Sections V.A-D below, the Board clearly addressed the materiality (footnote continued from previous page) personnel who reviewed the draft Shoreham objectives; they did not l

do so. Tr. 8802-07 (Weiss, Schwartz); agg Tr. 8620 (Kowieski).

l Rather, they admitted that they did not know whether the NRC RAC representative was satisfied that the Shoreham Exercise would i comply with Appendix E. Tr. 8814, 8863-64 (Schwartz, Weiss). In i these circumstances, where the Staff had it within its power to

! submit evidence but did not, it would be inappropriate to presume l that the NRC RAC member made any such determination.

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of the omissions from the Exercise. Further, as discussed in Section IV.A, the Board related possible Exercise omissions to the required reasonable assurance finding at the time Contentions EX 15/16 were admitted.- The Board was not obligated to do this again in the PID. Further, as noted in Section IV.C, the undisputed evidence of record established that each omission was all or part of a "major observable portion" of the Plan.

A. The Failure of the EBS Station to Particioate in the Exercise LILCO's assertion that the Licensing Board failed to assess the materiality of the non participation by WALK Radio is clearly erroneous. After noting FEMA's finding of weaknesses in commun-ication skills displayed by LERO during the Exercise, the Licensing Board stated:

Clearly, accurate communication of the text of EBS messages to the radio station which is to broadcast them is of caramount importance.

PID at 27-28 (emphasis added).53/ If this is not a finding of "materiality", then we are at a loss to understand what is.ld/

53/ The Board's linkage of the significance of omission of communications with WALK Radio to LILCO's overall problems with communications attains additional significance in the light of the Board's February 1, 1988 decision addressing the issues of LERO performance. Given LILCO's pervasive problems with communications (agg, g2gt, LBP-88-2, at 3-4, 52-53, 251-52) -- even when the attempted communications were confined to the LILCO organization

-- the failure even to attempt to communicate with so essential an outside entity as the EBS station is all the more egregious.

EA/ It therefore is absolutely untrue for LILCO to allege that

, the Board in "the PID fails to assess the materiality of any of l

the matters it believes should have been included in the 1986 exercise." LILCO Br. at 4 (emphasis added).

l There was ample evidence in the record to support the Board's conclusion that communications with WALK are an essential part of the LILCO Plan, and a part not so easily executed as LILCO would have the Appeal Board believe.55/ The EBS station is the essen-tial lin!: between the emergency response organization and the public. Getting word of the emergency to the public is a critical step in an effective response; without it, the protective action recommendations cannot be implemented. NY Ex. 1 at 42-47.

At the hearing, LILCO attempted to characterize the required communications with WALK as simply a "mechanical" task. Egg Tr. 6888 (Daverio). This characterization was belied by other 55/ LILCO dismisses the omission of WALK from the Exercise as:

extremely limited in real world consequence. It involves only the ability of WALK Radio personnel to answer a telephone call from LERO, verify an authentication code provided by the LERO caller, and record the EBS message read by the caller.

LILCO Br. at 46 (emphasis added). It also involyes the ability of LERO to make the call to the right person on a timely basis and to communicate the message accurately. Given that the Licensing Board found that the LILCO emergency workers had difficulty in communicating (e.o., LBP-88-2, at 251-52), the Appeal Board should not take LILCO's ability to call WALK for granted, even if this were all that was involved.

LILCO appears to believe that the simulation of telephone calls to certain other response personnel constitutes an adequate test of LILCO's ability to communicate with the organizations its Plan relies upon to implement protective measures. Egg Tr. 6935 (Kowieski); agg also Tr. 6898 (Daverio). Yet, LILCO conceded that, in some of the few instances during the Exercise when LILCO l

players attempted real (as opposed to simulated) telephone calls,

, there were problems. Tr. 6907, 6936-37 (Daverio) (problems

! contacting FAA, State of Connecticut). And the findings in LBP-

! 86-2 further confirm the seriousness of LILCO's communications l

deficiencies. Thus, there is no basis to believe that simulation l can substitute for contact with essential personnel.

l t l l

i t

evidence. The Governments' witnesses testified that, because of WALK's exclusion from the Exercise, there was no testing of the multiple human interactions that would be required to get an EBS message broadcast in coordination with the siren activation, and that it is these human interactions which have caused failed demonstrations in other exercises. NY Ex. 1 at 44-48; Tr. 7173, 7183 (Minor); 7174-75 (Papile). Even LILCO's witness, Mr. Daverio, conceded that once LERO had established contact with WALK radio, the disc jockey on duty would have to understand the message that had to be broadcast, the fact that it had to be broadcast at once, and the procedures for implementing the broad-cast. Tr. 6889 (Daverio).

-In short, the EBS station's active and efficient participa-tion in an actual emergency is essential to notifying the public of the emergency and the recommended protective actions. Its failure to participate in the Exercise makes it impossible to verify LILCO's capability to respond to a radiological emergency insofar as its ability te provide instructions to the public is concerned.

l LILCO makes two other arguments concerning the Licensing Board's handling of the WALK issue, both of which are without support in the record. First, LILCO criticizes the Board for failing to explain why it was reasonably achievable for WALK to participate, and states that "[t]he appropriate conclusion is that the Suffolk County ordinance made any participation by WALK Radio l

not reasonably achievable." LILCO Br. at 45. It was not the l

Board's burden, however, to explain why the participation of WALK Radio was achievable; the burden was on LILCO to show why the participation was a21 achievable. The Board was impressed with LILCO's failure to do so; indeed, that is why it found against LILCO on this issue. PID at 27.

Nor can LILCO's newly-formulated hypothesis that the Suffolk County ordinance prevented WALK from participating avail LILCO here. In its direct testimony, LI'COL blamed the ordinance for LILCO's failure to sound the sirens and to air a test message.

LILCO Ex. 12 at 16-17. Similarly, in its Proposed Findings, LILCO specifically attributed itJ failure to sound the sirens, to dis-tribute the public information brochure, and to air a test EBS message to the hostile political climate and the County ordinance.

LILCO Firdings at 33-34, 53-54. Clearly, when LILCO had a cciorable claim that the ordinance had chilled a particular demon-stration, L1LCO knew how to make it. Significantly, LILCO never claimed that WALK's non-participation was due to the ordinance.

, Indeed, it appears that as early as November 1984, LILCO intended to simulate its contact with the EBS station.56/ There is nothing in the record to support the conclusion which LILCO now argues is the only "appropriate" conclusion the Board could have reached.

In fact, when LILCO's witness was asked on cross-examination about WALK's non-participation, he speculated that the ordinance might have had something to do with whether WALK "wanted" to interface with LERO, but he claimed to have no knowledge as to why the 5_{/ Egut note 7 above.

l

' decision to exclude WALK was made. Tr. 6847 (Daverio). If LILCO had any evidence to explain why WALK failed to' participate, surely it was up_to LILCO to adduce this evidence. Instead, LILCO's  ;

8

-witnesses merely reiterated that WALK's participation was unneces-sary. Tr.'6829; ggg LILCO Ex. 12 at 31-32.11/

LILCO's second unsupported argument is that, in concluding.

that the omitted communications with WALK were not a mechanical activity which could be tested in a FEMA REP-10 test,}8/ "the Board disregarded the record." LILCO Br. at 46-47. In fact, for 4

the Board to have concluded otherwise would have required it to disregard the record.

The witnesses for New York State testified that airing an EBS

- message during a FEMA REP-10 test could not be considered an adequate substitute for coordinating with an EBS station as part j of a fully. integrated response to a scenario-driven event, and that a REP-10 test would not substitute for the integrated demon-strations routinely conducted at other Region II exercises. NY Ex.

1 at 47-48; Tr. 7145-50 (Baranski, Papile, Petrone). Similarly,  !

the FEMA witnesses stated that a FEMA REP-10 test is not a substi-11/ Moreover, even if LILCO had presented evidence that WALK Radio had refused to participate in view of the ordinance, this still would not excuse the omission from the Exercise. Tne ordinance was enjoined nearly three days before the-Exercise. If LILCO was unable during this period to coordinate WALK's inclusion in the Exercise, at least to receive phone calls and coordinate with LILCO, it bodes ill for LILCO's ability to coordinate airing '

of an EBS message with WALK in the event of a real emergency --

when it is unlikely that LILCO will have three days to make the necessary arrangements. ,

-jdY Sag Guide for the Evaluation of Alert and Notification Systems for Nuclear Power Plants, FEMA REP-10, November 1985.

Portions of FEMA REP-10 were marked as SC Ex. 98.

, - w e - ,

' tute for-an integrated demonstration during an exercise of the ability to coordinate siren sounding and the airing of an EES message; when an EBS message is aired during a REP-10 test, it is by pre-arrangement as to time, not in response to a scenario-driven decision. Tr. 8521-24 (Kowieski, Keller). When asked point-blank if FEMA Region II had ever deemed the standard alert and notification objectives satisfied by a REP-10 test, FEMA witness Keller responded, "No". Tr. 8379 (Keller). The standard objectives require the demonstration of an "integrated capability" (Tr. 8522 (Baldwin)), not the separate demonstration of various steps in the alert and notification procedure in isolation from i one another and from the decision that activates them. In short, the evidence was overwhelming that the mechanical REP-10 test never has been, and should not be, considered a substitute for demonstrating the capability to generate an EBS broadcast as part of an integrated exercise.517 Finally, the Licensing Board could not ignore LILCO's ocis-

! sion of EBS participation in the Exercise because the regulation 1

specifies that an exercise "shall . . . test the public notifica-tion system." 10 CFR App. E, S IV.F. LILCO failed to test the public notification system for multiple reasons, including the EBS i

51/ LILCO has used two quotations out of context to create the "record" it then accuses the Board of disregarding. LILCO Br. at 46, citina testimony by Messrs. Baldwin and Keller. That FEMA has conducted REP-10 tests, and that at these tests, sirens have been sounded and test messages aired was never in dispute. What was in dispute was whether this was an adequate substitute for testing in an integrated exercise. Dr. Baldwin's initial statement that he "believe[d)" the alert and notification objectives would be satisfied by a REP-10 test was subsequently corrected. Tr. 8521-30 (Kowieski, Baldwin, Keller); 8379 (Keller)r 8672-73 (Baldwin).

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l station's failure to participate at all.

B. LILCO's Failure to Ask Additional School Districts to Particioate LILCO's discussion of the Board's holding concerning the lack of school participation reflects LILCO's dissatisfaction with its own pre-Exercise decisions. FEMA specifically asked LILCO to seek more school participation, but LILCO declined.5S/ Indeed, Mr. Kowieski even specifically told LILCO's counsel at a training session in late January 1986 of FEMA's concern about lack of school participation; LILCO's counsel responded: "We accept this.

You know, whatever you are going to say in the post-exercise assessment we will accept this." Tr. 7607 (Kowieski).

Now that the significance of its omissions has been made clear, however, LILCO is no longer willing to accept the con-sequences of its decision. The Appeal Board cannot help LILCO out 4

of its dilemma. The fact is that the extent of school testing was exceedingly small -- so small in fact that FEMA admitted that it could make no finding whether any schools beyond the one district which participated in the Exercise could take adequate protective measures. Tr. 7588 (Baldwin, Kowieski); 7603, 7612, 8406 (Keller). This clearly was a material omission from the Exercise, one that could not be ignored. The PID is correct, and LILCO has presented no basis for reversal.

The Licensing Board found that the burden was on LILCO to lE/ Tr. 7584 (Kowieski) ("I was advised by Chuck Daverio that the LILCO management made a decision not to invite, with emphasis added or underscored, not to invite other school districts to participate in the exercise").

_ __ - _ -_ _ - ____________ - _____ __-_ _ _______ _ __ A

show it was not achievable to have had greater school participa-tion,51/ particularly in view of the fact that FEMA _had specific-ally asked LILCO to write to more school districts and LILCO adduced no testimony to explain its failure to comply with this

. request, beyond Mr. Daverio's speculation that LILCO management

~

might have thought such attempts fruitless. PID at 38-39 g_itino Tr. 6973-75, 6848.12/

LILCO's argument on the school participation issue (LILCO Br.

at 47-48) trivializes both the record made on the school partici-pation issue and the conclusions the Licensing Board drew from that record. LILCO, in its Plan, places reliance on the schools to implement the protective actions recommended for school children in an emergency. Plan, Appendix A at II-19 thru II-21; 51/ The Licensing Board's conclusion was as follows:

we have only Mr. Davario's speculation, elicited by Staff counsel, on the reason LILCO management decided not to issue the invitation when asked to do so by FEMA, and the probable response of the schools had an invitation been issued. LILCO bears the burden of proof. See 10 CFR 2.732. It has not established that the school participation which did take place was all that was reasonably achievable. Consequently, we must conclude that -

greater participation was reasonably achievable.

PID at 40-41. Clearly, the Board's conclusion was one it was

! obligated to draw as a matter of law, given LILCO's failure to produce any evidence that it had even attempted to involve more schools in the Exercise as FEMA had requested.

{2/ LILCO's reference to the resolutions passed by local schools (LILCO Br. at 47) is unavailing. Of the 17 resolutions, none address the Exercise issue -- in fact, 10 of the resolutions are dated after the Exercise, and the remaining seven date from 1983 (approximately three years before the Exercise). Egg NY Ex. 2, Att. 7. Consequently, there is no basis for speculating that these resolutions 3astify LILCO's failure to comply with FEMA's request.

. o OPIP 3.6.5. Yet, during the Exercise, only one school district demonstrated any emergency response capability at all, and that was very limited. NY Ex. 1 at 60-78. Early in the planning process, FEMA expressed concern that only one school district was participating. Tr. 7607-09 (Kowieski). The record also contained ample evidence that at other exercises in Region II, more schools were at least contacted, and that frequently, FEMA performed a more in-depth evaluation of school preparedness than it did at Shoreham. NY Ex. 1 at 66-68, 80-83; Tr. 7581-82 (Keller); 7586-87 (Baldwin); SC Ex. 66 cassim. Clearly, the Board was impressed both with the evidence of the importance of school preparedness to the successful implementation of the LILCO Plan, and the evidence relati.ng to the necessity for school participation in emergency preparedness exercises when it concluded that: "All parties recog-nize that there must be more extensive school participation. We agree that school participation is of areat imoortance." PID at 40 (emphasis added). Again, we submit that the Board's consider-ation of the materiality of this omission is clear.61/

p3/ The Board's decision not to give weight to how FEMA graded school participation in the FEMA Report (iz es, as an "ARCA" rather than a "Deficiency") is easily explained. There was ample evi-dence concerning both the importance of school participation in exercises, and tne lack of school participation at Shoreham. The Board had no reason to assess the details of FEMA's evaluation criteria for school participation. In fact, the Board expressly declined to do so, since the FEMA evaluation criteria for school participation were in flux at the time of the Shoreham Exercise.

PID at 41-42. Thus, as the Board stated, ". . . it makes little sense to consider whether the (FEMA) policy with respect to schools in effect at the time of the exercise was both appropriate under the regulations and satisfied by what transpired (at the Exercise)." PID at 42.

C. The Failure to Test Incestion Pathway Procedures LILCO's arguments about ingestion-pathway issues are without merit. First, it was clear -- both from the Governments' testi-mony and from cross-examination of FEMA -- that ingestion pathway activities. constitute a major observable portion of LILCO's Plan.

Egg Section IV.C.1 above. For this reason alone, the scope of the Exercise was deficient. It is frivolous to suggest that the com-plete absence of such activities in a 40-mile zone (10 to 50 miles from the plant) was somehow immaterial.

Second, as the Licensing Board found:

Paragraph IV.F.1. clearly requires, in addi-tion to testing as much of a plan as is reasonably achievable, that each State within the ingestion exposure pathway EPZ participate in the initial full participation exercise.

Thus both Connecticut and LERO, substituting fcr New York, should have been included and the exercise scenario should have included ingestion pathway objectives.

PID at 44. Given this clear mandate in the regulation, any addi-tional inquiry as to the "materiality" of testing the ingestion pathway procedures contained in the LILCO Plan would be super-fluous; the NRC would not mandate the testing of "immaterial" emergency response capabilities.

)

Third, had the Licensing Board conducted a specific "materiality" inquiry, it could have reached only one conclusion based on the evidence before it: the omission of ingestion path-way testing was material. The Governments submitted extensive, unrebutted testimony outlining the substantial ingestion pathway

.i

provisions and procedures contained in the LILCO Plan. NY Ex. 1 at 141-44; ggg alsg'OPIP 3.6.6. Further, according to the study conducted by LILCO's own witness, Dr. Hockert, one of the seven "most important" of the standard FEMA objectives is ingestion pathway testing. LILCO Ex. 12 at 28. Dr. Hockert also agreed that the seven objectives ranked "very important" in his study are the most, or very, important aspects of the observable portions of a plan. Tr. 6116, 6128-29 (HGckert).

All parties agreed that it is feasible to conduct ingestion pathway testing without mandatory public participation and that there is no conceptual reason why ingestion pathway testing could not be included in an exercise. NY Ex. 1 at 149; Tr. 6003-05 (Hockert); 7537-38 (Kowieski). In its Brief, LILCO argues that ingestion pathway activities are not "reasonably achievable" because FEMA has issued no formal guidance in this area. LILCO 9:. at 48-49. FEMA testified, however, that it could have devel-oped ingestion pathway objectives for the Shoreham Exercise.

Tr. 7538 (Kcwieski). FEMA did not do so primarily because of the NRC suggestion that FEMA concentrate on activities in the 10-mile plume exposure pathway EPZ. FEMA Ex. 5 at 125; Tr. 7525, 7539 (Kowieski).51/ Indeed, the evidence is clear that despite the 5d/ LILCO engages in gross speculation in arguing that the NRC's suggestion that the Exercise focus on the 10-mile EPZ was due to the alleged fact that the State of Connecticut had already participated in a 1984 full participation ingestion pathway exercise for Haddam Neck and would soon participate in a 1986 full participation ingestion pathway exercise for Millstone Point.

LILCO Br. At 9-10 n.13. No evidence was presented to support this speculation. Indeed, LILCO does not even reference the source of its non-record assertions. Second, although NRC Staff witnesses (footnote continued) l i

j i

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lack of formal FEMA criteria, ingestion activities have been conducted'in the past in some New York State exercises.51/

(footnote continued from previous page) testified, LILCO never bothered to ask why the 10-mile suggestion was made. Third, even if evidence had been submitted to support LILCO's speculation, it would not have justified the exclusion of ingestion pathway testing in the New York State portion of the Shoreham ingestion pathway EPZ. Finally, LILCO tries to have it both ways in arguing about ingestion pathway matters. It argues that ingestion testing in February 1986 was not possible for Shoreham (LILCO Br. at 48-49), but earlier argued that a "full-participation ingestion pathway exercise for the Haddam Neck station" had been held in May 1984. LILCO Br. at 9-10 n.13. It is hard to give credence to LILCO's "not possible" argument for Shoreham when LILCO alleges tnat such testing had been carried out two years earlier for another plant.

$1/ Sag, e.a., SC Ex. 63 (Indian Point, March 1983), at 17' (ingestion pathway samples were to be collected), 20 (demonstrated capability to obtain and analyze surface water sample; information on location of dairy farms within the 50-mile ingestion pathway EPZ was used in deciding how long farmers should keep cows on stored feed); SC Ex. 64 (Indian Point, August 1983), at 21 (decisions to recommend protective actions for ingestion pathway EPZ were good at the SEOC; information was available showing location of dairy farms, food processing plants, and water supply intake points; local agencies were provided with information to assist in implementation of protective actions, and ingestion pathway sampling was ordered); SC Ex. 65 (Indian Point, November 1984), at 22 (State was to exercise a limited demonstration of analysis and decisionmaking process for selection of ingestion exposure pathway samples consistent with problem posed by exercise parameters); SC Ex. 70 (Ginna, January 1982), at 33 (monitoring teams from State agencies enacted their plans to obtain measurements that would be important for longer term exposures, including doses through the ingestion pathway); SC Ex. 71 (Ginna, June 1983), at 26-27 (the field response was good when SEOC ordered ingestion pathway sampling, field sampling teams were dispatched to collect samples of fruits, vegetables, soils, milk and foliage; the teams were knowledgeable and collected samples in a timely manner; samples were labeled, appropriate forms filled out, location of each sample noted on a chart, and samples were given to State Police for express delivery to laboratory); SC Ex.

73 (Fitzpatrick 1982), at 34 (ingestion pathway sampling consisted of collecting one milk and one crop sample; collection of other samples was simulated); SC Ex. 74 (Nine Mile Point, September 1981), at 22 (timely and appropriate guidance concerning protective measures in the ingestion EPZ, including dairy facilities, was given to local government by State agency (footnote continued)

. J

LILCO attempts to rebut the evidence that exercises in New York had in the past tested ingestion pathway objectives by quoting FEMA witness Keller's testimony that New York State's performance of ingestion pathway objectives had been unsatis-factory. LILCO Br. at 49 n.47. Yet, as LILCO itself has pointed out on numerous occasions in the course of this litigation, performance issues are irrelevant to Contentions EX 15/16; an exercise can be a "failed" full participation exercise and still meet the requirements of Appendix E as to scope. The important fact is that, regardless of the results obtained, there have been ingestion pathway demonstrations at numerous New York exercises.55/

D. The Lack of Participation by Soecial Facilities In the portion of the PID dealing with special facilities, the Licensing Board details the extensive evidence concerning the (footnote continued from previous page) representatives); SC Ex. 75 (Nine Mile Point, September 1983), at 30-31 (performance of ingestion pathway sampling teams was excellent; sampling was simulated and correct procedures were demonstrated), 25 (good protective actions for ingestion pathway EPZ were developed promptly; commercial produce embargoed; residents were advised to abstain from eating their garden produce).

i 55/ LILCO has mischaracterized the PID's holding on ingestion l

pathway. LILCO implies that the Licensing Board found it i "essential for the Snoreham exercise to have included full ingestion pathway testing" and protests the injustice of this on the ground that "full" ingestion pathway testing has never been conducted for any nuclear power plant in New York State. LILCO Br.

at 49. The Licensing Board never concluded that "full" ingestion pathway testing (whatever "full" ingestion pathway testing might be) was required by the regulation. Rather, the deficiency for Shoreham was the lack of any demonstration of an ability to recom-mend and implement protective actions within the 40-mile ingestion pathway area outside the plume exposure EPZ.

l l

l J

O

' lack of participation in the Exercise by most special facilities in the EPZ, the lack of testing of facilitihs outside the EPZ-relied upon in the LILCO Plan to receive special facility evac-uees, the lack of special facility reception centers, and FEMA's failure to evaluate the capability of personnel at special facil-ities and at the ambulance compa".ies to carry out the actions contemplated under the LILCO Pla't. PID at 47-49. The PID notes FEMA's prior commitments to evalJate coordination between LILCO and adult / nursing homes, and to evaluate the availability of am-bulances and drivers. PID at 47-48. The PID also cites FEMA's testimony that coordination between LILCO and such special facili-ties constitutes a "major observable portion" of the LILCO Plan.

PID at 49.

The evidence on these points was unrebutted, and LILCO does not now in its appeal challenge this evidence. Rather, LILCO criticizes the Licensing Board for failing to assess "materiality" and for re,jecting "without explanation" the FEMA testimony that special facilities could be included in future, exercises using a "sampling approach for these facilities such that all facilities would be contacted over a six-year period." LILCO Br. at 50-51.

The reason the Licensing Board rejected FEMA's testimony con-cerning future evaluation at some point in a six-year cycle is that FEMA's suggested approach fails to comply with the NRC regu-lation:

We agree (with FEMA] that the level of coordination between LERO and the special facilities should be evaluated and add only

)

4 9 that such evaluation must include an evalua-tion of LERO's ability to communicate with special facilities. Further, we agree that an evaluation of the preparedness of the ambu-lance and ambulette companies should have been included. No showing has been made that a test of these aspects of the plan was not reasonably achievable. Consequently we con-clude that such an evaluation should have been a part of this exercise in order to satisfy the recuirements of oaracraoh IV.P.l.

PID at 49 (emphasis added).

The Licensing Board's conclusion on this issue is even more significant in light of its recent decision on the Exercise performance issues. Comraunications and training were two of the main weaknesses in LILCO's Plan which were revealed by the Exer-cise. Egg LBP-88-2, at 250-52. Because LILCO simulated communi-cation's and coordination with special facilities, and FEMA failed to evaluate the preparedness of the ambulance and ambulette companies relied upon by LILCO, an entire segment of the LILCO Plan which depends upon communications and the training of person-nel in LILCO procedures for implementation was insulated from demonstration and review.

Insofar as LILCO's "materiality" argument is concerned, we note once again that LILCO has attempted to minimize the omission which the Licensing Board found significant. Thus, LILCO argues i

that "the failure of personnel at special facilities to answer telephone calls made by LERO workers has very little real world consequence." LILCO Br. at 50. It was not, however, the failure of special facilities personnel to answer the telephone which the Board found significant -- it was LILCO's failure even to attempt

)

4

• O to make the calls or to involve most special facilities inside the EPZ and all special facilities outside the EPZ in the Exercise in any way, and FEMA's failure to evaluate and verify the implemt;nt-ability of LILCO's proposed evacuation of tne special facilities by ambulance that impressed the Board as necessary to comply with the regulatory requirements.

Given the Licensing Board's conclusion that LILCO failed to comply with the regulation, an additional "materiality" finding is unnecessary. Had the Licensing Board wished to engage in such an assessment, however, there was ample evidence (much of it, in fact, cited in the PID) indicating that coordination of the special facilities' evacuation is a major observable portion of the LILCO Plan (111 Section IV.C.1 above), and that this portion of the Plan must be capable of implementation in order for there to be reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the residents of the numerous special facilities in the Shoreham EPZ can and will be adequately protected in the event of a radiolog-ical emergency at Shoreham. Egg NY Ex. 1 at 92-114. Thus, there is no basis for LILCO's criticism.

)

4

• O VI. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, the PID should be affirmed.

Respectfully submitted, E. Thomas Boyle Suffolk county Attorney Building 158 North County Complex Veterans Memorial Highway Hauppauge, New York 11788 4.M. %  %

Lawrence Coe Lanphe(/

gj Susan M. Casey KIRKPATRICK & LOCKRART 1800 M Street, N.W.

South Lobby - 9th Floor Washington. D.C. 20036-5891 Attor' .s for Suffolk County

&dus X % % +u /w Richard J. Zahnleuter Special Counsel to the Governor of the State of New York Executive Chamber, Room 229 Capitol Building Albany, New York 12224 Attorney for Mario M. Cuomo, Governor of the State of New York 9 4 d,4*JA% /<gnc Stephen B. Latham Twomey, Latham & Shea P.O. Box 398 33 West Second Street Riverhead, New York 11901 Attorney for the Town of Southampton A

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NUCLEAR REGULhTORY COMMISSION -

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In the Matter of )

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LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY ) Docket No. 50-322-OL-5 (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station,

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that copies ~of GOVERNMENTS' BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO APPEAL OF LILCO FROM LEP-87-32 have been served on j the following this 26th day of February 1988 by U.S. mail, first Class.  :

Christine N. Kohl, Chairman Dr. W. Reed Johnson Atomic Safety and Licensing Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board Appeal Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission U.S. Nuclear Rcgulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Washington, D.C. 20555

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Alan S. Rosenthal John H. Frye, III, Chairman Atomic Safety and Licensing Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Appeal Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 WaRhington, D.C. 20555 Oscar H. Paris Mr. Frederick J. Shon Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Atomic Safety and Licensing Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C., 20555 Washington, D.C. 20555 Atomic Safety and Licensing William R. Cumming, Esq.

Board Panel Spence W. Perry, Esq.

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of General Counsel Washington, D.C. 20555 Federal Emergency Management Agency 500 C Street, S.W., Room 840 Washington, D.C. 20472

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Fabian G. Palomino, Esq. W.-Taylor Reveley, III, Esq.

Richard J. Zahleuter, Esq. Hunton & Williams Special Counsel to the Governor P.O. Box 1535-Executive Chamber, Rm. 229 707 East Main' Street State Capitol Richmond, Virginia 23212 Albany, New York 12224 Anthony F. Earley, Jr., Esq. Edwin J. Reis, Esq.

' General Counsel George E. Johnson, Esq.

Long Island Lighting Company U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm.

175 East Old Country Road Office of General Counsel Hicksville, New York 11801' Washington, D.C. 20555 E.-Thomas Boyle, Esq. Ms. Elisabeth Taibbi, Clerk Suffolk County Attorney Suffolk County Legislature Bldg. 158 North County Complex Suffolk County Legislature Veterans Memorial Highway Office _ Building Hauppauge, New York -11788 Veterans Memorial Highway Hauppauge, New York 11788 Stephen B. Latham, Esq. David A. Brownlee, Esq.

Twomey, Latham & Shea Kirkpatrick & Lockhart 33 West Second Street 1500 Oliver Building Riverhead, New York 11901 Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15222 Ms. Nora Bredes Docketing and Service Section Executive Director Office of the Secretary Shoreham Opponents Coalition U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm.

195 East Main Street 1717 H Street, N.W.

Smithtown, New York 11787 Washington, D.C. 20555 Hon. Patrick G. Halpin MHB Technical Associates Suffolk County Executive 1723 Hamilton Avenue H. Lee Dennison Building Suite K Veterans Memorial Highway San Jose, California 95125 Hauppauge, New York 11788 ALV24 M A.

Lawrence Coe Lanpher/

KIRKPATRICK & LOCKHART 1800 M Street, N.W.

South Lobby - 9th Floor Washington, D.C. 20036-5891

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r UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Before the Atomic Safety and Licensina Acceal Board O

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In the Matter of }

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LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY ) Docket No. 50-322-OL-5 -

'O ) (EP Exercise)

(Shorehsm Nuclear Power Station, )

Unit 1) )

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.O APPENDIX TO GOVERNMENTS' BR1EF IN OPPOSITION TO APPEAL OF LILCO FROM LBP-87-32 i

O KIRPATRICK & LoCxnART TWoMsy, LATHAM & SasA 1800 M Street, N.W. 33 West Second Street Washington D.C. 20036 Riverhead, New York 11901 Attorneys for Suffolk County Attorneys for the Town of Southampton O

Richard J. Zahnleuter Executive Chamber, Room 229 Capitol Building Albany, New York 12224 O Attorney for Mario M. Cuomo Governor of the State of New York February 26, 1988 O

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o CONTENTS OF APPENDIX CF ,

'I. Correspondence Pertaining to the Exercise Request i

3)~ LII. Direct Testimony of James C, Baranski, William Lee Colwell, Lawrence B. Czech, Gregory C. Minor, James D. Papile, Charles B. Perrow, Frank P. Petrone, and Harold Richard Zook on Behalf of the State of New York and Suffolk County j, Regarding Contentions Ex 15 and 16 -- The Scope of the Exercise (NY Ex. 1)

)

III. Guidance Memorandum GM EV-2 -- Protective Actions for School Children

$3 IV. Excerpts from Transcript V. Prehearing Conference Order (Ruling on Contentions and Establishing Discovery Schedule), dated October 3, 1986

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SHOREHAN NUCl. EAR POWER STATION

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P.O. DO X 610. > OHTH C( UNTRY H O A D

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[d/I, . 7 , vect Psituot set sevCt t An 0,et u s tioens

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2:d g"p'{ Mr. !!arold R. Denton, Director g3 J Office of Nuclear Hoactor Regulatior E U.S. Nuclear Heculatory Commission Ny k Washington, D.C. 20555 49f$#

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ryd Exercise Objectives for Emergency Plan Exercine 4M..M Shoreham Nuclear Power Station - Unit 1

.c q q Docket No. 50-322

$NY ww Dear Mr. Dentcant RQ ffM- . Attached

$.! ManagementforAgency your review and forwarding to the Federal Emergency pursuant to the PEMA-NRC Memorandum of JM;fp Understanding dated as of November 1, 1984, 45 Ped. Reg. 02i!3 90t (1980), is a statement of objectives to be demonstrated at an exercise of the Shoreham Emergency Preparedness Plan and the Local Emergency kesponso Organization (LEHO) Plan. Thi n a t i achment i:

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.  ; in two parts: firnt, a statement, in LII.CO's terma, of the

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~'1 c.bjectiven of the exercine label.d "LERO Objectives", and cessnd,

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gC a correlation of these objectives with the st.anda rd PEMA " C c. r e Objectives "

?d It is being submitted to you in order to :aippor t a il'. ~'

gr.cled 11, 1985.

exercise which LIs.CO is planning for the week r.! Feb ru a i ,-

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LILCD has also developed three potential nc..t:a r ton tio m the wot exercise, which have been kept under security provanions, be

,. and ycur o ne.d o f f your ld approriatc i ce s. transmitting thin document prorapt ly t o l'I'r4A in artar.qing tho prelimina ry twe t inq r.e e -

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na r;- ' r. cominonce the detailed planning procen. for the excreine- .

it yeu ' ave any <p:e m t onn , please cont act this of fi ce.

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1:dwa i il Jordon ( ! !. M )

,, Al1 1arties 1. i e t e d t n At t ac;hment !

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LILC0 SNOREHAN/LERO PIAN l

A. Emergency Response Facilities and Equipment

1. Demonstrate :he prcmpt activetion, adequacy of the staffing anc' set up as appropriate of emergency response facilities as follows:

o Snoreham Nuclear Power Station Control Room a

Shoreham Nuclear Power Station Technical Support Center o Shoreham Nuclear Power Station Operetions Support Center o

) Shoreham Nuclear Power Station Emergency Operations Facility o local Emergency Response Organization Emercency Operations Center in Brentwood (LERO E0C) o Local Emergency Respon:e Organization Staging Areas in Riverhead, Patchogue and Port Jefferson (LER0 SA) o Emergency News Center (ENC) o Emergency Worker Decontamination Facility 2

Demonstrate the Shoreham Nuclear Power Station cornunication capabilities amng the Control Room, Technical Support Center, Emergercy Operations Fscility, Operations Support Center, and the Emergency News Center.

3. Demonstrate +he capability to cormunicate effectively between O Shoreham Nuclear Power Station Emergency Resperise Organization and LERO.

4 l

Den.onstrate ef fective cocr.unications among the LERO FOC in Brentwood, and the various stagi.ig areas, the Energency News Center, and arong Staging Areas, Bus Transfer Points Traf fic O Centrol Points and Field locations.

l S. Deuonstrate the ability of the St orcham Huclear icwer Station I

and LERO ccmunications to:

l l o Perforu a 24-hour per day notification c Transui t accurate and titely inforc atici.

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Deconstrate the ability of the Shoreham Nuclear Pcwer Station Ec.ergency Response Organization and LERO to deploy, coordinate and centrol radiological conitoring teams.

7 J

Deconstrate exposure control capabilities for onsi+e correc tive action teams.

l l b.

( Deu.onstrate cc.r.unication of technical inform tion to the Nuclear Regulatory Ccanission via the NRC hotlines. I n

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9. Demonstrate tne adequacy cf internal comunications within the Emergency Response Facilities as defined in A.1 above.  !

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10 Demonstrate adequacy of facilities and displays to support emergency operations. k 3.

D. Notification and Mobilizaticn ofpy Personnel and Staff E m 1. 7 J Demonstrate the ability of the Shoreham Nuclear Power Station U staff to properly classify actua' or potential emergencies in $

accorriance with LILC0 Emergency Plen Implementing Procedure:. $

2. De'::enstrate the capability of the Shoreham Nuclear Power Station Euergency Response Organization to notify the Local Emergency P.

Response Organization h ERO) through the established d

noti fication system.

3. Deconstrate the carability of the S.:oreham Neclear Power Station .2 Emergency Response Organization and LERO to notify emergency {yg; .

response personnel.

8.. ,

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econstrate the capability of the Shoecham Huclear Power Station O pf,'

fccrgency pesponse Organization ar.d LERO to mobilize staf f and {#;

ac'.ivate the emergency response f acilities in a timel f manner and naintain staffing around the clock.

S.

Demonstrate, as appropriate the ability to identify the need gW(3 r-U, for, notify and request assistance froci Federal agencies.

9

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6 Cc=onstrate, as appropilate, the notification of and M

'3 Coordination with counties and states within the innestion W pathway EPZ and with agencies such as FEMA, NRC, DDd, Red Cross,  : ,,!.3. '

Federal Aviaticn Ad.ainistration, and Cuant. Guard. O lO C. _Energency Ooerations Mananecent ,i~* u l

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1.

Deroastrate the capability of the Shoreham Nuclear Power Station (".,*3 j",

Icergency Response Organization and '.ERO to it.ple: ant their '

1 radiological energency preparedness plans. ,

o 2 U Deconstrate the abi'ity of key e: erger.cy personriel within the Shorch 1 Nuclear Power Station Er.trqcncy Response Organization 1 l . ;l end LEr 0 to initiate, coordinate and 1:plement t hc.ely ar.d *

• ef fective decisiois during a radiolcgical emergecy end clearly '

deconstr, ate Nho is in cha rge. "

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LA onstrate t h. i t there is ef fect ivo or y ini:utional dis ect ic.n ar>l I :? ?

omtiol ark) intigrat al radiob9ica ; menyncy tonp>iw ineNiirrj Q d";)1 verit of t ich! nonitorn, aalu tsition, re<xipt at.d arulyci:: e,f IF, fiel I data. %l, w

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al . N:tonstrate the captbility t<> cronlirutu actionn (int erTully/ $lE.n externally) anorxy onJanizat. ions in order to obtain supp>rt ard te, [,l}

uke apprcpriato c*ecisiont:.

@A.p. s S. De:onstrate the capability of lers;nnsible p rsonnel to recomerd .pi,a .

ard/or implamnt aproprinte protes.tive actions. ,

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D. ,13:blic Alert uy; and tbtific ition .

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thonstr.ite th:it the Shon4utn ?.'uclear Zwer Station LO.'PS) D:s tr- %q ,j w.

gere/ lieuponse Organization ard Ir% authorities can ef fectively a sf previde accurate infort:ation to tha public 2n a ti':ely fashion. *l i 5 . g:-

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hr.ortst.

cation syston within rate tk ca Sility of ID' to activate tM prmpt roti fi- 'b 1*> ridnutes of tN cb: inion to itplment MN protretive actions to sirulate unir.) uirens, DlS ani tone alert ra.ilos . In addition, &mestrate the capthility of IDO to j%

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it:plutent route alerting ural situlate the notificatico prrr'ided by .

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/ .M' 1 f.ucrmtrate the capibility of t1.e :2.'IS Durgemy ksp nw Org.sni-

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zation <ual IIJO to provirL initial ard follcw up infoir.atico to N; tk pd.'lic in a rir.uly fashicn. W r*.7/.y l' . [wjic ars! M*lia ibl.s* itrsa g. .

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1. bwnatrate at.s:: ir : s f t h r n ::.:c:t / tw.; rent er b> .Onr e!w. h? %

it.:c ear 1 cu r Pt.it :cn }) e gerg f i t.:.;cr.w Orgatuzat icf. at.! :D0

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twonstrate the .tbility of IJ:lo to project dc.raen to th<t iblic via eln irvjestion pithway ard t.o d..tettniac a[prcpriati protec*ive- .

iw asuren lusal on 1%r.'s and other relevar.t factors.

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4. timmtrate tle a:tivatt.on, w;ui arnt. and preentures of !cth th.

t Cloreiwn t'uclear Itver !itation Dmtwncy Peacnt 0 Tpnisation anl 1ERO field radiation r:unitorian tea:x..

S. Iwonstrate the abi'.ity of in-plant persontv 1 to r.afely draw ard O azulyw post-accident 1 tquid arvi gasece. reciples.

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Tua:cstrate n;uiprunt mi prrodures for..rtu.nia ment of airlo: Tv*

radioirditer cercentrations au iru .ns 10 tr.'i/m in the presum '

of rchle gases. -

C. gticos to Prota t tk_ Publiq O

1. Dmonutrote the i.eplesuntativi of appror.riate prote etive oction response cptions by II% including (all th Iterirq ard evacuatien to be sinulatid):

O .V.elterire ard evmmation of of frito arvan ircitdira ochcolti ard statal facili':ier.:

Inforr.in; th- :bl..e on the develq :r n* of 11e oxident ied any rvguirul prot mtive at.tiens:

Identificatim, ro';ificati ;n a 4 evocw tis c of rc.v,inntitu-ticr slirtd axbility-ii.pir ed p rints:

O u.nlyzinJ Jd veter.z.iniro irijerttica exteware rath.ay mnsideratioru.: e Prcr/isica for ru.tr'al of irp<titaents trran eva: aition routed:

Prn.*j sina to guid- traf fic !ut ir.7 a sitt !..t s! e'eamst im:

Fransica to uvacuate tat.d er s of ti yJ.lic wit! wt t ratu.;<,rta t ico :

Act ivatten c,f heptir.r. Gr.t or;

~Q CrCrdifat tor with .).e Ma' rtr an h d Crn:.a o r 'jn. prp.it.1<.t. ..f ,

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Ccqrty.s!.* Care Cetitert,.

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11 llealth, Medical and Exposure Control Measures '

O 1 Demonstrate the decision making process for limiting exposure of crergency workers.  ;

19

2. Demonstrate processing of local emergency workers and vehicles 8 f;,t through personnel monitoring and decontamination facility.

"4',

O 3 Demonstrate the decision making process for recomendfr.g the use N of Potassium lodide for emergency workers.

4 Demonstrate methods and resources for distributing dosimetry and i l

thyroid blocking agents, if appropriate, to emergency workers. .

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0 5- D'* "5tt' th' C 'd k"Pi"9 f '*di*ti " '*P 5"" '"d "5' f 7 dostaetry and thyroid blocking agents for the protection of ll emenJency workers. 3 6

Deconstrate knowledge, on the part of the emergency worker, of W  !

doshetry and Potassium lodide usage procedures and of the I , 2 individual authorized to allow worker exposures above ' l O permissible limits. i 2

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L !! C0 Sil0REllAM7CERO PLAri O EXERCTSCOIfJECTnT VOK!11Er" _-

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FEMA '

l LERO Core Objective a l 0bj ec tive .'s ) l 9' l

l. Deaonstrate ability to mobilize staff and activate l B'~4 l

f acilities proeptly. l l

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2. Dez.onstrate ability to fully staff facilities and i A.1. B.4

O 'aatntain staf fing around the clock. I I

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3. Deconstrate ability to cake decisions and to l C.2 coordinate eciergency activities. I I

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Deronstrate adequacy of facilities and displays l A.10 to support emergency operations. l l

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5. Deconstrate ability ta cotz:unicate with all l A.3.4.6

~O *PP' P*** I ***' " '9'"'***'*"5' ""d 'I"Id I personnel.

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Oc:.icnstrate ability to uchtlize and deploy field l A.6 tsnitoring tera; in a titely fashion, l O l l

7. De.:.ons trate apyopriate equipe. nt and procedures for datervinir.) a:;bient radistica levels. i F.4 I

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w. L. .astrate epprvpriate equipant tr.d piscedur es If6 f cr :.aasur .. nt of airturne rectoicdine I cunewntreticns as Icw as 10" i.01 /(C in I tla pre.ei.;e or idle gases. ]

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'O - 1 Larce . v.c.,duier rui.at for uni f orut ty of saatulogical fr..,rgsney Preprud. ass Exercise Cbservations and Evaluations (Jur.e 1983) Attaci...ent ?

to letter fru.a Dave McLcaghlin (Deouty Associate Director, State and Local Prcgrc..:s Support) to Revivnal Dirs:iors, Acting hegions) Directors, Regions ill, V; Con:eri 18.) Frwedural Policy co E4 tiol agical (targency Preparednvas Plan Revie.r:,. f s ere f.e Lbservaticos and i valuations, end Interiu finJt or..

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LILCO Sil0 relia 9/CERO PLAN O

ExEPME oTTEcTTfE WORKStiEET d

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i m FEMA O Cort Obiective LERO .

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Objec tive(s ) 2 1

9. Demonstrate appropriate equipment and procedures for ~

I j collection, transport and analysis of samples l T of soil, vegetation, snow, water, and milk. l 4 O I 1

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10. Deconstrate ability to project dosage to the public l F.2 S vf a p1trae exposure, based on plant and field data, l ,\

and to determine appropriata protective ceasures l based on PAG's, available shelter evacuation time 1 O esticates, and all other appropriate factors l

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11. Deconstrate ability to project dosage to the pubite l F.3 $

via ingestion pathway exposure bt. sed on field data, 1 O and to octerutne appropriate protective measures 1 based on PAG's and other relevant factors. l l

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12. Deconstrate e,bility to icple=ent protective actions for I >

ingestion pethway hazards. ( ,,('

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13. Deconstrate ability to alert the ptbite within the -,.

10-o11e EP2, and disse =1nate an initial 1 0.2, 3 4 instructional nessage within 15 minutes. I  :-

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O 14 ce onstrate ability to tor =victe an: distribute 1 0.1, E.3, a propria te instructions to the public in l G.1 a titely f ashicn. ^

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O "- ' ""'* te w rgonizational ebtit ty and resourses l I c.1

necess..y to canage an orderly evacuation or all Or part of the ple.:e EP2. i y, I d I

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LILCO

) SHOREll#UCERO PLAN EXERClff60'JCCUTE70ftESHEET

) FENA LERO Core Objective Objective (s)

'l5. Demonstrate ability tIprovide advance coordination I E.1 of inforrstion released. 1 I

i 3 26. Dv;::enstrate ability to estabitsh and operate rumor l E.2 control in a coordinated fashion. i l

27. i De.onitrate adequacy of procedures for re l G.5 and radiological renitoring of evacuees. gistration l i

3 l

20. I Deconstrate adequacy of facilities for mass care I of evacuees.

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29. Dc:.onstrate adequate equipewnt and procedure; L I H.2 3 for decontaination of emergency workers, equipent and vehicles. l I

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30. I 0;:.onstrate adequacy of dulance facilities and pro- I l

cederes for handling conte 1nated individuals. l O 1

31. l l

Lw;nstrate adegacy af hospital facilities and l i

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prccedures for hutdling containated individuals. I l i

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32. 1 Os cnstrate c.bilit/ to identify need f or. request. I C.

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and obtain Federal assistance, 3 l .

I J .: . 1 Ce .ons trate ability to relwate to and opera te ti.e  !!bt l

I alternate ECF/ECC. l appl ica tale i O l 34 l Lea..s trate ab ti t t/ to estica te total popula tien esposure. I l

e t.. . . n. tra t e :.111 :f tv s te r .u.e 4 ..: n.ple c t l .

,, , , a i selate , ,; . u r e . f .r t t.. c , -

O u. t rol l e; r e o n e r; 1

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O 1.!LC0 SPOREI1A'UEIRO PLM EXERCET'OTIKCTIVfiT0)fSHII T '

O FENA 1 L El.0 Core Objective 10bje< ci ve(s) l T6. Demonstrate the organizational ability and resources 1 G.1

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' necessary to deal with 1.apedinents to evacuation, l such as incler.4nt wather or traf fic obstructions. 1 I

17 i Deconstrate the organizational .:bility and resources i necessary to control access to an c uated area. 1 O I

18. i De.aonstrate the organizational ability and resources l G.1 necessary to etivet an orderly evacuation of I c.cbility-icpaired individuals within the pluce EPZ. 1 I

'O 19.

l os.cnstrate me :rsanizational ab111ty and resourtes I c.) '

.ic-cessary to ef fect an orderly evacua*.;cn of i schools within the ple:ne EPZ.

l 1

20. Decons L ate ability to ccntinuously cent tor arid control 1 .:

O ecergency worker exposure. H.5, 6 1 l

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Decuns tra'c the ability to ct.ke the decision, based on l H.3 predet. mined criteria, whether to issue K1 to l

,0 e:.erger.cy workers ar.d /ci the ger.eral popula tion, l I

??. i Dew nstrate the coility tc supply end ac_:1nistcr i H.4 K I , o ric e the cecision has been 6.ce to c, so. I l

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to L rt e t it.e . J1: in a clear, I i . .: '

ac ure te a r.e ti .:1y c.ar.r.er.

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1. UNITED sT Af ts

\A NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISGION f CASMitoGTOet. D. C. Meet 3

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O MEMORANDUM FOR: Richard W. Krism Assistant Associate Director 9 Office of Natural and Technological Hazards Programs Federal Emergency Management Agency FROM:

Edward L. Jordan, Director Division of Emergency Preparedness 3 and Engineering Response Office of Inspection and Enforcement

SUBJECT:

SCHEDULING OF EMERGENCY PLAN EXERCISE FOR SHOREHAM O

In response to LILC0's standing request to schedule an exercise of its emergency plan for Shoreham, the Convnission, in a memorandum to the Executive Dinctor for Operations dated June 4,1985 (Enclosure 1), stated that it sees no reason wity the licensee (i.e., LILC0) should not be allowed to exercise those parts of the plan wtitch may be legally exercised. Further, the Cossaission int /icated that it does g not disagree with the view that an exercise of the LILCO plan could yield meaning-ful results, even though such an exercise may not satisfy all of the requirements of NRC's regulations. The exercise could, as a sinimum, identify the impact of the limitations of LILCO's plan when executed under the state and county restric-tions.

'O Accordingly, we request that FEMA schedule as full ao exercise of the LILC0 Local Emergency Response Organization (LERO) plan as is feasible at the present time giving :ppropriate consideration to the Suffollr County Executive's May 30, 1985 Executive Order and subsequent developments relating to emergency planning l

activities by the County. In determining those portions of the LERO 88t plan that th'*

I 'i 9ht D' P" P'i't' '*" I"*I"Si'" I" '" * **i ** thi 8 ti"* ' p"r'ep'a"re dne s s

'O FEMA emphasize evaluation of the functional areas of emergency related to the demonstration of response capabilities within the plume exposure (10 mile) Emergency Planning Zone.

O O

Contact:

F. Kantor, IE 492-974S O

O Richard W. Kri m

O In the event FDM determines that an exercise is not currently possible, we request that FD% provide a response which addresses the five issues identified Comissioner in the memorandum from the Secretary of the Comission.

Asselstine's views on this matter are provided as Enclosure 2.

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- A ~a r

O ard L. Jord . Director k Division of Emergency Preparedness and Engineering Response Office of Inspection and Enforcement

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Enclosure:

1. Memorandum from the Secretary of the Comission dtd. 06/04/85 .

2. Comissioner Asselstine's Views O

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A, CTION "'Nrley Jordan COMTR-85-5A MEMORANDUM FOR: lillliam J. Dircks, Executive Director for Operations g.

TROM: Samuel J. Chilk, Secret,)*/ 7 i I

SUBJECT:

SCHEDULING OF EMERGENCY'PL%N EXERCISE FOR SHOREHAM ,

In view of LILCo's standing request to schedule an exercise of its emergency plan, the Comission, with Chairman Palladino and Comissioner Asselstine disagreeing, sees no reason why the licensee should not be allowed to exercise those parts of the plan which it may legally exercise.

The Commission does not disagree with the view that an exer-cise of the LILCO plan could yield meaningful results, even thcugh such an exercise may not satisfy all of the require-ments of NRC's regulations. It could, as a minimum, identify the impact of the limitations of LILCo's plan when executed under the state and county restrictions. Although the Com-mission is aware that because of the recent court decision a fuM exercise of the LILCO emergency plan may not be possible, the staff should request that FEMA schedule as full an exer-cise of the LILCO plan cs is feasible and lawful at the pre-sent tine. If FEMA indicates an exercise is not currently pcssible, the sta"f should ask TEMA to provide a detailed report of its reasons for declining, addressing the following:

1. Status of the outstanding technical and operational deficiencies with the LILCO plan.

2. Estimates of when each remaining deficiency will be corrected.

O NOTE: Since this SRM was approved, the County Executive of Suffolk County has issued an Executive Order indicating that the Count Shoreham.y The willStaf cooperate in emergency f, in requesting that TE:'J.planning activities schedule an for emergency plan exercise, should also suggest that TEMA give O appropriate consideration to the County's apparent change of position regarding participation in emergency planning activities.

Ett*d0".EDO ENCLOSURE I e . .. w- v-rh% ..

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Specific plan implementation activities LILCO could not O exercise given the state court's decision.

4.

Benefits and disadvantages to holding an exercise, given the responsa to Item 3, until legal concerns have been fully resolved or adequate compensating measures taken.

O 5.

Views on whether (and if so how) the deficiencies can be adequately remedied without the involvement and coop-eration of state and local entities.

Comissioner Asselstine's views for inclusion in any letter to TEMA will be provided to you within several days.

O cc: Chairman Palladino Comissioner Roberts

.O Comissioner Asselstine comissioner Bernthal Comissioner Zech l OM l OPE l

ASLBP ASLAP lO og i c:A l OPA OCA Shoreham Service List lO l

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Ccetssioner Asselstine does not believe that the Comission should request that FD% schedule an emegency planning exercise of the LILCO plan at this O time. Absent state or local goverment participation, there are serious questions about LILC0's authority to telement significant portions of its eeergency plan for $boreham. Further, there is sn ongoing dispute within O suffolk County concerning the county's position on emergency planning at Shoreham and its willingness to participate in testing and implementing an e ergency plan. Under these cireur, stances Comissioner Asselstine O believes that scheduling an exercise of the LILCO plan at this time would only confuse matters further. He therefore recomends that FD'A wait to

' plan and schedule an exercise for Shoreham at least until there is some

'o resolution of Suffolk County's position on this issue.

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O ENCLOSURE 2 10 l

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1 Federal Emergency Management Agency 0 ~[ ,

Wuhington, D.C. 2002 October 29, 1985  :

Mr. Willim J. Dircks Executive Director for Operaticass O U.S. Nuclear Ra@latory Ccruission Washirgton, D.C. 20555 ,

Dear Mr. Dircks his is in res;cnse to a nenotand.ra dated June 20, 1985, frcen O Zoward L. Jordan to Richard W. Krints in Wich FD% was requested to pro-ceed with the cor&ct cd 'as full an exercise......as is feasible to test of faite preparMness capabilities at the Shorehm Nuclear Pcuer Plant."

In rsy october 8,1985 letter,*ich transmitted the rwiw of revision 5 of the LI14D local Ener9ency Aespoem organization (tDC) plan, I indicated t

we were analyzirg the results et the plan rvviw in the context d the

'O Septercer 17, 1985 letter frcen Chairnan Palladino to Congressmen Markey, and the varicus legal proceedirns nlated to Shorehara in order to res;cnd to the June 20 rnancrundum within several w%s. Cur analysis includes l consideration cd the Atomic Safety and I.icensirg Appeal Soard decision ca!

October 18, 1985.

.O ne deficiencies identified in ny letter cf October I do not preclude the i conduct of an exercise of the IDO plan. Mcwever, the reluctance of '

ccunty and State cf ficials to participate in su:h an exarcise and the related legal autterity issues w:uld plaos special paranaters on the corduct of a Ltm exercise.

O 4 have no indication at this tim that cdf aite jurisdictions cre willing "

i to directly participate in an exercise in the short tem. mus, any i

exercise will be dramatically different than is typical at other sites in the State of New York. Any exercise withcut participation by state and local gwemnents wuld not allcw us suf ficient de onstration to reach a  ;

finding of reasonable assurance. mis conclusten is based on the eurnnt '

,O legal decision with respect to utility authority to perfom civil energe.wy l functions. Howwr, that does not preclude the conext of an exercise i

that would pecvide an indication to the Ibclear kwlatory Cermission (NR:) >

l as to utility onsite and offsite energency capabilities. We believe such l

a report would have value in decisions te contirue the licenstrq procesa lO or possibly provide a basis on Wich the NRC could nake predictive i

firdiros. mvicusly, the value d such an exercise in the licensing process is a deteminatico Wie can only be nede by the NN:.

Given the nature cf y:ur June 20 request and censideration of a practical  !

strveture for an exercise, w feel that, tile there an a ntecer cf 10 variations possible, the basic eptiors for exercisire in the near tem '

are limitas to te c option 1 - mis gtion muld requin that we set aside all ,

functions aid exercise objectives Mlated to issues of  ;

mJtharity and state and 1ccal participation. mus, only O " * "*d # # "" #* I' # * #

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O O an exercise is possi.ble bat its usefulness aid seen very lim ted. An exercise of this type wculd rot address questions such as those raised on pages 35 througn 39 of the October 18 decision cd the Atanic Safety and Licenairg Appeal Board and would be redundant to actions already taken

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ootion 2 - nis cption w:uld irclude all fmetions and rozmal

exercise objectives. his @ tion would exercise Revision 5 of the LEIC Plan. exercise controllers muld simulate the roles of key State or local of ficials unable or unwilling O to participata. It w:uld be desirable that state and local i governnent personne'l actually play. However, such a siJaa-lation mechanist wculd at least teet the utility's ability to respond to ad hoc participation on the part of State and local 9:wrments.

O ne ultimate purpose et an exercise is to su; port a finding by rom for use by the NRC in their licensing process. As we mentierwi abca, neither of these cptions w:xald allcw a findirg by FD4A on cdfsite greparedness.

However, w recognize that Shorehan is in no way typical and that in the i past in exercisirg its adjudicatory powers the Canission and the varicus Atomic Safety and Licensing Boards haw reached predictive findings.

lO Pursuant to your June 20 request, we are initiating the procesa necessary to ocx@ct an exercise of either gtion. We are papared to conduct such an exercise in approximately 75 days. H: wever, f1MA requires further clarification frm. NRC as to the sege of the exercise to be conducted.

FD4A will proceed with the initiatire staps until November 15, at which O time we will nood a definitive exercise socpe fras Nhc in order to avoid prchibitive costa. If at that tire we hwe twosived re direction frts the Nuclear Regulatory Ccrsnission we will suspend activities tmtil a decision is made. Given other demands, we do feel that any delay beyond the current window would require an omrcise scatp:rtenant of at least 90 days befond the mid4aruary time frane.

O sincerely, mW VI. y -

acual W. Spect O am>ciate Direrter state ard tocal Progra.s and Support O

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Associate Director 4 State and Local Prograas and Support '

1 Federal Emergency Managemsnt Agency

Washington, D.C. 20472 d r O -

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Dear Mr. Speck ,

t This responds to your. letter of October 29, 1985, proposing two options for an Z exercise to test onsite and offsite energency preparedness capabilities at O

Shoreham. We conclude that an exercise should be conducted consistent with the .-

epproach outlined in your Option 2.

F -

You asked in the letter for further clarification ft p the NRC as to the scope of the exercise to be conducted. As stated in our s Aerendus to you of June 20, .

. 1985, we requested that you schedule as full an exetciu of the LILC0 Local O tetroency Response Organization plan as is feasibir,. Option 2 would include all functions and normal exercise objectives, recogni',ing that some offsite respcase

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roles may be simulated. We believe that such an exercise would be useful in the licensing process for Shorehas. Please let me '4now if we can be of further '

g assistance. _

7o 5tacerely, g

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lliam J. Dircks

• _O ({pecutive Director For coerations .

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J UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 3 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Before the Atomic Safety and Licensino Board 3

)

In the Matter of )

)

LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY ) Docket No. 50-322-OL-5

) (EP Exercise) 3 (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, )

Unit 1) )

)

O DIRECT TESTIMONY OF JAMES C. BARANSKI, WILLIAM LEE COLWELL, LAWRENCE B. CZECH, GREGORY C. MINOR, JAMES D. PAPILE, CHARLES B. PERROW, FRANK R. PETRONE, AND HAROLD RICHARD ZOOK O ON BEHALF OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK AND SUFFOLK COUNTY l

l REGARDING

() CONTENTIONS EX 15 AND 16 -- THE SCOPE OF THE EXERCISE O

April 6, 1987 O

O O

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O UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Before the Atomic Safety and Licensino Board

-O

)

In the Matter of )

)

LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY ) Docket No. 50-322-OL-5 O ) (EP Exercise)

(Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, )

Unit 1) )

( )

l

'O l DIRECT TESTIMONY OF JAMES C. BARANSKI, WILLIAM LEE COLWELL, i LAWRENCE B. CZECH, OREGORY C. MINOR, JAMES D, PAPILE, CHARLES B. PERROW, FRANK R. PETRONE, AND HAROLD RICHARD ZOOK O

l l ON BEHALF OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK AND SUFFOLK COUNTY l REGARDING lO l

CONTENTIONS EX 15 AND 16 -- THE SCOPE OF THE 5%ERCISE f

10 l

l l April 6, 1987

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TABLE OF CONTENTS m

.J Pace I. INTRODUCTION............................................... 1 O A. Identification of Witnesses............................ 1 B. Statement of Contentions Ex 15/16...................... 5 C. Overview and Summary of Conclusions.................... 11 O II. DISCUSSION OF CONTENTICNS EX 15/16 SUBPARTS................ 37 A. Notification Subparts.................................. 37 B. Public Education....................................... 50 0 C. Schools................................................ 60

1. Statement of Contentions........................... 62

2. Discussion......................................... 66 O (a) Introduction.................................. 66 (b) The Exercise Included No Meaningful Demonstration of School Preparedness.......... 71 (c) The Limited School Preparedness Activities lO During the Exercise Demonstrate that Appendix E Was Not Satisfied.................. 78 i

D. Special Facilities..................................... 84 l

1. Introduction....................................... 84 lO

2. Statement of contentions........................... 88

3. Discussion......................................... 92 l

(a)

Background:

LILCO's Planning for

O Special Facilities............................ 92 l

(b) The Demonstration of the Plan for Special Facilities Was Very Limited........... 99 1

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O P_ane

O E. Coast Guard / Water Portion of the EPZ................... 115 F. Buses.................................................. 122

1. Statement of Contention Subparts.................. 122 0 2. Discussion......................................... 125 (a) The LILCO Bus Plan........................... 126 (b) The Exercise of LILCO's Bus Plan.............. 133 O G. Ingestion Pathway..................................... 139 H. Recovery and Reentry.................................. 151 lO 1

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Aoril 6, 1987

)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Before the Atomic SLafety and Licensina Board

)

)

In the Matter of )

.) )

LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY ) Docket No. 50-322-OL-5 *

) (EP Exercise)

(Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, )

Unit 1) )

3 DIRECT TESTIMONY OF JAMES C. BARANSKI, WILLIAM LEE COLWELL, LAWRENCE B. CZECH, GREGORY C. MINOR, JAMES D. PAPILE, Q?ARLES B. PERROW, FRANK R. PETRONE, AND HAROLD RICHARD ZOOK ON 3 BEHALF OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK AND SUFFOLK COUNTY REGARDING CONTENTIONS EX 15 AND 16 -- THE SCOPE OF THE EXERCISE I. INTRODUCTION 3

A. Identification of Witnesses J Q. Please state your names, occupations, and experience.

A. My name is James C. Baranski. I have been employed by 3 the New York State Radiological Emergency Preparedness Group

("REPG") since 1981. I have been the Exercise Director since January 1985 and was a nuclear facilities specialist from 1981-3 b

O 1985. Prior to 1981, I was with the New York State Energy Office (1978-1981) and, before that, _ was a licensed senior reactor

.O operator at Indian Point, Unit 3 (1972-1978).

In my current job, I am primarily responsible for the off-site conduct of exercises at nuclear power plants within the State of New York. I have lead responsibility for scenario writing, offsite exercise planning, and the development of off-site exercise objectives. From December 1981 until January 1985, I was a planning nuclear facility specialist. In that position, y) I had involvement in offsite exercises, primarily as the REPG technical liaison to the licensee's Emergency Operations Facili-l ties ("EOFs").

!O In my present position as Exercise Director, and in my prior position as a nuclear facilities specialist, I have had occasion O to participate actively in the conduct of all offsite emergency preparedness exercises in the State of New York at New York State power reactors. A copy of my statement of qualifications is

.O Attachment 1 to this testimony.

My name is William Lee Colwell. A statement regarding my O qualifications is included in the testimony submitted on behalf of Suffolk County on March 20, 1987, regarding Contention Ex 50 (hereafter, the "Contention Ex 50 Testimony").

O lO 1

O My name is Lawrence B. Czech. My current position is Chief of Nuclear Protection Planning with REPG. In that position, I O

currently am responsible for the preparation, maintenance, revision, and oversite of the State portion of the New York State Emergency Response Plan and act as REPG liaison to Orange County.

In my various work with REPG since 1981, I have at various times been involved in the preparation, planning, and development of l

objectives for exercises in New York State. I have been a

O participant in all offsite exercises of New York State power reactors since 1981. A copy of my statement of qualifications is Attachment 2 to this testimony.

3 My name is Gregory C. Minor. A statement regarding my qualifications is included in the testimony I submitted on behalf O

l of Suffolk County on February 27, 1987, regarding Contention l

Ex 36.

l

'O My name is James D. Papile. I am currently the Director of REPG, a position which I have held for a little over a year.

O Prior to that and since 1980, I was one of three Associate Planners for REPG. In both my prior and present positions, I have been engaged actively in the preparation for, conduct, and O evaluation of offsite emergency planning exercises for power reactors located in the State of New York. A copy of my state-ment of qualifications is Attachment 3 to this testimony.

