ML20151P182
| ML20151P182 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Site: | Shoreham File:Long Island Lighting Company icon.png |
| Issue date: | 04/18/1988 |
| From: | Casey S, Latham S, Zahnleuter R KIRKPATRICK & LOCKHART, NEW YORK, STATE OF, SOUTHAMPTON, NY, SUFFOLK COUNTY, NY, TWOMEY, LATHAM & SHEA |
| To: | NRC ATOMIC SAFETY & LICENSING APPEAL PANEL (ASLAP) |
| References | |
| CON-#288-6138 LBP-88-02, LBP-88-2, OL-5, NUDOCS 8804260103 | |
| Download: ML20151P182 (346) | |
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
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Ensa.
L Inttoduetton......................................................................................................... 1
)- IL Emergency Phaatag Exercises and the Funda ment al Flaw S t andard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 A. m Licensing Board Properly Considered the Issue of Plan Im ple mentability....................................... ......... .... ..... ........ 3
) 8. A "Fundamental Flaw" Is ht Which Precludes a Finding of Re asonable Assuranc e . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
- 1. N History of the Fundamental Flaw Standard............................................................................................ 10
) 2. The Fundamental Flaw Standard Adopt ed by the Board. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 IIL h Fundamental Flaws Found by the Board.......................................................... 20 I
A. Contention EX 41 - N Traffic Im,wdiments.............................................. 20
- 1. The Board's Dec ision. . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... .. . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
- 2. Esa.Judicata Does Not Foreclose the Board's Conclusion ht LILCO's Communications Scheme Is Fundamentally F1 awed..............................................................................................22
- 3. It Was Not All the Evacuation Route C oord ina t oc's F au1 t . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . .. . . . . . ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
- 4. N Board's Finding of a Fundamental Flaw in Communications Is Supported by Substant tal Evidence in the Record...................................................... 26 B. Contentions EX 38, 39, and 22.F - Public Information................................................................................................ 28
- 1. h Boa rd's Dec is ion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 I
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) 2. ' Contentions EX 38 and EX 39 Were Prope r l y Ad m i t t ed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
- 3. hre Was Ample Basis in the Record '
for Finding That LILCO's Plan for Disseminating Public Information Is
) Funda men t ally F 1a w ed. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
- 4. The Board Did Not Err in Assessing the Adequacy of the EBS Messages Used During t he Ex erc ise . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 I
C. Contention EX 40 - Mobilization of Traffic Guides....................................................................................................... 38 ,
- 1. N Board's De c ision. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
- 2. LILCO's Two Arguments for Reversing the
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Board's Contention EX 40 Finding Lack ,
Merit................................................................................................
41
! D. C oa t Ha t ion E X 5 0 - Tra ining . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
- 1. The Tra ining Dec ision . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . 46
- 2. LILCO's Criticisms of the Licensing Board....................................,....... 51
- a. The Licensing Board Did Not Exceed
- Its Jurisdiction Whan It Assessed :
the Adequacy of LILCO's Training )
- Program.................................................................................... 52 i b. The Board Properly Admitted j Con t ent ion EX 5 0. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
- c. Shearon Harris Provides No Analogy............................................ 56
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- d. The Board Did Not Improperly Consider Evidence on Matters Previously Adjudicated................................ 57 ;
- i. The "R ealis m " Tes t i n ony. . . . . . . . . ... ... .... . ..... . . . . . . ... . .. . .. .. . . . .. . . . .. . 58 ,
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- 11. The Organizational Structure l Testimony........................................................................ 59 :
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I 111. The Board's' Conclusion ht LERO Workers Are Amateurs Was Not Based on the "Realism" Testimony....................................................................... 60
- e. The Pos t - Ex e rc ise D rills.. .. .. . . .. . . .. . . .... . .. ..... . .. .. .. .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 61
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l l f. The Board's Conclusion Is Amply l Supported by Evidence in the Record.......................................... 65 l
j g. The Board's Rationale Is Clearly and Pre c isely Ar t icula t ed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
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l IV. Conclusion........................................................................................................ 68 :
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Table of Authorities
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Casas and Nuclear Regulatory Comminston Decisions Eggs.
Union of Concerned Scientists v. NRC.
735 F.2d 1437 (D.C. Cir.1984), satt. denied.
) 46 9 U. S . 1 13 2 ( 19 8 5 ).. . ... . . .. . .. . . . ... . . .... .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. .. . 4,5,10,1 1,12 Carolina Power & Linht Co. (Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Planti, ALAB-843,24 NRC 200
( 19 8 6 ) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 2,1 3 ,14
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Carolina Power & Limht Co. (Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant), CLI-86-24,24 NRC 769 (1986)............................................................................................7-8,9 Carolina Power & Liaht Co. (Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant), LBP-86-11,23 NRC 294 (1986)..............................................................................................56 Carolina Power & Linht Co. (Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant), L3P-85-49,22 NRC 899
( 19 8 5 ) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . pass i m 1
Lona Island Limhtine Co. (Shoreham Nuclear .
Power Station, Unit 1), LBP-88-2,27 NRC
( Februa ry 1, 19 8 8 ) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . pass i m i Lona Island Linhtine Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), CLI-86-13,24 NRC 22 (1986)..............................................................................................42 Lone Island Linhtina Co. (Shorehatn Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), CLI-86-11,23 NRC 577 4 ( 19 8 6) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . pass i m Lone Island Limhtina Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), LBP-85-12,21 NRC 644
, ( 19 8 5 ) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . pass i m i Pennsylvania Power & Linht (Susquehanna Steam Electric Station, Units 1 and 2), LBP-82-30, 15 N R C 7 71 ( 19 8 2 ) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 9,4 2 i
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Ense.
Regulations 10 C F R $ 5 0.47( a )( 1 ) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 6 10 CFR $ 50.47(a)(2)..... ...........................................................4-5 10 C F R $ 5 0.47 ( b)( 7 ) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 5 10 C FR $ 5 0. 4 7 (b)( 10 ). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 10 C F R $ 5 0. 4 7 ( c )( 1 ). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 i
48 Fed. Reg. 16,69 3 Col. 1 ( 198 3)...................... ............... ................ 5 52 Fed. Reg. 4 2,0 8 4 ( 19 8 7 ). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
> Other Authorities NUREG 0654/ FEMA REP-1, Rev.1 (November 19 8 0). . . . . . . .. . . . . . .. . . . . . ... 6,3 5,42
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Aoril 18.1988 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION Before the Atomic Safety and Licensina Aeneal Board
)
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In the Matter of )
b LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY ) Docket No. 50-322-OL-5
) (EP Exercise)
(Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, )
Unit 1) )
l )
) i P LBP-88-2 L latteduction On February 1,1988, the Licensing Board ruled that LILCO's performan'ce during the February 13, 1986 Shoreham exercise ("Exercise") revealed fundamental flaws in LILCO's Plan and LILCO's capability to implement that Plan. The principal flaws involved communications, ',, compt staffing of traffic control points, and training. Lg_ rig.
Island Liahtina Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), LBP-88-2, 27 NRC (February 1,1988) ("Decision" or "LBP-88-2").
LILCO has appealed the Decision, objecting particularly to adverse Board rulings concerning Contentions EX 38, 39, 40, 41, and 50. LILCO's Brief on Appeal from the February 1,1988 PartialInitial Decision on the Emergency Planning Exercise, March 14, 1988 ("LILCO Brief" or "LILCO Br."). The Governments (3uffolk County,.New York State, and the Town of Southampton) oppcse LILCO's appeal.
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LECO alleges multiple errors. First, as overall criticisms, LILCO argues that the Licensing Board defined the "fundamental flaw" standard too broadly, allegedly including problems which are minor or easy to correct, or which have no potential health and safety impact. LILCO argues also that the Board erred by considering issues related to LILCO's capability to implement the Plan. Second, LILCO alleges a host of . errors pertaining to individual contentions, including improper consideration of matters which were tsa. ludicata from earlier Plan litigation; consideration of inadmissible evidence; failure to consider evidence proffered by LILCO; consideration of allegedly "isolated"
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problems; failure to support conclusions with substantial evidence; and failure to articulate the bases and reasons for particular conclusions. J If LILCO's Brief is read in isolation, it conveys the impression that the Board
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disregarded law and the record, and reached unsupportable conclusions about LILCO's Exercise performance. Nothina could be further from the truth. Both the Governments 3
and the NRC ' Staff urged the Board to find that LILCO's performance revealed fundamental flaws.1/ Further, FEMA testified and the Board found that, LILCO's performance was sufficiently deficient to merit r nenative reasonable assurance finding.
3 LBP-88-2 at 6. Thus, LILCO stands alone in asserting that its Exercise performance was adequate.
The Board articulated in detail the bases for its conclusions that LILCO's performance was inadequate. And, it is clear that the Board weighed the evidence carefully in reaching its conclusions. The Board had a large evidentiary record before it (almost 12,000 pages of transcript and prefiled testimony alone) and spent more than 250
, pages in explaining its Decision. The Board was hardly one-sided: it agreed with LILCO on many contentions; when it ruled against LILCO, it was almost always in the ontext of 1/ Sta. Suffolk County, State of New York, and Town of Southampton Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on the February 13, 1986 Shoreham Exercise, Aug.17,1987 ("Gov't. Findings"); NRC Staff's Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions
- of Law on the February 13, 1986 Emergency Planning Exercise, Sept. 11,1987 ("Staff i Findings").
extensive avidence of serious problems reflected in the Exercise, filings by the Govern-ments and Staff urging that fundamental flaws existed, and often a FEMA deficiency finding. There is ample - indeed, overwhelming - support for the Board's conclusions.
LILCO's Brief addresses particular contentions multiple times under multiple
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headings.2,/ Thus, ULCO never addresses in a single discussion the specific issues focused on by the Board. The Gov,ernments have sought to avoid this confusion by structuring this brief to parallel more closely the Licensing Board's Decision. We address first in Section II the fundamental flaw standard and LILCO's general criticisms related thereto. Thereafter, in Section III, LILCO's other arguments are addressed in the context of individual contentions.
)
II. Emergency P1maning Exercises and the Fundamental Flaw Standard LILCO's broad criticisms of the Decision depend on two related arguments: the Board erred by considering proWms related to LERO's inability to implement the Plan, rather than focusing solely on flaws "in the Plan" itself; and the Board improperly defined the fundamental flaw standard adopted by the Commission in CLI-86-11.3/
A. 'Ihe Ucensing Board Properly Considered the Issue of Plan Implementability LILCO's "implementation" argument is as follows:
The Board in its application broadened the "fundamental flaw" test sc as to apply it to plan Lmplementatio_q as distinguished from the plan itself. This extrapolation is inconsistent with the only relevant precedent - Union of Concerned Scientists.
Shearon Harris, and CU-86-11. All three of these cases concern the revelation in exercises of "fundamental flaws" in a plan itself not in performance on the exercise day.
l 2_/ For example, LILCO addresses Contention EX 50 in nine sections of its brief. Sig, i
ULCO Br at 3, 21-22, 36-38, 44-46, 46-49, 49-50, 60-61, 61-63, 66-67.
l l 3/ Long Island Lichtine Company (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1), CU 11, 23 NRC 577 (1986) ("CU-86-11").
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LILCO Br. at 19 (emphasis in original). It is thus LILCO's argument that llCid/ a Shearon Harris Licensing Board decision,5,/ and CLI-86-11 are the 9Bk "relevant precedent (s}" and that they compel a conclusion that issues of plan implementation are ,
I virtually get an.non-litigable la an exercise context.6/
LILCO is wrong. Plan implementation issues are at the hgArt.of the purpose of :
an exercise. Contrary to LILCO's suggestion, the ILC1 court recognized that fact. [
Further, FEMA's witnesses in this proceeding repeatedly made clear during the 1983-84 '
phaalag litigation that consideration of plan implementation issues would be the f central purpose of the Exercise. LILCO's reliance on the Shearon Harris Licensing
- Board decision is misleading. LILCO fails to cite a subsequent Shearon Harris Commission decision which clarifies that plan implementability issues are proper j subjects in exercise proceedings. Indeed, the Shearon Harris decision which LILCO fails i to cite was decided after CLI-86-11 and explicitly cites CLI-86-11 in deciding that plan t
! Implementatility issues ars. proper matters for exercise litigation.
i Under the NRC's regulations, the Commission must base a reasonable assurance finding on a review of i
4 i . . . the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA]
- l findings and determinations as to whether State and local i emergency plans are adequate and whether there is reasonable I assurance that they can be imolemented . . . .
- 4_/ Union of Concerned Scientists v. NRC. 735 F.2d 1437 (D.C. Cir.1984), cert. I denied. 469 U.S.1132 (1985). ;
j 5_/ Carolina Power as Limht Co. (Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant), LBP-85-49, 22 i NRC 899 (1985).
1 i i 6_/ LILCO hedges somewhat in a footnote and suggests that "(c]onceivably" some very serious implementation-related matters might be admissible. It then scoffs at this idea, l given Shoreham's facts. Sg1LILCO Br. at 19, n.12. However, prior to its appeal, LILCO !
l had agreed that implementation issues were relevant. SriLILCO's Opposition to Suffolk County's Motion for Order Compeling LILCO to Respond to Suffolk County's First Set of Interrogatories and Request for Production of Documents, Nov. 21,1986, at 3 (". . . the subject of this litigation is limited to whether the February 13, 1986 exercise itself demonstrated that LILCO's emergency plan is not implementable or that there exist ,
fundamental flaws in the Plan.") (emphasis added). !
l
10 CFR S 50.47(a)(2) (emphasis added). The ILC1 court recognized that information about plan imnlementability is the essential contribution of an exercise (T]he Commission is called upon to consider and weigh evidence presented by FEMA, the licensee, and state and local officials in assessing whether the exercises demonstrate that adeauate emernency crenaredness nians can and will be
~
) innlemented.
EGS, 735 F.2d at 1450 (emphasis added). The emergency planning exercise is a "material factor" in the licensing decision because it reveals whether a plan which appears adequate in the abstract can, in fact, be implemented. In distinguishing emergency exercises from pre-operational testing, which may not provide the basis for g litigation, the ECdcourt wrote:
Emergency preparedness exercises, on the other hand, are not evaluated in terms of preestablished criteria; they are evaluated to ensure that they do not reveal any fundamental inaderuacies in the nature or hglementation tanacity of ,
R. at 1451 (emphasis added). Thus, contrary to LILCO's assertions (LILCO Br. at 19),
3 QC1 does not stand for the proposition that plan implementability matters are irrelevant to an exercisell 2/ Even when the NRC took the position that the results of exercises were not necessarily litigable - a position rejected by the EQ1 court - it recognized that information on the implementability of an emergency plan would be part of the material information revealed by an exercise:
The full-scale exercise is actually an indicator of two factors:
the state of emergency preparedness at the time the exercise is conducted, and whether the emergency plan and the planning process are fundamentally sound. If the outcome of the exercise showed that the plan and the underlying judgments about its adequacy and canability of imolementation were seriously flawed - as opposed to details of its implementation in that exercise not reflectine on the overall adecuacy of the
> plan and its capability of imolementation - reopening of the hearing record might be appropriate . . . .
48 Fed. Reg.16,693 col.1 (1983)(emphasis added).
4 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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Moreover, the process followed by the NRC and FEMA in reviewing emergency plans confirms that testing plan implementability is a key purpose of an exercise. A
)_
plan is first evaluated to determine whether, as written, it comports with regulatory criteria. Once the written plan has been so reviewed, an exercise is scheduled to assess the plan in operation to predict how the plan would work under emergency conditions.
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This is the process that was followed with the LILCO Plan. The Plan was reviewed by FEMA and the OL-3 Board in the earlier 1983-84 Plan litigation.
'!hroughout those hearings, the FEMA witnesses reiterated that the final proof of the Plan's adequacy must await an exercise Q !s it fair to say, Mr. Kowleski, that this plan review has 3
been conducted 1py FEMA and by the RAC committee without consideration, at this time, for whether the plan can and will be effectively implemented by LILCO?
A The plan was reviewed, as I stated, measured against the requirements of NUREG 0654. We did not evaluate whether or i pot the nha is canable of beine innlemented. This would be dou at a later stane during the exercise.
Tr. 12,605-06 (emphasis added) 8/ Thus, FEMA's review processes for plans and 8_/ Sat. Alan, t.igu Tr.12,650 (whether resources specified in the Plan are adequate will be determined during the exercise): Tr. 12,711-12 (whether or not LILCO's backup means of communications will work "is a matter of exercise or test"); Tr.12,724 (people may not be able to implement the Plan, and that would change an evaluation, perhaps, af ter an exercise, but it would not necessarily change the evaluation of the Plan)
Tr.12,753 (issue of bus accessibility, including the drivers getting to the buses and getting the buses to where they would have to be, would be assessed during an exercise)
Tr.12,775 (in the context of a discussion of the criterion for timely activation of the staging areas, "(f] rom a planning perspective, the RAC has concluded that the planning standard has been met. Whether it can be implemented again will be shown in an exercise."); Tr.12,814 (in the context of a discussion of fuel distribution locations, "(w]e have, at this point in time, made a judgment on the planning perspective. Then, we will look at the implementability of the plan during an exercise and, therefore, we might have a different finding."); Tr.12,863 (on the adequacy of the bus transportation scheme,
". . . whatever we saw, whatever we read in the Plan made sense to us, and in our opinion it should work. If it will work, the exercise will tell."); Tr.12,866 ("Again, it is next stage. When we go to the
' stated exercise,forprior the to record, this will the exercise webewillthe spend nextgre step (a-]t deal of time developing exercise objections (sic] and exercise scenario, and we will go to the - and when we go to the exercise we will be well prepared to test, and we will test, whether the scheme is going (footnote continued)
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - . ~
exercises further underscore that plan implementability is a critical exercise issue 9/
The implementability issue was not presented squarely in CLI-86-11, the fir: t
~
case in which the NRC defined a tundamental flaw:
Under our regulations and practice, Staff review of exercise results is consistent with the predictive nature of emergency l planning, and is restricted to determining if the exercise revealed any deficiencies which preclude a finding of reasonable assurance that protective measures can and will be taken, i.e., fundamental flaws in the olan.
23 NRC at 581 (emphasis added). LILCO relles upon the "In the plan" language as the basis for its argument that implementability issues are not to be considered. See LILCO Br. at 16,19. LILCO ignores, howar, the prior clause - the "reasonable
)
assurance" language. Implementation flaws which preclude a reasonable assurance finding certainly cannot be ignored.
A decision in the Shearon Harris proceeding - issued by the Commission g_fitL f i
CLI-86 makes it clear that such implementation flaws must be considered.
Although LILCO relies upon the Shearon Harris Licensing Board decision, it fails to cite this Shearon Harris Commission decision which is directly on point. In this Commission decision, the NRC discussed CLI-86-11 and then proceeded to re-articulate the issues which are appropriate in exercise litigation:
Even though the results of the May 1985 exercise show some problems, they do not show a flaw in planning o_r_
(footnote continued from previous page) to work or not."); Tr.12,977 (on the public information program, "(s]o, basically the effectiveness is if people understand what they are supposed to do in case of an emergency. This would be evaluated du*- the exercise."); Tr. 12,458 (actual implementation of callup system will be verifico during the exercise); Tr.12,543 (when asked if the provisions contained in the LILCO Plan are sufficient to ensure effective communication among LILCO field personnel, "(algain, this is another capability that we would not be able to make a judgment on until there was an exercise").
9/ For the Appeal Board's convenience, the Governments have included some portions of the record on which they rely in a one-volume attachment to this brief. Excerpts from FEMA's earlier testimony are included, as are excerpts from the transcript of the Exweise litigation and copies of the post-Exercise drill reports objected to by LILCO.
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implementation _ that would require another exercise prior to issuance of a full power license. Rather, the May 1985 exercise showed that both planning and implementation were
) adequate to meet the regulatory reautrements.
1 Carolina Power & Llaht Co. (Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant), CLI-86-24, 24 NRC ]
769,777 (1986)(emphasis added)M/ Thus, an exercise must be looked at to determine whether both "planning and implementation are adequate to meet the regulatory requirements." M. Accordingly, the Licensing Board was correct in addressing matters related to the implementability of the LILCO Plan.
Before turning to the fundamental flaw standard, it is appropriate to address LILCO's related "tfi ludicata" argument, o , put another way, LILCO's argument that the Licensing Board engaged in "d_t n_gv_o_ o review" that inflicted "civil double jeopardy" on LILCO. LILCO Br. at 4. For example, LILCO asserts that the Board was wrong to conclude that LERO personnel need to be able to communicate laterally in the field, because the OL-3 Board had approved LILCO's vertical communications system. LILCO Br. at 40-42, citing Long Island Lightine Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1),
LBP-85-12, 21 NRC 644, 729-38, 794-96 (1985) ("PID"). LILCO similarly objects on tai judicata grounds to certain Board rulings concerning mobilization (LILCO Br. at 42-44), public information (M. at 44) and training (M. at 44-46).
