ML20215D696

From kanterella
Jump to navigation Jump to search
Brief on Three Issues Addressed in Commission 860919 Order. Requests That Commission Reverse Aslab Determinations That Contentions 22.B & 22.C Impermissibly Excluded for Litigation.Certificate of Svc Encl
ML20215D696
Person / Time
Site: Shoreham File:Long Island Lighting Company icon.png
Issue date: 10/09/1986
From: Mccleskey K
HUNTON & WILLIAMS, LONG ISLAND LIGHTING CO.
To:
NRC
References
CON-#486-1058 OL-3, NUDOCS 8610140249
Download: ML20215D696 (39)
v • d • e


Text

i

/d 00LKETED USNRC

~86 0CT 10 P2 :05 0FFICE f 5: , ' y UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 00CdLims A 5 e / >:.!

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION BW Before the Commission In the Matter of )

)

LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY ) Docket No. 50-322-OL-3

) (Emergency Planning Proceeding)

(Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, )

Unit 1) )

LILCO'S BRIEF ON THE THREE ISSUES ADDRESSED IN THE COMMISSION'S SEPTEMBER 19 0RDER Hunton & Williams 707 East Main Street P. O. Box 1535 Richmond, VA 23212 October 9,1986 8610140249 861000 PDR ADOCK 05000322 G pga gg

TABLE OF CONTENTS Page )

I. Contention 22.B. Impermissibly Challenges the Finding that a 10-Mile EPZ Provides an Adequate Basis for an Ad Hoc Response Beyond 10 M iles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 1

II. Contention 22.C Impermissibly Challenges S 50.47(c)(2) by Calling for an EPZ Based on the So-Called " Shadow Phenomenon" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 l

A. There is no logical connection between plume EPZ size and the ability to resolve problems associated with possible spontan-eous evacua tion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

1. Contention 22.C is an " anti planning" con ten tion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2. Under the theory of Contention 22.C, an EPZ has no rational boundary at all. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
3. Expanding the EPZ for people who are not truly at risk is illogical . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 B. The " shadow phenomenon" is not a local " con-dition" within the meaning of 10 C.F.R. 5 5 0. 4 7( c)( 2 ) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 III. NRC Regulations Do Not Require Evacuation Plans for H osp i t als . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 A. LILCO has Adequately Planned for Hospital Evac u a tion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 B. NRC Regt;1ations Do Not Require Evacuation Plans for Hospitals in the Shoreham EPZ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 C. The Lack of Detailed Evacuation Plans Is Not a Significant Safety Issue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 C on c lusio n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES CASES Page Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Power Station, Unit 1), CLI-86-13,24 NRC (slip op. July 2 4, 19 8 6) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 0 Lcng Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power l Station, Unit 1), ALAB-847,24 NRC (slip op.

Sep t . 19, 19 8 6) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), ALAB-832, 23 NRC 135 (1986) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Dassim Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, l Unit 1), Prehearing Conference Order (Ruling on Contentions and Establishing Discovery Schedule)(slip op.

Oc t . 3, 19 8 6 ) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 i

Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power l Station, Unit 1), LBP-85-31, 22 NRC 410 (1985) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), LBP-85-12, 21 NRC 644 (1985) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . passim Maine Yankee Atomic Power Co. (Maine Yankee Atomic Power Station), DD-83-15,18 NRC 738 (1983) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 Metropolitan Edison Co. (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit No.1), ALAB-698,16 NRC 1290 (1982) . . . . . . . . . . . . . passim Metropolitan Edison Co. (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1), LBP-81-59,14 NRC 1211 (1981) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-781, 20 NRC 819 (1984) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4,5 Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 & 2), LBP-82-70,16 NRC 756 (1982). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10,11 Philadelphia Electric Co. (Limerick Generating Stations, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-819, 22 NRC 681 (1985) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21,23 Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-82-102,16 NRC 1649 (1982). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 (i)

_gi_

Southern California Edison Co. (San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 and 3), CLI-83-10,17 N R C 5 2 8 ( 19 8 3) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Southern California Edison Co. (San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 and 3), LBP-82-39,15 N R C 116 3 ( 19 8 2 ) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4,5,16 REGULATIONS Title 10 C .F.R. 5 2.758 (198 6) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 Title 10 C.F.R. S 50.47(a) (1986) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18,22 Title 10 C.F.R. S 50.47(b) (1986) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . passim Title 10 C.F.R. S 5 0.47(c)(1) (198 6) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . passim Title 10 C.F.R. S 5 0.47(c)(2) (1986) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . passim OTHER AUTHORITIES CITED Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Sup-port of Nuclear Power Plants, NUREG-0654/ FEMA Rep-1/

R ev . 1 ( 19 8 0 ) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . p assi m Planning Basis for the Development of State and Local Government Radiological Emergency Response Plans in Support of Light Water Nuclear Power Plants, NUREG-0396/EPZ 520/1-78-016 (December 19 7 8) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12,13 Staff Response to Panel Presentations on Emergency Planning, Transcript of Commission Meeting of July 3, 19 8 0 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5,21 Statement of Considerations Accompanying Promulgation of Final Emergency Planning Regulations,45 Fed. Reg.

55,402 ( August 19 , 19 8 0 ) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,3 l

l l

l l

l

(

l

{

l l

(ii)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Before the Commission In the Matter of )

)

LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY ) Docket No. 50-322-OL-3 .

) (Emergency Planning Proceeding)

(Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, )

Unit 1) )

LILCO'S BRIEF ON THE THREE ISSUES ADDRESSED IN THE COMMISSION'S SEPTEMBER 19 0RDER In ALAB-832, 23 NRC 135 (1986), the Appeal Board remanded to the Licens-ing Board certain issues, including issues about the size of the plume exposure emergen-cy planning zone (EPZ) and about evacuation planning for hospitals. LILCO asked for review of this decision, and on September 19, 1986, the Commission agreed to review these issues and posed three questions to be addressed by the parties in briefs. This is LILCO's brief on the questions raised in the Commission's September 19 Order.

I. Contention 22.B Impermissibly Challenges the Finding that a 10-Mile EPZ Provides an Adequate Basis for an Ad Hoc Response Beyond 10 Miles The first issue for Commission review is whether the Intervenors' Conten-tion 22.B challenges 10 C.F.R. S 50.47(c)(2) - that is, whether the admission of Contention 22.B impermissibly chal-lenges the generic rulemaking finding that a 10-mile EPZ will provide an adequate basis for satisfactory ad hoc emergency response beyond ten miles should this be re-quired (s_ee_ 45 Fed. Reg. 55,406, col. 2 (August 19, 1980)).

h Commission Order (Sept. 19,1986), at 2.

Contention 22 calls for an EPZ "perhaps as large as 20 miles":

Intervenors contend that LILCO's proposed 10-mile EPZ is in-adequate in size. Under the site specific circumstances exist-ing on Long Island, an EPZ larger than 10 miles and perhaps as i

large as 20 miles is necessary.

Revised Emergency Planning Contentions, July 26,1983, at 38 (see the Appendix to this brief). Subpart B addresses those very rare, worst-case accidents that might actually ,

require protective actions beyond 10 miles. It alleges that eight " distinguishing charac-turistics" of the area around Shoreham, particularly the East End of Long Island, " con-

, tribute to the need to plan" beyond 10 miles. These " characteristics" appear to be fea-l tures of areas beyond 10 miles that would allegedly make evacuation beyond 10 miles difficult (for example, an increased seasonal population). One of the " characteristics" (number 6) mentioned specifically by the Appeal Board (ALAB-832,23 NRC at 148 n.37) is the nonparticipation of the State and County governments.

This contention is a challenge to the regulation,10 C.F.R. S 50.47(c)(2),

which calls for a 10-mile EPZ:

Generally, the plume exposure pathway EPZ for nuclear power plants shall consist of an area about 10 miles (16 km) in radius and the ingestion pathway EPZ shall consist of an area of about 50 miles (80 km) in radius. The exact size and config-uration of the EPZs surrounding a particular nuclear power re-actor shall be determined in relation to local emergency re-sponse needs and capabilities as they are affected by such conditions as demography, topography, land characteristics, access routes, and jurisdictional boundaries.