O O _3-

O My name is Charles B. Perrow. A statement regarding my qualifications is included in the Contention Ex 50 testimony.

My name is Frank R. Petrone. I currently am a special assistant to the Suffolk County Executive, Michael LoGrande.

g From January 1982, until April 1986, I served as the Director of FEMA Region II, headquartered in New York City. As Director for FEMA Region II, I had overall responsibility for all FEMA activi-O ties in that Region. As part of my responsibilities, I had overall responsibility for FEMA's conduct of the radiological O emergency preparedness program, including the conduct of annual exercises and other FEMA activities at licensed nuclear power plants in New York State and elsewhere in Region II. My respon-O sibilities as FEMA Region II Director also required me to be involved in the preparations for, the conduct of, and the post-exercise. evaluations of numerous nuclear power plant exercises in O New York State. I was involved in the FEMA decision to conduct the February 13, 1986, exercise ("Exercise") of LILCO's offsite radiological emergency response plan ("Plan") for the Shoreham O Nuclear Power Station. I proceeded with full concurrence with FEMA that this was a limited exercise. I was present at the Exercise and was involved in the post-Exercise evaluation of the O Exercise. I was also involved in a supervisory capacity with earlier FEMA reviews of LILCO's Plan, beginning with the review conducted in June 1983. A copy of my statement of qualifications is Attachment 4 to this testimony.

O

_4_

3 My name is Harold Richard Zook. A statement regarding my qualifications is included in the Contention Ex 50 testimony.

O B. Statement of Contentions Ex 15/16 3

Q. Gentlemen, what is the purpose of your testimony?

g A. To address Contentions Ex 15/16, ao consolidated by the Licensing Board.

Q. Please state the general allegation of Contentions O

Ex 15/16.

O A. The basic allegation is as follows:

The scope of the February 13 exercise of the LILCO Plan was so limited that it could not and did not yield valid or meaningful results o on implementation capability as required by 10 CFR S 50.47(a)(2), in that it did not include demonstrations or evaluations of major por-tions of the LILCO Plan and the emergency response capabilities of many persons and entities relied upon to implement the LILCO O Plan. The data set forth in subparts A-I, K, and M of Contention EX 15 and A-L and N of Contention EX 16 individually and collectively establish that the exercise demonstrated a fundamental flaw in the LILCO Plan. The exer-cise results do not demonstrate that the LILCO O Plan could or would be implemented, and the exercise results preclude a finding that there is reasonable assurance that adequate protec-tive measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency at Shoreham, as required by 10 CFR S 50.47(a)(1). Thus, O the exercise demonstrated a fundamental flaw in the LILCO Plan.

O _3_

O Specifically, several critical aspects of offsite emergency preparedness, and major substantive portions of the LILCO Plan, were O excluded from the exercise. Neither the exer-cise scenario (which LILCO prepared), nor responses by players during the exercise, nor any FEMA evaluation or observation, addressed the elements identified in EX 16 A-I, K and M O of emergency preparedness required by the referenced sections of the NRC's regulations and NUREG 0654.

The failure of each of the persons and entities identified in EX 16 A-L and N below to participate in the exercise both individ-

O ually and collectively means that the exercise did not comply with 10 CFR S 50.47(b)(14) and did not demonstrate that the LILCO Plan can or will be implemented, as required by 10 CFR SS 50.47(a)(1) and (a)(2). Rather, the exer-

'O cise results were so limited that they demon-strated a fundamental flaw in the scope of the exercise and in the implementability of the Plan and preclude a finding that there is

, reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of

.o a Shoreham accident, as required by 10 CFR S 50.47(a)(1).

Other than LILCO and its personnel, the major-ity of the organizations, entities, and individuals relied upon in the LILCO Plan for lO implementation of that Plan did not partici-l pate in the exercise. Thus, the exercise did l not address the willingness, availability, training, equipment, capability, or adequacy of performance of the entities and individuals identified in EX 16 A-L and N below, each of O which is necessary to implement the portions of the LILCO Plan referenced in each subpart.

The fact that each of these entities and individuals did not participate in the exer-l cise precludes a finding that the LILCO Plan is capable of implementation or a finding of O reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a Shoreham emergency, as required by 10 CFR S 50.47(a)(1). Accordingly, the LILCO Plan is fundamentally flawed.

O O

G A complete copy of Contentions Ex 15/16, which includes the various subparts thereof and other subparts and contentions which O

were subsumed and/or consolidated in Contentions Ex 15/16, is Attachment 5 to this testimony. Attachment 5 also contains a copy of Contention Ex 20. Although that contention was not separately admitted by the Licensing Board, we understand the Board to have ruled that the bases for Contention Ex 20 were o

u adequately covered by Contention Ex 15/16. Since we make reference to the Contention Ex 20 bases in this testimony, we have attached a copy of that contention.

O Q. Do you agree with the basic allegation of Contentions Ex 15/167 O

A. Yes, we do.

O Q. What do you understand the basic issue to be with i

l respect to Contentions Ex 15/16?

'O A. We understand that the basic issue is whether the l Exercise of the LILCO Plan for Shoreham which occurred on February 13, 1986, constituted a "full participation exercise,"

(3 as that term is used under the NRC's regulations.

l Q. What NRC regulatory requirements are pertinent to this O matter?

O _7_

G A. There are several regulatory requirements which come into ploy. These are 10 CFR S 50.47(a)(2), 10 CFR Q

S 50.47(b)(14), and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV pertaining to full participation exercises. These various provisions are as follows.

U First, Section 50.47(a)(2) provides:

IO The NRC will base its finding on a review of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) findings and determinations as to whether State and local emergency plans are adequate and whether there is reasonable assurance that n they can be implemented, and on the NRC L'

assessment as to whether the applicant's onsite emergency plans are adequate and whether there is reasonable assurance that they can be implemented. A FEMA finding will primarily be based on a review of the plans.

Any ther information already available to O

FEMA may be considered in assessing whether there is reasonable assurance that the plans can be implemented. In any NRC licensing proceeding, a FEMA finding wil? constitute a rebuttable presumption on questions of C adequacy and implementation capability.

Section 50.47(b)(14) provides:

Periodic exercises are (will be) conducted to O evaluate major portions of emergency response capabilities, periodie drills are (will be) conducted to develop and maintain key skills, and deficiencies identified as a result of exercises or drills are (will be) corrected.

O And the relevant portion of Part 50, Appendix E provides:

' Full participation" when used in conjunction with emergency preparedness exercises for a O particular site means appropriate offsite local and State authoritien and licensee personnel physically and actively take part in h3 O

testing their integrated capability to adequately access and respond to an accident at a commercial nuclear power plant. "Full O participation" includes testing the major .

observable portions of the onsite and offsite 4

emergency plans and mobilization of State, i local and licensee personnel and other resources.in sufficient numbers to verify the capability to respond to the accident (O

scenario.

4 i

j 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, S IV.F, n.4.

-()

Another portion of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, S IV.F is i also pertinent. The NRC has specified further guidance for the!

) full participation exercise which must occur within one year of~

operation above 5 percent power. The guidance is:

A full participation exercise which tests as O much of the . . . plans as is reasonably achievable without mandatory public partici-pation shall be conducted for each site at which a power reactor is located for which the first operating license for that site is issued after July 13, 1982. This exercise C) shall be conducted within 1 year before the issuance of the first operating license for full power and prior to operation above 5% of rated. power of the first reactor, and shall include participation by each State and local government within the plume exposure pathway 0 EPZ and each State within the ingestion exposure pathway EPZ.

10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, S IV.F.1 (footnote omitted). We O understand LILCO to have urged that the February 1986 Exercise was the particular full participation exercise required for licensing under Appendix E. Thus, this additional Appendix E O

O _g_

D

. guidance also is pertinent to the inquiry on Contentions Ex 15/16. Relevant data regarding exercises are also found in O

NUREG 0654, particularly Section II.N.

Q. Who sponsors this testimony?

A. This testimony generally has been reviewed by all of the witnesses. We have designated primary sponsors of particular O

l portions in order to identify the person (s) most directly familiar with particular matters. Where no primary sponsor is listed, all of the witnesses equally sponsor the answer.

As a general matter, and to assist the Board and parties in the review of this testimony, the sponsorship is roughly as O

follows: Messrs. Colwell and Zook discuss what the LILCO Plan provides and, together with Mr. Petrone, discuss what happened on O the day of the Exercise. Mr. Petrone adds views regarding the Exercise from the perspective of a former FEMA Regional Director.

Messrs. Papile, Czech, and Baranski discuss exercises at other O New York State plants and their opinions about the Shoreham Exercise in view of the data discussed by other witnesses.

Mr. Perrow discusses primarily the reasons from an organizational

() standpoint why the Exercise needed to be more complete.

Mr. Minor has assisted in review of those portions of the testimony describing what the Plan provides and what happened O

C) , - lo -

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during the Exercise. He also directly sponsors portions of the testimony, including those portions involving ingestion pathway 3

matters.

Q. Do you appear jointly as witnesses for Suffolk County O

and New York State?

A. Not exactly. Messrs. Papile, Czech, and Baranski appear on behalf of New York State; Messrs. Colwell, Minor, Perrow, and Zook appear on behalf of Suffolk County; and O_

Mr. Petrone appears on behalf of both the State and County. We have combined our testimony because the points we make are inter-related.

O C. Overview and Summary of Conclusions O Q. Before addressing particular Contentions Ex 15/16 '

subparts, please explain your view of how one assesses whether an exercise satisfies the "full participation" requirement of the o NRC regulations.

I A. (Baranski, Czech, Minor, Papile, Petrone) The primary

() criterion is the definition of a full participation exercise as  !

set forth in Appendix E to 10 CFR Part 50. In our view, the key )

terms from the definition are that such an exercise must "test ()  ;

O the integrated capability to adequately assess and respond to an 1

0 1

)

4 accident . . .

" and that the exercise must "include () (the]

testing (of] the major observable portions of the on-site and off-site emergency plans and mobilization of State, local, and licensee personnel and other resources in sufficient numbers to verify the capability to respond to the accident scenario."

Thus, it is essential that an exercise include sufficient testing of the major portions of the plans and sufficient mobilization of personnel to verify the capability to respond adequately to an o

accident. If major portions of the plans are omitted from an exercise or if the testing and/or mobilization of personnel are so limited that one cannot verify the response capability, then a O

full participation exercise has not occurred.1 0

1 (Baranski, Czech, Minor, Papile, Petrone) This does not l mean that mandatory public participation is an essential (or a I desirable) attribute of a full participation exercise. It does 43 mean, however, that major components of the plan (s) should be l included in the testing. This makes good sense, since only by l testing major observable plan elements can one determine whether l there is, in fact, the capability to respond adequately to an accident scenario. As will be discussed with respect to certain f the matters in subparts of Contentions Ex 15/16, it appears lO that the Shoreham Exercise did not include testing of certain major observable elements of the LILCO Plan. In our opinion, therefore, the Shoreham Exercise did not satisfy the regulatory criteria governing whether a full participation exercise has occurred.

O Further, it is only by such comprehensive testing of major observable plan elements that one can reach some conclusion concernli.' whether the various parts of the plan (s) work together. That is, as required by Appendix E, there must be some means for judging whether plan (s) can work together in an O integrated fashion. This can only be done if the various parts of such plans -- the major observable elements -- are tested together.

O l

e Related to the testing of the major observable plan elements, there also must be mobilization of sufficient response personnel to verify the capability of those personnel to respond to the accident scenario. This really involves at least two requirements. First, there must be the mobilization of O

personnel. Such personnel must be representative of major observable elements of the response plan; in addition, "other resources" which could be required to take effective and O

coordinated response acticas in an emergency situation must also be mobilized in sufficient members "to verify the capability to respond to the accident scenario." Thus, if there are certain O,

organizations or elements that are not mobilized at all in an exercise or are mobilized only to a minimal degree, then there be no means of verifying the capability to respond to the O

l accident scenario, much less to do so in the integrated and coordinated fashion required by the regulations. Simply put, without verification of the various entities' capability to O

respond to the accident scenario, an exercise by definition cannot constitute a "full participation" exercise.

O Second, to constitute a "full participation" exercise, it is necessary "to verify the capability to respond to the accident a scenario." In the context of a graded offsite exercise of a nuclear power plant emergency plan, such verification is provided j by FEMA evaluators. It is, of course, essential that FEMA

() personnel evaluate all the major observable elements of the l

l l

i lO l

.s_ _______ _ _ _ _ _

D response plan and the personnel and other resources mobilized to respond during the exercise. If FEMA does not provide such G

verification / evaluation or if its verification / evaluation is insufficient, then you do not have one of the necessary components of a full participation exercise, which precludes any

_J determination as to whether there is reasonable assurance that the plan can be implemented. Therefore, the adequate verifica-tion or, put another way, the evaluation of the responders' 3

performance is a key element in determining whether the exercise constitutes a full participation exercise.

O (All) The next essential element of a full participation exercise is that there be performance by the emergency O responders, to the extent that that is feasible. There are often tabletop exercises and drills and other activities which are designed to train personnel in various emergency actions.

O However, a full participation exercise needs to go beyond tabletop-like activities. Such in exercise is an event that tests the integrated capabilities and a major portion of the O basic elements existing within the emergency preparedness plans and organization. Thus, it must involve the actual performance of emergency response activities. By this we mean that emergency O response personnel cannot just practice performance of various procedures and still satisfy the requirements of.a full partici-pation exercise. As the term "participation" connotes, there O must be something beyond the walk-through of procedures -- for C) _ 14 -

l I

l l m

example, a demonstration of the underlying actions contemplated by the procedures also must be performed. Stated differently, an D

exercise does not just test the "plan" or the "organization."

Rather, it tests through the mobilization of personnel the "capability to respond to the accident scenario" (10 CFR Part 50, 3

Appendix E) and also permits an opportunity "to evaluate major portions of emergency response capabilities . . . . 10 CFR

_ S 50.47(b)(14).2 Q

Q. Please give an example of the kind of performance you believe is important in a full participation exercise.

_J A. (Colwell, Minor, Petrone, Zook) During the Shoreham y Exercise, LERO personnel were to follow certain procedures in responding to the simulated accident insofar as school prepared-ness was involved. Thus, the Plan called for LILCO personnel to 3 contact school personnel and advise them to keep schools closed.

2 We understand that LILCO witnesses have stated the view that 3 exercises are designed to assess the effectiveness of an emergency response organization, not the individual performers.

This matter is addressed in the Suffolk County testimony on Contention Ex 21 and thus we will not address it at length. We note only two points. First, the capability of an emergency response organization to respond is only as good as the D individuals which make up the organization. Accordingly, even if one were to focus ultimately on the "organization," the only way to do so in an exercise is to assess the sum of individual performances. Second, we read Appendix E to require a focus on individual performance. Thus, Appendix E talks about mobilizatien of response personnel in order "to verify the 3 capability to respond to the accident scenario." Such mobilization and verification requirements necessarily involve a focus on individual performance.

O - 15 _

D This was not done during the Exercise. Rather, LILCO personnel only simulated such calls. Thus, there was no real performance.

U Q. Why is it important for an exercise to test performance such as the performance involved in testing school preparedness?

A. (All) In our experience, one of the best indications

, of readiness has been how well response personnel handle human J

interactions. Do they communicate with each other well? Do they improvise with each other well when confronted with a difficult or perhaps unanticipated situation, such as relevant school 3

personnel being unavailable or their telephone numbers being busy? By ensuring that an exercise includes substantial 3 performance, one ensures a test of key human interaction elements.3 9 As set forth later in this testimony, one of our strongest reservations about the scope of the Shoreham Exercise is the degree to which human interactions outside of the narrow confines O of LERO were tested. For example, LILCO personnel did not contact the EBS radio station or the backup stations, most schools, any hospitals, other special facilities, or the owners O of congregate care facilities. The failure to establish and test 3 In a real emergency, it is in the context of human interactions that the unexpected arises. If response personnel C) cannot cope with the human factor, they cannot respond to an emergency. Human interaction is the primary thing that takes an "exercise" beyond the mere walk through of the paper plan.

C)

F

(j-these communications links and the ability, understanding, and capabilities of outside entities to coordinate effectively with L LERO eliminates an important aspect of performance which is l

essential to any complete exercise.

O (Petrone) Coordination and integration of various decisions j at all levels within the outside LERO entities is further g essential in order to effect a smooth flow of command and control and to ensure that key, top level decisions can be made on a timely and all encompassing basis, lO

! (Baranski, Czech, Papile, Petrone) In our experience in l

l New York State, offsite exercises have emphasized, at a minimum, l

() the actual establishment of communication links with entities like schools, hospitals, and other special facilities that are involved in the respective County plans. In this regard, the l

.O Shoreham Exercise appears to have departed significantly from l

l other exercises in New York State.

O (colwell, Minor, Perrow, Petrone, Zook) Further, the actual performance aspect noted above is all the more important for the Shoreham Exercise because the responders -- the LILCO members of

[) LERO -- have little (if any) opportunity in real life to demon-strate any integrated response capability. In this regard, they l

are very different from police and other emergency ser .ce

) personnel who at least get to practice emergency responses

O

_ 17 -

1 1

[J l

(albeit not to nuclear plant accidents) in their normal jobs.

Actual experience -- real performance -- is a key factor in the D

correct performance of emergency job functions.4 Since LERO workers do not have emergency response experience, it was even a

more essential that the Shoreham Exercise be as realistic as possible.5

,J (Perrow) I want to stress the importance of an exercise --

if it is to be a full participation exercise -- to test the human interrelationships. I have described the concepts of tight m coupling and interactive complexity in the Contention Ex 50 J

testimony and will not repeat that discussion here. Suffice it to say, however, that the interactions of people in responding to O a nuclear emergency, particularly when a highly centralized organization like LERO is in charge of the emergency response, have the potential to disrupt the response if such human inter-O actions are not carefully tested in advance.

O 4 (Colwell, Zook) We know of no training program in the law enforcement field where there is an absence of effort to O measure / observe actual performance. This becomes the real criterion. It is generally assumed that the ability to follow procedures is a first task, which is a prerequisite that permits the evaluation of performance.

5 (Petrone) A cookbook of solely a plan-dependent decision-O making response is usually, in a real emergency, ineffective.

Experience coupled with a plan is essential to realistic decision-making. One is not mutually exclusive of the other.

C) y O

Q. Dr. Perrow, you have spoken of "interactions" among

. groups involved in LILCO's Plan. Is there any organizational O'

theory that addresses the issue of interactions more systematically?

O A. (Perrow) Yes. Karl Weick in 1976 published an influential article on "loose coupling" in organizations.6 It

O contrasted centralized, bureaucratic organizations, which are tightly coupled, with decentralized ones that allow buffers between their units. If organizations are loosely coupled, a j) disturbance to one part of the organization will not quickly radiate to other parts, the disturbance will be contained in that part. It may do a good deal of damage to that part, but it will

() not radiate to the rest of the organization or to other entities or cause unexpected disturbances. A tightly coupled organiza-tion, however, will find that not only can the disturbance not be

O contained, but it will interfere with the normal ways in which j the organization interacts within itself and with other entities, thereby producing more damage than would be expected by the O initial disturbance.7 6

Karl Weick, "Educational Organizations as Loosely Coupled Systems," Administative Science Ouarteriv, vol. 21 (March 1976):

() 1-19. SAR &l12 his The Social Psycholoav of Oroanizinc, 2nd edition, Reading Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1979. '

7 In a recent book, I have discussed systems which are not  :

only tightly coupled, but have interactive complexity -- the '

potential for a failure or disturbance in one part of the system

)'( to interact in an unexpected way with other parts of the system.

Charles Perrow, Normal Accidents: Livina with Hiah Risk Systems, New York, Basic Books, 1984.

O i i

a

)-

)

Q. Please explain how the foregoing principles apply to the matters raised in Contentions Ex 15/16.

A. (Perrow) A community trying to evacuate or otherwise protect itself in an emergency situation is a system, just as a a

power plant is a system. A community that needs to evacuate rapidly suddenly becomes a much more tightly coupled community

_ than it is under normal circumstances. Things must happen fast; J

there are no easy substitutes for, say, buses or cars to leave the area; the plume cannnot be stopped for a time until the roads are cleared; on Long Island there are few alternative evacuation routes to use in leaving the area.

3 In this complex system of a community trying to evacuate before the radioactive plume appears, there would be the possi-bility of errors or failures compounding each other. For O example, normally a road impediment creates an inconvenience to motorists; those who know the area may even find ways around it, and most people do not find that reaching their destination on O time is critical. But if the impediment occurs after a failure to prevent a release of radiation from the plant, the impediment becomes critical. Let us assume, in addition, that the failure O to promptly get a road crew to the site occurs, and the impedi-ment sits there for a few hours. It is also possible that the impediment is a fuel truck, and the fuel spills out into the O surrounding gutters during the delay. A spark from a car that O

Q:

tries to circumvent the impediment recklessly, because of fear about the radiological emergency, could set the fuel on fire.

O Another "failure" interacting with this is the traffic jam caused by the impediment -- it prevents fire trucks from getting to the

-scene.

O Given that such tight coupling may impact a nuclear plant

-emergency, it is essential that an exercise include all key O

players and potential interactions. It must test their readi-ness, and the possibil'ities of unexpected interactions due to multiple failures or disturbances, in a setting that will suddenly become very tightly coupled. Only in this way can there be the possibility of verifying a real capability and readiness by both individuals and the organization as a whole to respond to O

an emergency. .

Q. Y u have described the evacuation as involving a O

community that'is interactive in complex ways that might not be appreciated beforehand, and that is tightly coupled. Are not all O tasks performed by organizations, or organizations and communi-ties, complexly interactive and tightly coupled? What is different about this situation?

O A. (Perrow) A nuclear power plant such as Shoreham is itself complex 1y interactive and tightly coupled. It has to be

.O because of the highly time-dependent processes going on in the

!O i

O core and elsewhere in the plant, and the very complexity of the system. An oil fired or coal fired power plant is quite "o

different. It is what I call a "linear system," more like an assembly line, in that processes generally can be stopped if they are out of order without endangering other processes or parts of O

the plant. The processes also are reasonably well understood, since there is more experience with burning coal or oil to boil water than there is with nuclear power. Most manufacturing

~O organizations are linear and loosely coupled; the interactions are well understood, and if there is a failure, there are many ways to recover from it without shutting down the whole system, or it can be shut down quickly and safely.

The same is true of communities. A fire in one place is not >

likely to spread if proper measures are taken. It is visible, and while some people may tend to rush to watch, potentially

4) interfering with recovery efforts, they are generally not going to go too close and standard crowd control techniques can be used. Similarly, a storm may damage power lines, but most of the z) normal activity of the community can continue while road crews repair the lines. Most dangers in communities are either visible

-- fires, for example -- so that people can either avoid them or

7) take obvious protective actions, or circumscribed to a particular locality. And finally, most community hazards that involve rapid

'O

() . - - _ _ _ _ - .

O responses or immediate dangers are familiar to both the public and to officials concerned with safety, such as the police and 9

firemen. They have experience with these.

A radiological hazard that requires sheltering or evacuation 9

ties a community and its response resources together instantly, and tightly. Things that normally never interact at all or only in expected and familiar ways now can interact in unexpected and D

unfamiliar ways.8 And of course, time becomes important to minimize its potential effects. What normally is not a very time-dependent or complex 1y interactive system becomes one. We are unfamiliar with the dynamics of such systems. We need exercises -- complete exercises that will couple interacting parts -- to discover the linkages that people may not have thought of, and to better learn about the amount of time and personnel required. Holding an exercise without many of the key fa 111 ties and potential sources of problems in the community O

will give a misleading view of preparedness.

.g Q. You have emphasized the need for an exercise to include involvement by and evaluation of the various response entities (like schools) which would be required to interact with LERO in o an actual emergency. But FEMA has indicated that it "does not evaluate sub-level emergency plans." FEMA Amended Answers to 8 For instance, in normal occurrences, school (Perrow)

O districts in suffolk county have no reason to interact with LERO.

In a Shoreham emergency, however, these districts are expected to interact with LERO personnel.

i

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• l l

O  ;

Suffolk County First Request for Admissions, No. 28 (hereafter referred to as "FEMA Arnended Admission No. "). Do you agree I

O with this FEMA position?

A. (Baranski, Czech, Minor, Papile, Petrone) We do not -

O disagree that FEMA is not generally in the business of evaluating the adequacy of hospital plans, school plans, and the like.

However, the issue, in our opinion, is not the evaluation of so-O called sub-level plans but, rather, whether there is a readiness and capability to interact effectively with LERO in the event of a Shoreham emergency. This does not require a FEMA evaluation of

O sub-level plans, but it does require some FEMA inquiry / evaluation as to whether LERO and the other entities mentioned in the Plan can communicate effectively and otherwise work together. This O

apparently was not done during the Exercise to any significance, which means there was no means to verify the capability of indispensable resources to respond to the accident scenario.

Q. Are there any other criteria to be considered in O w et er a Part cular exere 8e n8titutes a full Participation exercise?

I t

i A. (Baranski, Czech, Papile, Petrone) Yes. In

!O i

determining whether a particular exercise constitutes a full participation exercise, one must consider whether the exercise is O the initial ofbite exercise for the nuclear power plant in

(

! lO l

[ . _. . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _. _ _ _ .

b ,

I question. In New York State, the practice has been to test as 1

many elements of a new plan as possible during the initial

) exercise at a particular nuclear power plant site to determine the effectiveness and implementability of the offsite eme:.ger.cy plan. The reason for this is that prior to the first ex w tse,

)

one has no basis to know whether the emergency response plan really can be implemented by available response personnel. Thus, it is essential that the initial exercise be as complete as

)

possible.9 In subsequent exercises, once a "track record" has been compiled, it has been standard practice to focus attention on areas where there is perceived to be a need for improvement.

In these later exercises, certain elements may not be performed because adequate past performance leads to confidence that personnel and procedures are adequate.10 This standard practice -- very complete initial exercises '

) and more selective subsequent exercises -- finds support in the regulations. Thus, Appendix E specifies that for the initial exercise before exceeding 5 percent power, the testing must be 3 ____________________ .

9 (Petrone) An initial full participation exercise also provides a basis for plan revision and perhaps plan modification.

Thus, full participation of components is essential if for no other reason but to extend the planning process and minimize 3 decision-making problems during an actual response.

10 (Baranski, Czech, Papile) For example, the number of observed taffic control points in latter exercises has been reduced due to satisfactory performance in previous exercises.

Similarly, emergency worker personnel monitoring centers at some

) sites were not required to be demonstrated by FEMA since performance at the earlier exercises was evaluated as satisfactory.

3 .- . - . _

O most complete (the exercise must test as much of the plans "as is reasonably achievable without manda' tory public participation";

ND .

the exercise must also include each state and local government in the plume EPZ and each state in the ingestion EPZ).

O In the case of Shoreham, the February 13 Exercise was the initial offsite exercise and thus it should have been as complete

.O an exercise as possible. This also was the first exercise to our knowledge of a utility-sponsored offsite emergency plan, conducted in the absence of participation by State and local governments. Thus, whereas for initial offsite exercises at

)

other nuclear power plants FEMA has had available the knowledge of how first time exercises have been performed with State and y) local emergency plans, at the Shoreham Exercise there was no such track record. For this additional reason, it was essential that the Shorenam Exercise be as complete as possible.ll

O O - - - - - - - - - ' - - - - - - - - - - -

11 (Baranski, Colwell, Cze:h, Papile, PetroLe, Zook) The need for the Shoreham Exercise to have been highly complete is important for an additional reason. At other initial offsite exercises, a large portion of the offsite response personnel are persons who, to one degree or another, have regular jobs which

() require responding to emergency situations. Police officials in particular fall into'this category. There is a recognition that such responders possess basic knowledge of emergency response j that other persons (such as many LERO personnel) could not be I

expected to have. Since the LERO personnel do r.ot have actual emergency response experience, the need "to verify the capability i(3 l to respond to the accident scenario" compels that the i mobilization and evaluation of LERO personnel must be very l complete.

l 0 i . . . - . . . _ - . . _

J Q. Despite the fact that certain portions of LILCO's Plan were not exercised or only were exercised to a limited degree, o

isn't it true that LILCO mobilized a large number of its personnel and why doesn't that compensate, at least to some degree, for the failure to test other parts of the Plan?

D A. (All) It apparently is true that LILCO mobilized a lot of people. For instance, we understand that essentially all i field workers (such as traffic guides and bus drivers) were mobilized and dispatched during the Exercise (although most bus drivers drove routes in cars, rather than in buses). Deposition of John A. Weismantle (January 9, 1987) at 54-55. That does not compensate, however, for two reasons. First, the regulations O

require that'all major portions of the Plan be tested. Thus, a bigger than usual test of some Plan elements cannot compensate for failure to test other elements. Furthermore, although LERO O m bilized a large percentage of its workers, FEMA only observed and eva..aated a limited number of those persons mobilized.

Second, the key omissions, in our epinion, came in the areas of O the Plan where some of the greatest diftsculties in responses might be expected: in communicating and relating with other personnel (such as WALK Radio, schools, etc.). It is critical

'O that such interrelationships be tested, particularly since LERO has no real lif. experience in which to develop working relation-ships with such other entities.12 0 --------------------

12 (Petrone) Also there is usually interaction with such (fcotnote continued)

O _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . -

O Q.

'Are you familiar with FEMA's standard exercise objec-

~ tives?

O A. (Baranski, Caech, Minor, Papile, Petroae) Yes.

Q. Assuming that most of those standard objectives are included in an exercise, does that ensure that the exercise constitutes a full participation exercise?

O A. (Baranski, Czech, Minor, Papile, Petrone) No. We do O not agree with the apparent assumption

• hat most standard objectives were included in the Shoreham Exercise, since even FEMA agrees that 9 of the 35 or 36 standard objectives were not included in the Exercise. Deposition of Roger B. Kowieski, et al. (January 29, 1987) at 223-24. Two additional standard i

Region II objectives pertaining to public education were also omitted from the Exercise, as discussed in Section II.B below.13

'O (footnote continued from previous page)

{ entities during varied stages of planning prior to an exercise.

This was not the case to any large degree at Shoreham where such O ther entities played no large role in the Exercise.

13 (Petrone) The failure to include many objectives was not consistent conduct thewith what FEMA had told the NRC when it decided to Exercise. On October 29, 1986, Mr. Speck, FEMA's Associate Director for State and Local Programs and Support, told

0 the NRC that an "Option 2" exercise (which the NRC later chose) i "would include all functions and normal exercise objectives." As described later in this testimony, FEMA's evaluation omitted many functions and "normal" exercise objectives, including participation by the EBS radio station, sounding sirens, broadcast of a test EBS message, and testing of the public o information program. These matters largely were included in the exercise objectives which were originally proposed by FEMA in (footnote continued)

'O-1 Even if we agreed with the assumption, however, our answer still would be no, for at least two reasons.

)

First, the FEMA standard objectives were not derived to our knowledge with the purpose of ensuring that the "full participa-tion" requirement of Appendix E is satisfied. Indead, FEMA Guidance Memorandum GM-17, which discusses FEMA's standard exer-cise objectives, makes no reference to the Appendix E full participation requirement. Similarly, FEMA's "Modular Format for Uniformity of Radiological Emergency Preparedness Exercise Observations and Evaluations" (June 1983) makes no reference to the full participation requirement.

) (Baranski, Czech, Papile) We have dealt with FEMA Region II over the last six years in considering whether particular exer-cise objectives would be included in a particular exercise. In 3 our experience, FEMA has never in our presence or otherwise to our knowledge attempted to link its objectives or some portion of them to the determination whether there has been a full partici-e pation exercise. Thus, to our knowledge, the fact that FEMA may have included many standard objectives in a particular exercise has never been linked to any consideration regarding whether the 9 Appendix E definition of a full participation exercise has been  :

met.

(footnote continued from previous page)

1. November / December 1985 but later were deleted at LILCO's request prior to the Exercise. FEMA then proceeded with the Exercise, which was necessarily limited by the deletions.

O ._ .

)

1 (Petrone) In my experience as FEMA's Region II Director, I l can recall no instance where the number of objectives proposed D

for an exercise was discussed by FEMA personnel in the context of whether the exercise would satisfy full participation require-ments.14 And further, for Shoreham, the final decision whether to test or not test certain Plan components was LILcO's.

(All) Second, even assuming that all or most of the 3

standard objectives were included in an exercise, that would not necessarily mean that an exercise was a full participation exer-cise. The objectives merely are broad generalizations. The

.)

relevant inquiry from the full participation exercise requirement perspective is whether the demonstration required to satisfy the exercise objectives was sufficient to demonstrate "integrated capability to adequately access and respond to an accident" and to "test () the major' observable portions of the . . . plans and mobilization of . . . personnel and other resources in sufficient 3

numbers to verify the capacity to respond . . . . 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, 5 IV.F., n.4. If there is little or no demon-3 stration to document the fulfillment of these regulatory require-ments, then there can be no full participation exercise, O ____________________

14 For the Shoreham Exercise, there was no collective FAC decision that the Exercise would be a full participation event.

Kowieski 1/29/87 Dep, at 14-15. Furthermore, Mr. Daverio of LILCO, who interfaced closely with FEMA in the months before the D Exercise, did not have any discussions with FEMA personnel regarding whether the Exercise would be a full participation event. Deposition of Charles A. Daverio (January 5, 1987) at 77.

O D

l regardless of the existence of most or all of the GM-17 objec-tives and regardless whether FEMA believes that a particular D

objective was satisfied during the exercise.

Q. Please provide an example from the Shoreham Exercise of O

the points you have just made.

A. (Colwell, Minor, Petrone, Zook) We will be brief to avoid extensive repetition of some of the matters dealt with under particular Contentions Ex 15/16 subparts. Our example g concerns the EBS radio station. There are three basic "demonstrations" involved concerning such a stations the commun-ication by LERO of an EBS message to the station; the station's O ability to receive and process the message and get it ready for broadcast; and the actual broadcast of a sample message.

l O During the Shoreham Exercise, there was an objective on this l

i matter. It was objective EOC 15, which stated:

i

{ Demonstrate the capability for providing both lO an alert signal and an informational or l instructional message to the populatien on an area-wide basis throughout the 10-mile EPZ, within 15 minutes (to be simulated).

O As described in more detail in Section II.A below, LILCO appears to have formulated an EBS message to be sent to the EBS station and pretended to make a telephone call to that station (WALK O

O _

31 w - -

h) .

Radio). But WALK did not actually participate in the Exercise L and thus none of the three demonstrations described above o

actually took place.

l l We understand that FEMA found objective EOC 15 was O

satisfied. FEMA Report at 34. We disagree. In our opinion, the -

s objective could not be satisfied when the radio station did not so much as receive a telephone. call. But even if one were to O

assume for the sake of argument that the objective, as construed by FEMA, was satisfied, that does not mean that the full partici-pation exercise criteria were satisfied. A major observable z) portion of LILCO's Plan was not tested (ists, the EBS. system), no l EBS station resources were mobilized, and indeed, the EBS station O.

was n t even telephoned during'the Exercise. Since the EBS station's active and efficient participation in an actual emergency is a key to meeting regulatory requirements regarding o prompt notification in light of the provisions of LILCO's Plan, its failure to participate made it impossible "to verify the capability to respond to the accident scenario" insofar as the O ability to provide mescages to the public was concerned.

Accordingly, the above example demonstrates quite clearly O that the mere fact that FEMA includes an exercise objective does not mean that the full participation exercise criteria are satisfied. We discuss many other examples in Section II below.15 O --------------------

15 (Colwell, Minor, Petrone, Zook) One other example bears (footnote continued) 0

)

Q. In the example you just used, FEMA stated that the demonstration regarding objective EOC 15 would be simulated. Are you saying that the full participation exercise definition precludes the use of simulation?

O A. (All) No. Simulation in exercises is useful and necessary in order to avoid disruption of the public during an exercise. For instance, a standard objective in many exercises

! is demonstration of the capability of dealing with impediments to i

i evacuation. In our experience, actual roadway impediments are i

g not used, because of the potential disruption to the public.16 i (footnote continued from previous page)

O menti n at the outset. A number of FEMA objectives for the Shoteham Exercise called for demonstration of "a sample of resources necessary to effect" some particular response function, j such as early dismissal of schools. Egg FEMA Report at 14. As discussed in testimony being submitted on Contention Ex 21, care must be taken in relying on samples in order to decide whether o the population (public schools, for example) can take a particular action. However, consistent with the matters addressad in the context of Contention Ex 21, we have a concern with an objective calling for a demonstration of a "sample" of resources being used to fulfill an Appendix E requirement. We have no problem with looking only at a sample -- and even a very O small sample -- if there is a reason for that. We do have a problem, however, if a very small sample is looked at and, on the basis of that small sample, broad conclusions explicitly or implicitly are drawn without statistical basis.

16 (Baranski, Czech, Papile) If the exercise road impediment O requires use of heavy equipment, g g , bulldozers, cranes, etc.,

the need is identified, local agencies determine the source of the needed resource, determine availability and time of arrival at the scene, but the actual deployment of this heavy equipment is simulated. Similarly, the actual removal of school children from a classroom, and loading and transport by a bus to a school O reception center is normally simulated to minimize impact on normal school operations. Another simulated activity is the removal of mobility impaired persons from their residences.

O _ 33 _

O However, simulation cannot be used to avoid testing major portions of plans or the capability to respond. With regard to

'the notification example discussed above, the use of simulation permitted a key element of emergency response -- the EBS station

-- to be omitted entirely from the Exercise. We have no basic O

problem with doing that if the exercise purpose is limited; but it is not acceptable when a full participation exercise is purportedly being conducted.

O Q. Are you familar with FEMA Guidance Memorandum PR-1, concerning, among other things, periodic exercise activities?

A. Yes.

O Q. Does GM-PR-1 stats, in part:

Scenarios for oeriedle exercises should be sufficiently varied so that all of the major O elements of the planc and preparedness of offsite organizations are tested within a six year period.

A. Yes.

O Q.. Doesn't this Guidance Memorandum then contradict your

.O testimony that the initial offsite exercise must cover all major observable elements of'the offsite emergency plan?

'O I

O I l __ _ _. _ _ _ __

O A. There does appear to be a contradiction. We both agree and disagree with the Guidance Memorandum.

'O Q. Please explain.

O-A. (Baranski, Czech, Minor, Papile, Petrone) We agree to this extent. After the first exercise at a nuclear plant site, we think it is appropriate to vary the scenarios so that all

.O major elements of the plans are tested over a period of approxi-mately six years. Given the "track record" referred to earlier which can be expected to be developed, such periodic testing over six years is acceptable after the initial exercise has been conducted.

O We disagree, however, if FEMA is suggesting that the initial l

offsite exercise required by Part 50, Appendix E, S IV.F.1 (and

.g footnote 4) can include less than all the major observable elements of an offsite emergency plan. Our reading of Appendix E is that it clearly is mandatory that the initial exercise upon O which licensing above 5 percent power is based must include all major observable elements of the plan which are reasonably achievable without mandatory public participation.

O Q. At the time of the Exercise, did FEMA Region II I

personnel believe that the Exercise was a full participation

() exercise as required by Appendix E?

i O l

3 A. There does appear to be a contradiction. We both agree and disagree with the Guidance Memorandum.

J Q. Please explain.

'D A. (Baranski, Czech, Minor, Papile, Petrone) We agree to this extent. After the first exercise at a nuclear plant site, we think it is appropriate to vary the scenarios so that all 3

major elements of the plans are tested over a period of approxi-mately six years. Given the "track record" referred to earlier

, which can be expected to be developed, such periodic testing over a

six years is acceptable after the initial exercise has been conducted.

O We disagree, however, if FEMA is suggesting that the initial offsite exercise required by Part 50, Appendix E, S IV.F.1 (and fe tnote 4) can include less than all the major observable O

elements of an offsite emergency plan. Our reading of Appendix E is that it clearly is mandatory that the 4.nitial exercise upon O which licensing abova 5 percent power is based must include all major observable elements of the plan which are reasonably achievable without mandatory public participation.

O Q. At the time of the Exercise, did FEMA Region II personnel believe that the Exercise was a full participation O exercise as requ!. red by Appendix E?

O

. _ _ _ ._. _ - =_ -. _ . _ _ _ . . -__- _. - - - - . _ ,

1 l

LO A. (Petrone) I was the Region II Director at the time of the Exercise. I recall no discussions regarding whether the ,

13 I Shoreham Exercise would satisfy Appendix E requirements. In this ,

. I regard, I note that Mr. Kowieski has indicated that the Region II l RAC made no collective. assessment prior to the Exercise whether the Exercise would meet Appendix E requirements.

Kowieski, 1/29/87 Dep. at 14-15.

O Based upon my personal knowledge of the events prior to February 13, 1986, it is fair to say that if a collective i decision had been made at or about the time of the Exercise, we

O would have had to have concluded that the Exercise was not a full participation event. There were too many departures from Region j) II standard practice -- no EBS station, no EBS message, no 4

sirens, no public information, virtually no schools. It was my I intention to address these omissions in my cover letter to FEMA

O headquarters c nveying the FEMA Report. The Report noted that

, the "exercise was limited without State and local government participation." FEMA Report at ix, 3. I would have expanded upon these limitations in my cover letter and noted the other

.o l

limited aspects of the Exercise, including those noted above, had I not been forced to resign beforehand.

lO O

1 (O  !

D II. DISCUSSION OF CONTENTIONS EX 15/16 SUBPARTS g A. Notification Suboarts Q. Which contentions deal with notification and EBS messages (excluding for now the water portion of the EPZ)?

O l A. Subparts 15.A, 16.C, 16.D, and Contention Ex 24 all relate to those matters.

D Q. Please state those contentions and contention subparts.

J A: Subpart A of Contention Ex 15 states:

Procedures for actual notification of the public and actual issuance of emergency infor-3 mation and protective action recommendations to the public, as set forth in OPIPs 3.3.4, 3.8.1 and 3.8.2, and at pages 2.2-2 thru 2.2-2a, 3.3-4 thru 3.3-6, 3.4-6, 3.8-4, 3.8-6 and Appendix A, pages IV-2 and IV-3 of the LILCO Plan, were excluded from the exercise, in that 8 sirens, the LILCO EBS system, and WALK Radio were not tested, used, demonstrated, or involved in the exercise. Thus, neither the notification capabilities of LILCO or WALK Radio personnel, nor the nocification capa-g, bilities of LILCO's ESS system, were evaluated during the exercise. Such capabilities are required by 10 CFR S 50.47(b)(5), 10 CFR Part 50, App. E S IV.P; NUREG 0654 SS II.E and F, and Appendix 3, and were required to be demon-strated in the exercise. Objectives EOC 14 gp and 15. Their exclusion from the exercise precludes a finding of reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a Shoreham emergency, as required by 10 CFR S 50.47(a)(1).

Accordingly, the LILCO Plan is fundamentally e flawed.

G D

I

! LILCO's suggestion that the conduct of a l "prompt notification test" would correct this '

l deficiency (111 letter dated June 20, 1986,

[) from John Leonard to Harold Denton (SNRC-( 1269), Enclosure 1 at 4) is incorrect. Such a ,

test, assuming one were conducted in the future, would deal with siren operability; it would not test or demonstrate the ability of i' LILCO's offsite response organization to

)- integrate that single portion of an emergency response with the remaining actions necessary

! in an emergency, nor would it test or demonstrate that the LILCO Plan could be i implemented.  !

'O i Subparts C and D of Contention Ex 16 state: l C. WALK Radio did not participate in the exercise. It is relied upon for initial  !

O notification of the public of an emergency as well as for issuance to the public of protec- '

tive action recommendations and other emer-

! gency information. Egg LILCO Plan at 2.2-2 ,

l thru 2.2-2a, 3.3-4 thru 3.3-6, 3.4-6, and

• g 3.8-6; OPIP 3.3.4; OPIP 3.8.1; OPIP 3.8.2.

l D. No other radio stations participated in .

the exercise. Under the LILCO Plan, stations

! WBLI, WCTO, WGLI, WGSM, WLIM, WLIX, WLNG, i

! WRCN, NkHD, and WRIV are relied upon to con- '

O stitute LILCO's EBS system; therefore they are i relied upon for initial notification of, and l communication of protective action recommenda- (

L tions and other emergency information to, the r public. Egg LILCO Plan at 2.2-2 thru 2.2-2a; App. B.

O Finally, Contention Ex 24 states:

EOC ARCA 7 refers to the fact that there was [

,0 no activation of the siren system during the  !

, exercise. FEMA Report at 41. The siren 7 system is the central feature of the prompt  :

notification system in the LILCO Plan. Egg j 4 Plan at 3.3-4 thru 3.3-6 and 3.4-6; OPIP 3.3.4. Its exclusion from the exercise pre-  !

,(7 cludes a finding that LILCO can and will pro- t i vide early notification of an emergency to the  ;

j public as required by 10 CFR S 50.47(b)(5), l 1

i jO  !

1

. - - - - - . _ . - - _ _ . _ _ . . - _ _ _ _ _ _ _.. .. _- - _ _ . - - - -i

O and 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E S D.3, and thus precludes a finding of reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will O

be taken in the event of a Shoreham accident.

Q. What is your understanding about what happened during the Exercise insofar as the foregoing subparts and contentions C) are concerned?

A. (Colwell, Minor, Petrone, Zook) It is our under-() standing that, leaving aside the second paragraph of subpart A of Contention Ex 15 (the paragraph dealing with LILCO's prompt notification test which we understand has not occurred), most of the factual allegations set forth in subparts 15.A, 16.C, 16.D, and Contention Ex 24 are essentially correct. Thus, it is our understanding that:

O

1. LILCO's sirens were not activated during the Exercise; O

2. WALK Radio and the other radio stations identified in ,

the LILCO Plan as part of the LILCO EBS did not participate in the Exercise by performing or demonstrating (even on a simulated basis) the functions or roles assigned to them in the LILCO Plan;17 l

17 (Colwell, Minor, Petrone, Zook) LILCO, in response to lO Suffolk County's Admission Requests, asserted that WALK Radio and some of the other backup EBS stations "participated" in the

! Exercise by sending representatives to attend the LILCO press briefings held during the Exercise. Egg LILCO's Response to O

Suffolk County, State of New York and the Town of Southampton's First Request for Admissions, rovember 17, 1986, No. 10 (footnote continued)

O . _ .

O

3. Not only did WALK Radio and other EBS stations not participate in the Exercise in terms of broadcasting any sample i O or test EBS messages, but WALK Radio and the other stations were not even contacted by LILCO during the Exercise and did not even play-act or simulate the receipt, handling, or broadcast of any O

EBS messages or the performance of any of the other functions they might be called upon to perform under LILCO's Plan;

4. FEMA did not review or evaluate the operability of sirens or the ability of WALK Radio's personnel or WALK Radio's equipment to carry out any of their assignments under the LILCO O

Plan;

5. FEMA did not review or evaluate the existence, opera-bility, or adequacy of tone alert radios which, according to the LILCO Plan, are relied upon for notification of officials from schools, hospitals, nursing / adult homes and handicap facilities.

LILCO Admission No. 54.

,0 l (footnote continued from previous page)

(hereafter referred to as "LILCO Admission No. "). That d as n t c natitute the kind of participation required or

O expected of these entities under the LILCO Plan. Further, we understand that subsequent to the Exercise, WALK Radio has I

withdrawn as LILCO's EBS station and, accordingly, that there is a void in the LILCO Plan in this respect. Given the fact that a i Motion to Reopen the Record concerning the lack of an EBS station lo is now pending before the Commission, we do not address any further in this testimony the significance of the fact that LILCO no longer has an EBS station, o

O l

6. During the Exercise, LERO formulated EBS messages and performed other functions which would be required in sounding the L O

sirens, up to the point of contacting and interacting with WALK Radio. Egg Daverio Dep. at 220. Again, however, the sirens were r

not actually sounded and WALK Radio was never actually contacted, 50 much less requested to accept transmission of an EBS message, or to broadcast such a message over its radio network. l

o Q. In deciding whether the Exercise constituted a "full ,

participation" exercise, is it significant that LILCO failed to activate the sirens, failed to utilize tone alert radios, failed O

to involve WALK Radio and other EBS stations during the Exercise, and failed to have a. test EBS message broadcast?

10 l A. (Baranski, Czech, Papile, Petrone) Yes, we consider j this significant. It is possible that in some early New York State exercises, sirens were not sounded. However, in our O

experience with all recent exercises involving New York State r

nuclear plants, we can recall no other instances of an allegedly l g "full participation" exercise wherein the EBS station was not '

actively involved in the exercise, the EBS station did not broad- i l cast at least one test EBS message, and the sirens were not t

O activated. Aga Kowieski 1/28/s7 Dep at 63, 104-06, 206 (normal process in Region II is to sound sirens and air at least one test j EBS message); Daverio Dep. at 29, 138, 151-52 (as of November 25, l() 1986, FEMA expected sirens, tone alert radios, and test EBS f 1

1 i

4 O

O messages to be activated during Exercise). 13.1 Ala.Q. D* Position ,

of Sheldon A. Schwartz and Bernard H. Weiss (January 14, 1987) at

!O. .

4 1

46, 47 (every full participation exercise they attended involved  ;

j airing of a test EBS message).  !

i l

O .

A full participation exercise is required to include "testing (of] the major observable portions of the on-site and off-site emergency plans . . . . There can be no question but  !

.O  !

'that the siren system and the relevant radio activation, coordi- ,

nation among relevant entities, and the actual broadcast of test  :

messages by the radio station constitute "major observable O

! portions" of any offsite plan. Therefore, in our opinion the failure to include those elements of the Plan in the Exercise g constitutes a failure of the Exercise to meet the regulatory requirement of 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, Section IV.F.

1 i.

t i

IO (All) But our view that these omissions preclude the Exercise from meeting the regulatory requirement does not rest  ;

)

! solely on a reading of the regulatory language and our experience *

!O at other exercises. The notification of the public or an l l emergency situation via sirens and EBS messages clearly is a  !

1 i

critical function that needs to be performed in response to a j i  !

!O nuclear plant accident. Indeed, this is a function which in a i t i real emergency is a prerequisite to the performance of many other  ;

portions of the proposed emergency response. Thus, it is diffi-jO cult for us to identify any other portion of the Plan that would l 4

i l

1 lO l l 1

I O

i have been more critical to have included in the Exercise. This is the case particularly since it is generally accepted in any O

emergency response, that in order to assure cooperation of the public and minimize confusion, public information must be timely, continuously updated and fully disclose the actual situation as 20 j it exists."

j

~

(Baranski, Czech, Papile) Further, it must be emphasized

O that the exclusion of these items from the Exercise does not relate simply to some highly predictable "hardware" activation matter'which, while not demonstrated, involves no unpredictable lO elements and thus could be easily covered in some later test or

, drill. To be sure, essential hardware was not demonstrated: the y mechanica1 soun m , o, the s u ens .as noe demonstrated, the mechanical communication network between LILCO and WALK Radio was

not demonstrated; and WALK's mechanical ability to broadcast the O messages nee received fr m LILCo was also not demonstrated. we I do not belittle the importance of those mechanical demonstra-tions. In our past experience, there have been a number of

'O failures during exercises relating to just such matters -- such

as failures of sirens to be sounded even after the emergency response organization attempts to sound them. Sag Kowieski O 1/2s/s7 Dep, at 105-06 (describing instance at one exercise where sirans failed to activate).

i l0 l

lO  !

L

e i I

(Baranski, Colwell, Czech, Papile, Perrow, Petrone, Zook) l But more important than the failure to include such mechanical a

demonstrations is the failure of the Exercise to include a demon-stration of the human interaction aspects of these portions of LILCO's Plan. In order to get protective action recommendations a

ento the airways and the public alerted, multiple interactions among individuals are required. Thus, with respect to Shoreham, g the LERO personnel must prepare the messages, must have persons with the capability to sound the sirens and actually have those sirens sounded at the proper instant, must communicate with EBS g station personnel and advise them to be prepared to receive and then transmit the EBS message, and EBS personnel then must demon-strate the capability after receipt of the EBS messages actually O to air them for public listeners.

(Baranski, Czech, Papile, Petrone) Again, in our experience O at New York State exercises, there have been failures involving just these kinds of human elements.18 Thus, it is our view that 18 (Baranski, Czech, Papile) We have had timing problems O between siren activation and EBS test message broadcasts. For example, simultaneous siren sounding and EBS test broadcasts have resulted in confusion by the general public. They heard the siren and tuned to the radio but the EBS message was already completed. This problem could not have been identified through simulation. Another example is personnel who were responsible O for activating the sirens during an exercise but were involved in other activities. This resulted in sirens being sounded after the broadcast of the EBS test message. We do not believe this problem would have been identified through simulation. A third example involves a group of sirens not sounding following a satisfactorily coordinated activation order. Personnel at the U_ local level responsible for activation of that portion of the siren system failed to recognize the need for strict adherence to (footnote continued)

O _ 44 _

O the failure of the Shoreham Exercise to test these major observable elements -- and the related failure of the Exercise to O

test the "integrated capability" of the diverse response elements

-- of LILCO's Plan is significant.

O The Exercise was, at most, a partial demonstration of steps necessary to demonstrate the ability to actually get protective action recommendations broadcast to the public and the sirens sounded. It was a partial demonstration primarily because diffi-cult activities -- meeting the time limit from decision to time of initiation of the broadcast of protective action recommenda-tions, required coordination of siren activation and EBS message airing, and interactions between LERO and the EBS radio station

-- did not take place. The limited demonstration also meant that 0

there was no means to assess LERO's ability to coordinate the various activities with WALLK Radio. Egg Kowieski 1/28/87 Dep.

g at 102-07 (going through process of airing EBS message tests the communications between the decisionmakers and the persons who run the EBS network).

O Q. Is there any other reason that the foregoing omissions preclude the Exercise from satisfying the full participation O regulatory requirements?

C) (footnote continued from previous page) the procedure. It is doubtful whether simulation would have identified this problem.

O . - . . _ - . . - - .

O A. (Baranski, Czech, Papile, Petrone) Yes. As noted earlier, an important element of a full participation exercise is O

FEMA's evaluation of the emergency response capabilities related to major observable portions of offsite emergency plans. Due to omissions in the Shoreham Exercise, FEMA's evaluation never O

addressed the broadcast of sample EBS messages, the activities of WALK Radio, the sounding of the sirens, or the necessary human interactions between*LERO and WALK Radio.

O Q. During a deposition, FEMA consultant Joseph Keller expressed the view that the sounding of sirens and the broadcast of a sample EBS message are not major components of a plan and hence do not need to be part of a full participation exercise.

K wieski 1/28/87 Dep, at 206-07. Do you agree?

O A. (Baranski, Czech, Papile, Petrone) No. For reasons we g already have expressed above, we think these activities are extremely critical elements of a full participation exercise.

Indeed, getting word of an emergency to the public is a critical o step in an effective responses without it, you cannot implement protective action recommendations.19 19 (Baranski, Czech, Papile) We have learned valuable lessons O from these actual demonstrations which we could not have done doing simulations. We would not have had the actual coordination, pushing of buttons, sounding of sirens, and interaction with the public. A review of our post-exercise assessments demonstra tes a marked and continual improvement of the alert and notification system that would not be possible by

() simulation. This is a key link interconnecting the Plan and public response and hence needs to be a part of a full participation exercise.

O 9 i Q. LILCO has suggested that its conduct of a prompt notification test would correct its failure to have sounded the sirens during the Exer'cise. Do you believe that such a test would have the effect of compensating for the lack of a full participation exercise?

O A. (Baranski, Czech, Papile, Petrone) No. First, LILCO still would have failed to have involved the EBS station in any O

way in the Exercise or to have actually sounded a test EBS message. Thus, both the mechanical and human interaction elements resulting from the EBS station's participation would u

have been lost. These omissions, in and of themselves, in our opinion preclude the Exercise from being characterized as a full participation exercise.

Second, the sounding of a siren during a test procedure, n without any of the emotions and pressures of an exercise, would v

not test or demonstrate the ability of LERO to integrate that portion of an emergency response with the remaining actions necessary in an emergency, nor would it test or demonstrate that O

the LILCO Plan could in fact be implemented. The act of sounding the sirens is not merely a mechanical one. We have seen where C) the mechanical act has been inadequately performed by workers who simply have failed to do the right thing, even though in a non-emergency situation they have rehearsed it over and over again.

O Thus, LILco's proposed "fix" would not solve the problem at all.

O Finally, we understand the standard FEMA Region II practice has been to sound sirens and test the EBS n~etwork during an exer-10 cise and, then, also to conduct an alert / notification test to I perform a statistical sampling of the population. Kowieski 1/28/87 Dep. at 104-07.20 Accordingly, LILCO's proposed notifi-

O cation test cannot be considered to be a substitute for the demonstrations routinely conducted at other Region II full participation exercises.

We also stress that since this was the first exercise at the Shoreham site, the first exercise of a utility plan, and the first exercise involving LILCO's LERO organization, it is all the more important that the integrated capability of its notification Processes -- LERO workers, siren system, EBS radio station, and O

actual test message broadcast -- be actually demonstrated.

'O o. LILCO has suggested that its failure to sound its sirens or to air a test message is excused because of hostility to LILCO on Long Island. Do these factors mean that these 0

1 20 (Petrone) This procedure, to the best of my knowledge, was

() instituted to monitor in a more scientific fashion, the public input since time and resources during an exercise might not permit extensive evaluation. This does not preclude public involvement during an exercise. In fact, the public's reaction i gives you a sense of whether they have received and absorbed

! public information material during a time (exercise) when public O knowledge varies from informed to completely uninformed. get further discussion of public information in the next section of r this testimony.

l 0 i 1 _.

O omissions from the Exercise are not material to the question whether the February 13 Exercise was a full participation i O exercise?

A. (Baranski, Czech, Papile, Petrone) An exercise which j

.O does not test major observable portions of an offsite emergency plan -- such as the sirens, the EBS radio station, and test EBS messages -- does not satisfy the regulatory standard. Moreover, even if one were to assume arouendo that LILCO could not feasibly  ;

sound the sirens or air a test EBS message on February 13, 1986, it still omitted any contact with WALK Radio or a walk-through of the essential human interactions that are necessary between LERO and WALK Radio in order to get EBS messages on the air in a i timely manner. LILCO wrote the Exercise scenario which left WALK Radio out of any actions during the Exercise. In our opinion, such a crucial omission by LILCO of a key player in the O protection of the public constitutes a completely unexcused failure to include a major observable portion of LILCO's Plan in t the Exercise.

'O (Petrone) The decision not to include siren sounding and l test EBS message sounding in the Exercise was a decision that i O LILCo made. When the Exercise was first proposed in late 1985, FEMA expected that LILCO would include active participation by t

O ,

e 0 -

O'  ;

the EBS station and also the sounding of sirens and the broadcast of test messages. It was LILCO which later decided not to L

O

~

include that in the Exercise.

Q. Please summarize your conclusions regarding subparts l

15.A, 16.C, 16.D, and Contention Ex 24.

e A. (All) The omission of the many elements from the

O '

Shoreham Exercise which have been discussed above, and FEMA's inability to evaluate important and observable portions of LILCO's Plan, we conclude that the Shoreham Exercise did not

.g satisfy the requirements for a full participation exercise.  !

I, j) 8. Public Education Q. Please state subpart C of Contention Ex 15.

i

!O i A. Subpart C states (

j Procedures for public education and the disse- i l() mination of information to the public on a periodic basis, as set forth in OPIP 3.8.1,  ;

and at pages 3.8.-1 thru 3.8-4 and Appendix A ,

at IV-3 thru -4, IV-70 of the LILCO Plan, and a demonstration of the adequacy of public  :'

! education materials, were excluded from the l() exercise. Such programs and materials are i required by 10 CFR $ 50.47(b)(7), 10 CTR Part J

50, Appendix E, 5 IV.D, and NUREG 0654 5 II.G.

i Their exclusion from the exercise precludes a finding of reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in r k3 the event of a Shoreham accident, as required  !

by 10 CFR $ 50.47(a)(1). Accordingly, the l LILCO Plan is fundamentally flawed. j l [

O l l

. _ ~ _ - , - , . - _ , . , , - _ _ . - . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ . _ _ _ . _ _ _ _ _ , ~ . . , . _ _ - . . _ . . . . _ _ . , . . . , - . - _ . -- --,,c . --- -

3.

Q. Do you agree with the allegations in subpart 15.C7 Q A. (All) Yes, we do. We understand that TEMA has admitted that, during the Exercise, it did not evaluate or review the adequacy of materials proposed by LILCO for use in educating O

the public. nor did FEMA evaluate or review the adequacy of LILCO's procedures for the dissemination of information concerning Shoreham to th's public on a periodic basis. FEMA's Response to Suffolk County, State of New York, and Town of Southampton's First Request for Admissions and Second Set of Interrogatories Directed to FEMA, Admission Nos. 17, 18 l (hereafter referred to as "FEMA Admission No. "); Kowieski 1/28/87 Dep. at 64.21 O

Q. Does LILCO's Plan recognise that public education censtitutes an important part of LILCO's emergency response?

O A. (Colwell, Minor, Petrone, Zook) Yes. For example, Appendix A to the Plan states:

O Regardless of the detail that is incor-porated into the development of an evacuation plan or the engineering excellence that goes 21 (Colwell, Minor, Petrone, Iook) We also understand that O even if FEMA had wanted to review LERO public information brochures and materials (as it customarily does in Region II exercises, such as by conducting spot-check interviews with members of the public), it could not have done so. This is because !n November 1985, LILCO decided not to issue an informational brochure to the public, nor to carry out the other O public information activities required by 10 CFR $ 50.47(b)(7),

10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, 5 IV.D.(2), and NUREG 0654, 5 II.G.

13.g Memorandum from J. Weismantle, dated November 19, 1985.

O D

into a notification system for alerting the public, neither of these provisions can be considered complete or sufficient unless the public is knowledgeable and supportive of O them.

Each individual residence, work site, school, and institution must be made aware of the meaning of the sirens / tone alerts and g where to tune in to get additional informa-tion. They must be aware of the zone they are within, its alphabetical designation, and it physical boundaries. They must know the recommended route of egress from the zone to the Reception Center as required. They must 9 also be aware of the location and means of alternate transportation out of the zone if personal transportation is unavailable.

Most important, it is imperative that the public be made aware of the overall plan O concept and be convinced that, with their cooperation, the plan will work. This can only be accomplished through a massive continuing public education and awareness program throughout the design life of the plant. Appendix A at IV-3 thru IV-4.

O LILCO also has implementing procedures designed to ensure that the important function of educating the public is carried O out. Egg OPIP 3.8.1. Indeed, during the Exercise, LILCO seemed to recognize that public education was important. During one of the press conferences at the ENC, the LILCO spokesperson told

'O people to lo)k in their phone books to find out what they should do in response to the emergency.22 But, of course, at this time 0

22 The EBS messages simulated during the Exercise instructed people to refer to their Shoreham Public Emergency Procedures Brochure or to special inserts in their telephone books. The O messages also stated that posters with emergency information had been posted throughout the area.

O . _ - - _ _ _ . __ -

Q:

there aren't any instructions in the phone book.23 0- Q. Have the NRC.and FEMA recognized public education to be important?

O A. (All) Yes. The regulations, 10 CFR s 50.47(b)(7) and 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix E IV D.2, and NUREG 0654, S II.G, specif-ically require that an emergency plan contain provisions for the O~

yearly dissemination of basic emergency planning information to the public in the plume exposure pathway EPZ.24

,0 l Q. During exercises with which you are familiar, has FEMA i

normally included at an excrcise objective and as part of tha demonstration that must be carried out an evaluation of the O

public's awareness of the public education program?

l i

23 The LERO EBS messages and LILCO's theory of communication of emergency information to the public are based on people using

O

~

their brochures during the emergency. That is, the EBS messages do not identify various important information such as specific reception centers or the identification of which areas are in particular EPZ zones, but rather direct the public to refer to their brochures for such specific information.

!O 24 (Minor) LILCO's public information program was reviewed from a planning perspective in earlier phases of this proceeding.

! FEMA then reviewed Revision 3 of the LILCO Plan. No FEMA review I

of public information matters was included in FEMA's reviews of Revisions 4-8 of the Plan. Kowieski 1/28/87 Dep. at 66-67. The April 1985 Partial Initial Decision required changes which were iO to be checked by the NRC Staff. 21 NRC at 769-70. To our knowledge, this has not been done.

jO 1

L

O A. (Baranski, Czech, Papile, Petrone) Yes. In our experience, a regular part of any exercise in FEMA Region II O which is considered to be a "full participation exercise" is 1

FEMA's evaluation of the public's awareness of the public infor- l mation program. Indeed, the original FEMA objectives for

)

O Shoreham included such demonstrations.25 Ordinarily, FEMA l

performs a spot check of hotels, motels, transient areas,  !

shopping centers, and other locations and interviews at random O

various persons to find out whether they know where or how to gain information from phone books, etc., concerning the licensee's public information program.26 In addition, FEMA is O ____________________

25 (Baranski, Czech, Papile, Petrone) It has been standard FEMA Region II practice to include two public information objectives in exercises, These are:

O --

Demonstrate that the permanent population has received information on how they will be notified and what their actions should be in the event of a radiological emergency and that this information is updated on an annual basis.