The particular bases for the Board's Decision are addressed in the contention-specific discussion in Section III. At this juncture, however, we note that LILCO's tn _fudicata argument basically ignores the fundamental purpose of an exercise: to see whether the plan can actually work. LILCO would seemingly have the Board ignore plan implementation problems which document problems with the way the plan is structured, on the basis that the "structure" in question has been "approved." That ignores realityt 1.E/ Even the Shearon Harris Licensing Board decision relied upon by LILCO held that serious plan implementation problems revealed in an exercise would constitute fundamental flaws. See 22 NRC at 911. That Board also ruled that "(e]ffective communications among emergency personnel are crucial to plan implementation" (M.)
and thus admitted a communications contention.
o the "approval" during plan review, as the FEMA testimony discussed above makes clear, is at best a tentative approval, which must be confirmed at an exercise. If the exercise results convince the Board that the prior conclusions were wrong - that is, that the plan that looked good on paper does not work in practice - the Board is certainly not barred
, from so holding. If that were the "rule," it is hard to conceive what purpose might be served by an exercise. The vommission's guidance is consistent with rejection of LILCO's tsi ludicata argument. Ssg Shearon Harris. 24 NRC at 777 (exercises address
, "both planning and implementation").
LILCO's tsa, ludicata argument is also inconsistent with LILCO's fundamental flaw definition. LILCO claims that a fundamental flaw is, among other things, a "conceptual
) flaw in a plan . . . ." LILCO Br. at 10. If the Board identifies a conceptual flaw - the lack of lateral communications, for example - but that flaw was not identified in the earlier plan review, then LILCO's tri !udleata argument would leave the Board powerless i, to deal with the conceptual flaw. That makes no sense.
B. A "Fundamental Flaw" Is '! hat Which Precludes a Findian of Reasonable Assurance _
The NRC in CLI-86-ll articulated a straightforward definition of a fundamental flaws exercise resul's which preclude a reasonable assurance finding. 23 NRC at 581.
At LILCO's urging, however, the Board expanded upon the Commission's definition and established more restrictive criteria which had to be satisfied before a fundamental flaw could be said to exist. See LBP-88-2 at 7-11. Nonetheless, the Board found multiple flaws arising from the Exercise.
LILCO has no basis to complain about the Board's fundamental flaw definition.
LILCO's real complaint is with itself: its Exercise performance was so defective that it demonstrated fundamental flaws even under the Board's restrictive definition.
i 9
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- 1. Da History of the Fundamental Flaw Standa411 y
Contrary to LILCO's assertions (aan,LILCO Br. at 14-15), the "fundamental flaw" standard was first defined in CLI-86-11. The standard is mentioned in decisions prior to then, including 1[Cland Shearon Harris. But, as discussed below, those decisions do not j support any ruling that the OL-5 Board misinterpreted CLI-86-11.
It is first important to look at what was - and what was not - decided, by the llc 1 court. The petitioners in llc 1 challenged an NRC rule which barred intervenors 3 from contesting the results of emergency preparedness exercises in licensing hearings unless the NRC's stringent reopening standards were met. The llc 1 court rejected reopening as a substitute for the right to challenge exercise results in licensing
> hearings. 735 F.2d at 1443-443.1/
The llc 1 court held that the Atomic Energy Act hearing requirement includes the factual issues raised by emergency planning exercises. R. at 1447. The court then i noted the NRC's argument that emergency phantag exercises were only relevant to the licensing decision to the extent the exercises indicate "that emergency plans are fundamentally flawed." R. at 1448. The lanHa. of this standard was not before the court, however, and the court did not rule on it. R. The court did, however, offer two comments. First, it noted that if the NRC adopted such a standard, "the NRC might still have to defend itself against allegations that it had acted arbitrarily and capri-clously." M. n.20. Second, in the opinion of the ILQ1 court, to avoid summary disposition under such a standard, a party need only "identify and support specific facts upon which a reasonable inference could be drawn that the plan provided inadequate assurances of safety." R. (emphasis added). In short, the most the llc 1 court can 3.1/ If LILCO now urges that the Commission's standard for reopening hearings is equivalent to the standard for finding a fundamental flaw (LILCO Br. at 15 and n.8), that position has been rejected by the llc 1 court.
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accurately be characterized'as saying about a "fundamental flaw standard" is that the litmus test would be "inadequate assurance of safety."M/
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After U_QJ, the Licensing Board in Shearon Harris discussed the fundamental flaw criterion red concluded that it probably could be used to exclude contentions relating to an exercise at the threshold. 22 NRC at 910, n.1. It must be emphasized,
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however, that the Board's decision in Shearon Harris was highly fact-specific. In that '
case, FEMA had made a positive reasonable assurance finding based on *ts evaluation of 3
the Shearon Harris exercise: its overall finding was that "the exercise demonstrated that offsite preparedness is adequate to provide reasonable assutance that appropriate measures can be taken to protect the health and safety of the pub'ic . . . ." M. at 910.
In the case of Shoreham, of evurse, FEMA made no such reasonable assurance finding.
In fact, FEMA's witnesses testified that if FEMA had made an overall finding for Shoreham, it would have been negative. Tr. 7503-05, 8359-60, 8365-66, 8645-46, 8651-52; an LBP-88-2 at 6.
Six months af ter the Shearon Harris Board opinion was issued, and without discussing the Shearm Harris case,M/ the Commission articulated the fundamental flaw standard appilcable in this cases t
12,/ The UCS court noted that the NRC had made emergency preparedness findings more predictive. The court observed:
(E}ven under this amended standard, the NRC requires a successful evaluation of onsite and offsite emergency exercises before it issues a full power operatine license.
735 F.2d at 1445, n.14 (emphasis added). LILCO relies on this "predictive" standard in an effort to rebut the Boatti's findings. LILCO Br. at 19. However, as the EC1 court found, the proper test is whether there is a successful exercise. FEMA's findings on the Exercise make clear that the Exercise was no success.
M/ The NRC did note that LILCO had cited Shearon Harris in support of its argument that the Commission Aould reject contentions "which, as pleaded, do not demonstrate" a fundamental flaw. CLI-86-11,23 NRC at 580 and n.1. This standard was rejected b le Commission. M. at 581. It therefore appears at least by inference that the Commr on in CLI-86-11 rejected any broad reading of the Shearon Harris Licensing Board decision.
)
Under our regulations and practice, Staff review of exercise results is consistent with the predictive nature of emergency planning, and is restricted to determining if the exercise
) revealed any deficiencies which ereclude a findine o f-reasonable assurance that protective measures can and will be taken, i.e., fundamental flaws in the plan.
CLI-86-11, 23 NRC at 581 (emphasis added). The Commission aguted a fundamental
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flaw in a plan with problems, including those arising from implementation difficulties, which preclude a toasonable assurance finding. This is confirmed by a later Shearon Harris Appeal Board decision, which again is not cited by LILCO. Thus, the Shgaron Harris Appeal Board, having the benefit of CLI-86-11, interpreted the term "fundamerital flaw" in terms of the reasonable assurance findingt Although at the time the decision below was rendered the Commission had not spoken on the use of a "fundamental flaw" test, it has since expressly approved this standard. Sgg. Lgng.
Island Lighting Co. (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1),
CLI-86-11, 23 NRC 577, 581 (1986). The Commission therein made it clear that the term "fundamental flaw" means a "deficienefvl which precludelsi a finding of reasonable assurance that protective measures can and will be taken."
Carolina Power & Licht Co. (Shea:on Harris Nuclear Power Plant), ALAB-843,24 ?:RC 200, 215 n.11 (1986) (emphasis added).
LILCO maintains it is "clear" from UCS. Shearon Harris (the ASLB decision; not the ALAB decision), and CLI-86-11 that both the courts and the NRC have recognized:
- 1) that an exercise comes at the end of a long plan review process: 2) "that the concept of exercise litigation should be reviewed broadly with an eye towant whether the exercise disclosed major, fundamental problems in an emergency plan sufficient to justify reopening a hearing record"; and 3) that "the NRC was content to apply tne much stricter reopening standard before litigating an exercise." LILCO Br. at 15. The first point has never been in dispute. LILCO's second two points, however, state the unlawful position taken by the NRC e promulgating the rule struck down by the UCS l
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court. It was not adopted in Shearon HarAs_ or in CLI-86-11. LILCO's standard must be rejected here as well.
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- 2. De Fundamental Flaw Standard Adonted by the Board What emerges from the history of the fundamental flaw standard is that the
) standard has one key component exercise results which preclude a reasonable assur-ance finding constitute fundamental flaws. That was what was stated by the Commission in CLI-86-11 and the Appeal Board in ALAB-843. The Governments and I
the Staff each urged the Board to adopt essentially that standard; only LILCO sought a different standardJ.8/
Each of the parties addressed the fundamental flaw concept in post-hearing briefs. While the Governments and the Staff basically urged a definition focur,ed on the
.l.$/ On the final day of the Exercise hearing, the Board asked the parties to define "fundamental flaw." The NRC Staff defined the as follows:
A fundamental flaw means a deficiency which precludes a finding of reasonable assurance that protective measures can and will be taken.
i Tr. 8921. De Governments offered a similar definition:
In the context of an exercise proceeding, fundamental flaws are exercise results, events, and/or omissions which singularly (sic) or with other results, events or omissions preclude a finding of reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken on the basis of the LERO plan.
Thus, they reflect pmblems in the plan and/or its implementation which preclude a reasonable assurance finding.
Tr.8919-8920. LILCO proposed a more restrictive definition:
A fundamental flaw is a pervasive, systemic, conceptual flaw in a plan that has been revealed by an exercise which, if not fixed, prevents the issuance of s license because it 3.ffects the l public health and safety. It is not readily correctable by j egalpment or training but requires far-reaching changes to the plan because it is a fundamental defect in the way an f emergency plan is conceived.
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Tr.8917-18. Seg.ghq L3P-88-2 at 7-8,10, i
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CLI-86-11 reasonable assurance standardM/ LILCO proposed a restrictive three part test.E/ First, the threshold test, according to LILCO, was whether, in a real emergency, the alleged flaw would have substantially affected the health and safety of the public. Next, the problem must be systemic or pervasive, rather than merely one or
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more isolated and essentially independent problems. Finally, the alleged. problem must not be readily correctable by means of additional training, new equipment, or some other reliable and verifiable methods rather, it is a problem that is only susceptible of j correction through substantial, potentially far-reaching revision of the written emergency plan. LILCO Findings at 8.
For reasons already discussed, LILCO's test could have been rejected outright.
j The teet articulated in adjudicatory decisions (CLI-86-11 and AI.AB-843) is whether the flaws preclude a reasonable assurance finding. Any new test was beyond the Board's power to impose.
> Nevertheless, the Board essentially adopted LILCO's test. LBP-88-2 at 8,10.
Although LILCO complains that the third element of its test (not readily correctable) I was "apparently rejected" by the Board (LILCO Br. at 17), an analysis of the Board's
) Decision reveals that this was not the case. For each of the fundamental flaws it found, the Board suggested clunges to the LILCO Plan. In some instances, perhaps, one may argue about how "substantial" or "potentially far-reaching" the suggested changes are or must be; however, any such quibbling would be merely speculative unless and until the suggested changes have been made and tested in an integrated fashion in another exercise.
El StaStaff Findings at 3-6; Gov't. Findings at 6-13.
M/ LILCO's Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on the February 13, 1986 Emergency Planning Exercise for Shoreham, Aug. 3,1987 ("LILCO Findings"), at 6-12; LILCO's Reply to Intervenors' and NRC Staff's Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on the February 13, 1986 Shoreham Emergency Planning Exercise, Sept. 25,1987 ("LILCO Reply Findings"), at 6-16.
1 For example, to address the communications problems revealed by the Exercise, the Board suggested that LILCO re-vamp both the training program and the LERO
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communications structure. LBP-88-2 at 53, 217. To address the problems the Board found in LILCO's ability to communicate with the public, the Board recognized that changes are needed in the EBS messages and in the nature of the training given the
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LILCO Spokesperson. I_d_. at 233.11/ Similarly,' the Board recognized that the LILCO Plan must be changed in its provisions for alerting, briefing and/or equipping field workers if their mobilization time is to be improved over what was demonstrated at the Exercise. See 11. at 88 (noting Plan changes LILCO has already made to ensure more prompt dispatch, but leaving it to "emergency planners to devise a means to eliminate l
these flaws"). Further, FEMA itself had suggested changes for the areas in which it found deficiencies.18/
In short, LILCO has no basis to complain about the Board's fundamental flaw standards the Board essentially adopted LILCO's test. Yet, LILCO does complain. Its complaints appear largely to concern the Board's judgments in apolving the fundamental flaw standard in the context of Shorehe 's facts. We therefore address most of LILCO's specific complaints in the context of the individual contentions. We demonstrate there - with reference to the facts established below, to the extent possible, given the depth and breadth of the evidentiary record in this proceeding -
that the Board's judgments are fully supported by the record and that there is no basis
.l.1/ Simply to address FEMA's more limited criticisms of LILCO's public information dissemination during the Exercise, LILCO changed its entire procedure for getting information concerning the status of the emergency to rumor control personnel, more than doubled the number of copying machines available and moved the ENC to a i different facility. Daverio et al., ff. Tr. 3206 ("LILCO EX 38/39 Testimony") at 6, 24-l 25.
.l_8/ See. e_gy FEMA Report at 39, 75. LILCO's third fundamental flaw criterion also included the issue whether the problem was correctable by "training." See LBP-88-2 at
- 7. The Board could not possibly adopt such a criterion in this case, however, since it found that LILCO's fundamental flaws included serious deficiencies in the training program. See Section IU.D below. The Board obviously could not rely on a flawed training program to correct other flaws.
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for the Appeal Board to second guess those judgments. In this Section, however, we address some of the arguments which pervade LILCO's Brief.
First, LILCO appears to argue that the Board violated the fundamental flaw test by finding relatively minor or a_si_ hoc day-of-the-Exercise problems to constitute fundamental flaws. E_ g.u LILCO Br. at 20-21. The facts do not support LILCO. As it had earlier at the contention admissibility stage,.l9/ he t Board rejected defects which were non pervasive, unrelated to a problem with LILCO's Plan, readily correctable, or unlikely to affect the public health and safety.2q/ Thus, there is compelling evidence that the Board carefully considered the seriousness of each problem.
Second, LILCO charges that the fundamental flaws found by the Board are based l
on a few "isolated" events. Ste., gg., LILCO Br. at 2, 3, 9, 50. As demonstrated below in Section III, this is not true. But assuming arnuendo that it were true, there is no I
reason why a single, isolated event or occurrence should not constitute a fundamental flaw. If a single isolated event precludes a reasonable assurance finding, CLI-86-11 requires it be deemed a fundamental flaw. This makes good sense, as is illustrated by an example from the Exercise.
One of LILCO's fundamental flaws involved, in part, the failure of the LERO Evacuation Route Coordinator to inform his superiors and co-workers of two simulated impediments after receipt of FEMA's free play messages detailing the impediments, i .l.9_/ The Board denied admL ion of Contention EX 23 on :he ground that it described only a "minor or a_d. hoc" problem. Prehearing Conference Order (Ruling on Contentions and Establishing Discovery Schedule), Oct. 3,1986 at 15 ("Oct. 3 Order"). Similarly, the Board rejected Contentions EX 27 and EX 28 because the problems alleged were judged to be minor and readily correctable. [d at 16.
20/ S_gg, gau LBP-88-2 at 243 (lack of LERO workers' adequate knowledge of personal radiation protection is not p. fundamental flaw because it would not affect public health
! and safety); id_. at 103 (a few monitors taking too long to monitor is not a fundamental flaw); i_d at 130 (timing of ENC activation was acceptable, since the opening occurred prior to release and the only protective action recommendation was school closing); id at 160 (Board will not consider contention concerning misleading information in EBS messages about Traffic Guides further, as LILCO has committed w reword the i
messages).
! l
Y and his failure to include complete information on the impediments in the communications that were relayed to other personnel.. LILCO would have the Appeal Board reverse this fundamental flaw finding on the basis that it allegedly is an isolated event involving the performance of one individual on the day of the Exercise and thus
) does not rise to the level of a "fundamental flaw." E_&, LILCO Br. at 2.
As a result of the Evacuation Route Coordinator's errors, however, it is questionable whether LILCO could have implemented an orderly evacuation of the EPZ.
Two major evacuation routes were blocked but pertinent response personnel were not alerted or informed about this situation. What this illustrates with respect to the LILCO Plan is revealing: the improper actions of a single individual in a mid-level posi-tion within the LERO hierarchy had the effect of substantially impeding LERO's response. This demonstrates a glaring fundamental flaw in the LILCO Plant there are insufficient checks and balances within LERO to prevent the actions of one individual from significantly disrupting an emergency response. Thus, even a single, isolated event, depending upon the circumstances, can reveal a fundamental defect and vulnerability in the structure of a plan.
Third, LILCO argues that the Licensing Board was required to analyze whether each error would have had, in and of itself, a significant impact on public health and safety.21/ As discussed in Section III, the Board often did link flaws to public health and safety. However, the Board was under no obligation to make a specific finding that each problem which formed a basis for a fundamental flaw conclusion had to, in and of 2_1/ For example, LILCO lists its version of the "shortcomings" the Licensing Board found in LILCO's press conference performance and then complains that "the Board did not even discuss, much less determine, that each would have substantially affected the public health and safety." LILCO Br. at 27 (emphasis added). Similarly, in discussing the inaccurate information given by Dr. Brill concerning weathering factors, LILCO charges l that "there was no finding by the Board that this single statement at a press briefing would have had an impact on public health and safety." II. at 33 (emphasis added). And again, LILCO states that "the Licensing Board neglected to explain why the dated nature l
of the infr nation given to individuals by Rumor Control would significantly affect l public health and safety." II. at 32.
l f-itself, have a significant impact on public health and safety. Nothing in CLI-86-11 3 imposes such a requirement. In fact, since the emergency planning regulations are not premised on specific dose reduction criteria, it would be inconsistent with the regulations to require a showing that each specific defect has a specific health and
) safety impact.2_2/
Further, LILCO's argument ignores the purpose of emergency planning exercises.
Until a plan is exercised, it is merely a collection of individual procedures, divided by
> facility or workers' functions. The purpose of an exercise is to see whether what is set down on paper can be integrated into a coordinated response. If it cannot be - if the major parts do not work individually and/or in conjunction with each other - there i cannot be reasonable assurance that adeqrate protective measures can and will be taken to protect the public health and safety. It was not the Licensing Board's duty to attempt to separate out and quantify (assuming this can even be done) the precise i
impact of cuch problem on public health and safety. Rather, the Board looked at and .
examined the numbers and types of problems in major portions of the Plan and in their implementation and determined that in some areas (for example, communications, mobilization, and wide areas of the training program), problems were so manifest and serious that the necessary reasonable assurance finding was precluded. No more precise inquiry by the Board was required.
Fourth, LILCO proposed that the Board reject as non-fundamental any flaws which LILCO alleged were readily correctable. The Board appears to have accepted this criterion to a degree.E/ It should have rejected the criterion outright. The CLI-86-11 criterion is clear on its face: a problem constitutes a fundamental flaw if it 2_2/ The NRC's amended 10 CFR S 50.47(c)(1) specifically rejects any such dose assessment analyses. S_qn, 52 Fed. Reg. 42084 (1987) (emergency plans are to be evaluated without reference to the specific dose reductions which might be achieved under the plan).
El E_a,., LBP-88-2 at 160 (LILCO commitment to reword messages acceptable to Board).
precludes a reasonable assurance finding. The Commission in CLI-86-11 made no mention whether an extremely serious problem which perhaps appears to have a rela-
)
tively easy "fix" should or should not be considered to be a fundamental flaw.
Moreover, whether an item is easy to fix is not alway clear. Thus, FEMA noted that j~ the adequacy of LILCO's fixes could not be determined in the abstract but, rather, would require a further exercise. Tr. 7506-09, 7914-16, 7950-51. In any event, the fact that LILCO believes the particular matters are readily correctable is a matter for later adjudication, subsequent to a later exercise.