10 C.F.R. S 50.47(c)(2) (1986). The generic 10-mile EPZ was based primarily on four i

considerations, the last of which was that it would provide a " substantial base for ex-pansion of response efforts."M NUREG-0654 (Jan.1980), at 12.E

\

t I 1/ The other three bases were:

(footnote continued)

I a

, , , , , ,.,,,.,--,~,e-----,-,n ,--a,-,,- - - - ___e-, , -- .,n,

Thus Contention 22.B contradicts (e, challenges) 10 C.F.R. S 50.47(c)(2) in two ways: it contradicts the terms of the regulation, and it contradicts one of the four bases of the regulation. The regulation says that the EPZ should be "about 10 miles (16

. km) in radius"; the contention says the EPZ should be " larger than 10 miles and perhaps as large as 20 miles." The regulation is based on the Commission's decision that " plan-ning within 10 miles would provide a substantial base for expansion of response efforts in the event that this proved necessary"; the contention says that 10 miles will not

(continued from previous page) c
a. projected doses from the traditional design basis acci-dents would not exceed protective action guide levels outside the zone;
b. projected doses from most core melt sequences would

! not exceed protective action guide levels outside the zone;

c. for the worst core melt sequences, immediate life threatening doses would generally not occur outside the zone, j 2/ When the Commission amended its emergency planning regulations in August

! 1980, the Federal Register preamble accompanying the amendment provided that l

[T]wo Emergency Planning Zones (EPZs) should be estab-lished around each light-water nuclear power plant. The EPZ for airborne exposure has a radius of about 10 miles; the EPZ for contaminated food and water has a radius of about 50 miles . . . . These distances are considered large enough to provide a response base that would support activity out-side the planning zone should this ever be needed.

45 Fed. Reg. at 55,406, col. 2 (Aug.19,1980). See also NUREG-0396 (Dec.1978), at 16.

As the Commission said in the San Onofre case,"the concept of the [ emergency planning] regulation is that there should be core planning with sufficient planning flex-ibility to develop a reasonable ad hoc response to those very serious low probability ac-cidents that could affect the general public." Southern California Edison Co. (San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 and 3), CLI-83-10,17 NRC 528,533 (1983),

vacated and remanded on other grounds, GUARD v NRC,753 F.2d 1144 (D.C. Cir.1985).

I l

. , ___ ._ _ _ __ _._.. ..__.._ ._._ , .__ _ _ _ _ - . _ , . . . __- _ . , _ _ ._ ______.,_J

provide "a substantial base for the expansion of response efforts" in this case. There could not be a more transparent example of a challenge to NRC regulations.

Intervenors claim that the unique circumstances of this case particularly the fact that the State and County governments are not participating - make the Com-mission's finding about the base for expansion incorrect for this particular power plant.

But that is precisely the type of claim that calls for an exception to the regulations, I gnd the Intervenors have not requested an exception.3/

i Instead, the Intervenors have claimed that their contention fits within the i

! regulation because the nonparticipation of the State and local governments and the other " characteristics" listed in Contention 22.B are local " conditions" that justify ex-panding the generic 10-milo EPZ. This claim is wrong for two reasons. First, the nonparticipation of the State and local governments bears no resemblance whatsoever to the types of " conditions" recognized by 50.47(c)(2). Those conditions are those such as:

1 4

l 3/ Any party seeking to depart from the standard 10-mile EPZ may only do so by seeking an exception to 10 C.F.R. S 50.47(c)(2) under 10 C.F.R. 5 2.758. See Pacific i Gas and Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), ALAB-781,20 l NRC 819,831 (1984); Southern California Edison Co. (San Onofre Nuclear Generating l Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-82-39,15 NRC 1163,1177-84 (1982), af f'd, ALAB-717,17  !

NRC 346 (1983); Public Service Co. of New Hampshire (Seabrook Station, Units 1 and 2), l LBP-82-106,16 NRC 1649,1661 (1982). The Intervenors did not do so. l 4/ Likewise, the Appeal Board considered a utility-alone response to be a " local fac-tor" that may be litigated in accordance with S 50.47(c)(2). ALAB-832,23 NRC at 148 4

n.37.

I l

l

-T-vy s-ore-- e -er.- *- - -.-- _ ,-m-.+.yw- - - - - - ,-m. -wa,,-- --- ---------

- demography

- topography

- land characteristics

- access routes '

- jurisdictional boundaries.EI Not one word is said about nonparticipation of State or local governments.S Second, the Intervenors' argument is wrong because the type of " conditions" referred to in S 50.47(c)(2) are only such as to justify minor modifications of perhaps one or two miles. ALAB-832, 23 NRC at 149 n. 41,148 n. 37. The " characteristics" listed by the Intervenors, in contrast, would not justify such " minor adjustments" and indeed are claimed to justify as much as a quadrupling of the EPZ area.E g/ An extensive record on the types of " conditions" that should be considered was j' compiled in the litigation of Contention 22.D. (Cordaro, et al., ff. Tr. 8536; Herr, et al2 , f f. Tr. 8666).

g/ In the " legislative" history of the regulation, Mr. Minogue of the NRC Staff says that the site-specific factors identified in S 50.47(c)(2) are " narrowed to a relatively small range." Staff Response to Panel Presentations on Emergency Planning, Tran-script of Commission meeting of July 3,1980, at 49. Examples given are a " major pop-

ulation center" crossing the 10-mile boundary and " abnormal topographical situations, a i very peculiar river valley." M. Mr. Goller of the NRC Staff says that "it is the staff's intent that the deviations come few and f ar between and only for good cause, and then almost certainly by small amounts." M.

1 7/ The regulations " clearly allow leeway for a mile or two in either direction, based on local f actors. But it . . . clearly precludes a plume EPZ radius of, say, 20 or more miles." Southern California Edison Co. (San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 and 3), LBP-82-39,15 NRC 1163,1181 (1982), aff'd, ALAB-717,17 NRC 346 (1983). See

! also Pacific Gas and Electric Co., (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2),

1 ALAB-781, 20 NRC 819, 830-31 (1984).

g/ Recently the Intervenors have claimed that Contention 22, despite its plain lan-guage, does not propose a 20-mile EPZ. This claim is a post hoc rationalization and plainly at odds with the intent ..nd history of the contention. Suffolk County's advocacy of a 20-mile EPZ goes back at least to 1983, when the County's consultants proposed an EPZ 20 miles in radius. The County Executive said: ,

(footnote continued)

Two of them, for example, are Shelter Island and East Hampton, each of which is over 25 miles from the Shoreram plant.9I See LILCO Plan, Appendix A, Fig-ure 1.10/ In short, none of the " distinguishing characteristics" listed in the contention, (continued from previous page)

Analysis of the amounts of radiation which would be released during an accident and studies of human evacuation behavior lead to the conclusion that an Emergency Planning Zone ("EPZ") smaller than 20 miles is inadequate for the protection of the residents of Suffolk County.

Report of Suffolk County Executive Peter F. Cohalan Concerning Radiological Pre-paredness in Suffolk County, February 16,1983, at 4; see also iA 22,27, Attachment 9 to LILCO's Brief in Opposition to Suffolk County's Motion to Terminate this Proceeding and for Certification, March 18, 1983.

In the draf t of Suffolk County's contentions dated July 7,1983, the County called for an EPZ of "approximately" and "at least" 20 miles. Consolidated Emergency Plan-ning Contentions, July 7,1983, at 19. Only when LILCO and the NRC Staff objected to this contention as a challenge to the regulations did the County start to claim that the contention was not a "20 mile EPZ contention." Suffolk County's Preliminary Response to LILCO's Objections to Intervenors' Consolidated Emergency Planning Contentions and to NRC Staff Response to Draf t Emergency Planning Contentions, July 12,1983, at

32. By July 26, 1983, the County had revised the contention to read as it now reads, l

calling for an EPZ " larger than 10 miles and perhaps as large as 20 miles." Revised Emergency Planning Contentions, July 26,1983, at 38.

l l

l Moreover, the Intervenors asked the Commission to reverse the Appeal Board's declaration that only " minor adjustments (such as a mile or two)" should be considered.