Demonstrate that information on emergency actions has O been provided to transient populations.

Kowieski 1/28/87 Dep. at 64, 68 and Ex. 7, page 4. These objectives were not included as objectives in the Shoreham Exercise, although they were included in the initial draft objectives FEMA prepared for Shoreham. Id. at 64. 111 ale 2 O Daverio Dep. at 29 (as of November 25, 1986, FEMA expected that the public education brochure would be part of the Exercise).

Mr. Keller recalled that at a Nine-Mile Point exercise in 1981, public information was not reviewed but that it then had subsequently been done at all other Region II exercises, Kowieski 1/28/87 Dep. at 121-23.

g 26 LILCO witness Weismantle wrote as follows prior to the Txercise.

Usually the brochures are mailed a couple of weeks prior to the graded exercise. At the g same time the utility usually undertakes a (footnote continued) g ,

. - -- ,,A

l 1

5 ,

'Y provided confirmation of distribution of public information docu-l l

ments and inserts. l 3

Q. Do you believe that it is important for the public I education program to be demonstrated in order for an exercise to O constitute a full participation event?

A. (Baranski, Colwell, Czech, Papile, Petrone, Zook) Yes.

O There are several reasons why this is important. First, the public education progran is, again, one of the "major observable portions" of an emargency plan. Thus, purely on the basis of the definition in Part 50, Appendix E, it would appear necessary to include that program as part of a full participation exercise. ,

O Second, during an exercise, there necessarily is a limita-tion on how much actual performance or testing of performance can actually take place. For instance, it is not feasible to have O

actual impediments to evacuation on major roadways during an exercise. However, with respect to the public education program, there is an ability during an exercise actually spot-check the (footnote continued from previous page) media campaign to inform the public about the upcoming exercise. This maximizes the probability of getting high marks on the v random interviews of the public that FEMA conducts on the day of the graded exercise.

These interviews focus on public awareness, general unoerstanding of the local emergency plan and knowledge of the appropriate response to hearing the sirens.

)

Daveric Dep., Ex. 10, page 1.

O

O adequacy of the program. For example, by speaking with hotel and motel operators, persons at parks and recreation areas, and O persons within the EPZ, FEMA can obtain data regarding whether people would know what to do in an actual emergency. Would they know, for example, from telephone book inserts, etc., that the O sounding of the sirens indicates a need for them to turn on their radios to the EBS station? This has been the process followed at exercises at other nuclear plants in New York State. The fact O

that a test of the licensee's public education program at Shoreham was not included on February 13, 1986, constitutes evidence that the Exercise at Shoreham did not satisfy the

.O criteria for a full participation exercise.

(Petrone) Third, the public education program and the O

public response is part of the basis for an effective response.

A plan could be exceptional, have full government and private participation, but if the public is not aware and educated, the initial implementation of any plan may be doomed and chaos may I

prevail.

.O There is a further reason why it is important to include in a full participation exercise the actual testing of the public i

education program. Such an exercise provides a training oppor-O tunity not only for the exercise players, but also for the public. Thus, the hearing of sirens during the exercise is one O of the public's few opportunities outside of an actual emergency O l L-..

D to react to those sirens. The proper reaction to the sirens, assuming proper public education, is to tune in to the EBS

1. station and, if at home, to review the brochure. If not at home, information for transients should be reviewed.

O In the case of Shoreham, the need for public education to be part of the Exercise was even more important than at other plants. People are not accustomed to following directions from LERO. _Therefore, they must be educated (if one assumes that is possible given the public's view of L7LCO) about the purposes and function of LERO. You cannot safely assume that people will 3

absorb information. It is important to check on whether they have read and understood the information. FEMA does this at other Region II exercises; it was important that this be dine at O

the Shoreham Exercise as well. In this regard, the mere distri-bution of written materials just prior to a plant going on-line is not sufficient. Education-by-distribution probably is not a very good way to teach people how to act in an emergency in the best of circumstances. However, if the distribution of written material is the only way that this ccn be taught, there should at least be a means of getting an idea as to how effective such a process is or should be.

O In sum, therefore, one of the few opportunities to test the actual performance of a portion of LILCO's Plan was the testing f the public education program. However, despite having had O

O

O objectives-on this matter _ initially, such objectives were deleted from the Exercise by LILCO and there was no demonstration of that

O. portion of LILCO's Plan during the Exercise. Since it is a major observable portion of the Plan, it should have been included in the Exercise. Since it was not, this is an additional reason why

() the Exercise did not satisfy the Part 50, Appendix E criteria.

Q. FEMA personnel during discovery suggested that since M3 - Shoreham was not operating at the time of the Exercise, it was noc necessary to include public education activities as part of the Exercise. Egg Kowieski 1/28/87 Dep. at 64-65, 112. Do you

O agree?

A. (Baranski, Czech, Papile, Petrone) If the Exercise is

~O supposed to have been a full participation exercise, then we disagree. The public information portions of LILCO's Plan clearly constitute important/ major portions of the Plan. Under 40 the Appendix E definition, therefore, it is mandatory that those portions of the Plan be tested. Further, for reasons already discussed, we believe that the public information aspects of the

O Plan are one of the few areas where public reaction, etc., can be assessed and thus should be included in any full participation exercise.

.O l

'O

()

L - _ -.. . . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

e l l

Furth m, a publ.ic education program needs to be tested for j effectiveness. Under the scheme used at Shoreham -- do not D distribute brochures, etc., until just before operation above S percent powe -- the plant would be allowed to operate despite i

the fact that this important asp?:t of the plan has never been O tested. That is not procer. The public education program needs j to be implemented before the first full participation exercise, since if the brochures were not distributed, a qualitative evalu-ation of the program's effectiveness would not be accomplished as i

is done for other full participation exercises in New York State.

(Petrone) It is my belief that public information and education -- even in its most initial stages -- is essential to l be demonstrated in a full participation exerxise prior to O

licensing of a plant. Furthermore, FEMA knows and has taken seriously this aspect of emergency response in other exercises.

For example, extensive FEMA staff and contract resources have O

been dedicated to studying and determining the average reading ability of the public and encouraging the development of brochures that could be better understood. FEMA has gone to the extent of recommending that material be in other than the English language for certain segments of a community. FEMA has always considered public education and information to be at the fore-front of emergency planning. In fact, with FEMA's encouragement and support, New York State established a task force to study and O

O

)

improve the public information and education around Indian Point.

Shoreham to date has no public education or information program.

) FEMA cannot and'should not condone this.

t C. Schools

)

Q. Was there an adequate demonstration during the Exercise of preparedness to attend to the needs of school children during a Shoreham emergency?

A. (All) No. The demonstration during the Exercise of what would be done to' protect the health and safety of school children was extremely limited in scope. In addition, FEMA's evaluation of this aspect of the Exercise also seems to have 3

departed significantly from the kind of evaluation / verification activities carried out at other exercises. -

O Q. Please generally explain your concerns.

A. (All) There are more than 45 schools in the Shoreham 3

10-mile EPZ, comprised of 11 public school districts and 15 private schools. In the event of a real Shcreham emergency, there are four potential actions that could be taken: keep schools closed (assuming the accident occurred during non-school hours); early dismissal; sheltering; and evacuation. The

, successful completion of any of these actions would require ,

a 9

(0 extensive communications between LERO and school officials.

Plan, Appendix A at II-19, 20. For all but' keeping schools 3 closed, success also would require extraordinary actions by 1 school officials in order to protect children.

3 The Shoreham Exercise was set up in a way to minimize school preparedness actions. Thus, the scenario was such that the primary action could be school closing. To the extent that any O

otner school actions were "demonstrated," the test was so limited as to be virtually meaningless:

3 --

LILCO communicated with precisely one school district

-- the Shoreham-Wading River Central School District

("SWRCSD");

O l

There was only one attempted early dismissal

! demonstration, again involving only the SWRCSD; 4

0 There was only one attempted school evacuation demonstration, and that involved no school officials at O

all; 4

O There was no assessment of officials' knowledge how to accomplish sheltering; and t

O

.O ,

0 ,

l FEMA's "evaluation" of school preparedness consisted of talking with only two school officials, both again of the SWRCSD, and with a dispatcher at the bus company l

under contract to the SWRCSD. '

')

Since only one school participated, the foregoing testing was too limited in our opinion to test the capability to respond

and was less extensive than at other exercises with which we are O

familiar. This very limited demonstration, in our opinion, demonstrates again that the Shoreham Exercise was not a full participation exercise.

(Petrone) FEMA has cited school problems at other facili-ties and has in the past been extremely critical of plans and exercise responses that were far superior and more substantial than the conditions relevant to Shoreham as "demonstrated" during

) the Exercise. This is another reason for concern that the Exercise departed from pact practice and did not satisfy regula-tory requirements.

O

1. Statement of Contentions z) Q. Which subparts of Contentions Ex 15/16 address school preparedness issues and FEMA's evaluation of this aspect of the Exercise?

O

()

O A. Subparts E, F, and G of Contention Ex 15, and subparts F and G of Contention Ex 16.

,0 Q. Please state subparts E, F, and G of Contention Ex 15.

O A. Subpart E of Contention Ex 15 states:

Procedures relating to the sheltering cf school children (igg OPIP 3.6.5; OPIP 3.6.1; C) App. A at II-19 thru -21) were excluded from the exercise. Such procedures, and the re-sources and capabilities necessary to imple-ment them, are required by 10 CFR SS 50.47 (b)(8) and (b)(10), and NUREG 0654 SS II.J.9 and 10. Officials of most of the school O districts relied upon in the LILCO Plan for the implementation cf the protective action of sheltering have stated that they do not have the resources and are not capable of implementing such an action during a Shoreham emergency. The exclusion of LILCO's proposed d, school sheltering procedures from the exer-cise prtcludes a finding of reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a Shoreham emergency as required by 10 CFR S g 50.47(a)(1). Accordingly, the LILCO Plan is fundamentally flawed.

Subpart F of Contention Ex 15 states:

.O FEMA did not observe any demonstration of the organizational ability necessary to effect an early dismissal of schools, even though such a demonstration was one of the exercise objectives. Egg objective EOC 18; FIELD 15; O FEMA Report at 38. Under the LILCO Plan, early dismissal is one of the primary protective actions for school children.

LILCO Plan at 3.6-7; App. A at II-19 thru -

21; OPIP 3.6.5. Thus, procedures relating to the early dismissal of schools and the O ability to implement them are required by 10 CFR S 50.47(b)(10) and NUREG 0654 S II.J.

Officials of mont of the school districts O

O relied upon in the LILCO Plan for the imple-mentation of early dismissals have stated <

i that they do not have the resources and are l

g not capable of safely or effectively imple- l 1

menting an early dismissal during a Shoreham accident. FEMA's failure to observe any

demonstration of the ability to implement LILCO's proposed protective action of early

dismissal during the exercise precludes a y) finding of reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures ca and will be imple-mented in the event of a Shoreham accident, as required by 10 CFR S 50.47(a)(1).

Accordingly, the LILCO Plan is fundamentally .

flawed.

IO Subpart G of Contention Ex 15 states:

Procedures relating to the evacuation of

'O school children, as set forth in OPIP 3.6.5 L and in Appendix A at II-19 thru -21 of the LILCO Plan, which refer to non-existent ,

school plans and rely upon school officials to locate and mobilize necessary personnel and equipment te implement an evacuation, O were excluded from the exercise. Such procedures and the capability of implementing them are required by 10 CFR SS 50.47(b)(8) and (b)(10), and NUREG 0654 SS II.J.9 and 10.

Officials of most of the school districts relied upon in the LILCO Plan for the imple-O mentation of school evacuations have stated that they do not have the resources and are not capable of safely or effectively imple-menting an evacuation of school children during a Shoreham accident. And, the one free P l ay message in the exercise purportedly O involving simulated evacuation assistance for the Ridge Elementary School did not even purport to demonstrate the rescurces or capabilities of officials of that school or i of the Longwood School District to implement c, an evacuation, and thus failed to demonstrate the resources or capabilities necessary to implement the proposed procedure for evacua-tion of school children set forth in the LILCO Plan. The exclusion of such procedures from the exercise precludes a finding of O reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a Shoreham accident, as required by 10 CFR O

I

-Q 1 I

S 50.47(a)(1), and precludes any finding that objectives EOC 20 and FIELD 16.were met.

Accordingly, the LILCO Plan is fundamentally g flawed.

Q. Please state subparts F and G of Contention Ex 16.

A. Subpart F of Contention Ex 16 states:

Other than one or two persons from the Shoreham-Wading River School District, school

() officials and personnel, including teachers, from the two parochial schools, 13 nursery schools, and 33 public school located in the EPZ, as well as those from the seven school districts outside the EPZ but with children who reside within the EPZ, did not partici-

'O pate in the exercise. Personnel from such schools are relied upon for implementation of protective action reccamendations for school children under the LILCO Flan. Egg App. A at II-19 thru -21, IV-159 thru -171; OPIP 3.6.5.

I O

Subpart G of Contention Ex 16 states:

Other than two drivers from the Shoreham-Wading River School District, school bus 33 drivers did not participate in the exercise.

School bus drivers from 10 school districts, as well as from numerous private and nursery schools, are relied upon for implementation of the protective actions for school children

,0 of early dismissal and evacuation. Egg LILCO Plan, App. A at II-19 thru -20; OPIP 3.6.5.

Q. Are there any other contentions which specifically deal 43 with the capability to implement protective actions for school l

children?

l l

10 0 l 1

9-A. Yes. The allegations in Contention Ex 18.C(v) and in subparts F, G, and H of Contention Ex 20 address protective actions for the schools in and around the EPZ. Egg Attachment 5 to this testimony for the text of those contentions.

O 2. Discussion (a) Introduction O

Q. Do FEMA graded exercises generally devote much attention to school preparedness?

O A. (Baranski, Czech, Papile, Petrone) Yes. In our

experience, FEMA generally devotes a great deal of attention to

O school preparedness.27 For example, FEMA generally has required offsite emergency response authorities during an exercise to contact personnel from every EPZ school district.28 And FEMA lO 27 On Novemuer 13, 1986, FEMA issued Guidance Memorandum EV-2, Protective Actions for School Children. GM EV-2 clarifies NUREG l 0654 requiremer.cs as they relate to school children. The purpose of the Guidance Memorandum was to provide instruction on school

O evacuation in two contexts

in developing emergency response plans; and in conducting and evaluating exercises, insofar as they relate to the development and implementation of protective actions for school children. The Guidance Memorandum underscores the importance of school preparedness and defines school preparedness parameters. A copy of GM EV-2 is Attachment 6 to O this testimony.

l 28 (Colwell, Minor, Petrone, Zook) It is our understanding that Mr. Kowieski testified at his deposition that he generally requires that every school district participate in an exercise, O at least to the extent of actually receiving telephone calls from the EOC at the beginning of the exercise. Kowieski 1/28/87 Dep.

at 98-99.

() - GG -

3 always has gone, at a minimum, to at least several school districts to interview school officials about their knowledge and H"

capability to implement a range of protective actions, including sheltering, early dismissal, and evacuation. In addition, school administrators are interviewed by FEMA evaluators to determine 9

~

knowledge of how they are to be notified, how they would imple-ment their own protective actions, availability of resources, and the location of school population relocation facilities.

O Similarly, GM EV-2 specifies:

The following functions should be demonstrated and evaluated in exercises in which the evacu-O ation of students is necessitated by events in the exercise scenario:

1. Alerting and notification of appropriate school officials by local emergency officials with respect to status of O radiological emergency and need to imple-ment protective actions, including evacuation,

2. The contacting and notification of dispatchers and school bus drivers, as O appropriate, to inform them of any potential or actual need for them to transport students and

3. The provision of information to the n

parents and guardians, as appropriate, concerning the status and intended location or destination of the students.

Attachment 6, at 8.

O Thus, in sum, there generally has been extensive FEMA evaluation of the actual prepare?lness of school officials to undertake C

emergency actions, as well as an actual demonstration of the C)

O ability of offsite responders to communicate with the school personnel who would be responsible for implementing protective O actions.

Q. Did FEMA conform to its normal practice at Shoreham?

O A. No.

O Q. Please explain.

A. (Baranski, Czech, Papile, Petrone) Based on our experience, we would expect FEMA to evaluate LILCO's capability l and that of schools to implement protectivs actions for school hildren. .;n fact, four of the objectives to be demonstrated

.O during the Exercise related to this function: (1) objective EOC 18 "demonstrate the organizational ability necessary to effect an early dismissal of schools within the 10-mile EPZ"; (2) objective O

EOC 20 "demonstrate the organizational ability necessary to ef-fact an orderly evacuation of schools within the 10-mile EPZ. If this protective action is not recommended by the decisionmakers,

O n , schools were dismissed early, a free-play controller's mes-sage may be inserted to demonstrate this activity"; (3) objective

,0 FIELD 15 "demonstrate a sample of resources necessary to effect j an early dismissal of schools within the 10-mile EPZ (to be O

l

,0 .

V simulated out of sequence, if appropriate)"; and (4) objective FIELD 16 "demonstrate a sample of resources necessary to effect b

an orderly evacuation of all or part of the 10-mile EPZ."

1 (Colwell,_ Minor, Petrone, Zook) However, prior to the g.

Exercise,'we understand that FEMA was informed by LILCO that i

LILCO would have difficulty demonstrating these objectives, since  !

only one school district in the EPZ'had agreed to participate in D

the Exercise. On being notified of this, FEMA asked LILCO to  !

write to other school districts to ask them to participate in the Exercise. Memorandum from E. Tanzman dated November 26, 1985.

D To our knowledge, LILCO never did write to these other school districts.29 Only the SWRCSD participated in the Exercise. ,

Daverio Dep. at 241. Thus, the Exercise from the outset was of exceedingly limited scope. FEMA acquiesced in this limited i D

t 29 (Colwell, Minor, Petrone, Zook) It appears that LILCO witness Daverio talked with LILCO management about the school situation and-was instructed not to contact schools beyond the 3 SWRCSD to participate-in the Exercise. As was appropriate, FEMA did not contact any schools or school officials about participating in the Exercise. Kowieski 1/28/87 Dep. at 97-102.

Ett Alta Daverio Dep. at 80 and Weismantle Dep. at 38-39 (LILCO ,

did not write to school districts; LILCO assumed school districts '

would decline to participate in the Exercise). We understand 3 that many school districts and schools within the Shoreham EPZ r and the surrounding area, and organizations speaking on behalf of the parents, teachers, and children served by these schools, are on the record stating that they do not have the resources or the i personnel to protect the health and safety of their students in s the event of a radiological emergency. Copies of some of the letters and resolutions to this effect are attached to this

, testimony as Attachment 7.

() -  !

l 0

demonstration, although it did state that in future exercises other schools and school districts should participate. FEMA

O Repcrt at 38.

Q. Why isn't it sufficient to await future exercises to

.O test LILCO's capability and that of the schools to implement LILCO's Plan?

O A. (Barareki. Czech, Papile, Petrone) Because that would violate regulatory requirements. The Shoreham Exercise was ,

supposed to be a full participation exercise. As such, there had O

to be a sufficient demonstration so that FEMA could verify the ability to respond to the accident scenario. Clearly, by having q) only one school district participate and by not even contacting the many other districts and schools, LILCO did not test a major l portion of its Plan and FEMA was unable to verify the capability g of LILCO or the schools to respond to the Exercise scenario.

Accordingly, this clearly was B21 a full participation exercise.30

O 1

lO ____________________

30 Communication by LILCO with one school district on a l prearranged basis hardly constitutes a fair test of LILCO's l ability to communicate with all, an ability which is critical in an actual emergency. Further, the "participation" of a few lO

persons from the SWRCSD hardly constitutes the mobilization of l

"resources in sufficient numbers to verify the capability to respond to the accident scenario."

O 1 l - ._. __ _ __ _ _ -

O Further, FEMA's statement to the effect that a future exer-cise should include more schools ignores reality. The schools O~

were not left out of the Exercise because it was inconvenient to include them. Rather, as noted above, they were left out because they have no confidence in LILCO or its Plan to protect school O

children. Since the schools did not participate, the conclusion should have been that critical elements in a response to a Shoreham emergency could not be tested and hence the Exercise O

should have been acknowledged from the outset to be less than a full participation exercise.

O (b) The Exercise Included No Meaningful Demonstration of School Prenaredness Q. How many school districts are there in the Shoreham lO Epz?

A. '(Colwell, Minor Petrone, Zook) Eleven school lO districts, one socES supervisory district, two parochial schools, and 13 nursery schools have school buildings which are located I

within the 10-mile planning area surrounding the Shoreham nuclear O plant. Plan, Appendix A at IV-169 thru IV-171. There are six school districts with no buildings within the EPZ but whose

! district boundaries include residences within the EPZ, and one O

BOCES supervisory district and three parochial schools which have buildings located just beyond the 10-mile EPZ boundary. Plan, lO

O r

I Appendix A at IV-169. Clearly, therefore, a meaningful test of i school preparedness is a critical element to any full exercise of

• preparedness to respond to a Shoreham accident.

Q. How does the LILCO Plan deal with schools?

A. (Colwell, Minor, Petrone, Zook) Under the LILCO Plan, LILCO notifies schools of the necessity to take protective actions. The implementation of proterctive actions for school children, however, is left to school officials.

O More specifically, under the Plan, each school district office, parochial school, and nursery school in the EPZ is to be provided with a tone alert receiver which silently monitors the WALK FM radio frequency. When this frequency is activated by the EBS signal, the tone alert units are supposed to activate

,.s automatically and transmit the message which is being broadcast u

over EBS. Plan, Appendix A at IV-170. In addition, upon the declaration of an Alert or higher emergency classification, each g school district superintendent or individual in charge of the private schools in the EPZ is to be contacted by telephone by either the LERO Public Schools Coordinator or Private Schools O Coordinator to verify that the EBS message has been received and to receive requests for additional assistance. Plan, Appendix A at II-19.31 g ____________________

31 (Colwell, Minor, Petrone, Zook) The LILCO Plan provides (footnote continued) 0 .

D Q. Were school preparedness procedures demonstrated during the Exercise?

D A. (Colwell, Minor, Petrone, Zook) With the narrow exception of the SWRCSD (which, as discussed below, conducted a

~

very limited "demonstration"), school procedures were neither demonstrated by LILCO or the schools, nor observed by FEMA during the Exercise. As we have already testified, WALK Radio did not J

participate in the Exercise. Thus, the EBS station was not activated, and the tone alert radios which supposedly monitor that station were not activated.32 Thus, the only observable a

(footnote continued from previous page)

O that, upon an initial declaration of an Alert or a Site Area Emergency where no protective action is recommended for the general public, schools will be advised to implement their early dismissal plans if schools are in session. If schools are not in session, they will be advised to remain closed. If schools within the EPZ are still in session when a protective action is V- recommended for the general public, the schools will be advised to take the same protective action. Schools outside the EPZ which have students who reside in the EPZ are supposed to keep those students at the schools when the school day ends if any protective action has been recommended for the general public in g any area of the EPZ. Plan, Appendix A at II-20. The LILCO procedures for alerting schools in the event of a radiological emergency, and for offering assistance to those schools which require it, are similar to its procedures for alerting hospitals, nursing homes, and handicappe6 facilities. These procedures are contained in OPIP 3.6.5.

32 (Colwell, Minor, Petrone, Zook) Under LILICO's Plan, tone alert radios can be activated even without the sirens being sounded but this was not done during the Exercise. Kowieski 1/29/87 Dep. at 128-29. The original Exercise objectives called for demonstration of the tone alert radios. LILCO eventually o decided not to activate those radios and FEMA accepted that position. Daverio Dep. at 106-07; Tanzman Dep. at 124; Kowieski 1/28/87 Dep. at 170-71.

O IO action by LERO in connection with schools would have been phone calls made by the LERO school coordinators. However, except for

~O the SFRCSD, not even those calls were made.

In addition, FEMA asked that there be two "Field" demonstra-O tions. For one of those demonstrations, the SWRCSD was to request and receive two buses to implement early dismissal from its high school. The second demonstration was to be a simulated O'

request to LERO by the Ridge Elementary School in the Longwood School District for one ous to assist in evacuation. FEMA evaluators were supposed to evaluate the drivers of these huses,

O and, where appropriate, to discuss evacuation or early dismissal plans witn school officials. Neither of these demonstrations actually worked out as planned.'

9 Q. Please describe the school "demonstrations."

O 4

A. (Colwell, Minor, Petrone, Zook) At 6:52 on the day of .

the Exercise, EBS message No. I was broadcast (simulated) and O rec mmended that schools remain closed. LERO personnel pretended to begin calling private and public schools. The Private School Coordinator noted at 8:15 in his log that all private schools had O been contacted and had either closed or completed early dismissal. The Public School Coordinator noted in his log that, as of 8:44, all public schools had completed early dismissal. Of O all these telephone calls, only the one to the SWRCSD was 0

.O-actually made to a school official. The rest were "simulated",

apparently to another LILCO employee at a different phone number.

'O. Kowieski 1/28/87 Dep, at 226-27. Since all the calls but one were "simulated," there was no actual interaction as would have occurred if a real school official had to be contacted.

Similarly, the LILCO players had no difficulty reaching the appropriate "official" -- no busy signals, no need to call back, and no need to attempt to pass their message through intermedi-O aries in order to get in contact with a person in authority.

As had been planned prior to the Exercise, the Superin-O tendent of the SWRCSD requested the bus company under contract to his district to send buses to assist with early dismissal. Two buses were actually sent to the Shoreham-Wading River High

,O School, but no one got on or off these buses. Apparently, the buses merely went from their garage to the Shoreham-Wading River High School (which is co-located with the SWRCSD's offices), ran a route, and then returned to their garage.

FEMA had assigned an evaluator to evaluate the SWRCSD O

j "demonstration." He was supposed to get on one of the buses, interview the driver, and ride the bus to the reception center.

When he arrived at the school, the buses were there, but they O

left while he was inside talking to school officials. Deposition

! of William R. Gasper, December 1, 1905, at 35-36. Thus the FEMA evaluator never observed any actions by the bus drivers. The lC l

l lo  !

lO FEMA evaluator spoke to the SWRCSD Superintendent (who previously has testified in this proceeding as a LILCO witness) and to one O other SWRCSD official ~. The FEMA evaluator then sat around the school for several hours. When nothing happened at the school, the FEMA evaluator left to interview the disparcher at the bus O

garage about dosimetry and KI procedures. Gasper Dep. at 38- -

41.33

O The only other "demonstration" relating to school prepared-ness involved a simulated request by the Ridge Elementary School in.the Longwood School District for one bus to assist in evacu-33 This "demonstration" had nothing to do with ating its students. t school preparedness because no officials of Ridge School were even contacted, much less participated, in the demonstration.34 O

33 (Colwell, Minor, Petrone, Zook) Based on the foregoing i limited observation of what was in any event a very limited l demonstration, the FEMA evaluator concluded that objectives FIELD ,

15 and FIELD 16 were met. That is, he concluded that a sample of l

O resources to effect early dismissal and the orderly evo

uation of i schools had been demonstrated by the SWRCSD. Exercise Evaluation ,

Critique Form, FIELD 15 and 16, W. Gasper; agg FEMA Report at 43.  !

We' submit that such a conclusion clearly was unsupportable. The "demonstration" was far too limited and the evaluator missed

,O one-half of it (the bus driver and route). At any rate, such a demonstration at only one school clearly was insufficient to constitute an element of a full participation exercise. This l probably explains why the FEMA Report concluded that a ,

l demonstration of the organizational ability necesary to effect an early dismissal of schools could not be observed, then added that

"(i]n the future all schools must be included in all Federally

<O evaluated exercises and drills." FEMA Report at 38. We agree with Dr. Cole that the FEMA evaluation of the school objections, and FEMA's conclusions concerning them, are confused. Egg  ;

Testimony on Contention Ex 21. l 1

34 (C lwell, Min r, Petrone, Zook) This "demonstration" did 0 not even follow LILCO's Plan. Under the Plan, schools are  :

(footnote continued) t t

O -

4

O This simulated request was injected into the Exercise via a FEMA "free play" message at either 10:30 or 10:40. Exercise Free 13 Play Message, Ridge School Bus. At 10:42, the LERO Public School Coordinator was notified of the request; he transmitted the request to the Bus Coordinator at 10:59. Egg Public School O Coordinator Log, February 13, 1986. The Bus Dispatcher at the Patchogue Staging Area received the message at about 11:15.

O The FEMA evaluator who was supposed to observe this demonstration apparently spoke with the bus driver, but it is unclear whether he actually rode the bus, either to the school or i to a reception center afterwards. The "FIELD" portion of the "free play" message was not filled out.35

'O The FEMA evaluator filled out a critique form noting that the bus driver was "familiar with his function and followed the i

direction which was given to him very well." He also pointed

'O out, however, that "the driver did not leave the staging area O

(footnote continued from previous page) supposed to supply their own buses and effectuate their own protective actions. Further, while in theory it would be possible for a school to ask LILCO for help by supplying a bus, 43 such a demonstration, to be realistic at all, would have to involve some communication by LERO with the school or school district. There was none during the Exercise.

35 (Colwell, Minor, Petrone, Zook) In any event, we understand the Governments never received a copy of the completed form,  !

O although they did receive completed versions of other "free play" messages.

- r 0

!O until 11:20. Better control may reduce the time frame." He concluded that the objective FIELD 16 was only "partly met."

O EECF, FIELD 16, M. Ju.36 It should be noted that for school evacuation, there are

'O supposed to be special reception centers for school children.

Plan, Appendix A at II-20. LILCO has never designated such centers, which was cited as a deficiency in the PID. Egg 21 NRC

O at 860. Yet, during the Exercise, no reception centers for schools were set up or evaluated and, indeed, the one "demonstra-tion" of school evacuation -- the Ridge Elementary School event 0

-- had the bus sent to the Nassau Coliseum which is contrary to the Plan. Thus, the Exercise actually highlighted a deficiency in LILCO's Plan -- the lack of school reception centers.

(c) The Limited School Preparedness Activities During the Exercise Demonstrate that Anoendix E Was Not Saticfied

O Q. Please summarize the extent of school activities "demonstrated" during the Exercise.

O. --------------------

36 (Colwell, Minor, Petrone, Zook) At 1:23, the Public Schools Coordinator noted in his log that the bus simulated the pick up l of 40 children at the Ridge School. (LILCO now says the bus arrived at 12:12. LILCO Admission No. 169.) At 3:09, the Public i

.O Schools Coordinator called the Nassau Coliseum to find out if the Ridge School bus had arrived. LILCO personnel at the Coliseum said the bus had not arrived. Subsequently, LILCO's Reception Center personnel apparently inquired of bus drivers as they came in whether they were coming from Ridge School. As of 4:23, no bus drivers coming into the Reception Center had indicated that

!O they came from Ridge School (111 Public Schools Coordinator Log; LERO Messages). LILCO now claims the bus arrived at the Nassau Coliseum at 1:51. Sig LILCO Admission No. 50.

t o - -__ - - ._ .- . -- - - --,_ ..__ - __ - __- __- -_ -. . - . . -

O A. (Colwell, Minor, Petrone, Zook) LILCO has admitted that the gnly school personnel who participated in the Exercise O or were contacted during it were two SWRCSD school officials and i two SWRCSD bus drivers. LILCO Admission Nos. 12, 13, 15, 48, 49; l

Daverio Dep. at 243. LILCO also admits that, during the O

Exercise, there was no demonstration of the availability, loca-tion, accessibility or adequacy of reception centers for school children evacuated from schools in the EPZ. LILCO Admission No.

O

56. No teachers participated in the Exercise, although it should be noted that the Ridge School free play message specified that, "A teacher will be available at the school to ride the bus and Q

accompany the children to the school." Egg Attachment 8. No ,

sheltering of school children was demonstrated or simulated.

Finally, FEMA did not evaluate the alleged plans or capabilities of any sc1ools except the SWRCSD, and even that evaluation appears to have been limited. FEMA agrees that on the basis of the limited demonstration during the Exercise, one could not l conclude that adequate protective measures can and will be taken j for school children in all of the school districts in the event of a Shoreham emergency. Kowieski 1/29/87 Dep. at 159-60, 169, 4) 235.

Q. What conclusions do you reach on the basis of the lO l foregoing limited demonstrations?

l l

i O

l l

40 '

O A. (All) -We conclude that insofar as school preparedness is concerned, the 3horeham Exercise clearly did not satisfy the O

criteria for a full participation exercise. The demonstrations were far too limited to constitute a "testing" of a portion of LILCO's Plan. There also was far too limited a mobilization of O

personnel "to verify the capability to respond to the accident scenario." Finally, FEMA's evaluation was so limited that aven the very limited demonstrations that occurred were only partially O

evaluated by FEMA.

Q. FEMA has "justified" not reviewing school plans on the oasis that FEMA does not consider schools part of the "emergency response organization." Kowieski 1/29/87 Dep. at 236. FEMA also seems to rely on the fact that schools in New York State are

)

separate political entities. Id. Please comment.

g A. (Baranski, Czech, Papile, Petrone) Several comments

{ are in order. First, FEMA practice in New York State other than Shoreham has been to review school plans, at least in sufficient iO detail (via interviewing school officials, etc.) to gain assur-

! ance that the schools are in fact ready and able to respond.

This is consistent with GM EV-2. Egg Attachment 6. This clearly (3 was not done at Shoreham.

O O

r

O.  !

Second, to suggest that schools are not part of the "emergency response organization" misses the point. Appendix E

.;O requires "mobilization ce State, lecci, and licensee personnel  ;

and other resources in sufficient numbers to verify the capabil-ity to respond to the accident scenario." School personnel are 10' eithar "local personnel" or "other resources." They clearly must  ;

be mobilized for there to be a full participation exercise.

l Again, at-Shoreham this was not done. This was inconsistent with O

FEMA practice. Under FEMA's requirements (44 CFR S 350.9) and NRC requirements as interpreted by FEMA (10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E. 5 IV.F.1-5), "organizations with assigned responsibilities for

.O protecting students are required to demonstrate through exercises i their ability to implement emergency procedures contained in their emergency response plans." Attachment 6, at 8. Again, ,

O this clearly was not done at ?horeham.

4 4 The school preparedness demonstration at the Shoreham

,O Exercise differed in several other significant respects, which further evidence the fact that the Shoreham Exercise was not a +

full participation exercise. At other exercises in New York O ,

State, notification is made to every school district and every 1 -

I privaN . hool within the EPZ. This notification is corsidered i

O ver o . - c a r t,a n t . w v use they establish the critical communica-tje t ; n o . o; i-ride the opportunity for human interactions i

IO

i t

i l

lO -

81 -

. . , - _ _ _ , , . . , _ _ . , _ _ - . . , . . .,_.._,.__.._.--.__,____.__,_...___-..-,,_-_.,m 7, ,

,0 which are necessary and important in an emergency situation. At the Shoreham Exercise, these interactions were eliminated in I) advance from the Exercise.

Further, at other exercises in New York State, FEMA's evalu-I) ation of school plans and capaollities is more detailed. For instance, FEMA regularly visits a number of school districts to interview school district officials concerning thair knowledg'e of I) their role in a radiological emergency and capabilities to imple-r ment a full range of protective actions. At the Shoreham Exercise, FEMA's "svaluation" in terms of school district O officials extended only to the SWRCSD. The fact that all other i

school districts and private and other educational institutions were totally omitted from FEMA's evaluation is a telling indica-

O i

tion that the Shoreham Exercise-differed from standard practice, thereby precluding consideration of the Shoreham Exercice as a full participation exercise. Attachment 6 documents many other i 10 deviations from standa d practice as well. .

t Q. Given the fact that under the Shoreham Exercise

scenario, all schools were directed to remain closed, was there l any reason for a greater demonstration of the ability to effect t i early dismissal, sheltering, and/or evacuation?

l

)

l l  :

l

O I

l, O l A. (Baranski, Czech, Papile, Petrone) Given the scenario j which was chosen, we believe that it was esaential for FEMA to O-have conducted enough interviews with school officials who would have to act in an emergency situation to "verify their knowledge and capability to respond to the accident scenario." In this instance, FEMA simply did not follow the kinds of normal procedures that it has followed at other New York State exer-cises. Accordingly, the Shoreham demonstration +=s exceedingly O

limited and cannot support a finding that this was a full partic-ipation exercise.

O Q. Does the complexity of the emergency tasks require a more complete demonstration?

O A. (Perrow) Yes. I think that LERO has underestimated the complexity of these tasks. The response of schools is inter-dependent with other entities and with parts of LERO. The O

i failure of any part to perform at the optimum level may impact the ability of others to perform at the optimum level. Besides O the LERO EOC, we have the bus comp &nies and their drivers, the traffic guides and other route personnel from LERO, the school 1

district offices, the schools themselves, the parents, and the

O children. Only the LERO personnel have been tested in the excr- t ciso, but their behavior in a real emergency will be affected by O

1

!O _ _ .

/A d O

the behavior of the other groups and persons. This is an example j of the interactive complexity which is discussed in my testimony O

on Contention Ex 50.

Q. Please summarize your conclusions regarding school preparedness.

A. (All) The planned demonstrations were insufficient to demonstrate that LILCO and schools have the ability to implement a range of protective actions for the achool children. Insuffi-

) ciene numbers of schools, buses, schoci personnel and bus drivers were contacted or participated. Thus, even if the planned demon-strations had been executed perfectly, and observed and O thoroughly evaluated (which they apparently were not), they would have been insufficient to constitute a part of a full participa-tion exercise or to support a finding that LILCO could implement

O protective actions for school children.37 D. Soecial Facilities

'O 1. Introduction Q. What does this portion of your testimony address?

!O 37 Even FEMA witness Keller agreed that the observations at the Oxercise on .,chool preparedness matters were so limited that FEMA

,0 cannot conclude that adequate protective measu t can and will be taken for school children in all the school districts. Kowieski l

1/29/87 Dep, at 232-41.

l l

lO - 84 _

.. - . ~

)O 1

A. (All) In this portion of the testimony, we address a i

,0 number of interrelated iscues relating to the adequacy of the 1

demonstration during the Exercise of the capability to protect

j. special facility residents in the event of a Shoreham emergency.

l lO Q. What do you mean by special facilities?

A. (All) Residents of hospitals, nursing and adult homes, and similar facilities are examples of special facility resi-dents. While schools are often considered to be withir; the class f "rpecial facilities," school-related matters are addressed in

!O an earlier portion of this testimony.

O Q. What is the basic concern relating to the demonstration

~\

for special facilities?

Q A. (All) In the Shoreham EP2, there are three hospitals, numerous adult and nursing homes, many homebound citizens with

-special needs, and other residents of facilities such as those O who reside at or attend facilities for the handicapped. In the event of a Shoreham emergency, depending on the nature of the event and the facility involved, it might be necessary either to

() shelter and/or evacuate the residents of such special facilities.

In order to effect such protective actions, a number of inter-related steps must take place, including the following: LERO O must contact officials at the special facilities to advise them O

0 1

of the nature of the emergency and to recommend protective actions; the officials at the special facilities must either arrange to shelter their residents or prepare them for evacuation to facilities outside of the emergency planning zone; LERO must arrange for ambulances or ambulettes for the transport of these persons in the event that evacuation is the protective action recommended for some of the facilities; there must be reception g facilities outside of the EPZ to which the special facility evacuees can be taken; and LERO must arrange at those reception facilities outside of the EPZ for necessary monitoring and

O decontamination of these special facility evacuees. Accordingly, there are numerous steps which must be implemented in order to demonstrate a capability of adequately protecting special

O facility residents in the event of a Shoreham emergency.

Q. During the February 13, 1986, Exercise, did LILCO and O special facility officials adequately demonstrate, in your opinion, the capability of implementing the necessary steps in order to protect special facility residents ir. the event of e O shoreham emergency?

A. (All) No. We explain the bases for these conclusions O in more detail below. However, briefly, the reasons are as follows:

O O _ gg _

O l l

(1) During the Exercise, there was no communication between LERO and any officials of any of the special facilities either

'O inside or outside of the Shoreham EPZ.

(2) During the Exercise, no officials of any special facil- ,

O ity inside or outside the Shoreham EPZ actively participated in the Exercise.

O  :

(3) FEMA did not evaluate LERO's ability to communicate with special facilities inside or outside of the EPZ, nor did FEMA, even on a spot-check basis, assess the capabilities of ,

O  ;

special facilities inside or outside of the EPZ to carry out any of the actions contemplated under the LILCO Plan.

O (4) The primary "demonstration" relating to special facili- -

l ties during the Exercise was the mobilization of ambulances in

! t y) order to simulate the evacuation of special facility residents i from EPZ locations to locations outside of the EPZ. However,  !

that demonstration was exceedingly limited, since FEMA evaluated 7

lO only ne ambulance and one ambulette during the entire Exercise,

! special facilities within the EPZ did not interface either with  !

LERO or the ambuance companies, and special facilities outside of X) the EPZ were not part of the Exercise.

f

()

i  !

IC) l

! t r

O: V On the basis of the limited demonstration summarized above, r

it is our conclusion that there was not an adequate testing of a O major observable portion of LILCO's Plan, namely, the capability to. implement adequate protective measures for special fe.cility y evacuees. In addition, there was insufficient mobilization of 20

resources and personnel such that it was impossible to verify i

j whether LERO and special facilities (1-.h inside and outside ths 1

EPZ) have the capability of responding adequately to the accident O

scenario. In these circumstances, therefore, we must conclude that there was no full participation exercise.

i iO l 2. Statement of Contentigng i

4 Q. What are the contentions which.are relevant to the j matters which you have summarized above?

A. (Colwell, Minor, Petrone, Zook) There are a number of

)

contentions which cover these matters. With respect to hospital evacuation, and the lack of participation in the Exercise uy EPZ hospital officials, the primary contentions are Ex 15.D and 16.E.

O With respect to the lack of participation of other EPZ special i facilities in the Exercise, Contention Ex 16.I is the primary i

() contention. With respect to the reception facilities and hospi-tals outside of the EPZ to which special facility evacuees might

be taken, Contentions Ex 15.K (relating to monitoring and l() decontamination) and 16.J (pertaining to lack of participation by l

O - as -

O those facilities outside the EPZ) are the primary contentions.

Finally, with respect to the lack of an adequate demonstration of

.:O

~

the transportation facilities (ambulances and ambulettes) to effect an evacuation of special facility residents, Contentions Ex 16.L and 18.C(ii) are the primary contentions. In addition, a lO number of bases of Contention Ex 20 are properly considered with l this group of contentions. Thece bases of Contention Ex 20 are E, I, H, and N.

L,O Q. Please state the fotagoing contentions which you have '

mentioned, except for those porticas of Contention Ex 20 which are found in Attachment 5 to this testimony.

O A. (Colwell, Minor, Petrone, Zook) The various contention i subparts which are mentioned above are as follows:

15.D. Procedures relating to evacuation of

O EPZ hospital patients and patients in the .

Suffolk Infirmary, and a demonstration of the -

i capability of implementing such an evacuation, I

were excluded from the exercise. There are approximately 850 patients in the Central Suffolk, St. Charles, and John T. Mather

(3 Hospitals and the Suffolk Infirmary (OPIP 3.6.5, Att. 2), of which approximately 155 are designated maternity, newborn, or pediatric.

Procedures to evacuate these persons and the capability and resources to implement them are >

required by 10 CFR SS 50.47(b)(8) and (b)(10), ,

() and NUREG S II.J.9 and 10. Their exclusion  !

from the exercise precludes a finding of reasonable assurance from that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in ,

the event of a Shoreham accident, as required  ;

by 10 CFR S 50.47(a)(1). Accordingly, the O LILCO Plan is fundamentally flawed.  ;

O r

l O 1 l

16 . H . . Officials from hospitals located in the EPZ -- Central Suffolk Hospital, St. Charles l

l Hospital, John T. Mather Hospital -- and the

O_ Suffolk Infirmary did not participate in the '

exercise. Such officials are relied upon for determination and implementation of protective action recommendations for hospital patients.

Egg App. A at IV-172; OPIP 3.6.5 $ 2.0 (Note);

OPIP 3.6.1 5 5.3.2.

!O 16.I. Officials and personnel from the nine nursing and adult hot.es located in the EPZ did not participate in the exercise. Such personnel are relied upon for implementation

, of protective action recommendations for the

(D - residents and patients of such homes. Egg App. A at II-28 thru -29, IV-173 thru -176; OPIP 3.0.5.

16.J. Officials from hospital, nursing homes, and similar facilities outside the EPZ relied O upon for relocation services and necessary health care for special facility evacuees did not participate in the exercise. The LILCO Plan fails to include agreements for such facilities which indicate an ability to provide necessary reception services, in O violation of NUREG 0654 5 II.J.10; instead, the Plan merely includes a list of such facilities and indicates LILCO's reliance upon them for relocation services and necessary health care for evacuees from hospitals, nursing and adult homes in the EPI. Egg App.

O A at IV-166a thru -168, IV-172 thru -178; OPIP 3.6.5.

15.K. Procedures relating to the radiological monitoring and decontamination of evacuees fr m special facilities who, according to the O LILCO Plan, are to be evacuated to special reception centers, were excluded from the exercise. Such procedures, and the resources and capabilities necessary to implement them, are required by 10 CFR $$ 50.47(b)(8),

() (b)(10); NUREG 0654 5 II.J.9 and 10 and objective FIELD 21. Their exclusion from the exercise precludes a finding of reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a Shoreham accident, as required by 10 CFR

() 5 50.47(a)(1). Accordingly, the LILCO Plan is fundamentally flawed.

() -

D 16.L. The following ambulance companies did not participate in the exercise:

3 (1) Bi-County Ambulance and Ambulette (2) Gosline Ambulance Service (5)

(3) Mercy Medical Transportation Service D (7)

(4) Nassau Ambulance Service (11)

(5) New York Patient Aids, Inc. (18) 3 (6) Orlando Ambulance anf **m.ulette Service, Inc. (6)

(7) Peconic Ambulance Service, Inc. 910)

(8) Transportation With Care (9)

(9) Weir Metro AmbuService, Inc. (62)

They are relied upon for implementation of the protective action of' evacuation in that the LILCO Plan assumes that each company will O provide the number of ambulance and ambulette vehicles, manned with the necessary personnel, indicated in parentheses in the above list.

Egg LILCO Plan, Ap'p. B.; OPIP 3.6.5.

p#

18.C. (ii) The "participation" of the Medibus, Inc. and Stat Equipment Corp.

ambulance companies consisted only of providing 12 vehicles (six ambulances and six ambulettes). Those cotapanies are relied upon in the LILCO Plan, however, for 11 ambulances and 45 ambulettes, all 57 of which are 9 supposed to be properly manned by trained workers. LILCO Plan, App. B; OPIP 3.6.5, Att.6.

O O

O O

3. 211pussion O (a)

Background:

LILCO's Planning for Special Facilities ,

Q. Gentlemen, please first describe generally what the l0 LILCO Plan requires in terms of protective actions for the fore-going special facilities.

4 O A. (Colwell, Minor, Petrone, Zook) We will respond to that question by discussing the different kinds of facilities and the different kinds of functions separately.

,0 With respect to hospitals, LILCO has decided in advance that sheltering will be the preferred protective action. Egg OPIP O 3.6.5 at 2. However, the Appeal Board of the NRC has ruled that  :

hospital evacuation cannot be ignored. Egg 23 NRC at 154-57. At any rate, under the LILCO Plan, it is expected that in the event I3 of an emergency, hospitals will be notified by tone alert radios and the EBS system, as well as receive telephone calls from the LERO Health Facilities Coordinator to verify that they heard the O

EBS messages and are implementing sheltering. Egg OPIP 3.6.5.

The implementation of sheltering by hospitals is to be undertaken by hospital staff. If administrators of hospitals decide to

'O evacuate all or a portion of their patient population, LERO will arrange for transportation on an ad hoc basis.38 38

() There are three hospitals in the Shoreham EPZ. The John T.

Mather Hospital in Port Jefferson has 203 beds, the St. Charles l (footnote continued) t

,0 l t l

3 With respect to the 10 major nursing and adult homes in the '

l EPZ, which collectively house more than 1,300 residents (Appendix i

A, II-28-29), the Shoreham Plan generally provides as follows.39 As it does with hospitals, the LILCO Plan relies on tone alert radios and EBS messages to inform these facilities initially that an emergency exists. At the Site Area (or higher) emergency classification, the Evacuation Coordinator is supposed to contact the Emergency Medical /Public Service Coordinator and ensure that O

1) a dosimetry recordkeeper is sent from the Riverhead Staging Area to Peconic Ambulance Company and 2) that all other ambulance companies are instructed to send their ambulances and ambulettes to the LILCO Emergency Worker Decontamination Facility ("EWDF')

in Brentwood. OPIP 3.6.5, S 5.1.2(a).

O If sheltering is recommended, the Evacuation Coordinator is supposed to er.sure that the Special Facilities Evacuation g Coordinator is having the nursing and adult homes contacted to verify implementation. OPIP 3.6.5 S 5.1.2(e). Apparently at the same time, the Special Facilities Evacuation Coordinator is to O ____________________

(footnote continued from previous page)

Hospital, also in Port Jefferson, has 271 beds, and the Central Suffclk Hospital, located in Riverhead, has 157 beds. EgLq OPIP 3.6.5, Attachment 2.

O 39 There also are four organizations for the handicapped in the EPZ which require special assistance the Association for the Help of Retarded Children; United Cerebral Palsy of Greater Suffolk Inc.; the Maryhaven Center of Hope; and the Board of Cooperative Educational Services Hearing Center. Between them, O these organizations maintain a total of 14 facilities throughout the EPZ, serving 86 non-ambulatory individuals and 413 ambulatory individuals. (Appendix A at IV-166 thru IV-160).

O 13 i

have nursing ano adult homes contacted to "verify" transportation requirements. Id. 5.1.2(b).

The procedure includes "sheltering"  !

O and "evacuation" messages to be read to whoever answers the phone at the facility. Id. Attachments 9, 10. The actual sheltering or preparation for evacuation is left to the facilities to imple-

.;O

, ment. LILCO's primary role is to give notice, to provide trans-portation if evacuation is recommended, and to alert reception hospitals that evacuees are coming.

O An evacuation of the special facilities obvicusly requires g arrangements both in terms of the transportation facilities and reception facilities. The LILCO Plan attempts to provide for i

those arrangements roughly as follows. The Transportation

!O Coordinator, after getting a list of zones that are to be u

evacuated, is supposed to determine (from a proprinted list) the number of vehicles that will be needed, and give this information lo to the appropriate coordinators to pass on so that the vehicles

$ can be assigned and di3 patched. OPIP 3.6.5 5 5.3. The Hospital Coordinator, meanwhile, is supposed to contact reception hospi-

tals to determine where there is available space for evacuees and

O 1 then to assign evacuees to reception hospitals. The Hospital Coordinator is then to call back the reception hospitals and j(3 inform them of the number of evacuees to expect. This list of reception hospital assignments is to be given to the Health l Facilities Coordinator. OPIP 3.6.5, 5 5.540 C) --------------------

40 A few of the nursing homes and other special facilities have (footnote continued)

O O

Finally, the LILCO transportation plan for special facility lO evacuation is roughly as follows: LILCO relies on ambulances and ambulettes to evacuate two segments of the EPZ population (1) the homebound (ligt, noninstitutionalized) mobility-impaired O who cannot be moved in buses and (2) residents of special facil-ities such as nursing / adult homes, facilities for the handi-capped, and hospitals who require special vehicles for transport.

O In its Plan, LILCO sets forth the vehicle requirements for these segments of the EPZ population. The vehicle estimates contained in the LILCO Plan are shown in the chart below:

O Pooulation Ambulances Ambulettes 1 Nursing / Adult Homes 41 23 179 Handicapped racilities *

• O Homebound mobility impaired 13 9 l

Suffolk Infirmary 84 9

'O *

• Hospitals

• Assumed to have owr; transportation; may request additional  !

assistance from LERO.

!O sources: Plon Appendix A, ,

IV-166a,b t IV .t75

() (footnote continued from previous page) prearranged reception centers in the LILCO Plan, but for most of them, the Plan just states "(t)o be arranged" (111, OPIP 3.6.5, j Attachment 2). The LILCO Plan also contains procedures for the bus and ambulance coordinators, and detailed forms for .

dispatching vehicles and reporting the "status" of the f

O evacuations of the various special populations. '

41 Exclusive of Suffolk Infirmary.

0

-_. . ._ . _ __ --- - .. _ - _ - . _ - = .

1 0  !

I l

LILCO assumes that each ambulance will carry two passengers, and l jg each ambulette will carry four passengers. LILCO further assumes i

that, in the event of an emergency at Shoreham, a total of 192 i ambulances and ambulettes would be made available to "LERO". Egg

.() LILCO Admission No. 32.42 j i

i Because insufficient emergency vehicles would be available .

i 0- t accomplish a simultaneous evacuation of the EPZ, the LILCO

Plan has set up a hierachy: resources would first be applied to ,

i evacuate the homebound, then residents of nursing / adult homes and

O facilities for the handicapped. Finally, in the event that evac-untion were recommended for hospitals and the Suffolk Infirmary, ambulances and ambulettes would be provided for them. Egg OPIP l

'o 3.6.5, 5 5.6.2. [

LILCO has contractual arrangements with 11 different ambu- l o lance companies to make ambulances and aubulettes available in the event of an emergency. OPIP 3.6.5, Attachment 6. Prior to

the Exercise, LILCO wrote to three ambulance companies (two of i 4

'O which -- Stat Equipment and Medibus -- are at the same address l and apparently managed by one person) and asked that these  !

i companies make available a total of eight ambulances and eight [

r

'O t i [

4 It appears, however, that LILCO has only contracted for the  !

'O Egg OPIP 3.6.5 availability of 57 ambulances and 118 ambulettes.

Attachment G. l r

O l

i) ambulettes, with drivers, for the day of the Exercise.  :

Weismantle Dep. Exhibit 5, Letter from John Weismantle to Robert O

Coulter, dated February 8, 1986; Letter to Richard Gabriele,

, dated February 8, 1986.

!O Q. Under the LILCO Plan, how are ambulances and ambulettes dispatched to where they are needed?

O A. (Colwell, Minor, Petrono, Zook) The ambulance dispatch plan, like the bus dispatch plan, is highly centralized, with all

decisions and resource allocations being made by personnel at the

'O EOC. At a Site Area or higher emergency classification level, l

the Evacuation Coordinator is supposed to make sure that the 4lO Special Facilities Evacuation Coordinator contacts the Emergency Medical /Public Service Coordinator. It is the Emergency i

]

Hedical/Public Service Coordinator's responsibility to ensure Q) that the Ambulance Coordinator contacts the 11 ambulance companies listed on Attachment 6 to OPIP 3.6.5. Egg OPIP 3.6.5 55 5.1.2, 5.6.1.

!O 2

1 The Ambulance Coordinator, once he has determined tne number of vehicles available, is supposed to instruct the ambulance l() companies, with the exception of the Peconic Ambulance Company,43 1

l 43 All ambulances and ambulettes are dispatched from the EWDF, l uith the exception of vehicles from Peconic. For the Peconic ccmpany, the Ambulance Coordinator is supposed to call the

,()

Riverhead Staging Area Coordinator and ask him to send a

! Dosimetry Record Keeper, with dosimetry equipment, to the Peconic l

(footnote continued)

!O  ;

I

I C) to send all of their available vehicles to the EWDF. The Ambulance' Coordinator is then supposed to contact the i O

Decontamination Coordinator and inform him of the approximate number of ambulance /ambulette drivers who will be arriving and in  !

i need of dosimetry. (When the drivers arrive, the Decontamination O

Coordinator is supposed to contact the Ambulance Coordinator, so ,

i the Ambulance Coordinator can issue dosimetry to the drivers.  ;

i OPIP 3.6.5, 5 5.6.1.) 1 0  !

The Ambulance coordinator is next supposed to begin-filling  ;

out "Ambulance /Ambulette Dispatch Forms" (131 Attachment 13 to OPIP 3.6.5) for the homebound who will require evacuation by [

ambulance or ambulette.44 The Ambulance Coordinator is also i supposed to estimate the number of trips each vehicle will have O

to make and provide this information to the Realth Services  !

Coordinator. OPIP 3.6.5, 5 5.6.1.

f O l When an evacuation is recommended, the Ambulance Coordinator I (using information about reception hospital availability obtained [

O from the Hospital Coordinator) is supposed to begin filling in e the reception location on each Dispatch Form. Working outward I i

O (footnote continued from previous page)  !

Ambulance Company. OPIP 3.6.5 $ 5.6.1. Once this Desimetry i Record Keeper has been given pick-up assignments over the pnene l from the Ambulance Coordinator, he fills out the forms and t dispatches the ambulances from Peconic. OPIP 3.6.5 5 5.6.3.

l O 44 This information appears on the list which gives the names,  :

addresses and phone numbers for the homebound. OPIP 3.6.5 5  !

5.6.l(d).  ;

O  !

i f

l l

!]

from the plant, he is to provide for the homebound, the health care facilities and, finally, the hospitals and Suffolk i

Infirmary. OPIP 3.6.5, S 5.6.2.

l l The Emergency Medical /Public Service Communicators "or other I O '

l available personnel" at the EOC are then to go downstairs to the l

EWDF to issue dosimetry, brief, and dispatch the ambulance

.g drivers. Each driver is given a number of Dispatch Form copies equal to the number of persons he is to evacuate in his vehicle.

(The drivers are s2pposed to fill in the pick-up and delivery g times on their copies of these forms.) After making his pick-ups and delivering the patients to the predetermined reception hospital, each ambulance /ambulette driver is to ernturn to the O EWDF for re-dispatch. OPIP 3.6.5, 5 5.6.4.

(b) The Demonstration of the Plan for Special Facilities Was Very Limited

O Q. To what extent was LILCO's Plan and the related I

l capablitties of special facility personnel tested during the O Shoreham Exercise?

A. (Colwell, Minor, Petrone, Zook) The testing at all

'O levels was limited. Basically, the following was what occurred.

We begin first with the hospitals.

O O 99 _

O During the Exercise, LILCO demonstrated no ability to evac- i uate any hospital patients, even though children, expectant .

O j mothers, and newborns are particularly radiosensitive, i Basically, LERO decided ahead of time that sheltering would be O the protective action recommendation for the EPZ hospitals (as well as for the Suffolk Infirmary). 13.g OPIP 3.6.5, at 2 Note.

l Although the Plan provides that if the administrators of these O hospitals decide to evacuate all or part of their patient popula-tion, LERO will arrange for transportation, the LERO players during the Exercise did not even contact any of the officials at O these hospitals, even to discuss whether they were ready to shelter patients.45 FEMA has admitted that it did not review or evaluate procedures for evacuating any of the patients at these  ;

lO hospitals, nor d'id FEMA evaluate the capability of implementing an evacuation of the hospitals. FEMA Admission Nos. 20-23. 131 alag Daverlo Dep. at 234 (procedures for hospital evacuation were  :

!O not demonstrated during the Exercise). Similarly, it appears l that FEMA did not evaluate the hospitals' capability to effect sheltering.46 i

O l

45 Although some personnel from Central Suffolk Hospital i participated in a medical drill on the Sunday before the Exercise i dealing with a simulated injured person from the plant site, no i

O hospital officials were contacted during the Exercise or  !

otherwise participated in the Exercise. LILCO Admission Nos. 21, 22, 23.

46 (Petrone) In other exercises, there generally is a coordinator at the EOC that communicates and interacts with I

O hospital administrators. Although actual evacuation of patients  !

I has never occurred, simulation and evaluation of procedures and *

! process is the generally accepted approach.  ;

1 .

O

_ ton . l 1

l

!O l

LERO's "demonstration" during the Exercise of what it could l 4

j do for the patients in these hospitals apparently was to simulate

O ,

a shelter recommendation. Somebody at LERO subsequently checked-off the sheltering action as "completed." But this i

apparently was "accomplished" without LERO even doing so little  !

O as demonstrating the ability to establish phone contact with the  !

hospitals. Egg Daverio Dep. at 234 (agrees with subpart H of

) Contention Ex 16 that hospital officials did not participate in j the Exercise).  :

lO This falls short of LERO Plan requirements. Nobody at the  ;

hospitals was even apprised of the simulated emergency -- let alone notified by tone alerts and the EES, as set forth in the '

i

g Plan (Appendix A, at IV-172). The LERO Health Facilities Coordinator did not telephone the hospitals and verify that they had heard EBS messages (simulated in this Exercise) or that they l

!O were implementing sheltering. No one evaluated whether hospitals could implement a sheltering recommendation. No consideration  !

! was given to evacuating any or all of the patients. Nor were  ;

i

!O means of transport, places for relocation, or means of registering, monitoring and decontaminating these patients given consideration -- let alone coordinated or discussed with hospital ,

O officials the capability of implementing protective actions, gag

l OPI? 3.6.5 for details about how hospitals were to be notified I i l l and assisted by LERO.

lO  ;

i  :

I l

1 0 _1o1 -

1

)

The situation with respect to the EPZ nursing and adult homes does not seem to be much different. Although LILCO states that the two nursing homes with which it had pre-Exercise arrangements participated in the Exercise (LILCO Admission Nos. 24, 25), there are no player documents showing actual contact with officials at these homes or indicating that i

protective actions were actually discussed with them. Players at the EOC merely marked the Suffolk Infirmary as "sheltered" and 3

the other nursing homes as "evacuated" at some point during the course of the Exercise. OPIP 3.6.5, Attachment 2, February 13, 3 1986.

(Baranski, Colwell, Czech, Papile, Petrone, Zook) FEMA's O evaluation, in our opinion, should have extended beyond simply l

the LILCO players making a sheltering determination. That evalu-ation should also have included the ability of the LILCO players, O after the recommendation was made, actually to contact the hospi-l l tal staff. FEMA should also have had evaluators at one or more l

hospitals to evaluate the communications and to determine if the l

3 hospital administrator is aware of how his facility is integrated into the entire offsite radiological emergency plan and that he/she has knowledge and is capable to effectuate protective C) action recommendations.

O O - 102 -

1 - _ _ _ - - __ _ ___ _ __________ .

'O (Colwell, Minor, Petrone, Zook) Further, there was no 1

demonstration of the capabilities of facilities outside of the i

EPZ to receive any special facility evacuees. The LERO players j made no actual contact with officials at reception centers and .

hospitals outside the EPZ who were supposed to receive nursing

O ,

home evacuees. Sag LILCO' Admission No. 26; Daverio Dep. at 237  !

(Mr. Daverio agrees with facts alleged in Contention Ex 16.J, namely t at fi a8 I m 8Pi tals, nurshg homes, and similar O

facilities outside the EPZ that are relied upon for special facility evacuees did not participate in the Exercise).47  !

O FEMA has admitted that no officials from hospitals, nursing t t

homes, or similar facilities outside the 10-mile EPZ participated

O in the Exercise in any way. FEMA Admission No. 44. FEMA has ,

also admitted that it did not observe or evaluate the availabil- [

ity or adequacy of the United Cerebral Palsy Residence in Stony O Brook and the VA Hospital in Northport to serve as relocation l

centers on the grounds that FEMA does not evaluate "sublevel" emergency plans. FEMA Admission, Nos. 48, 51.

10  :

47 (Colwell, Minor, Petrone, Zook) During the Exercise, an ambulette drove up to the United Cerebral Palsy Residence in Stony Brook, which is designated as the reception center for residents of the United Cerebral Palsy of Greater Suffolk O facility in Ridge, New York. Egg Exercise Free Play Message, Ambulette. Similarly, the ambulance which simulated the evacuation of a resident from Our Lady of Perpetual Help Convent drove to the VA Hospital in Northport. Sag Exercise Free Play ,

Message, Ambulance. This hospital is not listed as a relocation l center for Our Lady of Perpetual Help Convent in the Plan. No  !

O activities occurred at either of these places, nor were there any [

contacts with these facilities, or with officials from them, i during the Exercise. l l

i O _ to3 _  ;

l

,0 It must be further emphasized that LILCO has identified no

reception centers for most nursing / adult home residents. It is

O impossible in these circumstances to conclude from the Exercise Snat LILCO could effect an evacuation of this population when there is no place to take people. Similarly, since ambulances O

must make more than one run, they need to know where they are taking people, particularly in order to calculate how long it may

O take. In the earlier Partial Initial Decision, the Licensing Board found the LILCO Plan deficient because it failed to identify reception centers for nursing and adult home evacuees.

'O 21 NRC at 840. However, during the Exercise, this same defi-ciency continued to exist, but was ignored by LILCO and FEMA.