Somewhat inconsistently, LILCO objects to the Board's discussion concerning possible correction of some flaws which were identified. Fe,r instance, LILCO objects to the Board's "gratuitous discussions" regarding whether LILCO is capable of correcting certain deficiencies. LILCO Br. at 4; see hi_. at 62; LBP-88-2 at 63-64,173-
- 74. LILCO itself had urged, however, that a criterion which the Board should adopt was whether defects could be corrected. That is precisely what the Board did in these instances. LILCO's complaint is not with the Board's process but with the results:
LILCO lost and it thus complains. It demonstrates no error, however.
Finally, LILCO attempts to make a major issue out of the question whether a FEMA "deficiency" is the same thing as a fundamental flaw under CLI-86-11. LILCO Br. at 17-18. This issue requires no Appeal Board resolution. The Board suggested that l a FEMA deficiency might be more serious than a fundamental flaw. LBP-88-2 at 7-9.
However, the issue played no part in the Board's Decision. Indeed, the Governments asserted that for all practical purposes, there was no significant difference between a deficiency and a fundamental flaw, particularly since each rests upon consideration whether a reasonable assurance finding can be made. Gov't. Findings at 7-13. LILCO's attempt to make this distinction into a major issue is much ado about nothing.
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IIL ne Fundamental Flaws Found by the Board A. Contention EX 41 - ne Traffic Impedirnents
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During the Exercise, FEMA introduced two traffic impediments into the scenario by means of "free-;. lay" messages. The message concerning the first impediment - a multiple vehicle collision involving a gravel truck and three cars - was input at approximately 10:40. The second impediment, an overturned fuel truck, was simulated to occur at approximately 11:00. LBP-88-2 at 29-30,34-35.
These accidents were typical of the simulated impediments that FEMA customarily injects into exercises. See Tr. 8539-40. LILCO's response was atypical: it was one of the worst ever witnessed in FEMA Region II. Tr. 8234-35. The Board analyzed in detail what occurred, and when, in connection with these two impediments.
LBP-88-2 at 29-40. Rather than repeat those details, we refer the Appeal Board to the two chronologies contained in the Board's Decision. Id. at 29-31, 34-37.
The bottom line is that it took LILCO three and a half hours to simulate clearance of the gravel truck impediment. LBP-88-2 at 29-31. And then,15 minutes after the impediment was simulated to have been cleared (i.e.. at 1:45 on the day of the Exercise)
LERO simulated to broadcast an EBS message which announced for the first time that the impediment existed. Id. at 31. Similarly, it took LILCO three hours and forty minutes to deal with the fuel truck impediment. Id. at 34-37. These delayed results were only achieved because of FEMA prompts. Id. at 34, 38-39.
LILCO does not dispute the facts concerning its response to the impediments.
Rather, it disagrees with the conclusions the Board drew from those facts. LILCO maintains that: (1) the Board's conclusion that LILCO's Plan is fundamentally flawed because it does not permit lateral communications among field workers lacks factual basis and fails to treat the prior emergency planning decision as r_e_s _iudicata (LILCO Br. at vi, 40-42, 60); (2) the Board erred because it found a fundamental flaw based solely on problems created by one Exercise participant (id. at vi, 2, 51-59); 3) the Board's
-_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - - . - _ - - - _- - u
I. -
finding of a fundamental flaw in communications was based on isolated and unrelated events (R. at 50-51); and, (4) the Board improperly based its finding on actions taken
)
during post-Exercise drills, rather than on events during the Exercise (R. at vi,46-49).
Before we address LILCO's individual arguments, it is important-to set out what the Board did find. Its careful decision regarding Contention EX 41 received cavalier treatment by LILCO.
- 1. 'Ibe Board's Decision The Board began its analysis of LILCO's response to the impediments by discussing
)
the Plan's provisions for removal of impediments. LBP-88-2 at 18-22. The Board then examined the facts m1ating to the mobilization of LILCO's Road Crews - the field workers responsible for actually dealing with impediments. Although the Board concluded that the dispatch of Road Crews should have, been accomplished more quickly,2_4/ it ultimately determined that the four crews dispatched initially could have handled accidents occurring early in the evacuation process. Thus, the Board found timt the slow mobilizativa of LILCO's full complement of Road Crews did not rise to the level d
of a fundamental flaw ~ R. at 22-28.
Next, the Board set out the chronology of the responses to the two impediments.
LBP-88-2 at 28-40. Having synthesized the facts, the Board then analyzed what those facts revealed in terms of LILCO's communications abilities, the actions taken to clear the impediments, and the rerouting schemes developed to mitigate the impact of the impediments. R. at 42-58. Although the Board noted problems in LILCO's actions to clear the impediments (once the appropriate people had been informed of them), it declined to find a fundamental flaw in this area as well. R. at 53-55. As to rerouting, I the Board concluded that reasonable experts may differ on the merits of proposed rerouting schemes. Sss.R. at 55-58.
2_4/ At the time a General Emergency was declared, less than 25 percent of the Road Crew personnel needed to implement LILCO's Plan had been mobilized. LBP-88-2 at 24.
Y The Board found, however, that LILCO's untimely response to the two impediments revealed that LILCO's communications were inadequate. Even with allowance for the fact that the impediments were simulated via use of free play messages introduced at the EOC, serious inadequacies remained with how LILCO handled the impediments. These inadequacies, in the Board's view, demonstrated a fundamental
)
flaw. LBP-88-2 at 48-50. Thus, the Board concluded that "the communication system in LILCO's Plan is fundamentally flawed in that it inherently hampers response to j unexpected events." M. at 53. In concluding that this fundamental flaw stemmed from LILCO's communications structure, the Board relied heavily on FEMA's conclusion to the same effect. R. at 55.
The Board also noted that communications problems persisted during subsequent
)
drills. Se_g.LBP-88-2 at 50-51. However, the Board's finding of a fundamental flaw did not depend on this evidence. Sag, regu M. at 61 ("Clearly the problem that was demonstrated to be a fundamental flaw in the LILCO Plan by the February 13, 1986 (Exercise) continued to plague LERO's performance as late as the October 1,1986 drill");
M. at 217 ("Because the consequences of poor communication durina the Exercise, resulted in a finding of a Deficiency by FEMA and a Fundamental Flaw by us . . . .")
(emphases added).
Finally, using the evidence from tha post-Exercise drills, the Board concluded that the steps LILCO had taken to fix the problems, steps including the addition of a Traffic Engineer to the staff at .the EOC, had failed to cure the fundamental flaw in the Plan -
its deficient communication structure and procedures. LBP-88-2 at 63. The Board then expressed doubt as to whether utility personnel can ever achieve the level of performance that professional emergency workers display. I_si._
- 2. Esa.Judicata Does Not Foreclose the Board's Conclusion That LILCO's Communications Mame Is N= mentally Flawed LILCO argues that the Board's determination that the Plan is flawed because it does not permit lateral cornmunication among field workers is barred by re.utludicata or "final agency action." LILCO Br. at vi, 40-42. Certainly, the Board viewed lack of
)
lateral communications between f'ield workers as part of the problem in LILCO's flawed communications scheme. See LBP-88-2 at 251. However, the other problem with LILCO's communications scheme, its relentless verticality, was also noted by the Board.
)
Indeed, it was this aspect of the scheme, with the resultant delays and replication of inadequate or erroneous information, which was most graphically illustrated by LILCO's
)
response to the impediments.
Of course, a necessary implication of LILCO's vertical system is that it lacks lateral lines of communications - but this lack of "laterality" is not confined to the lack 3
of lateral communications among field workers. Indeed, it was the lack of lateral communications at the EOC which FEMA specifically condemned. FEMA Ex.1 at 39.
Thus, even if it had not also concerned itself with the arrangements for communications 3
among field workers, the Board necessarily condemned the communications plan approved by the prior planning Board by concluding, based on the response to the ,
impediments, that LILCO's communication system "inherently hampers response to
, unexpected events." See LBP-88-2 at 535/ It thus appears that LILCO is arguing that the Exercise Board was barred from any inquiry into the adequacy of.the communications system in LILCO's Plan 5/
2_/ LILCO contends that the Decision is "internally inconsistent" and "lack (s) coherent reasoning" because it found both the vertical communications and LILCO's lack of lateral communications among workers in the field to be fundamental flaws. LILCO Br. at 40, n.29. LILCO is wrong. First, it was not solely the lack of lateral communications among t
field workers which the Board condernned. See LBP-88-2 at 53, 250. Second, as we I
discuss above, a solely vertical system necessarily implies a system lacking lateral capabilities.
2g/ In this regard, it must be recognized that, even if it were found that the Board improperly attributed the problems it found, in part, to the inability of field workers to communicate with one another, the fact remains that FEMA, the Governments, and all
, three judges below found fundamental flaws in LILCO's implementation of its l communication system. $_u.LBP-88-2 at 43-44, 254-56.
l I
The doctrine of r_na. ludicata. however, is inapplicable to the Board's finding of a fundamental flaw in LILCO's communications system. The Board's finding that LILCO's communications plan was shown, during the Exercise, to be untenable does not intrude on the prior planning Board's finding that the Plan appeared workable when viewed in the abstract. To hold otherwise would completely ignore the two-step nature of the emergency plan evaluation process called for by the regulations. S_st Section II.A.
aboveb1l The OL-3 Board's conclusion was, moreover, based on assumptions which even the limited simulation of emergency conditions during the Exercise proved inaccurate. For example, the OL-3 Board had relied on LILCO's representations that:
Traffic guides need not communicate directly with each other to ensure coordinated information concerning traffic conditions because that information will be assessed at the staging areas and directions from staging areas to traffic guides can be given. Personnel at staging areas, in turn, can communicate with the EOC traffic control point coordinator who will analyze traffic conditions on a large scale and give directions to those at the staging area.
PID, 21 NRC at 730-31. Similarly, LILCO had maintained that "{slince actions to be taken in the nuclear emergency situation are preplanned . . . the need for information to flow from the field to the control organizations and back down again is predominant over the need for workers to solve problems on their own." IA. at 731. These representations and LILCO claims were proved wrong during the Exercise. Indeed, what the Exercise 27/ As Judge Shon (who had also served on the OL-3 Board) noted during trial, the prior phaning Board made "predictive" findings. Sgt Tr.1265. Those findings were based on the evidence then available. It was within the Exercise Board's mandate to reach different conclusions, if Exercise events established that LILCO's paper plan could not be implemented under the simulated emergency comittions of the Exercise.
Moreover, to have turned a blind eye on what the Exercise revealed about the workability of LILCO's communications scheme would have been particularly inappropriate, since, as the Exercise Board noted, the OL-3 Board hardly gave LILCO's vertical (or "administrative") communications structure an enthusiastic endorsement. LBP-88-2 at 52,254; agg.PID,21 NRC at 737 ("(W]e find that LILCO's administrative communications system is a ureful provision for emergency response, even though there can be little doubt that the broadly versatile system the police advocate is in the final analysis a superior one.").
.)
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demonstrated was that the expert opinion first advocated by Suffolk County's police witneises during the planning litigation was correct: not all actions during an emergency ,
can be preplanned; and even if a vertical systera works on paper, it may not work in real life.
LILCO questions the Boa-d's conclusion that lateral communications between field workers could have helped LILCO respond to the impediments. LILCO asserts that there was no evidence that its problems resulted from lack of communications between field workers or that lateral communications would have helped. LILCO Br. at 42, 60. Of course, the Exercise did not provide direct evidence on this point. LILCO's vertical plan
- the one which was exercised - could not yield this information specifically. The Board did have before it, however, evidence of the failure of LILCO's vertical plan, and the testimony of expert police witnesses describing how the problems LILCO faced during the Exercise could have been better and more quickly addressed by communications between knowledgeable personnel in the field. Sam, em Roberts et al.,
ff. Tr.1134 ("SC EX 41 Testimony") at 76-78; Tr.1194-95,1198-99,1246-48, 2338-39. ,
This evidence affords ample support for the Board's finding. ,
- 3. It Was Not All the Evacuation Route Coordinator's Fault LILCO attempts to minimize the seriousness of its problems in handling the traffic impediments by arguing that the problems were created by a single Exercise participut, the Evacuation Route Coordinator. LILCO Br. at vi, 59. Indeed, LII.CO asserts that "the Board took the Evacuation Route Coordinator's inaction and, without explanation, parlayed that single individual's response into two ' fundamental flaws,' one ,
in communications and the other in the training program." M. at 2.
First, even if LILCO's characterization of the Board's conclusion were correct, the i fact that the LILCO Plan is structured so that a "performance problem" by one individual
! can compromise LILCO's entire impediment response is, in itself, a fundamental flaw.
i l
4
)
Egg, Section ILB.2 above. Thus, LILCO's own argument underscores the inherent
^
unworkability of a communication scheme structured in a solely vertical manner.
?
Second, LILCO's argument is not supported by the facts. Many LILCO employees made errors in responding to the impediments and the problems caused by them. For example, LILCO's inadequate and untimely response to the gravel truck impediment can also be attributed to the Lead Traffic Guide at the Patchogue Staging Area, the Trat sportation Support Coordinator at the EOC, and the Evacuation Coordinator and others althin LERO responsible for preparing and issuing EBS broadcasts or other information ta the public. Even more LILCO personnel were to blame for the delays and problems associtted with the fuel truck impediment, including the Lead Traffic Guide at Port Jefferson, the Road Logistics Coordinator, the EOC Communicator, the Port Jefferson Stagiag Area Coordinator, the Traffic Control Coordinator, and, again, the Transportation Support Coordinator and the Evacuation Coordinator and others responsibla for preparing and disseminating emergency information to the public3.8/-
Thus, while the Evacuation Route Coordinator was clearly a key player in LILCO's impediment response debacle, he did not stand alone. Many LERO personnel made errors in responding to the impediments: if anything, LILCO's inadequate response was a team effort.
- 4. 'Ibe Board's Finding of a Fundamental Flaw in Communications Is Supported by Substantial Evidence in the Record LILCO argues that the Board "strung together" a series of isolated events to "create" a fundamental flaw in communications. LILCO Br. at 50. LILCO's complaint appears to be that because its numerous communications failures did not share the same 28/ Sag.nenerally. FEMA Ex.1 at 36,37,41; Lieberman et al., ff. Tr. 272 ("LILCO EX 41 Testimony"), at 15, 25, Atts. B.5, B.8, C.10, C.20, C.21; Suffolk EX 41 Testimony at 24, 36-37, 44, 46-47, 49, and Att. 2; SC Exs.15,16; Tr. at 543-44, 564, 646-50, 827, 855, l 996-99; gag.glao.LBP-2-88 at 31, 35, 36.
l
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direct causes, the Board had no basis for finding them all to be "communications" problems. See LILCO Br. at 3.
LILCO has missed the point. In each instance, there was a demonstrated failure -
whether caused by the communication system itself, the LERO workers' inability to realize that a "planned" responte was inadequate or superceded by even.ts, the LERO workers' failure to folloiv the Plan, or an equipment problem - to convey timely, accurate, and adequate informatbn to the persons who needed it. The effects of these failures, moreover, were intensified by LERO's passive acceptance of the communications problems.
For example, the LERO Spokesperson did not realize the need to obtain details about the impediments or attempt to get them. When the xerox machine broke down at the ENC, no alternative action to get necessary information to LILCO's rumor control personnel was taken. When Dr. Brill gave out inaccurate information at the ENC, no one immediately corrected him. Nor did anyone recognize the inconsistencies and ambiguities in the EBS messages and act to correct or explain them. Even af ter it was recognized that the Evacuation Route Coordinator's inaction had delayed LILCO's initial
- response to the impediments, no action was taken to make up the lost time. Thus, there was ample evidence for the Board's finding of a pervasive "all encompassing" communications flaw in LILCO's Plan. The system in the Plan is cumbersome, and LILCO's personnel demonstrated themselves incapable of overcoming the built-in shortcomings of that system.
Finally, LILCO argues that the Licensing Board erred because the Board based its finding of a fundamental flaw in LILCO's response to the impediments on actions taken in post-Exercise drills. We address the issue of the post-Exercise drills in Section III.D below, and thus will not discuss them in detail here. The Governments do emphasize, 1
l however, that the Board found that a fundamental flaw was demonstrated during the l
l Exercise. LBP-88-2 at 61, 217. The evidence of the post-Exercise drills confirmed that
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the same problems persisted, and effectively rebutted LILCO's claim that the impediment response problems during the Exercise were due just to the anomalous
?
performance of the Evacuation Route Coordinator during the Exercise. See id_ at 216.
B. Contentions EX 38. 39 and 22.F - Public Information
, LILCO's problems with communications also dogged its efforts to implement its plan for disseminating information to the media and the public. As the Board stated at the beginning of its Decisiom
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Breakdowns in communications occurred within LERO as well as between LERO/LILCO on the one hand and the public and media on the other.
Errors occurred not only with respect to procedures, but also with respect to the substance of the information transmitted. Confusing and conflicting information was furnished to the public, and erroneous information to the media.
LBP-88-2 at 3-4.
LILCO alleges an inability to understand how many fundamental flaws the Board found in LILCO's public information plan. Sg_e_ e LILCO Br. at 27. There is no mystery:
the Board found three fundamental flaws. First, the Exercise revealed a fundamental flaw in LILCO's methods for getting copies of the EBS messages into the hands of the people who need them (iau the media representatives at the ENC and the personnel in LILCO's rumor control system who are responsible for responding to telephone inquiries from the public and the media) and in the information conveyed by the EBS messages, because the messages contained numerous inconsistencies. Sie, LBP-88-2 at 138-39, 168.2_9/
Second, the Board found that LILCO's inability to give accurate information at press conferences constituted a fundamental flaw. LBP-88-2 at 148,158. Finally, the Board concluded that the confusing and conflicting information LILCO promulgated during the Exercise demonstrated a fundamental flaw because, as a result of those l
1 2_9/ Under the LILCO Plan, EBS messages are generated at the EOC, then sent to the ENC. LILCO EX 38/39 Testimony at 13; OPIP 3.8.1.
I
[
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information problems, it is improbable that LILCO could achieve the controlled y
evacuation required by the Plan. Id at 170-71.
In its scattered discussion of the Board's handling of the public information issues,30/ LILCO has failed to describe accurately the evidence the Board relied on, and
- the sense and methodology of its Decision. For example, in discussing the "isolated events" at the ENC which the Board relied on, LILCO summarizes the public information problems as the failure of two copying machines, two incomplete answers 3
by the LERO Spokesperson, two remarks by a LILCO consultant, and three phrases from EBS messages. See LILCO Br. at 9. The Board had before it, and relied on, far more than this. S_gg.Section III.B.1 below. LILCO then criticizes the Board for failing to
- assess the health and safety effect of each problem revealed by the Exercise. See, e_.g.,
LILCO Br. at 21, 27, 31, 33, 35, 66. Having excised much of the evidence the Board relied on and the Board's reasoning, LILCO then accuses the Board of reaching a
, decision without basis and of failing to articulate its rationale with sufficient clarity.
I_d at 59-60, 63-69. Finally, LILCO also charges the Board with two additional. errors:
in admitting Contentions EX 38 and EX 39 in the first place (LILCO Br. at 20-22); and, in intruding on "final agency action" when it identified problems in the EBS messages (i.d_. at 44).
The foregoing criticisms are without merit. Indeed, simply reading the Board's Decision (let alone examining the extensive record evidence cited by the Board and underlying the conclusions it reached) reveals that the Board did not err. We thus begin detailed discussion of these contentions by setting forth the Board's ruling.
- 1. h Board's Decision At the outset of its discussion on these contentions, the Board sets out and resolves one area of dispute: the role of the media. The Board took a middle ground between the parties' viewpoints on this issue, concluding that if the media is not E/ Sag,LILCO Br. at vil, 3, 9, 20-21, 22, 27-36, 44, 59-60, 65-66.
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provided with clear, timely and accurate information, it will be at best a neutral influence and at worst detrimental to an orderly response. LBP-88-2 at 124-27. The
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media has an "important; role to play in ensuring an orderly public response to an emergency." M. at 138-39.
The Board agreed with LILCO, the Staff and FEMA in rejecting the
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Governments' argument that the ENC was activated too late in the emergency. LBP-88-2 at 127-29. The Board then set out the undisputed facts concerning the delays in' LILCO's posting and distribution of news releases and EBS messages to the media and to rumor control. R. at 130-39. FEMA had assessed a deficiency as a result of LILCO's delays in providing EBS messages 'o the media, and up-to-date information to rumor control. Id. at 133-34. The Board discussed LILCO's proposed remedy to the problem, but noted that FEMA had withheld review of these fixes and that, even if FEMA finds LILCO's changes facially adequate, the changes must be evaluated in an exercise. M. at 137. The Board agreed with the Governments that failure to keep rumor contrni i
personnel advised of the current state of emergency response was a fundamental flaw; the evidence showed that the persons LILCO had designated to field inquiries from the public were consistently two hours behind the information available to the public via the EBS messages. R. at 138. The Board added:
Consistent with our view that the media have an important role to play in ensuring an orderly response to an emergency, we agree with FEMA's assessment of a deficiency with regard to the failure to promptly provide the EBS messages to the media, and regard that failure as an integral part of the above mentioned fundamental flaw.