See Suffolk County, State of New York, and Town of Southampton Petition for Review of ALAB-832 (Apr.15,1986), at 9-11.

l 9/ Contention 22.B refers to "the area of Long Island which surrounds Shoreham, l particularly the area which lies east of the Shoreham Nuclear Plant and east of LILCO's l proposed EPZ," including "the towns of East Hampton, Southold, Shelter Island, most of Riverhead and virtually all of Southampton." Riverhead is at the EPZ boundary, and the EPZ was adjusted af ter litigation to include parts of Riverhead under contentions grounded in 10 C.F.R. S 50.47(c)(2). Southold is 10 to 15 miles from the EPZ boundary:

Southhampton is 15 to 20 miles from the EPZ boundary; Shelter Island is approximately 30 miles from the EPZ boundary; and East Hampton is at least 40 miles from the EPZ boundary. This is hardly the " minor adjustment" contemplated by 10 C.F.R. 50.47(c)(2).

10/ To the extent that the Intervenors argue that Contention 22.B seeks only " minor adjustments" to the EPZ, the " local conditions" listed in Contention 22.B have already (footnote continued) t

and certainly not the hypothesized absence of government resources, is a condition such as those contemplated by 10 C.F.R. Section 50.47(c)(2).

Finally, the possibility that a utility-alone response is a local factor justi-fying expansion of the EPZ has been eliminated by CLI-86-13,in which the Commission held that the State and County would engage in a best-efforts emergency response in a true emergency. As the Appeal Board said subsequently:

What seems clear from the Commission's remand [in CLI-86-13), however, is that any plan ultimately ap-proved must involve some form of governmental partici-pation.

ALAB-847 (Sept.19,1986), slip op. at 28. Accordingly, the " local factor" that the emergency response would be provided by the utility alone, ALAB-832,23 NRC at 148

n. 37, is not a f actor at all, but rather a myth. To put it another way, an ad hoc re-sponse outside 10 miles would be done by the local and State governments around Shoreham just as the ad hoc response would be done by governments at any other plant.

(continued from previous page) been considered and the EPZ adjusted accordingly. A look at the map (Figure 3.5.1 of the Plan, for example) shows that on land the EPZ boundary is outside the 10-mile radi-us for almost its entire length, in some places as much as a mile and half. And the Li-censing Board expanded it still further to include several schools. The effect of the seasonal population on the ability to evacuate was litigated in Contention 65 ; the road network on Long Island was litigated in Contentions 23.C, D., H and 65; and the ettect of the weather on protective action recommendations was litigated in Contentions 60-64,66.D. and 97.

II. Contention 22.C Impermissibly Challenges S 50.47(c)(2) by Calling for an EPZ Based on the So-Called " Shadow Phenomenon" The second issue for Commission review is whether Contention 22.C, which alleges that the Shoreham EPZ size should be determined by the alleged " shadow phe-nomenon," is a challenge to the regulation 10 C.F.R. S 50.47(c)(2) (see the Appendix to this brief). In particular, the Commission has asked whether (a) there is a logical connection between plume EPZ size and the ability to resolve problems associated with possible spontaneous evacuation, and (b) the regulations contemplate that the possibility of spon-taneous evacuation is a " local condition" which should re-sult in adjustments to an EPZ.

Commission Order (Sept. 19,1986), at 2. The answers are (a) that there is no logical i connection and (b) that the possibility of spontaneous evacuation is not a local "condi-tion" within the meaning of 10 C.F.R. S 50.47(c)(2).

~

A. There is no logical connection between plume EPZ size and the ability to resolve problems associated with possible spontaneous evacuation As the Commission's question appears to recognize, there are a number of logical absurdities in Contention 22.C. In its essence, Contention 22.C proposes that the EPZ be set on the basis of psychology - on people's hypothesized perceptions of risk and their reactions to these perceptions.III This is a challenge to 10 C.F.R.

11/ Contentions 22.B and 22.C are in some respects hard to distinguish, because 22.B contains in it " shadow phenomenon" claims like 22.C. However, as a general matter (footnote continued)

_g.

S 50.47(c)(2).

1. Contention 22.C is an " anti-planning" contention ,

8 First, Contention 22.C is an anti planning contention. It says that the EPZ should be determined not by planning concepts but by assuming an u_nolanned response.

The contention seeks not to improve emergency response by planning but rather to in-crease the arbitrary area over which an unplanned response is assumed to occur. This whole idea is contrary to the emergency planning regulations. By contrast, the purpose of the Commission's regulations, and of emergency planning in general, is to minimize such things as spontaneous evacuation-to minimize, that is, the very thing that the contention claims should be the basis of the EPZ. What, af ter all, is the purpose of an l EPZ? To identify the area in which there are to be preplanned protective actions-in this case, preplanned evacuation. Preplanned evacuation in turn means identifying the best evacuation routes, telling people about them, and arranging to have traffic guides, tow trucks, and gasoline trucks to help them evacuate. But it makes no sense to do this for areas hypothesized to be " shadow" areas; the people being planned for are those who, by definition, do not follow emergency recommendations.12/

(continued from previous page) 22.B and 22.C appear to differ in two respects. First, 22.B deals primarily with the East End of Long Island, while 22.C addresses tsoth east and west. Second,22.B assumes that people outside the ten-mile distance will need to evacuate because of one of those rare, very severe accidents that would require an a_d hoc expansion of efforts beyond the EPZ; 22.C assumes that people outside ten miles need protection because they will evacuate voluntarily without really needing to.

12/ The contention alleges that, since people will evacuate despite one's best plan-ning, one should do even more (allegedly futile) planning (by expanding the EPZ). As the Licensing Board noted recently,"(p]lanning to take an ad hoc action seems to us to (footnote continued)

.g.

The record shows,in fact, that the way to minimize spontaneous evacuation is to provide accurate, consistent information to the public. And this is the way the regulations contemplate dealing with spontaneous evacuation, not by adjusting the EPZ.

E Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 & 2), ,

LBP-82-70,16 NRC 756, 779 (1982), aff'd, ALAB-781, 20 NRC 819 (1984) (" Assuming overreaction was likely, we have no remedy beyond that which is already planned, which is to broadcast accurate, consistent information").

2. Under the theory of Contention 22.C, an EPZ has no rational boundary at all A second logical flaw in Contention 22.C is that it proposes an EPZ that ex-pands without bounds. No matter where the boundary is drawn, there will always be l

people outside it who then become part of a new hypothesized " shadow":

[Rlegardless of where a boundary is set there may be a spontaneous evacuation of a larger area or, on the other hand, there may be resistance to evacuation by a portion of the population within the boundary.

Metropolitan Edison Co. (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit 1), LBP-81-59,14 NRC 1211, 1553 (1981).13/ Thus the EPZ spreads out like oil on water till it runs out of peo-ple.

(continued f rom previous page) be an oxymoron." Prehearing Conference Order (Ruling on Contentions and Estab-lishing Discovery Schedule), Oct. 3.1986, slip op. at 26. The same might be said of planning for people who by definition act contrary to the plan.

Moreover, one might well ask what the planner should plan to do about the shad- _

ow area. Should he tell the people n_ot to evacuate, or assume that many of them will evacuate and so tell everyone to evacuate despite his best judgment?

13/ Reviewed in ALAB-697,16 NRC 1265 (1982); ALAB-698,16 NRC 1290 (1982);

CLI-83-22,18 NRC 299 (1983).

l l

l

If nothing else, this peculiar, infinite feature of the shadow-based EPZ shows I4/ that Contention 22.C challenges 10 C.F.R. S 50.47(c)(2). The four bases for the generic 10-mile EPZ are recited in part I of this brief above; none of the four has anything to do with a " shadow phenomenon."

3. Expanding the EPZ for people who are not truly at risk is illogical Third, expanding the EPZ to include people who are not really at risk and who do not need to take protective actions is senseless. The 10-mile EPZ is set such that, except for the rare accident extending beyond 10 miles (which is handled by an ad hoc expansion of effort), the only people who are at risk and need to shelter or evacu-ate are those within the roughly 10-mile zone. Expanding the EPZ beyond that extends planning-and thus uses planning resources-for people who do not need them.