Under these circumstances, one must find that a further major lO observable element of the Plan -- the reception centers for nursing and adult home residents -- was omitted, thus under-scoring that the Shoreham Exercise was not a full participation

O exercise.

Next, no procedures for radiological monitoring and

O decontamination of special facility evacuees were demonstrated.

They were apparently excluded from the Exercise. 13.t Daverio Dep. at 248-49 (agreeing with facts set forth in first sentence lO of Contention Ex 15.K). Both FEMA and LILCO have also admitted that, during the Exercise, there was no demonstration of the i

I

)O

- 104 -

1

O registering, monitoring or decontamination of evacuees from 8pecial facilities. FEMA Admist. ion No. 37; LILCO Admission O

No. 192.

O In short, except for observing simulated phone calls from the EOC to special facilities in the EPZ and reception hospitals outside the EPZ, a simu.ated recommendation to hospitals and the O suffolk Infirmary to shelter, and the two limited ambulance and ambulette runs (discussed below) in which the emergency personnel made no contact with either the facilities being evacuated or the o facilities receiving evacuees, FEMA neither observed nor evalu-ated LILCO's ability to implement protective actions for the residents of special facilities. Thus, the Exercise results O offer no basis for a conclusion that LILCO can adequately assure the health and safety of the residents of special facilities in l

the event of a Shoreham emergency. In fact, the results of the

(

13 Exercise do not offer assurance that LILCO could even contact i

these facilities in the event of an emergency.

O Q. It appears from the foregoing that with respect to special facility evacuees, LILCO demonstated very little.

However, you stated earlier that there was some sort of a demon-O stration of ambulance capability. Please explain.

O O

- 105 -

O A. (Colwell, Minor, Petrone, Zook) There was not very much demonstration. We set forth below what we understand to O

have occurred. Egg Daverio Dep. at 249 (agreeing with facts alleged in Contention Ex 16.L.).

O At 8:19, the Hospital Coordinator began conta' ig reception hospitals. Emergency Medical /Public Services Coordinator Log, February 13, 1986. Although the FEMA evaluator believed these z) vere actual phone calls (Malina Dep. at 39), apparently, the i

hospitals were not actually contacted. LILCO Admission Nos. 24-iO 25. At 8:25, the Ambulance Coordinator began calling ambulance companies to ascertain ambulance availability. Ambulance Coordinator Log, February 13, 1986. It is not known whether

.O these were simulated calls, but LILCO has admitted that only two ambulance companies participated in the Exercise. LILCO Admission No. 35. Thus, it is our assumption that any calls

,0 beyond calls possibly to the two participating companies were

! simulated.

lO The two ambulance companies which did participate in the Exercise sent a total of 12 ambulances and ambulettes to the EWDF. FEMA observed the dispatch of all 12 vehicles (FEMA I) Amended Answer to Admission No. 45), and then observed and evaluated one ambulance and one ambulette route.

O O - los -

1 O

The ambulette route observed by FEMA was from the United O Cerebral Palsy Residence in Ridge to the United Cerebral Palsy Residence in Stony Brook. The ambulette used in the demonstra-tion arrived at the EWDF/EOC at 9:50. The free play message g requesting its dispatch was inserted at 10:30, but did not reach the Ambulance Coordinator until 10:55. The ambulette then was dispatched from the EWDF at 11:14, but did not make its simulated o pick-up until 11:54, and arrived back at the EWDF at 1:00. Egg Exercise Free Play Message, Ambulette. The FEMA evaluator who accompanied the driver on his route considered the demonstration

.() successful, but did note that "a second person would be helpful to the driver for map reading and message handling over the radio." EECF, Field 13, D. Hulet. The ambulette evaluator also O noted that, when asked, "the ambulette driver was unsure when he l should take KI. Additional training is suggested for drivers."

t EECF, Field 7, D. Hulet.

.O

, The ambulance run from Our Lady of Perpetual Help Convent in Sound Beach to the Veterans Administration Ecspital was also O rated satisfactory by FEMA. EECF, Field 13, P. Lutz. The ambu-lance used in this run also arrived at the EWDF at 9:50. The free play message requesting the ambulance was injected at 10:30 C

but the ambulance was not dispatched until 11:05. The simulated

() -

l

'O

- 107 -

1 __.

pickup at the convent did not occur until 12:05; the ambulance

- did not arrive at the VA Hospital until 1:14, and returned to the J

EWDF at 1:36. Egg Exercise Free Play Message, Ambulance.48 g Q. In your opinion, was the demonstration and evaluation of LILCO's ability to implement its ambulance /ambulette evacua-tion of the EPZ adequate to constitute a part of a full partici-3 pation exercise?

A. (Colwell, Petrone, Zook) No. First, as we have noted O above, the LILCO Plan relies on the availability of 192 of these emergency vehicles. LILCO Admission No. 32. During the Exercise, even on paper, LILCO was apparently only able to O ' marshal 159 vehicles. LERO Message Form, No. AC-3, February 13, 1986. Even as to the 159 vehicles which LILCO claimed were available during the Exercise, FEMA did nothing to verify their O actual availability beyond noting that the ambulance companies did provide 6 ambulances and 6 ambulettes. Kowieski 1/29/87 Dep.

at 171, 249-50. Nor did FEMA determine whether there were suffi-O cient numbers'of trained drivers or other emergency medical 48 FEMA did not observe or evaluate the availability or adequacy of either the VA Hospital in Northport or the United C)

Cerebral P31sy Residence in Stony Brook to serve as reception facilities for the persons supposedly evacuated there during the Exercise. Ega, FEMA Admission Nos. 48, 51. Nor did FEMA determine whether the officials from the sending facilities had agreed to or approved the reception facilities proposed by LILCO.

Egg, FEMA Admission Nos. 49, 52. There was no interfacing at all g' between the ambulance /ambulette drivers anc any person from the sending facility, and FEMA did not evaluate any communications between ambulances and medical facilities. Kowleski 1/28/87 Dep.

at 266.

O

- 108 -

personnel to man the vehicles required for an evacuation. Egg FEMA Admission No. 141.49 It is quite possible the vehicles "LERO" is counting on in an emergency might be committed else-where, 12gt, to the special facilities and hospitals listed in Attachment 2 of OPIP 3.6.5 which apparently have their own trans-portation available. Finally, FEMA did not even interview any officials of ambulance companies. Kowieski 1/29/87 Dep. at 175.

3 FEMA's failure to verify the availability of ambulances and ambulettes contradicts FEMA's prior testimony in these D Proceedings:

Q: It is fair to say, Mr. Rowieski, when you talk about the evaluation that would be e conducted during an exercise with respect to ambulances that, again, FEMA would rely on a sampling approach to determine whether the number of ambulances identified in the plan would actually be available to LILCO during an emergency?

3 At We would rely on our interviews of responsible officials that are in control and can direct and allocate resources during the emergency, that is correct.

J Q: With respect to the LILCO plan, Mr.

Kowieski, such officials would be or would include officials with the ambulance companies, correct?

3 49 The FEMA evaluator was told by a LERO player that additional vehicles would be available from volunteer ambulance and fire 8 companies, but apparently FEMA did nothing to ascertain either the existence or the availability of these vehicles. Egg Malina Dep. at 59, 65.

3 - 109 -

~ -

3 O

A: That is correct.

O (Tr. 12,242, July 10, 1984.)

Second, as can be seen from our description of the Plan, the dispatching of the ambulances and ambulettes from the EWDF to run

)

their routes, if it is to occur timely, requires close coordina-tion between personnel at the EOC and the ambulance companies.50 i

The Exercise only demonstrated the ability to achieve this z) coordination when 2 ambulance companies and 12 vehicles were involved, and then the runs were not particularly timely. And it O is clear that even this scaled-down demonstration taxed LERO's

! capabilities. For example, one observer at the EOC who was supposed to evaluate "Special Evacuations" noted that the iO "(g)roup continues to operate as individuals. No group decisions involved." Special Evacuations Log, February 13, 1986. The LERO Ambulance Coordinator, in particular, seems to have played a lone

() hand. The observer who evaluated EOC Communications noted that, at 12:52, the Ambulance Coordinator logged the first two ambula.nes which returned, but failed to inform the Health l

0 Facilities Coordinator and the Special Facilities Evacuation Coordinator. The LERO Health Facilities Coordinator did not learn until 1:50 that the ambulance run from the United Cerebral

~

C) Palsy Residence was completed, even though the run was completed l

50 The EOC has no radio communications with the ambulances.

Thus, to make contact with the drivers, the EOC must either go O through the dispatchers at the ambulance companies, or actually send personnel to meet the drivers at the EWDF. Kowieski 1/28/87 Dep. at 264-70.

O _ 11g _

O at 1:00. Fufthermore, at 1:20, the Ambulance Coordinator sent out a vehicle on a second run to simulate an evacuation from the '

Woodhaven Nursing Home without discussing which reception i hospital was going to be used with either the Health Facilities -

O Coordinator or the Health Services Coordinator. Nor did the l Ambulance Coordinator check on traffic impediments or the plume '

before dispatching the vehicle; as a result, the driver was not O briefed on either of these critical points before he was sent out. EOC Communications Log, February 13, 1986. The Ambulance Coordinator actually missed the interject of the free play

o messages because at 10:30, he was downstairs briefing ambulance l drivers at the EWDF, rather than at his post. Ambulance Coordinator Log. If such breakdowns in procedure occurred when lO only 12 vehicles needed to be dispatched, it is reasonable to f

assume that, in a real emergency, with more than 10 times that l number of vehicles to be dealt with, chaos would reign.

!O Third, even with no passengers to pick up or drop off, the round-trip ( h , from the EWDF and back) ambulance run took 2 ,

O hours and 25 minutes, and the ambulette run took one hour and 45 l

minutes. If the LILCO leading time estimates are added to these route times,51 it is clear that an evacuation requiring each '

,0 emergency vehicle (or most of them) to make two runs could not be accomplished in under 5 hours5.787037e-5 days <br />0.00139 hours <br />8.267196e-6 weeks <br />1.9025e-6 months <br />. When dispatch and turnaround O SI LILCO assumes it takes 15 minutes to load an ambulette (20 minutes in adverse weather) and 20 minutes to load an ambulance (30 minutes in adverse weather). Plan, Appendix A, at IV-176.

O

- 111 - '

times are added to the loading and driving times -- even using the optimum dispatch times achieved during the Exercise when LILCO personnel only had to deal with 12 vehicles at a time -- it is obvious that LILCO could not meet the evacuation time esti-mates it reported in the Plan. Yet this crucial factor -- h ,

whether the Exercise demonstrated that the evacuation by ambulance and ambulette could be implemented in a timely manner

, -- was not even evaluated by FEMA. FEMA Admission No. 135. FEMA made no attempt to determine whether the times achieved on the two routes actually run during the Exercise supported LILCO's time estimates for a two-wave evacuation. Sjltg Malina Dep. at 48.

3 Fourth, to the extent that actual demonstrations were made g (or simulated), the FEMA evaluation or analysis was perfunctory.

Of the 12 routes apparently driven, FF.MA actually evaluated only two. FEMA did not consider the evacuation times actually yielded 3 by evaluation of these two routes in concluding that an ambulance /ambulette evacuation could be accomplished in 3 1/2 to 4 hours4.62963e-5 days <br />0.00111 hours <br />6.613757e-6 weeks <br />1.522e-6 months <br />. Malina Dep. at 48. FEMA also did nothing to verify the e actual availability of the numbers of vehicles the LILCO Plan says are needed for an evacuation of the handicapped (_i_4. at 45, 64), nor did FEMA check whether those facilities which have said 6 they could arrange their own transportation would be calling on the same vehicles for which LERO has contracted.

O 8 - 112 -

O Despite the limited demonstration and superficiality of its I

review, FEMA concluded that the LERO EOC had met the Exercise '

O objective of demonstrating the organizational ability to manage an orderly evacuation of all or part of the 10-mile EPZ (objective EOC 16), as well as the Exercise objective of demon-strating a sample of resources necessary to effect an orderly evacuation of the institutionalized mobility-impaired within the l'0-mile EPZ (objective Field 13). FEMA Report at 34, 43. FEMA's

-limited observations do not support such strong conclusions.

O In summary, the demonstration observed by FEMA can afford no sound basis for a conclusion that, in the event of a real emergency, LILCO is capable of coordinating and implementing an O evacuati n by ambulance and ambulette of special facilities, hospitals, and residences in the EPZ. LILCO demonstrated, and FEMA observed, no capability of coordinating with hospitals out-O side the EPZ to receive the evacuees, no capability of coordin-ating with facilities inside the EPZ to organize transport arrangements, no capability of marshalling and dispatching the O minimum number of vehicles which would be required, even for a two-stage evacuation, no capability of achieving the evacuation time estimates reported to FEMA or contained in the LILCO Plan, O and no capability of integrating all the relevant information received at the EOC about the emergency and the offsite response with the ambulance /ambulette evacuation. In fact, LILCO did not O even demonstrate that it could communicate with special facil-O _ 113

D ities. In sum, therefore, the demonstration and evaluation was too limited to constitute a part of a full participation exer-cise.

, Q. Please summarize, gentlemen, your conclusions regarding the Shoreham Exercise insofar as special facility residents are concerned.

S A. (All) The demonstration by LERO and special facility officials and ambulance company personnel was so limited during g the Exercise that one cannot conclude that there was an adequate testing of a major observable portion of LILCO's Plan or suffi-cient mobilization of resources to verify that there could be an 3 adequate response to the accident scenario. Further, we must emphasize that we believe that FEMA's evaluation was insuffi-cient. Indeed, FEMA's evaluation extended basically only to one 3 ambulance and one ambulette and, also, apparently to some simu-lated telephone calls to various health facilities. There were no actual telephone calls made and there was no evaluation, even J on a spot check basis, of the capabilities of any special facil-ities to undertake the actions which were contemplated by the LILCO Plan. Further, FEMA did not even evaluate whether LILCO 3 had reception facilities outside the EPZ to accept personnel. In all of these circumstances, we must conclude that there was not a full participation exercise.

3

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O E. Coast Guard / Water Portion of the EPZ O

^

Q. Gentlemen, subparts B and H of Contention Ex 15 and subpart B of Contention Ex 16 deal with matters related to the

)

g water portion of the Shoreham 10-mile EPZ and the Coast Guard's I participation in the Exercise. Are you familiar with those contention subparts?

'O A. Yes.

O Q. Please state those contention subparts.

A. EX 15.B. Procedures for notification of, and issuance of protective action recommendations o to, the members of the public in the water portion of the plume exposure EPZ, as set forth in OPIP 3.3.4, and at pages 2.2-2a and 3.3-5 and Appendix A at IV-4 and IV-6 of the i

LILCO Plan, were excluded from the exercise, in that the U.S. Coast Guard did not O participate in the exercise (other than perhaps the receipt of one or more telephone calls) and FEHA never evaluated Coast Guard performance (assuming arcuendo there was any).

Such capabilities are required by 10 CFR S 50.47(b)(5), 10 CFR Part 50, App. E. S IV.D, C) and NUREG 0654 SS II.E and F, Appendix 3, and the exercise was supposed to (but did not) test the alleged Coast Guard commitment under the LILCO Plan to notify water-borne traffic in the EPZ. Egi, L.5La., FEMA Report at 9; objective EOC 16. The water portion of the X,) EPZ constitutes nearly 50 percent of the physical area of the plume EPZ. The exclusion of such procedures from the exercise precludes a finding of reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a Shoreham emergency, as

.O required by 10 CFR S 50.47(a)(1).

Accordingly, the LILCO Plan is fundamentally flawed. ,

O - 115 -

e EX 15.H. Demonstration of the capability of implementing protective action recommendations for the public on the waters of the plume e exposure EPZ, or for transients on beaches or in parks or similar areas in the EPZ, as set forth in OPIP 3.3.4, and at pages 2.2-2a, 3.3-4 thru 3.3-6, 3.8-1 thru 3.8-3, and Appendix A at IV-4 and IV-6 of the LILCO Plan, was excluded from the exercise. Such 3 capabilities are required by 10 CFR S 10.47(b)(10), and NUREG 0654 SS II.J, and objectives FIELD 9 and EOC 16 required a demonstration of the ability to evacuate all or part of the 10-mile EPZ including the water portion. There in fact was no demonstration 8 of any ability to effect an evacuation of the water portion of the EPZ. This exclusion from the exercise precludes a finding of reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a J

Shoreham accident as required by 10 CFR S 50.47(a)(1). Accordingly, the LILCO Plan is fundamentally flawed.

EX 16.B. The U.S. Coast Guard did not participate in the exercise beyond perhaps g receiving phone calls. It is relied upon for initial notification of, and communication and implementation of protective action recommendations to, members of the public in the water portion of the plume exposure EPZ, and for private and commercial vessel traffic o control and access restriction on the water portion of the EPZ. Egg LILCO Plan at 2.2-2a, 3.3-5; OFIP 3.3.4. The water portion of the EPZ constitutes approximately 50 percent of the entire EPZ. FEMA did not observe or evaluate the Coast Guard's performance of any

'O of these activities, including, if it occurred in fact, the dispatching of any Coast Guard vessels into the EPZ.

Q. How is the Coast Guard relied upon in the Plan?

A. (Colwell. Hinor, Petrone, Zook) LILCO relies upon the Coast Guard to receive notifications from LERO and then to O

disseminate protective action recommendations on the water

.O - 116 -

I -~

l e

portion of the EPZ. In essence, the Coast Guard is to implement all actions necessary on the water portion of the EPZ. Plan at 3

2.2-2a; Attachment 2.2.2.

Q. What is your understanding about activities during the

.O Exercise which pertain to the water portion of the EPZ?

A. (Colwell, Minor, Petrone, Zook) According to the FEMA Report, the U.S. Coast Guard participated in the Exercise. FEMA Report at 111. And objective EOC 16 specifies that there was to O

Se a demonstration of "the organization's ability to manage an orderly evacuation of all or part of the 10-mile EPZ including the water portion." FEMA Report at 10. FEMA found that this O bjective was satisfied (FEMA Report at 34), but FEMA does not specify in the Report how or in what way this ' objective was satisfied insofar as the water portion of the EPZ is concerned.

() The Report does state that LERO notified the Coast Guard at about 7:55. FEMA Report at 38.

O Q. Have any' documents other than the FEMA Report served to provide you with any details concerning what in fact was done during the Exercise pertaining to the water portion of the EPZ?

.O

,o .

O - 117 -

3 A. (Colwell, Minor Petrone, Zook) Yes. We have been provided co; Ss of certain discovery materials which provide D

additional details concerning this matter. It is our under-standing that the following took place.

D According to LILCO, the U.S. Coast Guard received two phone calls during the Exercise from the LERO Evacuation Coordinator and made six phone calls to that Coordinator to report on simu-lated evacuation of the water portion of the EPZ. LILCO Supplemental Admission No. 1. LILCO also indicates that at

~s 11:27, the Coast Guard sent a boat into the water portion of the o

EPZ "to perform the functions required under the LILCO Plan and reported to the Evacuation Coordinator that the water evacuation g was completed at 11:51 a.m." 14.52 FEMA has also provided additional information concerning the O Coast Guard's purported participation during the Exercise.

FEMA's factual account differs somewhat from that of LILCO.

Thus, FEMA states:

O The FEMA observer during the exercise directly observed communications between LERO EOC and the Coast Guard, both by telephone and by radio. Additionally, during the exercise, the FEMA observer verified, with the Coast Guard that the Coast Guard took or simulated O protective actions for the public notification in the water part of the EPZ. The Coast Guard 52 LILCO seems to have been as much in the dark about the Coast Guard's "participation" as the Governments were. In LILCO's initial responses to the Governments' Admission Requests, LILCO O indicated that the Coast Guard's only "participation" in the Exercise had been to receive telephone calls from LERO. LILCO Admission No. 1.

O _ its _

g' simulated the~ establishing of a Maritime

-Safety Zone for the watar part of the EPZ and n . simulated making emergency radio broadcasts to v all shipping on the distress frequencies. The Coast Guard also dispatched a patrol boat to

~

the water part of the EPZ for access control at 10:20. The boat was on scene 11:27, reported the area clear at 11:51 and returned

• **" "*"*" ** 17'38' O

FEMA Admission No. 13. FEMA appears to believe that its verification through such radio and telephone contacts consti-C) tuted a proper evaluation of the Coast Guard's capabilities and other actions during the Exercise. FEMA Admission Nos. 14-16.

O Q. Do you disagree with the statements made by LILCO and FEMA in their admission responses?

O A. (All) We are not in a position to agree or disagree with the statements that phone call exchanges took place, that the Coast Guard dispatched a boat, or that the Coast Guard simu-O lated emergency radio broadcasts to vessels on the water portion of the EPZ.53 However, we do believe that this assumed partici-pation by the Coast Guard did not constitute the proper means under the circumstances of providing e demonstration that Exercise objective EOC 16 was satisfied.

O 53 We note, however, that the FEMA evaluator who performed some sort of review of the Coast Guard actually was assigned to ride an ambulance and evaluate the evacuation of the mobility-g impaired. He observed communications with the Coast Guard after he had completed the ambulance ride. Kowieski 1/28/87 Dep. at 238-40; FEMA Report at 5. Accordingly, the degree of actual FEMA evaluation of LERO/ Coast Guard communications is not clear.

O _ 119

O.

Please explain the basis for your previous statement.

'Q.

O A. (Baranski, Czech, Papile) Based on our prior experi- ;

ence, a demonstration and evaluation of the Coast Guard's  !

() ' capability to implement protective actions on the water portion f of the EPZ is important. In a number of exercises in New York

~ State, the coast Guard was required to make such demonstrations o' and through such demonstrations it was discovered that Coast i Guard personnel needed further training, particularly in '

dosimetry and radiological exposure control.

O In our experience, a proper evaluation of the Coast Guard i

performance could not be made through radio or telephone calls ,

O with the Coast Guard. We know that face-to-face evaluation has  !

taken place in other exercises in New York State; we do not know why it did not take place in the Shoreham Exercise.54 However, !

() in our opinion, based on what we understand in fact occurred, there was no adequate demonstration of the capability of the Coast Guard to play a role in the LILCO Plan for Shoreham.

O ,

54 Prior to the Exercise, there apparently was consideration of closer FEMA evaluation of Coast Guard performance. It apparently was undecided, however, as to whether the Coast Guard would only C) receive and make telephone calls or whether it would dispatch a vessel. The FEMA evaluator did not know until the Exercise that a vessel was actually dispatched. Kowieski 1/28/87 Dep. at 236-

38. Objective EOC 16 also would have required the Coast Guard to demonstrate a 45-minute notification capabiity. This apparently was deleted as an objective when FEMA decided it would not O observe any Coast Guard vessel during the Exercise and it was unclear the degree to which the Coast Guard would participate.

Daverio Dep. at 16-18; Deposition of Edward Tanzman (November 25, 1986) at 143-45; Kowieski 1/28/87 Dep. at 200-01, 279-80.

O

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1 l

9- '

Q. It has been suggested that since the Coast Guard is in the-business of dispatching boats everyday, there was no need to have FEMA observe such an action. Sig Kowieski 1/28/87 Dep. at 1

238. Do you agree?

O A. (Baranski, Czech, Papile, Petrone) No. The dispatch of a boat is not the key. The key is the Coast Guard's formula-() tion of a message and demonstrating the ability to get.the message to boaters within 45 minutes.

g Q. From the perspective of assessing whether the Shoreham ,

Exercise was a full participation exercise, do you believe it was important that FEMA failed to evaluate the Coast Guard's o performance in a first-hand manner?

A. (Baranski, Czech, Papile, Petrone) Yes. The water O portion of the EPZ for Shoreham constitutes approximately one-half of the plume exposure EPZ. During certain months of the year, we would expect that there would be large numbers of O beaters on those waters. Thus, this clearly constitutes an important portion of the emergency planning zone for Shoreham, and it was incumbent to test that portion of the Plan and to O verify the capability to respond to the accident scensrio.

O  :

O

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D FEMA has failed in this instance to verify / evaluate the 3 Coast Guard's ability to respond. Such verification cannot be made by telephone. Rather, it takes face-to-face evaluation. In these circumstances, therefore, one must conclude that this

) aspect of the Shoreham Exercise did not constitute a full partic-ipation exercise.

O F. Buses i

1. Statement of Contention Suboarts

.O Q. Which contentions cover this aspect of the Exercise and its evaluation?

O .

A.' As far as buses are concerned, subpart K of Contention Ex 16 speaks to this issue.

!O l

Q. Please state subpart K of Contention Ex 16.

1 O A. Subpart K of Contention Ex 16 states:

The following bus companies or yards did not participate in the exercises (1) Baumann & Sons Buses, Inc. -- East Northport Yard (50)

(2) Baumann & Sons Buses, Inc. -- Amityville Yard (74)

'O l 1

1 1

4

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i O

(3) Huntington Coach Corp. (100)

(4) Herman E. Swezey Co., Inc. (29)

(5) United Bus Corp. -- Ronkonkoma Yard (46)

(6) Suffolk Transportation Service, Inc. --

Lakeland Yard (40)

C) (7) Suffolk Transportation Service, Inc. --

Bayshore Yard (147)

(8) Coram Bus Service -- Coram Yard (39)

O (9) Coram Bus Service -- Rocky Point Yard (27)

(10) Louis A. Fuoco Buslines, Inc. (39)

(11) Starlite Bus Co., Inc. (60)

O (12) Seaman Bus Co., Inc. (35)

They are relied upon for implementation of the protective action of evacuation in that the LILCO Plan assumes that each listed entity O w uld provide for LILCO's use the number of buses indicated in parentheses above. Egg LILCO Plan, App. B.; OPIP 3.6.4. -

Q. Do any other contentions address the lack of a demon-O stration of LERO's ability to evacuate those who would rely on LERO to provide buses for an evacuation?

O A. Yes. Contention Ex 18.C(i), which the Licensing Board "incorporated" in Contentions Ex 15/16, also deals with this.

O Q. Please state the relevant portion of Contention Ex 18.

1

O l

l l(3 - 123 -

)

A. Contention Ex 18.C(i) states:

) The exercise did not ensure that emergency organization personnel are familiar with their duties. As described below and in Contention EX 16, the organizations and personnel listed in Contention EX 16 did not participate in the

, exercise and the participation of certain other organizations was so limited that the exercise did not ensure that the personnel of such organizations, relied upon for implemen-tation of the LILCO Plan, are familiar with their duties. Specifically:

(1) The "participation" of the following bus companies or yards in the exercise consisted merely of receiving a telephone call and a request that only 122I buses be prepared for LILCO's use (the LILCO Plan assumes each 3 yard actually will provide the number of business listed in parentheses):

(a) Bruno Bus Company (30)

(b) Educational Bus Transportation, Inc.

D (100)

(c) Suburbia Bus Corp. -- Setanket Yard (80)

(d) Suburbia Bus Corp. -- Middle Island D Yard (110)

(e) United Bus Corp. -- Yaphank Yard (64)

(f) United Bus Corp. -- Coram Yard (90)

(g) Baumann & Sons Buses, Inc. --

Westhampton Yard (5)

(h) Baumann & Sons Buses, Inc. --

J Schemia Yard (90)

0. Are there any cther contentions which relate to this matter?

O

- 124 -

l Cj i A. Subpart J and part of subpart N of Contention Ex 20

O also relate to LERO's failure to demonstrate the capability of evacuating persons who rely on buses for leaving the EPZ. Egg

, Attachment 5 for their text.

O

2. Discussion y) Q. Do you agree with the basic allegations of these contentions, and particularly whether the Exercise was of suffi-cient scope such that LILCO could demonstrate the capability to

() deal with the needs of persons without cars?

A. (All) Yes, we believe that the scope of the testing,

'() mobilisation, and evaluation of bus personnel and other bus-i related resources during the Exercise was limited and did not l

l permit verification of the capability to respond to the accident lO scenario.

Q. Please explain the bases for this conclusion.

O A. To explain our bases, it first is necessary to explain i

the LILCO Plan's complex bus provisions and then compare that i(3 "plan" with what actually occurred during the Exercise, i

l l

10 i

O - 125 -

O (a) The LILCO Bus Plan O

Q. Please explain LILCO's bus plan as it existed on the day of the Exercise.

O A. (Colwell, Minor, Petrone, Zook) LILCO estimates that there are approximately 11,000 transit-dependent persons in the O g e ral p pulation who would rely on LSCO buses to evacuate them in the event of a Shoreham emergency. Plan, Appendix A, at IV-74g thru IV-74h, Table XIII. To accommodate these persons, LILCO

.g has developed a bus evacuation plan, which is implemented in two stages. First, the plan calls for 236 40-passenger "route" buses to travel through the emergency suozones picking up transit-lO d*P*ndent Persons. These buses start their routes one hour after I

the recommendation to evacuate is made to the general public.

f Plan, Appendix A, at IV-74b. The i,'ite buses are deployed from,

!O and return with their passengers to, 11 bus "transfer points."

l Six of these transfer points are within 10 miles of the plant; I

! the remaining 5 are a mile or two further out. Plan, Appendix A, lO at IV-74c.

i I

l At the transfer points, passengers disembark from the O "route" buses and get on "transfer" buses, which then take them to the Reception Center (the Nassau Coliseum during the l Exercise). There are 97 transfer buses. Plan, Appendix A, at lO IV-74a thru IV-74c. Once the transfer buses arrive at the l

0 - 126 -

9 Reception Center and discharge their passengers, some of the I transfer buses return for more passengers, while others remain at j

the Reception Center to shuttle people to the congregate care '

centers after they have been processed at the Center. OPIP 3.6.4, Attachment 2.

g Altogether, the LILCO Plan requires a total of 333 buses and g drivers, many of whom make multiple runs. As can be seen from i the charts at pages IV-741 thru IV-74xb of Appendix A of the LILCO Plan, LILCO's bus evacuation plan is a rather complicated O 1 gistical arrangement. In order for it to work, the times for running bus routes, and the times between bus runs, which are f

estimated in the Plan, must be adhered to.

O Q. Please describe the logistics of this LILCO bus plan in L

more detail.

i O

A. (Colwell, Minor, Petrone, Zook) Implementation of this ,

bus evacuation plan is the function of the "Transportation O Support Group." Procedures for executing the plan are contained in OPIP 3.6.4. As set fcrth in those procedures, when a Site Area Emergency is declared, the Manager of Local Response, after l K3 consulting with the Radiation Health Coordinator, directs the Evacuation Coordinator to begin "prestaging" buses to some or all l  :

bus transfer points. OPIP 3.6.4 $ 5.1.1. The Evacuation o

d3 - 127 -

I b

Coordinator then instructs the Transportation Support Coordinator

, to direct the Bus Coordinators to begin bus deployment or route a

evacuations. OPIP 3.6.4 S 5.2.1.

, The Bus Coordinators, meanwhile, are supposed to have J

completed part of their tasks earlier. As soon as an Alert is declared, the Bus Coordinators are supposed to contact the bus g companies which are under contract to LILCO, to ascertain the potential numbers of buses available for an evacuation. OPIP 3.6.4 5 5.3.1. (The 20 bus yards upon which LILCO can call for g buses are listed in Atuachment 3 to OPIP 3.6.4). Using the number of buses available, the Bus Coordinators are then supposed to assign particular bus company yards to each of the three g Staging Areas established under the LILCO Plan. OPIP 3.6.4 5 5.3.3. Then, using Attachment 5 to OPIP 3.6.4 (which lists "Bus Evacuation Requirements By Zone"), the Bus coordinators are O to determine the number of buses required, the number of bus transfer points to be activated, and the number of bus drivers required from each LERO staging area. Using this information, O the Bus Coordinators then fill out, for each staging area, a form listing the number of drivers needed for particular transfer points and the bus company yards from which they are to obtain O buses. Plan, OPIP 3.6.4, SS 5.3.5 thru 5.3.7; 111 A112 OPIP 3.6.4, Attachment 10. Once these forms have been filled out, O

O - 128 -

O l

\

they are given to the Evacuation Support Communicators who relay I 1

g the information in the forms to the Bus Dispatchers at the staging areas. OPIP 3.6.4 5 5.3.7.

O The Bus Dispatcher at each staging area copies down the information relayed to him from the EOC by the Evacuation Support Communicator. OPIP 3.6.4 SS 5.5.2. Each Bus Dispatcher then

() briefs the Transfer Point Coordinators and gives each one a filled out "Bus / Van Dispatching Form." The entries made on this form are keyed to maps which give the Transfer Point Coordinators

,0 directions from the staging area to their respective bus transfer points. Egg OPIP 3.6.4, Attachment 7.

O Once the Transfer Point Coordinators have been dispatched, the Bus Dispatcher of each staging area (r.ssisted by any unassigned Transfer Point Coordinators), turns to dispatching bus

O drivers. First, bus drivers are assigned to transfer points in accordance with pre-established guidelines which set forth the number of drivers required at each transfer point. OPIP 3.6.4 iO 5 5.5.10; 111 Attachment 8 (to the OPIP) which contains the guidelines. The bus drivers are then briefed and given dosimetry. OPIP 3.6.4 $$ 5.5.11 thru 5.5.14. As each bus driver

() is dispatched, he is also given a copy of the "Bus / Van Dispatch

! Form", filled in with numbers which correspond to maps giving him directions: 1) to the bus yard where he is to pick up his bus;

) and 2) from the bus yard to his assigned bus transfer point.

- 129 -

1 OPIP 3.6.4 $15.5.12. Once the driver arrives at his transfer point, he is given a packet which contains a map of the route he is to drive and the corresponding identification sign for his

bus.55 When an evacuation recommendation is made, the LERO Private

schools Coordinator is supposed to call each nursery school, j parochial school, and school for the handicapped, verify their transportation requirements, and then pass this information on to the LERO Transportation Support Coordinator. OPIP 3.6.5 3 5 5.10.3(d). The Health Facilities Coordinator is supposed to call and obtain the transportation requirements for each nursing home and "handicapped" facility, and then pass the information j relating to bus and van requirements to the Transportation support Coordinator. OPIP 3.6.5 $ 5.9.2(a), (c). Meanwhile, the Transportation Support Coordinator, once he knows whic,h r.ubsones J are being evacuated, is supposed to determine the number of buaes which will be needed for curbside pickup of the homebound.56 55 f.dditional procedures setting forth how "special J populations" (LL., handicapped, etc. persons, who do not require transport by ambulance) are to be evacuated are contained in OPIP 3.6.5. LILCO has determined that, in the event of a full 10-mile evacuation, five buses and eight vans would be required for "curbside pickup" of the homebound mobility-impaired, and an additional 39 buses (14, if the evacuation is at night) would be 3 required from LILCO to evacuate special facilities, including private schools. OPIP 3.6.5, Attachment 12.

l 56 Homebound residents of the EPE who will require assistance i from LILCO in the event of an evacuation are supposed to register i

with LILCo. LILCO maintains a list of these individuals, which h includes a notation as to what type of transportation assistance they need (e.g., ambulance, curbside pickup) and whether or not l

(footnote continued) p - 130 -

1 L. .

l l

After the Transportation Support Coordinator has determined the bus and van requirements for the special populations evacua-l tion, he is to give this information to the Bus coordinators so I that they can include such information in the vehicle assignment i i

list for relay to the Patchoque Staging Area. OPIP 3.6.5 5 5.3.1. One of the two Patchoque Bus Dispatchers is designated .;

under LILCO's Plan to dispatch all vehicles required for the l I

special population evacuation. OPIP 3.6.5 5 5.7.1.  !

i

\

l The actual dispatch of bus drivers and vehicles for the  !

t j special population evacuation follows essentially the same pattern as the dispatch procedure described above for general i

l population bus evacuation, except that special dispatch forms are  ;

D used and the drivers cover different routes. In addition, with  !

\

l ____________________

l (footnote continued from previous page) l they are hearing-impaired. In its procedures, LILCO assumes that i

! 011 homebound persons who require ambulance /ambulette [

D transportation must be relocated to a hospital.  :

I l At the Site Area or higher emergency classification level,  !

the LERO Hospital Coordinator is supposed to start calling (from o list) hospitals outside the EPE to determine potential ,

available space. Once space availability is determined, the  !

O Hospital Coordinator begins assigning homebound persons and l others who require hospitalization to reception hospitals. These l casignments are then given to the LERO Home Coordinator. l Once an evacuation recommendation has been made, the Home Coordinator is to begin calling the people on the Homebound List  !

O (except for the deaf -- route alert drivers contact them). The l l Homebound Coordinator reads each person on the list a pre-printed )*

l cvacuation message, tells them a vehicle is being dispatched for them, and informs them as to where they will be taken. The Homebound coordinator is also supposed to determine if the j g persons contacted will need additional assistance and is then j instructed to tell the appropriate coordinator (L.g , aus or Ambulance) whether or not such additional assistance will be j required. OPIP 3.6.5.  !

lQ - 131 -  !

l

)

the exception of the curbside pickup passengers, the "special populations" are to be driven directly to hospitals, or to special reception centers, rather than to transfer points, frem where general population evacuees are transported to tr.1 Reception Center. The hei Round who have been picked up at curbside, however, are driven to the nearest transfer point, and must change nust the:e for the trip to the Reception Center.

) The "curbsi M p. ,ap" bus drivers are instructed in e. heir procedures *- *

.op at each house, identify themselves, and help the evacuees onto the vehicle if necessary. Similarly, they are

) instructed to assis,t these passt.e4h 5 in getting onto transfer buses at the transfer point. OPIs s.6.5, Attachment 7.

3 Thus, LILCO requires a total of 377 buses to evacuate the ambulatory transit-dependent population in the EPZ: 333 buses for the general population; and 44 buses for the "special popula-J tions." Just the evacuation of the transit-dependent general populatiori requires 333 bus drivers operating out of the 11 transfer points to make 474 bus trips. LILCO Admission Nos. 221, D 222, and 223. Before these trips can even commence, the 333 bus drivere must report to their respective staging areas for briefing and assignment. They then are dispersed to 20 different p bus yards to collect their vehicles.

O O - 132 -

g-(b) The Exercise of LILCO's Bus Plan 4

Q. Did the Exercise include a reasonably comprehensive test of LILCO's bus plan?

O A. (Colwell, Minor, Petrone, Zook) No. LILCO mobilized '

all its drivers and those not in buses drove routes in cars.

() But, FEMA only evaluated eight general populstion bus runs, and 4 one "curbside pickup" bus run.57 For each of the eight general  ;

population routes run, a FEMA evaluator apparently went to the ,

O appropriate staging area, watched the briefing and dispatch.of the driver, then accompanied the driver to the bus garage, the bus transfer point, along his route, back to the transfer point,

.l(y and on to the Reception Center. No passengers were picked up or discharged at any point.

t O Q. How d.3 'oILCO do on this "test"?

A. (Colwell, Minor, Petrone, Zook) Not very well. ,

O Despite the relative simplicity of the demonstrations,58 FEMA did 57 Limited FEMA resources played a role in the decision for i only eight bus routes to be demonstrated in the Exercise.

() Kowieski 1/29/87 Dep. at 260-67. Egg Daverio Dep. at 249 (agreeing with facts alleged in Contention Ex 16.K). l 58 There was none of the confusion which might be attendant if 333 drivers actually were required to converge upon 20 bus yards i to claim vehicles. For example, LILCO's drivers did not have to

() interact with any -- let alone frightened -- members of the public. There were not excessive numbers of people and vehicles '

milling around the transfer points.

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l

. - . . _ . . _ ~ ._. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . . . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ . __ ___ __ _ . _ . -_

e a '

]

not rate the bus drivers very highly. For example, although FEMA j apparently rated the objective 59 demonstrated by the completion of two bus routes under the jurisdiction of the Port Jefferson l l

L Staging Area as satisfactory (agg FEMA Report at 58), the evalu-

) ator for one of these routes noted that an interval of one hour

'O and 45 minutes elapsed from the time the order to go to the transfer point was received until the time the bus arrived at its va uation rcIte. EECF, Field 9, P. Kier. Similarly, although O

the execution of the two bus routes managed from the Riverhead Staging Area escaped criticism in the FEMA Report, one evaluator '

g trare commented on the length of the process: "[t]he entire process, while requiring 5-1/2 hours, was an expeditious as possible." EECF, Field 9, A. Foltman.

O It was at the Patchoque Staging Area, which had to dispatch drivers for four of the actual general population bus route

() demonstrations, that FEMA directed most of its criticisms. Three of the four bus drivers evaluated from the Patchoque Staging Area i made major errors. One driver went to the wrong bus transfer O point. This error was not detected by the Transfer Point Coordinator, even though the driver's paper work clearly indicated he was at the wrong location. The error had to be

<} corrected by a "prompt" from the FEMA evaluator. EECF, Field 9, D. Santini. Another bus driver initially went to the wrong bus

~

C) 59~~~hb~~e bus ut s were evaluated under objective FIELD 9, "Demonstrate a sample of resources necessary to implement an orderly evacuation of all or part of the 10-mile EPZ."

O

- 134 - <

- ,-w- ,--c .- , -w,

-,v---r-, ,-,-,, e --,,,,,-m- ,

1 l

l. '

!O

. garage; as a result, he did not arrive at his transfer point l

until 1:25. EECF, Field 9, D. Jankowski. A third bus driver  !

O l

from Patchoque missed a segment of his evacuatien route. EECF,  !

' Field 9, J. O'Sullivan. There were also problems with the one bus route for the non-institutionalized mobility-impaired which FEMA evaluated.60 Such were the results when only 10 of the 333 LILCO bus

)

drivers had to actually secure and drive real vehicles -- i.e.,

buses;61 there were problems with half the demonstrations. It

.O seems reasonable to conclude that the results would have been at least as bad -- and perhaps much worse -- if more buses had had to be secured and deployed. At any rate, it seems clear to us

<3 that upon the basis of the very limited demonstrations which were carried out and evaluated, one cannot conclude that the Exercise objectives were satisfied.

O 60 Although the bus driver apparently requested a van, he was given a regular school bus. Egg Exercise Free Play Message, Noninstitutionalized Mobility-Impaired Route G. Obviously, for

O persons who are "mobility-impaired," getting aboard a school bus

, and finding their way to a seat on it would be no easy task --

2 assuming they could do it at all. The FEMA evaluator noted that the driver had difficulty locating the homes of the persons on his route. FEMA Report at xvi. Finally, when the driver did arrive back at his transfer point, the Transfer Point Coordinator

{3 erroneously directed him to the Emergency Worker Decontamination Facility ("EWDF"), even though the Coordinator had earlier received a message clearly telling him to direct buses to the Reception Center. Id.

61 That is, the eight who drove general population routes, the A,3 one who drove the route for the mobility-impaired, and the one who responded to the simulated request from Ridge School (ggg testimony above in Section II.C. regarding schools).

(3 - 135 -

3 -

Q. Isn't it true, however, that all of LILCO's bus drivers drove their bus routes, thus making the test more extensive than

)

you have described?

A. (Colwell, Minor, Petrone, Zook) We are aware that, f

during the Exercise, LILCO apparently dispatched all of its bus drivers and had them perform some sort of simulation in their

) cars. The paperwork which would have actually accompanied the mobilization and dispatch of these drivers (ggg OPIP 3.6.4 and its attachments) was also filled out as part of the simulation.

3 This does not, however, indicate that LILCO is capable of inte-grating the elements necessary for a successful bus evacuation.

LILCO showed -- albeit less than successfully -- that LILCO's e part of the effort could be put in motion. Egg FEMA Report at

62. The Exercise did not demonstrate, however, that, in fact, they would have buses to drive. Of the 20 bus yards which LILCO 9 relies upon in its Plan, 12 were not contacted or communicated with at all during the Exercise. LILCO Admission Nos. 27, 30.

Those that were contacted had been alerted in advance and 8 apparently had buses fueled and ready to go. Thus, there is no evidence that, in a real emergency, LILCO would be capable of even contacting the other bus yards, let alone securing buses 8 from them.

S

- 136 -

)

Furthermore, FEMA has admitted that it did not review or evaluate the availability to LILCO of the number of buses needed

)

under the Plan to effect an evacuation of the transit-dependent population. FEMA Admission No. 144. FEMA did not review the number of buses which would be available to LILCO if an emergency occurred while school was in session. FEMA Admission No. 145.

Nor did FEMA review or evaluate the amount of time necessary for LILCO tc effect the bus evacuation of the transit-dependent general population. FEMA Admission No. 143. In this regard, it should be noted that, as of 2:05 on the day of the Exercise, only j 40% of the 377 bus route trips required for the evacuation had been completed -- even though none of the drivers had passengers, and few had real buses, to contend with. Health Services 3 Coordinator Log, February 13, 1986. Nor did the few drivers who actually drove buses have to worry about whether buses would be ready for them when they arrived at the bus yards; the buses to 3 be used had been ordered by LILCO to be fueled and ready before the Exercise began. Letters from J. Weismantle dated February 7-8, 1986. Finally, FEMA did not evaluate any bus company J officials. Kowieski 1/29/87 Dep at 175.62 3

62 FEMA's bus "evaluation," like that of ambulances discussed 4D in Section II.H, below, focused on LERO personnel's activities, and not actions which the bus company might have to take.

Kowieski 1/29/87 Dep. at 247-49.

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b 1

Q. What conclusions do you reach?

l D

A. (Colwell, Petrone, Zook) In summary, the demonstra-tions observed by FEMA offered inadequate basis for verifying the capability of LILCO to effect a bus evacuation in the event of a radiological emergency. As noted above, FEMA's evaluation covered only eight buses and left ott other key elements in any

) overall performance, including particularly the likelihood that sufficient buses would actually be available in a timely manner in an actual emergency. The mere ability of LERO to field a D large number of people is no proof of respotte capability when the people fielded do not perform their main emergency functions and there is no demonstration that they would, in fact, be able

) to obtain the resources (11gt, bases) they would need for the jcb.

O Q. Did FEMA's bus evaluation conform to its practice at other plants?

$ A. (Baranski, Czech, Papile, Petrone) It does not appear to have been the same. At other exercises. FEMA has not neces-sarily evaluated a larger number or larger proportion of bus

1. routes. However, FEMA has required that all bus companies affected by the scenario actually be contacted. FEMA also has interviewed bus company personnel to ensure that the number of 8

buses required would, in fact, be available and ready to respond

- 138 -

D in the event of an emergency and that the bus companies under-stood their responsibilities. These sorts of activities apparently did not occur during the Shoreham Exercise.

, G. Incestion Pathway-

')

Q. Are there other parts of the LERO Plan which you

) believe were inadequately demonstrated and/or inadequately evaluated at the Exercise?

3 A. Yes. There was very little in the way of testing of the ability to implement protective actions for the ingestion pathway EPZ. That omission is addressed in subpart I of 3 Contention Ex 15.

Q. Please state subpart I of Contention Ex 15.

O A. Subpart I of Contention Ex 15 states:

3 Procedures for determining, issuing, and implementing protective action recommenda-tions for the ingestion pathway EPZ (aside from the single recommendation that dairy animals be placed on stored feed), as set

, forth in OPIP 3.6.6 and at pages 3.6-1 thru J 3.6-4 and 3.6-7a thru 3.6-8a of the LILCO Plan, were excluded from the exercise in that the State of Connecticut did not participate in the exercise and LILCO did not implement such procedures even for the portion of the ingestion pathway EPZ located in the State of O New York. Such capabilities are required by 10 CFR S 50.47(b)(10.6, 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, 5 IV.F, and NUREG 0654 S II.J, O

_ 139 _

I B l l

i and by objectives EOC 9, 12. Their exclusion I from the exercise precludes a finding of reasonable assurance that adequate protective 3 measure scan and will be taken in the event of a Shoreham accident, as required by 10 CFR S 50.47(a)(1). Accordingly, the LILCO Plan is fundamentally flawed.

3 Contention Ex 37 is also being considered in connection with Contention 15.I. Contention Ex 37 is set forth in Attachment 5 to this testimony.

I 3

Q. What is the ingestion pathway EPZ?

A. (Baranski, Czech, Minor, Papile, Petrone) This is a defined generic area around a nuclear facility to facilitate offsite emergency planning for a response to the possibility that O

the population may suffer exposure to radiation from the ingestion of food or water which has been contaminated as a result of radioactive release from the plant. Basically, in the 0

event of a radioactive release, actions must be taken to protect the food chain. Generally, regulatory guidance requires that an emergency response plan contain provisions for protecting the O

public against ingestion exposure for an area approximately 50 miles from the plant.

O Federal regulations require that "(e]ach state within any ingestion exposure pathway EPZ shall exercise its plans and g preparedness related to ingestion exposure pathway measures at least once every five years." 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, C)

_ 140 _

l 3

IV.F.3(e). Appendix E also provides, however, that in an exer-

, cise such as that held for Shoreham (i.e., the exercise held J

prior to a plant's initial operation above 5 percent power),

every State in the ingestion pathway EPZ must participate in

, order for the exercise to qualify as a full participation event.

J Id., at S IV.F.1.

3 Q. Does the LILCO Plan contain provisions for implementing protective actions for the ingestion exposure pathway for the Shoreham plant?

O A. Yes.

O Q. Please describe Shoreham's S0-mile EPZ and what the Plan provides concerning the ingestion pathway.

O A. (Colwell, Minor, Petrone, Zook) The 50-mile ingestion pathway EPZ around the Shoreham plant extends into Connecticut and other parts of New York State. In the event of a radiolog-O ical emergency, the Radiation Health Coordinator is responsible for the "coordination" of ingestion pathway sampling and doce assessment activities. He is supposed to work with the RAP Team O Liaison at the EOC to coordinate the activities of the RAP Team Captain, the Environmental Survey Function and the Dose Assessment Function. Using projected doses from particulate O deposition and the analysis of field samples, the extent of food O

_ 141 _

O contamination is to be assessed. Once the Director of Local Response has decided that a protective action will be O

recommended, the Radiation Health Coordinator is responsible for communicating the recommended protective action to farms, food processors and other food chain establishments. The Coordinator of Public Information is supposed to inform the public of the protective action recommendations. Plan, 3.6-8.63

.O Implementing procedures for ingestion pathway protective actions are contained in OPIP 3.6.6. Because field sample analyses likely will not be immediately available, the Plan O

provides that some ingestion pathway protective actions are predetermined. Thus, as soon as a Site Area Emergency is

.O declared, an immediate recommendation will be made to place milk producing animals located within two miles of the plant on stored feed. OPIP 3.6.6, S 5.1.1.1(b). Similarly, in the event .of a o General Emergency, an immediate recommendation to place milk producing animals within 10 miles of the plant on stored feed will be made. OPIP 3.6.6, S 5.1.1.l(c).

O O

63 The LILCO Plan relies on the federal government (particularly the Departments of Agriculture and Health and Human Services, and the Food and Drug Administration) to assist "LERO" in implementing protective actions governing the treatment and O disposition of contaminated food stuffs. The functions of these l agencies are outlined in the Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan ("FRERP"). Plan, at 3.6-7a.

O - 142 -

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DOE RAP Team personnel and environmental survey teams from  ;

i the Shoreham Plant are supposed to collect field samples to determine levels of radioactive particulate deposition.

Personnel in the "Dese Assessment Function" calculate whether

O measured and projected activity levels exceed listed emergency response levels contained in various attachments to OPIP 3.6.6.

The results of isotopic analyses of these are to be given to the q) Radiation Health Coordinator so he can determine if the FDA Ingestion Pathway Protective Action Guidelines have been exceeded. OPIP 3.6.6.

O When a protective action recommendation is made for foods other than milk, the Director of Local Response is supposed to

,o contact the New York State Commissioner of Health and the Connecticut Lepartment of Environmental Protection 64 to relay the recommendation. OPIP 3.6.6, S 5.1.3.6. If these agencies indi-

-O cate that they are willing and able to implement ingestion pathway actions, no further action is necessary. OPIP 3.6.6, 5 5.1.3.6.

O

If, on other hand, these officials cannot be contacted or are unable or unwilling to implement pcotective actions, LILCO C) supposedly takes over the implementation function. The Radiation 64 Under the LILCO dian, upon notification by LILCO,

.O Connecticut is supposed to provide an ingestion pathway emergency response within its boundaries as described in a "letter of agreement" contained in Appendix B of the LILCO Plan. Plan, 3.6.8.

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10 Health Coordinator has overall responsibility for this effort.

OPIP 3.6.6 5 5.4. Under his direction, field sampling continues, and food producers, suppliers, and prccessers in the ingestion pathway are to be telephoned and notified of protective action O

i structions; LILCO will offer to pay for unsalvageable food.

The Coordinator of Public Information is supposed to keep the public informed of ingestion pathway recommendations.

.O The Manager of Local Response and the Health Services Coordinator, after briefing by the Radiation Health Coordinator, g will develop a "proposal for the disposition of contaminated foodstuffs." OPIP 3.6.5, S 5.5. If necessary, the Director of Local Response, the Logistics Support Coordinator, and the O support services Coordinator must engage in efforts to procure and distribute uncontaminated food from alternate sources. OPIP

! 3.6.6 S 5.6.

!O Q. To what extent was LILCO's ability to implement these

) ingestion pathway protective actions demonstrated during the

!O Exercise?

A. (Colwell, Minor, Petrone, Zook) Prior to the Exercise, O it was determined -- either by LILCO or FEMA, or both, -- that l the ingestion pathway aspects of the LILCO Plan would not be demonstrated during the Exercise. Sie, Memorandum from E. Tanzman O dated November 26, 1985, handwriten Addendum; Kowieski 1/29/87 O

_ 144 _

O l Dep. at 242-243; Daverio Dep. at 76-77 (Mr. Daverio recalls that FEMA informed LILCO that~no ingestion pathway objective would be 3

included in the Exercise). This also was the result of an NRC request that FEMA focus during the Exercise on the 10-mile EPZ.

Kowieski 1/29/87 Dep. at 215. Thus, it was decided ahead of D

time, and probably written into the scenario, that LILCO's ability to protect the food chain in the 50-mile ingestion pathway EPZ would not be demonstrated or observed.

As far as protecting the ingestion pathway EPZ within 10 g miles of the plant, it appears that LILCO simulated those actions which are automatic under the procedures of the LILCO Plan.

Thus, when the broadcast of the EBS message announcing a Site O Area Emergency was simulated, the EBS message contained a recommendation that milk producing animals in those subzones within 2 miles of the plant should be moved into shelters and O Pl aced on stored feed. EBS Message No. 2. When an EBS message announcing a General Emergency was simulated (EBS Message No. 4),

LILCO did not immediately extend the animal sheltering recommen-o dation out to 10 miles; instead, LILCO waited until the following EBS message, which coupled the General Emergency announcement with a recommendation to evacuate; to extend the animal

() sheltering recommendation. EBS Message No. 5.

O O - 145 -

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During the Exercise, LILCO also attempted to call the State of Connecticut at 8:20, shortly after the plant had declared a 3

Site Area Emergency. Egg Pos. #38, Director of Local Response Log, February 13, 1986. The Director continued to make 1

unsuccessful calls to Connecticut (at 8:50 and 10:20), and may i have reached someone there at approximately 10:30. Id. Who he may nave reached and the substance of any ensuing conversation, however, are not reported in the Exercise documents released

_J during discovery to the Governments. LILCO has admitted that Connecticut's "participation" in the Exercise was confined to the receipt of "a telephone call from LERO" (agg LILCO Admission No. 2), and that there was no demonstration of Connecticut's capability to determine, issue, or implement ingestion pathway protective action recommendations in the event of a Shoreham 3

emergency. LILCO Admission No. 3.65 g As far as the Governments have been able to ascertain, the EBS messages and the telephone calls referenced above were the only ingestion pathway activities demonstrated during the O Exercise. LILCO admits that no protective action measures were recommended for animals other than dairy animals. LILCO Admission No. 42. No protective action recommendations were made O for drinking water, fruits, vegetables or other food chain o ____________________

65 The FEMA Report does not list Connecticut as having participated in the Exercise. FEMA Report at 111.

O - 146 -

3 items.66 LILCO Admission No. 43. This seems of questionable g validity since LILCO in its Contention Ex 36 testimony has stated that major releases covering the entire downwind area of the land portion of the 10-mile EPZ had occurred by 1:00.

~)

FEMA has admitted that it did not observe or evaluate the implementation of procedures for detercining, issuing, or imple-g menting protective action recommendation for the ingestion pathway EPZ (except for the dairy animal recommendation), that "LERO" personnel made no protective action recommendations for g the ingestion pathway EPZ beyond the 10-mile zone, and that LERO personnel made no protective action recommendations concerning drinking water, fruits, vegetables, non-dairy animals and other foodchain items even within the 10-mile EPZ, even though major releases had been assumed to have occurred. 133, FEMA Admission O

66 LILCO has stated that such recommendations were "considered" during the Exercise. LILCO Admission No. 43. It is unclear what O LILCO means by this. There are certain references to "ingestion pathway" in some logs ( n , at 3:46, at a meeting, it was noted in the Manager of Local Response's log that the RAP Team "will gather isotopic measurements" and "will assess ingestion pathway," and the Radiation Health Coordinator's log indicates that he received "smear information," and that at 3:45, the O Radiation Health Coordinator began to explain "the ingestion pathway EPZ" to New York State and Suffolk County simulators. A LILCO observer noted that the idea of assessing population dose was discussed at a 4:25. Dose Assessment Staff briefing, but the drill was terminated before this task was performed. Sas., Pos #3

- Manager of Local Response Log; Radiation Health Coordinator O Log; Observer Data Log, EOC - Radiological Assessment Coordinator.

~ 147 -

O

Nos. 30-32. Similarly, FEMA clearly did not evaluate any ingestion pathway capabilities of the State of Connecticut on D

February 13, 1986.67 Thus, almost the entire panoply of ingestion pathway procedures, resources, and implementation capabilities laid out in OPIP 3.6.6 of the LILCO Plan were intentionally left out of the Exercise.

Q. Is the ability to coordinate and implement protective

, action recommendations for the ingestion pathway EPZ usually demonstrated at FEMA-graded exercises before a full power license is granted?

D A. (Baranski, Czech, Papile, Petrone) That is a hard question to answer. In the initial exercise at each New York e State nuclear site, ingestion pathway measures have been required to be demonstrated at least once to some degree,68 although we do not recall whether FEMA had specific exercise objectives covering S

67 It is FEMA's position that demonstration of LILCO's ability to make PARS for the ingestion pathway was not an objective of the Exercise and that ingestion pathway PARS for an area beyond O 10 miles from the plant would have been inappropriate, given the Exercise scenario. Egg, FEMA Amended Answer to Admissions Nos. 30, 31.

68 There has never been a complete testing of ingestion pathway S

activities for any plant in New York State, even during the initial exercises referenced above. Koweiski 1/29/87 Dep. at 215-16. But there has been testing beyond the very limited demonstration which occurred at the Shoreham Exercise.

8 - 148 -

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the ingestion pathway EPZ. In subsequent exercises at these plants, the ingestion pathway protective actions generally have l D i not been demonstrated. -

There 1.= no co.1ceptual reason why ingestion pathway measures b

should not be included in an exercise 69 The difficulty has been, however, that FEMA has never developed criteria on how it would evaluate ingestion pathway performance. This has made D

exercise participants hesitant to prepare scenarios calling for ingestion pathway demonstrations.

D Q. Does the lack of ingestion pathway demonstrations at Shoreham affect your assessment whether this was a full partici-pation exercise?

A. (Baranski, Czech, Minor, Papile, Petrone) Yes. This g constitutes additional evidence that the Exercise did not satisfy Appendix E. First, the unevaluated "receipt" of a single tele-phone call by Connecticut does not constitute "participation."

g Thus, the Appendix E requirement that each State within the ingestion EPZ participate clearly was not satisfied. Second, while New York State did not participate, LERO should, in order o to have had a full participation exercise, have demonstrated the roles it allegedly would perform in the absence of New York State g 69 Indeed, in the Modular Forms for Uniformity of Radiological Emergency Preparedness, Tab D at 24, guidance for ingestion pathway EOC observations are set forth.

G ,

- 149 -

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participation. Again, this did not occur. Third, a full partic-ipation exercise must include testing of all major observable

) portions of the Plan. This did not occur. Finally, there must be a sufficient mobilization of personnel and resources in order to verify that the capability to respond exists. Again, this did

) not occur and there was, in fact, no FEMA evaluation at all. In short, the almost complete lack of ingestion pathway demonstra-tion and the complete lack of FEMA evaluation compels the D

conclusion that this was not a full participation exercise.

Q. Assume for a moment that the Exercise scenario was D

insufficiently severe to have required protective actions for the ingestion pathway beyond those "automatic" actions announced by LERO. Does that affect your conclusion? -

A. (Minor) No. LILCO and FEMA negotiated the details of the Exercise scenario. Thus, as noted above, it seems to have been a conscious decision to keep the scenario limited. However, as I read the regulatory requirements, an ingestion pathway g demonstration was required in order for this to have been a full participation exercise. This does not mean that every single element of LILCO's Plan for ingestion pathway would have had to g have been tested. But, there needed to be sufficient testing in order to satisfy the regulatery requirements.

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l H. Egs.p3.erv and Reentry Q. Which portion of Contentions Ex 15/16 pertains to recovery and reentry?

'O I A. Subpart M of Contention Ex 15.

Q. Please state subpart M.

O A. Subpart M provides:

.O Procedures relating to recovery and re-entry and activities to implement recovery and re-entry, as set forth in OPIP 3.10.1 and at pages 3.10-1 thru 3.10-2 of the LILCO Plan, were excluded from the exercise. Such capabi-lities are required by 10 CFR S 50.47(b)(13),

O 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E S IV.H, and NUREG 0654 S II.M. Their exclusion from the exer-cise precludes a finding of reasonable assur-ance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a Shoreham accident, as required by 10 CFR S 50.47(a)(1).

O Accordingly, the LILCO Plan is fundamentally flawed.

Q. Describe the applicable federal standards relating to O recovery and reentry activities in the event of a radiological emergency.

.O O

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^

O l A. Both 10 CFR S Sc.47(b)(13) and NUREG 0654 require that

"[g]'eneral plans for recovery and re-entry are developed."

NUREG 0654 S II.M.70 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix E, 5 IV.H also l requires that "(c]riteria to be used to determine when, following -

an accident, reentry of the facility would be appropriate or when operation could be resumed shall be described." In addition, FEMA's "Modular Format for Uniformity of Radiological Emergency Preparedness Exercise Observations and Evaluations" Attachment D, .

page 30 (June 1983), contains a ' module' summarizing the aspects of reentry / recovery which would or should be evaluated during O FEMA-graded exercises. These are set forth in Attachment 9 to 70 The NUREG 0654 "Evaluation Criteria" for this planning ,

standard are as follows:  !

O'

1. Each organization, as appropriate, shall develop general plans and procedures for re-entry and recovery and describe the means by which decisions to relax

prctective measures (e.g., allow re-entry into an evacuated area) are reached. This process should consider both existing and potential conditions.

2. Each licensee plan shall contain the position / title, authority and responsibilities of individuals who will fill key positions in the facility recovery organization. This organization shall include technical personnel with responsibilities to develop,

O evaluate and direct recovery and re-entry operations.

The recovery organization recommended by the Atomic Industrial Forum's "Nuclear Power Plant Emergency Response Plan" dated October 11, 1979, is an acceptable  ;

framework. ,

I

!O 3. Each licensee and State plan shall specify means for l informing members of the response organizations that a  :

! recovery operation is to be initiated, and of any l changes in the organizational structure that may occur.

l O 4. Each plan shall establish a method for periodically estimating total population exposure.

O - 152 - i

3 this testimony. The same document includes as exercise objective number 35: "Demonstrate ability to determine and implement J

appropriate measures for controlled recovery and re-entry."

Modular Format for Uniformity of Radiological Emergency Preparedness Exercise Observations and Evaluations, Tab M.

Q. What provisions does the LILCO Plan contain regarding g recovery and reentry activities?

A. (Colwell, Minor, Petrone, Zook) Certain members of O LERO are designated as gg officio members of the "Recovery Action Committee." The Manager of Local Response is the Chairman of this Committee. Other members of the Committee are: the Health O Services Coordinator, the Evacuation Coordinator, the Support Services Coordinator, the Coordinator of Public Informatio'n, the Radiation Health Coordinator, and the Nuclear Engineer. This O Committee is supposed to be convened prior to recovery / reentry to gather information which will assist in making decisions about recovery / reentry. It is up to the Director of Local Response to O authorize reentry; once he has done so, it is implemented by the Recovery Action Committee. OPIP 3.10.1 5 5.1.

O oPIP 3.10.1 outlines various recovery and reentry tasks to be implemented, depending on the type of accident that occurred, the type of protective actions that were taken, and the existence O of contamination in the area to be re-entered.