R. at 138-39.
Next, the Board turned to the press conferences simulated during the Exercise.
After setting out the facts established at trial concerning the LERO Spokesperson's 45 minute delay in informing the media of the noon evacuation recommendation, the Board concluded that the Spokesperson should have immediately conveyed this information.
)
Her waiting might have given rise to the inference that information was being withheld.
The Board did not deem this problem a fundamental flaw in and of itself, however.
)
LBP-88-2 at 141-42. The Board also agreed with LILCO that (with the exception of information about the impediments), most of the information given out by the Spokesperson was accurate. It concluded that "[t}he fact that the information was not
)
adeauate to resoond to the media's needs clearly results from the fact that the Spokesperson was reporting simulated events and thus did not have detailed Information." R. at 145 (emphasis added). She should, however, at least have been able
)
to respond to questions concerning the impediments to the extent the details sought were written in the free play messages which had introduced the impediments at the EOC. R. at 145-46. The LERO Spokesperson, moreover, erroneously reported the gravel truck impediment cleared more than an hour before it actually was,31/ and, t three hours after the fuel truck impediment arose, she was unable to give the details concerning it. Eat 146.
The Board then analyzed the evidence adduced concerning alleged misstatements made to the press at the ENC. It dismissed two of these misstatements, although proven, as trivial. LBP-88-2 at 147. It found the Spokesperson's misstatement of the Protective Action Recommendation ("PAR") at the first press conference more serious; ;
she should have been able to give complete and accurate information concerning the PARS. The Board also found that LILCO or LERO should have corrected Dr. Brill's erroneous dose calculation based on his assumption of an incorrect "weathering factor" and they should have taken precautions to ensure that Dr. Brill would not contradict
. LERO's PARS.32. / R. at 148. The Board found that these failures, together with the 31/ Further, after she told the media the gravelimpediment had been cleared, an EBS message telling the public to avoid it was broadcast. S_g.p.LBP-88-2 at 31.
l l 3_2/ LILCO claims that the Board's conclusion that no one corrected Dr. Brill's querying of the LERO evacuation recommendation "Is in direct conflict with the uncontradicted testirnony of LILCO witnesses during the hearing." LILCO Br. at 33.
(footnote continued)
{
l . - -- - - _ - . - __- - - - - _ - . - - - _ - . - - - .- ___-
l Spokesperson's inability to provide accurate responses to questions about the traffic
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impediments, rose to the levol of a fundamental flaw. M.
After concluding that LILCO's press conference efforts were fundamentally flawed, the Board considered the allegations concerning rumor control's handling of j simulated inquiries from the media and the public during the Exercise. Although the Board found that the Governments had proven the alleged time lapses in rumor control's response, it noted that accuracy is more important than immediacy of response and thus 3
found no fundamental flaw. LBP-88-2 at 151-52. The Board then considered the adequacy of the responses given. Although the Board agreed that LILCO's rumor control personnel gave incomplete responses to numerous callers, and that this illustrated a lack of good judgment, this lack of judgment did not, in the Board's view, rise to the level of a fundamental flaw. M. at 153-56.
The Board also devoted extensive discussion to the adequacy of the contents of
, the EBS messages simulated during the Exercise. It pointed out that LILCO agreed that some of the EBS messages contained information about the Traffic Guides which was potentially misleading, but declined to consider this matter further, since LILCO had agreed to fix the messages. LBP-88-2 at 160. The Board also rejected the County's arguments that the messages should have contained more specific information about the radiation risk. M. at 163-64.
Next, the Board set out three problems with the EBS messages which were conceded by LILCO.33_/ The Board noted that, aside from the three problems even (footnote continued from previous page)
This mischaracterizes the record. S_eo.Tr. 3572-74; LILCO EX 38/'19 Testimony, Att. P at 59-61. The Governments submit that a clear issue of credibility arose here, and that the Board resolved it against LILCO.
3,,3/ EBS No. 2 stated that "A very minor release has occurred" and then, in the same l message, stated that a release was "not imminent." This message was recognized as j additionally inconsistent and confusing because it failed to explain why dairy animals l needed to be sheltered while people were advised to take no action (aside from figuring l out what evacuation zone they lived in). EBS No. 7 reported an expected thyroid dose (footnote continued)
LILCO conceded were in the messages, the County's witnesses testified about additional problems. This testimony was "essentially uncontroverted," and the Board found three of the problems significant: the messages' reference to dose projections, while the LILCO news releases and LILCO Spokesman used the term dose rate projections; the use of various adjectives to describe the magnitude of the release without providing some quantification of the terms; and, finally, the failure of the messages to explain the emergency classification levels or put them in perspective. LBP-88-2 at 167.
LILCO variously attempts to dismiss the problems in the EBS messages as "criticisms of a few phrases" (see LILCO Br. at 3), "a few inconsistencies" (see id. at 35), and "three statements occurr{ing} in the context of eleven EBS messages" (see id.
at 34). In addition to thus understating the number of problems, LILCO fails to point out that many problems occurred in more than one message, and that each message was simulated to be aired repeatedly at 15 minute intervals.
The OL-3 Board had concluded that "reasonable people need and will seek infermation on which to base their actions, particularly in the urgent conditions of emergency. If the information is inadequate or conflicting, they may act inappropriately. If it is complete and consistent, they will accept and use it as intended." PID, at 21 NRC at 662. Because during the emergency planning litigation, LILCO's experts convinced the Board that LILCO's planned public information efforts would overcome Long Islanders preexisting fear of radiation and LILCO's lack of credibility, and ensure that LILCO's PARS would be followed, that Board ruled against the Governments on the issue of shadow evacuation. It noted, however, the contingent nature of its predictive finding:
The Board's ultimate finding on this contention strongly depends on there being clear nonconflicting notice and instructions to the public at the time of an accident. If for any reason confused or conflicting (footnote continued from previous page) of 40 percent of the EPA evacuation guidelines at 10 miles downwind of Shoreham, while simultaneously and without explanation telling people that if they were outside the 10-mile zone, there was no reason to take any action. LBP-88-2 at 165-67.
J
information was disseminated at the time of an accident, the Board accepts that a large excess evacuation on Long Island could materialize.
) Id_. at 670.
The Exercise Board correctly concluded that LILCO's public information efforts during the Exercise belied it.s earlier representations that it could achieve compliance
) with its protective action recommendations through dissemination of consistent, timely, accurate information, 'thus bringing the OL-3 Board's conclusion that an excess evacuation could occur into play. Since the controlled (i.e. guided by Traffic Guides)
) evacuation3 _4/ required by LILCO's Plan probably could not be achieved, the Board found, as a result, that there was a fundamental flaw in the Plan. LBP-88-2 at 169-172.
- 2. Contentions EX 38 and EX 39 Were Properly Admitted
) LILCO argues that the Board erred in admitting Contention EX 39 because rumor control is not a primary means of communication under the LILCO scheme. Thus, its shortcomings are not likely to affect the health and safety of the public. LILCO Br. ct i 20-21. LILCO also argues that, in admitting EX 38, the Board "ignored that threshold element of the fundamental flaw test", i.e.. that the alleged flaw affect the public health and safety. Ld_. at 22. Neither argument has merit.
t 3._4/ LILCO mainta'ns that the Exercise Board merely speculated that a shadow evacuation could have occurred and that a controlled evacuation could not be achieved.
LILCO Br. at 35. The Board did not "speculate." It made a sound finding, fully supported by the evidence adduced in both the Plan litigation and the Exercise litigation.
LILCO also claims that the Board erred in concluding that a controlled evacuation was required and that the Board "never gave notice nor took evidence on whether a controlled evacuation was required." I_d_,. We address in Section III.C. below LILCO's belated claim that a controlled evacuation was not required. As to LILCO's complaints 4
concerning lack of notice of this issue, the Board's order ruling on the admissibility of contentions clearly put LILCO on notice:
If Intervenors prevail on Contentions EX 38 and EX 39 and the evidence is sufficient to conclude that a large shadow evacuation will occur, Intervenors will be free to claim that this constitutes a fundamental flaw l in the_ plan because the evacuation could not be control 1 d_3.
2 l
Oct. 3 Order at 26 (emphasis added).
LILCO's assignment of error concerning the admission of Contention EX 38 should be rejected outright. LILCO at, no time prior to this appeal objected to the i
admission of the contentiom LILCO does not oppose the admission of Contention EX 38 to the extent that the enumerated problems (1) involve communications of the offsite L organization and (2) are alleged to collectively disclose a systemic problem in the dissemination of information. -
LILCO's Objections to Intervenors' "Emergency Planning Contentions Relating to the February 13, 1986 Exercise, Aug. 15,1986 ("LILCO Objections") at 26.3,_5/ This is
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precisely what the contention alleged and the Board found: the problems litigated under EX 38 collectively disclosed a systemic problem in LILCO's ability to disseminate information at the ENC.
i LILCO did object to the admission of Contention EX 39, urging the same grounds as raised in this appeal. LILCO's Objections at 27; ans, a_ lao _ M. at 124. The Board's treatment of this argument at the contention admission stage is as correct today as it was then: ,
LILCO's objection is not persuasive since the numerous bases asserted might collectively reveal a fundamental flaw in the plan if proved. The ability to deal with rumors or inquiries from the public was thought to be important enough to test by the designers of the exercise and we assumed from that that it is material to a licer. sing decision.
Oct. 3 Order at 21. The experience of Three Mile Island showed the importance of rumor control in achieving an orderly response from the public; it was considered important enough to be mandated in the regulations. 533.NUREG 0654 5 ILG.4.c.; agg.
Alto.10 CFR 5 50.47(b)(7). Certainly LILCO has presented no basis for questioning the judgment of the regulators that coordinated arrangements for dealing with rumors are l 35/ LILCO did object to the admission of subparts EX 38.A and EX 38.0. LILCO l Objections at 124. But the Board resolved subparts A and O in LILCO's favor. LBP-l 88-2 at 130,157.
1
\
necessary in order to provide reasonable assurance that adequate protective measums 1
can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency.
) 3. There Was Ample Basis in the Record for Finding 'Itat LILCO's Plan for Disseminating Public Information Is Fundamentally Flawed l
The basic fallacy in LILCO's arguments that the Board erred in finding LILCO's
) ,
public information plan fundamentally flawed is LILCO's assertion that the Board had to l find that each problem, considered in isolation, had to affect the public health and safety.E/ This simply is not the test. The Board could not consider Dr. Brill's misstatements and the Spokesperson's misstatements each separately from the other. It had to consider the impact of all the inadequacies on the overall effectiveness of LILCO's press conference effort. Then, to resolve the issue left open by the OL-3 Board, it had to consider the integrated impact of LILCO's press conferences, its dissemination of the EBS messages, the contents of the EBS messages themselves, and the rumor control system on the information environment as a whole.
- Based on the extensive evidence before it, the Board found (as part of LILCO's pervasive problems in communications generally) that LILCO cannot communicate emergency information and PARS to the public. LPB-88-2 at 171, n. 48. The ability to communicate such information is the s_laaua non of protecting the health and safety of the public in a radiological emergency. It thus is not surprising that the Board felt itself under no compulsion to intone this tautology ritualistict.lly at every turn.
Nonetheless, the Board did explicitly state this truism often enough to satisfy even LILCO's strictures. LBP-88-2 at 148, n.42 (". . . the provision of inconsistent information by LERO, LILCO, or its consultants in an emergency situation is detrimental to the public health and safety."); id_ at 158 (to find a fundamental flaw in l
! M/ See, em LILCO Br. at 33 ("No impact on the public health and safety by l Dr. Brill's isolated opinion was shown.'); i.s1. at 32 (". . . one response, taken in the light of a day's worth of press briefings and over 100 questions answered for the public, truly elevates the trivial.").
)
LILCO's delay in providing EBS messages to rumor control but not the media
". . . would exalt form over substance to the detriment of public health and
)
safety.")d7/
- 4. 'Ibe Board Did Not Err in Aming the Adequacy of the EBS Messages Used During the Exercise 2 LILCO asserts that the Board erred because its fundamental flaw finding was partly based on problems in the prescripted EBS messages "reviewed and accepted" during the prior planning litigation. LILCO Br. at vil,30,44.
When these messages were litigated in the abstract, it was not known what other information LILCO would be disseminating in conjunction with them. Thus, for example, it was not known that LILCO would fail to put the Emergency Classification Levels into perspective, or fail to explain the differences between and the reasons for LERO's use of "dose projections" and LILCO's use of "dose rate projections." It also was not known that LILCO would fall to explain why animals needed to be sheltered, while people just needed to know where they live, or that some member of the public information staff would "edit" EBS No. 2 so that it would simultaneously state that "no release was imminent" and that a "minor release had occurre6."
In short, the problems in the prescripted EBS messages were not focused until actualimplementation during the Exercise demonstrated which messages would be used, in which order, and in conjunction with what other information. The Exercise performed its function in revealing these problems, and the Board performed i_ts l
l 3_7/ Suffolk County submitted evidence, drawn from survey data and focus group studies, demonstrating the effect of the messages LILCO used during the Exercise on i the Long Island public, and documenting the high percentage of the population who would use LILCO's rumor control system in a real emergency. Evans et al., ff. Tr. 3786
("SC EX 38/39 Testimony") at 152-168,172-77,188-222, Att.14. This evidence was admitted, but the Board found it unnecessary to consider it, given its resolution of the issues on other grounds. LBP-88-2 at 171. If there were doubt concerning the impact LILCO's public information efforts would have on the public, this evidence must be considered. The Governments submit that it would put any such doubts to rest.
1
I function in assessing them.38/ Once these problems were clearly revealed by the Exercise, the Board would have been derelict in its duty had it ignored them.
)
C. Contention EX 40 - Mobilization of Traffic Guides
- 1. 'Ibe Board's Decision
) LILCO's Plan requires Traffic Guides to guide evacuees and encourage them to adhere to the evacuation routes prescribed by the Plan. They are to accomplish this by using traffic control strategies and techniques, such as blocked lanes, barricades, and the
> channelization of portions of the evacuation network. Roberts et al., ff. Tr. 2180 ("SC EX 40 Testimony") at 16; Plan, Appendix A, at IV-5 thru -72e and V-2; OPIP 3.6.3. They are also expected to expedite traffic flow out of the EPZ by controlling and routing traffic through selected intersections, otherwise known as Traffic Control Points
("TCPs"). SC EX 40 Tes.timony at 16; see OPIP 2.1.1. The evacuation time estimates for a controlled evacuation are based on the assumption that "[r]equired personnel to control traffic are mobilized and in place at the outset of the evacuation process, or soon thereafter." Plan, Appendix A, at V-2; see LBP-88-2 at 67-68.39_/
38/ The Appeal Board should also be aware that, although LILCO did move to strike portions of Suffolk County's public information testimony (see LILCO's Motion to Strike Portions of Suffolk County's Testimony on Contentions EX 38, 39, 22.F, 44, 40.C and 49.C (Public Information), April 6,1987), it did not seek to strike the evidence concerning the EBS messages. Tr. 3112-13. In fact, LILCO attached copies of the Exercise messages to the testimony of its own witnesses, and repeatedly made the point that the EBS messages were the primary means of communication with the public; it also argued that since LILCO's EBS messages were so good, the other problems with l LILCO's public information would not matter very much. See. gig , LILCO EX 38/39 1
Testimony at 5-7, 11-14 and Att B. Given this, it is much too late for LILCO to attempt to withdraw the EBS messages from issue.
39/ Ihe Board accepted for purposes of its Decision that safety is reasonably assured by a controlled evacuation. Ses_LBP-88-2 at 84-86. A controlled evacuation is achieved l M. "mobilization of all field workers (is) substantially com?l eted in three hours (after declaration of a Site Area Emergency] and Traffic Guides lare) in place approximately one hour af ter an evacuation recommendation (is issued]." Id.i at 72, 76, 84-86; g.es, also PID,21 NRC at 720,723; Tr.1665-68. According to the Board, Traffic Guides must be in place within one hour, because that is when congestion of the roadways is expected to occur. If they arrive later, they "lose" their ability to expedite traffic flow. LBP-88-2 at 79,84; an,also LILCO Br. at 23, n.15.
FEMA structured the Exercise to test the PID's assumption that LILCO could i
mobilize quickly enough to conduct a controlled evacuation.40/ Sag, FEMA Ex.1, at xiv-xviii,14, 21-22; Tr. 8136, 8569. For purposes of evaluating the results of this test, Traffic Guides had to be substantially in place no later than the onset of traffic l congestion, or one hour after the evacuation order was issued. LBP-88-2 at 84. Applying this standard, the Board found that "large numbers of TCPs were not staffed until well after traffic congestion would have occurred." R. at 86. FEMA had already reached the same conclusion, having given LILCO a deficiency with respect to its ability to mobilize Traffic Guides in a manner sufficient to protect public health md safety. LBP-88-2 at 70-71; FEMA Ex.1 at 74-75; Tr. 8093; agg. Alan. SC Ex.106; FEMA Ex.1 at 64. This conclusion was concurred in by the Staff and the Governments. Sam.LBP-88-2 at 82-83,
- 87. Accordingly, the Board concluded that a controlled evacuation would probably not have been achieved, and found LILCO's Plan, as it applies to the staffing of TCPs, fundamentally flawed. Eat 84-87.41/
There clearly is substantial evidence to support the Board's conclusion. Traffic Guide mobilization took far longer than the maximum times assumed by the PID and l
l 40/ The FEMA scenario gave LILCO enough time to achieve a controlled evacuation.
LILCO attempts to confuse this issue by stating that FEMA's simulated accident was "fast breaking." LILCO Br. at 23. FEMA devised a scenario, however, in which a Site Area Emergency, which required Traffic Guide mobilization, was declared at 8:19, and an evacuation order was issued at 10:24. This meant that the PID's three hour mobilization (11:19) and one hour staffing (11:24) assumptions could have been met under the Exercise scenario. The scenario tl.us fairly tested whether LILCO could comply with the PID, and its own Plan requirements for staffing, to achieve a controlled evacuation. SC EX 40 Testimony at 17; Plan, Appendix A, at V-2.
LILCO also argues that the OL-3 Board held that "under some accident sequences" LILCO is not required to achieve a controlled evacuation. LILCO Br. at 26, n.20. That is true, but irrelevant. While so:ne accidents can hypothetically occur so quickly that no one could mobilize fast enough to assist the evacuating public, such a scenario wa> not used during the Exercise, 11/ As one Licensing Board has noted, "[a}r;uably, no more critical item in emergency planning exists than that which deals with the movement of people and vehicles during an j evacuation." Pennsylvania Power & Light (Susquehanna Steam Electric Station, Units 1 i and 2), LBP-82-30,15 NRC 771, 796 (1982). ;
- required by LILCO's own Plan. The Licensing Board noted that "[f]or purposes of this l l
l decision," LILCO's Traffic Guides were to be substantially in place one hour following an h
l evacuation recommendation." LBP-88-2 at 84.42_/ LILCO's performance clearly was fundamentally flawed. A_t most_, only 12 of the 93 TCPs (13%) for which staffing times were known were timely staffed. Lieberman and Weismantle, ff. Tr.1548 ("LILCO EX 40 Testimony"), Atts. B, C, and D. This uncontested fact, based upon LILCO's own data, strongly supported the Board's conclusions that LILCO's plan for mobilizing its Traffic Guides was fundamentally flawed.43./
This conclusion was consistent with FEMA's findings as well. FEMA had concluded that LILCO's slow staffing of TCPs from Riverlead constituted a deficiency. FEMA Ex.
4_2/ The Governments' believe that Traffic Guides must mobilize much soone2than one hour after an evacuation is ordered if health and safety are to be protected. The protection of public health and safety requires that Traffic Guides be at their TCPs at the "onset" of the evacuation process. Se.e_,
e regu Tr. 2202-04. In the Governments' view, the evacuation process would occur even before LILCO orders an evacuation. I_si_.
Suffolk's witnesses, ' experts in practical problems of the streets," contended that at a minimum, however, Traffic Guides must be in place a._t least "within minutes" after the evacuation order is issued. See LBP-88-2 at 77-78,87; Tr. i.206,2208,2224. ,
LILCO's testimony regarding when the evacuation process would likely begin was inconsistent. On the one hand, LILCO's witness, Mr. Lieberman, testiflad that the process would begin approximately 20 minutes after tha public was first advised to evacuate. Tr. at 1608. At other times, LILCO argued that the relevar.t time period for manning TCPs was one hour. LBP-88-2 at 72.