14/ The absurdity of the Intervenors' position becomes clear when one thinks care-fully about exactly what they are proposing the NRC should do when it draws an EPZ boundary. First, the Intervenors claim that the emergency planner must predict how much spontaneous evacuation (that is, how many people and how far away) there will be in an emergency of unknown nature sometime in the future. This task is impossible.

(Intervenors would use opinion polls for this purpose, but the record shows that opinion polls cannot predict actual emergency behavior.) Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), Partial Initial Decision, LBP-85-12, 21 NRC 644 at 666-67,676 (hereinaf ter cited as "PID").

Even assuming the planner can predict the extent of spontaneous evacuation, he then has to have a criterion for where to draw the line. (Opinion polls, for example, will show fewer spontaneous evacuations as distance from the plant increases; at what point on this decreasing function does one end the EPZ7) There is no such criterion in NRC regulations or guidance, and the criteria used by Suffolk County's consultants to set a 20-mile EPZ were based largely on the risk calculations addressed in Contention 22.A, which is inadmissible.

1_5/ "(T]here is no apparent hazard to public health and safety if overreaction oc-curs." Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 & 2),

LBP-82-70,16 NRC 756,779 (1982), aff'd,20 NRC 819 (1984).

(footnote continued)

The only legitimate question about the " shadow phenomenon" is wh' ether it might affect the safety of those people who really are at risk-those within about 10 miles of the plant.16/ And that is precisely the issue that has already been litigated in this proceeding. In connection with Contention 65, which addressed evacuation time estimates, LILCO presented studies of the effects of hypothetical voluntary evacuation by people 10-20 miles from the plant. Cordaro et al. (Contention 65), ff. Tr. 2337, Att.

6.

B. The " shadow phenomenon" is not a local " condition" within the meaning of 10 C.F.R. S 50.47(c)(2)

Spontaneous evacuation is not a local " condition" of the type addressed by 10 C.F.R. S 50.47(c)(2). In the first place, it is not a condition such as " demography, to-pography, land characteristics, access routes, and jurisdictional boundaries." 10 C.F.R.

S 50.47 (c)(2) (1986).17/ It is rather a type of behavior. Nor is it " local"-that is, a (continued from previous page)

Moreover, basing the EPZ on the needs of people who are not at risk can have pernicious effects for the people who are at risk. The Licensing Board expressly re-jected the proposition that Sunrise Highway shorld be part of the EPZ, since including it would cause a gross distortion of evacuation time estimates which could not ade-quately ensure protection of the health and safety of persons within the EPZ.

LBP-85-12,21 NRC at 803.

16/ See ALAB-832,23 NRC at 148 n.36.

17/ Indeed, it can hardly be gainsaid that Contentions 22.B and C both propose creating the EPZ from scratch. And this is contrary to the purpose of 5 50.47(c)(1),

which was to create a generic EPZ. For example, NUREG-0396, at 16, provides as fol-lows:

(I]t was the consensus of the Task Force that emergency plans could be based upon a generic distance out of which predetermined actions would provide dose savings for any (footnote continued)

phenomenon peculiar to Long Islanders, as evidenced by the litigation of the same issue in several other licensing proceedings. As the record and decision in this case have es-tablished, there is nothing unique about human behavior on Long Island. Tr. 1500 (Dynes); see LBP-85-31,22 NRC 410,427 (1985).

In the second place, the " shadow phenomenon" cannot justify a " minor ad-justment" of one or two miles. See ALAB-832,23 NRC at 148 n.37,149, n.41. Instead, Contention 22.C seeks a dramatically enlarged EPZ based on postulated behavior of people living unspecified distances away.18/

(continued from previous page) such accidents. Beyond this generic distance it was conclud-l ed that actions could be taken on an a_d hoc basis using the same considerations that went into the initial action deter-minations.

The Task Force concluded that "the size of the EPZ's need not be site specific," M at

!!!-7. The Task Force further provided that " emergency planning needs seem to be best served by adopting uniform Emergency Planning Zones for initial planning studies for all light water reactors," % at 111-8.

18/ Contention 22.C calls for "an EP7 larger than 10 miles," not merely extended with minor adjustments, but expanded "to the west to encompass those persons who may be involved in protective actions" and to the east to include " East End residents" who may have "the perception that they would be trapped if the wind blew to the east" during an accident at Shoreham. The eastern most end of Long Island is approximately 50 miles from Shoreham. And as already noted, Contention 22 proper, of which Con-tention 22.C is a subpart, specifically alleges that an EPA "perhaps as large as 20 miles" is necessary, it is true that the regulation provides that minor adjustments can be made to the 10-mile configuration based upon local conditions such as " demography, topography, land characteristics, access routes, and jurisdictional boundaries." But Contention 22.C does not define in any way any specific population centers, topographical characteris-tics or jurisdictional boundaries within a mile or two of the 10-mile EPZ, that would explain the specific need for an EPZ adjustment. Instead, the Contention defines an area as large as Long Island itself. Therefore, Contention 22.C challenges not only the Commission's finding that a 10-mile EPZ is adequate, but also the bases for adjustments that can be made to that EPZ.

The difference between local " conditions" cognizable under S 50.47(c)(2) and the conditions listed in Contention 22.C is demonstrated by Contention 22.D, which raises the kinds of " conditions" that are inadmissible. The Intervenors litigated the pre-cise boundary of the EPZ under Contention 22.D, which provides as follows:

Contention 22.D. 10 C.F.R. Section 50.47(c)(2) provides that two elements essential to defining the configuration of an EPZ are the location of local jurisdictional bound-artes and demographic conditions. Thus, it is good emer-gency planning practice to include, if possible, the entire area of a local municipality within the boundaries of an EPZ. At a minimum, an EPZ should avoid dividing major population centers within a local municipality. See NUREG 0654,Section I.D.a.

LILCO's EPZ f ails to meet the criteria of 10 C.F.R. Sec-tion 50.47(c)(2) and NUREG 0654 because the proposed LILCO EPZ runs through and divides the villages of Port Jefferson and Terryville and the town of Riverhead. The EPZ should be extended to include all of Port Jefferson and Terryville and additional portions of Riverhead (those portions in the area 1-2 miles to the immediate east of the proposed EPZ which contain dense population and Riverhead's business district.)

Under S 50.47(c)(2) jurisdictional boundaries and demographic conditions are taken into account in defining the EPZ, and the Intervenors met no objection when they contended that the EPZ f ailed to meet 10 C.F.R. S 50.47(c)(2) because it ran through the villages of Port Jefferson and Terryville and the town of Riverhead. Af ter extensive litigation, the Board did order the EPZ to be adjusted. But this sort of adjustment is quite ditfer-ent from the wholesale revision of the EPZ called for by Contention 22.C.

i

III. NRC Regulations Do Not Require Evacuation Plans for Hospitals The third question from the Commission is whether the NRC's regulations in 10 C.F.R. S 50.47 (including 10 C.F.R. S 50.47(c)(1)) require evacuation plans for hospi-tals in the EPZ even though sheltering would be the pre-ferred option in most circumstances.lF Although the answer to this question is that the regulations do n_ot necessarily require evacuation plans, it is important to recognize that the Appeal Board's premise that LILCO has no evacuation plans for hospitals is incorrect. As detailed below, the record 1

shows that LILCO, in consultation with hospital officials, has planned extensively for hospital evacuation. The only differences between the evacuation plan for hospitals and the evacuation plan for nursing and adult homes are those necessitated by practical constraints associated with the unique circumstances surrounding the three hospitals in question.