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Q. Were recovery and reentry activities demonstrated by LILCO or observed by FEMA during the Exercise? )

^) , \

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A. (Colwell, Minor, Petrone, Zook) No. As with the '

ingestion pathway aspects of the LILCO Plan, it was determined pri?r to the Exercise that recovery and reentry activities would be excluded from the Exercise. Esp,. Memorandum from E. Tanzman g dated November 26, 1985, handwriten Addendum, which states: "All aspects of the LERO Plan (Rev. 5) will be tested, with the exception of ingestion pathway and recovery and re-entry." '

g Consistent with the foregoing, FEMA has admitted that, during the Exercise, it did not review or evaluate the procedures or activi-ties. required to implement recovery and reentry following a O Shoreham emergency, since this was "not an objective" of the Exercise. FEMA Admission No. 39.

Q LILCO, on the other hand, claims that "[rlecovery and re-entry procedures were reviewed and implemented by players during the Exercise." LILCO Admission No. 17. Apparently, however, O this demonstration was confined to talk of establishing the "re-entry committee" which never actually met and looking at the radiation levels present. Daverlo Dep. at 156; Weismantle Dep.

O at 152-65; Deposition of Richard J. Watts (December 3, 1986) at 98-101. The LILCO observer who evaluated the Radiological Assessment Coordinator at the EOC noted that "Preliminary 0

0 _ 134 _

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discussions were held regarding recovery. Reviewed OPIP 3.6.6" and that "Drill was terminated prior to recovery." Observer Data

-O Log-EOC, Radiological Assessment Coordinator, February 13, 1986.

Whatever LILCO did do during the Exercise so far as recovery O

and reentry are concerned -- we cannot say with certainty that in fact LILCO players did anything in this respect -- it is obvious that LILCO in no way demonstrated in any comprehensive manner its O

ability to implement the procedures and activities, outlined in OPIP 3.10.1. Recovery and reentry has been demonstrated at other exercises and recovery action committees have met.

(Baranski, Czech, Papile, Petrone) LILCO has stated that it was prepared to attempt to de so at Shoreham but FEMA was O

insistent that it was'not going to observe recovery and reentry operations. Behr Dep. at 152. Thus, this is one more major g aspect of the LILCO Plan which was exempted from any demonstra-tion during the Exercise and further supports our view that this '

was not a full participation exercise.

O Q. Does this conclude your testimony?

O A. Yes.

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3 0: ( Federal Emergency Management Agency Washington, D.C. 20472 i a - -

ND/ I 3 ti.

GUIDANCE MEMORANDUM EV-2 PROTECTIVE ACTIONS FOR SCHOOL CHILDREN Purnose This Guidance Memorandum (GM) is intended for rederal officials to aid them in evaluating emergency plans and preparedness for school children during a radiological f.

emergency.

This guidance is also intended for State and  !

} local government officials and administrators of public and i private schools, including licensed and government supported  ;

i pre-schools and day-care centers, for developing emergency

'g safety of students. response plans and preparedness for protecting the health and:!

Backcround The joint 'rederal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) aind l Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) guidance document, HUREG-0

, 0654/ FEMA-REP-1, provides criteria for protective actions for persons, including school children, within the plume exposure i

pathway emergency planning zone (EPZ) in the' event such protective actions are needed in response to a radiological i emergency at a commercial nuclear power plant. The need to

O address the issue of protective actione for school children stems from both the lack of detailed gaidance on this issue and the expressed interest for such guidance from publicin rederal Regional officials.

secee Guidance contexts: isforprovided in this GM on school evacuation in two developing emergency responte plans and for conducting and evaluating exerciset. The primary method for protecting school children examined is evacuation to O rel cation centers. This GM is a companion of the guidance on evacuation Evacuation contained in GM 21, Acceptance Criteria for Plans. This specific guidance related to school children is appropriate because of the interest and concern expressed about protecting the health and safety of school O

c' !;drenpower n ulear duringplant.

a radiological emergency at a commercial O

1

3-  ;

School Evacuation Considerations -

Evacuation is Relocation Centers. The evacuation of school

" children under the continuous supervision of teachers and administrators from a school to a relocation center is a viable and reasonable approach when confronted with a radiological emergency. The decision to implement a protective action recommendation to evacuate to a relocation center should be tied to the nuclear power plant's emergency '

3 . action level classification.

Some emergency response plans include the protective action strategias of early evacuation and early dismissal. If State and local governments select one of these Strategies, then C) they ought to address it in their emergency response plan. I If a State or local government elects to employ early evacuation or early dismissal, this guidance is sufficiently flexible to cover both strategies. All of the general guidance for evacuation would apply with the addition of the special considerations for early protective actions at the end of this GM.

The recommendation to school officials to evacuate the school children to relocation centers should specify the area (s) to be included in the evacuation. For example, the evacuation could include schools within the two-mile radius of the plant O and within three downwind sectors beyond the two-mile radius.

Prompt evacuation is not advisable during exceptional situations such as having to drive through a radioactive plume or into a severe blizzard. Under these circumstances, g the special population including school children, handicapped and/or immobile persons should be temporarily sheltered and subsequently evacuated, if need be, as soon as conditions permit.

School children and other special population evacuees (see also GM 26, REP for Handicapped Persons) should be relocated O outside the ten-mile EPZ in predesignated facilities to ensure that the accountability, safety and security of the evacuees and can use telephone be maintained within the EPZ. and to minimiza vehicular traffic General Considerations. For whatever protective action O options are contained in emergency plans, the plans should include provision for notifying parents and guardians (e . g. ,

through the Emergency Broadcast System (EBS)) of the status and location of their children during a radiological emergency. Also the plans should document the decision O making process a,nd criteria used for developing emergency procedures for implementing protective action measures for school children. Acceptance criteria for developing and evaluating emergency planning and preparedness for school children are provided below.

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Plannino Standard and Evaluation Criteria 13 J. Protective Response Plannino Standard A range of protective actions have been developed for the

,0 plume exposure pathway EPZ for emergency workers and the Guidelines for the choice of protective actions public.

during an emergency, consistent with Federal guidance, are developed and in place, and protective actions for the ingestion. exposure pathway EPZ appropriate to the locale have been developed. (NUREG-06 5 4/FE M A-REP-1, j3 p. 59)

Evaluation criteria

• 2224 Each Stat'e and local organization shall establish a capability for implementing protective actions based

' O upon protective action guides and other criteria. This shall be consistent with the recommendations of EPA regarding exposure resulting from passage of radioactive airborne plumes (EPA-520/1-75-001), and with those of DHEW (DHliS )/FDA . .r e ga r di ng ra di oa c t iv e

!O contamination of human food and animal feeds as published in the Federal Recister of Becember 157 19987 443 PR 58998F october 2 2.198 2 112 IE 470731.

• 2412. The organization's plans to implement protective measures for the plume exposure pathway shall includes O J.10.a. Maps showing evacuation routes, evacuation areas, preselected radiological sampling and monitoring points, relocation centers in host areas and shelter areas (identification of radiological sampling and monitoring points shall include the designators in O Table J-1 or an equivalent uniform system described in the plan);

J.10.b. Maps showing population distribution around the nuclear f acility. This shall be by evacuation areas (licensees shall also present the information in a O sector format);

J.10.e. Means for notifying all segments of the transient and resident population; J.10.d.

Means for protecting those persons whose mobility o may be impaired due to such factors as institutional or other confinement;

• For your information and ref;tence, the 12/15/78, DHHS guidance has been superseded by the 10/22/82, guidance.

O 3

O-J .10. c . Means of relocation;'

J.10.h.

O Relocation centers in host areas which are at least five miles, and preferably ten miles, bevond the boundaries of the plume exposure EPZ (See K.8);

_J .10.1. Time estimates for evacuation of various sectors and distances based on a dynamic analysis (time-motion O study under various conditions) for the plume exposure pathway EPZ (See Appendix 4);

Aeoendix L. Evacuation ling Estimetig Within ,thg Plume Excosure Pathway Emercency Plannino Ign3 C) Ao endix A.TI.C. Special Facility Pooulation An estimate for this special population group shall usually be done on an institutiun-by-institution basis. The means of transportation are also highly individualized and shall be descIlbed. Schools shall be included in this segment (p. 4- -

o 3).

Areas 21 Review These evaluation criteria address the key planning

O requirements concerning the evacuation of students from schools. The review under these criteria is intended to ensure that adequate planning and preparedness capabilities exist to enable school officials te evacuate students in the i

( event such a protective action is necessary durin.g a radiological emergency. This guidance covers those actions ,

O from the initial notification to school officials of the need to evacuate the students to their arrival at relocation centers or other protective actions.

actions, the guidance also addresses time In addition to these frames for accomplishing the protective actions.

I O For purposes of definition and reference to NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1, we are including "schools" among the types of institutions, the mobility of whose population may be impaired during a radiological emergency, because most students are dependent on school officials for transportation to and from their residences. (See evaluation criterion

.O J .10.d. ) Also, "schools" are explicitly referenced in Appendix 4 on pages 4-2 and 4-3 as a type of "Special Facility Population" for which evacuation time f rames are needed on an institution-by-institution basis. The term, "schools," as used in this GH refers to public and private schools, and day-care ce .ers.

.tcensed or government supported pre-schools and

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1 Accentance Criteria

~

An 6mergency ; plan will typically be acceptable under these 1;3 evaluation cetteria if it fully addresses the following emergency functions for the evacuation of, or other i appropriate protective measures for, school children.

Local governments should take the initiative to identify and contact all nublic and orivate school systems within the i

'O designated plume exposure pathway EPZ to assure that both public and private school officials address appropriate planning for protecting the health and safety of their students from a commercial nuclear power plant accident. The planning of both the public and private school officials should be closely coordinated with that of the local

o government.

Local governments should ensure that appropriate organizational officials assume responsibility for the emergency planning and preparedness for all of the identified schools. Local governments should also ensure that the

'O emergency planning undertaken by these organizations is integrated within the larger offsite emergency management f ramswork for the particular nuclear power plant site.

In accordance uzth"the guidance contained in GM 21, the

O evacuation planning undertaken may be developed in three contextss -

l (1) Part'of the existing radiological emergency 4

preparedness plans,

(2) A separate annex of an existing integrated

O energency plan for many types of disasters and l emergencies or (3) A separate evacuation plan for all of the schools in each school system.

O school officials should document in the plan the basis for determining the proper protective action (e.g., evacuation, I early preparatory measures, early evacuation, sheltering, early dismissal or combination) including:

.o

• Identification of the organization and officials responsible for both planning and effecting the protective action.

{t

] Institution-specific information:

4 l() - Name and location of school; l - Type of school and age grouping (e. ge , public elementary school, grades kindergarten through sixth);

4

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- Total population (students, faculty and other employees); '

0

- Means for effecting protective actions;

- Specific resources allocated for transportation and supporting letters of agreement if resources are provided from external sources and 0

- Name and location of relocation center (s), and transport route (s), if applicable.

If parts of the institution-specific information apply to  ;

C) many or all sch'o ols, then the information may be '

presented generically.

Time frames for effecting the protective actions. ,

Heans for alerting and notifying appropriat'e persons and C) S**"P' *****id "ith th' **h**18 ""d t"' **"d'"t*

including:

- Identification of the organization responsible for providing emergency information to the schools; i C) * - The method (e . g. , siren and telephone calls) fer contacting and providing emergency information on  !

recommended protective actions to school officials; 1

- The method (e.g., . siren, tone alert radios and telephone calls) for contacting and activating o designated dispatchers and school bus drivers; and

- The method (e. g. , EBS messages) for notifying parents and guardians of the status and location of their -

children. .

O 2.lannins standara and Evat1mation criteria N. Exercise and Drills Plannina Standard '

O Periodic exercises are will be portions of emergency r(esponse ) capabilities. conducted Periodicto evaluate drills major are (will be) conducted to develop and maintain key skills.

Inadequacies identified as a result of exercises or drills ,

are (will be) corrected. (NUREG-06 5 4/ REM A-REP-1, p. 71)

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Evaluation Criteria '

N.1.a. An exercise is an event that tests the integrated O capability and a major portion of the basic elements existing within emergency preparedness plans and organizations. The emergency preparedness exercise shall simulate an emergency that results in offsite radiological releases which would require prompt '

response by offsite authorities. Exercises shall be O

conducted as set forth in NRC and FEMA rules.

N.1.b.

An exercise shall include mobilization of State and local personnel resources adequate to verify the capability to respond to an accident scenario O requiring response. The organization shall provide for a critique of the biennial exercise by Federal and State observers / evaluators. The scenario should be varied from exercise to exercise such that all major elements of the p3 ans and preparedness organizations are tested within a six-year period.

O Each organization should make provisions to start an exercise between 6:00 p.m. and 4:00 a.m. once every six years. Exercises should be conducted during dif ferent seasons of the year within a six-year ,

period in order to provide for exercising under ,

various weat Some exercises should be

.o i

unannounced.her conditions. .

Hal4 official observers from Federal, State or local governments will observe, critique and evaluate the 4

required exercises. A critique shall be scheduled at

,0 the conclusion of the exercise to evaluate the ability 1

of organizations to respond as called for in the plan.

i The critique shall be conducted as soon as practicable

af ter the exercise, and a f ormal evaluation should l result from the critique.

Areas 21 Review 3

0 These evaluation criteria addresa exercise-related l requirements and their evaluation by Regional Assistance Committee (RAC) staff. In addition to identifying capabilities for evacuating students or effecting early dismissal as a "major element" of an organization's emergency

[3 response plan, suggestions are provided for conducting

, interviews with officials f rom schools during an exercise.

i

O i

• These provisions conform to the revision of evaluation criterion N.l.b. of NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1 promulgated in GM PR-1, Policy on NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1 and 44 CFR 350 l Periodic Requirements.

O 7 ,

i

i

)'

Acceotance Criteria Requirements are set forth in FEMA (44 CFR 350.9) and NRC (10

) CFR 50, Appendi x E.IV.F.1-5.) rules for conducting periodic exercises and drills. Under these requirements, i organizations with assigned responsibilities for protecting students att required to demonstrate through exercises their ability to implement emergency procedures contained in their emergency response plans. However, the public (e.g., school I) children) are not required to participate in exercises.

Further, the actual use of school vehicles is optional. The demonstration of each organizaticn's capability to implement these measures in exercises will be evaluated by FEMA and other Federal of ficials.

3 The following functions should be demonstrated and evaluated in exercises in which the evacuation of students is necessitated by events in the exercise scenario:

1. Alerting and notification 'of appropriate school officials by local emergency officials with respect to status of 3 radiological emergency and need to implement protective actions, including evacuation;

2. The contacting and notification of dispatchers and school bus drivers, as appropriate, to inform them of any 3 potential or actual need for them to transport students and

3. The provision of information to the parents and guardians, as appropriate, concerning the status and intended location or destination of the students.

8 With respect to simulating the evacuation of school children in an exercise, the following guidelines are provided.

1. At the discretion of school officials, the bus driver may proceed to drive a school bus to a relocation. center, as

, necessitated by the simulated exercise events.

2. An exercise evaluator will interview the relevant personnel at the EOC's, the School Superintendent's office, the School Principal's of fice, and the Dispatcher's office, as well as the bus driver to

, determine ~their awareness of and preparedness for the evacuation of the school children. Pertinent questions f or the exercise evaluator pertaining to the dispatcher and bus driver include:

Emeroency Ocerations Center (s) -

(EOC) e One or more EOC's may be involved in decisionmaking to effect the evacuation of schools. For example, in some States, local school evacuation must be coordinated with O .

8

O '

i i

2 state officials. In such cases, observers may need to concurrently evaluate evacuation or other protective

<O action decisionmaking in both State and local EOC's.

1.

Who madeaction protective the decision for evacuation of schools and when?or other

) 2. What specific actions (evacuation, early dismissal or j

O shelter) are incorporated in the decision and what specific sectors / schools are impacted by this

! decision?

3.

j When and f rom whom did the EOC receive information 4

about this decision?

{O 4.

When and whom did the EOC staff contact to implement this decision?

4 5.

Did EOC staff undertake actions to assist school evacuation or other protective action such as

• securing guides, buses and assistance in traffic

'O control?

School Sueerintendent's Office

! 1. When and from whom did the superintendent receive

'O

' protective action instructions or recommendations?

What specific instructions or recommendations did the superintendent receive?

2. What actions did the superintendent take to implement O these instructions or recommendations? Whom did the superintendent contact and when?

School Prineinal's Office

1. When and f rom whom did the principal receive O protective action instructions?. Uhat specific instructions did the principal receive?

2. What means of communications (e.g., telephone, tone alert) were used to provide these instructions? Did this means of communication function adequately to

) provide accurate and timely information?

3. What actions did the principal take to implement these instructions? Whom did the principal contact and when?

Dl'"'t h*"

O -

1. When and f rom whom did the dispatcher receive the instructions? What specific instructions were received?

O 9

O 2 .: Uhat means of communications were used? Here the

,O communications between the disp'atcher and his/her

. sularvisor and the dispatcher and the bus driver adequate to-convey appropriate and timely L information?

. 4.4 When did the dispatcher initiate notification to bus  !

drivers and guides to implement the evacuation or

'O~ ,

other protective action plan? What specific

instructions were provided by the dispatcher? How i long did it take to contact the bus driver to give the order to evacuate?

l g nyg Drivers /cuides 1.- When and from whom did the bus drivers and guides 4 receive instructions? What instructions were

. received?

,O 2.. When did the driver arrive at the school?

3. Did the driver have an adequate map or knowledge of

. the route?

4. Uas the driver aware of any agreement between the O

drivers and local authorities for them to provide .

their services in the event of a radiological emergency? ,

5. . What means of communications were used? Were 13 communications with the dispatcher adequate to convey appropriate and timely information? ,

6. Did the exercise play necessitate a change in instructions to bus drivers and guides? If so, what uere these new instructions? What means of L

O communications were used to contact the bus drivers and guides? Mas this means of communication adequate?

Padiation Guides .[g3tonitorine dosionatedARd Protection enercenev IAI_)

workers DM3 Drivers and

')

l

( 1. Nere bus drivers and guides provided with specific means for radiation monitoring- (e.g., dosimeters and j film badges) and exposure control (e.g., potassium i

iodide, respiratory protection)?

2. Were bus drivers and guides trained in the proper use i O of these instruments and materials? i

3. Were instructions provided to the bus drivers and i

guidos for the authorization and use of potassium iodide?

iO '

10 t

/

)

4. During the exercise, were instructions given to alter evacuation /early dismissal routes in order to avert

) radiation exposure by bus drivers and guides?

l Relocation Centers /Neichborhoods lf2I early dismissal)

1. When did the buses arrive at the relocation center (s)/ neighborhood (s) ?

]

2. According to the exercise scenario events, did the bus drivers go to the appropriate relocation centers / neighborhoods? Did they arrive in a timely manner to avert radiation exposure?

3 Provision Guardians 21 Emercenev Instructions 12 Parents and

1. Was information provided to parents and guardians on the location of students, e.g., relocation centers, 3 early dismissal to residences or sheltering? When was this information provided?

2. What means (e. g. , EBS messages and telephones) were used to provide this information?

3 , 3. Was this information provided in a timely and accurate manner according to the exercise scenario events?

In some cases, answers to the above questions will be secured from direct observation of the simulated evacuation, thus 3 obviating the interviews.

Soec'al Considerations inI Imolementino Protective Actions i

In addition to the guidance above on school evacuation, the D

following special considerations are provided for use when implementing other protective actions.

Early preoaratory Heasures. In order to facilitate the '

implementation of protective actions, the following measures should be considered:

O a. Inventory resources for mobilization; e.g., school buses and drivers.

b.

Curtail extramural or extra curricular activities so that school children are available for prompt

, evacuation, if it becomes necessary.

11

---av+--~w-------,,,--,a , - _ - _

3~

l

c. Select the method (e.g., EBS) and the draft message i to notify parents.and guardians of the status or a destination of their children if it becomes necessary to take protedtive actions.

d.

Assure that the relocation event evacuation is necessary.center is available in the Early Evacuation.

3 Early evacuation is accelerating the implementation of protective actions for school children prior to the activation of protective actions for the general public.

For example, if a plan calls for an evacuation of the public at the "General Emergency" level, then protective actions for school Area Emergency" children would be initiated at the "Site level.

D In the event of a rapidly '

deteriorating situation, school children would be evacuated simultaneously with the general public.

Ea riv Dismissal. While early dismissal of school children is not addressed as an evacuation option per se in NUREG-O 0654/FE!!A-REP-1, it is incorporated in this GM as a method for accomplishing the intent of evaluation criteria under planning standard J because of its use for other t emergencies such as imminent natural hazards (e.g.ypes of snowstorms). ,

have a limited Hazards hazardoussuch area,asunlike a school fire or boiler failure an extended  !

O radiological plumet therefore, the early dismissal of -

students to their parents and guardians may be prudent. The .

greater area affected by severe weather, such as a blizzard, usually does not jeopardize the health and safety of the school children if they are dismissed early before the storm o or remain sheltered in the school. In contrast, the radiological plume may make both the school and home undesirable shelters if both are in the plume exposure pathway, or if a fast moving event could escalate to while the children were in transit. Further, in the presence of  ;

unstable the movementmeteorological conditions of radiological releases. it is difficult to project i O characteristics of a radiological emergency place limits 'onTherefore, the unique the use 'of early dismissal as a viable protective action, particularly in heavily populated areas.

Evacuation Combined Elit Early Dismissal. Early dismissal

() used in conjunction with evacuation as described above provides another option. The school children who reside in a sector of the ten-mile EPZ not effected by the potential danger or outside the ten-mile EPZ could be dismissed early to their parents, guardians or other supervision while those )

students whose homes are potentially in the path of a O radioactive plume would be evacuated to designated relocation centers.

O 12

I e' i Shelterino. Under certain circumstances sheltering may be the preferred protective action (e . g. , when there are S hazardous road conditions or the possibility exists that evacuation may result in transporting students through the

• plume). Sheltering may be used as a primary or temporary 3 l

protective action depending upon the characteristics of the '

radiological release and the status of weather and road conditions.

O GM EV-2 is issued subsequent to review and concurrence by NRC staff who have determined that it provides clarification and -

interpretation of existing NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1 criteria applicable to protective actions for "special populations."

J e

3 3

O O

. 13

)

}

}

)

)

IV.

)

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)f 3

3 00909 _ , * .. 5983

.' ,W31sh i testimony, you state: "My familiarity with the issues dealt 3 2 with in Contentions IX 15 and 16 stems from my work..." and 3 it goes on to describe three different areas.

4 What issues are you referring to on Page 17 O 5 (The witness is looking at the document.)

6 A (Witness Daverio) The issues dealt with in 15 7 and 16, what wasn't done in the exercise, those kind of O 3 issues.

9 I believe there also are some contentions that to got subsumed into 15 and 16 that had some performance C) ii aspects of the exercise. The one that comes to mind is the 12 40 minute bus dispatch one.

33 So, generally those kind of issues were the

) u issues we were talking about there.

l 15 Q on Page 2, you talk about your experience in l g developing and implementing the Shoreham plan. Do you see u

N g that testimony?

3 A yes, I do.  !

,, Q How did that experience relate to your O

g understanding of the Appendix E requirements for exercises? j t

I 22 '

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5984 l l . , , ..  ;

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l j A (Witness Daverio) If you look at your EX-30,

)' 2 You have some contentions subsumed into 15 and 16 that talk I about procedures. And, that's, you know, just a general .

3 t statement, that I'm very familiar with the procedures and

) $i Plan.

And, based on that, you use some of that 6 {

7 knowledge not only to talk about some of your contentions  !

l

) ,

but in developing an exercise you need to have familiarity i

, with the plan and how it works so that you can get the 10 exercise objectives to mesh with the plan.

) 33 So, I think you can say it relates in that 12 direction. .

Q But, in developing and implementing the plan, 33 3 3, did you have any occasion to attempt to construe the Part 50, Appendix E, full participation exercise requirement?

15 g A No. l D 37 Q Okay. Now, you go on on Page 2 to talk about 1

y ur role as Lead controller. In that -- do you see that is 3, ,

testi=ony, sir? ,

3 1 i A Yes, I see that.

3 ,

I g; Q :n that job, do you have a.y occasion to &Itempt i

, , '; to construe the full participation exer:ise requirement of O  !

Appendix E?

g ;I A Y u are 1:,miting that sentence to the word 24 l l "exercise?" Aren't you going to ask me about the rest of 3

O  !

v. n a n ,_ - _ : .. - . . . .- --

5985 3 010' 0 hvalsh g , il it, because if you are going to want the whole sentence it 2

might be a different answer.

3 Q Well, let's just talk about your Lead Controller 7 a job.

A As the Lead Controller, no.

5i Q Thank you. Now, we are going to get down to 6

[] 7 what you want to talk about, your involvement in the g

preparation of the exercise scenario. ,

I

n. Do you see that testimony? >

O A Yes, I do.

io

Q Now, isn't it correct, sir, that as -- well, you 12 were the lead. LILCO person in terms of interfacing with FEMA C) 33 on the development of the exercise.

Is that a fair generalization?

u '

A That's correct.

15 MR. LANPHER: For the Board's information, I l Lo g i--

think most of that has been covered in earlier testimony. I i

I a will try not to duplicate. i i

O BY MR. LANPHER: (Continuing) j i

Q Isn't it true that in your interf acing with FC:!A 39

- ,e you never discussed with FEMA whether the Shoreham exercis-C) ,, would satisfy the Appendix E full participation requirement?

A To my recollection, the only comments we had 3 j,l i tha* it n 3j]fromFEMAconcerningthescopeoftheexercisewas was going to be handled and be in scope equal to other

'l ,,! .

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v I 5986  !

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g31sh  ;

Region II exercises.

g g i

The words "10 CFR, Appendix E, full 2

l 3

participation" did not come up, i

Is it fair to state that you assumed it would be j , Q 3j a full participation exercise? I I

i It's fair to say that I thought that given

.I A

a ,

i FEMA's representation to me this was going to be like all  ;

a other exercises that I assumed it met some of that standard,  :

3l I l

9) yes, that was part of what they meant by that.  !

i l

Q But, you never pressed them?

9 je i,

A No, I never asked that particular question. I I

Q Now, how did your involvement in the preparation f 12 of the exercise scenario, as referenced at Lines 4 and 5 on l O g  :

y Page 2 of your testimony, lead you to familiarity with ,

Appendix E, full participation?

A only through the conversations I just mentioned  !

O q <

I p i to you I had with FEMA in developing the exercise scenario. t

' i

.g  ; Q But, in those conversations there was no express g j i l

O discussion of Appendix E7

! gl -

1 l . n. q

. A That's correct.

x nave you ever -- now, these quest: ens all wen:

.) l1 l

Did you understand that?

O 3[uptothe time of the exercise.

A Yes, ! did.

. ., j

..l Q Have you at any time subsequent to the exercise

..h O ,,Ihaveanydiscussionswithanyone from FEMA concerning 3

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. _ .. __ . m. _ .. -

u 5987 01010 **

gaish l i

whether the exercise, the shoreham exercise, satisfied i

} .

l 2

Appendix E?

3 A No. '

1 Q Now, Mr. Behr, prior to the exercise did you

]) 4 5

ever have any discussions with FEMA whether this would be a l 6

full participation exercise as defined in Appendix E7 l Nothing in reference to Appendix  !

]) 7 A (Witness Sehr) 3 E. just many times in discussions with Mr. Kowieski he kept o making the point time and time again that this exercise was

[) to going to be no different than any other exercise in Region i

11 II.

a Q 'Jow, subsequent to the exercise, 2/86, have you E) 33 had any discussions with anyone from FEMA concerning whether u

the Shoreham exercise satisfied the Appendix E requirements?

No, I had not. I A

15  !

O Q Mr. Daverio, have you had any discussions with 16

,7 anyone from the NRC Staff on whether the Shoreham exercise  ;

satisfied Appendix E7 '!

33 l (Witness Daverio) Not to my recollection, no.

3 ,,

A

. Q And, that question --

c i

3efore and after. ,nswered that.

i ( A

[) Q Thank you. Same question for you, Mr. Sehr.

22 A (Witness 3ehr) No, I have not.

23 1 Q And, that was before and after the exercise?

3 i

, i J <

A That's correct.

,5l 5

I O ,

I

,p1111 ,, , .. 6003 gsinons t Q And as part of these alert notification tests,

) 2 did this include -- do these tests that you've been involved j 3 with, maybe not personally at the test, but from which 4 you're obtaining data, did they involve the participation of

)

3; emergency broadcast system radio stations? i g A yes.

I 7 Q Is that part of the, shall : say, the standard

)

REP 10 repertoire?

s g A As required for a qualification test, yes, sir, to a qualification demonstration actually, ii Q Now you stated that you, and this is at page 3 12 of your prefiled testimony and you altered the testimony, 13 you stated that you managed a project that developed a draft i, guidance memorandum on the ingestion pathway. ,

i 15 Do you see that testimony?

g A Yes, sir. l 9 Q 1 believe you testified during your deposition i

a that the ingestion pathway module in fact was never actually

., l prepared.

) i i

', A That's correct. That's one of the reasons tha:

.?

l  : changed this testimony. The project was intended to

,3

-,il develop an ingestion exposure pathway exercise evaluation 3  :

t

.,,' What in fact was done was a draft guidanca

.l module.

,I l

N=emorandumwasdeveloped.

L .,j Q What has happened with that guidance nemorandum7 l

l J -

i.

___ ~ _ . . _ - _ _

D L .

6004 l 1;11 "*

33 sons j A It was given to the client at Edison Electric D and I honestly don't know what's been done with it since.

2

- Dhat's one of the disadvantages of working as a consultant. l 3

l once you turn the deliverable over to the client you lost i D track.

i 5

Q So you don't know if it has ever been relied l i

l upon by anybody?

O No, sir, I do not.

g A

,j I

Q Did you rely upon that draft guidance memorandum I

, g, for any of the conclusions you reach in your testimony here?

l A Not specifically. Only to the extent that that 33 experience again allows me to interpret a little better }

12 I

what's in the guidance memorandum. l m

g- li Well, did that assist you to interpret what u Q constitutes a full participation exercise?

,3 A Marginally at best and probably not. ,

i n' Q Do you have any reason to believe that it's not j g' , feasible to develop a guidance memorandum for ingestion '

l  !

3;

pathway exercises?

)

a l A  : developed a draft. So : assume that it is

.{

.o a

.,j feasible to develop a guidance memorandum.

l Q Do you know of any reason why you :ou l dn ' t have

) 3 I

an exercise which tested ingestien pathway ac :cns in 4

,, j propcsed accident scenario?

.-,j i,

A  : don't know of any specific reason why these

7; 3 l

0 i l

h l 301111 .. 6005  !

~' - -

yr,1 mons 1 i could.not be tested. I'm not specifically aware of good 3 guidance for testing those at this point in time.

3 Q But you don't know any reason why that wouldn't l f

4 be something that could be achieved?

q 3 A' I don't know of any reason why it can't be done l

3 in theory, no, sir. l; 7 Q Mr. Hockert, in your statement of i O l 3

qualifications, the first five pages I believe relate to i i

g your work at the NRC in various responsibilities. Is that i in correct? That's up into July of 1983.

3: A That is correct, sir, n Q And during that time you had no involvement with i3 offsite emergency planning issues; is that correct? ,

A Other than participation from the NRC side in a i, l i few NRC exercises; that is correct.

l i3

'6 Q NRC safeguards exercises? ,

O t n A They were exercises involving safeguards issues l

! at nuclear power plants. l

! I i, ,' Q These were not exercises conducted under  ;

,O i

.c Appendix E to Part 507 l .

,i A No, sir. They sere internal NRC er.ercises as

,1 1

O ,! opposed to licensee exercises and of f site exercises.

o

• ) i/

. Q Mr. Rockert. hav3 you reviewed the offsite 1

.,; emergency response pf,an fer thereham?

,$ A No, sir.

I I  !

I i

O i I.

O I 40 03 03 6085 1 materials, right?

Jevalsh 9 2 A (Witness Daverio) That's correct.

3 0 You did not -- once Ftr. Aidikoff and the others 4 went through the reports and exercised judgments, you did 9

5 not go and query them and ask them about how they had 6 exercised that judgment; isn't that correct?

7 A That's correct.

O 8 MR. LANPHER: I have nothing further, Judge. I 9 would move to strike all that testimony.

g 10 MR. 2EUGIN: Judge Frye, I would merely note 11 that we have done the best we can given the time available 12 between last evening and this morning to conduct this work.

8 13 -

If Mr. Lanpher feels that it's absolutely 14 important t..'t these witnesses review every last document, 15 they can do that over the week-end. I see no reason to not G

16 admit this testimony based on the representations of Mr.

17 Daverio, and the fact that the common set of criteria that 18 were used were agreed to in advance.

l l 19 i JUDGE FRYE So I understand it and am clear, 20 the testimony you are moving to strike begins on Page 43 and g 21 goes to the end; is that correct?

22 MR. LANPHER: Yes, Judge Frye. It's the 23 discussion of the other exercise testimony and it's 8 24 Attachments O and R.

I 25 JUDGE FP.YE: Right.

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2) 03 03 6086 1 MR. LANPHER: And, if the motion is granted kvalsh

) 2 there are some references earlier in the testimony that 3 references back --

4 JUDGE FRYE Which would no longer --

D 5 MR. LANPHER: I think you understand the thrust 6 of what I'm going after.

g 7 JUDGE FRYE I do.

8 MR. LANPHER: And, the suggestion that, well, 9 let them try again over the week-end, I'm not going to D 10 reargue the schedule or anything at this point. It was set, 11 and they were supposed to be ready. I'm sorry they are not 12 ready, but I don't think they are proper sponsors for this I 13 testimony.

14 MR. ZEUGIN: I strongly object to Mr. Lanpher's 15 characterization as giving the witnesses an attempt to try

_)

16 again. I think what he is asking is whether they have 17 physically reviewed themselves each last one of these 18 reports and each last notes of Mr. Millioti and compared the

_)

19 two. T'ie witaesses have clearly stated that they did not, l 20 given the amount of time that was available. The witnesses 21 clearly stated that the criteria that were used were uniform 22 criteria for all of these.

23 There are basically not that many changes if one 24 looks at the tables. The end result is really no different 25 in terms of conclusions one would draw from these tables, m

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walsh I just don't see what purpose is served by 2

making the witnesses -- and they would be willing to do that 3

if the Board feels it is necessary -- to go back and 4

personally look at every last report and look at the table O 5 t see that, in fact, they agree with every notation in the 6 table.

7 JUDGE FRYE You have now an answer to your

() 8 question, Mr. Pirfo. How do you stand on this?

9 MR. PIRFO:

Well, the answer I heard clearly 10

.O falls under the rubric of prepared under the direction and '

11 supervision.  !

I think Mr. Lanpher -- and, so I don't think i 12 there are grounds to strike.

! r 13 O ,

I think Mr. Lanpher has succeeded in-14 undercutting a certain amount of the weight to be accorded 15 the testimony on it. I don't know where Mr. Lanpher's cross

(J 16 examination is going with this, and it may present a problem 17 for him as to detail.

18

) But, I don't think I -- as much of the other  !

19 testimony, or virtually all of it, it's prepared under the 20 direction and supervision of t?P witnesses. They have t

21 supervised it, they set the , 5 teria, they did some of the

\

C) 22 l

reviews themselves. I have the same concerns Mr. Lanpher  ;

23 has, they said they have not reviewed each of them. I 24 43 MR. LANPHER: Judge, I --  !

25 MR. PIkFO: If I may finish? So, I don't think  !

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a motion to strike at this point is improper. I think to

') 2 the extent they.have not done a report by report review 3

themselves personally, then certainly the weight is u'ndercut 4 somewhat.

O 5 Juo3E rRYE: okay, we will go back to you and 6 then we will need to confer.

7 MR. LANPHER: - Just briefly. I want it to be O

8 understood, I don't object, because I think everyone does 9

it, to witnesses having stuff done under their control.

g 10 This is a complicated case and a lot of people are busy.

11 That's not the point here.

12 I know our witnesses, and I think most LILCO O I 13 witnesses, get back to making sure that everything is done 14 right and review the stuff that is relied upon. That's what 15 hasn't been done. That's what is improper here.

C 16 Mr. Zahnleuter said that he has --

17 MR. ZAHNLEUTER: The State of New York supports C

'l B that motion to strike. And, I think that it's one thing to 19 swear to the truth and veracity of information that is in 20 the testimony, and it's another thing to be very willing to O 21 defend it, but it's quite another question to know what you 22 are talking about.

23 And, that's the issue that we are coming down to t 24 here. These witnesses just don't know what it is that r 25 underlies this information in the testimony and how it was O

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2 MR. 2EUGIN: Judge Frye, I would just merely 3 note that the latter part of Mr. Zahnleuter's argument, none 4 of that has yet been brought out one way or the other on e l 5 cross-examination.

6 I think a lot of that was --

7 MR. PIRFO: Well, I think --

g, 8 MR. 2EUGIN: -- an assumption by Mr. Zahnleuter 9 about what the witnesses may or may not know.

f

@ 10 MR. PIRFO: That's the problem I'm having at 11 this point. As I said earlier, I don't know where Mr.

12 Lanpher's cross is going.

G k 13 JUL'GE FRYE: We understand. Let us confer for a 14 moment.

15 (The Board is conferring.)

b' 16 17 M

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19 l

20 I l

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1 22 1 23 24 25 o

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1sh 1 JUDGE FRYE: We have conferred and have decided 2 to grant your motion, Mr. Lanpher.

3 MR. ZEUGIN: Judge Frye, could I get an 4 explanation of what it is that you are granting?

O 5 JUDGE FRYE: The striking of the testimony that 6 Mr. Lanpher identified before we conferred.

7 MR. ZEUGIN: Is that the exhibits or the

,3 8 testimony itself that was admitted yesterday, because I I

9 think --

0 10 JUDGE rRYE: The testimony and the exhibits.

11 Well, wait a minute, you moved to strike not only the {

12 exhibits but the testimony beginning at Page 43 --

U I 13 MR. LANPHER: Question 52 on Page 43 --

14 JUDGE FRYE And the attachments?

15 MR. LANPHER: -- and Attachments O and R. Yes, O

16 sir. i 17 JUDGE FRYE: That's what I thought.

g 18 MR. LANPHER: And I will, at an appropriate  !

19 time, identify -- thece are just a couple of snippets -- i i 20 JUDGE FRYE: I don't think we need to go through O 21 and edit out the snippets, ne understand what has been 22 done.

i 23 MR. ZEUGIN: Could I ask the Board for the k

l 24 reasons why it decided to strike all of that material?

l 25 JUDGE FRYE: We are concerned about -- I can't

\

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6091 40 04 04 g31sh 1 say reliability so much as we are about how useful it would 2 be, given the involvement of these witnesses in its 3 preparation. They have themselves testified that it D 4 involved judgmer.t calls.

5 they have a number of people who have, using 6 their criteria, gone througn these exercise reports and 7 exercised their judgment. Those people are not here, and we 8 have to rely on Mr. Daverio and Mr. Behr to indicate how 9 they used that judgment.

10 So, in our view the reliability of it, in the 11 sense of how useful it would be in preparing a decision, was 12 pretty slim. {

7

• i 13 JUDGE PARIS: There were six people identified, 14 ir.cluding those gentlemen, as being involved in the review,

) 15 each of whom, according to their testimony, reviewed three.

. 16 And, that leaves 15, according to my figures, reviewed by a 17 person or persons unknown. I don't think counsel did 15 0

.i 18 last night, did you?

19 MR. IRWIN: Judge Paris, I hesitate to get into i

the middle of this but I am one of tN people who did not i

l! 20 l C l 21 review any, so I am to some extent a disinterested 1 22 observer.

g 23 JUDGE PARIS: So, you are innocent.

24 (Laughter.)

25 MR. IRWIN: However, I'm going to tell you what O

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1 I saw in that room, which wan a bunch of peeple sitting 31sh around a table in a very collegial process. And, if it 2

3 would assist the Board's ultimate determination on this i

~ 4 important issue, which is the only testimony on the 5 comparative nature of this for the scope of exercise you 6 have in this proceeding, I would be happy to do it.

7 There was a collegial review process. The Board 8 cut off Mr. Daverio in his description'of that process, and 9 Mr. Daverio had more to say, and would have said it if 3

10 offered the chance. If the Board wishes to reconsider its 11 motion on the basis of further questioning, we would be 12 happy to provide that basis.

13 Mr. Daverio is unquestionably an expert on I 14 emergency planning and on emergency planning exercises and 15 has experience at exercises beyond Shoreham. The same is 16 true of Mr. Behr.

l I

17 The point that they were making, and Mr. Daverio d 18 j was making in terms of the exercise judgment, is that the

]

FEMA reports themselves are not encyclopedic. The

! 19 f

20 methodology they used is inherently not reduceable to total 4  !

21 exactitude. There is inherently some judgment in it.

22 Mr. Daverio did say though that he was confident of the overall results of the review. If you look at the 23 '

24 number of entries which were changed, even exercising 25 judgment, it's somewhere on the order of 10 to 15 percent of ss ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.

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04 6093 p 04 1 the entries at most. It doesn't swing the results

, p31sh 2 substantially.

3 The basic testimony was already in. What we are g 4 talking about is a refinement of testimony which is already 5 in which modifies the detail and exact level of comparison 6 of Shoreham but doesn't significantly swing the results.

1. 7 JUDGE FRYEt Well, we are not going to reverse 8 our ruling. You will have an offer of proof essentially.

l l 9 If at some point down the road we decide that we O'

10 really need to know more about this, then we may be in a 11 j position of having to reopen the record.

12 I But, we are not going to reverse our ruling.

O 13 MR. CUMMING: Judge Frye, may I ask for a 14 clarification for the record?

15 stricken then is the Question and Answer 52, 16 starting on Page 43 over through to the top of Page 49, 17 where Question 56 begins?

O 18 MR. LANPHER: My understanding, Judge, is that 19 it goes down to *.he last three lines on Page 50. Question 20 57 and Answer 57 can remain in, q

1 21  ! JUDGE FR'iEs I would think so, yes. ,

22  ;

Essentially, it's to the end. Question 57 is: Does that

. 23 conclude your testimony.

q 24 MR. CUMMING: With leave of the Court to educate i 25 the FEMA counsel, my understanding is that the Board does, ACE. FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.

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in fact, have the right to take judicial notice of documents 1sh 2 that are filings if, in fact, they were filed in the Public 3 Document Room.

4 If they are not sponsored, that would raise the 5 issue. But, it's also my understanding that a sponsor of 6 testimony does not have to be the author'of the specific i

7 document. This could be important to the way that FEMA 8 presents its testimony in the future, since we did cite some 9

10 JUDGE FRYE That's true as a general 11 propocition.

12 MR. IRWIN: LILCO -- just so the record is 13 clear, LILCO would make an offer of proof at this time or,

, 14 if the Board considered it material, to the reconsideration b'

15, of its motion. The nature of the collegial process that was 16 followed in the course of the review --

i 17 JUDGE FRYE Let me suggest, to cut this short j

18 so we can get on with it for the witnesses, why don't you 19 l make your offer in writing or if you want to make a motion 20 for reconsideration in writing, whatever, but I would like l l 21 to move on with the testimony.

22 MR. IRWIN: Yes, sir. We will do that. }

23 MR. LAWPHER: Judge, with the Board's 24 indulgence, I know it's early for a break but if I could a

25 have maybe three or five minutes just to reorganize

')

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1 6116 l gg 00 Protective measurec in that which is a separate objective.

g ,ggons 1 2 0 And that would be then, since it's one of the 3 very important in the Hockert report, that would be one of g 4 the major observable portions of the emergency plan, l 5 correct?

6 A Not necessarily.

9 7 Well, you testified earlier that the 35 standard 8 objectives represented certainly the large majority of the 9 observable portio 6s. You didn't use the word "major,"

10 correct?

11 A That's correct.

12 O And then your Hockert report br,eaks down these O

t i 13 objectives into three categories, correct?

14 A That's correct.

15 0 Isn't it fair to assume that those objectives 3

16 that are listed as most important correspond to major, not 17 just observable portions, but major observable portions of I 18 the plan?

19 A I'm reluctant to use that term because it is 20 regulatory language and I think that's part of what the 21 Board is deciding here. They are certainly the most 22 important aspects of the observable portions.

~; 3 0 I didn't ask whether they were more important v

24 aspects. I asked whether this was a major observable 25 portion. Are you testifying you can't answer that C

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m 6128 06 06 1 A Not specifically. However, there was a good j

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2 deal of discussion between myself and members of the NRC 3 Staff and the FEMA Staff abo 0t what objectives were to be g 4 tested in all exercises, what would be a reasonable way to 5 put that sort of information together, but I do not recall 6 that the words, ' full participation exercise' and the C) 7 specific regulatory definition ever came up in those 8 discussions.

9 Q I think you agreed before that the o

10 communications portion -- the abi]'ty to communicate, the 11 Objective 5 that we are talking about before, that is an 12 observable portion?

O I 13 A Yes, sir.

14 0 You also -- would you agree also, given the g 15 study that you performed, that that is a very important 16 observable portion?

17 A Absolutely.

O 18 Q And that ingestion pathway testing is a very 19 l important observable portion?

20 l MR. ZEUGIN: I will object to the form of that O

21 question. I think it is vague. I don't know that ingestion 22 pathway testing deals with --

23 MR. LANPHER: Objective 11. I O l 24 JUDGE FRYE: Objective 11.

I 25 -

WITNESS HOCKERT: Yes, sir. The one for making O

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) 2 protective actions.

3 BY MR. LANPHER: (Continuing) 4 Q That is a very important observable element of a

) 5 Plan.

6 A (Witness Hockert) Yes, sir.

7 O And the only difficulty that you have is saying

) 8 whether that is a major observable element, is that 9 correct? That is what you have difficulty in answering?

10 A I believe the term you used before was, ' major 11 observable portion,' or, ' major portion observable.'

12 O Well, you had difficulty calling either of h ) 13 those, the ability to communicate or the ability to project 14 dosage to the public by ingestion' exposure, you had 15 difficulty calling either of those a major observable h 16 portion, is that correct?

l 17 A That is correct.

18 0 You have no problem finding it a very important 19 one?

20 A That is correct.

21 O Now, would you agree if that is a major 22 observable portion, please assume for a moment that it is a 23 major one, that it would have to be exercised in order to

), 24 qualify as a full participation exercise?

l )

25 A I think, sir, we are talking at cross-purposes.

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4 06 6130 g 06 1 0 Answer my question please. If you can't answer 1sh 4 f 2 ny question, just say so.

3 A I can't answer your question, then.

4 0 What is the difficulty you are having, sir?

5 A The difficulty that I am having is that there 6 seems to be a paradigm on vour part that there are certain gi 7 objectives which get the title, ' major observable portion' 8 attached beside them.

9 0 Well --

8 10 A And the view that I have, based on the analysis 11 in the Report, is that one can take a set of objectives, sum 12 up the importance of them, find out how much of the total G

f 13 importance of all the off-site preparedness objectives they 14 subsume, and thereby based upon that sum, say a major g 15 observable portion of the emergency preparedness was 16 exercised.

17 0 You said, 'a major portion,' correct?

G 18 A Yes.

19 0 Bu t doesn' t the regulation -- do you have a copy  ;

20 of Appendix E there, sir?

4 21 A I think I have one.

22 (Witness Hockert obtains document.)

23 0 I direct your attention to Part 4.F, if you have 4

24 it. Do you have that, Mr. Hockert?

n U 25 A Yes, sir.

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g 07 07 1 O I thought you were comparing Numbers 1 and 2 on l

valsh 2 Page 28.

3 A No. I'm sorry. I was comparing --

g 4 0 Oh, you were comparing 2 and 37 5 A -- 5 and 3. Objective Nuiaber 5 and Objective 6 Number 3 on 4-3.

E 7 0 We were talking about different things. I'm 8 sorry.

9 A Yes.

B 10 0 okay.

11 A It gets to be confusing with all the different 12 objective numbers that are flying around between PR-1 and EX-13 3.

14 0 Now, Mr. Hockert, going again to your Answer 33 D 15 on Page 29, I won't repeat that question and answer. We 16 have got it in the record. We were focusing before on what 17 were the major observable portion of whatever.

3 18 Let's move on to another part of the regulatory 19 standard, and that -- strike that.

20 Before we do that, it's your testimony that D

21 these very import, ant ought to be demonstrated the most l 22 frequently, correct?

23 A Yes, sir. That would seem logical.

g 24 O And, isn't it true that under Appendix E that if 25 demonstration is reasonably achievable, it is supposed to be ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. ,

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o 07 6140 g 07 1 done for a full participation exercise?

p.31sh 2 A For the first full participation exercise, I 3 believe thAt is correct.

4 0 Okay. So, if the demonstration of an objective 5 is -- of a major portion of the plan is reasonably 6 achievable or -- excuse me. If a demonstration of a r arti.on C 7 of the plan is reasonably achievable it should be done for 8 the first full participation exercise, correct? ,

9 A Understanding that you mean reasonably g"

10 achievable without mandatory public participation.

11 0 That's right. And --

12 A Yes, sir.

O  ;

13 0 -- would ingestion pathway testing, to your 14 I knowledge, require mandatory public participation? When I c 15 say ingestion testing, again we are talking about Objective v

16 11.

17 A No, sir.

O 18 0 It would not? Now, earlier, Mr. Hockert --

if 19 you will indulge me one moment and let me look at my notes.

20 (Pause.)

21 Mr. Hockert, directing your attention to Page 4-22 1 of the Hockert report, you acknowledge really what you 23 just acknowledged in your testimony that there could be v

24 differences, relatively small differences, in the rankings 25 that individual respondents might give.

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6198 g 11 11 01 jysimons1 what-we were discussing at that point. I was distracted.

2 MR. LANPHER: We were talking GM-17, Revision 1.

3 JUDGE FRYE: I got that much.

O I asked the witnesses whether that 4 MR. LANPHER:

5 document even mentions Appendix E to Part 50, and they 6 couldn't recall and they don't have a copy of the document.

O -

7 JUDGE FRYE: Okay.

8 MR. LANPHER: Given their answer that they cite g 9 it here basically for historical stuff, I'll look at the 10 transcript and maybe we can avoid having to go into that in

11. detail.

() 12 JUDGE PARIS: I just noted in your testimony l}'

13 that you gave on page 10 the date for GM PR-1 as October 4, 14 1985. That's the date of the covering memorandum. The O I just thought I 15 memorandum itself is dated October 1.

16 would point that out.

17 MR. LANPHER: Okay.

O 18 BY MR. LANPHER:

19 Q Is it your position, gentlemen, that PR-1 20 specifies FEMA's position on what the requirements are for 0

21 full participation exercises?

22 A (Witness Daverio) It's our position that GM PR-0 23 1 sets forth FEMA's thinking on what standard exercise 24 objectives they would have as their general classification II 25 of objectives which they would use as they see fit in O

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,gysimons 1 designing exercises to De held in response to their 2 requirements under 44 CFR 350.

3 0 So this is a guidance memorandum again issued n

under 44 CFR 350; is that correct?

4 5 A That's my understanding; that's correct.

6 0 Does this guidance memorandum attempt t o.

(3 7 interpret full participation exercise requirements of the 8 NRC's regulations?

9 A They don't reference NRC regulations that I can g

10 find other than it's how they ---

11 (Witnesses confer.)

12 As Mr. Behr just pointed out to me, they

() '

{

13 actually do reference 10 CFR on page 1 of the guidance 14 memorandum.

C) 15 0 Well, let's talk about that for a moment, Mr.

16 Behr, that's the second full paragraph on page 2 of 17 Attachment E; is that correct?

O 18 A (Witness Behr) That's correct.

19 0 And the first page of Attachment E, just so the 20 record is clear, is a memorandum from Samual W. Speck to 21 Regional Directors concerning this guidance memorandum?

22 A That's correct.

23 O

24 I

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}-l ggE/sw 1 A (Witness Behr) Yes, I do.

2 Q Did you have any opportunity to attempt to 3 refresh your recollection?

) 4 A Yes, I have.

5 0 And, was I correct that the basic purpose of that

6 Rule change concerned the changing of the time -- the

)j 7 frequency for state participation in bi-annual exercises?

I. 8 A I believe that was one of the purposes. There 9 was also I think for the first time a definition of the term

) 10 "full participation."

i 11 JUDGE PARIS: Speak into the mike, please.

1 12 WITNESS BEHR: I'm sorry. I think for the first l 13 time a definition of "full participation" appeared in the l

l 14 Federal Register, Appendix E.

15 BY MR. LANPHER: (Continuing) 16 0 Prior to that time, the NRC regulations did not 17 have a definition of a "full participation" exercise, h 18 correct?

19 A I don't recall one.

l l 20 0 Now, Mr. Behr, looking at the first page of D

21 Attachment E to your testimony, am I correct that PR-1 was 22 designed to provide guidance under 44 CFR 350 and also NUREG 23 0654?

24' A That's correct.

l l 25 Q That was FEMA's intention, correct?

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10 13 05 6221 O sus /sw 1 A Excuse.me? -

2 O That it was FEMA's intention?

3 A Yes, I believe that's correct.

0; 4 0 You say I believe that was correct. Do you have j- 5 any knowledge other than what you read in this piece of 6 paper?

g 7 A No, I don't.

8 0 Do you, Mr. Daverio?

9 A (Witness Daverio) No, I don't.

O 10 0 And, isn't it, in fact, true according to this 11 piece of paper that "The policy, procedures and requirements g 12 contained in this GM were developed to synchronize them with I

g 13 i the bi-annual exercise frequency, highlight periodic l

14 'l requirements and formally set forth the reporting O 15 requirements in the annual letter of certification which is 16 due by January 31 for the preceeding year's activities."

17 That was the purpose, rignc?

O 18 (The witnesses are looking at documents.)

19 That's what it says, isn't it?

20 A (Witness Behr) That's what it says, yes.

O 21 Q You have no reason to disagree with that, do you, 22 either of you?

l Oj 23 A (Witness Daverio) I do not.

24 (Witness Behr) No.

l 25 0 Gentlemen, in this series of questions I will O

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ND 6235 140 14 14 memorandum, gentlemen, I guess, Mr. Behr, you were the one l jprycimons 1 2 that drew our attention to paragraphs 4 and 5. Isn't it 3 true that each of those paragraphs expressly references

'q~

4 full participation under 44 CFR 350?

5 A (Witness Behr) Yes, that's true.

6 0 So how does this constitute guidance or O

7 interpretation of what is required under Appendix E to Part 8 50?

o 9 I would like to nave Mr. Behr answer this a

10 question if he can. If you can't, say so, and then 11 l certainly consult with Mr. Daverio.

O 12 A Well, I go back to the background paragraph on 13 the first page, or actually the second page of the 14 attachment that says that "The purpose of the memo is to 10 15 add clarification. With the publication of the final FEMA 16 rule and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, NRC final 17 regulation, 10 CFR 50 on July 6th, 1984 it has become O necessary to clarify some of the requirements."

18 19 0 But paragraph 4 and paragraph 5 on page 3 are m

20 very express in their reference to 44 CFR, the FEMA rule U

21 and not any NRC rule; isn't that correct?

22 A That's what the paragraphs say, yes.

23 0 You have no reason to disagree with them, do (3

24 you?

l ) A No, I don't.

25 ,

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y arysimons 1 reference on page one intends that this guidance memo l 2 provides clarification of the new rules that were passed.

3 Q Aside from that one reference to the new rule on O 4 page one of the guidance memorandum, is there any other 5 reference to the NRC rules in here?

6 A In these two paragraphs?

h 7 0 Anywhere in this guidance memorandum or the

! 8 cover sheet.

9 (Pause.)

O l

10 I'll take it from your silence that there 11 isn't. If you find it over the weekend, you can point it l

12 out. Wa won't take time now.

yg

W 13 A There is a reference.

! 14 O All right, where?

g 15 A On page 2 under "Acceptance Criteria."

16 0 Okay. That's the other reference. Do you rely 17 on that reference?

'O 18 A Not from what we were just talking about, no.

19 MR. LANPHER: Okay. Thank you.

20 JUDGE FRYE: Mr. Behr, so I understand, do I iO 21 understand your testimony correctly that you believe this 22 guidance memorandum was intended to convey FEMA's a 23 interpretation of the NRC rule; is that correct or not at O, ,

24 least in part?

25 WITNESS BEHR: I think in part. I think they O

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l 2140 14 14 6238 3rycimons 1 provided this to the regions to give them guidance on how 2 to apply that rule in their design of exercises.

3 JUDGE FRYE: Thank you.

j 4 BY MR. LANPHER:

5 0 And you base that belief on your reading of this 6 piece of paper, correct?

O 7 A (Witness Behr) That's basically correct, yes.

8 0 I don't mean to repeat, but you've had no 9 discussions with FEMA personnel who were involved with the 10 guidance memorandum when it was draf ted or subsequently to 11 tell you, yes, that's exactly what this was about, Mr.

12 Behr?

4 13 A No discussions with FEMA personnel, no, 14 discussions with colleagues, g 15 0 Colleagues who were involved in drafting this?

16 A Not necessarily involved in drafting that, but 17 colleagues who are involved in design of exercises and O 18 emergency preparedness in general.

19 0 Tell me about these conversations. How did that .

20 clarify the meaning of this guidance memorandum? You don't o

'> 21 really rely on ,those conversations, do you?

22 MR. ZEUGIN: Judge Frye, I don't which is a 23 pending questions any more. Mr. Lanpher continues to ask O l 24 one question and then continues to ask questions while the 25 witness is trying to answer the first question.

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0 01700303 6821 jo3walsh i however, is a little more specific.

J C 2 In your opinion, does this guidance, dre.it i

3 guidance memorandum, provide an interpretation of what is 4 required in order to comply with 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E O

5 insofar as that Appendix E pertains to full participation 6 exercises?  !

7 (The witnesses are looking through a document.)

O 8 A (Witness Daverio) I hate to say the same words 9 again, but it's only tied through FEMA's using its to Memorandum of Understanding to -- and I will quote - "Make C

11 determinations as to whether state and local emergency plans l

12 and preparedness are. adequate and continue to be capable of i3 maintaining training, staffing..." and it lists a lot of 14 things and references the MOU and acknowledges that they are l is providing a finding to FEMA -- to NRC, which NRC under its 16 w rules makes its determination.

OI 17 So, it's linked through 350 and the MOU. That's is the only way.

O, 19 0 And, it is your understanding, Mr. Behr, that 20 this Draft Guidance Memorandum reflects the way FEMA goes 21 about preparing for and running exercises?

O 22 Is that your testimony, sir?

23 A (Witness Behr) It's my testimony that this 24 Draft Guidance Memo does nothing but refine the way the

O 25 process is applied and basically documents what is actually f

. O,

e".

O c1700303 6822 joevalsh I

done and what has been being done for the last seven years.

O 2 Q So, the answer to my question is yes? ,

3 A Yes. l 4

Thank you. l Q Now, turning your attention to Page .

U 5 3 of Attachment G, Draft Guidance Memorandum EX-3. First, 6

you included as relevant to your testimony the paragraph l 7.

starting about a third of the way down, starting "The  !

O a objectives for each exercise. . ." and continuing down to 9 Roman Numeral II.  !

l

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10 That's not really relevant to your testimony, is

'O 11 it?

l 12 A (Witness Daverio) Yes, it is.

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i 0 In what way is it?

O 2 A It talks about NRC Regional Office being ,

3 specifically involved in looking at scenarios, and it ties 4 NRC and FEMA in coordinating the review in the third 5 paragraph. So, it just supports the premise that NRC and 6 FEMA are working together though they have separate

. I 7 regulations.

O 8 0 This is a guidance memorandum under the FDIA 9 regulations, correct?

Oj i A That's correct. But if you -- FDIA does i

11 business on exercises through the RAC Committee which has 12 NRC membership, as I understand it. And, I think that 's CI 13 vhat is being alluded to in those two paragraphs.

14 And, that's all they are included for.

is Q Okay. I understand. And, the discussion at the C 16 top of the page, Page 3 of that same document, that is your

. 17 understanding, Mr. Behr, of the way FDIA goes about l l

is preparing for and conducting exercises?

O 19 A (Witness Behr) That's correct, yes.

20 Q And, thus FEMA, in preparing for an exercise, 21 selects objectives in order to test a significant portion of O 22 the emergency response capability. That's FEMA standard, n correct?

2- ] A That's correct.

O 25 i

0 Now, am I correct, Mr. Behr, that there is l

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-q l 01700404 6829 suevalsh I

with LERO personnel, that would not have required tandatory l O 2 public participation, would it?

3 A My only problem with answering that question, 4

Mr. Lanpher, as you know there were two entities within i O 5 LILCO.

I did not talk to WALK radio and know whether they .

6  :

wanted to participate or whether they felt some constraints  !

7 about participating. '

C 8 So, I don't know.

9 MR. LANPHER: Judge Frye, I'm not getting an 10 answer to my question. And, maybe I'm being --

'S 11 WITNESS DAVERIO: Try it again and I will try to 12 answer it. If I'm not, I'm sorry.

13 C

BY MR. LANPHER: (Continuing) dW 14 Q Mr. Daverio, you testified that WALK radio did 15 not participate at all in the exercise. It wasn't 16 telephoned, it didn't interface with LERO, correct?

O 17 A That's correct.

is Q Is it your testimony that for WALK radio to have 19 been telephoned by LILCO, to have interfaced with LILCO

)

20 I under the LILCO plc: would have required mandatory public ,

21 ' participation?

22 A Now, I understand your question. No, it would

') 23 not have but it wasn't necesscry to dercionstrate the plans 24 l

l and procedures either, because we did everything, including .

25 3' calling son.eone who was sinulating being WALK.

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1i MR. LAMPHER: Judge Frye, we are going to be

, I

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here a long time. I'm not getting straight answers. Maybe l 3 people are rested now.

4 JUDGE PRYE: Well, he did answer it and then he

) 5 qualified it. As I recall, he said no, it did not involve 6

public participation, mandacory public participation.

7 Isn't that what you said, Mr. Daverio?

-?

8 WITNESS DAVERIO: I said but I didn't believe it 9

was required because of the --

10 JUDGE SHON: What about the other half of the n'

'~

11 same -- the other horn of the same dilemma? Was it 12 reasonably achievable?

la Could you have reasonably have done it?

')

)- 14 WITNESS DAVERIO: That is where I got to the t is answer of having a problem. I did not talk to WALK radio is prior to the exercise, and I don't know whether they had O

17 reservations about participating to the extent of receiving 18 a phone call or not.

19 JUDGE PARIS: Did anybody else in LERO talk with i

.- WALK radio or LILCO, that you know?

WITNESS DAVERIO: Yes. People at LILCO talked 9

! to MALK radio, but because I was preparing the exercise ,

scenario I was divorced f rom that end of what was going on. .

And, I did not talk to WALK radio.

j BY MR. LANF RED: (Continuing)  !

C1_

'J e '

l

sy-e 6847 01700505 prysimons g ,

1 moment.

/

2 A Okay. Sorry.

3 0 That Suffolk County law and the rest of the g a situation to which you refer on pages 16 and 17 had not 5 impact at all, however, about human interactions with WALK, 6 leave aside actual test broadcast of a message and on the g , 7 legal side the actual sounding of sirens; isn't that a correct? That had nothing to do with you interfacing, you, 9 LERO interfacing with WALK Radio, correct?

E i 10 A It would have something to do with whether WALK 11 wanted to interface with LEh0. As I remember the law, if 12 you participated, it didn't say who, you could have been d '

i3 subject to the fine and penalties in that law and there may hf 14 have been a concern on people's parts.

is Q But you don't know whether anyone even d '

16 approached WALK Radio during that time frame to, would you 17 please take phone calls from us so that we can more fully is test the EBS system? You don't even know, do you?

I '

19 A I don't know why the decision was made. I know 20 people have talked to WALK, but I was not involved in making 21 the decision concerning WALK.

I' 22 Q Now you state that it was LILCO's intent to 23 demonstrate, and I guess you really mean to test the plan 24 and procedures to the fullest extent possible, correct?

II 23 A That's correct, t

l

i f I O

6848 01700505.

parysimons 1 0 You included in that test actual contacts with 9 2 one school district; is that correct?

3 0 That's correct.

4 Q The Shoreham Wading River Central School 5 District.

6 A That's correct.

7 Q And isn't it true that during the time when 8 objectives and scenarios were being developed that FEMA 9 requested LILCO to involve additional school districts in i the test or to consider it?

O 11 A FEMA asked whether LILCO was willing to write 12 the other school districts to determine whether they were 13 willing to participate.

CF

$ 14 Q And LILCO responded after considering that FEMA 15 request that it did not want to; is that correct?

16 A LILCO told me to tell FEMA they did not want to; O

17 that's correct.

18 O And no LILCO made no effort to involve other g to school districts in the February 1986 exercise?

20 A I think it was obvious that they would not have ,

21 participated and I think that's what LILCO decided, though I l

O 22 wasn't involved in that decision.

23 Q The question is that LILCO made no effort even 24 to conract those other school districts and .see if they o 25 would participate, correct? ,

i h

f 3

C1700000 6888 prySim ns 1

here, but if I'm missing something you'll tell me.