Under Suffolk County's standard, as well as LILCO's 20 minute standard, LILCO totally failed the Exercise, as none of LILCO's 132 TCPs was staffed during that time frame. Even if the one hour time is accepted as the standard, however, LILCO failed; 87% of the TCPs were n,_o_1 staffed with!n one hour. LILCO EX 40 Testimony, Atts. B, C, D. Because LILCO failed "under any party's view," the issue of wher the evacuation process would have begun was not regarded as particularly important. LBP-88-2 at 82, 87-88.
4_3/ LILCO asserts, but is plainly wrong in claiming, that two staging areas mobilized in a "substantially" timely manner. LILCO Br at 3-4. None of the 58 TCPs in Port Jefferson was staffed within one hour following an evacuation recommendation.
Moreover, substantial numbers were unstaffed an hour and one-half, two hours, and even more after the order to evacuate was issued. Further, although the Riverhead data were "lost," at most two of seven (28%) TCPs were timely staffed, and those were among the Lint Riverhead TCPs to be staffed under the LILCO Plan. LILCO EX 40 Testimony, Atts. C and D; Plan, OPIP 3.6.3, Att. 7; Appendix A, Fig. 8.'. Consequently, they were likely staffed earlier during the Exercise than were the other Riverhead TCPs, for which staffing times were never made available by LILCO.
1 at 75; LBP-88-2 at 84-85. Once FEMA learned (subsequent to the Exercise) of LILCO's late staffing from Port Jefferson, it also found the performance demonstrated by those 1
Traffic Guides deficient. Even with respect to the Patchogue Staging Area, FEMA concluded that Traffic Guides wera so unfamiliar with the Plan that a "near" deficiency was found. Sgur. FEMA Ex. I at 64,67; SC Ex.106. Based upon this st.bstantial evidence,
?
the Board concluded: .
Clearly, large numbers of TCPs were not staffed until well after traffic congestion would have occurred. Consequently, a controlled evacuation would probably not have been achieved.
)
We agree with FEMA that a deficiency should be assessed, and conclude that LERO's performance demonstrates a fundamental flaw.
LBP-88-2 at 86.
- 2. LILCO's Two Arguments for Reversing the Board's Conten_ tion EX 40 Findine Lack Merit Unable to attack the substantiality of the Board's Contention EX 40 finding head on, LILCO advances two other arguments. First, it argues that the Board inconsistently applied the fundamental flaw standard in Contention EX 40 by ignoring "the need to search for public health and safety effects that might have resulted from delays in mobilization of LERO Traffic Guides." LILCO Br. at 23. Second, LILCO argues that the Board failed to treat prior litigation as final agency action. [d. at 42-44. Neither argument is correctd4/
LILCO's first argument is premised on one sentence from the Board's holding, which LILCO takes out of context:
Nor can we accept LILCO's invitation to consider whether the delay would have a signiilcant effect on public health and safety.
LILCO Br. at 26. This statement by the Board cannot be read to support LILCO's
!/ LILCO also asserts, in passing, that the Board should have excluded Contention EX 40 from the Exercise proceeding. LILCO Br. at 42. This assertion cannot properly be raised, since LILCO essentially did not oppose Contention EX 40's admission. EgiLILCO Objections at 2,62-63; Oct. 3 Order at 22.
assertion that the Board made no finding on health and safety.45/ To the contrary, the Board made such findings. Indeed, it agreed with FEMA that LILCO's failure to staff large numbers of TCPs until well af ter an evacuation order had been issued and traffic congestion had occurred constituted a deficiency, meaning that the public health and safety would have been impacted. LBP-88-2 at 86.
LILCO asserts that the Board erred in n2aking this safety finding, citing for support an interim March 11, 1988 order by the cunent emergency planning (OL-3) ,
Board.5/ According to LILCO, this order held that LILCO is not required to effect a 4
controlled evacuation er even to have a traffic control plan. LILCO Br. at 26, n.20.
LILCO is wrong.47/ '
~
First, the PID, CLI-86-13,48/ and the Susauehanna decision (15 NRC 771) all make clear that, while the regulations do not explicitly address traffic control, it is nevertheless necessary to meet the requirement in 10 CFR S 50.47(b)(10) that a range of protective actions be provided for the public. In addition, the regulatory need for traffic control is recognized by NUREG 0654 and Appendix 4 thereto. The March 11 order relied h5/ Read in context, all the quoted language means was that LILCO's failure even to .
come close to implementing a controlled evacuation was sufficient for the Board to conclude that LILCO could not protect the public. See LBP-88-2 at 85-86.
$/ Memorandum and Order (Denying hs Part and Granting in Part LILCO's Motion for -
Summary Disposition of Contentions 1,2 and 9 -Immateriality), March 11,1988, at 6-8.
47/ This claim is inconsistent with LILCO's position below. LILCO argued to the x Licensing Board that the principal standard against which the manning of TCPs should be judged was the PID standard necessary to achieve a controlled evacuation. LILCO acknowledged this standard was linked to public health and safety. LILCO Findings at 99-102.
The Board agreed that LILCO's Traffic Guides had to be mobilized in time to h achieve a controlled evacuation. LBP-88-2 at 84, 86. Based upon the Exercise results, ,
the Board concluded that a controlled evacuation would not have been achieved. Id. at
- 86. Faced with this finding, LILCO now attempts to argue that a controlled evacuation is unnecessary. This new argument should be summazily rejected.
' 48/ Long Island Lighting Company (Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, Unit 1),24 NRC 22 (1986).
I I upon by LILCO in no way contradicts these regulatory provisions or the referenced case law.
) .
Second, the purpose of tne Exercise proceeding was to assess the results of the Exercise. LILCO attempted a controlled evacuation. It did not attempt an uncontrolled :
one. '!hus, the Board was correct in assessing what was actually attempted and not i
speculating on some different test that did not occur.
! Further, LILCO's own brief cuts against LILCO's argument and demonstrates why it is misplaced. As noted by LILCO (agg.LILCO Br. 42-43), the PID was binding on the Exercise Board, for purposes of its findings, unless a different holding were confirmed by !
Exercise events or results. LILCO cannot rely on the prior emergency planning decision i
only when it favors LILCO. The Staff recognized this. 533. LBP-88-2 at 85-86. So did
[ the Board. Sag.ki. at 86-87 and n.23. The traffic control plan tested in the Exercise was I the one approved by the PID, which assumed that Traffic Guides could be mobilized in time to achieve a controlled evacuation. 5g3.21 NRC at 720, 723. The Exercise Board !
evaluated whether LILCO could achieve this, and found that it could not.4_9./
j Thus, contrary to LILCO's assertion that the Board "ignored the need to search for j public health and safety effects" (LILCO Br. at 23), the FEMA Report, FEMA's testimony, the Staff's Findings, Suffolk County's testimony, as well as the PID and the l evidentiary record from the emergency planning litigation, all establish that the untimely mobilization of LILCO's Traffic Guides would have negatively impcted the public health [
c ,
and safety. .
Perhaps recognizing this, LILCO vigorously complains that the Board failed to consider evidence that LILCO claims would have shown that its long mobilization delays j would have had no effect on the total population dose received by EPZ residents. LILCO i l 4._9/ Contention EX 40 itself alleged that LILCO's Plan is fundamentally flawed, given LILCO's inability to staff TCPs in a timely fashion. Sgt. LBP-88-2 at 66-70. And, the County's testimony addressed this fact. Indeed, as noted by the Board, the County l provided numerous examples demonstrating why LILCO's late staffing would have ,
l negatively impacted public health and safety. LBP-88-2 at 78-80,87. !
l '
t l ,
.--.n,-c-,-----
)
Br. at 26. LILCO also claims that the Board ignored uncontested testimony that, had an evacuation actually taken place, the delay in manning TCPs would have added only a total of 19 minutes to the controlled evacuation time estimates contained in the LILCO Plan. Id. at 26-27.
LILCO's arguments should be rejected. It is true that the Licensing Board did request LILCO testimony on this matter. LBP-88-2 at 86, n.23; LILCO Br. at 26. But LILCO's claim that this testimony would have proved that the mobilization delays experienced under the Exercise scenario would not have increased total population doses is baseless. The Governments were prepared to prove that LILCO's proffered testimony was unreliable and did not establish that the mobilization delays would have had no effect on total population dose under the Exercise scenario. The Board, however, correctly decided that consideration of LILCO's testimony was not necessary to its Contention EX 40 finding; thus, the County was never called upon to demonstrate the suspect nature of LILCO's evidence. Sag.LBP-88-2 at 86-87, n.23.5_0/
Similarly, LILCO's claim that its late staffing would have added only 19. minutes to total evacuation times (LILCO Br. at 26-27) is without merit. According to LILCO, this testimony was "uncontested." I_d., at 26. This is false; not only was the testimony contested, it was discredited and explicitly rejected by the Board, even at trial. See generally. Tr. 1994-2012. The Board's ruling was based on Suffolk County's testimony.
Sees g.gu Tr. at 2267-70; see also LBP-88-2 at 76-77, 78-80, 875.1/ Based on the 5,0/ Moreover, LILCO never sought admission of its testimony. The Board made clear that were it to accept LILCO'* ' tstimony, the Governments would need an opportunity to rebut LILCO's calculations . 88-2 et 86, n.23. LILCO chose not to pursue the admission of its proffered te:,:xmony and never objected during trial to the Board's ruling.
Thus, LILCO has no right to have this testimony now considered by the Appeal Board.
5_1/ The Board foup' that Suffolk's testimony about tha mobilization delays was highly credible, because "it was offered by Suffolk County police officers with considerable experience" "experts in the practical problems of the streets. . ." LBP-88-2 at 87.
i
)
evidence of record, it was reasonable to conclude that LILCO's slow staffing would have
)
delayed evacuation more than 19 minutes,52 /
LILCO also claims that the Board failed to police the Contention EX 40 Testimony that was admitted, and that, as a result, testimony that replicated testimony presented 3
and decided against the Governments during the earlier planning litigation was improperly admitted, and then considered and used by the Board. LILCO Br. at 42-43. In particular, LILCO complains about County testimony that the traffic control treatments y specified in LILCO's Plan would have been difficult, if not impossible, to implement after an evacuation was ordered, that some strategies would have been virtually impossible to implement under any circumstances, and that establishing and maintaining traffic flow
, required special training and experience not p-M by LILCO's Traffic Guides. Id at 42; agg.4149.LBP-88-2 at 78-79.
Notwithstanding LILCO's complaints, the testimony was admitted by the Board i only as "necessary background to understand Suffolk's position." Tr. 1003-04. Furthe' ,
the Board made it abundantly clear that the testimony was "not a necessary underpinning for (its] conclusion" regarding Contention EX 40. LBP-88-2 at 87. Thus, LILCO's claim that the testimony must have "played a role" in the Board's decision "the Board's finding on Contention EX 40 is predicated, in part, on an improper factual basis" (LILCO Br. at 43) - is nothing more than sheer speculation, which is contrary to the Board's explicit representations.
D. Contention EX 50 - Trainine The Licensing Board devoted over 80 pages to detailing its findings and conclusions concerning the efficacy of LILCO's training program. LBP-88-2 at 172-253. Because it 52/ A fundamental flaw finding would have been necessary even if LILCO's delay i
wdd have increased total evacuation times by "only" 19 minutes. All parties agreed that LILCO's Traffic Guides were to be substantially in place within one hour following
' an evacuation recommendation, and this was the standard against which LILCO's performance was judged. LBP-88-2 at 84. Mobilizing only 13% of TCPs within an hour is not substantial compliance.
4
)
cannot refute the evidence that was before the Board, LILCO attacks the Board's
) reasoning and raises a plethora of criticisms, ranging from assertions that the Board e,rred in admitting Contention EX 50 in the first place, to claims that the Board considered evidence it should not have, and failed to consider other evidence it should have. None of
) LILCO's criticisms is valid. The extensive evidence considered and discussed by the Board, and the conclusions the Board drew from the evidence, form the most effective rebuttal to the many criticisms LILCO makes. We thus begin with a discussion of the
> Board's Decision.
- 1. N Teminina Decision Even a cursory reading of the Board's findings on EX 50 leads to the conclusion that 1 it was FEMA's evidence - particularly as compiled in the FEMA Report - which the Board found most persuasive. In its "Overview" on this contention, the Board notes that FEMA identified a significant number of training problems and inadequacies in the FEMA i Report. LBP-88-2 at 172-73; agg, a_ho, FEMA Ex.1 cassim. Moreov.er, as noted by the Board, the FEMA witnesses agreed at the hearing that FEMA had identified a significant number of training problems, and that FEMA observed many areas in which training needs to be improved. LBP-88-2 at 173. The Board also cited the statement in FEMA's prefiled testimony that "most of the Exercise inadequacies which were identified as either
' Deficiencies' or 'ARCAs'53/ were attributable to breakdowns in the LILCO training program." R. at 193, citing FEMA Ex. s at 73.
After presenting in its Overview the standards it used to judge the LILCO training program (LBP-88-2 at 176-79), the Board addressed the specific categories of deficient performance set out in the subparts of Contention EX 50.
Contention EX 50.A alleged that LILCO personnel had not been effectively trained to respond to unrehearsed and unanticipated situations likely to occur in an emergency. In M/ That is, the two more serious categories of problems in FEMA's tri-partite grading system.
)
its discussion of this subpart, the Board focused mainly on LILCO's handling of the simulated traffic impediments. The Board noted its earlier conclusion, made in connection with Contention EX 41, "that LERO personnel were not adequately trained in emergency decision-making and communication." LBP-88-2 at 180. The Board then pointed out that FEMA had identified a significant number of training problems and inadequacies in the FEMA Report, leading FEMA to conclude that LILCO personnel needed additional training. R. at 180, 182-83. The Board also noted that the NRC Staff had concluded that LILCO's response to the impediments supported the allegations that l LILCO personnel are not sufficiently trained to deal effectively with unanticipated events that have the potential to disrupt the taking of protective actions. R. at 183. Based on the foregoing, the Board concluded that (T}he training of LERO personnel in responding to unanticipated and unrehearsed events, in communicating information about such events, in analysing the kind of equipment needed to respond to serious roadway accidents, and in the development of alternative actions
, when actions called for by the Plan do not or will not work effectively, has been inadequate.
K-Contention EX 50.8 alleged that LILCO's training program had been ineffective in instructing LILCO personnel to follow and implement the LILCO Plan and procedures. In addition to the evidence on this subpart adduced in connection with the traffic impediments, the Board listed and discussed more than 20 other examples of LILCO personnel failing to follow their procedures or evidencing a lack of basic knowledge of the Plan. Most of these examples were culled from the FEMA Report. LBP-88-2 at 185-89 54
, / Before stating its conclusion on EX 50.B, the Board noted that:
E4/ LILCO did not, in the main, dispute the numerous problems cited by FEMA in its Report. Rather, LILCO took the position that the large number cf errors made by its personnel failed to reflect a pervasive training problem, when viewed in the context of the large number of LILCO workers mobilized during the Exercise. LBP-88-2 at 192.
The Board, however, rejected this argument, reasoning correctly that there was no basis to conclude that LILCO's unobserved participants had performed any better than those observed. Sat.K. at 194 and n.50.
I The NRC Staff, in its proposed findings, noted that enough workers made errors to indicate a pattern related to deficiencies in training.
Staff suggested that until the ability to maintain emergency response
) skills has been demonstrated, it retained. serious doubts about the adequacy of the LILCO training program.
R. at 193-94. Thus, relying on the evidence set out in the FEMA Report, as illuminated by testimony at the hearing, and buttressed by the Staff's similar interpretation of the same evidence, the Board concluded: ,
(T]he proportion of LERO workers observed failing to follow the Plan or procedures was disturbingly great. These failures occurred frequently enough to suggest that there is, indeed, a pervasive i
problem in training LERO workers to follow the Plan. We conclude, therefore, that the allegation made in Subcontention EX-50B is valid; LILCO's training program has not adegaately trained LERO personnel to follow the LILCO Plan and procedures.
R. at 194 (footnote omitted).
6 Contention EX 50.C alleged that LILCO's training program had failed to teach LILCO personnel to communicate necessary and sufficient data and information, to inquire and obtain such information, o:: to recognize the need to do so. In discussing this subpart, the Board once again detailed the evidence relied upon in support of the factual allegations in the contention. In addition to the "glaring example" afforded by LILCO's response to impediments, the Board listed 10 other examples from the Exercise which the Governments alleged demonstrated communications problems.E/ LBP-88-2 at 195-98, 206-11. The Board discussed the problems revealed in LILCO's post-Exercise drill reports, noting that the exact same sorts of problems which plagued LILCO's communications efforts during the Exercise continued to recur during later training drills. S_et.ld_. at 198-205, 215-16. Contrary to LILCO's claim, however (see, t,gu LILCO Br. at 46-49), the Board's fundamental flaw finding was independent of (although certainly confirmed by) the results of the post-Exercise drills:
El The Board rejected otLer examples used in the Governments' testimony, stating that its "reading of the [ FEMA] Report indicates that those were more in the nature of equipment problems." LBP-88-2 at 197, n.51.
r__
The conclusion that must be drawn is.that the training program as conducted before and since the Exercise has failed to teach LERO personnel how to communicate emergency information effectively.
Because the consequences of poor communication during the Exercise resulted in a finding of a Deficiency by FEMA and a Fundamental Flaw by us, and because we agree with Suffolk's witnesses that timely and accurate communications provide the backbone of a successful emergency response, we conclude that LILCO's training program is fundamentally flawed in the area of communications.
LBP-88-2 at 216-17 (emphasis added).
Contention EX 50.E alleged that LILCO's training program had not successfully or effectively trained LILCO personnel to exercise independent or good judgment, or to use common sense, in dealing with situations encountered during an emergency or in implementing the LILCO Plan and procedures. In addition to the numerous instances of poor judgment displayed by LILCO workers in dealing with the traffic impediments, the Board set forth 11 other examples of poor judgment drawn from incidents during the Exercise. LBP-88-2 at 220-22. The Board referenced, but was obviously not convinced by, LILCO's assertion that its workers need not be trained to exercise good, independent judgment:
We conclude that the weight of the evidence supports Suffolk's i
contention that LERO workers are not adequately trained to use independent and good judgment in response to unanticipated events.
LILCO itself admits that its training program is intended to teach LERO workers to implement the Plan and not to make a_d_ hoc dccisions during an emergency. We are convinced, however, that situations would arise during a radiological emergency at SNPS that could be dealt with effectively only if the emergency workers are _
able to make good, independent judgments and a_d_ hoc decisions.
l M. at 224.
l Contention EX 50.F alleged that LILCO's training program ha: not successfully or effectively trained LILCO personnel to deal with the media, or otherwise to provide I
timely, consistent, and nonconflicting information to the media. Once again, the Board carefully reviewed the evidence and the arguments of the parties. Sit,1Ku id_. at 225-33.
The Board concludmi that "[t}he delays and inaccuracies in communicating information i
{
about exercise events to the media is undoubtedly another reflection of the inadequate training LERO personnel have received in communication skills." R. at 233 (emphasis
)
added).
Contention EX 50.G alleged that LILCO had failed to train the non-LILCO persons 3
and organisations relied upon to implement the LILCO Plan (gdu school bus drivers, ambulance drivers). The Board detailed FEMA's findings concerning the lack of dosimetry training for bus and ambulance drivers, and the Staff's acknowledgment that this could be i 3
a "problem." LBP-88-2 at 235-36. It ruled that any determination as to whether LILCO's post-Exercise training efforts had resolved these problems had to await a future exercise.