In any case, an examination of the pertinent regulations reveals that the an-swer to the Commission's question is n_o; the regulations do not require detailed evacua-tion plans when sheltering would almost always be the preferred option. The regula-tions require adequate emergency plans, not evacuation plans per se. An affirmative answer to the Commission's question would, as a categorical rule of law, require every 1_9/ The Licensing Board found LILCO's emergency planning for hospitals adequate, even though LILCO addresses evacuation of hospitals in somewhat less detail than it does evacuation of other special facilities. The Board agreed that, because of the hos-pitals' distance from Shoreham (they are at or beyond the edge of the 10-mile EPZ),

their heavy construction, and the condition of the patients, sheltering would almost al-ways be the appropriate recommendation, and that evacuation is only a backup mea-sure. See PID, 21 NRC at 835-46 (1985). The Appeal Board reversed, holding that LILCO must provide the same level of detail of evacuation planning for hospitals as for other special f acilities such as nursery schools and homes for the aged. See ALAB-832, 23 NRC 135,154-57 (1986).

emergency planner to provide a detailed sheltering and evacuation plan for every facil-ity and every population group within the 10-mile EPZ, regardless of the factual dissim-ilarities among those groups and facilities. Such a decision would be contrary to the Commission's established practice of considering the facts of each case, and would con-tradict the well-established notion that emergency plans must be flexible and individu-ally tailored to fit the conditions at each plant.20/

The Commission should reverse the Appeal Board a'id, based on the existing record, uphold the Licensing Board's well-supported conclusion that LILCO's Plan pro-vides reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken with regard to the hospital population.

A. LILCO has Adequately Planned for Hospital Evacuation The Licensing Board properly concluded that "LILCO has planned thought-fully for the difficult problem of protective actions for hospitals." PID at 843. The LILCO Plan calls for a sheltering recommendation for the three hospitals at the edge of the EPZ, even if the general population has been instructed to evacuate, unless LERO projects that the shelter dose would be excessive and the hospital administrators decide 20/ The Appeal Board's principal error was in taking such a categorical approach to emergency planning requirements, it decided, apparently, that as a matter of law hos-pitals have to be treated like nursing homes no matter what.

But such a categorical rule is not in keeping with the flexibility built into the emergency planning rules. For example, there is no requirement that evacuation be possible under all circumstances. Southern California Edisen Co. (San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 and 3), LBP-82-39,15 NRC 1163,1184 (1982). And particu-larly where the plan element is being judged by inferences from a guidance document like NUREG-0654 rather than by a regulation (as is the case with the Appeal Board's de-cision on hospitals ALAB-832, 23 NRC at 156-57), the applicant is free to show that circumstances justify a departure from the guidelines - in this case, to justify a dis-tinction between hospitals and nursing homes. And that is exactly what LILCO did.

to evacuate their patients.E The Licensing Board concluded that LILCO's sheltering preference is " consistent with the planning basis of NUREG-0654." PID at 844. FEMA ,

agreed that it is appropriate to designate sheltering as a primary protective action and evacuation as a backup action. Id. at 844.

Nevertheless, LILCO's Plan also describes the means by which evacuation would be accomplished. The Plan specifies how each hospital's needs would be estab-lished, the vehicles that would be used, and the process by which they would be dis-patched to the hospitals. See PID at 844-46. The only significant difference between LILCO's Plan for hospitals and LILCO's Plan for nursing and adult homes is that ambu-lances and ambulettes are pre-assigned to each of the latter facilities for use in an evacuation. Vehicles will be assigned to hospitals according to each hospital's needs as communicated to LILCO by the hospital adminstrators at the time of an emergency.

Moreover, the record also contains general time estimates for a hospital evacuation. The Licensing Board found that the hospitals could be evacuated within 9 hours1.041667e-4 days <br />0.0025 hours <br />1.488095e-5 weeks <br />3.4245e-6 months <br /> and that, even though this time period exceeds the general public evacuation time estimate, the difference is justifiable given the hospitals' distance from the plant and the fact that the same vehicles would be used first to evacuate special facilities closer to the site. See PID at 845-46. The Board recognized practical constraints which make a simultaneous evacuation of all special f acilities in the EPZ " impossible."

% at 846. ,

21/ A decision to evacuate a hospital would rest in large part on the professional medical judgment of each hospital administrator. Af ter receiving information on weather, projected dose, and other factors from LILCO, and using the EPA PAGs as a reference, the administrators would have to decide (in conjunction with LERO person-nel) whether the additional risk to patients which accompanies evacuation should be in-curred, even if it is clear that evacuation would bring greater dose savings. Given the necessity of this ad hoc determination, and other variables distir.guishing hospitals from other special facilities, it seems inefficient at best to require that LILCO maintain a more detailed evacuation plan for each hospital.

Clearly, LILCO's evacuation plan for hospitals contains basically the same elements that evacuation plans for other special f acilities contain.22/ It merely recog-nizes the limitations of further advance planning in the specific circumstances.23/

LILCO's refusal to engage in an empty exercise does not constitute an absence of evac-uation planning or an abdication of that responsibility.

B. NRC Regulations Do Not Require Evacuation Plans for Hospitals in the Shoreham EPZ In the emergency planning regulations, the NRC did not attempt to set forth a " laundry list" of specific features that every emergency plan must contain. Even 10 C.F.R. S 50.47(b), which defines the standards by which emergency plans are assessed, does not prescribe specific means by which the standards must be satisfied.b Instead, the regulations recognize that the precise details of emergency plans are by necessity different for every site, and that the determination of appropriate protective actions in an emergency rests on many site-specific and accident-specific f actors.

22/ That is, LILCO has provided vehicles, personnel, procedures for identifying re-ception hospitals, communications, and time estimates. See, e.g., Cordaro, et al., Tr.

May 10,1984, Vol. II, at 16; OPIP 3.6.5.

23/ The transportation requirements of hospitals fluctuate widely and rapidly.

Cordaro, Weismantle, ff.Tr. 9101, at 12-13. This is due to many factors, including the amount of surgery being performed, patients' recoveries, daily admittances and re-leases, and unpredictable populations of newborns. IA at 11-12. These f actors, com-bined with the extremely low likelihood that evacuation will be recommended, make only less detailed planning for that contingency practical. IA 24/ For example, Section (b)(3) requires " arrangements" for requesting and using as-sistance resources; (b)(5) requires " procedures" for notifying emergency response per-sonnel; (b)(6) requires " provisions" for prompt communications; and (b)(8) requires "ade-quate emergency facilities and equipment" to support an emergency response. But planners are lef t to decido how best to satisfy these general standards in a way that enables the NRC to make the requisite 50.47(a)(1) reasonable assurance finding. See _

Metropolitan Edison Co. (Three Mile Island Nuclear Station, Unit No.1), ALAB-698,16 NRC 1290,1304 (1982)("The precise means of implementing the Commission's emergen-cy planning regulations require a high degree of judgment.")

The key regulation at issue here is 10 C.F.R. S 50.47(b)(10). That section re-quires that "a range of protective actions have been developed for the plume exposure pathway EPZ for emergency workers and the public." In practice, the " range" of pro-tective actions consists of two measures: sheltering and evacuation. NUREG-0654 Section II.J.9 suggests b that each state and local organization " establish a capability for implementing protective measures based upon (EPA] protective action guides and other criteria."Section II.J.10 lists suggested contents of each organization's emergen-cy plan, to include

d. Means for protecting those persons whose mobility may be impaired due to such factors as institutional or other confinement; l g. Means of relocation;
1. Time estimates for evacuation of various sectors and distances based on a dynamic analysis for the plume exposure pathway emergency planning zones; and
m. The bases for the choice of recommended protective actions from the plume exposure pathway during emergency conditions. This shall include expected local protection afforded in residential units or other shelter for direct and inhalation exposure, as well as evacuation time estimates.