Oi l 2

{ (Pause while the witnesses confer and review the 3

document.)

O 4 A There is just a sentence in there that talks 5

about administrative procedures to cor.municate and the I 6

physical capabilities, just that one sentence.

7 O

Q So that's the reason this is attached?

s A Yes, that's all.

9 Q "Adequate administrative procedures to U

% communicate appropriate information."

11 Now, gentlemen, earlier you described, I 12 believe, WALK's role as purely a physical role and not part O

13 of the administrative procedure; is that right? I think l 8 14 that was in the context of explaining why you didn't think 15 it was important for WALK to participate in the exercise.

Os 16 A I think we talked about that they didn't have a 17 decision-making role, la Q Well, did they have an administrative role, or g !9 was it totally a mechanical action?

00 ,. A I would say based on our agreement with them it ,

21 was more mechanical than adminic tative in that they would

,  :: get the message and just rebroade st it. I 23 i

I 24 O j

[

8 s l l I 1

Yf i

6889 01700909 joevalsh I Q But people were involved. They had to l S

)

understand the message,and in fact, carry out the l

• 3 instruction, correct?

g 4 A Didn't have to understand the message, just had 5 to broadcast the message. l 6 Q They had to understand the message that here comes a broadcast item, please take it and get it out over c 7 8 the airways, isn't that correct?

9 A That much they had to know, that is correct.

to Q And whether it is a disc jockey, at 2:00 in the O

11 afternoon or 4:00 a.m., those people have to understand and 12 be able to implement that procedure, correct?

O 13 A That is correct.

1 $ 14 Q And they have to know when they get that call y from LERO, that has to be done, correct?

n O 16 A That is correct.

17 Q That is more than merely a physical step, isn't 18 it?

O 19 A I would ce^ sider it a physical step.

I

c , O Have you reviewed all of REP-10, Mr. Daverio, at ,

1 some time?

O 22 A At some time I nava, yes. l 1

MR. LAUPHER: I werld like to have marked as ,

{

I

4 ; Suffolk County Exhibit 98 for identification, another page i

O 23 i out of Rev. 10. It is Page E-3. -

I l

1 0 l O \

l

6898 p100909 jo evalsh G r i O In fact, we talked about K.78. K.79 end K.80 l .

2 refer -- those references refer to, respectively, broadcast 3 message broadcast and sirens activated; that was K.79 and 9 4 K.80, sirens sounded /EBS message broadcast, correct?

5 A That's correct. But, I don't want to leave the 6 misimpression that these logs don't reflect --

O 7 Q Excuse me, Mr. Daverio.

8 A Okay.

9 Q Mr. Zeugin will ask you the questions he wants, O 10 okay. Those were simulated actions again?

11 A The three -- they were simulated to the extent 12 that they called a simulated person, not that they didn't 8 13 call.

I 14 There are two ways of doing simulation. There 15 is a way of saying I did it and I simulated it. Or, you C 16 make them make the call to a simulated person. They had to 17 make real calls to simulated persons, not simulato the 18 action.

n

" Okay.

i; Q 20 A There is a difference.

All right. I think we understand. Okay. Back

1 Q n

22 to your text on Page 32, gentlemen, you state -- this is at 23 the bottom two-thirds of the page, you say, "...LILc0 has 24 com:nitted that, before operating above 5% power, it will 25 test the remaining mechanical capabilities of the system in 7

( O.

O

! 3f

b. l 1 l 6907 i f.;1701010 evalsh j ij northeast region RAP team. They are the response team for  !

){ f 2'

i the whole northeast.

l l

3i Q But, you are not calling DOE or the whole 1 4I federal team. You are calling, by pre-arrangement, a

)  !

5i specific entity at Brookhaven which is integrated under all l

6l circumstances into your plan, isn't it?

I 7 A It's integrated in the plan, but we are calling '

) e DOE for their assistance.

9I (Witness Behr) I think that paragraph also l

10 j refers to the inter-agency radiological assistance plan D i 11 which brings into play the other federal agencies.

12 0 You didn't call for that assistance, did you, i3 during the exercise?

)I i u A Well, we called for Coast Guard assistance.

15 Q But that again was pre-arranged through a letter

6 of agreement, in fact, right?

17 A That's correct. I la Q And, you state that you called for FAA 19 assistance. In fact, the FAA was not notified, was it? ,

o l' A (Witness Daverio) There were scr.e problems with i

sj having the wrong phone number or not the appropriate phone 1

22 !; number. There was a problem with that.

)

3 JUDGE PARIS: You called the FAA but the wrong i

2: , number at the FAA? Is that what you are saying?

I i

g 25 WITNESS DAVERIO: I think they had proble.vs I I .

O  ! l i

l

a I

i 01701212 6935

• joevalsh i 1 A It's my understanding they did occur.

q'-

2. Q Do you know whether there are any documents .

1 3' which would reflect that? ,-

4 A I do not know. Again, just to point out uhy I 5 might not know is the arrangements for who would be called 6 were made by Mr. Weismantle and the people at LILCO. We 7 just got phone numbers from them.

O 8 And, it's my understanding that they gave us 9 real phone numbers for these two cases. But, that's all. I to do not have independent knowledge that they did it, or I've 11 i never seen a player document.

12 0 Going back to Objective 4, the ability to 13 communicate with all appropriate locations and Of l\

u organizations. Hospitals, we already covered. They didn't is have -- there were no communications with them with the is exception of perhaps two nursing homes. With the exception

O 17 of Shoreham-Wading River School District and their ous is company, there was no communication. And, with respect to 19 WALK there was no communication, correct?

i

o ' A They were all simulated, that's correct.

;; ,1 2 Or they were simulated. Do you still consider 22 l! that to be a full test of Objective 47 O d l Yes. It demonstrated that LILCO coUmunicated --

\1 '

could :: ave conmunicated with the appropriate locations for

n il i

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sf I the day of the exercise.  !

I

+

I l

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I I

) .

01701212  !

powalsh 6936 i j 11 0

Now, you are relying at least for some of that ,

2, on simulated telephone calls, correct?

II 2

A Yes.

4 0 Now, when you attempted to contact the FAA,

) 5 actual contact, you had difficulties; isn't that correct?

6 A That 's correct. And, it's an ARCA. .

7

)

Q And, when you attempted to contact the State of .

B Connecticut during the exercise, you had difficulties '

9 getting through also.  :

10

) A That's correct.

11

}

0 So, isn't it significant --

isn't it more than  !

12 the -- strike that.  !

13 Isn't it true, therefore, that in attempting to 14 make real telephone calls as opposed to simulated telephone  ;

15 i

calls you learned impo.: tent information about your i i

l i6

) capabilities, in fact, to carry out the implementation of i i 17 the plan?  !

i 18 A I think those could be checked without doing any :

19 exercise. You are just ree.11y going to confirm phone

!. numbe;; .

i ,

l

! . 1

^

Well, didn't you try to confirm those with

) :2 !ji Connecticut, for 11nstance, before the exercise?

, 5g A I'.'s my understanding on the Connecticut, again

O just fron: talking to people, that there were two numbers and i

t

s .' they tried the one that isn't manned 24 hours2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br />. It's in the O

l 1 i

8 I

0 I i

1

]f

)

g01212 6937 oet:als h 1; Health Department, j

l But, again that's just from someone telling me 3 about what happened.

4 FAA was that they didn't have the most

) 5l appropriate phone number.

e Q That 's the kind of information you find otit in 7 an exercise, isn't it?

) A s Or in other ways. It doesn't have to be an 9 exercise, 10 Q It's the way you found out about it with respect i

) 11 to Connecticut and the FAA, isn't it?

12 A In those particular cases, yes.

13 JUDGE PARIS: Bave you made real calls to any of b o 14 the places that you simulated calls to to sea if you have 15 the right numbers and can get through before or since the 16 exercise?

) 17 WITNESS DAVERIO: I do not know if they have is done that. The phone numbers that are in the real documents .

1; are under separate cover from the plan and procedures. And,

o ; I just don't know if they have done that or not, i

! ' BY MR. LAt;PHER: (Continuing) s  :: ; -

O Gentlenen, moving on to Objective S -- and we

l have covered that largely this morning. There is just e r. ,

I

q follow-up I wanted to address.

l' D

Objective 0, this is draft EX-3 Objective 8, I) i 3

l

if b I l

1 01701616 6973  ;

g;walsh 1 A No. Stewart Glass was at the meeting.

2, 0 Or, in addition to Roger Kowieski? ,'

A It was in addition to. Roger Kowieski was at a the saae meeting. I don't recall having a conversation with D

5I a FD!A person that Roger was net at.

l 6 Q Do you Iemember the date of that meeting?

7 A I believe it was the November 25th meeting.

a 0 with respect to your response concerning 0 contractors, who did you have conversations with that were l

10 FE!!A contractors about objectives and the scenario? l D  !

11 A Dr. Baldwin, Joe Keller, Mr. Tanzman. They were 12 the primary ones. I also just recalled Spence Perry may l B .

33 have been at one of the first meetings with Stewart Glass, 14 and I just don't remember. He may have been at one.

15 MR. CUMMING: I nave no further questions.

) 16 JUDGE FRYE: Redirect? Oh, Staff.

17 MR. PIRFO: Thank you, Judge Frye.

18 CROSS EXAMINATION g ,9 BY MR. PI RFO:

o l' 0 Mr. Daverio, just a couple of more questions on l;i

1 the schools. You are familiar with a number of recoluticns

that were passed by various school districts and boards in

j the EPZ, are you not?

I 24 !! A (Witness Daverio) Yes, I read them.

i!

g  :: ! O I believe a nurber of them are attached to the

, i a

i i

g701616 l 6974 pewalsh 1i Suf folk County testimony as Attachment 7. Do you happen to el l l l 2' have that in front of you?

f 2 A No. I do not, but I know it's there, i

4 0 We may not need it. If we do, I will hand it up

.)

5 to you. And you, of course, are familiar with these 6 resclutions?

7 A With the general language in them, that's

' t B Correct.

9 O And, these resolutions pre-dated the time of g to FEMA's request to you that you get the schools involved in j 11 the exercise; is that not right? l i

12 A I would say most of them. There may have been g 13 one that has come in since, but I think most of them pre-I i f 14 dated it. i l

15 0 And, of course, LILCO management with whom you '

g le had discussions regarding the participation of schools were ,

17 familiar with these resolutions?

12 A They were more awa,e of the dealings with the

[] !9 school districts than I would have been.

i. O Given the apparent position of these resolutions

) 4 and petitions, would participation by the schools have been 0

C)  :: a reasonably achievable objective, in your view, for the

j February 13th exercise?

l

!i A Given the resolutions as I think I said before, i

D :s I didn't have direct knowledge that they wouldn't 6

i l

O l l

n

if 3 1 01701616 6975 pevalsh i participate but I would have a hard time believing they '

2 would have.

3 0 And, LILCO management presumably had the same --

4 was the same view expressed to you by LILCO management?

5 A They expressed the view that they did not want 6 to write the letter. And, I assume that was the reason but l 7 I don't know.

8 Q And, I'm assuming -- were the resolutions 9 specifically cited as one of the reasons in your discussions i g to with LILCO management?

11 A Not that I recall.  !

12 Q Did you mention these resolutions to FDIA in g 13 your discussions with FD1A, if you remember?

14 A I don't recall discussing them. I think FEMA 13 was aware of them. Based on being involved in the 0-3 ,

3 16 proceeding they were not documents that surprised anyone.

i; But, I don't think I discussed it directly with l

1s them. l I

j 19 MR. PIRFO: Okay. Thank you. I have no other  !

I

c . questions.

l l .

i JUDGE FEYE: Eedirect?

l C) :2 MR. ZEUGIN: No redirect, Judge Frye.

JUDGE PAEIS: I may have a questien for you

! depending on what answer I get back frc.; the note I sent to

q J :s Judge Shon.

I I

i b

D

)

Og 09 m2 j

sw 1 Are you saying that he cannot supplement after the others 2 answer?

3 JUDGE FRYE: I don't believe that has been our 3 4 past practice. He was not one of the witnesses who answered 5 that particular question.

6 MR. LANPHER: Well, can we talk about present

) 7 practice then, Judge Fyre? I don't want to get into 8 semantics.

9 JUDGE FRYE: Let's get the answer if he knows.

D 10 WITNESS BARANSKI: Yes. If I read Part 50, 11 Appendix E -- and I'm under Section D that says notification 12 procedures in Paragraph 1: Administrative and physical l 13 means for notifying local, state and federal officials and 14 agencies -- and I'm going to -- for the prompt notification 15 of the public and for public evacuation or other protective

)

16 measures it should be described. The description shall l 17 include the identification of the official, title, agency 18 and so forth.

l 19 Then, we can go ato NUREG 0654 and if you look 20 in the columns of NUREG 0654 there are licensee check marks D 21 for the alert notification system in 0654.

22 JUDGE FRYE: Okay.

23 WITNESS PETRONE: May I make a point?

S 24 BY MR. IRWIN: (Continuing) l I

25 0 Go ahead, Mr. Petrone.

D ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.

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7143 gOg10

,g/s w 1 A (Witness Petrone) I think there is relative g

2 confusion with this. When we talk about major observable 3 portions, I know there has been much discussion with FEMA in 3 4 years past in terms of what's observable and what's not.

5 And, I think what's relative here is the fact 6 that if FEMA does prepare 35 objectives as they are l 7 prepared, they are observable or they would not be there.

8 And, I think what's relative to Appendix E here 9 is the fact that major observable portions are those things 3

10 that can be observed at an exercise other than public 11 participation. For example, you would never -- or you could 12 really not ever mobilize a community in terms of a

l l 13 evacuation. And, that's a public participation.

14 I think if we can make that distinction, that 3 15 public participation is one portion of an exercise and 16 observable portions or major observable portions are the 17 other things that are delineated through -- I would even go C 18 as far as saying the 35 objectives that would have to be 19 reviewed, and then reviewed in the contents of integration 20 or an integrated response.

21 And, I think that may be able to help clarify.

22 (Witness Papile) I would like to clarify 23 something here.

24 JUDGE FRYE: Yes.

'( $ -

25 WITNESS PAPILE: In our experience, it has been e

ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. .

[ l :n:m.rno Nationwide Coserate 800-336-6M6 f

y 7145 08 12 demonstration may or may not occur during an annual y ' dgy 1 n  !. Actual activation can occur at any mutually 2 exercise.

3 agreed upon time between appropriate state and local 4 officials. State and local officials are responsible for D

5 determining the time of day an alert and notification system 6 is activated.

) 7 Now, I read that as saying thac a FEMA REP-10 8 test need not occur at the same time as an exercise. Isn't 9 that correct? Isn't that what it says?

j D

10 A (Witness Baranski) What you read to me, sir, is 11 correct. However, I think we have to focus on what a FEMA 12 REP-10 document is, and that is a system acceptance criteria l

' 13 document. It has nothing to do with the exercises.

14 We install siren systems. We want to insure 15 their design performance. We use FEMA REP-10 to evaluate C

16 that design performance.

17 (Witness Papile) I also may add, prior to us H 18 receiving a 350 approval of a plant, Judge Frye, FEMA 1

19 imposed on us a requirement to receive approval of the siren 20 system, the mechanics, the engineering portion of it, from O FEMA REP-10 which used to be FEMA 43 and they revised it.

21 22 Prior to FEMA 43, all they told us was there was 23 no need to test sirens because we have no requirement for 9

24 them. But, up until FEMA REP-10'this is engineering and it k .

25 goes into how you test sample people who hear, who don't 8

ACE. FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC. f I w.m.Pm Nationwide Coserate 800 336-6646 l

7140 08 13 1 hear, and it's a lot more than sirens. You can have a 1 E/sw 2 system for vehicles, for airplane notification and many 3 other things. .

8 4 We take it as an engineering requirement.

5 JUDGE FRYE: And if I recall your testimony 6 correctly, you also believe it's a requirement to test the G

7 siren system during the exercise?

8 WITNESS PAPILE: We do.

9 JUDGE FRYE: I see.

O 10 WITNESS BARANSKI: Our experience in New York 11 State dictates that, yes.

12 JUDGE FRYE Okay. Is that the same as the FEMA g

l 13 REP-10 test or is that different from the FEMA REP-10 test?

14 WITNESS BARANSKI Different from the FEMA REP-10 C 15 test.

JUDGE FRYE Okay. In the exercise, what are you 16 17 checking on, audibility or what are you testing?

U 18 WITNESS BARANSKI: That particular criteria is 19 tested in FEMA REP-10 scientifically. They will go out witi 20 DB meters, measure the sirens, do the sound contours, dead O

21 spaces, things of that nature.

22 Now, when we blow the sirens during an exercise, 23 the primary purpose of blowing the sirens during an exercise O

24 is to make up that critical link between an on-site plan and 25 an off-site plan. And, this is the key vehicle that we O

ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.

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7l47 14 g08 l have for notifying the public. And, we feel that it's very

'l j.g/sW 2 important that the public 'anderstand what the sirens mean, 1 3 how they are to respond, what stations they are supposed to .

4> 4 turn to for their EBS messages, and things of that nature.

5 6

as 7

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21 22 23 24 I

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l 7148 09 01 n 1 JUDGE FRYE: So, would your exercise then include v l9:t/,,

2 some sort of a survey of the public to find out whether they 3 have heard and understood?

() 4 WITNESS BARANSKI: This is a, I would say, 5 limited review by FEMA of people on the street to ask them, 6 number one, did you hear the sirens; number two, do you know C) 7 what the sirens mean?

8 Or, if we go to a particular facility: Did your 9 tone alert radio go off? Do you know what that tone alert O

10 radio means? Do you know what stations you are to turn to 11 for your EBS message, whether it be radio or television?

12 JUDGE FRYE: FEMA does that?

O l 13 WITNESS BARANSKI: FEMA does that in a spot check 14 during an exercise.

15 JUDGE FRYE DJring an exercise.

()

16 17 O 18 19 20 0

21 22 23 0

24 l l 25 O

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l 7149 01 g 10 I' A (Witness Petrone) I think I would like to 1

p$ log While I had been 2 clarify the FEMA Region II procedure.

3 Regional Director at Region II, it became practice, standard .

I 4 practice, to make sure sirens were sounded, and it became standard practice in that one wanted to test, or at least 5

6 sample, also the public information input, or public 7 education piece, and that basically was sampling whether 8 they were brochures or whatever type of vehicle was used.

p 9 An alert notification test also was put into 10 existence, and again it was a Region II initiative, based on 11 the fact that you -- it is very difficult to test sirens 3 12 specifically the day of the exercise.

I 13 You have limited observers, and these observers 14 are at any given time dealing with problems of sirens or D 15 notification, and they are trying to observe that.

16 To get into sampling the public, it was another modified event that we used during on exercise, but to 17 D

18 really test the mechanicability or the operability of the 19 sirens, the test was pretty much utilized.

20 We did this, I believe, at one of the Indian

[)

21 Point exercises. I can't recall the exact one, but it was 22 done there because there seemed to be some problems with a 3 23 few of the sirens sounding, and as a result a problem with 24 notification of a specific area.

(l 25 JUDGE FRYE: If I understand what you are l

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'jpg, 1 saying, you found it impractical to test the mechanical 2 aspects of it at the same time you were conducting an 3 exercise, so you did that separately. _

<\

WITNESS PETRONE: Right. Also, the mechanical 4

5 aspects of the siren were specific, and it needed specific ,

6 types of people, too, and I believe FEMA went into a 7 contractor to do much of this, because it needed expertise, 8 and to bring these people into an exercise specifically to o 9 any given one day, was, I think, somewhat inconvenient 10 also.

11 WITNESS PAPILE: Specifically at Nine Mile, it O 12 took us almost four hours just to run this FEMA 10 test.

I 13 They brought consultants in, they brought a bunch of 14 telephone people in and so forth, and it would have been 4 impractical to do it during an exercise.

15 ,

16 BY MR. IRWIN: (Continuing) .

17 0 Gentlemen, what is the regulatory basis on which 0

18 you conclude that activating tone alert radios in isolation 19 constitutes a major observable portion of an emergency plan?

20 WITNESS BARANSKI: I think you threw in a key g,

21 word on us. Would you repeat that, please.

22 MR. IRWIN: Would you read the question back, O 23 Mr . Reporter . I am not sure what the key word was, 24 (Reporter reads back question.)

g WITNESS BARANSKI: Judge Frye, Mr. Irwin used 25 O

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03 7151 t g 10

,jp 1 "in isolation." It has been our experience and practice O

2 that the tone alert radios are a part of an integrated alert l 3 notification system, and they go off in conjunction with the 4 sirens, not in isolation.

5 JUDGE FRYE: Okay. So, if you eliminate the 6 term, "isolation," --

O 7 WITNESS BARANSKI: In isolation.

8 JUDGE FRYE: -- in isolation, can you answer the 9 question?

O 10 WITNESS BARANSKI: The answer is, yes, because 11 that is part of the alert notification system.

12 JUDGE FRYE: Yes, but he was asking for the O

l 13 regulatory basis for your --

14 WITNESS BARANSKI: The regulatory basis would go 15 back to the same regulatory basis as for the sirens.

16 JUDGE PARIS: How are the tone alert radios 17 activated in most of your plants?

O 18 WITNESS BARANSKI There are different 19 mechanisms. Some of them are coupled up with the NOAA radio 20 system, and others are activated in conjunction with the O 21 siren activation signals.

22 JUDGE PARIS: Does this mean that the utility 23 itself broadcasted the signal to the tone alert radios?

24 WITNESS BARANSKI: No, sir, not the utility. The l

l 25 utility is not in control of the tone alert radios.

~O l ACE. FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.

202 347 3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336-6 4 6

,Y 9 l!

I 7152 g 10 04 1 JUDGE PARIS: Well, where does the tone alert

( ggw

-2 radio -- from whence comes the signal that goes to the tone 3 alert radio? -

O WITNESS PAPILE: We have different systems, and 4

5 NOAA radios are done in conjunction with the NOAA radio 6 people. We coordinate with them when we have to call a O

7 certain number or so forth and so on.

JUDGE PARIS: How are the others activated?

8 WITNESS PAPILE: Others from what we call WABC, 9

10 because that is the EBS station for the four counties in the 11 Indian Point area. When they come on and hit the EBS, they 4 12 automatically set off the radio, sir. One is just the tone,

) 13 the other is voice and everything else, as you know.

JUDGE PARIS: Okay. Thank you very much.

14 8 15 BY MR. IRWIN: (Continuing) 16 O Mr. Baranski, let me ask the same question about 17 the next phrase in this paragraph on Page 42. Coordination r

18 among relevant entities. How is that, in isolation, a major 19 observable portion of an offsite plan?

20 MR. LANPHER: I object to the question. I don't C

21 understand what Mr. Irwin --

It is a different question. Are you 22 JUDGE FRYE g 23 trying to ask the same question?

BY MR. IRWIN: (Continuing) 24 I

25 0 I am sorry. What is the regulatory basis for O

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p 10 05 7153 ggw 1 concluding that coordination among relevant entities, and 2 here I presume this is in the public notification area, is 3 in itself in isolation a major observable portion of an 4 offsite plan?

3 5 (Witnesses conferring) 6 JUDGE FRYE: In isolation.

7 MR. IRWIN: In isolation.

8 WITNESS BARANSKI That item, sir, is an integral 9 part of the whole alert and notification system.

O 10 BY MR. IRWIN: (Continuing) 11 O If I were to ask you -- well, let me ask you now 12 about actual broadcast of a test message in isolation. How O 1 ! 13 is that in isolation a major observable portion of an 14 offsite plan? What is the regulatory basis for that?

15 A (Witness Baranski) I am going to refer back to O

16 my previous answer, that it is an integral part of the 17 system.

18 O As I understood this paragraph, I thought I heard 19 you indicating four separate, distinct major observable 20 portions of an offsite plan. I thought that is what the g 21 text said. Are you now saying they basically are all one 22 integral item whic.. could be, I supposed, characterized as 23 public notification?

O 24 A That is correct. These are all an integral part 25 of the objective of being able to alert and notify the n

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4 7154 kgo06 g .gg 1 general public in a timely manner.

2 0 And, in fact, those all four together would 3 correspond, would they not, to Standard FEMA Exercise 9 4 Objective No.13, attached to the McLoughlin memorandum, 5 which reads as follows: Demonstrate the ability to alert 6 the public within the 10 mile EPZ, and dissiminate an O initial instructional message within 15 minutes.

7 8 Is that correct?

9 A Yes.

C 10 (Mr. Minor and Mr. Baranski conferring.)

11 0 There is no question pending, Mr. Minor, and you 12 are not on this answer, so if you want to confer --

g f f 13 MR. LANPHER: Judge, do I need to respond?

JUDGE FRYE: I don't think you do. We will let 14 Cl 15 them confer briefly, and if there is a problem, I want the 16 Reporter to note whenever there is a pause, and the reason 17 for the pause, whether it is witnesses conferring, Board O 18 conferring, or what have you.

19 REPORTER: I have been doing that, sir.

20 JUDGE FRYE: Thank you. I thought you probably

'O 21 have.

22 BY MR. IRWIN: (Continuing) 23 O As I understand it now, you were referring to the

)

24 four elements in this paragraph on Page 42 collectively as a II 25 major observable portion of the plan. Did I understand you I

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O 2 A (Witness Baranski) Ye s .

3 0 What is your definition of the term, "major 4 observable portion?"

O 5 (Witnesses conferring) 6 A What I would like to share with you, Mr. Irwin, t

7 is the procedure we use in our exercises to accomplish that 8 objective.

9 Now --

g 10 0 Mr. Baranski, before you do that can you give me 11 a definition of the term, "major observable portion,"

12 because you use this term many times in your testimony.

Ot l 13 A I will illustrate a major observable portion.

14 0 Well, I think you just did on Page 42. I am 15 wondering if you have a working definition of it?

16 MR. 2AHNLEUTER: Judge Frye, I think it is fair 17 to allow the witness to define a term by showing an 18 illustration.

O 19 JUDGE FRYE: Let's see if he has a working 20 definition, and then we will permit the illustration, g 21 (Witnesses conferring.)

22 WITNESS BARANSKI: My working definition of a 23 "major observable element," or ours, would be that a major O 24 observable portion of the plan w6uld encompass many elements ik 25 of the planning standards. And I was going to illustrate e

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e 7156 go 08 1 that with use of the sirens, the EBS, the radio stations,

,gg 2 the decision making that goes into the activation of the EBS 3 network, the preparation for the message, and the -- using g 4 the objective that is outlined in PR-1 to do all this within 5 a fifteen minute time frame, to satisfactorily accomplish 6 that objective.

C 7 It is very important, and FEMA has evaluated us, 8 that that is a very important fact, because we have had to 9 do it over.

n" 10 BY MR. IRWIN: (Continuing) 11 O I take it from your answer that there is no 12 objective or constant working definition you used to define l 13 a major observable element of an offsite plan?

14 A (Witness Baranski) There is a common sense ss o 15 . approach to trying to accomplish a particular objective tro l

16 the fullest capability possible to ensure that you have l

l 17 reasonable confidence with your plan.

1 f3 18 0 In your last answer you referred to elements.

19 What elements are you referring to?

20 A The elements that are outlined in the 16 planning 21 standards in NUREG 0654.

22 O In your previous answer, you also used the word, 23 "elements" as well as portions. Did you mean, if you can O

24 recall that answer, again, the same use of the word I ,

25 "elements" as in your last answer, namely the 16 planning O

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O 11 13 7173 ,

I g,w 1 MR. LANPHER: Judge Frye --

F j

g 2 JUDGE FRYE

Let Mr. Minor answer. ,

3 MR. LANPHER: Thank you. I 4 WITNESS MINOR: If I may add to that. In the

O 5 actual exercise, there was the preparation of an EBS message 6 at the EOC. It was not, however, formally transmitted to 7 the WALK radio station. In fact, there was no actual

-O 8 contact with the WALK radio station.

9 There was only the simulated call to WALK which 10 did not have the human interaction that would come with an O

11 actual contact to the station transmitting the message to 12 them and verifying that they did indeed receive the message 13

.O correctly and were at least prepared to send it out.

{

14 JUDGE PARIS: Mr. Minor, where or who activates 15 the sirens? Where is that effected? Do you know?

O 16 WITNESS MINOR: Actually who, I'm not sure I 17 could tell you right now. It's --

18 JUDGE PARIS: Does the message have to go from

'O 19 the EOC to somebody that flips the switch to sound the 20 sirens?

21 WITNESS MINOR: That's my understanding. I 22 don't believe that happens at the EOC itself, but the 23 message -- the decision has to originate there. And, then O 24 the EBS message that goes out has the additional effect of l r 25 notifying all the people who are on tone alert systems by O ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.

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D 7174 31 14

.g,w 1 the activation of the WALK FM station.

3 2 JUDGE PARIS: Well, I noted on Page 43 of your 3 testimony you say at the bottom of the page there, "In our 4 past experience, there have been a number of failures during D exercises relating to just such matters -- such as failures 5

6 of sirens to be sounded even after the emergency response 7 organization attempts to sound them."

3 8 And, you talked about earlier the necessity of 9 the timing, not having an EBS message go out before the 3 10 sirens are sounded. Is it up to the EOC to initiate the 11 timing of those different messages or not?

12 WITNESS PAPILE: Judge Paris, since I've been in O 13 the Conmand Room of the State quite a bit, the answer to you I l 14 is yes. What we do in order to meet the 15 minutes, when I 15 the Governor or his representative makes a decision, at that O

16 time we state the time of the decision to the news center l

17 and then FEMA grades us on 15 minutes from that time for the l

g 18 message to get to the public.

the same time, the County's are coordinating i

19 At 20 the blowing of the sirens by actually coding a machine for O 21 the sirens to be activated. When this is done, we hope and 22 we try to put the siren, say, in 12 minutes and then the 23 mescage itself to go out at 15 minutes, because the sirens, O 24 the undulation, takes about 3 minutes. That's the procedure 25 we use.

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g,w In the meantime, the decision is very important I

2 D to us where we have m' ore than one county or even one county, i

3 if the decision is between the County Execs, the number one i r

4 man in the county, and the Governor or the Governor's 3 5 representative exactly when to blow those sirens and what to

, 6 say in the message. That's what we are getting at.

7 We have had difficulty in doing that in the past, D' 8 sir.

9 JUDGE PARIS: Thank you.

10 BY MR. IRWIN (Continuing) 11 O Now, you gentlemen --

12 JUDGE FRYEt Mr. Minor -- excuse me. Go ahead.

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p 08 7183 JUDGE FRYE Okay. Gentlemen, with that addition r*j 1

)( 2 by Mr. Baranski, is there anything else that you think may 3 have been left out?

4 WITNESS MINOR: Well, as I mentioned earlier, 3 5 there is the observation of these activities.

6. JUDGE FRYE: Well, that is implicit in all of 7 this. Obviously, you can't observe it if it doesn't D

8 happen. Unless you have something else in mind.

9 WITNESS MINOR: With all due respect, I think 10 there is a difference, though.

3 11 If you observe someone making a call to a person 12 across the room at a fictitious number, and that person is Dl 13 expecting the call, you are observing an activity which may 14 not be nearly as complicated or potentially error prone as 15 looking up the number to the actual WALK radio, dealing with 16 l somebody at WALK radio that might not be expecting that 17 call, transmitting a message to him, and getting it verified 18 that it is correct.

) l 19 l Those steps may be more involved and may take 20 , more evaluation.

I g 21 JUDGE FRYE: Anything else?

f 22 i WITNESS PAPILE: There is one other point, Judge, I

23 that I would like to bring out.

1. 24 Even if you had a direct line between the EOC or l' 25 the joint news center in the radio station, there is an O l ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.

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hi p.i 16; 01 7231 g/gv 1 JUDGE FRYEt Shall we go back on the record,

{ 2 please? Mr. Lanpher, or Mr. Zahnleuter?

)

3 REDIRECT EXAMINATION, .

4 BY MR. ZAHNLEUTER:

) 5 0 Gentlemen, you just fielded some questions by 6

Mr. Irwin regarding recovery and re-entry. Is recovery and 7 re-entry a PR-l objective?

) 8 A (Witness Baranski) Yes, sir.

9 0 Could you identify specifically where it appears 10 in PR-1 as an objective?

11 A Objective No. 35, demonstrate ability to 12 determine and implement appropriate measures for centrol, 13 recovery, and re-entry.

14 O Do you believe that the PR-1 objectives 15 correspond to major observable portions?

j 16 A Yes, sir.  !

17 0 l-And do recovery and re-entry objectives i

18 constitute major observable portions under Appendix E?

) 19 A By definition.

4 20 l 0 Is your answer, yes?

I 21 I

{ A Yes.

22 , O Also, in response to questions from Mr. Irwin, '

23 you stated that you understand ingestion pathway testing is 24 an NTOL Appendix E requirement, is that correct?

{

25 A Yes, sir.

i i

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16-02 7232 y/gv 1 _Q Have there been any NTOLs issued in New York O1 k 2 State?-  ;

3 A t NTOLs have been issued,;but none that we have 1

4 done the emergency planning for.

g 5- 0 Since the --

6 A Since the implementation of the-regulation for  !

7 emergency planning exercises, the answer is, no. All of our O '8 exercises have been with operating units. t 9 JUDGE FRYE: Do you know, by chance, when the t

-10 last operating license was issued? l O  :

11 WITNESS BARANSKI: Approximately mid '75, Indian >

12 Point 3.

13 i BY MR. ZAHNLEUTER: (Continuing) 14  !

Q How do you reconcile your position that recovsry ,

15 and re-entry and ingestion pathway activities should be O 16 included in an exercise prior to the issuance of an NTOL, j 17 but those same activities should not have been included in r 18 other full participation exercises in New York State?

O 19 A (Witness Baranski) Well, for one looking at i 20 Appendix -- 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, there is a i-f 21 regulatory requirement under F, Training, 1, that for a full l

O '

22 participation exercise for an NTOL, and I am paraphrasing a  !

i 23 little bit, shall include participation by each state and i t

24 local government within the plume exposure pathway EP2 and

,O. I t

'{ l 25 each state within the ingestion exposure pathway EPZ.

l l

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7351 goo 808 l'.$valsh 1 of the ones is whether we had a schedule for the NRC Staff

)

2 testimony, sir.

3 JUDGE FRYE Do we, at this point?

I am not certain we are going to

) d MR. BARTH:

5 give any testimony, Your Honor.

6 JUDGE FRYE: We specifically requested that the 7 Staf f furnish testimony, and I understood that that requect 3

B was winding its way through the EDO.

9 MR. KARMAN: It hasn 't winded by our desk.

) 10 JUDGE FRYE: It hasn't winded it's way back from 11 the EDO.

12 MR. KARMAN: Not as far as we know.

) 13 JUDGE FRYEt I see. Okay. We will face thet 14 when we get the answer, I suppose.

15 Anything else?

) 16 MR. LANPHER: That was the one that really came U to mind. Just in terms of planning and preparing that.

18 Obviously, we know what the FEMA testimony is.

b M MR. KARMAN: We will convey that information.

l 20 MR. LANPHER: Obviously, if they are going to l

21 submit t es timony, it should be prefiled some time in advance D 22 of the start.

23 JUDGE FRYE: It would be helpful.

24 MR. LANP HER : Because otherwise people are going D It is going to be 25 to be involved in the ongoing hearing.

I ,

i J

I i

)

.p00808 7501 hrysimons I think of it, in the evaluation of the exercise, although

)

2 that's not in our testimony either, but I think tnat goes 3

withou t saying.

d BY MR. LANPHER:

) 5 Q Mr. Keller, did you use the FEMA regulations 6

when you evaluated the exercise, the Shoreham exercise?

7 A (Witness Keller) I have a problem with that.

) 8 0 Why?

9 A Because the way I read 44 ---

10 Q Answer my question, please. Did you use the 11 FEMA regulations in Part 350 of 44 CFR?

12 A Specifically, no.

13 Q Did you use the NRC regulations in Appendix E to 14 Part 507 15 A Absolutely not.

16 Q And I assume the same answer goes for the other D 17 two members of the panel?

ts A (Witness Kowieski) That's correct, with the 19 qualification that obviously the NUREG is interrelated to 10 20 CFR. NUREG 0654 is related to 10 CFR. 21 Q But in your evaluation of the exercise you did 22 not use Appendix E to Part 50?

E 23 A Not specifically.

24 . O And you didn't either, Mr. Baldwin?

25 A E

(Witness Baldwin) That's correct.

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$f 7502 1700808 6815 ""

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1 Q Did you use Part 350 of FD1A's regulations in 1

2 your evaluation of the Shoreham exercise?

3 A (Witness Keller) In that 0654 is referenced ll d within 44 CFR 350, we did use the concepts of NUREG 0654.

5 But we really used 0654 rather than 44 CFR 350 I believe.

6 Q And in your evaluation of the Shoreham exercise l>

7 you didn't use 10 CFR Section 50.47, did you?

8 A Not specifica31y, no.

9 Q Now, gentlemen, in the listing of documento, and I 10 I understand the qualification you gave with Judge Frye, you 11 did not mention what we've called the IAEL report by Dr.

12 Hockert, a LILCO witness. Are you familiar with that E 13 report?

14 A (Witness Kowieski) I read that report.

15 Q Did you use that report in any way in your 8 16 evaluation of the exercise?

17 A Not really.

18 O Did you read that report prior to the exercise?

8 19 A It's quite possib1'e. I don't remember the time I know 20 frame that I received and reviewed the document. I 21 that I reviewed the document.

II 22 O You don't even know when though?

23 A When, I don't know.

2d O Okay. You certainly didn't use draf t guid anc e ,

• 25 memorandum EX-3 in your evaluation of the exercise, and that n

if m

g00909 7513 pgvalsh

- 1 MR. LANPHER: Thank you .

i "l I.

2 BY MR. LANPHER: (Continuing) 3 Q Now, Mr. Keller, you stated there is no guidance 4 which you are aware of which specifies the nurber of a

5 objectives that must be tested in order for an exercise to 6 constitute a full participation exercise, is that correct?

7 A (Witness Keller) I need one clarification, if O

8 it is all right. There is an NRC rule which discusses full 9 participation. There is a FEMA rule wnich uses the word 10 full participation.

O 11 I am only talking about. the FEMA rule; I am not 12 talking about the NRC rule. And with that caveat, okay, I 13 am not aware of any required number of objectives at this u'  !

u time that are required for an exercise.

1$ Q Are you aware of any FEMA guidance, or any other 16 docurent that says that it is the number or types of O.

17 objectives which are critical to an evaluation of whether 18 comething constitutes full participation exercise?

g 19 A Not in those words.

o 20 Q Don't hold me to those exact words. I was 21 paraphrasing the LILCO statement in their testimony.

22 A Yes. It is my position that the FEMA guidance 23 specifically states that we should cover all of the 35 24 standard objectives over the six year cycle, and that to me implies that you don't do them all in any one exercise

') ~

23 .

O

D p100909 7514 jgvalsh

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In our statement it says we should do them over 2

c. six year cycle, which would normally be three exercises if 3

we exercise ou a bi-annual frequency.

4 So, that all 35 objectives have to be J

5 demonstrated within this six year cycle, and that to me is 6

strong indication that you do not have to do all of them at 7 any one exercise.

s Q And that testimony, that is stress indication 9

that under FEMA's regulations you don't have to, is that

, 10 correct?

q 11 A That is correct. This is not the NRC. I think 12 we have been precluded from stating what we think the NRC's 13 regulations are.

II 77; 14 Q I don't think you have been precluded exactly.

15 You stated you have no confidence or or expertise to testify 16 about that, is that correct?

g 17 A (Witness Kowleski) That is correct. We will is testify on FEMA regulations and guidance memoranda.

19 Q Now, the FEMA guidance which you just referred D 20 ! to, Mr. Keller, is that PR-17 l

21 - n (Witness Keller) That is correct.

1 22 O Is there any other FEMA guidance you can recall g 23 on that subject?

24 A I think that is the only one I recall 25 sp ecif ic ally.

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3 91010 7523 hvalsh ,

1 A (Witness Keller) That 's not in 44 CFR 350, that

? 2 is correc t.

3 (Witness Kowieski) But, that's the reason why 4

guidance memoranda are issued, to clarify 44 CFR 350 and

? 5 NUREG 0654.

6 Q Guidance memoranda are not issued to clarify 7

Appendix E to the NRC regulations, are they?

C)  : A That 's correct, they are not.

9 Q Is it fair to state then, gentle =en, given your 10 las t answers, that the guidance memoranda which you have O 11 referenced in your testimony and the other documents, the 12 secondary sources I guess in the term you used, those are 13 pertinent to your interpretation of what is required under Ol 14 FEMA 's regulations?

15 A (Witness Keller) I think this is Headquarters' 16 interpretation, FEMA Headqua$ters ' interpretation, as to O 17 what is required under FEKA regulations. That 's correc t.

18 Q Gentlemen, have you reviewed the NRC definition 19 of full participation exercise?

O 20 A I've read it.

21 (Witness Kowieski) Same here. I read it.

22 (Witness Baldwin) I have read what 's in 10 CFR.

g 2: Q Do you recall approximately when the first time 24 was you read that?

25 A (Witness Keller) Four or five years ago.

O-Il i

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)I o

7524 701010

.fegalsh 1 (Witness Kowieski) That's right. Same. I o

V I l 2 (Witness Baldwin) I had occasion to read it 3 four or five years ago, and since it has changed over time l

4 to re-read it with each change.

o 5 0 But, in connection with your work on this 6 exercise -- I will leave aside the litigation that we are in 7 the middle of now, but your preparation for and your 7.-)

8 evaluation of this exercise, you made no attempt to 9 determine yourselves whether this exercise was designed in a 10 manner that would satisfy the NRC's regulations, correct?

O' 11 A (Witness Keller) That 's a judgnent I can 't 12 make.

13 Q Well, did you make an attempt to -- you didn't O' i u make an --

15 A No. No, I did not. And , I c an ' t make that 16 judgment anyway. These gentlemen can, but I can't.

O 17 0 Would the same answer --

is A (Witness Kowieski) That 's correct.

19 (Witness Baldwin) Yes.

O

) 20 ( Paus e . )

I 21 MR. LANP HER : Judge Frye, I'm sorry to take a 22 couple of moments. Some of these answers have obviated a O

23 nurber of questions.

24 JUDGE FRYE: I see. Should we take a lunch

,s 25 break now?

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7525 4701010 yevalsh

. 1 MR. LANPHER: I'm willing to continue. Whatever E (

2 the Board's please is, I c an go on . I mean, it has not been 3 an hour since we took our break.

d JUDGE FRYE: Why don't we go on then for a 5 little bit longer?

6 MR. LANPHER: I don't mind going on.

7 JUDGE FRYE Fine.

D 8 BY MR. LANPHER: (Continuing) )

9 Q Gentlemen, I would like to direct your attention l l

10 to Page 90 of your prefiled testimony. You there reference l e  !

11 a suggestion from the NRC that FEMA emphasize evaluation of 12 the functional areas of emergency preparedness related to 13 the 10-mile plume exposure zo:te.

t 14 Do you see that testimony?

15 A (Witness Keller) Yes, I do.

16 Q And, am I correct that FEHA took this suggestion 17 from NRC and decided that activities outside the 10-mile 18 zone would not be included in the exercise?

g 19 A (Witness Kowieski) That's correct.

20 Q And, so FEMA did not evaluate, for instance, any 21 of the standard ingestion pathway objectives?

g 22 A (Witness Keller) That 's what our testimony 23 states, that's correc t.

24 Q So, that would be Standard Objectives 9, 11 and 3 25 12?

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D l

i 24701010 suewalsh 7530  ;

i proposed exercise objectives were forwarded to FEMA j 2 Headquarters and then to NRC Headquarters for transmittal to 3 LILCO.

4 And, as far as I know, no one from NRC, at NRC

) 5 He adquarters ,

raised an issue or question why ingestion 6

pathway and recovery anJ reentry exercise objectives were 7

not included.

) B Q And, in fact, NRC representatives were present 9

at some of the meetings which were held to discuss or io negotira? the objectives isn 't that correct?

3 11 A That's in addition and above NRC --

12 Q Wait. I missed a word.

13 A In addition and above to whatever I said, I said D I 14 that NRC Headquarters had an opportunity to review the 15 exercise objectives.

In addition and above, RAC member is 16 part of RAC Committee and proposed exercise objectives with 9 17 LILCO comments were forwarded to RAC -- NRC RAC member.

18 Q And, they never commented to you that it might 19 8

be inappropriate to leave out ingestion or recovery / reentry?

A 20 That's correct to my recollection.

21 Q There was no determination by the RAC, was 22 there, that this exercise was going to comply with the NRC 23 regulation, was there?

24 A No.

There was no determination to this effect.

25 Q In fact, up to the time -- up to and including i

Ir e

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l D i gg701010 7531 l suevalsh 1

\r the time that the exercise was held, do you recall any

) 2 discussions whatsoever regarding whether.this exercise would 1

j 3

satisfy the NRC's regulations?

4 A

I don't recall discussions of this nature.

3 5 Again, if I may add, again I would refer you to Mr. Speck 's I 6

letter of October 29 to NRC in which he clearly stated that 7

the value of such exercise would have to be made by NRC, 3 8 what determination, the value of such exercise would have to 9

be made by NRC.

10 MR. LANPHER: Judge Frye, I think I am going to 3 11 start a new line of questions. I can go on if you would 12 pre f er .

13 JUDGE FRYE Why don't we take our lunch break D 14 at this point?

15 MR. LANPHER: Whatever you prefer.

16 JUDGE FRYE: We will come back at quarter of 2.

e 17 (Whereupon, a the luncheon recess was taken at 18 12:15 p.m., to reconvene at 1:45 p.m., this same day.)

19 O 20 21 22 I) 23 24 25 e

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.g01010 7537 ysimons 1 of the plans?

l O 2 A (witness Keller) well, I would prefer to 3

characterize it as at one point in time that was the 4 thinking. I'm not sure that is the thinking now.

O 5 Q well, can you explain ---

6 A You all are aware that EX-3 is under revision.

7 Q That is not effective.

O 8 A It's not e'Tective, that's right, but it is in 9

draft form and there nas been sone rethinking on the 10 objectives for the finalization of EX-3.

O 11 Q well, with respect to what is in ef fect now, is 12 it fair to state that the 35 objectives correspond to the 13~ major observable portions of the emergency plans?

Oi 14 A (Witness Kowieski) That's correct.

15 Q And we discussed this morning this morning, that 16 some of the standard objectives were not included in the O

17 Shoreham exercise, those that we've discussed, iugestion and 18 recovery /re-entry. So it's fair to state that all of the 19 major observable portions were not included in the Shoreham O

20 exercise, that firs t Shoreham exercise, correct?

21 A (witness Keller) That's correct.

22 Q And that 's consistent with FEMA policy to do all O

23 of the major observable portions over a six-year cycle?

24 A That's our understanding.

25 Q That's your understanding of FDiA policy?

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.g01010 7538

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A (Witness Kowieski) That's correct.

3i O Now going back to the ingestion pathway l

4! objective just for a morant, it was not impossible for FEiA -

}

5, to have done ingestion pathway objectives for the Shoreham l l

l 6i exercise, was it?  !

I 7' A I don't know if I understand your question, s Could you rephrase it?  ;

7 Q Any time you don't understand a question, Mr.

10 Kowieski, please don't try to answer it.

11 FEMA could have developed objectives for 12 ingestion pathway testing at Shoreham, couldn't they?

13 A That's correct.

)l l 14 Q In fact, LILCO was willing to test ingestion 13 pathway aspects of its plant isn't that correct?

16 A I don't have a specific recollection to this l

17 effect. I had a discussion with the Exercise Director, is Chuck Daverio, but to be consistent -- well, I must put on 19 the record, and I think it 's important, my directive from my 3 i

;1 Regional Director, my former Regional Director, Fran'. ,

1 Petrone, as well as Sam Speck to be consistent r.ni "P::ever g  :: ; you have done for other sites in Icew York State use t?.4 sare l

t

;i, approach as for Shoreham, and I did.

1

4 ! As far as I'm concerned, we did not have a full-

< ' scale ingestion pathway exercise in the State of liews Ycrk 9 i

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v 7539 q701010 hrysimons

- 1 as of today.

-Ji l 2 O I understand your testimony, Mr. Kowieski, that 3 you 've not done a full-scale ingestion exercise in New York 4 State as of yet, but you did do ingestion pathway testing at 5 all or virtually all of the first exercises of New York 6 State operating plants, didn't you?

7 A Very small elements of ingestion pathway and 8 very limited tests of ingestion pathway in the State of New 9 York.

10 Q But you had objectives, correct?

O 11 A That's correct.

12 Q And you did test those objectives?

g 13 A Some, that's correct.

i i 14 Q And that could have been done for Shoreham?

15 There was no reason that something about Shoreham or that exercise made it impossible ---

O 16 17 A Well, again besides the NRC guidance to 18 concentrate on the 10-mile EPZ.

Q That was the only thing that held you back in O 19 20 terms of ---

21 A It was I would say our major deciding factor.

O 22 O I would like to direct your attention to page 92 23 of your testimony, gentlemen.

24 (Witnesses comply. )

O 25 Q You state at the bottom of that page that the O  !

t

) I

\

g701010 7542 l prysimons l

t Q When I refer to public information, testing the  ;

3 2 knowledge of the public through spot checks of brochures and 3 that sort of information that FEHA Region 2 normally has 4

included in their exercises.

) 5 A A point of clarification. That's not part of 6 the 35 standard objectives. That's what Region 2, when I 7

was the RAC Chairman between 1982 and '86, and I felt it was 3 8 important when public information brochures and pamphlets 9

are distributed to the public and transients to check the 10 knowledge and the public awareness on the emergency response 11 options.

12 Since, as far as I can tell, prior to the 13 February 13th Shoreham exercise, LILCO did not distribute O I u public information brochures or panphlets. There was no 15 need to go and verify in the field whether or not the public 16 understands what to do in case of an emergency. Basically u that's a verification of whether public residents read the is brochures and pamphlets and whether they understand the 19 ins t ruc tions .

3 20 Q But, Mr. Kowieski, normal Region 2 objectives 21 would have included what I call the public information

, 22 objectives.

O 23 A (Witness Kowieski) That 's correc t. Yes, sir.

24 A (Witness Keller) At that time.

25 Q At that time. Thank you.

O l

O

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g4701010 7543 prysimons 1

In fact, your initial draf t objectives for the 2

Shoreham exercise included FEMA's Region 2's standard ---

3 A (Witness Kowieski) That's also accurate, but I 4

was correctly reminded by Mr. Daverio of what are you going

) 5 to check in the field. We have not distributed, that was 6

his position, public information brochures or pamphlets and 7 what are you going to verify?

) 8 Q Well, if you were going to be consistent with 9 FEMA Region 2 practice, why didn't you include those two 10 objectives and during your evaluation note that they could D 11 not be observed?

12 A Being consistent and being logical is two 13 different things. Again, there was no reason for me to go

' l 14 and verify what wasn't there. I knew from day one that the 15 public information brochures weren't not distributed to the

, 16 public.

D 17 Q Well, you didn't know that from day one, did 18 you?

19 A That is why I included it as a part of the 20 exercise objectives, and then after I was reminded by Mr.

21 Daverio that LILCO has not distributed public information to i

22 residents I agreed to strike both objectives.

D 23 A (Witness Keller) I think we knew they had not 24 been distributed. I think it was an oversight that they 25 were included in the list, the first draft list, b ec au s e, as j

l l

a m-- - - , -

a.

7544 {

hg01010 rysimons 1 you pointed out, it was the draft list that was sent to 2 LILCO that was the standard set which we at that time used 3 in all the objectives.

4 And after Mr. Daverio pointed out to us that we 5 had overlooked the fact that they had not distributed the 6 public information brochure and therefore it really didn't 7 make much sense to spend evaluator time to go out and have 8 interviews that you knew weren't going to be successful 9 an yway.

10 Q Mr. Keller, during the time frame that we 're 3

11 talking about, the preparation for the Shoreham exercise, 12 FEMA Region 2 considered public information brochures and 13 their distribution to be important portions of eutergency 14 plans; isn't that correct?

15 A (Witness Kowieski) For the operating plant the 16 answer is yes.

_J 17 Q Well, you hadn't had any tests of non-operating 18 sites as of that time, had you?

, 19 A (Witness Baldwin) That's correct.

J 20 A (Witness Kowieski) That's also correct.

21 Q So is it fair to state that the public 22 information brochure constituted in FEMA Region 2 practice a 23 major observable portion of the amergency plan which you 24 included in exercises as a standard Region 2 objective?

g 25 A (Witness Keller) For operating sites that is l ,

e

U

.go1010 yrysimon s 7545 1

correct.

<l

, 2 J Q And is it your testimony that before you could 3

give a reasonable assurance finding for Shoreham you would 4

need an exercise that included an assessment of the adequacy g 5 of LILCO's public information brochure, its distribution and 6

its understanding?

7 A

I think.that goes a little far. No. 1, it is O 8 nt ne f the standard 35 FEMA Headquarter's objectives.

9 To say that we would require it is probably a little beyond 10 what we could do.

g 11 As we pointed out earlier this morning, a FEMA 12 position is when it's sent from Headquarters in Washington 13 to NRC that 's when it becomes a FEMA position.

O t 14 I would think, jus t an assumption, that we do 15 have deficiencies, as we discussed this morning, that would 16 have to be remediated in an exercise or drill ---

0 17 0 Excuse me. You're referring to Shoreham 18 deficiencies?

19 A Shoreham deficiencies, and that some kind of

() 20 exercise or drill would have to be held prior to remediating 21 those deficiencies. At that time we would probably, if the 22 brochures had been distributed, we would indeed do that O 23 verification.

24 However, since Mr. Kowieski is no longer the RAC 25 Chairman, those objectives are not being used by FEMA Region O

i ,,

O s C_

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1212 7552 N

Yvalsh i

material would be distributed prior to exercise, although Il 2 there is no requirement as far as I'm -- I'm not aware of J

3 any requirement, specific requirement, that public 4

information brochure will be distributed to the public m

u 5 before a full license will be issued, a full operating 6 license will be issued.

7 Q Now, are you talking about FEMA requirements, o 8 NRC requirements or --

u 9 A FEMA requirements. I always -- when I -- I hope 10 this will clarify for the future. Unless I specifically O 11 will refer t NRC regulation, I will be referring to FEMA 12 regulations and guidance memoranda.

13 Q Gentlemen, we were on -- before we got in a bit g{ l 14 of digression on public information, we were talking about 15 your testimony on Page 92 which talks about -- our 16 discussion was all functions and normal exercise objectives.

O 17 Now, isn't it true, gentlemen, that one of the is normal functic: s under an emergency plan is actual contact 19 and coordination with the EBS radio station?

O 20 A Not always. Normally, we require that at least 21 one EBS, test EBS, message will be issued.

22 O No. I'm not talking about a test message. Can

'() 23 you recall, Mr. Kowieski, any FEMA Region II exercise in New 24 York State where the radio station that would have to 25 broadcast the message in an actual emergency wasn 't at least

.Ol l O

Aw

Ah' l

l O l

.g01212 7553 l jgvalsh I i telephoned?

O 2 A I cannot testify with a great deal of accuracy 3

to whether or not we in every single exercise in the State 4 of New York, the radio station was contacted. I know at C) 5 least one instance when we positioned our observer -- back i

6 in 1983 or '84 -- where we actually observed interaction 7 between the joint news center and radio station.

O 8 We, in any other exercise -- you know, you have 9

to realize that what we do observe the actual phone calls 10 that are being made, and if we don't have an observer at O 11 other side we don't know and we cannot certify with a 100 12 degree of confidence that the phone call was placed to the is radio station, or for this matter school or any other Ol l i4 organ iza tion .

15 Q Would it be fair to state that it's standard 16 Region II practice that you are aware of that the radio O 17 station will be involved in the exercise, the primary EBS 18 radio station is involved in the exercise?

19 A That's a fair characterization.

O 20 Q That wasn't -- did you have a comment, Mr.

21 Keller?

l 22 A (Witness Keller) Yeah. There's a reason for O

l 23 that. And, I suspect you will get to it here soon.

24 In all of the other Region II exercises, with 25 the exception of one, the sirens were sounded. When the 0,

$}

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f 701212 7556

1. ish i Q You say, "FEMA evaluated coordir.ation of EBS 3 2 mes sages with WALK radio. . . " Do you see that? It's in the 3 second paragrega on that page. It's toward the bottom of 4 the page, Mr. Keller?

g 5 A Okay. Yes.

6 Q The second sentence of that second paragraph?

7 A Yes, I see it. Yes.

9 8 Q That's not, in fact, accurate, is it?

9 A As I tried to explain, in -- it is accurate io insofar as it is consistent with what is done in all of the O it other exercises in Region II.

12 Q Mr. Keller, in every other exercise in Region II i3 at least some communication is actually made with the radio Ol 14 station, isn't it?

15 A When the sirens are sounded, the communication 16 is made with the radio station because it 's important that O 17 when the sirens are sounded the radio station air a test EBS 18 message so that the public is not going to be alarmed at 19 hearing the sirens without any indication of what the sirens O 20 are for.

21 Q Mr. Keller, there was no coordination with WALK l 22 radio at the Shoreham exercise, was there?

O 23 A It is our understanding, after the fact, that 24 the call was not made to WALK radio. It was --

25 Q Are you --

O IL O

A

}l L l J

7557 i

{q701212 gvalsh

> 1 A -- made to someone else.

n l

'l l 2 Q Are you saying that during the exercise FEHA 3 didn't know that WALK was not involved?

4 A (Witness Baldwin) I can say that that's n

5 c orrec t .

6 (Witness Keller) Yes, that's correct. You have 7

to understand how exercise evaluation is done I b-lieve.

O' 8 Q Mr. Keller, there is no question pending.

9 A Okay.

10 Q Mr. Keller, isn't it true then that if not even O 11 a phone call was made to WALK radio, it was in actual fact 12 no coordination with that radio station?

13 A That's a fair assessment.

O ,

l 14 Q So, TEMA did not evaluate the coordination with 15 WALK radio?

16 A We were told during the exercise when a man made O

17 a phone call, the person on the side of the man making the 18 phone call: Who did you call? I called WALK radio.

19 We, therefore, evaluated that coordination had O

20 been made. We later found out that he had not called WALK 21 radio, he had called sorebody else or a fake number.

22 Q When you prepared this testimony, you knew that 23 it had been a fake number or something to that effect, to 24 use your words, right?

25 A In our opinion, because of the way --

%/

l 0

f

%.1 7559 4701212 gwalsh n, 1 reviewed it after.

l '

2 And, I believe it was in some of the testimony 3 and some of the cross-examination is where I came across it, 4 Q Is that consistent with your recollection, Mr.

g 5 Baldwin? I know the dates are hard to keep straight.

6 A (Witness Baldwin) The dates are very hard to keep straight. But, at any rate, I will testify that I have

() 7 8 seen LILCO's admissions and that WALK radio did not 9 participate and that we learned sWbsequent to certainly the

'O 10 preparation of the post-exercise assessment, which is what 11 our testimony is largely based on, that WALK did not 12 participate, 13 Since I was standing next to Mr. Lane who did C) l l 14 the evaluation on that, it was my impression, having watched 15 what he was in turn watching, was that they were O 16 coordinating with WALK radio. We subsequently learned that 17 that was a call to a simulator.

18 O 19 20 21 0 22 23 24 0 25 I

0 l l

4

O g701414 7584 l prysimons 1 JUDGE PARIS: Did LILCO explain why they wanted

~ l U' 2 you to contact only a single school district?

3 WITNESS KOWIESKI: Well', I wasn ' t privy, sir, to 4 all the discussions obviously that took place at LILCO. It C) 5 was communicated to me, sir, by Chuck Daverio that well, I 6 have to contact my management and see what we can do, and 7 eventually a week or two weeks prior to the exercise that I

() a was advised by Chuck Daverio that the LILCO management made 9 a decision not to invite, with emphasis added or to underscored, not to invite other school districts to O

11 participate in the exercise.

12 JUDGE PARIS: So the sort of answer you got was 13 my boss said no.

Ol 14 WITNESS KOWIESKI: That's a very fair is characterization, sir.

16 WITNESS KELLER: I think to be fair to Mr.

O 17 Lanpher, I would say that one school ---

18 MR. LANPHER: Don't go out of your way, Mr.

19 Keller.

'O 20 (Laughter.)

21 WITNESS KELLER: Why not.

22 (Laughter.)

23 One school is probably a little small for most 24 of the exercises in New York, but I don't think we evaluate 25 the contact of every school district. That's not saying ll C

O g01515 g 7586

p y21sh

) Q In most exercises, you at least contact most of n

C/

2 the school districts. Leave aside the evaluation for a 3

monent; you'at least contact them, is that correct?

4 A (Witness Keller) We don't, no.

O 5 Q The players.

6 A (Witness Kowieski) The players, yes.

]

A (Witness Baldwin) 7 In most exercises that I have

() a been an evaluator at, in fact, all exercises that I have 3 9

been an evaluator at with the exception of this one, there 10 has been State and Local participation; people doing those O 1 e ntacts are state and Local representatives, state or Local 12 repres entatives, and when I watch them make those calls, 13 since I don't have an evaluator there at that school, in OI 14 most cases I assume that they are contacting the school, but is what they tell me is what I write down on my form.

16 Q And they tell you that they are, in fact,

() 17 contacting the schools, isn't that correct?

18 A It depends, but yes, in most cases. However, we 19 have exercises in New York State which have early dismissal, O 2o and that involves the early closing of schools prior to 21 opening, and in cases where that is a part of the exercise.

22 a school of ficial is contacted at home rather than -- yes, O 23 the school official is contacted.

24 Q In either event the school officials are 25 actually contacted, and that is standard practice at the e

I e

a.

gc1515 7587 fjwalsh I exercis es that you are familiar with.

7) 2 A It is standard for me to ask the question: Who 3 are you speaking with?

4 C And at the Shoreham exercise, the calls were

) 5 simulated calls to school officials with the exception of 6

Shoraham Wading River Central School District, correct?

7 A That is my understanding.

) 8 Q The evaluation of school preparedness in the 9

context of the Shoreham exercise was by Mr. Gasper, wasn 't 10 that correct?

[) 11 A Which school.

12 A (Witness Kowieski) There were two individuals 13 evaluating school buses.

[) { 14 Q Let me go back a step. First of all, the Ridge 15 School demonstration involved a LILCo bus going to that 16 school, correct?

[) 17 A That is correct; from Patchogue to the staging 18 area, that is right.

19 Q And it did not involve the participation of 3 20 school officials, did it?

21 A (Witness Baldwin) That is correct.

22 Q Ucw, the Shoreham Wading River Central School 3 23 District deconstration was the only demonstration during the 24 Shoreham exercise that involved school officials, correct?

25 A That is correct.

O IL 1

l 9

"w 1

1 7588 3701515 gwalsh i Q And school bus drivers ?

2 A That is correct.

3 Q And a school bus company, I believe it was Seaman Bus Company?

g a 5 A I don't know which corpany it was, but it was a 6 bus company.

) 7 Q Would you agree that on the basis of the a

Shoreham Wading River demonstration, you could not reach any 9

conclusion or verify that other School districts could, in

) to fact, perform as intended under the LERO Plan?

11 A That is correct. That is why on Page 38 of the 12 Post Exercise Assessment, we made the statement that only 33 Shoreham Wading River was -- participated in the exercise, C) 14 and then there is the statement in the next sentence that:

13 Prior to the exercise, LILCO management made the decision 0 16 that the other schools would not be contacted.

17 A (Witness Kowieski) And we made a recommendation is that in future exercises all school districts should O ig part ic ipate .

20 Q But ycu couldn't verify the capability of 21 schools beyond Shoreham Wading River to respond, based upon C) 22 what transpired at the exercise?

23 A That is correct.

24 (Panel conferring.)

C# Q Gentlemen, could you turn to page 43 of the Post 23 C

O 7602 4701616 lgewalsh I evacuation .

Ol The schools actually use their own normal bus 2

3 resources to transport these children hone except in the 4 event that a school needs additional bus resources there is O

5 a provision in the plan where that can be requested from 6 LERO. And, we tested that with the Ridge Elementary School 7 out-of-sequence demonstration.

s So, we tried to cover as many bases as we could 9 even though several of them were out of sequence.

10 0 Mr. Keller, you said you tried to cover as many 11 bases. In fact, the demonstrations for schools were more 12 limited than in other exercise.s, given the LERO or LILCO 13 decision not to attempt to ir.volve other school districts?

g I la A That's correct.

15 Q So, maybe FEHA did as much as they could but it rs 16 ended up being a more limited demonstration than what you v

17 are used to?

18 A What I was trying to get at is that the way --

19 Q Answer my question.

j) 20 A Okay.

' 21 Q The answer is yes to my question?

A I think that's correct, the answer is yes.