R. at 236-37.
Contention EX 50.I alleged that the modifications made by LILCO to its train 8mg program to correct the problems identified by the Exercise will be unsuccessful. In deciding this contention subpart, the Board relied heavily on the analysis of the evidence (particularly the evidence of LILCO's performance during drills held after the Exercise) contained in the Staff Findings. Sam, LBP-88-2 at 246-49; aan. Staff Findings at 181-86. ,
The Board's conclusion was as follows: !
r We agree with the NRC Staff. The evidence before us in this L proceeding . . . generates substantial doubt that LERO personnel f have been adequately trained in the areas of communication, ,
respaaMag to unanticipated events, and timely dispatch of and t prompt performance of duties by emergency field workers, especially l Traffic Guides and Bus Drivers . . . LILCO's training program, !
therefore, is fu'wimmentally flawed in teaching emergency '
communication and the timely dispatch and response of personnel. ;
R. at 249-50.56/ l i
56/ Ihe above summar'zes the Board's analysis of those parts of Contention EX 50 on I
which the Board's findings were more or less consistent with the position advocated by the Governments. The Governments point out (because LILCO has not done so) that the Board found at least one subpart of Contention EX 50 unsupported, for a reason LILCO ;
argues in its brief the Board failed to consider. Thus, the Board concluded on Contention EX 50.H that the lack of adequate knowledge of personal radiation protection ,
demonstrated by LILCO workers was not a fundamental flaw, as it would not likely I affect the pub!!c health and safety. LBP-88-2, at 243. Stitlao_.id at 217-19 [
(insufficient evidence to support the allegation that LILCO's training program failed to t teach LILCO workers to follow the directions of their superiors). i
-5 0-
1
) ,
I Following its discussion of each Contention EX 50 subpart, the Board summarized
)
its overall conclusion on the contention, listing three areas in which deficiencies were j found durina the Exercise and had not been corrected af ter it. LBP-88-2 at 250. N l
Board concluded that these deficiencies in LILCO's training program precluded a
)
reasonable assurance finding. R. at 251.
In in appeal, LILCO makes little attempt to confront either the evidence relied upon by the Board, or the conclusions the Board drew from this evloence. Nor could
> LILCO do so. N Board had before it solid evidence of numerous and significant errors made by LILCO personnel during the Exercise, in the form of the findings contained in r
the FEMA Report and the confirmatory testimony of the FEMA witnesses. It was not the [
, Governments' witnesses alone who inferred from the evidence that there was something , 1 seriously awry with LILCO's training program. N NRC Staff drew essentially the same conclusion (nas, Staff Findings at 185-186), as did the FEMA witnesses. Sea.Tr. 8283, 8284-85, 8297-98 5.7/
- 2. LILCO's Criticisms of the Licensing Board ,
LILCO alleges seven basic errors in the Board's Contention EX 50 findings. First, LILCO claims that the Board, in derogation of the OL-3 Board, CLI-86-11 and concep'ts of tai udicata, l conferred upon itself "unfettered jurisdiction" to review the adequacy of [
LILCO's training program. LILCO Br. at 10, 45-46, 49-50. Second, the Board erred in >
admitting Contention EX 50, because even if the allegations in it were true, they would not establish a "sufficient" pattern for finding a fundamental flaw. M. at vil, 3, 21-22.
Third, the Board erred because it applied a different standard in evaluating LILCO's I
[ training program than the Shearon Harris Licensing Board allegedly did in rullag on the
! communications contentions in that proceeding. R. at 36-38. Fourth, the Board h 5.1/ N Board's findings on Contention EX 50 must also be viewei in light of two other facts: first, at the time of the Exercise, LILCO's training program had been in place for three years (Tr. 5423); second, during the two months prior to the Exercise, LILCO held at least three full-scale dress rehearsals. LBP-88-2 at 176.
.,_.,.-,,.-w,-,--,,-_,.,,w-,,7.---,,,wm,-,-e.,--ra -,,-,mmn n _-- -e--,,.r-.m,-m,n.v,---n w-,-- ,w, e,,--- -
,-n -ww-we-- -~-*n
improperly considered evidence submitted by the Governments concerning LILCO's organizational structure and the lack of "realism" in its training program, and that the -
Board's impermissible consideration of this evidence led to the incorrect conclusion that LERO workers were amateurs, and to the improper holding of LERO to a "police standard" in its emergency response. M. at 44-46. Fif th, the Board improperly based its
. finding of a fundamental flaw in the LILCO training program on the post-Exercise drills, after having "misled" LILCO into believing that the evidence concerning the drills would not be used. M. at vil, 46-49, 62-63. Sixth, the Board's decision is not supported by substantial evidence, because the Board erred in "ignoring" or in according "no weight" to testimony concerning how LILCO's performance compared with performmce by other organizations at other exercises; moreover, instead of looking for a pattern of failures, the Board "focused on the poor performance of a single individual ((&, the Evacuation Route Coordinator) on the day of the Exercise, and determined that that performance reveal [ed) a fundamental flaw in the entire training program . . . ." M. at 63. Finally, LILCO alleges that the Board failed to articulate its rationale with sufficient clarity and precision. M. at 66-68.
None of these points or complaints is well taken. Most have as their starting premise LILCO's mischaracterization of the record and of the Decision,
- a. The Licensing Board Did Not Exceed Its Jurisdiction When It Assessed the Adequacy of LILCO's Trainina Procram The Licensing Board which heard the prior planning litigation concluded that LILCO's training program, viewed in the abstract, "meets the regulatory standards."
PID,21 NRC at 756. That Board added, however, that:
This conclusion is made subject to confirmation by a finding, to be made t v FEMA after a graded exercise, that the Plan can be satisfactorily implemented with the training program submitted and that LILCO possesses an adequate number of trained LERO workers.
)
R. FEMA made no bottomline finding concerning the Shoreham Exercise. It was also FEMA's testimony that FEMA does not make separate findings as to the adequacy of r
training programs. Tr. 8297. Thus, the only finding the OL-3 Board could have intended is the usual FEMA finding as to whether an exercise has demonstrated that an adequate paper plan can be implemented. Clearly, the OL-3 Board was making the (not ;
) !
unreasonable) assumption that if a training program has not trained personnel in what is ,
required under a plan, the personnel will not be capable of implementing the plan. In other words, the proof of the training program is in the Exercise performance. !
LILCO has seized on the language of what it characterizes as the "Frye dissent"58/ i to conclude that the evidence of "inadequate" training that the Board found in the context l of Contention EX 50 was somehow different in quality and magnitude from a "fundamental i
flaw." LILCO Br. at 39. There is no basis for this conclusion, however. !
The jurisdiction granted to the Board was to determine if ie Exercise revealed any deficiencies which preclude a reasonable assurance finding, lau fundamental flaws in the f l
Plan. 23 NRC at 581. There can be no flaw more fundamental - none more likely to preclude reasonable assurance - than for there to be a training program in place which has failed, or is unable, to impart the ability to follow a }..an and procedures, or the ability .
l to exercise good judgment and common sense, or the ability to communicate planned :
response actions to the public and the media. In admitting Contention EX 50, the Licensing Board recognized this:
Our initial decision on emergency planning acknowledged that the exercise was to be the vehicle that would confirm the adequacy of LILCO's training program. Indeed, we were repeatedly told by FEMA witness during the planning hearing that FEMA followed a two-stage
, review process in which the adequacy of the written plan was first reviewed and that adequacy of training would be reviewed later as revealed by personnel performance in an exercise. We are now at 58/ Judge Frye disagreed with some conclusions reached by the majority in i
conjunction with Contention EX 41 and with some of the conclusions on the subparts of EX 50. LBP-88-2 at 257-58. He fully endorsed the majority's overall conclusion on
- Contention EX 50, however, stating that he viewed this conclusion as "the definitive i statement of the ways in which the training program is fundamentally flawed." M. at l 258.
l i
)
that second stage where adequacy of training as revealed by the exercise is ripe for litigation. Nee can be little auestion that the al= a waald be fuadameatally flawed if it were nroven that a larne ~
) traialaa nroaram havina amnie onnortunity to train has failed in its mission.
Oct. 3 Order at 30 (emphasis added).
N Board reviewed training, "as revealed by personnd performance in [the]
(E)xercise," and, based on that review, concluded that LILCO's tre!.hing was fundamentally flawed. The majority did not, Judge Frye and LILCO notwitbstr.nding (ass. LBP-88-2 at 257-58; LILCO Br. at 39), engage in some far ranging inquiry as to "whether the LILCO training program meets each aspect of the regult+ory s+amard." LBP 88-2 c! 257. m OL-3 Board had already determined that, on partr, it did. */ne Enercise Board's sde inquiry was whether the training program had, in far:t, +ggingst. N Boaid found, base <1 on the extensive evidence of performance errors at the E=erdse. ihat it had St. N Board thus had no choice but to conclude that LILCO's drainlig prograts did Sot meet the key
- regulatory standards provision of reasor.able amu.ence 1s+ ULCO Plan can and will be implemented. ,
N Board did not, as LILCO asserts, impermissibly "pus !Wif in the role traditionally reserved to FEMA and the NR7 Spft d evaluaten cf omrcise performance, all without benefit of FEMA's and the Staff's experienca and without having etteMAed the exercise."' LILCO Br. at 10. Rather, the Board simply filled the mandata of OLI-86-11 and considered the results of the Exercise, to determine if they reveued ah fu:wamental flaws in the Plan.
- b. h Board Properly Admitted Contention EX 50 With rhetoric reminiscent of its initial objection to the aamission cf Contention EX 50,59,/ LILCO maintains that the Board erred in admitting the contemion be.?anse "ac pattern was alleged to establish, if true, a potential effect on the ytbliL health and sa/ety 59/ LILCO asserted that Contention EX 50's "dragnet approach smacks of a conspiract charge" and charged that the contention's subparts attempted "to transitute tripiality into substance by spurious organization." LILCO Objections at 55.
and therefore a fundamental flaw in the LERO training program." LILCO Br. at 22.
LILCO is wrong.
Contention EX 50 makes one central allegation: that the Exercise demonstrated that LILCO is incapable of training emergency workets, and as a result there can be no reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of an emergency. The subparts of the contention then list specific areas, supported by specific examples, of how the profusion of errors committed by LILCO personnel during the Exercise demonstrate that there has been a training failure. LILCO alone is incapable of perceiving the pattern here, persisting in characterizing the numerous problems exhibited by its personnel in performing their emergency response tasks as isolated incidents. See LILCO Br. at 60-61, 63.
FEMA testified that mest of the exercise inadequacies which were identified and evah sted as either De..clencies or Areas Requiring Corrective Action, were attributable to breakdowns in the LILCO training program. FEMA Et. 5 at 73. The Staff ultimately concluded (despite its initial objection to the admission of EX 50, which LILCO makes so much of in its brief (see LILCO Br. at 21)) that:
Although some errors, such as the erroneous announcements to LERO workers, seem to be isolated or inadvertant mistakes, others were made by enough workers to indicate a pattern related to deficiencies in training. [These errors] suggest that the LERO training program was not equal to the task, at least on the day of the Exercise.
Staff Findings at 176. Thus, the pervasiveness of LILCO's training problems was apparent to the Staff, FEMA, the Governments, and the Board. Only LILCO fails to perceive it.
Moreover, LILCO's claim that a training program which has not been successful 5 tralr.'ng eme.cency workers in even the basics of the Plan they will be called upon to t np emer.t would not have a "potential effect on th.e puMic health and safety" is absurd.
ft is tantarmunt to saying that planning for radiological emergencies is an unnecessary exercise in futDity.
-- - : u .
)
In short, the Board acted properly, in compliance with the mandate given it by y
CLI-86-il,,and pursuant to the confirmatory information sought by the OL-3 Board, in admitting Contention EX 50. The Board's stated rationale for admitting the contention was correct: "There can be little question that the plan would be fundamentally flawed if 3
it were proven that a large training program having ample opportunity to train has failed in its mission." Oct. 3 Order at 30.
- c. Shearon Harris Provides No Analogy LILCO attempts to fault the Board's finding of a fundamental flaw in the training program by purporting to compare its conclusion on Contention EX 50 with the hanelling by the Shearon Harris Licensing Board of contentions in that case dealing with
- communications.6,L/ LILCO Br. at 37-38. There is no analogy, however.
The contentions rejected by the Board in Shearon Harris did not allege that that exercise had revealed fundamental flaws in the emergency plan; nor did they allege that exercise events precluded the required Section 50.47 (a)(1) reasonable assurance finding.
23 NRC at 398,403. Had they done so, the intervenors still would have had to overcome FEMA's Shearon Harris determination that that exercise was satisfactory and that the errors were all correctable. 23 NRC at 406.
Further, there is no reason for the Appeal Board to speculate about what may or may not have happened to Contention EX 50 on summary disposition, had LILCO sought 6_0/ Carolina Power & Linht Co. (Shearon Harris Nuclear Power Plant), LBF-86-11,23 NRC 294 at 398,403 (1986). It should be noted that LILCO's conclusory assertions concerning the "focus" of Contention EX 50, which forms the introduction to its discussion of Shearon Harris, trivialize the contention and the evidence adduced in connection with it. Sag,LILCO Br. at 36. For example, whether or not the LILCO Plan has excess bus capacity is irrelevant. Of the eight bus drivers FEMA did evaluate, major flaws were identified in the training of three. Tr. 4548-51. As the Board observed, "(ilf the eight observed by FEMA were a truly representative sample . . . then one might expect 37 percent of 333 bus drivers, or approximately 125, to fail to carry out their function properly." LBPe88-2 at 194, n.50. And, of course, those observed may have performed better than the norm.
W
i it.61/ What happened in a 'different proceeding, with different parties, different evMence, and in a different procedural context is irrelevant to the factual determinations made by the Licensing Board in this case,
- d. 'Ihm Board Did Not Improperly Consider Evidence an Matters Prevhly Adl= Hated LILCO claims that the Board improperly considered evidence concerning the lack of realism in LILCO's training program and the nature of LERO's organizational structure
- two matters LILCO maintains had already been adjudicated and decided in LILCO's favor. $ss.LILCO Br. at 45-46.
- N short answer to these criticisms is the one made by Judge Shon - himself a I member of the Licensing Board which heard the prior planning litigation - when LILCO
- raised its tsa.ludicata Legument at the hearing
N earlier Board did decide that certain things might be possible. Nt a plan was a good plan, or a workable plan.
However, the Commission had directed us specifically to look at the plan and see whether, in fact, the exercise shows that it works.
, And I would not - I think I expressed a very si:nilar opinion a day or *
, two ago, I would not feel us bound by a decision of the previous Board l as to the workability as demonstrated by the exercise.
i
, Tr.1265; aan. Ala9. Tr. 511-12. N judicial concept of tal. ludicata as LILCO has
- attempted to apply it has no place in this proceeding. If the results of the Exercise i
i demonstrated that some part of the Plan approved by the earlier Board without the benefit of evidence on implementability is, in reality, unworkable, the abstract approval I of the plan previously given must be qualified or withdrawn.
l t
I
$.1/ LILCO implies that the Shoreham Exercise Board refused to permit it to make use i
of the summary disposition option in the regulations. LILCO Br. at 36, n.28. This accusation is baseless. Had LILCO believed it could have prevailed on summary l disposition, it doubtless would have sought it. Certainly, the Board did nothing to l prohibit LILCO from seeking summary disposition.
l L h
- Realism" Tatimony h County's witnesses, based on their expertise in training, in organizational
)
behavior, and in emergency response, concluded that the poor performance of LILCO personnel during the Exercise resulted from poor training. LILCO's training program was 3
criticized, in part because it failed to give LILCO personnel sufficient training in "learning by doing." Contrary to LILCO's assertions, the County's witnesses did agttestify that the ability to respond to emergencies can Saly.be developed by responding to them.
Rather, the thrust of their testimony was that, although real experience is the best teacher, a good program, involving realistic attempts to simulate an emergency, can be effective and, for that reason, is essential. Performance errors in the Exercise which
,, would have been revealed earlier, and mitigated, if LILCO had had realistic learning by doing training were described. Further, the witnesses pointed out that after the Exercise, the LILCO training continued to be unretlisuc; instead of creating new and unanticipated situations to develop responae skills, the subsequent drills simply repeated the precise types of situations involved in the Exercise scenario. Sea, tau SC Ex. 95 ("SC EX 50 Testimony") at 15, 28, 53-54, 78-80, 82-87, 89, 92-95, and 99.
LILCO moved to strike this testimony on the ground that the "realism" of LILCO's training program had already been litigated.62/ The Board, however, properly declined to strike the testimony. The Board's ruling recognized that the OL-3 Board had merely found there to be no support for the assertion that LILCO's drills and exercises were defective, because they lacked realism. 533. PID, 21 NRC at 753. Further, in the planning Board's opinion, it was not established that LERO jobs were so complex that they required training or experience beyond that called for in the Plan. E at 750. These observations were followed by the OL-3 Board's overall conclusion on training, however: any final seal of approval had to await the proof afforded by performance in an exercise. E at 736.
6,,2/ Sag,LILCO's Motion to Strike Portions of Suffolk County's Testimony on Contention EX 50 - Training of Offsite Emergency Personnel, April 22,1987, at 23-25.
i Of course, in the abstract posture of the prior planning litigation, there was' no
)
evidence that the lack of realism in LILCO's training program impacted negatively on LILCO's ability to respond to an emergency. The Exercise (just as the OL-3 Board i
assumed it would) provided the test of LILCO's training program. Based on that test, only one conclusion was possible: LILCO's training program failed, and the County's experts were entitled to give their opinion concerning one of the reasons for that failure.
IL 'the Organizational Structure Testimony LILCO also complains that "even though the Board agreed to strike testimony on the organizational structure of LERO, the concepts advocated by that testimony were 4
scattered throughout the Board's decision." LILCO Br. at 46.
! First, LILCO mischaracterizes the Board's ruling on the objected-to testimony.
l The Board ruled that the testimony was admissible "to the extent that it raises matters 1
i revealed by the exercise which bear on the efficacy of the training program." Tr. 4332-
- 33. The thrust of the testimony LILCO complains about was that the Exercise clearly demonstrated that LERO's highly centralized structure is inappropriate for responding to emergency events and that, as a result, an innovative and highly effective training i
program was needed. The testimony suggested that LILCO was asking too much to expect its part-time emergency workers, involved at most in a few drills a year, to
! perform well in an actual emergency.
j Further, the testimony LILCO sought to strike demonstrated how Exercise events f challenged the structure of LERO and revealed its limitations, limitations which had not
, been compensated for by the LILCO training program. Certain Exercise events l (particularly the free-play messages and the simulated interaction with the media and
, the public at the ENC) were the first "non-routine" events ever faced by the LERO organization. Thus, if the Board did consider this testimony in reaching its conclusions, such consideration was perfectly proper. The purpose of the Exercise was to determine whether the structure approved in the planning litigation worked, given the training
)
LILCO personnel had received; as revealed by the Exercise, it did not. The County's testimony was perfectly admissible.
)
To the extent the testimony LILCO objected to contained information which was not, in a literal sense, "revealed" by the Exercise (ogu the description of LILCO's centralized decisionmaking structure), this information was taken directly from the :
)
LILCO Plan, which was in evidence in any event. Its inclusion in the County's testimony was not error, and would be harmless in any event.
In short, it is difficult to see what LILCO is hoping to accomplish by arguing that the testimony on "realism" and LERO's "organizational structure" should not have been considered by the Board. Whether LILCO's training program is fundamentally flawed because its drills lack realism or for some other reason, and whether LILCO's organizational structure led to its fundamentally flawed performance in communicating emergency information within LERO and to the public, would not alter the conclusions drawn by the Board on these issues, iiL no Board's Conclusion hat LERO
- Workers Are Amateurs Wcs Not Based on the ' Realism" Testimoor _
LILCO contests the Board's characterization of the members of LERO as "amateurs," asserting that LERO is made up of "professional utility workers" and that LILCO field workers face emergency, life-threatening situations in their day-to-day lives. LILCO Br. at 45, n.34. The Board did not impugn the credentials of LERO members as "profeutonal utility workers." It simply pointed out that "(als emergency workers, LILCO personnel are amateurs . . . ." LBP-88-2 at 63. This conclusion was
, r consistent with the admission by a LILCO witness, who agreed that LILCO personnel in LERO do not typically perform the kinds of emergency responsibilities they have in LERO during their normal jobs. he mau Tr. 5136-37.
Moreover, if LILCO had evidence that LERO is composed solely, or even in large part, of those LILCO field workers who allegedly face "life-threatening situations" daily,
-6 0-
)
and that the skills they have developed in these situations are transferable to implementing LILCO's Plan, LILCO was free to present it. Since LILCO did not do so, it
)
cannot complain that the Board drew from the evidence regarding LERO's inadequate response the logical inference that LERO personnel were inexperienced at perfornsing the tasks they were faced with in the Exercise.
Similarly, LILCO's complaint that the Board held LERO workers to a "police standard" is without basis. Suffolk County's witnesses on EX 50, many of whom were or are in law enforcement, offered examples of what they considered to be effective,
)
appropriate and adequate training, as a way of comparing such training to the training given LERO workers. Given the witnesses' backgrounds, it is not surprising that many of these examples described police or FBI training techniques. This testimony was not, however, offered to dictate how LILCO should run its training program. hs.Tr.4223.