NUREG-0654 at 61, 63-64. Finally, NUREG-0654, Appendix 4 5 II.C. provides that an estimate of the special facility population (which includes those in nursing homes and 25/ NUREG-0654 does not rise to the level of a regulatory requirement. Nor does it set out the only method of meeting applicable regulatory requirements. Methods and solutions different f rom those suggested in the guidelines are acceptable if they provide a basis for the requisite reasonable assurance finding. TM1, supra,16 NRC 1290 at 1298-99 (1982).

d hospitals) "shall usually be done on an institution-by-institution basis [and] the means l of transportation . . . shall be described." ,

Clearly, none of these provisions requires every licensee to maintain a de-telled plan for both sheltering and evacuation of every facility and population group in the EPZ. Instead, the NRC regulations are intended to be flexible. Long Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), CLI- 86-13, 24 NRC (slip op. July 24, 1986).2_6/ All the regulations require is that a " range of protective actions have been developed," for example, by providing a "means of protecting" mobility-impaired per-l sons and a "means of relocation". The applicant must also show that " guidelines for the i choice of protective actions during an emergency, consistent with Federal guidance, J

are developed and in place." 10 C.F.R. 5 50.47(b)(10). Significantly, the EPA Manual of Protective Action Guides expressly acknowledges the need in certain circumstances to

! epply different criteria in establishing the appropriate protective action for special groups, including bedridden and critically ill patients. Cordaro et al., Tr. of May 10, 1984, Vol. II, at 25. This LILCO has done. The Commission does not (and did not intend to) require exactly the same emergency planning treatment for all facilities and popu-J lation groups. The rulemaking history supports this view.2_I/

4 i

! 2j/ This principle is well-established. See, TMI, ALAB-698, supra; see also Maine Yankee Atomic Power Co. (Maine Yankee Atomic Power Station), DD-83-15,18 NRC l

738 (1983) ("The Commission has r.dopted a graduated approach to emergency planning

in which evacuation is only one of several possible respontos to an emergency. It is un-likely that evacuation of the ten-mile Emergency Planning Zone would be required in

~

the event of an accident . . .").

2_I/ On June 25, 1980, the Commission entertained presentations from three panels of public commentators concerning the proposed emergency planning rule. On July 3.

l the NRC staff presented its responses to those comments. Commissioner Gilinsky re-

quested an explanation of the extent to which the requirement for evacuation plans would require consideration of individuals having special circumstances. The Staff re-sponded as follows

$ (footnote continued)

The Appeal Board cited the Limerick case for the proposition that an emer-gency plan cannot avoid addressing a certain protective action simply because the probability of having to implement that action is very low. Long Island Lighting Co.

(Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), ALAB-832, 23 NRC 135,155-56 (1986). W (continued from previous page)

Mr. Goller: The answer to the question is: there is nothing specifically in the rule that addresses this requirement other than the general requirement in the ,

rule and in the supporting guidance document, NUREG-0654, in particular, that requires that all people in the area be provided for in the emergency planning . . . .

Mr. Grimes: . . . the rule has only very general provisions . . . which require protective measures to be in place and administrative and physical needs for evacuation have to be described in the plans.

Transcript of July 3,1980, at 44-45.

2_8/ The Appeal Board's observation from Limerick that a possible deficiency in an emergency plan cannot be " disregarded" because of the low probability that action pur-suant to the plan will ever be necessary, ALAB-832, 23 NRC at 156, is fine so far as it goes, but it does not apply to this case. First, it does not apply because, as explained above, LILCO has not " disregarded," or f ailed to plan for, anything.

Second, it does not apply because the Limerick principle obviously does not mean that one must plan to the same level of detail for all facilities or all situations. Most

emergency planners would agree, for example, that it is sound practice to devote greater attention to the more likely events. Even one of Suffolk County's witnesses testified that " planners must apportion their resources expended in attempting to limit the public consequences potentially associated with such accidents in accordance with priorities that are associated with the relative probabilities of Category 5 events"(the most unlikely ones). Finlayson, Tr. of July 11,1984, at 12,380-81.

A perfect example is the very rare, worst-case accident that requires protective actions beyond 10 miles. The Commission acknowledges that such accidents are possi-ble (though improbable), and yet does not require preplanning for them; but the Limerick principle, as applied by the Appeal Board, would require such planning.

Why does the Commission not require a plan for the beyond-10-mile-plume? Be-cause the planning required for the 10-mile EPZ provides sufficient resources to deal with a worse accident ad hoc. Analogously, LILCO is prepared to evacuate the hospi-tais (though here a_d hoc is a misnomer) because it has arranged to have ambulances for the more likely event of evacuation of nursing homes.

That proposition is undoubtedly correct. But it is also beside the point, since LILCO h_as planned for an evacuation of the hospitals. And it doesn't change the f act that no-where in the regulations is there a requirement for more detailed evacuation plans under these circumstances.

Two of the three hospitals in proximity to Shoreham are just inside the 10-mile boundary and the other is outside the boundary. Accordingly, although LILCO has considered and planned for evacuating the hospitals, it does not maintain a pre planned commitment to evacuate under a certain set of circumstances. Transportation re-sources have been more efficiently allocated to protect special f acility populations closer to the plant, since, because of the hospitals' distance from the plant,2_g/ they would almost always be recommended to shelter. This planned expansion of existing transportation resources at the time of emergency is consistent with the regulations and is reasonable given the characteristics and location of the hospitals at issue.

C. The Lack of Detailed Evacuation Plans Is Not A Significant Safety Issue Even if it were determined that the regulations in 10 C.F.R. S 50.47(a) and (b) ordinarily require both sheltering and evacuation plans for all facilities and all popu-lation groups at all nuclear plants, in the case of Shoreham, the lack of detailed evacu-ation plans and implementing procedures for hospitals is "not significant for the plant in question" under S 50.47(c)(1). The plain fact is that the hospitals in the Shoreham EPZ are different from other special facilities and should be treated accordingly. The factors requiring different protective action planning for these facilities are many: (1) 2_2/ At least two other factors contribute to making sheltering the appropriate pro-tective action: the high sheltering values inherent in hospital buildings and the in-creased risk of adverse health effects in evacuating hospital patients.

the hospitals are located at the very edge of the 10-mile boundary; (2) the hospital buildings offer a high degree of shelteringb; (3) the population by definition consists of sick and injured people, for whom evacuaticn brings additional risk of trauma and otherwise deteriorating health; and (4) the hospital population, and the make-up of that population on any particular day, is impossible to predict in advance. For these and other reasons, LILCO's " calculated choice" to provide for sheltering and general evacu-ation planning, but not to engage in specific evacuation planning for hospitals is rea-sonable and prudent, and is not a significant deficiency precluding the requisite reason-able assurance finding.E l

Conclusion For the reasons stated above, LILCO requests that the Commission reverse ,

the Appeal Board's determinations that (1) Contentions 22.B and 22.C were impermissibly excluded for litigation and (2) more detailed evacuation plans for the hos-pitals on the edge of the EPZ are required by NRC regulations.

Respectfully submitted, 30/ The buildings have a shielding factor of 0.2, meaning each patient would be pro-tected from 80 percent of the whole body dose that he would receive if he were out-of-doors. Miele, Tr. of May 10,1984 at 8885; s_e_e PID at 773. An accident sequence which would produce doses to hospital patients exceeding the upper EPA PAG limit of 5 rem whole body is an " extremely low probability event." PID at 842.

31/ In the Limerick case cited by the Appeal Board, the asserted shortcoming in PECO's plan was deemed "not significant for the plant in question" because it con-cerned only backup, not primary protective measures. ALAB-819, 22 NRC 681 at 715-16 (1985), review declined, CLI-86-5, 23 NRC 125 (1986). Similarly, evacuation is only a backup protective action for the hospitals in or near the Shoreham EPZ, and sheltering is the primary measure. Therefore, even if a shortcoming in the evacuation plan is established, it would not be significant within the meaning of 10 C.F.R.

S 50.47(c)(1).

I

/)( Halci P rWin" #'j Ja es N. hristman Ka hy E . McCleskey Scott D. Matchett HUNTON & WILLIAMS 707 East Main Street P.O. Box 1535 Richmond, VA 23212 DATED: October 9,1986 l

Appendix: Text of Contention 22

" Revised Emergency Planning Contentions" dated July 26,1983, at 36-47 Contention 22: Inadecuacy of LILCO's Proposed 10-Mile Plume Exposure Pathway Emergency Planninst Zone ("EPZ")

Preamble to Contention 22. 10 C.F.R. Section 50.47(a)(1) prohibits the NRC from issuing an operating license absent a finding that emergency preparedness exists for the offsite area surrounding a nuclear power plant. The Commission must find that the state of emergency preparedness provides " reasonable assurance that adequate pro-tective measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency." Id.

A major source of radiation exposure in the event of a radiological emergen-cy is that received as a result of direct contact with a radioactive plume and/or from inhalation of radioactive gases and particles within the plume. Thus, the NRC requires the development of a plume exposure EPZ around each plant as the basis for planning for a radiological emergency.10 C.F.R. Sections 50.47(b)(10),50.47(c)(2) and Appendix E, Sections II.N.2 and IV.