22

O 23 Q Okay.

24 A What I was trying to got at is that in the e knew, for l() 25 objectives that we tried to demonstrate was -

I

O

OIo 7603 (g701616 w ewalsh 1 1 exanple, as you pointed out, that with the scenario that was O-2 approved there was a high probability that the schools would 3 be closed prior to ever opening. That stops all 4 demonstrations. If the schools aren't opened in theory, 5 it's all done. You can 't do anything else.

6 So, we put in the free-play messages out-of-7 sequence for the demonstration of early dismissal and for 8 the evacuation with the buses. In that regard, we tried to 9 cover as many bases as we could. It would have been helpful g 10 had there been more schools districts participating so this 11 could have been observed on a broader scale. But, that was 12 somebody else's position.

,0 13 0 You would have had to have that broader scale 14 demonstration, I think was the word you used, in order to 15 reach any kind of a conclusion in terms of verifying the 16 capability of school districts more generally to respond to C

17 a Shoreham emergency?

i8 A I would say that, yes.

g 19 Q Now, gentlemen, with respect to the Shoreham-20 Wading River Central School District demonstration, it is 21 t ru e , is it not, that when Mr. Gasper followed up at the bus O 22 company he determined that there had been a lack of 23 dosimetry training for school bus drivers; isn't that 24 correct?

I

() 25 A That's what the report says, that's correct. i l

L i I

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24701616 7607 gewalsh 1

Q Mr. Kowieski, in that last answer you referenced 2 our good friend, Mr. Irwin, I believe; is that right?

3 A { Witness Kowieski) Right. Right.

4 Q I didn't f ollow your answer. What was his b 5 involvement?

6 A Well, because a decision not to -- I guess a 7

decision not to activate the siren system and not to invite O

8 the school, all the school districts, to participate was 9 made also prior to the exercise, but I know that not to 10 activate siren systems was like, you know, a week prior, not D

11 to invite school districts to participate in exercise it was 1

12 like two weeks prior.

13 And, when we had a training session preparing o I 14 sort of for a table-top exercise on January the 30th, there 15 was a training session on January the 29th which was l 16 attended by FEMA, some FEMA representatives, and LILCO g

17 repres entatives and I believe Mr. Irwin was present. And, 1

18 we just expressed our concern over the fact that (a) the l

O 19 sirens won't be activated and sore school districts would l 20 not participate.

21 And, I believe -- and , again this was long time g 22 ago -- that Mr. Irwin stated: Well, we accept this. You 23 know, whatever you are going to say in the post-exercise 24 assessment we will accept it.

25 Q And, was the concern -- you stated that sone

)

1 4

1

'O

l O

24701616 7608

,gewalsh 1 time in that time frame --

OI 2 A Right. I don't know exactly when.

3 Q The dates are hard, but some time --

4 A Yes.

O 5 Q -- in that time frame, you said to LILCO: We 6 are concerned that this exercise is too limited because you 7 are not doing certain things.

8 Is that right?

9 A No, that's not right. That's not a good 10 characterization --

0 11 Q What --

12 A -- of my conc ern. My conc ern --

13 Q Let me ask a question now.

O 14 A Surely.

15 Q You expressed the concern that sirens weren't 16 going to be sounded?

17 A That's correct.

18 Q And, you expressed the concern that more schools were not going to be involved?

) 19 20 A That's also correct.

21 Q And, isn't it fair to state that the lack of 22 involvement meant that the exercise would be more limited 3

23 .than otherwise would be the case?

24 A Well, in coming back to schools, this --

Q No.

() 25 1

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gd701616 7609 gewalsh 1

MR. LANPHER: Can I get an answer to that YI 2 question, Judge Frye?

3 JUDGE FRYE: Yes. Please answer the question.

4 ,, WITNESS KOWIESKI: That's a good

'Q 5 characterization.

6 BY MR. LANPHER: (Continuing) 7 Q And, you advised LILCO of that concern, correct?

A)  :

8 A Yes, I did.

9 Q And, LILCO said: That's the way it's going to 10 be?

~O 11 A That's also a fair characterization.

12 Q So, they were on notice of FEMA's concern?

1 13 A Yes, sir.

q 14 Q Now, included among the objectives of the l

15 Shoreham exercise was the objective of demonstrating the

.O ;

i 16 capability of implementing adequate protective measures for 17 school children wichin the EPZ; is that correct?

18 A Could we be more spec;fic and refer to the post-gi 19 exercise assessment?

20 .

i Q Sure. Why don't we go to the objective? And, 1

21 ! between the field objectives and the EOC objectives, is it f

'O , 22 f air to state that FEMA sought a demonstration that adequate 23 protective measures could be taken for school children 24 within the EPZ?

() 25 If you would look at EOC-18 and Field 15 and 16 I

O

'? ,

(3 3 4701717 7612 prysimons 1 Q With respect to the school demonstrations you 've n {

'# testified already that there was insufficidnt demonstration 2

3 to permit verification that school children could be 4 protected throughout the EPZ.

O 5 A (Witness Keller) What we said is we could not 6 extrapolate from what we saw at the Shoreham Wading River 7 School District to the other schools.

O Fine. I'll accept that.

e Q 9 So given the inability to extrapolate you could 10 not make a determination that adequate protective measures O could be taken for school children throughout the EPZ, 11 12 correct?

u A If you want a global finding for all of the O school children within the EPZ which was not an objective of 14 15 the exercise, that would be my conclusion of what it would 1

16 have to be based on what we saw in the exercise.

O 17 Q Mr. Keller, I think I understood your answer

?e there and I apologize if I'm repetitive here. But your 19 conclusion would be that based upon the exercise O

l 20 demonstration you could not conclude that adequate i

21 protective measures could be taken by all school districts 22 to protect school children?

23 A That is correct. However, it was not an 24 objective of the exercise to draw this global conclusion.

' Well, the objectives that we were just talking 25 Q l

70

v 24701717 , 7614

.t pryaimons i school districts to be involved, right?

2 WITNESS KELLER: It's my understanding of EV-2 3' that all school districts must at least be contacted, and I 4 presume EV-2 would be in ef f ect for Shoreham in the event of n

U 5 a remedial or another exercise.

6 Q Mr. Kowieski, you had basically put LILCD on

? 7 notice that looking at only one school district, and maybe

() '

s more than one school, but one school district wasn't 9 adequate from FEHA's perspective. That's was pre-exercise, l 10 right?

Oi 11 A (Witness Kowieski) That's right. *-

12 Q Why didn't you issue a deficiency here, Mr.

33 Kowieski, since you couldn't make a finding of reasonable 14 assurance as to all school districts?  !

. 15 A Because there is no requirement that each school i

I 16 district needs to participate in every exercise.

.' O '

17 Q Isn't there a requirement to verify the ,

i 13 capability to respond to the accident?

l 19 A Keep in mind that at the time ---

0 20 Q Can you answer the question, please?

21 A Okay.

22 Q Isn't there a requirement under FEMA regulations 23 to verify the capability to respond to the accident?

24 A Whose capability?

!, 25 Q Well, in this case schools, o

C i

I

.-, . . - . - , - . = . - - . - - - -

NF

)

24701717 7619 I pary~:imons 1 A (Witness Kowieski) That's correct.

2 Q Now in this testimony are yot purporting to 3 clarify any requirements of the NRC's ru3 es?

d A (Witness Keller) Only insofar as PR-1 clarifies

)

5 the NRC rules.

6 Q Well, insofar as PR-1 clarifies NRC rules , are i

you providing testimony about those NRC rules in the

) 7 8 clarification?

9 A Insofar as PR-1 clarifies 10 CFR 50, yes.

How does PR-1 clarify 10 CFR 50, Appendix E?

) 10 Q 11 A I'm not sure it does.

12 Q Well, this is your testimony and what does this mean on this page, Mr. Keller, page 89 that we just read?

3 13 y 14 A This is an attempt to bring into focus what the 15 FEMA position was at the time. The FEMA guidance memorandum 16 PR-1, as you correctly pointed out, the first sentence is,

]

17 looked at word or word, and I guess we lifted it, is a 18 discussion of how it got there and how FEMA got there.

) 19 We as a geneIal policy do not prorulgate chings 20 which are contrary to FEMA Headquarters policy. PR-1 is 21 Headqaarters policy and we put it in the testimony.

D. 22 Q Gentlemen, did any of you participate in l 23 drafting PR-1?

t (Witness Baldwin) No.

24 A

) 25 A (Witness Kowieski) No.

o ,

1 1

J.

7624

.4701717 ggysimons s

1 of ficial' position is that no FEMA can be the arbiter or O 2 determiner of what NRC regulations require.

g 6

3 FEMA counsel has no objection if they wish to

[ 4 state a personal opinion, bu.t it's not the official FEMA DI position. They are testifying in that sense as experts, and "i 5

?

6 if they wish to so state or they have sone understanding, we -

7 have'no objection with that qualification. I would leave it n- up to the Board to rule.

8 9 JUDGE FRYE I think it would be good to let to them state what the FEMA position is.

11 WITNESS KELLER: The FEMA position is that FEMA 12 does not make judgment as to what the NRC rules mean.

13 JUDGE FRYE: Okay.

14 BY MR. LANPHER:

Q Just so I understand, Mr. Keller, if I were to is 16 ask you questions along those lines, these would be the O 17 personal judgments that you've reached and these aren't is judgments that are sanctioned by the Federal Emergency 19 Mamagement Agency?

O 20 A (Witness Keller) That 's correct.

Q Gentlemen, let's turn to page 105 of your il 22 testimony, or excuse me, before we do that let's go to page 23 94.  !

24 (Witnesses comply. )

Gentlemen, starting at page 94, am I correct

, 25  ?

LD O

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24701818 joevalsh 7630 '

1 r Q

So it was a partial demonstration, correct?

O 2 A

It was a simulation.

1 Q

Why do you disagree with my characterization it 4

was a partial demonstration?

(y 5 A

Because in most exercise evaluations, we  :

6 .

evaluate simulations as being conpletely adequate, and we 7

reserve a partial demonstration for a failure of some i C) 8 variety.

9 Q But you can 't recall any other exercise I 10 believe, Mr. Keller, where all communications with the EBS C1 11 radio station were via simulation?

12 A

We discussed that earlier. Tha t is correc t . .

13 Q Looking at the top of Page 95, Standard C) 14 Objective 3 is deronstrate ability to make decisions and to 13 coordinate emergency activities .

16 As we discussed earlier, there was no I) 17 coordination with WALK, correct?

18 A You are right.

1 19 Q

There was no coordination with most of the t

O 20 schools?

21 A

The schools that we knew were going to '

22 participate, participated.

O I 23 Q

Beyond one school of the Shoreham Wading River 24 School District, there was no participation, was there?

25 A That is correct, and we knew that going in.

O( ,

l

.O

)

24701818 7635 joew31sh I consistent with standard Region II practice /

2 A That is right. What.ever we asked for, and  ;

3 whatever was demonstrated, are two different things. You

) 4 know, remerber we already testified to the fact that we 5 asked for siren activation. LILCO said no.

6 Q And you did not mark that as a deficiency?

) 7 A That is correct, and I have an explanation, if 8 you will allow me to add that.

9 Q I don't have a question. If the Judge would

) 10 like you to --

11 JUDGE FRYE: Let's move on. .

12 BY MR. LANPHER: (Continuing)

D 13 Q Gentlemen, lookinc >' 'w f,03 of your l 14 testimony, one of the standarc. muavetives is to demonstrate 15 the ability to identify the need for a request and obtain 16 Federal assistance, and you note that that wasn't evaluated 17 during the exercise.

18 Do you see that testimony? ,

l 19 A (Witness Baldwin) Yes.

I 20 Q Isn't it true that the monitoring assistance by 21 DOE RAP constitutes an integral part of LERO's plan?

22 A Yes.

23 A (Witness Keller) However, during the exercise, 24 DOE personnel went further than the integral part of the 25 UERO Plan.

!4 a

U) 24800202 7663 g;rysimons 1 nursing homes?

2 A (Witness Keller) Not necessarily.

3 Q Well, in sore instances doesn't the LERO plan 4

provide that LERO will provide the transportation resources 5

for certain adult homes and nursing homes.

U 6 A In sone instances that is correc t.

7 Q And that coordination would require phone calls O,

8 and discussions between LERO and those homes, correct?

9 A Yes, it would.

10 Q And during the exercise such discussions did not 11 take placer is that correct?

12 A It was not an objective of the exercise and to

__ 13 my understanding they did not take place.

J U **" I' * #* '*"'l***"' 'h*' #"'i"' 'h*

O 15 earlier phase in this proceeding you testified that during 16 an exercise for Shoreham you would evaluate through a 0 17 sarPling approach the level of coordination between LERO and is adult homes and nursing homes?

19 A That is correct.

() 20 Q But you did not do that in the exercise?

21 A I believe our testimony was that during an  !

22 exercise, not during all exercises and not during the first

() 23 exercise. What we are trying to say is these things have to 24 done, it is part of the six-year cycle and you dcn't do 25 everything in every exercise.

O

.O 24800202

,aryaimono 7664  :

3 -Q-  :

l 2 And these things have to be done because thes e ;

O

{

constitute major portions of the plan, correct?

3 i A

That is correct.

4 Q

And these are observable portions of the plan 1 5 correc t? ,

t O 6 A Tha t 's correc t .

y (Pause.)

8

.O' 9 10 11 O i2 13 14 O

is 16 17 O

is 19 l 20 0

23 22 23

'O 2a 25

O

'O

'3 24800404 7673 suewalCh

' 1 of unsuccessful attempts and finally they were able to get 2 throught is that correct?

O 3 A That's correct.

4 JUDGE PARIS: Mr. Baldwin, do you know why they 5

had dif ficulty getting through to Connecticut?

O 6

WITNESS BALDWIN: No, I don ' t .

7 BY MR. LANPHER: (Continuing) 8 Q Gentlemen, yesterday we talked briefly about 9

recovery / reentry which you discuss at Page 128 of your -

to testimony. I believe you stated that that does constitute 11 one of the major observable portions of an emergency plan 12 but under FEMA policy it's not necessary to test that in is every exercise.

. 14 A (Witness Kowieski) That 's correc t.

15 Q There was no reason why you couldn't have tested 16 recovery and reentry at Shoreham, however, was there?

17 A (Witness Keller) Yes, there is a reason.

18 Q Why is that?

19 A The federal government in the position of the 20 Environmental Protection Agency is yet to pronulgate doses ,

21 acceptable doses, for reentry of evacuated areas. They are 22 currently out in draf t form, but they have not been 23 pronulgated as of yet.

24 And, therefore, you don't knew what standard you .

I 25 have to measure against. The State of New York has objected 9

O e

0 c

24800404 7674 su walsh i to including recovery and reentry objectives in their 2

exercises af ter the new system was established af ter '83, b

i 3 August '83, and we have not had after the new system was 4

established in August of '83 recovery and reentry objectives 5 in New York. t 6

We had some prior, but the system at that time 7

was a lot different than we have now. And, we were a evaluating different kinds of things. And, if you don't 0

9 have a standard against which to measure it's very dif ficult to to make a measurement, 11 Q Well, there are other activities besides the 0

12 dose standard which are part of the recovery and reentry l 33 operation.

14 A Clearly, they are. But, if the doses are not is safe --

16 Q Could you just answer the question, please? ,

17 A Yes, they are, is JUDGE PARIS: Such as finding farms.

tg WITNESS KELLER: Such as finding farms.

g 20 (Laughter.)

i

) MR. LANPHER: Well, finding farms is I think L

22 inges tion pathway, Judge. '

O 23 JUDGE PARIS: Oh, excuse me. I'm sorry. l

,I 24 BY MR. LANPHER: (Continuing) 25 Q Isn't that correct, Mr. Keller? '

O ,

l l I 6l, i-1 A

~

%/

24800404 7675 suewalsh-c

"' 1 A (Witness Keller) It can also be recovery and O 2 reentry.

3 Q Okay. So, you could do it on both, couldn't 4 you?

O 5 A That is correct.

6 Q That wasn't done for Shoreham?

7 A That is correct.

C3 8 Q And, some of those other activities relating to 9 recovery and reentry are set forth in the evaluation 10 criteria of 0654, Section M --

k) 11 A Did you say M, M as in Mary? That is correct.

12 Q And, isn't it a fact that you construed NRC's 10 13 mile suggestion to be an indication from the NRC that you C) . 14 should omit recovery and reentry from the exercise?

15 A (Witness Kowieski) It was a deciding factor, 16 yes, sir.

() 17 Q You made that decision, correct, Mr. Kowieski?

18 A No. NRC made the decision.

19 Q Well, in your initial set of objectives for O 20 Shoreham, you did not include recovery / reentry?

21 A Yes. I followed the instructions.

22 Q And, you did not evaluate recovery and reentry

() 23 even within 10 miles, correct?

24 A That's correct.

25 Q And, Mr. Keller , you testified before that Ok o

7676

-24300404 I suevalsh i recovery and reentry has been exercised at other New York Q 2 State exercises, correc t?

.3 A (Witness Keller) That is correct, those prior 4 to -- the new system which was established in August of '83.

,0 -5 Q so, prior to August '83 it was done?

6 A That is correct.

7 Q And, so there is nothing that makes it O impossible -- I mean, you have had experience doing recovery 9 and reentry.

10 A There are very few things that are impossible.

O, 3: Q Well, in f act, rata Region II has had experience i2 doing recovery and reentry?

i3 A In a much different system than we currently Oj i, haves that is a correct statement.

i5 Q But, under the same NUREG 0654 criteria?

i6 A That is correct.

O i7 Q And, in fact, during some of those exercices ,

in FDiA concluded that recovery and reentry had been well is demonstrated; isn't that right?

.O A That is correct.

2o 2i Q Even without the dose guidance which you spoke 22 about before, the EPA dose guidance, you were able to

,0 evaluate recovery and reentry --

33 24 A We evaluated --

25 Q -- during other exercises?

O O ,

i

).

p800404 7677 I

suevalsh

- 1 A We evaluated recovery and reentry based on the

] 2 criteria which were in existence at the time which were --

3 which is a dif ferent system than we have now. And, at that 4

time we made the judgment that what was demonstrated was

[) $ adequate.

6 Q Your RAC reviews subsequent to 1983 of plans 7

include evaluation of recovery / reentry, don't they?

O 8 A And prior to ' 83, yes, sir.

9 Q So, the fact that there was a different system 10 didn't stop you from evaluating recovery / reentry in your C) 11 plan reviews, correc t?

12 A That is correct.

13 Q I don't understand why it stops you from iO . 14 evaluating recovery / reentry during exercises.

15 A Because the plan review is a review of a 16 docueent which is words on paper. And, my recollection of

'O 17 the M criteria state that there should be generalized plans t

l 18 for recovery and reentry. I can look it up, but I think l 19 that 's close enough. But, it's a general plan that is l

C) 20 required in the plan.

21 When you get to an exercise, you expect people 22 to implement sorething. A general plan is very difficult to l 1

[3 l

23 evaluate, whether they did a good jcb or not. And, that's

, 24 why there has been a stop, at least in Region II, of the t

' I 25 evaluation of recovery and reentry exercise objectives, 0 -

I.

I

PI D

8379 N3cosos s$walsh I

populace, which is not normally done in conjunction with a O I 2 joint exercise.

3 In FEMA Region II, but not in the other regions d

where I have evaluated exercises, the sirens have been O 5 sounded, with the exception of one other exercise. We 6 requested that the sirens be sounded. LiLCO managen.ent made 7

a decision that they would not be sounded. This is in the 8 Report. That is all we can say about it, I guess.

Q At other exercises in New York State and FEMA 10 Region II, have there been objectives similar to EOC-14 and a

11 157 12 A That is correct.

13 Q Have they been satisfied by FEMA REP-10 testing?

a

} Id A (Witness Kowieski) For some sites, we had a 15 fornal test of alert notification systems specifically for a

16 Nine Mile Point, alert notification system was formally 17 tested.

Is Q Was that in conjunction with exercise objectives 19

,,, 14 and 15 as you have here in the Shoreham exercise?

~J 20 A No, that is a separate test. It is in addition

! 2I to.

I 22 My question then is:

f) O At other exercises in New 23 York State and FEMA Region II have cbjectives such as EOC-14 24 and 15 been satis fied by FEMA REP-10 test?

25 A (Witness Keller) No.

I o

i l

f D

8380 h3cosos alsh 1

Q The sentence at the end of your testimony on D I ~

2 Page 106 also says that the siren system needs to be 3

actually tested in the future. Does this trean prior to full operation of Shoreham?

D 5 (Panel conferring.)

6 A (Witness Keller) Our confusion is the 7

following: The NRC has a requirement that this prompt O 8 notification alerting system be installed by the Licensee

' whether it is Shorehara or Miller site, and it is the 10 O Licensee's responsibility to install, and maintain, and keep 31 it operational.

12 We know that there are operating sites which 13

, have not had a formal acceptance of the alert notification J j Id system. As Mr. Kowieski just pointed out, Nine Mile Point 15 system has been accepted in New York. The Indian Point 16 system has not been accepted as of yet.

17 We have limited experience in Region II with 18

NTOL lic ensees, if you will . It is rny recollection that I 1

l' had read sornewhere that there have been NTOL licensees who 20 were granted full power licenses prior to the cor pletion of t 21 the FDiA REP-10 proc ess , but that is a recollection. It 22 3 clearly wasn't in this Region. i 23 I believe it happened in FD!A Region IV -- I am 2' sorry -- yeah, FD!A Region IV.

25 g So, I am not sure that there is a require: tent I

o

3 8406 h1500707 rYsimens 1

A. That 's correc t.

a m\ f 2 Q Now, Mr. Keller, last Tuesday you testified in 3

response to the question, "But you couldn't verify the d

capability of schools beyond Shoreham Wading River to

) 5 respond based upon what transpired at the exercise?" you 6

answered "That is correct."

7 Do you still stand by that testimony?

O' 8 A That's correct.

Q And ycu also testified "One school is probably a 10 little srall for most of the exercises in New York."

O 11 Do you recall that?

12 A Yes.

13 Q And, Mr. Kowieski, do you recall testifying that O I I Id "My directive from my Regional Director, my former Regional 15 Director, Frank Petrone, as well as Sam Speck was to be l 16 consistent, and whatever you have done for other sites in O 17 New York State, use the same approach as for Shoreham, and I 18 did."

19 Do you recall testifying to that?

O 20 A (Witness Kowieski) Yes, I do.

21 O Now at Indian Point FEMA evaluated schools and 22 issued two deficiencies and five ARCAs related to schools.

23 A That 's correc t, but ---

2d C At Shoreher FEMA did not evaluate any schools 25 save Shoreham Wading River and issued only cne ARCA.

l O

g .._

8442 100909

.alsh s I contrac tors, FEMA repres entatives, FEMA contractors would be

\

l 2 Dr. Baldwin and Mr. Keller, NRC RAC merber. The first 3 meeting was on Noverber 25th. There were other meetings d

beginning of December, I believe Decerber the 6th.

3 5

Q Is your testimony regarding the decision to only 6 include one school the same as it applies to the decision 3

7 not to sound the sirens and not to actually broadcast an EBS 8 test message?

9 A I don't agree with your characterization that my O 1 decision to include one school. I think we already testify 31 to this effect, the decision was made by LILCO not by FEMA 12 or Roger Kowieski.

{3 13 JUDGE FRYE: Yeah, I think that's clearly in the I

l Id rec ord .

l 15 WITNESS KOWIESKI: Yeah.

O 16 MR. ZAHNLEUTER: Okay.

17 BY MR. ZAHNLEUTER: (Continuing) 18 Q Given the LILCO decision, is your testimony the O 19 sare with regard to sirens and EBS test messages?

20 A (Witness Kowieski) Yes, it is.

4 21 0 The points of review for particular objectives, O 22 they were not approved by the RAC, were they?  ;

23 A (Witness Keller) That's correct.

24 (Witness Baldwin) That's correct.  !

D 25 (Witness Kowieski) Yeah, that's correct.

I O

a ,

)

31501424 8521 joewalsh

'I q JUDGE FRYE: I am not sure you picked up all the 2

qualifications.

3 WITNESS KELLER: I think we are stopping with d

the siren sounding. We are not including the EBS and the D 3 EBS station, I trust. In this question, we are stopping 6

with the --

7 MS. McCLESKEY: Perhaps I ought to repeat the D ,

8

, question.

(

j JUDGE FRYE: Yeah, let's repeat the question, i to BY MS. McCLESKEY: (Continuing) 11 '

Q Did the exercise sufficiently test the j 12 organizational skills of LERO regarding the sirens so that I

m 13 the results of the exercise could be taken with a REP-10 i,

W Id test to show adequate public notification?

15 A (Witness Kowleski) The answer is, no.

l 16 Q Why not?

O 17

! A Because we would like to see the integrated l

18 l capability, including actual siren sounding, in the issuance L i

l " of test EBS message. And this was missing from the O f j 20 exercise, actual siren sounding, pushing the button.

l 23 JUDGE FRYE:

l Right. And then you said --

22 UITNESS KOWIESKI. A test EBS message. Test EES 23 message, which is required.

24 BY MS. McCLESKEY: (Contint.ing )

l 25

,l Q Well, Mr. Kowieski, you testified earlier that I l

D! l t i

)

p5014 24 8522 gwalsh I

l LERO did everything but actually push the button and have 2

the noise come out of the sirens, right?

3 A (Witness Kowieski) That is correct.

d Q So, I take it that part of it isn't deficient

) 5 for you?

6 A That is correct.

7 O All right. Now, the REP-10 test would t.est

) 8 whether the noise comes out of the sirens or not, right?

9

, A That is right.

I 10 Q So, the piece that you are bothered by is the

) i t H test message over the radio, is that right?

12 JUDGE PARIS: Is it not the timing of the EBS 13 message and the siren sounding. You don't want the EBS

) 14 message coming ou t in the middle of the sirens, is that 15 right?

16 WITNESS KOWIESKI: That is exactly correct.

J 17 WITNESS BALDWIN: The issue, too, comes to the 18 standard objectives used by FEMA, and it talks about an 19 integrated capability here because the standard objective 20 used is demonstrate ability to alert the public within the 21 ten mile EP" and dissemin.'te an initial instructional 22 message within 15 minutes, so that is an integrated D

23 c apab ili ty. l l

24 That is the standard cbjective that is used in a !

25 '

biennial exercise.

D 4

D .

)

d501414 8523

pw21sh i

)q I BY MS. McCLESKEY : (Continuing) 2 Well, Mr. Kowieski, isn't it true that in a REP-O 3

10 test, part of the test is the sounding of the sirens and

)j '

the testing of a message so that integration is there by 5

definition of a REP-10 test?

6 A (Witness Keller) Yes, but it is not in reaction

) 7 to a scenario kind of driven event. Typically, in the 8

qualification test for the acceptance and the certification of this prompt notification system which we sometimes call

) 10 the REP-10 test.

' They will decide that we are going to run this 12 test at 10:00 on Saturday morning, and everybody knows it is 13 going to go at 10:00 on Saturday morning. ,It.may go at ,

l' 10:15, because many times the EBS stations are willing to 15 inter rup t their normal programming, but not their news 16 p rog ramming .

17 They somehow or other don't like to interrupt 18 their news, because apparently they feel it has something to D M do with their ratings or whatever, so they say we will run 20 your test but here is a block of time we will run it, here 21 is a block of time we won't run it, but everybody knows this

) 22 well in advance, right, and they say: Okay, we will run the 23 test, we will put the EES cn at 10:15, the sircns then wculd 2d go from 10:12 to 10:15, the EES ccres en at 10:15.

3

' 25 That is not in response to some kind of activity

? -

I

yf D

8524 4501414 1 plsh I driven by scenario. It is not in response to a decision.

0; 2 g;ow, that part of it was done in the exercise.

3 But it is our f eeling that this should be done in this

^)

d integrated way.

5 6

i

' I l>

8 9

' ) 10 11

{

l2

)  ?

13 14 15  ;

i ln

(_) 16 17 18 0 1, 20 21 0 22 23 24 o

^

g i

oi 4

l

r 8525 gf/501515 gewalsh ,

I (The witnesses are conferring.

(Witness Keller) 2 A I_think you are aware, as we t

3 testified previously, that not all the regions sound the sirens in every exercise, okay. Mr. Kowieski, when he was

) 5 the RAC Chaiman felt that it was important that these t

6 exercise (sic) be sounded in the exercises.

7 JUDGE PARIS: Sirens.

3 8 WITNESS KELLER: Sirens, I'm sorry. I'm losing.

it. Sorry. He felt it was important to sound the sirens, e 30 during the exercise. All right.

II We see no reason to change that evaluation at t

]

12 this point in tirne, okay. But, if we were going to do it 13 again we would like to see the sirens sounded as an 3

l' integrated thing in an exercise to be consistent with what [

~

15 we have done in the past in this region. That's not what's  ;

h, 16 done nationwide, but to be consistent with what has been 17 done in the past in this region we would like to see it done 18 consistently.  !

I 19 BY MS, McCLESKEY: (Continuing) l O

N ' O Mr. Keller, ycu have evaluated exercises outside r

21 this region, haven't you?

t 3 22 A (Witness Keller) That's correct.  !

s 22 Q And, at these exercises the button pushing, -

j i 4 '

24 siren sounding and EES test r-es s age don ' t ' all take place on f '

l3 l

25 the san.e day, do they? ,

l t l t i

D l I

i

Mr 9

8526 i

3

!,7501515uswalsh l A Quite often, they do not.

gW 2 O You do the button pushing or the simulated 3 button pushing as we did at the Shoreham exercise, and then d you do the test cessage and the siren sounding separately at 5 a REP-10 test, right?

! 6 A That is correc t.

)

7 Q Now, when -- Mr. Kowieski, in Region II when you

>f t 8 do the three activities on the same day, does FEMA send 9 anyone to the radio station to observe what goes on therc?

3 10 A (Witness Kowieski) I already testify to this 11 effect. Only on one occasion we sent an evaluator to a 12 radio station. I believe back in 19 82 or '83. It was at i

' 13 the Ginna site or Nine Mile Point site. <.

Id O And, Mr. Keller, the scheduled nature of the 15 test and the siren testing is the same for an exercise or D 16 for a REP-10 test, isn't it?

Well, not exactly. I mean, I 17 A (Witness Keller) 1 le soretimes we are told that we cannot sound the siren in a 0' 19 certain window, okay. I'm sorry.

20 As we testified last week, we think it's l 1

21 critical that when the sirens are sounded that the EES test 22 ressage core on in the time frane that you 've told the i l

23 public in ycur educational brechure that they will ccre on.

l>

22 And, we are not in favor of sounding the sirens unless we l i

' 25 have a commitment to air this test ressage, I think for l '

o i

4 3

857.7

'37501525

,pev31sh l Okay.

obvious reasons.

(

2 If the radio station says: We will not air that 3 test message in this time window, whatever tirne window it

' is, and if in the flow of the exercise, okay, the decision-5 maker says evacuate those A to M, Q and R -- for lack of 6 anything else -- and put out the EBS message, right, and 7 we'll sound the sirens at 10:15 and we will go with the EBS 0:

8 ressage at 10:18, let's say, okay, let's assurte that to be

' decided, all right.

10 The controller, who is aware of the fact that O

" the window is 10:18 will be in an area which is prohibited 12 by the radio station because it's an exercise. The 13 controller steps in and says: Stop. You have a gold star, id everything is fine. Now, sound the siren and run the test 15 cessage at, let's say, 10:30 instead.

) 16 O So, you don't get that integration that you want 37 to see anyway?

18 A Cnly occasionally have we had that problem.

J M But, it is a possibility that you don't get the integration, 2C that's true.

21 (Witness Kowieski) That's correct.

) 22 JUDGE PARIS: In an exercise, events are driven 23 by the scenario and you don't know exactly when the sirens 2d l are going to be sounded --

J ' 25 WITNESS KELLER: That's right.

1

f w, , .)  !

i h

ji 8528 t.

y7501515 i gutV818h' - i I JUDGE PARIS: -- and you need to follow ~up by an-

'2 EBS message.  ;

3 WITNESS KELLER: That is correct.

j 4 JUDGE PARIS: Whereas, in the other you know 3 precisely.

6 WITNESS KELLER: Ycu know precisely. It's

) 7 widely publicized and pre-planned and announced in every 8 media that you can find.

' BY MS. McCLESKEY: (Continuing)

) 10 Q Mr. Keller, I guess I just don't understand what Il you just responded to Judge Paris ' questions.

12 When you are negotiating and preparing for an 7 D 13 exercise, you go to the radio station and you talk to them l

U l' about what time the message and the sirens might happen, and 13 they will tell ycu that's okay or it's not, right? -

The State does,

) 16 A Well, number one, we do not.

17 ok ay. All right.

18 Now, as Judge Paris correctly pointed out, the .

) 19 participants in the exercise are responding to scenario 20 events. You know reasonably closely what time an initiatir.g 21 event will occur on site. A pipe will break at 10 o' clock, ,

22 okay. L 23 The on-site participants must analyze the '

i

' . 24 censequences of that break. They then r..us t declare an 25 er.crgency classification level. They may give a t

li l ._

8529 l 37501515 ,

- g w31sh '

& i I recomendation to the of f-site authorities. The off-site 2 authorities get all this information, -integrate it and then 1 3 make a decibion, okay,

. i

' We know that once the of f-site authority makes We cannot --

5 that decision we have this 15 minute window.

Pipe break at 6

all the scenarios have these wonderful times.

7 10, ECL 10:05, all these -- the times are right there in the And, you never follow them. But, they are 8 scenarios.

guidelines only.

10 You have a window of probably maybe 10 or 15 ,

Il minutes that you have a pretty good idea. If the radio 12 station gives you a big window that we will not air the EBS message, then -- that's never happened to my knowledge.

l 13 ,

l Id Typically, the windows are like five or seven minute windows t i

15 in an hour where the EBS station says that, for their own 16 reasons, and since it's only an exercise or a drill, they ,

17 will not air the EBS test message.

18 So, you are talking about a five or seven minute ,

D 19 slide in when you can do it. As I say, I would estimate l

20 that greater than 80 percent of the time it flows without ,

Il any problem. Less than 20 percent, you might run into one l

D 22 of these c11tches.

l

! 23 Q Right. My point is that even during exercises '

t 22 the radio station knows within that 10 or 15 minute window J

t 25 what time it's going to get the call. ]

t l t

i

(

O 8530 31501515 8

psvalsh 1

A No, no. All -- well, my understanding in the

,O 2 negotiations which have gene on -- and I've been involved 3 with one or two or been present when it was going on -- is

• • **"' * * ""d 'h* *i'*"' T"**0*" " ""i"S' k*"' ""#

Of 5 soretimes they will say mid-morning or sonething like that.

i 6 The radio station will say: Okay, w2 won't air it from 10 7 to 10:07, we won't air it from 11-to 11:07, and that's it, g=

s O Okay.

' A And, that's all the further it goes. The 1 ntr 11ers wh are watching that -- and they have to watch O

11 it very closely -- have this infor1 nation and they have to 12 step in with a contingency rnessage.

g 13 Q So, during the exercise you are talking about . a 14 two or three hour frame of spontaneity where in a REP-10 15 test they know what time it's going to go?

16 A Precisely, that's right.

O 17 0 Right. Are any of you aware of any exercises in la this region where protective action was changed from O

19 evacuaticn to sheltering due to a scenario wind shift

0 projection?

t A Uell, from 1962 on I would say that there has O  :: never been a don grade in the protective action due to a 22 l wind shift. That's my recollection of about 12 exercise 2 repcrts , and I'm not zeady to stand up and say there never 0 25 l has been. But, my recollection is there hasn't.

Oi I ,

e

)

- 1 600606 0620 Ph'palsh ,

) . .i i

A That is true.

3 0 Is it fair to say that you don't know what kind 4

of a review that Mr. Amato or anyone else at the NRC made

) 5 of the Shoreham objectives?

6 A What I know sir, I can only testify what I asked 7

for. I asked each RAC menber to review the proposed

) 8 exercise objectives.

9 O That is not my question. Ycu don't have --

10 A I don't know.

) 11 Q Okay. Similarly, you don't know what guidance 12 d ocumen ts , if any, may have been utilized by Mr. Amato or 13 anyone else at the NRC to revi'.7w the objectives, correc t?

A That is correct.

15 0 And you don't know what guidance documents, if 16 any, any merber of the RAC, other than yourself, perhaps, used to review the proposed cbjectives, isn't that correct?

18 A That is also correct.

19 s

J O You don't know what regulations, if ar.y, were 20 reviewed by any tenber of the RAC, excep t perhaps ycurs elf, I 21 related to the proposed cbjectives of Shoreham, correct?

22

, A That is also correct, t Q Mr. Kowieski, am I correct that the only -- the 24 cernents from the NRC, which are ref erer.c ed in Su f f olk 25 g County Exhibit 107 on the objec tives, correct?

l( A That is correct.

1 dbhm_ ,

ulf l

[l ' fgeCsh 1 600909 i

E663 l A Okay. That's correct.

O And, then there were additional ARCAs relating

) 2 to each, correc t?

3 A That's correct.

O tiow , ycu stated yesterday also that special

) 5 facilities generally are tested by no rore than telephone calls. Do you recall that?

7 A Yes, I do.

D 8 O Did you mean to include schools as special facilities when you were testifying?

'O A lio .

) 11 O You meant nursing homes and hospitals?

12 A That's correct, although the plan -- although I3

) l I' the plan defines special facilities as --

O But, in your testimony yesterday when you used 13 special f acilities you weren't including schools?

A That's correct.

3 O Decause usually more than just a telephone call

is done wjth schools?

A That's correct.

3 20 0 And, am I correct that scretires more than just

,i a telephone call is dore f or schools in FDiA-graded 22 g exercises - f or special f acili. ties, excuse re?

23 I (The witnesses are ecnferring.)

I' Isn't it a fact, centleren, that in the Indian 25 o

Il e

5i

)

6673 c1010

$1sh t

I Q Mr. Baldwin, I want to clear up what seem to me

)' 2 to be a potential inconsistency in your statement fren 3

yes terday r.orning to yesterday afternoon, and yesterday terning you testified that --

5 A (Witness Kowieski) What page is that?

Q Let ce find it first. You testified at Page 837 8 that you believed that a REP-10 test would satisfy

) 8 exercise objectives for demonstrating the ability to alert the public in a timely manner. 837 8.

'O And it was with reference to EOC Contentions 14

) 11 and 15, generally that the discussions were taking place.

12 Do you see that testimony?

I3 A (Witness Baldwin) q Yes.

) I' Then later in the day, you testified that a REP -

O II -

I think it was questions from Ms. McCleskey, and then from I' the Board as well, that in fact REP =10 test plus an exercise i,

would not be adequate because -- plus the exercise that took 18 plac e -- f orget about future exercises -- because you wouldn't have a chance to evaluate t! e integrated capabilities of all the. players that are involved. l 21 A That is correc t. Can ycu give rce a page j citation on that, too?

h 2 There were a nurber of pages s t a r t i r.g arcund l Q

l E521. Fut my question, Mr. Baldwin, I thir.k ycu dcn't have

,.i i

) * * '

to go to that if you ag:ee generally with my i

i 1

t.

gt i

,,010 8673

'"jlsh e '

characterization of the later testimony. I think it was all I I t).rce of ycu that later testimeny.

3 A That is right. Being able to evaluate the t

integrated capability in the context of an exercise in which 5

we would have objectives such as EOC-14 and 15.

6 Q So, this testimony on 837 8 is really modified by 7

that later discussion that we had yesterday?

8 A That is correct.

9 MR. LANPHER: Thank you. Judge, that completes 10 the questions on 15, 16, and my portion of 21, and Mr.

> 11 Miller has sore questions on sore of the traf fic 12 contentions.

13 JUDGE FRYE: How much more collectively would

l ' la you estimate?

15 MR. LANPHER: Ms. Letsche tells me that she has abou t ten minutes on the ENC-type. A half hour or less from 17 Mr. Miller.

18 JUDGE FRYE: Ms. McCleskey?

- MS. McCLESKEY: I have a few rinutes of 20 questions.

JUDGE FRYE: One question frer Staff. Tlere 22

, will be scre redirect, I suspect. i

'3

• l MR. CUMMING: Thet depends. ,

I JUDGE FRYE: Why dcn't we take cur lunch break

~$

now, and core back at 1:45.

)

( ',

M

1 O l l

l I7700101 8767 '

.e walsh 1 2 How was it put together?

O 3 A (Witnuss Schwartz) We both prepared it 4 together.

0 5 Q And, this was prepared just prior to the June 5 6 submittal date; is that correct, Mr. Schwartz?

7 A I can't say exactly what date, but it was some 8 time prior to June 5th.

O 9 Q Now, I believe in the oral argument your counsel

io mentioned a deposition earlier. Did you review that Ol 11 deposition, the deposition of Sheldon A. Schwartz and 12 Bernard H. Weiss which was held on January 14 of this year?

13 Did you review that deposition in connection

0, 14 with the preparation of this testimony?

15 A Yes.

16 Q Did you review any other documents in connection

'O, 17 with the preparation of this testimony?

t r 18 A No.

19 0 Is that correct for you as well, Mr. Weiss?

O 20 A (Witness Weiss) I believe I may have looked at 21 one other memorandum just to refresh my memory on the events t

22 that took place, IO 23 Q Would you please identify that document?

24 A It was part of that deposition.

25 Q Well, let me show you a copy of that deposition, lO l*

Mr. Weiss, and the six exhibits to it. I assume you are lI O

q

1. 9700101 8768

,3 e walsh 1

'2 referring to one of those?

3 A Exhibit Number 6, 4 Q So, except for the deposition testimony the only 5 other document you reviewed in connection with this 6 testimony was that Exhibit Number 6 to the deposition?

7 A I believe so.

) e Q And, in reviewing the deposition testimony did 9 you describe based upon what you had stated in that i

(

10 deposition what the substance of your testimony here, your

)f 11 prefiled testimony, would be?

1 12 Is that a fair summary of the way the testimony 13- was put together?

)j 14 A Not based on -- would you repeat the question?

I 13 Q Sure. By the way, both of you, if at any time i

16 you don't understand the question, please don' t speculate or

) guess what I mdan.

17 Let me ask it again or try again, all 18 right.

19 Is it fair to state that the purpose of -- why

)

20 don't you tell me, what was your purpose in reviewing the 21 deposition?

22 MS. McCLESKEY: Excuse me, gentlemen. We can't 23 hear any of you on this side of the room. Could you-all l 24 speak up?

25 MR. LANPHER: Can you hear me?

MS. McCLESKEY: Hardly at all.

O r$7700101 8769

,g,walsh I i

2 MR. LANPHER: Maybe -- I'm talking real close to O 3 the mike.

4 JUDGE FRYE: For some reason, you seem fainter 5-today than you have in the past. I don't know why.

r~'

j 6

MR. LANPHER: Maybe -it 's the euphoria a t this 7

stage of the proceeding.

l 8

(Laughter.)

O 9

MS. McCLESKEY: I think it's more likely that i 10 it's that blasted f an that is blowing in our ears. I

• 11

.O! JUDGE PARIS: I will turn up the master just a i2 little bit. l l '

I L. 13 MR. LANPHER: Is that be,tter?

i 3

14

)-

JUD'GE FRYE: That is better.

l 15 MR. LANPHER: Okay.

16 BY MR. LANPHER: (Continuing) 17

9 Q Mr. Weiss, my question is, what was the -- first 18 of all, did you both review the deposition testimony?

19 A (Witness Schwartz) Yes, I did.

'O 20 (Witness Weiss) I reviewed it very quickly.

i 21 Yes.

i 22 l 0 Did you review it very quickly, Mr. Schwartz?

O 23 A (Witness Schwartz) Yes, I reviewed it very 14 quickly. And, to make sure the record is clear, I believe l 25 you have previously asked if I reviewed the deposition.

O 1

And, then you asked if I reviewed any other documents.

O

O 37700101 8770 ie valsh 1

2 My presumption was that the documents that were 3

appended to the deposition made the whole deposition. And, 4 yes, I did review some of the documents that were appended o 5 to the deposition as well as the deposition.

6 Q And, so that the record is clear, the' documents 7

that you reviewed were one portion of NUREG 0654, Planning C) B Standard N of that document, which is Deposition Exhibit 1, 9

correc t?

10 A Correct.

O 31 Q And, you reviewed 10 CFR Section 5047? '

12 A i

Correct.

13 Q And, Appendix E to Part 50 of 10 CFR7 "o 14

. A Yes.

i 15 Q And, you reviewed Guidance Memorandum 17, Rev 1, 16 or that's a draf t guidance memorandum I believes is that

^O 9 right?

1B A I believe so, yes.

19 Q And you reviewed that document?

20 A In the context of review, I read them but I 21 don't think I scrupulously went through every single word.

2 O Q Y u reviewed then Draf t Guidance Memorandum EX-23 3, c orrec t?

24 A Let me see if I can follow you.

25 lO 0 I believe that was Deposition Exhibit 5, sir.

(The witness is looking at the document. )

A Correct.

O 1

~

7700202 8771 i

~U jgwnich 1- Q And, then finally you reviewed Deposition 2

Exhibit 6, which was a memorandum from Mr. Jordan to Mr.

O 3 Taylor, Re: Report of NRC Activities on Shoreham Exercise, 4

dated -- that memorandum is hand-dated March 10, 1986 I 5 believe?

O 6 A That's correct.

7 Q So, that's the sum total of the documents you 8 reviewed, correct?

o 9 A Again, the context of review versus read and to become familiar with is --

l' 11

. Q Well, are there any other documents -- in O.

i 12 connection with the preparation of your testimony, did you 13 look at any other documents in connection with the l 14 preparation of your testimony?

O I MR. PIRFO:

15 .

Asked and answered.

16 H MR. LANPHER: Judge --

17 JUDGE FRYE: Overruled.

I 18 MR. LANPHER: Thank you.

19 WITNESS SCHWART2: To the best of my knowledge, O 20 I did not review any other documents. -

21 BY MR. LANPHER: (Continuing) l 22 Q My question was, did you look'at any other in 12 23 connection with this testimony? You drew a distinction

24 between review and something else, i

l 25 A (Witness Schwartz) To the best of my knowledge, O

l

!O l

) 37700202 8772 j oeg31sh I

I did not review or look at any other documents with respect 2

) to the preparation of this testimony before us today.

3 Q Is the same true for you, Mr. Weiss?

d A (Witness Weiss) The same is true for me.

5 Q Thank you, sir.

6 MR. JOHNSON: The Staff counsel would just 7

represent that yesterday evening the Staff counsel supplied

)! ,

8 the witnesses a copy of the transcript, certain pages of the 9 __

10

) MR. LANPHER: Judge, I object to that kind of a

)j I,

II statement.

12 JUDGE FRYE: I think it would be better to I3 refrain from those sorts of statements.

)[

1 I'

MR. PIRFO: I don't --

l , 15 JUDGE FRYE: The questions were --

> I 16 MR. LANPHER: In connection with the preparation U

f of the tes timony.

' I8 JUDGE FRYE: --

in connection with the

" preparation of the testimony.

l The testimony was obviously

)

20 prcpared before last night.

21 MR. PIRFO: Judge Frye, respectfully -- well, 22

) 23 maybe we didn't -- he asked in connection with the testimony. We provided the witnesses with the first day's 24 transcript of the FEMA witnesses when Mr. Lanpher was cross-25

, examining on 15 and 16.

d

)

k 8782 b;00202

alsh 1-2 MR. LANPHER

Or start.

1 3 BY MR. LANPHER: (Continuing) l 4 Q Now, gentlemen, your counsel indicated that 5 subsequent to the preparation of this testimony, Staff 6 Exhibit 1, you have reviewed at least one additional 7 document, a trial transcript; is that correct?

g A (Witness Weiss) That's right.

9 (Witness Schwartz) Yes, that's true. In the 10 context of review, yes, I did read some of the pages of that

) u transcript.

12 Q And, can you please identify for me which 13 transcript that was just by the date?

D . i4 A (Witness Weiss) The testimony of June 9, Pages 15 7 416 to 7 64 8.

16 (Witness Schwartz) And, testimony of June 10, ,

) u 7 649 through 7 887.

is Q Mr. Weiss, on June 9 what were the page numbers, jg 7416 to?

20 A (Witness Weiss) 7648. Those are the total i

~

21 pages in the document, but I read each on of those.

22 Q That was the -- is it fair to state that that g~

23 was the examination by Suf folk County, by me on behalf of 24 Suffolk County, and also Mr. Zahnleuter -- no, I guess not, 23 by me of the FEMA panel on Contentions 15 and 167 D

A That's correct.

O

3 per

)

87 83 I.00202 f;alsh 1

) And, when did you review that?

2 Q Was that 3 yesterday or last night?

4 A Last night.

j 5 (Witness Schwartz) Last night.

6 Q Now, are there any other documents, aside from 7 the deposition transcript and the documents attached to it D a and those two trial transcripts, that you have reviewed in 9 connection with your testimony?

10 A (Witness Weiss) Not that I can recall at this

[) 11 time.

i 12 (Witness Schwartz) I can't recall reviewing l 13 anything in connection with the testimony.

3 ja Q Now, gentlemen, you testified earlier that you 33 recall being deposed earlier this year in connection with --

16 leave that aside.

17 Are there other documents, Mr. Schwartz, which is you have reviewed pertaining to Shoreham besides those that l 39 have already been identified?

O 20 A To the best of my knowledge, there were many 21 other documents. I don't say many there are other L

V 22 documents that I did review pertaining to Shoreham.

'{ 23 Q Well, can you name any of those?

f 24 A The one document that does stand out in my mind I

c 25 that I did review was the FEMA findings on the exercise, the FEMA report of the exercise.

's I

9 i

e

)

i~

,!00202 1 8784 walsh 2 Q Okay. The post-exercise assessment report?

O 3 A That's correct.

4 Q So, you reviewed that. Do you recall the time 5 frame when you reviewed that, Mr. Schwartz?

6 A I can't recall the date that it was offered and 7 it was complete. It was somewhere in 1986 time frame, maybe 8 the Summer or something like that. But, I can't remember J_

9 any better than that.

10 Q You have not reviewed that since that general 11 9 time period, some time in 1986; is that correct?

12 A To the best of my knowledge, I don't think I

13. reviewed it again. I don't think I looked at it again after O- 14 that.

15 Q And, Mr. Schwartz, did you review any of the 16 underlying documents from the exercise such as evaAuator O' 17 critique forms or player logs?

18 A Nono.

19 Q Is that the only document related to the n

20 exercise that you recall reviewing, the post-exercise 21 assessment report, sir?

22 A To the best of my knowledge, that's the -- those 23 are the documents that I reviewed, the only document that I 24 really looked at and read through.

l j;

i 25 Q Now, you testified during your deposition that 4

you had had no occasion to review the Shoreham -- the LERO 1

11 i

i

6 1

<- r h

l

,go0202 , 8785 ivalsh 2

emergency plan for Shoreham; that's correct, right?

3 A That's correct.

d Q That's not part of your responsibilities at the 5 NRC, c orrec t?

])

6 A Th'it is right.

7 Q Mr. Schwartz, to make sure there wasn't an D 8 oversight on your part, is it fair to state that you have 9

not reviewed Contentions 15 and 16 as admitted in this 10 proceeding?

) II A At some point in time, I'm sure that I read 12 Contentions 15 and 16 as part of this proceeding.

G Q You don't recall though?

O A But, I don't recall. I remember a discussion on 15 Contention 15 and 16 with counsel when I agreed to 16 participate in this proceeding, but other than that I cannot O 17 recall reviewing it at any other time.

18 Q In fact, you don't recall reviewing it at that 19 timer you recall some discussions about it, is that correct?

20 A That's a fair characterization, yes.

21 Q And, would that have been in the time frame of your deposition or the preparation of your testimony, sir?

22 Q.

23 A That was in the time frame of -- prior to 2d preparation of the deposition.

25 Back in early January, then?

7) Q A Whenever that was, yes.

10

) . 8787 l f*#gish g303 F

i Q. Now, Mr. Weiss, have you reviewed Contentions 15 2 and 16 as admitted in this proceeding?

)

3 A (Witness Weiss) No, I have not.

4 Q You have never reviewed them?

5 A No.

6 MR. LANPHER: Judge Frye, I move to strike this 7 testimony.

, These witnesses have never even reviewed the

). e contentions that they have been asked to testify about.

9 JUDGE FRYE: Well, you have established that and to that may go to weight, but I don't think we want to strike it the testimony.

32 MR. LANPHER: I just wanted it to be on the i3 record. I didn't think you were going to do it, but --

) 14 (Laughter.)

35 MR. PIRFO: I m;ght also note for the record i6 that the Board's -- again, to reiterate, the Board's

) 17 direction to the Staff was not to produce witnesses to is testify on 15 and 16. The Board's direction to the Staff 19 was to produce witnesses on what constitutes a full

) 20 participation exercise.

21 And, that may be within the context of 15 and 22 16, but that was what we complied with.

)

MR. LANPHER:

23 Judge Frye, their testimony on 24 Page i says it's on Contention 15 and 16. I would have 25 expected they might have reviewed it, since it says it's on l

)

( ]

OL 00303 8790 I ;valsh k,

i A No.

O Q You are not aware of any discussions by the 3

Shoreham RAC whether the Shoreham exercise would or would 4

not be a full participation exercise, are you?

3 O A ' ot directly in that context, no.

N 6

Q And, you have never been responsible at other 7

exercises to make a determination or a judgment whether the O 8 exercise satisfied Appendix E of the NRC's regulations; 9

isn't that correct?

10 A That's correct.

n 11 Q And, that's true for you, isn't it, Mr.

12 Schwartz?

'3 A (Witness Schwartz) c) ,,

That's corr 9ct. -

Q Now, Mr. Weiss, is it fair to state that --

15 well, you were involved in the preparations for the Shoreham exerciser am I correct?

O  ;,

A (Witness Weiss) That is correct.

18 Q And, is it fair to state that your duties g primarily related to development of the controller and 20 simulation plan for the Shoreham exercise?

21 A I was involved in preparation of the controller O plan and the simulation plan in coordinating NRC's 23 participation in that control operation.

2a Q Now, you had better pull that closer, because

O I'm even having trouble hearing you here and I'm real close

O 8791 h.700303f *,yals h 1

to you.

O And, you were requested to provide these 3

services to FEMA to assist them in their -- in FEMA's a

preparation for the exercise; is that correct?

O A That is correct.

6 Q And, you started in that work in early November 7

of 1985; is that correct?

O 8 A I believe that's about correct.

9 Q In connection with developing -- well, is it 10 fair to say that you helped to develop the controller and O 11 simulation plan?

12 A Portions of it, yes.

13 Q Okay. 2n connection with developing portions of G 3a that and otherwise assisting in the exercise preparation, 15 l did you work closely with the -- with RAC, the regional RAC, i6 which was under Mr. Kowieski's direction?

.O l, ,,

A I worked directly with Mr. Kowieski.

18 Q You didn't have to work with the entire RAC, you 19

O w rked directly with him; is that correct?

20 A That's correct.

21 Q And, is it fair to state that you got your 22

'() directions on what work needed to be done from Mr. Kowieski 23 or others who were working directly with him on a daily 24 basis?

25 jO A That's correct, i

4

\

i

) 8793

,g303

.alsh f 1 Q Is it also fair to state that as part of your 2

duties in developing the portions of the controller or

~

simulation plan -- and simulation plan -- your duties did a

not include making a determination of whether the exercise

, 5

). would or would not satisfy 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E, 6

correc t?

7 A That is correct, 8

s

/ Q Your duties also didn't include any 9

determination whether the exercise would satisfy any FEMA 10 regulatory requirements for full participation exercises, 11 c orrec t.?

l 12 l A Would you clarify that question, please? The l 13 .

duties that you are referring to, is that a reference to the

) previous question?

l 15 Q Duties in connection with the Shoreham I 16 l

ex erc is e . In connection with your preparation for the

) I?

Shoreham, exercise, your duties in that connection, you had 18 no occasion to, or responsibility for, making a 19 determination whether the exercise was of sufficient scope 20 to satisfy the NRC full participation exercise requirements, i 21 correct?

j 22 A I did not make that decision, that's right.

j 23 Q And, it wasn't within the realm of your 24 responsibilities either, correct?

! : 25

) ,

A That is correct.

I J

l -) f b

8793 go0303 ,

I ps1*h ,

Q And, the sama -- you didn't make a decision of

) that nature with respect to compliance with the FEMA 3

requirements for full participation exercises, correct?

s A That's correct.

) Q Now, Mr. Weiss, let me go back for a moment. In 6

connection with the preparation of your testimony in this 7

proceeding or your preparation for the deposition, you had

) 8 no occasion to review any portions of LERO's emergency off-9 site plan for Shoreham, correct?

10 A I did. I did review LERO's off-site plan.

O In connection with the preparation of your 12 testimony?

13 A Oh, I'm sorry, no. No, not in connection with

)

the preparation of the testimony. ,

15 Q And, not in connection with the preparation for 16 the deposition?

)

A That's correct.

18 Q But, there was an earlier time when you had 19

) 20 occasion to look at at least some portions of that plan?

A That's correct.

21 Q What was the purpose of looking at some portions 22

) of LERO's plan?

23 A To familiarize myself with the plan so that I 24 .

could better understand how they developed a method of 25 simulating the participation of state and locals and

('l

i i

y7700303 8794

,,.;e v lsh understanding how the control system would best operate.

Q And, this review of the plan was in the November / December '85, January 1986, time frame?

l A That's correct.

5 Q Prior to'that approximate time frame, had you had any occasion to look at any portions of LERO's off-site plan for Shoreham?

8 A I don't believe I did.

9 Q And, what was the nature of your review of the ,

plan during that time period? Did you review the entire plan?

A No. I believe I reviewed the front portions. I 13 u can't remember the numberg, but the summary portions,

) -

probably the first volume. I can't remember exactly. .

l Q Okay. The first volume is the plan volume; isn' t that correct?

A Right.

! O And, then there are I think three volumes of 19 implementing procedures; is that correct?

)

A That's correct. Those are the ones I did not 21 l

l review in any detail.

22 5 Q You did not review thosc in any detail. Did you 23 review the Appendix A, the evacuation plan?

A I do not -- I don' t believe I did. I don't 25 h recall.

L

y 3 7700303 pe walsh 8795 2

Q So, it's fair to state that to the best of your  !

0 recollection your review of the Shoreham plan was a _ review 1

3 4

of volume 1 of the Shoreham plan?

5 A I believe basically that was it.

0 Q Now, did you review all of Volume 1?

6 7

A I believe I did.

Q Well, let me provide to you just a Table of O

9 Contents of volume 1 of the plan. I will represent that is what it is. And, we all have the plan.

O

" I don't think we need to mark this as an 12 exhibi t, because it's just the Table of Contents of Volume

1. And, if you would please briafly look that ever and tell 13 O id me after you've had an opportunity to look dt it what 15 portionc of Volume 1 you recall reviewing?

16 (The witness is looking at the document. )

A To the best of my recollection, I probably would have reviewed the first four chapters.

Q And, for the record could you identify what r-

• 20 those four chapters were, sir?

21 A Chapter 1 is Introduction; Chapter 2, Organization; Chapter 3, Concept of Operation; and, Chapter

q 4, Facilities and Equipment.

23 Q Thus, there was no occasion for you to review Chapter 5 which was the Maintenance of the Planning Effort,

'S correct?

P 1

s 8796 l,.17003 ,03apalsh A Not in detail. I'm sure I glanced at it just to 2

)

3 assure myself that I didn't really have to review it in detail.

5 0 w'11' a portion of Chapter 5 is Section 5.1 entitled "Training." You didn't perform any review of the 7 LILCO or LERO training program for its off-site personnel, g

correc t?

A No.

g Q And, in connection with developing the --

j 33 performing the work that you did prior to the exercise, you g did act feel that it was necessary to review the l

implementing procedures for the LERO plan, correct?

p g t. No't in detail. I may have looked at something 15 f r clarifi ation fr m time to time but not in detail.

Q You don't recall looking at any --

g A That's right.

18 Q And, is it correct that the reason you didn't i, feel it was necessary to review those implementing h

f g procedures was that your responsibility was to develop a i

g plan for the simulation of state and local governments and i g for the control messages that would be related thereto?

/

g A That's correct. And, I believe that I had g enough information. My recollection is that I had enough 3 information.in that first volume to do what I needed to do.

Q But, it's fair to state then that your review d

l i

8797 '

i.7100303

e valsh 3 l

2 did not include all the portions of the LILCO plan, did it?

D 3

A That's correct.

, Q So, you only reviewed a portion of the plan?

A That's correct.

5

, Q And, is it fair to state that given your 7 responsibilities you were not involved in making decisions abou t wha t the scope or what portions of the -- strike that.

9 Your responsibilities did not include making decisions as to what portions of the LERO off-site plan g 33 would be included in the exercise; is that correct?

12 A I did not make the decisions. I may have been involved in making suggestions, but I didn't make the ,

D 3, d ecis ions', no.

15 Q Those decisions were basically made by Mr.

f ,,

Kowieski; is that correct?

O g A That's correct.

3, O And, it was not within the scope of your

,, responsibilities to detertnine what objectives should be

,i g included in the Shoreham exercise except for obj ectives 21 related to the simulation of state and local government g officials, correct?

g P A g That's correct.

24 Q The rest of the objectives were decided by Mr.

K wieski, correct?

25 A That's correct.

O

e l

3 0404 8802' jaish 1 Q Or anywhere?

2 )

A My wife maybe.

3 Q That is privileged, my co-counsel points out.

Mr. Weiss, did you have conversations --

5 A (Witness Weiss) No, I did not.

6 Q Mr. Schwartz, during the time frame of the 7

preparation for the Shoreham exercise, late '85, early '86, 8

you had no occasion to speak with Mr. Amato about his review 9

of the Shoreham objectives or the scenario, or anything of 10 that nature, isn't that correct?

11 A (Witness Schwartz) That is correct.

12 O You had no occasion to talk with anyone from 13 Region I ebout any ruch review, correct? That you recall.

) Id A That I reca1.1. I may have discussed it with 15

'some of the individuals in the Region, but I don't recall, 16 since it was an activity that was going on.

O Now, Mr. Weiss, after the post exercise 18 assessment report was published on I believe it was April 19

) 17, 1986, did you have occasion to speak with anyone from FEMA abou t that report, or the conclusions reached in that 21 l report?

22

) A (Witness Weiss) I don't recall, I don't

! 23 l \ remember. I have a vague idea that I may have, but nothing i 2a that strikes me.

J 25l Q Did you have any conversations with anyone from

. l f

0 l

)

8803 Isn*0404 ish 1 LILCO about that report, as a result of the exercise?

)- 2 A No, no I have not.

3 G Do you recall any discussions with any NRC d

personnel about that report, or the results of the exercise?

D 5 A No.

6 Q Is it fair to state, Mr. Weiss, that subsequent 7 to the exercise, and up to the time that you got pulled back 8 into this proceeding when there was a request for a f deposition by Long Island Lighting Companye you didn't have 10 any involvement in the Shoreham exercise proceeding?

3 11 A That is correct.

12 Q Same true for you, Mr. Schwartz?

O 13 A (Witness Schwartz) That is correct.

Id Q Now, am I correct, Mr. Weiss, that you attended 15 a November 25, 1985 meeting, attended by LILCO O 16 representatives and Mr. Amato, and Mr. Kowieski, and come 17 others, to discuss -- where there was discussion of an 18 initial draf t obj ectives for the Shoreham exercise?

O 1$ A (Witness Weiss) That is correct.

20 Q And subsequent to that meeting, am I correct 21 that you focused your attention or activities on development

'O 22 of the controller plan and simulation plan?

23 A That is correct.

j 24 Q You attended a LERO drill in early December as 25 part of year preparation activities, correct?

6 0

i

) p 04 8804

1. ,1sh I

A That is correct.

2

] Q And during that time frame when you were 3

preparing the controller and simulation plan, am I correct that Region -- the Shoreham RAC had been distributed copies

) ,

5 of a marked up version of the Shoreham objectives?

A That is correct.

7 Q And members of the RAC, if they chose to do so,

) 8 provided comments back to Mr. Kowieski, correct?

9 A That is correct.

'O Q The did not provide comments back to you, O 11 ;' correct?

l A That is correct.

I3 Q Do you have any knowledge about what the D 14 comments of the NRC RAC meinbers were?

15 A I believe I received a copy of those comments 16 when they were sent to Mr. Kowieski.

17 l

Q Is that your only knowledge of what those 18 comments were?

I' A That is correct.

Q Are they your only knowledge of what their 21 review was?

22

,o A That is correct.

23 Q Let me show you, Mr. Weiss, a copy of a document which was marked yesterday. It is Suffolk County Exhibit 25 O 107 for identification. For the record, it was a letter O

8805 I.700404

,gralsh l '

from Terry L. Harpster, NRC Region I, to Mr. Kowieski, and I 2

ask you is'that the letter you recall seeing.

l MR. JOHNSON: Before the witness answers, I 4

don't happen to have a copy of that. May I either approach

)

i 5

the witness.