Nor did the Board mandate that LILCO employ these techniques. It merely suggested that LILCO try something like them, since the Exercise had clearly demonstrated that i
what LILCO has been doing does not work. LBP-88-2 at 217,233. ,
- e. The Post-Exercise Drills _
Following the Eurcise, LILCO made changes in its Plan to attempt to address the criticisms made by FEMA. See SC Ex. 96, Att.10. It was LILCO's position that these changes remedied the problems found by FEMA and supported LILCO's quest for a licensed.3/ The Governments' contentions diquted that LILCO's "fixes" had adequately addressed the problems revealed by the Exercise. he_, e_.Eu Contentions EX 38.Q, 40.E, 41.E, 47, and 50.I.
6_3/ As counsel for LILCO stated during his opening remarks to the Boardt LILCO believes that the exercise and the remedial measures it has taken . . . demonstrate adequate readiness for full power operation.
Tr. 264-65 (emphasis added).
l '
) ,
During discovery, although LILCO strenuously objected to producing any evidence concerning pre-Exercise training and drills, it never objected to producing, or questioned l
) '
the relevance of, materials and information pertaining to post-Exercise training.6,f/
Among the post-Exercise materials produced by LILCO were documents relating to drills held on June 6, September 10, September 17, October 1, December 2, and December 10, 1986. Reports summrrizing the results of these drills and prepared by LILCO consultants were filed as attachments to Suffolk County's direct testimony on Contention EX 50.65/
l l
LILCO also produced the drill observer forms prepared during the drills, which formed the underlying data base for the drill reports.
Both LILCO and Suffolk County discussed the evidence from the post-Exercise drills in their prefiled testimony on numerous contentions. The gist of Suffolk County's testimony was that the drills unequivocally demonstrated that LILCO's post-Exercise fixes had not worked to correct the problems that arose during the Exercise. LILCO, of course, claimed otherwise.
Contrary to LILCO's representations (LILCO Br. at 47, n.35), the County first began to cross-examine LILCO witnesses concerning the drills during the trial of Contention EX 41. Counsel for LILCO objected. Following a sidebar conference, Judge Frye stated that admission of the post-Exercise drill reports would be postponed until the trial of Contention EX 50, because LILCO had represented that it would then make
$$/ For example, LILCO stated:
Included in the documents which are responsive to this request are individual training files for each of the 2,500 LERO players; these files fill eight four-drawer file cabinets. Within these files only the oost-Exercise training review exercises are relevant.
LILCO's Supplemental Responses and Objections to Suffolk County's First Set of Interrogatories and Roquest for Production of Documents, Nov. 10,1986, at 6 (emphasis added).
6,.5/ Stg.SC Ex. 96, Att. 7 (report of June 6,1986 drill), Att. S (consolidated report of September 10, September 17, and October 1,1986 drills), and Att. 9 (consolidated report for December 2 and December 10,1986 drills).
t available witnesses who were familiar with the drill rsports. Tr. 879-886; as.t. also Tr.
)
953-962.
In connection with the next issue litigated, Contention EX 34, counsel for Suffolk County cross-examined LILCO's witnesses on pertinent portions of the December drill reports. Rather than objecting on relevancy grounds, counsel for LILCO simply suggested
)
that the drills be discussed in connection with Contention EX 50. Tr.1452-53. Further, when counsel for Suffolk County moved the relevant portions of the drill report into i
evidence, counsel for LILCO only objected to the admission of portions of the report -
those pagas not cross-examined on. Tr.1470.
The post-Exercise drills came up again in connection with the litigation of LILCO's fixes made to address the problems revealed by the Exercise in mobilizing Traffic Guides.
Tr. 2117-33. Counsel for LILCO made clear LILCO's understanding that these drills were relevant to the efficacy of LILCO's fixes, and agreed that the Board should consider them.
The Board concurred. Tr. 2125-26.
LILCO now alleges that, in contradiction to the Commission's mandate in CLI 11, the Board used the post-Exercise training reports as bases for the fundamental flaws it found (IJLCO Br. at 46), that the Board led the parties to believe it would not make use of the drill reports (d. at 48), and that "(i]f the Board was concerned that exercise events revealed a fundamental flaw in the LILCO Plan, it should, with adequate notice to the parties, have examined the post-exercise materials only to see if the flaw had been easily remedied"(E.). These allegations are without merit.
First, as the chronology above makes clear, the Board at no time indicated that it would not make use of the post-Exercise drill report data. All parties were on "adequate notice" that the Board would use the post-Exercise data in assessing whether LILCO's "fixes" had worked; indeed, those data formed the only evidence on this contested issue.
LILCO's belated attempt to feign surprise should be ignored.
)
Second, the Board did not rely on the post-Exercise drills in making any of its fundamental flaw determinations. LILCO is correct that, at the outset of its discussion of
)
Conter. tion EX 50, the Board stated that it would "analyze the results of the Exercise and additionally determine whether problems found during the Exercise have recurred during post-Exercise drills." LILCO Br. at 46, cuoting LBP-88-2 at 179. The Board had no other
)
way of resolving the issues raised by Contention EX 50.I. Each finding of fundamental flaw made by the Board, however, was specifically based on Exercise results; the Board used the post-Exercise drill reports only to make the point that the exact same types of 3
problems continued to recur - despite Plan changes, and despite additional training and drilling.6,6_/
Third, the Governments submit that although the Board did not use the post-1 Exercise drill evidence as a basis for any of its assignments of "fundamental flaw," it certainly could have done so had it wanted. For the most part, LILCO did not object to the admission of such evidence, and the objection it did make was not preserved for appeal.8/
Further, it must be recognized that LILCO's performance during post-Exercise drills would have been highly probative of the issues raised in EX 50. LILCO's own witnesses testified that the concepts and basics of the training program remained unchanged following the Exercise. Tr. 4375, 5687, 5710, 5711-12, 5729-30. Thus, the drill performance of LILCO's personnel provided a way to check the training program's adequacy.
$.6/ LILCO essentially concedes this, by not providing a single example of the Board using the post-Exercise evidence as a basis for a finding of fundamental flaw.
$/ Af ter LILCO's counsel made the remarks quoted in LILCO's brief (ne.LILCO Br.
at 47, n.35), there was addition'a i discussion; at its conclusion, Judge Frye pointed out that he "wanted to get some better feel for what (LILCO's] position was" so that he could "have a little bit of background when and if the oblection arises." Tr. at 5671-72 (emphasis added). It never did.
). .
Perhaps the best reason for the Licensing Board to have considered the post-
)- Exercise drills would have been to put the final quietus on LILCO's constant averments that the problema during the Exercise were isolated, individual performance problems occurring that day, ad, has., and easily correctable. If these problems were so easy to i correct, it is surprising that they persisted throughout the year following the Exercise.
Similarly, if they were truly individual performance problems, it is surprising that different individuals continued to have the tama. so-called individual performance problems.
In short, the Board did not base its fundamental flaw findings on the post-Exercise drills, but it could have and, in the view of the Governments, in some respects, it should have.$.8/ ,
- f. De Board's Conclusion Is Amply Supported by Evidence in the Record Rather than addressing the extensive evidence the Board analysed and relied upon in deciding Contention EX 50, LILCO claims that the Board's conclusion that LILCO's training program is fundamentally flawed is erroneous because: first, the Board inaccurately characterized LERO as an amateur organization, and relied on this "inaccurate insinuation" to support its conclusions that fundamental flaws existed in the LILCO Plan; second, the Board declined to consider evidence comparing the Shoreham Exercise to other exercises; and, third, the Board focused on the poor performance of a
$8./ LILCO claims that the Governments attempted to enter selective parts of the drill reports into the record. LILCO Br. at 48, n.36. His is untrue; the Governments attsched full copies of each report to its profiled testimony. SC Ex. 96, Att.10. The Governments did enter only portions of the observer forms under! the reports simpl because submission of aR these data (as LILCO proved by submitt the balance of it) y would only have burdened the record with no countervailing benefits. The Board did not cite to a single observer form in its Decision. Rather, it relied on LILCO's summaries of l the data.
l LILCO also accuses the Board of failing to make a "searching review of the available post-exercise material." id, LILCO has no basis for this assertion; moreover, LILCO has completely omitted to mention a single piece of pertinent information a "searching review" would have revealed.
l l
J single individual and determined that that performance revealed a fundamental flaw in LILCO's entire training program, thus erroneously holding LILCO's training program to a standad of perfect performance. LILCO Br. at 61-63. None of these assertions is accurate.
LILCO has not pointed to a single instance in which the Board reached a conclusion that there was a fundamental flaw in the LILCO Plan because of LERO's amateur nature.
The Board did express its opinion that the lack of LERO workers' experience perhaps explained their poor performance during the Exercise. Nevertheless, the problem found with LILCO's training program was that it had failed to address this inexperience effectively. N Board's opinion that it is possible that LILCO may never be able to overcome the problems exhibited during the Exercise is, moreover, supported by the clear evidence that despite three years of effort, LILCO had been unable to achieve an acceptable emergency response performance from its workers.
LILCO's complaint that the Board focused on the poor performance of a single individual is not worth discussing further. The Decision itself, in detailing the, numerous errors made by LERO workers throughout the LERO organization, belles LILCO's assertion. LBP-88-2 at 173-252; aan.1149.Section III.A. above. Further, the Board specifically rejected the notion that it interpreted Contention EX 50 as seeking a demonstration of perfect performance. Tr. 4543-44.
Finally, the Board had ample reason for according no weight to LILCO testimony concerning other exercises. It was and is irrelevant to the issue of whether there is reasonable assurance that the LILCO Plan can or will be implemented.61/
l 6,,,i/ Because the Board ruled that information concerning other exercises would not l form a basis for any of its findings (Tr. 5248-49, 5356-59), the Governments were l foreclosed from demonstrating the numerous errors in LILCO comparisons of its performance with performance at other exercises. As the Board noted, however, the County sharply contested the methodology of and conclusions drawn in LILCO's analyses.
Tr. 5358. ms, if the Appeal Board were to rule that LILCO's data should have been considered, the County's evidence showing the specious nature of those data would have to be considered as well.
~
J b
Nonetheless, it must be noted that LILCO mischaracterizes the testimony that was proffered by FEhiA's witness, Mr. Kowieski. LILCO Br. at 62. hir. Kowleski said not a
)
word about how LERO's performance compared to exercise performances by full-time emergency organizations. All he said was that LILCO's demonstration was about as good
)
or better than other first-time exercises in the State of New York. Tr. 8534. LILCO did not ask, nor did the FEMA witnesses specify, what kind of performance had been achieved at these other first exercises.
hforeover, when the questions became more specific, hir. Kowieski's position changed. For example, when asked .nout training problems at the Shoreham Exercise, compared to other exercises, Mr. Kowieski opined that only LILCO's dosimetry problems i were typical. Tr. 8535-36. Further, it was Mr. Keller's opinion that LILCO's response to the simulated traffic impediments was the worst he had ever seen. Tr. 8234.
- g. The Board's Rationale Is Clearly and Precisely Articulated Finally, LILCO purports to be mystified by the Board's conclusions on Contention EX 50, complaining that "it is difficult to determine which training contentions LILCO won or lost." LILCO Br. at 66, n.43. The answer to this is simple: LILCO lost thy, trairing contention. The Board found, based on the results of the Exercise, that LILCO had inadequately trained its workers in numerous areas - those identified in the subparts of the contention - essential to an adequate emergency response. As the Decision itself reveals, the so-called "discrete activities" which the Board determined were poorly demonstrated at the Exercise implicate virtually every component of the LERO organization, and the job functions within it.
)
Contrary to LILCO's assertions 3/ het Board's Decision reveals that the evidence on each subprt was carefully analyzed, with the Board clearly indicating which party's 1
analysis it accepted. The Board had no duty to discuss every shred of evidence, submitted by each of the parties, for relevancy, accuracy and persuasiveness. The Board highlighted and discussed the evidence it relied on for each conclusion. It is clear that LILCO
)
disagrees with many of these conclusions. LILCO has failed, however, to point out a single piece of evidence the Board failed to consider - or interpreted incorrectly - which would have made a difference to the Board's decision. FEhfA, the NRC Staff, and the Board all determined, ultimately, that there was sufficient evidence that the LILCO training program had "failed in its mission." There is no reason for this Appeal Board to disagree with that conclusion.
IV. Conclusion For the reasons above, and those detailed in the Decision itself, the Decision of the Licensing Board on Contentions EX 38,39,40,41, and 50 should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted, E. Thomas Boyle Suffolk County Attorney Building 158 North County Complex Veterans hiemorial Highway Hauppauge, New York 11788 l
l l
]O/ For example, LILCO claims the Board gave no indication of which examples it relied on in deciding EX 50.B, and made no effort to point out whether the examples l were relevant to training. LILCO Br. at 67. In fact, when and if the Board found an I example irrelevant to the issue at hand, it said so and declined to consider it. Ss1LBP-88-2 at 197, n.51.
)-
&n Y ,_
Lawrence Coe Lanphef
) ,
Michael S. Miller /
Susan M. Casey P. Matthew Sutko KIRKPATRICK & LOCKHART 1800 M Street, N.W.
South Lobby - 9th Flot -
) Washington, D.C. 20035-5891 Attorneys for Suffolk County h Mb Q. Y
! Richard J. Zah#leutfrt /
Sper-k1 Counsel to the Governor of the State of New York Executive Chamber, Room 229 Capitol Building Albany, New York 12224 4
Attorney for Mario M. Cuomo, Governor of the State of New York
- b. kOIU V Steph#n B. Latham Twomey, Latham & Shea P.O. Box 398 33 West Second Street Riverhead, New York 11901 Attorney for the Town of Southampton
~ -
g o .w -
EO April 18.1988- E[C UNITED STATES OF AMERICA NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 'M APR 20 P6 :41 Before the Atomic Safety and_Llconsina Board f0CNb1 NESfb$kf BRAhCH
)
In the Matter of )
)
LONG ISLAND LIGHTING COMPANY ) Docket No. 50-322-OL-5
) (EP Exercise)
(Shoreham Nuclear Power Station, )
Unit 1) )
)
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
! hereby certify that copies of GOVERNMENTS' BRIEF IN OPPOSTTION TO LILCO APPEAL OF LBP-68-2 have been served on the following this 18th day of April,1988 by U.S. mail, first class.
Christine N. Kohl, Chairman Dr. W. Reed Johnson Atomic Safety and Licensing Atomic Safety and Licensing Appeal Board Appeal Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Washington, D.C. 20555 Alan S. Rosenthal John H. Frye, I!!, Chairman Atomic Safety and Licensing Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Appeal Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Washington, D.C. 20555 Oscar H. Paris Mr. Frederick J. Shon Atomic Safety and Licensing Board Atomic Safety and Licensing Board U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, D.C. 20555 Washington, D.C. 20555 Atomic Safety and Licensing William R. Cumming, Esq.
Board Panet George W. Watson, Esq.
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Office of General Counsel Washington, D.C. 20555 Federal Emergency Management Agency 500 C Street, S.W., Room 840 Washington, D.C. 20472
s.
Fabian G. Palomino, Esq. W. Taylor Reveley, III, Esq.
Richard J. Zahnleuter, Esq. Hunton & Williams Special Counsel to the Governor P.O. Box 1535 Executive Chamber. Room 229 707 East Main Street State Capitol Richmond, Virginia 23212 Albany, New York 12224 Anthony F. Earley, Jr., Esq. Edwin J. Reis, Esq.
General Counsel George E. Johnson, Esq.
Long Island Lighting Company U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm.
175 East Old Country Road Office of General Counsel Hicksville, New York 11801 Washington, D.C. 20555 E. Thomas Boyle, Esq. Ms. Elisabeth Taibbi, Clerk Suffolk County Attorney Suffolk County Legislature Bldg.158 North County Complex Suffolk County Legislature Veterans Memorial Highway Office Building Hauppauge, New York 11788 Veterans Memorial Highway Hauppauge, New York 11788 Stephen B. Latham, Esq. David A. Brownlee, Esq.
Twomey, Latham & Shea Kirkpatrick & Lockhart 33 West Second Street 1500 Oliver Building Riverhead, New York 11901 Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15222 Ms. Nora Bredes Docketing and Service Section Executive Director Office of the Secretary Shoreham Opponents Coalition U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm.
195 East Main Street 1717 H Street, N.W.
Smithtown, New York 11787 Washington, D.C. 20555
, Hon. Patrick G. Halpin MHB Technical Associates Suffolk County Executive 1723 Hamilton Avenue H. Lee Dennison Building Suite K Veterans Memorial Highway San Jose, California 95125 Hauppauge, New York 11788
- Joel Blau, Esq. Alfred L. Nardelli, Esq.
Director, Utility Intervention New York State Department of Law N.Y. Consumer Protection Board 120 Broadway,3rd rioor Suite 1020 Room 3-118 Albany, New York 12210 New York, New York 10271 i
Mr. Jay Dunkleburger Mr. Stuart Diamond New York State Energy Office Business / Financial Agency Buildling 2 NEW YORK TIMES Empire State Plaza 229 W. 43rd Street Albany, New York 12223 New York, New York 10036 tv2 W Y _
Susan M. Casey // /
KIRKPATRICK & LOpKHART 1800 M Street, N.W.
South Lobby - 9th Floor Washington, D.C. 20036-5891 1
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)-
):
) ATI'ACHMENTS
).
- 1. Excerpts From FEMA Testimony During 1983-84 Emergency Plan Litigation
) 2. Excerpts F:om Exercise Litigation Transcript
- 3. Post-Exercise Drill Reports
)
)
i-
)
)'
t h 1 to satisfy FEMA and the criteria of 0654?
I, . Y J
f[- -- 2 A That there is a system and a backup system, yes.
6h . *1
$ , 3 A (Witness Kowieski) If I may, there is a F
,t.#
M P
D.f[, ff 4 system, backup systems, and also there are procedures
%$; f 4 5 that describe how the system will be used. The actual 5
@ 'y$ 6 implemen ta tion, if the system is going to work or not,
>W
'jl '
7 will be verified during the exercise.
8
.g (Witnesses conferring.)
'4
) I,.
9 Q Gentlemen, let me ask you, with respect to 10 1
your expertise regarding communications issues, we have 11 talked about this a little bit during your depositions, 12 is it fair to say that any exoertise that you have with 13 respect to communications issues is expertise which comes 14
, from the fact that you have reviewed other off-site emergenc; 15 plans?
16 A (Witness McIntire) In my case, we have an f 17 emergency paging system in FEMA's regional office in New 18 York. Every fourth month I am required to carry a pager, i 19
> Mr. Kowieski is also on that period. .
20 So we have had, you know, extensive personal 1
21 use of paging systems. We know, for example, they do 22 not function when one is on the subway, but that is one of
, 23 the few olaces that we have found.
. We know our range is 24 approximately 50 miles. So we have, you know, personal 25 knowledge of the system that we have.
21-8-Wal
~-
. .12,543 1 communications equipmsnt in ito Plc.n.
2 A (Witness McIntire) No formal determination.
3 -
0 Would you look , please , at Contention 30 on 4
page 33 of your testimony, pages 33 and 34, actually. The 5 first question posed on page 33 is: Are provisions contained 6
j in the LILCO Plan sufficient to ensure effective communication l 7 among LILCO field emergency personnel?
8 And I would like to know the answer to that I
9 question, please.
10 A Again, this is another capability that we would 11 not be able to make a judgment on until there was an 12 exercise.
13 O So, at this time you are unable to render an
) (V)- 14 opinion in this regard?
15 A We can from a planning standard.
16 Q Well, from a planning standard, Mr. McIntire,
)
17 what is your opinion?
18 A (Witness Kowieski) There are provisions'in the
( 19 Plan sufficient to ensure effective communications among 20 LILCO field emergency personnel in the field. The Plan, 21 as we have already identified in our answer, there are four 22 radio frequencies that are dedicated for certain groups, 23 including three staging areas, plus EOC to road crews, 24 evacuation route spotters, and ambulance dispatch stations.
25 Q Are you aware of the f act, Mr. Kowieski, that 1 .
12,605 I
C. 'N7 I
, 4"9 1 ;
documents which we will mark as exhibits in a few minutes, l
2 i'
but let r.ie just ask first of all, see if we can't make a 3
D clarification, is it fair to.say that as a general 4
proposition, the FEMA testimony, which has been presented 5 l t
before this Board, is based on the RAC report and the 6
y review of the LILCO plan which has been conducted by the RAC committee and yourself ?
- 8 :
A (Witness Kowieski)
! That is correct. I
> 9 I !
, Q And is it fair to say, Mr. Kowieski, that I
- 10 the RAC report , as a gencral proposition, was based i 11 ;
, upon the RAC committee's review of the LILCO plan and '
12 '
Judgments regarding the plan's compliance with the criteria l 13 !
of NUREG 0654?