"EPZs are defined as the areas for which planning is needed to assure that prompt and effective actions can be taken to protect the public in the event of an ac-cident." NUREG 0654,Section I.D.2. The "overall objective" is to provide planning and a state of preparedness that will permit implementation of protective actions if expo-sure to the public is projected to be above the EPA's Protective Action Guides ("PAGs").

10 C.F.R. Section 50.47(b)(10) requires that planning for protective actions must be consistent with Federal guidance such as the PAGs. Under the PAGs, protective ac-tions should be commenced in the event of potential exposure of members of the public in the range of one to five rems. NUREG n654,Section I.D.1.

Under the NRC's rules, plume exposure EPZs are generally 10 miles in radius.

However, the 10-mile size is not an absolute: "[t]he exact size and configuration of the EPZs surrounding a particular nuclear power reactor shall be determined in relation 1 -__ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ___

to local emergency response needs and capabilities as they are affected by such condi-tions as demography, topography, land characteristics, access routes, and jurisdictional boundaries." 10 C.F.R. Section 50.47(c)(2). See also NUREG 0654,Section I.D.2.

Contention 22. LILCO proposes a plume exposure pathway EPZ of approxi-mately 10 miles in radius, (See Plan Figure 3.5.1 and Appendix A, Figure 3.) Interve-nors contend that LILCO's proposed 10-mile EPZ is inadequate in size. Under the site specific circumstances existing on Long Island, an EPZ larger than 10 miles and perhaps as large as 20 miles is necessary. The bases for Intervenors' contention that a plume exposure pathway EPZ greater than 10 miles is required are: the site specific conse- ,

quences which would be experienced in a severe Shoreham accident, special topographic, geographic, governmental and social conditions existing on Long Island; i the fact that LILCO's 10-mile EPZ does not provide a sufficient base for expanding emergency response to larger areas should the need arise; the evacuation shadow phe-nomenon; and the need to avoid having the EPZ divide population zones and govern-mental entities. These bases are described in greater detail in paragraphs A-D below.

Contention 22.A. The radiological consequences of a severe accident at Shoreham are likely to be experienced at serious levels at distances greater than 10 miles from the plant. A Shoreham-specific consequence analysis (F.C. Finlayson and Edward P. Radford, " Basis for Selection of Emergency Planning Zones for the Shoreham Nuclear Power Plant, Suffolk County, New York,"(Draf t), October,1982) has been con-ducted which takes into account, among other things, the meteorological and topographic characteristics of the areas surrounding the Shoreham plant. This analysis based on local conditions demonstrates that in the event of a core-melt accident at Shoreham, there could be doses far in excess of PAG levels at the edge of the 10-mile EPZ propsed by LILCO.

In the event of an especially severe Shoreham accident, persons in areas be-yond the LILCO 10-mile EPZ would have a 35 percent chance of receiving 200 rems and a 60 percent chance of receiving 30 rems. (200 rems represents the threshold level for early deaths; 30 rems is the level at which detectable damage to the body occurs).

Even in the event of a less severe accident, persons in areas beyond the LILCO 10-mile EPZ would have a 50 percent chance of receiving 10 rems, and a 20 percent chance of receiving 30 rems. These projected doses are well above PAG levels. At 20 miles from the plant, there is less than a one percent chance of receiving a 30 rem dose (de-tectable physical damage can result from such a dose) for the spectrum of representa-tive core melt accidents. For more severe core melt accidents, at 20 miles there is less than a one percent chance of receiving 200 rems.

An EPZ larger than 10 miles is necessary in order to provide planning and preparedness for protective actions necessary to mitigate doses that could produce early injuries or death, and to ensure that persons will be prepared to take protective actions in those areas most likely to experience radiation doses above the PAG levels.

NUREG 0654,Section I.D.2., recognizes the need to be prepared to take protective ac-tions at distances beyond 10 miles from the plant but appears to assume that for most situations a base planning area of 10 miles readily permits expansion of planning to the area beyond 10 miles. This is untrue on Long Island for the reasons described in parts B and C below and for the additional reason that emergency response is to be undertaken by LERO, a LILCO creation which lacks capability in an emergency to augment its re-sponse needed for the 10-mile area. Hence, detailed advance planning for a larger area is required. The Intervenors believe that given the site specific consequences of a se-vere accident at Shoreham, an EPZ of approximately 20 miles is justified. In any event, in light of such consequences, the 10-mile EPZ proposed by LILCO is inadequate and should be enlarged.

Preparedness beyond the 10-mile EPZ proposed by LILCO is further required .

by 10 C.F.R. Section 50.47(b)(10), since "[g]uidelines for the choice of protective ac-tions during an emergency, consistent with Federal guidance, (must be] developed and in place." The Shoreham specific consequence analysis demonstrates that under certain accident scenarios, exposures of five rems or more are likely out to 20 miles from the plant. The Federal PAGs require the commencement of protective actions at a poten-tial exposure of one to five rems. In failing to provide for the commencement of pro-tective actions anywhere beyond a 10-mile EPZ, the LILCO Plan is thus inconsistent with Federal PAGs and in violation of 10 C.F.R. Section 50.47(b)(10).

Contention 22.B. The NRC has recognized that in the event of certain seri-ous accidents, protective actions would need to be taken beyond a 10-mile EPZ. See NUREG 0654,Section I.D.2 at 11 and 12. The site specific characteristics and conse-quences of a severe accident at Shoreham would make such protective actions essential to comply with the Federal PAG guidance and 10 C.F.R. Section 50.47(b)(10).

The area of Long Island which surrounds Shoreham, particularly the area which lies east of the Shoreham nuclear plant and east of LILCO's proposed EPZ (including the towns of East Hampton, Southold, Shelter Island, most of Riverhead and virtually all of Southampton), possesses a number of distinguishing characteristics, which taken together, contribute to the need to plan beyond the 10-mile EPZ proposed by LILCO. Among these distinguishing characteristics are the following:

1. A significant seasonal increase in population, particularly during the five months of May through September;
2. A highly transient, dispersed seasonal population, much of which depends upon limited public transportation:
3. A road network which is inadequate to accommodate this seasonal pop- .

ulation and which is heavily congested during ordinary seasonal conditions; l

4. Due to Long Island's configuration, the inadequate road network on the north and south forks connects to two principal east-west arteries, the Long Island Ex-pressway and Sunrise Highway, both of which pass through or very close to LILCO's proposed EPZ;
5. The area east of the EPZ provides no means of exodus to the east, meaning that persons deciding to evacuate must travel toward and through LILCO's EPZ. Studies show that large numbers of people in this area will spontaneously evacu-ate toward the EPZ;
6. The governmental resources available to control, communicate with, direct, shelter, provide security and otherwise accommodate this seasonal population are inadequate. Further, as noted in part A, no governmental resources will be avail-able and thus all response is a LILCO responsibility. LILCO's LERO lacks capability to expand response to an emergency from the 10-mile EPZ to a larger area unless detailed .

advance planning is in place. (This might be different if governmental entities have greater resources and experience than LILCO were participating in the response); .

7. One of the five towns east of the EPZ (Shelter Island) is itself an island, ,

which further aggravates its traffic and transportation concerns; and,

8. In addition to the complications caused by seasonal population, trans-portation east of the EPZ is affected by flooding and snow storms at various times dur-ing the year.

Intervenors contend that these site specific characteristics which exist for Shoreham demonstrate that local emergency response needs and capabilities require planning and preparedness beyond LILCO's proposed 10-mile EPZ. Such planning and preparedness are necessary to assure the existence of an adequate response base to sup-port expanded response efforts which may be required in the event of a serious acci-dent. LILCO has failed to provide planning or preparedness for any area beyond 10 miles from the plant, despite the site specific consequences which could result from a

severe accident at Shoreham. Thus, the LILCO Plan does not provide a substantial base - .

for the expansion of response efforts which is likely to prove necessary and such efforts could not be developed during the course of an accident based on LILCO's Plan. This is contrary to the guidance of NUREG 0654,Section II.D.2 and 10 C.F.R. Section 50.47(b)(10).