6 MR. LANPHER: Let me see if I have an extra

^7 copy.

(Witness peruses document.)

9 JUDGE PARIS: Is this a letter to Kowieski from l 10 Harpster, dated Decerber 3rd?  :

11 MR. LANPHER: Yes, sir.

JUDGE PARIS: Thank you. That is Suffolk 107?

) ,

MR. LANPHER: Yes. It was marked for 14 identification yesterday. I believe it was yesterday.

BY MR. LANPHER: (Continuing) 3 "

O Did you have a chance to review that?

17 A (Witness Weiss) Yes, I have.

18 Q This is the document you were referring to?

P A Yes.

20 Q And your only knowledge about the NRC Staff --

21 the NRC Region I comments 'en the proposed obj ectives is your O 22 review of this letter, correct?

23 A That is correct.

24 Q You had no conversations with Mr. Ama to abou t O 25 what he did to review the objectives, correct?

l L

3V l

O

.g404 8806

'.als h 1 A No, I did not.

2 O Q You had no conversations with Mr. Harpster about 3

it, correc t?

4 A I don't believe I did, no.

O Q You had no conversations with anyone from NRC 6

about what their review of the Shoreham objectives entailed, 7

c orrec t?

O 8 A No, I was not part of that process.

9 Q The same goes for you, Mr. Schwartz, correct?

10 A (Witness Schwartz) That is correct.

O 11 (Panel conferring) 12 Q Are you through conferring?

13 '

A (Witness Schwartz) Yes.

Q Gentlemen, is it fair to say that you have no 15 g knowledge about what review of Shoreham objec tives was 16 l g conducted by any other members of the Shoreham RAC, correct?

A (Witness Weiss) That is correct.

18 Q You don't know what documents any of them may 19 O have used to review the Shoreham proposed objectives, 20 correct?

21 A That is correct.

22 O A (Witness Schwartz) Correct.

23 Q You have no basis to know, or not know, for that 24 matter, whether any members of the Shoreham RAC made any 25 O ; determination whether the Shoreham exercise would satisfy i

O

'r O

'g04 8807 r;ish 1 full participation requirements, am I correct?

O A (Witness Schwartz) Would you repeat that?

3 Q Well, you don't know what any of the members of 4

the RAC did in reviewing the objectives, correct?

5 O

A That is correct.

6 Q So you had no basis to know whether any of them 7

made any kind of determination whether the Shoreham exercise 3 8 would or would not constitute a full participation exercise?

9 A That is true. Mr. Chairman, may I confer with 10

_ counsel just for a moment?

v 11 MR. PIRFO: Maybe this would be a good time for 12 a break, Your Honor.

l f)

JUDGE FRYE: How much more do you have? -

14 MR. LANPHER: That is what I am trying to 15 decide. I have some more. I am going to finish before 16 O 17 lunch.

JUDGE FRYE: Well, if it is that much more, why 18 don't we take our break at this point.

19 O MR. LANPHER: It would probably focus things

! better if we do it right now. i 21 JUDGE FRYE: Let's do that.

n. 22 V

, MS. McCLESKEY: Judge Frye, I would like to --

23 just so that everyone knows, I am going to provide the 24 witnesses with a copy of Suf folk County Exercise Exhibit 25

()

'109, and Attachment I to LILCO's testimony on 15 and 16, and O

N # (

lkd~~~

. e6 -f, n

8814 l

/*'505

sh ,

JUDGE FRYE: Yes. It will go a lot more

[) ,: /

2 smoothly that way.

3 MR. LAMPHER: Okay. Thank you.

t BY MR. LANPHER: (Continuing)

[)

5 Q Thus, you do not know whether the NRC RAC 6

representative for Shoreham was satisfied that Appendix E 7

J requirements were going to be met, full participation 8

exercise requirements were going to be met, for the Shoreham 9

exercise?

10 V

Ycu don't know that for a fact, do you?

11 A (Witness Schwartz) I don't know for a fact 12 whether it did or did not.

O 13 O That's right. The same f or you, Mr. Weiss?

It A (Witness Weiss) The same.

15 Q Gentlemen, turning to Page 5 of your prefiled 0 16 testimony, toward the bottom of the page, the last question 17 and answer, the answer starts off saying, "There are no 18 u criteria or guidance published by the Nuclear Regulatory U 19 Commission with respect to the scope and depth of a full 20 participation exercise."

21 Now, there are the regulations in Appendix E, O g correct?

l 23 A That's correct.

24 Q So, those regulations are the criteria and

~O guidance published by the NRC as to full participation O

'Y

-O 8815 900505 halsh i exercises; isn't that correct?

2 n

You weren't meaning to exclude that, were you?

A (Witness Schwartz) I was not meaning to exclude 5

it, but there are regulations in that criteria and guidance.

, Q Okay. You were distinguishing from the regulations?

7 A Exactly.

, Q Okay. Thank you. Now, Mr. Weiss and Mr.

jg Schwartz, turning to Page 6 of your testimony, the first jj full question and answer, the last sentence, you say, "

...it 12 is our view that a determination as to whether an exercise is ofull participation' is dependent on the particular

O 14 details in the plan that is being evaluated."

33 Mr. Schwartz, you have not reviewed the Shoreham ,

plan at all. That was your testimony, correc t?

O i, A .(Witness. Schwartz) That's correct.

l 1e Q And, Mr. Weiss, you've only reviewed Chapters 1 j, through 4 in any detail of the first volume of the Shoreham O g plan, correct?

21 A (Witness Weiss) That's correct.  ;

22 Q And, Mr. Schwartz, you have not reviewed the O

43 particular details of the Shoreham plan, have you?

24 A (Witness Schwartz) That's correct.

g MR. JOHNSON: Asked and answered.

BY MR. LANPHER: (Continuing)

C

'r

\-

/

10 606 8832 hvalsh

) exercises for new licensees carry -- and I don't know how 2 many of the 35 would be acceptable, but it carries more than

) 3 just some of the 35 elements.

4 Do you recall that testimony?

5 A Yes. I'm looking at it. I have it before me.

6 Q Why should exercises for new licensees carry 7 more than just. some of the 35 elements?

a A C4.n I read the context that I answered that in?

9 Q Y2s, you may. But, I still ask my question.

10 A I understand that.

) 11 (The witness is looking at the document. )

12 I'm sorry. I forgot your question now af ter 13 reviewing it.

) 14 Q My question'is, why should exercises for new 15 licensees carry more than just some of the 35 elements?

16 A Well, in the context of what I'm reading here in 3 17 the deposition, the context was that we were discussing the 18 number of #, laments of the 35 elements needed for a full 19 participation exe rciser and, for an operating facility that 3 20 a nurber of those elements would be -- X number for a full 21 participation exercise.

22 And, for a new license I was making a point that D 23 more than just some of the 35 would be required, in my 24 judgment, to meet the full participation criteria.

25 Q And, my question is why would more than just D

==

,y

~

J 8833 100606 r

.hv81sh i some of the 35 be necessary?

, 2 MR. JOHNSON: Asked and answered.

Q 3 MR. ZARNLEUTER ,

I don't believe I heard why.

4 JUDGE FRYE: He hasn't answered it yet.

O-5 WITNESS SCHWARTZ: The answer why is, it is the 6 first demonstration for licensing of the integrated 7 capabilit'y of the on-site /of f-site individuals, the first --

io a strike that.

9 The first opportunity for the integrated 10 capability to adequately respond to an event at a nuclear O 11 power facility, a'e that particular nuclear power facility.

12 BY MR. ZAHNLEUTER: (Continuing) ,

13 Q You are saying that because it's the first O i, opportunity it's more important than the subsequent

13 exercises that may be carried on?

l 16 MR. JOHNSON: That's not what he said.

O 17 MR. ZAENLEUTER: I'm asking the witness if 18 that 's true.

19 JUDGE FRYE: Okay. Let's let the witness O

j 20 clarify it.

21 WITNESS SCHWARTZ: That it is my belief that in 22 order to demonstrate that integrated capability for a 23 license, there is a test of that capability that has a 24 higher threshold of -- I will use the word reasonable

***"#*"** "h*" * #*-'***' 'h*" f # "" "T 'h*" * " #"*1 O

O

'r g

8834 lp00606palsh l 1 biennial exercise as conducted at an operating facility.

2 BY MR. ZAHNLEUTER: (Continuing)

! 3 Q In your answer, you just said "license." Did f

4 you mean new license?

} 5 A Yes.

6 l

l MR. ZAHNLEUTER: Thank you. I have no other 7 questions.

) &

JUDGE FRYE: Ms. McCleskey.

9

, MS. McCLESKEY: I just have a few questions.

10 CROSS EXAMINATION 3 11 BY MS. McCLESKEY:

12 Q Mr. Schwartz, have you ever attended a FEMA-13 graded exercise?

D 14 A (Witness Schwartz) Yes, I have.

15 0 About how many have you attended?

16 A I would say in the neighborhood of the teens, 15 D

17 maybe.

is O Mr. Weiss, other than the Shoreham exercise l'

which you said you were participating in, how many other 20 exercises have you attended?

21 A (Witness Weiss) In the field, maybe on the 22 3 order of five. But, I have participated in exercises, NRC 23 Headquarters, which maybe 15 or 20.

24 Q And, Mr. Schwartz, in what capacity have you l 3 25 attended these exercises?

O '

i 8847 l' 00707'.glsh more specific; and, frankly, I had trouble following it.

MR. JOHNSON: Yes, sir.

)

BY MR. JOHNSON: (Continuing)

Q I believe your testimony was that your answer

) that you did not have detailed or first-hand knowledge of the plan -- and my question is, did you have other sources of information on which to base knowledge of the plan?

8 h A (Witness Schwartz) Yes, I did.

9 Q What were those? -

A As Deputy Director of tba division responsible

) for the emergency planning and preparedness I was briefed by 12 the Staff men e who was responsible for reviewing the plan

'3

and so I do have know) edge, and did have knowledge, as to

) 14 the substance of the LERO plan and what it included and the 15 philosophy embodied in that plan but not detailed knowledge of the implementation or the details of how the plan fit p 17 together.

18 19 20 21 l

l 22 P 23 24 25 9

3

11

) osos alsh 8855 I

A At each briefing.

2 There is more than one. As the plans came in, there were other revisions, the Staff 3 3 discussed the status of it, and I was told what was going 4

on.

5 Q The Staff discussed the status of the plan. But D 6 each of these briefings wasn't a detailed review of what the 7

plan provided, was it?

8 A No, it was a review -- not a detail review of D 9 what the plan provided, but the scope and depth of the

'O philosophy of the plan. Of the LERO plan.

11 Q A briefir.g about the scope and depth of the 12 philosophy of the LERO plan? What does that mean, sir?

I3 A

What it means is that the LERO transition plan i I'

g was just that, and what was included in the plan'was how 15 LERO was to compensate for the lack of State and Local 16 governments, and that is --

g Q So, these were briefings about the compensation issue, is that correct?

A It was briefings about the plan itself, and the 2

O compensation issue as well.

21 Q What were the nature of the briefings about the 22 Plan?

O 23 A The nature of the briefings of the plan were how 2'

each of the 16 planning standards were addressed in the 25 plan.

(9 l

• t 0808 0856

! sish

/ 1 Q And you belicyo that you could provide tsstimony 2 about the details of the plan based upon those briefings?

3

) No, I am saying I have knowledge of the plan, d but I don't have detailed knowledge of the plan.

5 MR. JOHNSON: I obj ect to this line of 6 questioning. It is not what -- ha didn't oay he had

)

7 detailed knowledge of the plan. It is a mis-a characterization.

9 JUDGE FRYE: He qualified it.

I- 10 BY MR. LANPHER: (Continuing) 11 O You had a number of answers about your

) 12 understanding of the purpose of this exercise as you 13 understood from the NRC perspective was -- I am addressing 18 this to you, Mr. Schwartz -- was to test as much as was 15 f eas ible, feasible and lawful I think were some words you i 16 used.

l 17 A (Witness Schwartz) I don't remember the exact 18 words in the correspondence, but it was something like that.

M Q You referenced, I believe, a June 20 memorandum l

20 from Mr. Jordan to a Mr. Crimm, do you recall that

) 21 memorandum. June 20, 1985, excuse me.

22 A I don't remember the exact date, but I recall a 23 memo.

24 Q Isn't it a fact that in that memorandum --

25 MR. PIRFO: I am sorry, but I think the I

) 3 00909 8862 palsh r

1 Q And, continuing with the next sentence on Page 2

13, "When asked by LILCO' counsel whether a full l

)

3 participation exercise required that every element of an d

emergency plan be exercised, NRC Staff witness Schwartz 5

stated Othere's no NRC requirement.'"

) 6 There is no NRC requirement one way or the 7

other, is there, sir?

8 A (Witness Schwartz) I'm sorry. I'm not sure D 9 what you mean by one way or the other.

i 10 0 Well, the way this sentence is phrased is that, 11 is there a requirement that every element of a plan be 3  ;

12 exercised, and you said there is no such NRC requirement. i i

13 There is no requirement that says one way or the l Id other, whether every element should or should not be 15 ex ercis ed, c orrec t?

16 A That's correct.

17 g Q Now, looking two sentences further, the sentence 18 that starts, "When asked whether the language regarding core 19 ebj ectives in draf t GM EX-3 was consistent with his 3 20 understanding of NRC requirements..." you replied yes.

21

Now, there are no NRC requirements relating to  !

22 objectives, are there?

i Di 23 A That's correct, f

24 Q Now, looking at the last three sentences in that l 25 same answer they read as follows: "Witness Schwart: added i e-l 0 j

l 7f j 'I,90909 1 8863 Y3 sh l that the Staff can detemine in a specific case that an 2 exercise design contains suf ficient objectives to render the

) 3 exercise full participation because the NRC relies on the d evaluation of the Regional Assistance Committee as to .

5 whether an exercise meets the criteria for a full 6 participation exercise. If the NRC representative on RAC is l

7 satisfied, then the NRC is satisfied. Witness Schwartz 8 further stated that this process was followed in the

' development and conduct of the Shoreham exercise."

10 I just want to reiterate what I believe you naid M earlier as I understand it. You have no personal knowledge 3

12 about what any NRC -- what the NRC RAC member felt about the 13 Shoreham obj ectives, correct? .

18 (The witnesses are conferring.)

15 MR. LMJPHER: Judge, I would like to have this 16 witness answer, because it is a citation to his purported --

O 17 deposition testimony.

le JUDGE FRYE Do you have any recollection?

I' WITNESS SCHWARTZ: I have recollection that I ,

i 20 have no knowledge as to whether it did or it did not satisfy 21 the obj ectives.

22 BY MR. LM1FRER: (Continuing)

(

.O 23 And, you don't know whether the NRC RAC member Q

24 for Shoreham thought this was a full participation exercise 25 or not, do you?

'O O ,

E r

.p0909 8864

?galsh

(

1 A I have no knowledge.

2 Q So, this statement there that this process was followed in the development and conduct of the Shoreham 4

exercise is based upon your general feeling that you don' t 5

know any reason why Shoreham differed from anything elser is

) 6 that right?

7 A That Shoreham differed from anyone else with 8

respect to the process of the Regional Assistance Committee.

9 Q But, you don't know personally what the NRC 10

, member -- I'm just focusing on the NRC member -- (

11 A l

) '

I understand that. ,

O -- what the NRC member did or did not do to  !

'3 satisfy himself in any way, correct? l I'

j A That's correct.

I Q Now, Mr. Schwartz, going to Page 15 of this same exhibi t, the numbered Page 15, the first sentence there, you j were not involved in the design of the Shoreham exercise, 18 correc t?

A That's correct.

b 0 Q Now, Mr. Schwartz, you know of no reason why the ingestion pathway portions of LERO's plan for Shoreham could not have been exercised, do you?

23 h A That's correct.

24 0 You don't know of any reason, do you, Mr. Weiss?

's A (Kitness Weiss) No. i D

l

1..

y[

8865 h.' ss 1  !

Q And, you don't know whether as much of the LERO t

2 plan as reasonably achievable without mandatory public 3

participation was, in fact, exercised, do you?

4 MR. JOHNSON: Obj ec tion. That calls for a legal 5 conclusion.

) 6 JUDGE FRYE Overruled.

7 BY MR. LANP3ER: (Continuing) 8 Q Do you recall the question, gentlemen?

) 9 A (Witness Schwartz) Yes, I do.

10 Q You don't know whether as much of the LERO plan 11 as reasonable achievable without mandatory public

) 12 participation was, in fact, exercised, do you?

13 A It is my belief that the -- and, it gets into li the context of what's major -

) .

15 Q I'm not asking major or minor here. There is i

16 testimony on Page 15 that says a6 much -- well, substituting 17 for --

18 A It says major observable portions. -

m 19 O --

state and local. Look at Bullet Number 1, 20

) the Shoreham exercise included as much of -- and we are l l

21 going to change it to the LERO plan as is reasonably 22 achievable without mandatory public participation.

23 I want you to focus only on that, okay. Now, 2d ingestion pathway testing was not included, right?

I 25 A That's correct.

)

1 l

jf Mjp09 D alsh 8866 i

Q To include that would not have required 2

mandatory public participation, would it?

D 3 A

That's correct.

Q So, as much as was exercised or was not --

5 that's a terrible question. Excuse me.

O 6 7

They did not exercise as much as was reasonably achievable, did they? You have no reason to disagree with 8

that assertion, do you?

O '

A They may have exercised what was reasonably

'O achievable. 1 11  :

Q But, you don't know, do you? ,

I2 A

I was not involved in those decisions, and I

'3 take it r

from the individuals who were in charge of it that I'

'O they did as much as reasonably achievable.  !

15 Q

But, you don't have any personal knowledge to 16 give this kind of a judgment, do you, sir?

I7 A

O l Other than what was reported to me, as in the

'I FEMA report as to what was accomplished during the exercise.

Q The FDiA report doesn ' t talk about ingestion

, 20 g pathway testing, does it?

21 A That's correct.

22 Q So, you don't know if it was reasonably 23 O achievable to have tested that or not, do you?

2' A That's correct.

25  !

Q So, you don't have a basis to fom a conclusion  !

O  !

o I

if 0909 8867 alsh whether the exercise tested as much of the LERO plan as was 2

l reasonably achievable without mandatory public

) 3 participation, do you? .

A On the narrow issue of ingestion pathway, no, I 5

don't know --

) 6 Q You don't either, do you, Mr. Weiss?

I A (Witness Weiss) No.

8 Q The same question about recovery / reentry. You

) 9 don't have a basis for a position on that, do you?

10 '

l A (Witness Schwartz) I don't have a basis for s 11 t

position on reencry and recovery, that's correct.

12 Q So, this statement is not completely accurate, 13 is it? .

I' A For those things, you are correct.

)

15 Q Now, Mr. Schwartz, please describe the t

I' participation in the Shoreham exercise of the radio station, II 3 the EBS radio station.

'8 A I have knowledge as to --

Q No. My question, please describe the h participation in the exercise by the Shoreham EBS radio 21 t

station.

A May I answer that with respect to radio WALK? I 23 don't know.

Q I don't understand that. Please describe the 25 participation by the Shoreham EBS radio station in effect at

)

' l 400909 8868 -

) alsh- t i the time of the exercise?

2 A As far as I know, the EBS radio station that was

) 3 supposedly used during the -- that is built into the plan 4 1 was not used during the exercise, i 5 Q That's another part of the plan that was not

) 6 exercised, correct?

7 A That's correct.

s Q It would have been reasonably achievable to have

' them participate, wouldn't it?

10 A I'm not sure what you mean by reasonably 11 achievable.

) 12 O Well, you used those terms in your deposition --

13 A Yes.

l l

14 Q -- or, you didn't disagree with the terms here, 15 correct?

16 A Yes.

17 Q But, you don't know what those terms mean?

le A The term "reasonably achievable" means something l'

to me.

20 Q Well, tell me, wasn't it reasonably achievable l 21 to have included participation by the EBS radio station 22 during the exercise?

h 23 A If they were included in the plan, if they were I

24 participating in the plan, if they were assigned under the 25 plan, then it would been have been reasonably achievable for D

D

-} f*

) -

t 0 909 1sh 8869 I

them to have participated.

2

q. And, it's your testimony that they did not 3

participate, correct?

A It's my understanding that they did not 5

participate.

Q And, assuming that as of that time they were 7

part of the plan, if they didn't participate then this 8

exercise didn't include as much as was reasonably achievable, did it?

30 A Are you asking me to presume they were part of the plan?

D .  ;

12  !

l Q Yes, as of February 13, '86.

.O A- Then, that was an element that probably should lg have been -- it's an element that, my understanding of their

'8 involvement that up to the point of the EBS announcement l

16 being made that the process is the one that the message gets i

O put through the system as to what the message ought to be on II the EBS network; and, as far as my personal knowledge of what the FDiA requirements are for whether or not that O 2 message has to go' out on the radio or not is something 21 different.

I 22 But, whether or not they participated, I'm not O 23 sure whether it is or is not a major observable portion of 2'

the exercise.

25 Q That wasn't my question, Mr. Schwartz. It was

- i O i i

.o I 1

II j .100909 8870 palsh I

reasonably achievable, still just on Bullet Number 1 here.

7 You have no basis to believe it wasn't 3

) reasonably achievable, do you, to have included participation of that radio station?

5 A

By your presumption, they were already included

) '

in the plan.

I have no knowledge as to why or why not they were not included.

8 Q So, it's fair to say, Mr. Schwartz, then that

) '

this broad conclusion about they tested as much as

'O reasonably achievable is made on the basis of pretty scanty l 11 knowledge on your part, wasn't it? 'i 12 A Well, I think there was a lot more tested than 13 was -- in the exercise --

I'

) Q Well, that's not -- the standa'rd here that you' U

quote is as much as was reasonably achievable, not whether a l'

lot was tested but whether as much as reasonably achievable was tested, right?

A Yes. I Q And, you don't know whether that, in fact, was 20 1 3 achieved or not for Shoreham, do you?

21 A Again, as I understand from what I've seen of 22 the exercise, as I testified earlier --

23 D Q Wait. I missed it. Of the exercise or the 24 l ex ercis es? I missed a word.

\ r I \

A The exercise, i

J  :

i l

1 l

I l

9 i

'Il

,gg 00909 u pgalsh 8871 1

Q Okay, 2

A That's -- it's my belief that what was tested  !

O 3 was reasonably achievable. '

d Q Was it as much as reasonably achievable? That's

[

5 the regulatory standard, sir.

O 6 A I believe it was.

7 0 Then, tell me why the EBS radio station could l

8 not have participated in the exercise?

O 9 A I don't have detailed knowledge about that.

10 Q Okay. That's fine. You don't -- the answer is, 11 you don't know?  !

2 0 12 i

A That's correct.  !

13 Q Gentlemen, did the shoreham exercise provide a .

id I O

basis to verify the capability of schools, all' schools, '

15 within the Shoreham 10-mile EPZ to respond adequately in the 16 event of a Shoreham emergency?

17 O A I don't recall the details tt Q Do you know, Mr. Weiss?

19 A (Witness Weiss) I don't either.

2 O Q And, your answer would be the same with respect 21 to whether you have any knowledge about whether there was a 22 demonstration of the integrated capability of schools within 23 O the Shoreham EPZ to coordinate with LILCO, you just don't 2d know, correct? I I

25 A (Witness Schwart::) I don't recall. l O ,

I c

16,550

)Sim3-7 1 contcntions shc11 be cdmittGd. Wa cortcinly cro not L

2 looking to create such a role for ourselves.

n cL/ Today the issue as to the scope of review of

) 3 4 FEMA's obligations under the MOU, under this proceeding ,

5 and in its involvement in conducting and preparing for ,

[) 6 an exercise have been raised.

7 I would like to reserve an opportunity when we a get to the discovery schedule to address those issues

) '

g becuase I think it would be more appropriate at that time.

10 JUDGE MARGULIES: We will take a 10-minute recess,

[) 11 f

,XXXXXXXXX (Recess taken from 10:25 a.m. to 10:35 a.m.)

12 .

i 13 - JUDGE MARGULIES: Back on the record.

O 34 JUDGE SHO'N: The Board has a question that seems 15 pretty fundamental to the whole thing, l

i 16 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E4 (f) requires that a D ,

37 specific exercise be held within I think a year before i

18 the granting of an operating license, i

O ig We would like to know for starters is this 20 exercise the exercise? Will there be another? Is this i

21 a special thing that was undertaken only buenuso the O

22 Commission ordered it and not because it is a requirement .

23 f the regulations? What is the nature of this beast?

C) 24 W uld anybody like to start answering?

.h 25 MR. IRWIN: It is my belief, Judge Shon, and I O

i

16,551  !

gb 3-8. 3 b311ovo I spack for LILCO in this, that thic oxcrciso ,

3-was intented by the Commission, if satisfactorily conducted, D' 3 to afford a sufficient basis for licensing. In other words, [

] i

, it is eligible to be that exercise referred to in Appendix

, E and not simply a kind of model exercise which would then

,. be followed.by a real exercise.

7 It is conceivable that if there were deficiencies

, in the exercise which must be addressed by either a remedial b ,

exercise or a table-top or some other event, those would g follow as they have in-various other plant cases, g My understanding from everything the Commission has said, including its precursor orders for the exercise, was that if the exercise were shown adequate for an

@ emergency that it could be sufficient for licensing.

Now the section you have read raises an interestinc l 15 question because there is a time frame built into that regulation and we are in, shall we say, some danger of being turned into a penumbrum by the force of passage of time.

O 3, Suffice it to say that LILCO will either seek --

20 well, we will do both. We will seek to have this proceeding 21 h 22 go as fast as possible and, if necessary, we will seek a vaiver from that requirement, but I don't think that 23 requirement definitionally would operate to preclude this

-Q 25 exercise from being sufficient.

O

16,552 h Sia 3-9 1 1

JUDGE MARGULIESt 10 it intondad thnt this be 2 the exercise under that portion of the regulation? You

'O 3 used the term that it is "eligible," but it is intended

) to fulfill the requirements 4 of that portion of the 5 regulations?

) 6 MR. IRWIN: I believe, Judge Margulies, that 7 that was the Commission's intent. 'It may be CLI 86-14 or 8 it may be an earlier order where the Commission instructed D~

g FEMA to hold an exercise that was as full in scope as 10 possible given the circumstances. That tracks another provision of Appendix E which requires that exercises 3 it 12 for licenses purposes be as full as practicable under the

- 13 circumstances.

N 14 It does not require that every element of the 15 50. 4 7 (b) be in fact exercised, and that is ansimportant 16 point.

g 37 So I think the Commission was tracking the is intent of the regulations in its order.

O ig JUDGE SHON: How, Mr. Irwin, could it have been 20 in the Commission's mind that this could even be THE 21 exercise, that specified exercise, when the specified O

22 exercise is supposed to be evaluated by FEMA and FEMA 23 had already served notice that it would not be able to C 24 make a finding of reasonable assurance?

h 25 I believe that was the chronology, was it not?

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AW NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING B0 g Q:T -6 P2 :47 Before Adniinistrative Judgesdfru . .

2-2 00 cpi M i tIf Morton B. Margulies, Chai 1 nan WW*

j Dr. Jerry R. Kline Mr. Frederick J. Shon a - --

G ^?I -61006

)

h In the Matter of ) Docket No. 50-322-OL-5

) (EPExercise)

LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY (ASLBP No. 86-533-01-OL)

(Shoreham Nuclear Power Station.

Unit 1) October 3, 1986

)

PREHEARING CONFERENCE ORDER (Ruling on Contentions and FStablishinc Discovery Schedule)

)

A prehearing conference was held in Hauppauge. New York on September 24, 1986. The conference dealt with the admissiblity of

) proposed contentions and establishing a discovery schedule. During the conference, the parties were requested to submit a proposed discovery order to the Board by October 1, 1986. The Board has considered the positions and arguments of all parties on these matters, presented in their written submissions and at the conference, i

Contentions A. Standardt S i Admissibility The Comissi 'n au'horizing the institution of th't hearing litigating the matter of the LILCO emergency planning exercise,

)

l L

1

'O 2

O conducted pursuant to 10 CFR 50.47 and Part 50, App. E, adopted a "fundamental flaw in the plan" criterion, as a standard for use in the proceeding. Long Island Lighting Company (Shoreham Nuclear Power O Station, Unit 1), CLI-86-11, 23 NRC 577, 581 (1986). The Commission in responding to Applicant's proposal to use "threshold pleading" and sumary disposition prior to discovery to exclude contentions which do O not demonstrate, as pleaded, a fundamental defect in the emergency plan, stated:

Under our regulations and practice, staff review of exercise results is consistent with the predictive nature of emergency O planning, and is restricted to determining if the exercise revealed any deficiencies which preclude a finding of reasonable assurance that protective measures can and will be taken, i.e., fundamental flaws in the plan. Since only fundamental flaws are material licensing issues, the hearing may be restricted to those issues.

O We adopt the foregoing standard to be employed in the proceeding as well as the following set forth in the Comission's Memorandum and Order. The Commission directed the Board to admit "only those Intervenor contentions which satisfy the specificity and other requirements of 10 CFR 2.714 by: 1) pleading that the exercise demonstrated fundamental flaws in LILCO's plan; and 2) by providing O bases for the contentions which, if shown to be true, would demonstrate a fundamental flaw in the plan." M.

One cannot merely utter the words "constituting a fundamental flaw" O as part of the contention to have those words act as a shibboleth and allow its admittance as litigable. There needs to be alleged the activity or circumstance which constitutes the fundamental flaw, i.e.,

O that which precludes a reasonable asserance finding, and the allegation O

~

f .

i 3 I

must be supported by an adequate basis. An adequate basis assures that the contention raises a matter appropriate for litigation in the proceeding, establishes a sufficient foundation for the contention to

) warrant further inquiry into the subject matter addressed by the allegations, and puts the other parties sufficiently on notice so that they will know at least generally what they will have to defend against or oppose.

The standards contained in CLI-86-11 are not the only criteria for.

detemining the admissibility of contentions in a proceeding to evaluate

) the emergency planning exercise. It must be remembered that in

~

CLI-86-11 the Comission in the main was responding to proposals made by i

Applicant as to how the emergency planning exercise should be litigated

) and the action the Cemission took was not wholly dispositive of the I

matter of standards for the admission of contentions. For a more detailed discussion of criteria and their applicability, one must look to the seminal case of Union of Concerned Scientists v. Nuclear Regul.atory Cem., 735 F.2d 1437 (D.C. Cir.1984), cert. denied 105 S.

Ct. 815 (1985). The Court in UCS, in discussing the balance between efficiency of proceedings and the public's right to a hearing stated i that there is nothing to prevent "the Comission from holding a special i

supplementary hearing solely on issues raised by the emergency exercises

) closer to the date of full power operation. And certainly the l

l

! Comission can limit the hearing to issues--not already litigated--that it considers material to its decision" (footnote omitted). The Court went on to state that it in no way restricts the Comis'sion's authority D

, 4

)

to adopt as a substantive licensing standard one that considers "minor and ad hoc problems occurring on the exercise day" as irrelevant to the proceeding. M.at1447,1448.

) We find the above UCS standards to be wholly applicable o this proceeding and we adopt them. Fairness and maintaining the effectiveness of the' administrative process dictate that we adopt these measures in a proceeding where emergency planning has been in litigation rather continuously since 1983, where we have a transcript record of more than 16,000 numbered pages and approximately 7,000 additional pages of prefiled written testimony and exhibits.

UCS standards were adopted by the Licensing Board in Carolina Power

& Light Company and North Carolina Eastern Municipal Power Agency (Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant), LBP-85-49, 22 NRC 899, 910 (1985).

In so doing, the Board noted that although the Commission had not formally adopted the standards in UCS, the Board's delegated authority to decide the Shearon Harris, case included the authority to decide novel legal questions, subject to Appeal Board and Commission review. On that basis it adopted the UCS standards. The Board's action was cited with

)

approval by the Appeal Board in Carolina Power & Licht Company, et al.

(Shearon Harris Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-843, 23 NRC _

(August 15, 1986) (slip opinion at 26, n.71). The Licensing Board in

)

Shearon Harris, LBP-85-19, stated that contentions alleging minor or l readily correctdble problems should be rejected, which is also a standard we accept. .

)

l

)

5 Proposed contentions can meet criteria other than those discussed above to be acceptable for litigation. These include situations where the emergency preparedness exercise itself is so fundamentally inadequate that it cannot be used to make a reasonable assurance finding. This can occur where the exercise is so limited in scope that it does not evaluate what it is supposed to under the regulations. It can also occur where the exercise was conducted in a manner that was so essentially defective that the results cannot be relied upon.

Authority for approving such contentions is to be found in UCS, I supra. In UCS the Court stated that where a hearing is required the agency must generally provide an opportunity for submission and challenge of evidence as to any and all issues of material fact, id,at

) The NRC cannot issue an operating license for a nuclear power 444 plant absent a finding that there is reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological

)

emergency. 10 CFR 50.47(a)(1). In order that there be an adequate record for the Corrr!ssion to make this determination, NRC regulations require among other things that an offsite emergency plan be developed,

' and that there be an exercise of the plan. 10 CFR 50.47, App. E IV.F.1.

very specifically provides what the plans shall prescribe for the conduct of the emergency preparedness exercise upon which the agency is k

to rely, paragraph 1 states:

4

1. A full participation exercise which tests as.much of the licensee, State and local emergency plans as is reasonably achievable without mandatory public participation shall be

) conducted for each site at which a power react *or is located for which the first operating license for that site is issued

)

)

6

) after July 13, 1982. This exercise shall be conducted within 1 year before the issuance of the first operating license for full power and prior to operation above 5", of rated power of the first reactor, and shall include participation by each State and local government within the plume exposure pathway i

) EPZ and each State within the ingestion exposure pathway EPZ.

M ' Full participation' when used in conjunction with emergency preparedness exercises for a particular site means appropriate offsite local and State authorities and licensee personnel physically and actively take part in testing their integrated

) capability to adequately access and respond to an accident at a comercial nuclear power plant. ' Full participation' includes testing' the major observable portions of the onsite and offsite emergency plans and mobilization of State, local and licensee personnel and other resources in sufficient numbers to verify the capability to respond to the accident

) scenario.

It is clear beyond cavil that if the Commission is to properly exercise its statutory responsibilities, it must act in making its

) reasonable assurance finding on an exercise that is not so fundamentally flawed that it cannot be relied upon. Because the scope of the emergency preparedness exercise and the manner in which it was conducted are material consideretions in the licensing process, they are matters

Intervenors may contest.

The Court in UCS stated:

Where, as with preparedness exercises, the decision involves a central decisionmaker's consideration and weighting of many other persons' observations and first hand experiences, questions of credibility, conflicts and sufficiency surface and the ordinary reasons for requiring a hearing come into the picture. M.at450.

l The NRC in making its reasonable assurance finding bases it on a review of the FEMA findings and determinations on whether the offsite plans are adequate and whether there is a reasonable assurance that they

) can be implemented. 10 CFR 50.47(a)(2). The post exercise assessment

)

D 7

is based on observations made in testing the plan, which are evaluated by FEMA. Applicant agrees that the Federal Eargency Management Agency (FEMA) approved scenario is not completely imune from Board review. It O acknowledges a contention can be admissible if it alleges that the scenario was so deficient that it simply failed to live up to the standard that the NRC requires for its ultimate licensing decision.

7 Applicant claims, however, that for such a contention to be admissible l

Intervenors would have to allege that the scenario was materially different from other FEMA-approved scenarios at other nuclear plants.

O Applicant's stated requirement is errontous. The correct requirement is that the emergency preparedness exercise meet the regulation standard of 10 CFR 50.47 and App. E. Whether the e.ercise per se,is not materially

,O different from other FEMA-approved s'.enarios at other nuclear plants is irrelevant. It is the regulatory '.tandard that must be met.

The full participation exercise described in 10 CFR 50.47, App. E IV.F.1., and set out above, provides the standard against which the February 13, 1986 exercise is to be measured. The Comission did not l call for more than one exercise and the conduct of that referenced above O -

is mandatory. FEMA stated in its Post Exercise Assessment that it was requested by the NRC to conduct "a full-scale exercise of all functions and normal exercise objectives." FEMA was to exercise the current version of the LERO Plan. Exercise controllers would simulate the roles of key state or local officials unable or unwilling to participate.

' ** " " ^" "'**"** * "'# *" ' "#"'" '**'"

O Emergency Response Organization (LERO), as specified in'the LILCO O

l

)

8 i

Transition Plan for the Shoreham Nuclear Power Station at Shoreham, New York. April 17, 1986, at ix.

The Comission in making its reasonable assurance finding is called upon by regulation to consider the FEMA emergency preparedness exercise ,

evaluation. There is nothing sacrosanct about the FEMA evaluation which makes it uncontestable. The FEMA finding constitutes a rebuttable presumption on questions of adequacy and implementation capability.

10 CFR 50.47(a)(2). Inherent in the matter of adequacy and implementation capability are the issues of the sufficiency of the

) exercise and its evaluation. Aside from due process considerations, the Comission regulations make the FEMA review contestable and that can only be accomplished by way of allowing admissible contentions.

) The general principle that in an operating license proceeding (with the exception of certain NEPA issues), the Applicant's license application is in issue, not the adequacy of the Staff's review of the D application, does nothing to relieve FEMA from the scrutiny called for by the admitted contentions. Pacific Gas and Electric Company (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant Units 1 and 2), ALAB.728,17 NRC 777, 807

}. The Board considers FEMA's responsibilities for participation (1923).

in the exercise to be akin to Staff's responsibilities as called for by NEPA. FEMA cannot be called upon by the NRC to conduct a mandatory l exercise to test offsite emergency preparedness at the Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, proceed to conduct the test and evaluate its results, and then not be available to justify its actions. The FEMA'r,eview is directly et issue in the proceeding and that agency can be called upon P

1 t

O 9

to defend it. The regulations provide for making the FEMA finding a rebuttable presumption, not an irrebuttable one.

This proceeding, like any other, has no place for duplicative O'

contentions, whether all of the repetitiveness occurs in the proposed contentions currently being filed or whether the contention now being filed repeats that which has previously been litigated. It is possible for a single factual situation to support more than a single contention.

Where that occurs it is not permissible to allow proof of the underlying factual circumstances to be presented more than once. Hearing requirements are not at odds with disallowing a contention from being litigated more than once and not pemitting the relitigation of the same factual matters. This proceeding involves myriad factual matters. It

!O will require the professional skills of all concerned to make for a concise and clear record. All parties are called upon to make a maximum effort to accomplish this result.

O B. Ruling on Contentions Contentions EX 1-7 Denied.

O The cententions allege that LILCO lacks legal authority to implement critical areas of its plan. This being so, the LILCO plan as exercised, cannot be implemented absent LILCO's performance of these prohibited functions and since LILCO cannot actively perform these functions, the exercise results demonstrate a fundamental flaw in the LILCO plan. These contentiens are iM dmissible because they allege matters that have already been litigated and were not raised by the O

5 0

10

~

O exercise. The contentions thus do not meet the criteria for admittance.

This Board has already found "that because of Applicant's inability to

~

.g perform these functions the LILCO plan cannot and will not be implemented as required by regulation. Long Island Lighting Co.

(Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), LBP-85-12, 21 NRC 644, 895-919 (1985). The determination has been affirmed by an Appeal Board.

O ALAB-818, 22 NRC 651 (1985) CLI-86-12, _NRC_ (1986). The Comission has taken cognizance of the situation in its decision remanding the realism issue to the Board CLI-86-13 _NRC_ 1986. Relitigation before O

us of the issue in this exercise proceeding would accomplish nothing, g Contentions EX 8-14. Denied.

Although we have considered Contentions EX 8-14 individually, we dispose of them as a group because they each allege matters which are mere variations of a tral theme, the essence of which is that the O

State and local governments did not participate or assume responsibility in the exercise and that there was no opportunity to measure the

O emergency response performance of these governments.

The contentions are all rejected for the same reasons. First, it is already well known to all parties and decision makers and well O established on the emergency planning record that State and local governments refuse to participate in Shoreham emergency planning and exercises. The exercise was planned without state and county O participation and FEMA has declined to make a reasonable, assurance finding because of that fact. No basft ' resented fo'r believing that O

11 i

new material facts arose from the exercise that would have any important bearing on that situation. Second, the contentions are inconsistent with the posture of this case. We have already decided the realism argument in Intervenors' favor. The Appeal Board has affirmed. The Commission has remanded the issue to us for further consideration. We shall give the matter the consideration called for in a separate j proceeding in due course. The lack of government participation will hardly escape our notice in that proceeding.

l

{

l Contention EX 15. Admitted.

As explained above, this Board views the matter of the scope of the l

exercise as being within the ambit of the present proceeding. We will

)

admit this contention, treating the individual bases as specific examples of features of the plan which should have been exercised but were not. Basis 15J, however, we find inadmissible. We have already ruled a contention concerning provisions for "contaminated injured individuals" is inadmissible in this proceeding, and our ruling has not been reversed. (Memorandum and Order Denying suffolk County's and New York State's Motion to Admit New Contention, August 21, 1986; ALAB-832, 23 NRC 152 (1986).) We note there is a recent policy statement from the Comission which supports our renoning in rejecting

)

Basis 15J. See 51 Fed. Reg. 32,904-06 (September 17,1986). Basis 15L will be subsumed under EX 21 along with EX 32.

l ,

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Contention EX 16. Admitted.

As with Contention EX 15, we see Contention EX 16 as alleging omissions in the exercise, which, in our view, could preclude a finding of reasonable assurance. We admit Contention EX 16. However, of its bases we view only E, L, and K as raising omissions independent of those raised in Contention EX 15. The other bases are subsumed within the corresponding portions of Contention EX 15, with the understanding that they name individuals or entitics whose failure to participate led to a failure to exercise the feature of the plan named in Contention EX 15.

Basis M of Contention EX 16 will be specifically excluded for the reast :ited in excluding Contention EX 8 through Contention EX 14, supra.

Contention EX 17. Withdrawn.

This contention has been withdrawn.

O Centention EX 18. Denied.

The main body of this contention merely expands on the allegations O

of incompleteness in Contentions EX 15 and EX 16. We reject it because it is simply a clarification of certain matters admitted in Contentions EX 15 and EX 16. We will admit one of its bases as a further O

clarification and specification of the matters adnitted in Contention EX 15 or Contention EX 16. Basis C is admissible as detailing further

' deficiencies in the exercise. Basis A merely repeats the, previous O

s

.O

)

13 L

) contentions. Basis B is inadmissible for the reasons set forth in excluding Contentions EX 8 through 14.

Contention EX 19_. Admitted for Argument Only.

Contention EX 19 is, in the Board's view, a matter for legal argument, not for factual dispute. We will not accept evidence on it,

) but we will entertain legal argument as to the extent to which FEMA's -

inability to make a favorable finding reveals a fundamental flaw in the l plan.

)

l l Contention EX 20. Denied.

This contention, in essence, states that FEMA "did not review" the features and participants which the previous contentions complained were not exercised. We reject it as being adequately covered by Contentions EX 15, and 16, which we are admitting. ,,

)

Contention EX 21. Admitted.

This contention challenges the sufficiency of the data used by FEMA

) to reach the conclusion that certain exercise objectives were satisfied.

To the extent that the data might be insufficient to support such a .

conclusion, the conduct of the exercise might indeed preclude a finding

) of reasonable assurance, as we have reasoned above. We will admit the contention.

^

3 (

3

.O 14 0- Contention EX 2,2,. Admitted.

This contention asserts that certain FEMA findings are premised on matters contrary to fact. On its face it would be admissible if its O individual bases presented specific deficiencies educed by the exercise.

We find only one such instance: Basis A is admitted for litigation.

While it is true that the lack of the Nassau Coliseum was not revealed by the exercise, it is also true that the exercise may have shed considerable light on the Coliseum's importance to the plan. In particular, this contention states that FEMA's conclusions on objectives O E0C 16 and FIELD 9, 17, 19, and 21 are all based on the presumed availability of the Coliseum. That is certainly a matter ostensibly revealed by tha exercise about which there is a factual dispute.

O Bases B, C, D, E, G, and H concern the lack of school plans, bus drivers, buses, and school facilities, nursing homes, and hospitals

~

located outside the EPZ. None of these matters arose during the O

exercise. To the extent that they were untested they are covered by other contentions. These bases will not be accepted.

The substance of basis F will be dealt with under Contentions EX O

38 or 39, and need not be admitted here, i Basis I presents a matter better treated under Contention EX 41.

It will be dealt with th.ere.

O Basis J raises a matter (overloaded telephones) which was dealt l

with and disposed of earlier in these hearings (LBP-82-115, 16 NRC 1923 (1983)). By no stretch of the imagination did it arise'jfuring the l

.O

O 15 O exercise, nor, in fact, was any light shed on it by the exercise. This basis is rejected.

Basis K seeks to raise the question of the availability of O congregate care centers. That question was dealt with in our earlier partial initial decision (22 NRC 410, 422-23). To the extent that this basis concerns the fact that only two centers were activated, it is O subsumed under Contention EX 21 as an additional example of the inadequacy of the data gathered in the exercise.

O Contention EX 23. Denied.

This contention. alleging as it does that an error in dose data was made and went uncorrected for 21 hours2.430556e-4 days <br />0.00583 hours <br />3.472222e-5 weeks <br />7.9905e-6 months <br />, does not present, in itself, a O "fundamental flaw". It is clear that this is one of the "minor or ad hoc problems occurring on the exercise day" which the Court in UCS v.

NRC specifically excepted from proceedings of this sort (733 F.2d 1437,

-O- As to whether this particular misstep, combined with others, 1448).

could be taken as indicative of a deeper deficiency, that matter will be addressed in dealing with Contention EX 50, basis C, admitted below.

O Contention EX 23 is rejected.

Contention EX 24. Denied.

O This contention is rejected. The failure to test the siren system will be dealt with as an example of an additional omission under Contention EX 15, basis A. .

O O

3:

16 Di contention EX 25. Denied.

To the extent that this contention may allege more than a minor ad hoc flaw on the day of the exercise, it will be dealt with under O Contention EX 41, basis B, admitted below. It is rejected.

Contention EX 26. Denied.

O This contention cites, a FEMA Area Requiring Corrective Action (ARCA). That in itself suggests that the matter at hand, a paucity of participating school districts, is not a deficiency per Le,,e for FEMA lists ARCAs and deficiencies separately. To the extent the lack of sufficient school districts in the exercise, in concert with other omissions, may show an inadequate exercise, it will be dealt with under

!g Contention EX 15, bases F and G. Contention EX 26 is rejected.

i Contention EX 27. Denied.

O

! The contention cites ARCAs which focus on the lack of health physics training for school bus drivers. In view of the minor and readily correctable nature of the flaw, we do not find it to be fundamental . To the extent it may demonstrate a serious lack of training it will be dealt with under Contention EX 50, basis H.

It is not admitted.

l Contention EX 28. Denied.

On the basis of the same reasoning as that for Contention EX 27, f0 this contention will not be separately admitted.

O

C) a 17 r's Contention EX 29. Denied.

As with the immediately preceding contentions, this contention cites an ARCA which shows at most a matter cognizable under Contention O

EX 41, basis B. It is rejected.

Contention EX 30. Denied.

O This contention is also rejected. The matter of the bus dispatched to Ridge School, to the extent to which it, taken with other matters, may demonstrate a fundamental flaw, will be examined under Contention EX O

15, basis G.

Contention EX 31. Denied.

O This contention alleges an inability on LER0's part to monitor people in the required period of time. It will not be separately admitted, but the matter it alleges will be subsumed under Contention EX O

49, basis A admitted below.

Contention EX 32. Denied.

O As an additional instance of failure to exercise the plan in sufficient depth, this contention will be deemed an additional basis for Contention EX 21, two congregate care centers being alleged to be

)

insufficient data to test the functioning of the total number relied upon. Contention EX 32 is rejected.

k C)

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Contention EX 33. Denied, i The slight delay in notifying Nassau County and the State of Connecticut which is alleged here does not rise to the importance of a fundamental flaw in the plan. The contention is rejected.

Contention EX 34. Denied.

O s

This contention alleges that the response of route-alerting in the event of siren failure was slow. Route-alerting procedures are mere

. backup procedures. It is understood that, if they become necessary, O

they will not be as prompt as sirens in alerting the public. It is clear to the Board that delay in route-alerting cannot be considered a fundamental flaw. The contention is rejected.

O Contention EX 35. Denied.

The NRC Staff and Applicant oppose admission on the basis that the

,O alleged flaws in the exercise are not fatal and because (in the case of l Applicant) it raises a previously litigated issue (conflict of 1

interest). 21 NRC 644, 686 (1985).

O Admission is denied because the contention fails to allege a violation of NRC regulations with sufficient specificity to be litigated. Intervenors' assertion that the failure to make independent lO l assessments by LERO violates OPIP 3.6.1 in the plan does not save this contention, since that provision states only that independent I

confirmation should be made if time is available. The coptention makes no reference to the time that was available in the exerc'ise. Further, i

19 i

omission of an activity which is required only if time is available cannot on its face be a fundamental flaw even if the matters asserted are true. The thrust of 10 CFR 50 App. E IV.D.3. which is cited as a

! basis is to assure capabilities for prompt notification of government agencies and the public. Nothing in that section supports a contention alleging a failure to make independent calculations of a confirmatory

'O

nature. Finally, the section cited in our initial decision dealing with conflict of interest has been vacated on appeal.

O Contention EX 36. Admitted.

NRC Staff objects that this contention is redundant with Contention EX 35 and should be rejected for the same reasons. Applicant advises rejection on the basis that the contention does not postulate a fundamental flaw in the plan.

The Board finds that Contention EX 36 is not redundant with

O Contention 35 and that a fundamental flaw could exist if the alleged facts are proved. This contention asserts performance errors in the conduct of the exercise, while EX 35 asserts a failure of independent O

action without adequate basis in the regulations. The failure asserted here might have affected the welfare of some 20,000 people. The assertion and bases are. sufficient to pursue the matter further and to

.O put LILCO on notice as to what it must defend.

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O O i l

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O Contention EX 37. Denied.

Staft advised denial on the basis that the contention asserts matters that are beyond the scope of the exercise. Applicant rejects O

this contention on tne basis that a fundamental flaw is not properly asserted, it challenges the exercise scenario, and it lacks basis.

The Board disagrees with both Applicant and Staft on the' question

'O of permissibility of challenges to the scope of the exercise. We do not, however, admit this contention separately because it is redundant to others. Instead, we incorporate it into Contention EX 15 wherein Intervenors may present their evidence concerning the ingestion pathway when it addresses its asserted basis numbered 151 which is already admitted.

O Contention EX 38. Admitted.

Staff advises that this contention is admissible with various reservations regarding redundancy in the bases. Applicant also has reservations to an otherwise admissible contention in that it objects that bases A and D address Phase ! issues and that basis K has been g

previously litigated. Intervenor commits to presenting evidence only once on any basis for an admitted contention in answer to redundancy objections.

g The Board will exercise its authority to manage hearings to the extent required to prevent redundant or cumulative evidentiary presentation. The Board is not persuaded by the Phase.'I, objection at O

this stage in the proceeding since the errors asserted 'are based on the O

O 21

~ C' exercise which came years after the original Phase I default and controversy. Nothing arising from the exercise could be known at the time the Phase I sanction was imposed and we conclude that the O

disciplinary intent of that sanction has already had all the effect we could reasonably expect and that the matter is now closed. The Bcard agrees with LILCO, however, that the issue specified in basis 38K has O

already been heard and dec,ided and that it should therefore not be admitted in this proceeding. 22 NRC 410, 422 (1985).

O Contention EX 39. Admitted.

The Staff advises admission of this contention with reservations about redundancy in the bases. LILC0 objects on the basis that the O

matters alleged do not constitute a fatal flaw in the plan.

LILCO's objection is not persuasive since the numerous bases asserted might collectively reveal a fundamental flaw in the plan if O

proved. The ability to deal with rumors or inquiries from the public was thought to be important enough to test by the designers of the exercise and we assumed from that that it is material to a licensing

O decision. Whether alleged flaws are correctable is precisely the matter that litigation is needed to resolve either by sumary disposition or at hearing.

,O The Board admits the contention but affirms that it will enforce the Intervenors' commitment to presenting evidence only 'once on a particular factual issue regardless of how many different propositions O

the Intervenors might attempt to prove using the same factual basis.

O

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Contention EX 40. Admitted.  !

The NRC Staff recomends acceptance of the contention and bases A, B, and C, subject to reservations concerning possible redundancy with other contentions and to the restriction that contentions must reveal a flaw in the plan as opposed to one of performance of the exercise.

Applicant has no objection to basis 40B and 40E but advises rejection of bases A, C and D on the basis. of lack of fatal flaw or that the issues asserted have been litigated. The Board agrees with both Staff and Applicant that evacuation shadow issues posed by basis 400 are already O

litigated and settled and should be excluded. Contention EX 40 however is stated with sufficient basis and specificity to be admitted. The fatal flaw criterion cannot be used to exclude the bases A, B, C and E O

since they would collectively demonstrate a fundamental flaw in the plan if proved on the record.

O Contention EX 41. Admitted.

LILCO objects to bases 41A, C and D and has no objection to bases 418 and E. The NRC Staff objects to bases 41C, D and E but would admit O

41A and B with some reservations. The Board agrees with both LILCO and Staff that bases 41C and D assert fundamental flaws in the exercise related to voluntary or shadow evacuation which is a matter already O

litigated and settled and should on that ground be excluded. We are not persuaded by LILCO's lack of basis argument for rejecting 41A. The O paragraph numbered 41A is Intervenors' basis for Contendpn EX 41 and it puts LILCO on adequate notice of what it must defend. S'ta f t 's O

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prematurity argument for rejection of basis 41E is unconvincing. We see no reason why.a LILCO document cannot be cited as basis for a contention simply because it is newly drafted. Such citation differs in no material way from citations of published journal papers or a Staff SER supplement as bases for contentions. We, therefore, admit Contention EX 41 together with bases 41A, B and E.

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Contention EX 42. Denied.

LILCO obiects s

to all parts of this contention on the grounds of

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I lack of basis, lack of fundamental flaw, ard redundancy of the bases to l

other contentions. Staff also objects to admission on the ground that each basis exhibits redundancy with some other conter, tion and that many fail to identify a fatal flaw. The Board agrees that the redundancy l

exhibited in this contention does not permit its separate admission.

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Each stated basis alleges facts which relate to other admitted h

contentions. To the extent that new factual evidence would have been presented in this contention and not elsewhere, we expect that Intervenors will have adequate opportunity to present all of their relevant evidence in connection with other admitted contentions on the same subjects. Intervenors' general assertion that the same factual j bases may be used to prove different propositions does not save this contention. That principal may not be used to fragment issues or to l extend a proceeding. Even if true that LILCO personnel'made errors under certain conditions that fact would constitute noth'ing more than contributing evidence to the test of other contentions dealing with I

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training (EX 50), information and rumors (EX 38 and 39) or ability to handle road impediments effectively (EX 41). The contention is rejected.

.O Contention EX 43. Denied.

LILCO objects to the principal numbered contention and bases 43A O

ar.d 438. The Staff advises with reservations that 43A may be basis for admission of the contention. It asserts, however, that 43B is an attempt to raise evacuation shadow issues one more time and should be O

rejected on the basis that that issue is now settled in this case.

LILCO further asserts that the factual comparisons recited as part of Contention 43 are inapt for demonstrating that mobilization of bus drivers was untimely.

l The Board agrees with LILCO t' hat Intervenors' factual recitation of mobilization times presents no basis for acceptance of the contention since even if true they point to no particular flaw and Intervenors assert none. We also agree that 43B should be excluded from the proceeding because it raises an already litigated issue.

l Basis 43A, which the Staff accepts, alleges that EBS messages concerning bus transportation for the public were false and misleading because buses were not available at the times the message was broadcast.

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. The Board however concludes that Contention EX 43 should not be admitted since even if true that EBS messages were out of synchrony with bus i availability,suchamatterissubjecttoadministrativejemedythatis

.O l entirely within LILCO's administrative capability to imp'lement and the

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Staff's to enforce. Thus, there is no basis for alleging that a j fundamental- flaw in the plan exists.

O I Contention EX 44. Denied.

LILCO objects to the contention on the basis that it reopens old issues, is not based on the exercise, and impennissibly challenges the O

scenar'o/ FEMA review. The Staff advises that consideration of this contention should be deferred pending consideration of the remand issues contained in CLI 86-13.

O The factual question raised by this contention is whether or not an evacuation shadow phenomenon will arise in an evacuation as a result of an inability of LILCO to provide clear nonconflicting infonnation to the public. This contention is therefore of a contingent nature. Its resolution is dependent on the outcome of litigation on the information contentions numbered EX 38 and EX 39. An acceptable basis for the contention is traceable to our partial initial decision where the Board found:

The Board's finding on this contention strongly depends on there O being clear nonconflicting notice and instructions to the public at the time of an accident. If for any reason confused or conflicting information was disseminated at the time of an accident the Board accepts that a large excess evacuation on Long Island could materialize. 21 NRC 644, 670 (1985).

O Other than a citation to our initial decision, Intervenors provide nothing nore in their discussion of Contention EX 44 that would provide an acceptable basis for admission of matters that have..been previously O litigated. We need not look again at consequences of ' shadow evacuation O

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26 because this was previously litigated and decided and because Intervenors have shown no basis for believing they could learn anything new on this subject from an exercise that did not include a public 3 evacuation.

We find no basis for assertions of Intervens ~s that we must require LILCO to test its preparedness for a large shadow evacuation or to plan D for an ad hoc expansion of the EPZ. Planning to take an ad hoc action seems to us to be an oxymoron. If Intervenors prevail on Contentions EX 38 and EX 39 and the evidence is sufficient to conclude that a large

) shadow evacuation will occur, Intervenors will be free to claim that l this constitutes a fundamental flaw in the plan because the evacuation could not be controlled. We see no value in taking the matter further D than that. In view of the fact that the bases submitted with this

ontention are invalid in all respects save the reference to our initial l decision, we conclude that this contention should not be separately b

admitted. However, there is sufficient basis to link the assertion of Contention EX 44 to those of Contentions EX 38 and EX 39. We therefore consolidate the first full sentence of Contention EX 44 with Contentions D

EX 38 and EX 39 and deny admissibility of all other parts and bases of Contention EX 44.

We furthsr conclude that the matter can be resolved on the basis of J

l information gained during the exercise and that there is therefore no need to defer consideration as urged by the Staff.

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O 27 O Contention EX 45. Denied.

LILCO objects to this contention in its entirety because in its view it is redundant to SOC, it lacks basis, lacks specificity and does O

not show fundamental flaws. The Staff also objects on the grounds of redundancy or lack of fatal flaw.

The Board finds (in agreement with LILCO) that the wording of this O

contention is virtually identical in meaning with Contention EX 50 and one of its bases, 500. Presumably, in order to prevail on Contention EX 50 that training was inadequate, Intervenors must as a first step show O

that failures of the type cited in Contention EX 45 actually occurred.

They will have adequate opportunity to do this in connection with the

' litigation of EX 50. The bases cited in EX 45 are therefore O

consolidated with EX 50.

Contention EX 46. Denied.

O The Staff objects to admission on the grounds of mootness since it admits that the Coliseum is no longer relied upon in its plan. LILC0 objects on the grounds that the information is not based on the exercise and that it reopens old issues.

This contention is redundant with Contention EX 22 basis A which is admitted. Contention EX 46 will not be separately admitted.

Contention EX 47. Admitted.

LILCO objects to admission on the grounds that it'f,s redundant with

.O EX 15 basis K, shows no fundamental flaw, is not based'on the exercise, reopens old issues, challenges the scenario and lacks basis. The Staff O

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. I also objects in part on the grounds of redundancy and more importantly in part because the bases rely on LILC0's Revision 7 to the plan which g has not yet had the results of a FEMA review. Thus, in Staff's view, Revision 7 is irrelevant to the proceeding.

The Board does not agree that Revision 7 to tha. LILCO plan is an

.O impermissible basis for a contention simply because the FEMA review has not yet been completed. To the extent that Rev. 7 contains LILCO's proposed remedies for flaws that surfaced during the exercise, it is O relevant to the correctability of those flaws.

The Board understands from both the original statement of the contention and Intervenors' reply to objections that the essence of this O contention is that LILC0 failed to demonstrate matters that should have been demonstrated because of their importance to public health and safety. In this case they have alleged enough basis to concluce that a O matter of sufficient importance has been raised to make it reasonable to pursue the matter further.

O Contention EX 48. Denied.

This contention alleges failure to provide for contaminated injured individuals. It is rejected since the Commission has previously ruled O that this is a matter not to be taken up in emergency planning proceeding except under limited circumstances that are not met here.

The Board has previously rejected a late filed contention on the same O subject and for the same reasons and we have no cause te, reconsider that O

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action because of events that occurred during the exercise. 50 Fed.

R_eg. 20892, May 21, 1985. (See also EX 15 basis J supra).

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Contention EX 49. Admitted.

This contention alleges that LILC0 is incapable of performing j necessary registration and radiological monitoring within 12 hours1.388889e-4 days <br />0.00333 hours <br />1.984127e-5 weeks <br />4.566e-6 months <br />.

Staff and Applicant both oppose its admission in part on the grounds that some of its bases involve matters which were then being considered on appeal. Although there is a remand pending involving the question of the total number of people to be monitored, there is a sufficient alternative basis to admit this contention, namely that the time to monitor each person was allegedly shown by the exercise to be far longer 3

than planned for. We also combine the matters alleged under Contention EX 31 with Contention EX 49 and will hear them together as Contention EX 1

j 49. The bases for this contention adequately put LILCO on notice as to what it must defend.

j Contention EX 50. Admitted.

This contention alleges that numerous flaws that came to light dt.'ing the exercise demonstrate collectively a fatally inadequate D training program. The many bases are redundant to many other contentions. However, we have consolidated other admissible referenced contentions in EX 50 wherever possible. Ot t :4: 1 decision on emergency planning acknowledged that the exercise was ta,be the vehicle that would confinn the adequacy of LILCO's training program. Indeed, we D

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were repeatedly told by FEMA witnesses during the planning hearing that FEMA followed a two-stage review process in which the adequacy of the written plan was first reviewed and that adequacy of training would be u

reviewed later as revealed by personnel performance in an exercise. We are now at that second stage where adequacy of training as revealed by the exercise is ripe for litigation. There can be little question that the plan would be fundamentally flawed if it were proven that a large training program having ample opportunity to train has failed in its mission.

LILCO has correctly pointed out that the issues posed by this contention are diffused by the use of extensive references to other contentions. The Board emphasizes that it will hear evidence only once O

on each admitted factual matter in dispute regardless of whether it pertains to Contention EX 50 or to some referenced contention that has g not been consolidated. The Board will not take evidence on the details of the training program because that has been thoroughly ventilated in previous hearings. The only issues of interest in this proceeding will be whether flaws specified in the bases occurred in the exercise and if C

so whether they collectively point to a fundamentally deficient training program.

O DISCOVERY SCHEDULE

- The Commission in instituting the proceeding stated, "the Board is t expedite the hearing to the maximum extent consistent' with fairness O

to the parties." The following schedule was arrived at'with the i

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< 31 D foregoing in mind along with the positions expressed by the parties during the prehearing conference and in the proposed orders for establishing a discovery schedule submitted October 1, 1986. Particular b difficulty in setting the schedule was caused by the limited availability of FEMA personnel. Absent this problem a shorter discovery period would have been set.

D The disc 9very period.is to connence as of the service date of this order and is to terminate on December 19, 1986. This period should provide the parties with adequate time to conduct discovery on the issues raised by the admitted contentions and to prepare for hearing on the issues. The schedule will be strictly adhered to. The Board is aware of the possibility of the need for some limited additional discovery in regard to the FEMA review of Revisions 7 and 8 to the LILCO Offsite Plan. That matter is not of sufficient consequence to the proceeding to warrant extending the discovery period and delaying the start of the hearing. With the foregoing discovery period in placi, the hearing should commence sometime during the first week of February 1986, with prefilad testimony submitted two weeks prior thereto. Whatever O.

additional discovery time is required pertaining to the FEMA evaluation of Revisions 7 and 8 can be conducted in the period imediately prior to the hearing period or simultaneously with it. The request for such

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discovery shall be made within ten days of FEMA providing its findings to the NRC. Responses are due five days thereafter.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

O FOR THE ATOMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD O

MortonB.Margulies,Chapn ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE h _

0 . Jerry B.'KTine' MINISTRATIVE JUDGE G / .i ], I Frederick J. Shon ~ 7 Y

ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE

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.O Dated at Bethesda, Maryland this 3rd day of October, 1986 O

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