Contention 22.C. An EPZ larger than 10 miles is required for the additional reason that people from outside the 10-mile EPZ will attempt to evacuate, whether or-dered to do so or not. Without planning and preparedness for an area beyond 10 miles, which takes local conditions (see C above) and voluntary evacuation into account, the voluntary evacuation will impede the evacuation of persons within the 10-mile EPZ and -

will result in inadequate protection for persons both inside and outside the 10-mile EPZ.

Thus, in light of local conditions and the voluntary evacuation which will exacerbate the effects of such local conditions, an EPZ that is larger than 10 miles is required.

LILCO's plan essentially ignores any planning for voluntary evacuees and thus is inade-quate. (For a detailed discussion of voluntary evacuation (the " evacuation shadow" phe-nomenon), see Contention 23).

An EPZ larger than 10 miles is further necessary to provide planning and 4 .

preparedness for the education, notification, and safe movement and relocation of the large number of people likely to be on the roads in the event of a Shoreham emergency.

A high proportion of the voluntary evacuees will be from the eastern end of Long Is-land. Due to their perception that they would be trapped if the wind blew to the east, many East End residents will choose to evacuate in the event of an emergency at '

1 l Shoreham. In voluntarily evacuating, they will move to the west, in some cases enter-ing the 10-mile EPZ. In order to protect these people.. and to ensure that their volun- ,

tary evacuation does not adversely affect people within 10 miles of the plant, the EPZ gh must be extended so that detailed planning encompasses the people to the east of the

, plant.

2

Further, large numbers of people to the west of the plant may also voluntari-ly evacuate, creating congestion for those attempting to leave the 10-mile EPZ pro-posed by LILCO and also affecting the safety of those people east of the plant who may also voluntarily evacuate. Extension of the EPZ to the west to encompass those per-sons who may be involved in protective actions is essential.

LILCO ha:; not ade'quately provided for communications, security, blockades, relocation centers, medical facilities or any other protective actions for the area out-side the proposed 10-mile EPZ in order to mitigate the impact of spontaneous evacua-tion on the adequacy or implementability of protective actions in LILCO's proposed 10-mile EPZ, or to prevent any such impact altogether. Failure to develop at this time emergency planning measures for the area outside tbo 10-mile EPZ will result in uncontrolled, chaotic evacuation should a serious accident occur at Shoreham, thereby l affecting LILCO's efforts to manage the evacuation (jf persons within its EPZ and caus-

' y ing fear, panic, accidents, looting, possible violence' and other phenomena beyond the control of the officials in the area east of the EPZ. Thus, an EPZ of larger than 10 miles is necessary to achieve compliance with 10 C.F.R. Section 50.47(a)(1).

Contention 22.D. 10 C.F.R. Section 50.47(c)(2) provides that two elements essential to defining the configuration of an EPZ are the location of local jurisdictional boundaries and demographic conditions. Thus, it is good emergency planning practice to include, if possible, the entire area of a local municipality within the boundaries of an EPZ. At a minimum, an EPZ should avoid dividing major population centers within a local municipality. See NUREG 0654,Section I.D.a.

LILCO's EPZ fails to meet the criteria of 10 C.F.R. Section 50.47(c)(2) and NUREG 0654 because the proposed LILCO EPZ runs thorough and divides the villages of Port Jefferson and Terryville and the town of Riverhead. The EPZ should be extended to include all of Port Jefferson and Terryville and additional portions of Riverhead

(those portions in the area 1-2 miles to the immediate east of the proposed EPZ which contain dense population and Riverhead's business district).

f e

i

1 LILCO, October 9,1986 DOLKETED USNkC

! CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

'86 0CT 10 P2 :05 In the Matter of LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY OFFIC:. u- h e CL (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit ig0CKET tg":j r!:

Docket No. 50-322-OL-5 f

I hereby certify that copies of LILCO'S BRIEF ON THE THREE ISSUES ADDRESSED IN THE COMMISSION'S SEPTEMBER 19 ORDER were served this date upon the following by Federal Express as indicated by an asterisk, or by first-class mail, postage prepaid.

Lando W. Zech, Jr., Chairman

  • Alan S. Rosenthal, Esq., Chairman U.S.- Nuclear Regulatory Commission Atomic Safety and Licensing 1717 H Street, N.W. Appeal Board Washington, DC 20555 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Fif th Floor (North Tower)

Commissioner Thomas M. Roberts

  • East-West Towers U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 4350 East-West Highway 1717 H Street, N.W. Bethesda, MD 20814 Washington, DC 20555 Gary J. Edles, Esq.

Commissioner James K. Asselstine

  • Atomic Safety and Licensing U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Appeal Board 1717 H Street, N.W. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 Fif th Floor (North Tower)

East-West Towers Commissioner Frederick M. Bernthal

  • 4350 East-West Highway U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Bethesda, MD 20814 1717 H Street, N.W.

Washington, DC 20555 Dr. Howard A. Wilber Atomic Safety and Licensing Commissioner Kenneth M. Carr

  • Appeal Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 1717 H Street, N.W. Fif th Floor (North Tower)

Washington, DC 20555 East-West Towers 4350 East-West Highway William C. Parler, Esq. Bethesda, MD 20814 General Counsel U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Morton B. Margulies, Chairman 1717 H Street, N.W. Atomic Safety and Licensing Washington, DC 20555 Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission East-West Towers, Rm. 407 4350 East-West Hwy.

Bethesda, MD 20814

e )

Dr. Jerry R. Kline Fabian G. Palomino, Esq.

  • Atomic Safety and Licensing Special Counsel to the Governor Board Executive Chamber U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Room 229 East-West Towers, Rm. 427 State Capitol I 4350 East-West Hwy. Albany, New York 12224 Bethesda, MD 20814 Mary Gundrum, Esq.

Mr. Frederick J. Shon Assistant Attorney General Atomic Safety and Licensing 2 World Trade Center Board Room 4614 ,

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission New York, New York 10047 l East-West Towers, Rm. 430 .

4350 East-West Hwy. Spence W. Perry, Esq.

  • Bethesda, MD 20814 William E. Cumming, Esq.

Federal Emergency Management Secretary of the Commission Agency Attention Docketing and Service 500 C Street, S.W., Room 840 Section Washington, DC 20472 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 1717 H Street, N.W. Mr. Jay Dunkleberger Washington, DC 20555 New York State Energy Office Agency Building 2 Atomic Safety and Licensing Empire State Plaza Appeal Board Panel Albany, New York 12223 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 Stephen B. Latham, Esq.

  • Twomey, Latham & Shea Atomic Safety and Licensing 33 West Second Street Board Panel P.O. Box 298 U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Riverhead, New York 11901 Washington, DC 20555 Jonathan D. Feinberg, Esq.

Bernard M. Bordenick, Esq.

  • New York State Department of Oreste Russ Pirfo, Esq. Public Service, Staff Counsel Edwin J. Reis, Esq. Three Rockafeller Plaza U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Albany, New York 12223 7735 Old Georgetown Road (to mailroom) Ms. Nora Bredes Bethesda, MD 20814 Executive Coordinator Shoreham Opponents' Coalition Lawrence Coe Lanpher, Esq.
  • 195 East Main Street Karla J. Letsche, Esq. Smithtown, New York 11787 Kirkpatrick & Lockhart Eighth Floor Gerald C. Crotty, Esq.

1900 M Street, N.W. Counsel to the Governor Washington, DC 20036 Executive Chamber State Capitol Albany, New York 12224

f ..

Martin Bradley Ashare, Esq.

  • Dr. Monroe Schneider Eugene R. Kelly, Esq. North Shore Committee Suffolk County Attorney P.O. Box 231 i H. Lee Dennison Building Wading River, NY 11792 Veterans Memorial Highway',

Hauppauge, New York 11787

~'

a~ thy E . McCleske

/

Hunton & Williams (

707 East Main Street l P.O. Box 1535 Richmond, Virginia 23212 DATED: October 9,1986

_.

Retrieved from "https://kanterella.com/w/index.php?title=ML20215D696&oldid=3238997"