14 i
) A That is also correct.
15 lI l I
i, 1
O Is it fair to say that the RAC review process 16 I
in the context we have just discussed is, therefore, a l
) 17 it
' j review of the paper plan, that is, review of the plan and 18 ;
whether'the criteria cf 0654 are satisfied or are not
- 10 L ll satisfied?
i e 20 i.
,! A It was a review of the plan, measurinc the P
21 g 1 3
plar against the requirements of NCREG 0654, that is 22 i!
l ccrrect. l 03
~
Q Is it fair tc say, Mr. Howieski, that this 1
24 ,
I plan review has been conducted by PEMA and by the RAC I I committee without consideration, at this time, for whether l ll 1 n' l s
,4/1
, 2, i 12,606 Je! !
4,. I the plan can and will be effectively, implemented by LILCO?
i
]' 2 ; A The plan was reviewed, as I stated, measui: i l I l 3
l against the requirements of NUREG 0654. We did not
{
4 ;
evaluate whether or not the plan is capable of being 5
implemented. This would be done at a later stage during l
6 the exercise.
I 0 Is it fair to say, Mr. Kowienki, that, l l '
8 l therefore, a fella-graded exercise of the LILCO plan .
I
' 9 i l is required before FEMA can make a determination regarding i 10 whether or not the LILCO plan can be implemented? '
11 ; A As I believe I explained. The process that i 12 i we usually follow is that we first, the first step is j 13 l l to review the plan, to review the plan for its compliance i 14 l
, with the requirements of NUREG 0654. It is the first
'5 step.
I 16 l.
The second step, which we evaluate the I;
i 17 '
preparedness and whether or not the plan can be implemented, ,
l 18
),
that obviously can only be accomplished during the 19 fl exercice.
i 20 k A .(Wi tness McIntire) We must point out also 21 l p!
that wnat Mr. Kowieski has described is the normal process, 22 and I think all the parties here at this -- around this 23 'i b
l table understand that this is not a normal orocess.
I 24 j So, therefore, they may have some caveats and there may l
!I be some differences from the normal process.
i, J
7, n 5-b3' ;
I A :..-R 1 '
p/ t i the reading of the Plan, was designed to substitute, to w \
. 2 replace, the State and local resources.
3 That is the reason for this assumption, sir.
$' 4 0 Is it fair to say, Mr. Kowieski, that this
} 5 assumption enabled the RAC Committee to assume that there p 6 would be sufficient personnel to carry out the LILCO Plan?
I 7 A It would enable the Regional Assistance j 8 , Committee to conduct a Plan review. We did not -- I believe 9 I stated for the record that actually the resources that 10 ! are specified in the Plan are adequate or not will be 11 l determined during the exercise.
l 2 12 i O Yes, sir. I understand that. Is it fair to -
4: l i
l 13 say, however, that by making this assumption, the RAC !
. I
-4 "h 14 l Committee was able to assume that there would be personnel
-:r 15 l available to LILCO to carry out the LILCO Plan, since there
'i l
16 would not be State and local personnel, emergency response
-. c 17 -
to do so? !
's ! personnel '
I 18 A That is correct.
l 19 O And the third assumption, Mr. Kowieski, states l 1
20 l that the Plan does not reference the New York State radiological l
l emergency preparedness plan, and it has been submitted without:l 21 22 . a State site specific plan. Do you see that?
23 A Yes, I do.
24 Is it fair to say that this a',sumption was made Q
25 because you do not want members of the RA' Comittee to l
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I Do you see that statement?
e1 1
,5) l'i,$2 2 l A Yes, we do.
?.%. i n7 +& l 3 Q i
Mr. Kowleski, I take it that you are not
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4 saying that LILCO's backup means of communications --
1.e i ,
g'j ; 5 } that is, commercial telephones -- are adequate and will i
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b 6 provide assurance that notification and verification to
~ '
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special facilities will take place; is that correct?
e ':
4t 8 MR. GLASS: I am a little confused by the m.
'A l> ,
R 9
- question. You are using the term "adequate" and ]
y I LT w 10 l
- "provide assurance." There is a difference between, 11 you are talking about adequate against NUREG standards 12 and you are -- we have gotten into this issue before.
,2 -
yp 13 g BY MR. MILLER:
e, 14 i
Q Mr vieski, are you confused by my question?
6 \
15 !! !
n .
i 16
- +
. 1 O Let me ask you again, looking at that first ,
> i 07' l' l sentence to the answer on page 52, is it fair to say i
-,. l.
18 i f
that you are not saying that LILCO's backup means of 4
- 19 I communications, using commercial telephones, will provide assurance that notification and verif; cation to special 21 facilities will take place?
i -
22 -
A What I am saying in this comment is that provisions identified in the LILCO transition plan 24 i satisfy the NUREG 0654 n1anning criteria.
U O So you are not making the statement regarding I
. - s-s I
24, <24 l* ,
) ]$[ 1 whether or not such provisions actually would work, correct?
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2 '
A That is correct. Again, it is a matter of
)i ' 3 exercise or test.
D 's *I 4 ?- 4 0 You mention in your answer, Mr. Kowieski, i2 .
~
. t-that a directory of mobility-impaired persons is being 5
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?f 6 compiled based on the completed survey cards
- i. <
7 Do you see that?
8
? ; It is towards the end of the answer on page 52.
e.
> 9 It is also mentioned at the end --
~:n l 10 A Yes, I do. l l
I 11 Q Have you seen this alrectory at this time, i
12 Mr. Kowieski?
13
[' , A I have not.
gj I 14 i m Q Will FEMA or the RAC review such directory 15 if it is indeed compiled by LILCO?
- t
16
,. A Prior to or during the exercise.
G o
' 'Y 17 0 On page 53 of the testimony, where you say that
,1 18 the RAC has considered these provisions for protecting 19 mobility-impaired persons to be adequate, provided that i
N there is such a directory, do you see that statement?
21 A On cace 53?
l 22 '
- Q Yes, sir.
I M
A Yes, I do.
24 0 I take it, Mr. Kowieski, that you are not saying in this testimony that mobility-impaired persons will l
a ..
^] jji[ i 7, .ry@ 1 Q Mr. McIntiro, if there were no pre-planning by g',g 3. . 2 l' the schools for an emergency at the Shoreham plant, would
'. ku ,' n a i
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1 3 that a ,_ l change your testimony in any regard?
ec
> g.gy ? 4 A
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'r We did -- I don 't understand the question now,
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5 I am thoroughly confused.
u, 6
): Q Let me back up, Mr. McIn tire .
g Why don't you p 7
.y . look at page 69 of your testimony, and it says after the
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'; : blo'cked indented material, we consider that the Plan contains l
9 l adequate provisions for protecting school children.
10 It goes on from there and talks about the plant 11 l condition matter.
f
) 12 My question to you is:
l 2 That assuming there were .
13 1
- g no pre-planning by schools for an emergency at Shoreham, !
'{l 14 would your testimony remain the same? That is, would you i
)
l,
{
15 i
still believe that the LILCO Plan contains adequate provisions I 16 for the protection of school children?
.di s t l
'O 17 A
(Witnest Keller )
The Plan would contain ,
16 adequate provisions. I think what you are getting to is the i
i 19 3 b
implemen tation aspect of this again,
_ l 20 l The Plan would still contain what it contains.
21
, The people may not be able to implement the Plan, if your s
22 I hypothetical were in effect, and that would change an
{
23 evaluation, perhaps, af ter an exercise, but it wouldn't i 24 necessarily change the evaluation of the Plan.
{} 25 Q Mr. Kowieski, would it be fair to say that the f
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-s- o, i 12,753 1 5 i 8
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> ' g$] p p' 1 'l O And when you say that, in the first sentence 7/i,,
Up ' 2 of the answnr, "The plan designates the locations of the i" r 3
- various bus compcnies which have provided letters of
> all :
4 [' intent to LILCO," would you agree with me that busses
]%4 . .c;
~ ,
5 17{ ; may be stored at locations other than the locations of If i !
JY ,' 6 l th? various bus comoanies. identified in the letters of i intent?
I 8 l A (Witness Kowieski) Yes, I do.
) Jk 9 '
O Is it considered a plan deficiency that 10 ,
the plan does not assign LERO drivers to any soecific i
II l bus company?
)
- 2 A (Witness Keller) As we stated in our written ;
13 l
i testimony, toe issue of bus accessibility, including
? l 14
) - , the drivers getting to the busses and getting the busses 15 f to where they would have to be, would be assessed during 16 l
! an exercise. I i
l 1'
Q Looking at page 74, gentitmen, the statement 18 l.
in bold type at the top of the page which, as you note, i
19 n is in the LILCO plan and procedure 3.6.5, do you consider
!i 20
'll; this statement to provide assurance that school children j 21 will be supervised at the schools in the event of an i'
22 j emergency at the Shoreham olant?
ji A (Witness Kowieski) Again --
24 A (Witness Baldwin) Yes. If this statement that 25 is contained in the plan is to be implemented, that is i
-$N $ '
MN
~
I
- - Ip p]. suet 1 l there is r.o specific requiremont outlined in NUREG document 1;G M,_
1 2 that would ask that this, any given individual will report
.. 3 l to any station, duty station, within thirty-five minutes
~:f.; %
4 .
or forty-five minutes.
l I
5 O What it asks for is timely activation, right?
I 6 A We l'1, I understand timely. Timely is already 7 discussed, the issue of timely. We -- there will be 6 exercise. If individuals will be able to arrive, to be
> 1 9 on time to perform their duties, that will be timely.
10 (Witness Baldwin) And there is one other thing i
, 11
, to make sure that the record is straight with our written I
12 testimony. And in our written testimony in the answer to l
i 13 ,)
Question 47, which is Contention 27.F, we specifically 14 , state that the plan contains no information upon which 15 to base a' determination as to whether the arrival of u ! emergency workers required to report to field assignments l
17 would be timely.
18
( 0 So, in other words, you can't really determine il 19
[ whether H.4 is met until the exercise is held, correct? !
20 ! A (Witness McIntire) We are getting back to this 21 l current problem. From a planning perspective, the RAC i
22 l has concluded that the planning standard has been met.
{
23 l Whether it can be implemented again will be shown in an 24 exercise.
25 Q But with respect to timeliness, the only au
%% - . - - ~ - - -
eer.et
)
1 l say that they are adequate, correct?
q,6-Suet 5
~
L A 2 From a planning perspective or a preparedness
) 3 perspective?
4 0 Why don't you give me the answer to both?
5 A We have, at this point in time, made a judgment
)
6 on tne planning perspective. Then, we will look at the 7 implementability of the plan during an exercise and, 8 therefore, we might have a different finding.
)
9 l (Witness Kowieski) If I can just add --
10 , Q Excuse me. Just a second. Until you evaluate i 11 l those fuel deployment locations --
i 1
12 MR. GLASS: Mr. Miller, I thought our ground 13 rules were that if another witness wanted to supplement ll 14 an answer, he would be given an opportunity before the 15 attorneys went on.
l 16 Mr. Kowieski indicated his intent to supplement 17 Mr. McIntire's answer.
l 18 JUDGE LAURENSON: That is correct.
l l
, 19 l BY MR. MC MURRAY: (Continuing) l f
j 20
- l. O Mr. Kowieski, I'm sorry for interrupting you.
! I l
21 l And, my name is Mr. McMurray.
22 MR. GLASS: I'm sorry.
I I l
23 WITNESS KOWIESKI: With regard to the planning l
I 24 aspects, just maybe as a reminder, the NUREG 0654 planning 25 criteria, J.10.K, states that it would require identification i .
12,86:'
)
1 Q And the others were just concerned about the 2
letters of intent, and nothing else?
) 3 A That is correct.
4 O Mr. Baldwin, what was looked at in determining 5
)
whether or not the bus transportation scheme was, in fact, 6
adequate and I -- let's not go over the issue of letters 7
of intent, okay? Let's talk about the mechanism. The 6
actual working of the bus transportation scheme.
9 A (Witness Baldwin) What was looked at there 10 was whether the provisions for relocation were stipulated i-11 in the Plan, and those provisions were there.
12 A (Witness Kowieski) Also, when we evaluated 13 the scheme as such, the thought process that went into it 14 made sense. So we evaluated it -- there was command and 15 control, there was good coordination. We felt that in 16 our opinion this should work. If it will work, it will 17 be determined during the exercise.
18 In other words, the concept, what we saw in 19 the past during the previous exercises for other nuclear 20 sites, it is not exactly the same. You have dif ferent 21 conditions. However, whatever we saw, whatever we read 22 in the Plan made sense to us, and in our opinion it should 23 work. If it will work, the exercise will tell.
24 0 Let me -- are you talking about your thought 25 processes, or are you speaking for other members of the RAC,
4-4-Wal . 12,866 1 Drive rs . Vehicles. Route maps to follow. And knowledge i 2 of those people as to what it is they are to do.
> 3 Those things are set forth in the Plan and 4 procedure s .
5 Q Those things are set forth, but other than 6 reading the words on the page you have not -- on the pages 7 of the Plan , you have not done anything to determine whether
, 8 or not that scheme will work, correct?
9 A (Witness Kowieski) Again, it is stated for 10 the record, this will be the next step -- next stage. When 11 we go to the exercise, prior to the exercise we will spend 12 grest deal of time developing exercise objections and 13 exercise scenario, and we will go to the -- and when we go 14 to the exercise we will be well prepared to test, and we will 15 test, whether the scheme is going to work or not.
16 A (Witness McIntire) May I complete an answer, 17 please. Mr. Kowieski has also testified that based on the 18 RAC members and his own personal experience of observing 19 exercises, that knowledge antered into the discussion of X) this point.
21 Q Have you reviewed other plans that have used 22 the transfer point scheme?
23 A (Witness Kowieski) Not in Region II.
24 (Witnesses confer) 25 No, we did not. To answer your question, if
\
12,977 1
offectiveness of a public education brochure?
2 A I will be glad to answer your question. What
, 3 we have done in the past during the exercises, we would 4
sample at random population within the ' ten mile EPZ.
5 I would assign ~each observer that after they I
6 finished their regular task they would sample, lets say 7
each one of them five or ten residents, that some of them 8
would go to various public building facilities, the 9
restaurants, real estate offices, golf courses, every possibl 10 place that would be involved, or would have to follow the i
11 recommendation made by decision-maker.
12 And we would ask those individuals, interview
- 13 individuals the questions of this nature
- Are you aware that 14 your facility, that you are located within the ten mile EPZ.
15 We would ask them if they understand what kind of warning, 16 how the warning came about, the sirens, or route alerting, 17 and how they should respond. If they understand what is 18 necessary. What would be the next step?
19 And obviously, we would expect they understand 20 there is an emergency broadcast system, that they are 21 supposed to turn on the radio to EBS and listen for 22 instructions, l
! 23 So, basically the effectiveness is if people 24 understand what they are supposed to do in case of an 25 emergency. This would be evaluated during the exercise.
l
~_ _ . . _ _ _ _ __ _-
1 t
)
12000302 264 joswalsh 3 participate.
2 No one, including them have ever considered that 3 they would not respond in fact in a real emergency , but 4 , because of their non-participation, their role was simulated 3 by participants in the exercise.
6 I have three brief points to make about the 7 exercise in this litigation. First, LILCO believes that it a was sufficient in design and concept to provide the basis 9 for the issuance of a full power license, and we believe to that will be borne out amply in these proceedings.
11 Secondly, the standard for litigation of this 12 exercise, as with any exercise, is whether that exercise l
i3 displays fundamental flaws in the off-site plan.
. 14 Not trivial flaws, or intermediate flaws, but 13 fundamental flaws. As to fundamental flaws, the word, is ' fundamental' is not equivalent or synonymous with 1,-
irreparable, and in fact, LILCO has taken steps to remedy 18 those areas which FEMA has considered to be relatively w important, namely those areas they have classified as
- deficiencies, but also less significant areas, those areas 21 which are known as ARCAs, or areas requiring corrective 22 action and in also areas recommended for improvement.
l t 23 LILCO believes that the exercise and the 1
24 remedial measures it has taken and which have been referred I
1 25 to in the testimony and reviewed by FEMA and the NRC since l
1 l
1 l
l l_-
l 12000202 265 joewalch i demonstrate adequate readiness for full power operation.
2 Third and finally, this is an expedited
/ 3 proceeding as the Commission indicated last June in CLI 86-4
- 11. One aspect of this is that -- and it is a measure also 5
of LILCO's concern with the importance of this proceeding.
)
6 Mr. Weismantle is the Vice President of Long 7 Island Lighting Company. Mr. Wilm is a Vice President of a Long Island Lighting Company. Other witnesses LILCO will
)
will put forward are senior executives with LILCO, who to because of its concern for off-site emergency preparedness it has placed these gentlemen in important roles in their off-12 site organization.
i3 Their testimony here is important because of l 14 their knowledge and their involvement in the plan and the is exercise. And also, however, irretrievably detracts from i3 their ability to perform their normal duties. They are here i7 as long as is necessary. They will answer all questions is that are material and important. However, we urge the Board i, to recognize that these gentlemen have very important ,
20 ; other responsibilities as well, and there may come times l
2i i
when I am going to have to ask the Board's leave to let theml!
22 do their normal work as well as to participate in this 23 Proceeding.
24 Thank you gentlemen. That is all I have. Mr.
25 Zeugin will be in charge of presenting the witness panel.
I l
l l
t
I 1P 100302 511 evalsh
)
this.
~
, 2 Now, much of the argument this morning has 3
concerned law of the case, res judicata, and it is true that l 4 there must be an end to litigation, and all that kind of l 5 thing. But human beings are fallible. You are, and in 6 particular I am.
7 And as a member of the Board that made this l
decision,theearlierdecision,Iamveryawarethatsomeofj l s 9 our decision was of the nature of prediction. The l 10 Interveners, the Government's claim that LILCO or LERO 11 couldn't do a particular thing. We looked over che plan, 12 and we decided that that thing was indeed possible, you 13 could do it.
I 14 Now, we are faced with an exercise in which an 1
is attempt has been made to do certain of these things, and the l 16 Interveners now tell us those attempts failed.
i 1B
!?
20 21 l 22 I
23 28 l 25 A
i I 512 00303 181
, prys gon5 I cannot see why the doctrine of res judicata should
- say that because a Board in a predictive manner said this is l
3 possible and we believe it can be done that for all time 4
then, even if it turned out it couldn't be done, one must 5
decide that it can be done anyhow even if the world says no, 3 I could have made a mistake. It could be possible that I i
7 believed that LILCO could do something in a reasonable ;
i 1
e length of time, when in fact they couldn't. !
l 9 I would like to have each of you address this to notion, that perhaps res judicata does not take precedence {
ri over experimental fact in certain instances. j Do you see what I mean? !
12 13 Mr. Reis was talking about it last and perhaps l
," 14 he would like to discuss it first. i 15 MR. REIS: In the legal framework which of ,
16 course we are in, and of course we try to mirror the real 17 world and there is no question about that, but we do have ;
13 certain rules and certain rules of finality. f l
'? One of the rules here is the mandate of the l
20 Commission to the Board, the Charter of this Board, and in i 2i the charter itself it said what has gone before is going to i 22 be what is and what you should consider, and it sets out 23 your jurisdiction in effect. That is one ansyer. l i
24 The second is if it is really material, the l 25 rules of the Commission have ways of changing and there can I \
i ;
i i
t
I ]p 1 1,0 543 s
i A I would say yes.
2 Q And, are you telling me, sir, that you have no -
[
3 basis for knowing which of those three assumptions was, in 4 fact, the case on the day of the exercise? \
3 MR. ZEUGIN: Judge Frye, I will object to this 1 6 question. He is asking the witness to speculate, i i
- 7 The witness answered in the very first response 3 to Mr. Miller that he was not privy to the conversation ,
o between the route spotter and the FEMA controller and could i io only speculate that that was the reason why he reported it i it as being east rather than north of the intersection.
1 1
12 JUDGE FRYE: Just to be sure it's in the record,
,3 do you have any basis for knowing what may have occurred I 34 between the route spotter and the FEMA controller? i i3 WITNESS WILM: No, II don't, Judge, i 3 JUDGE FRYE: Okay. '
l i7 BY MR. MILLER: (Continuing) is Q Now, Mr. Wilm, once the information came into ig the EOC stating that the impediment was, according to the !
- o route spotter, east of the intersection and apparently that 21 was either about 11:50 or 11:55, then the next step ;
22 essentially was that road crew 2006 was dispatched to the 23 scene of the impediment; is that correct? :
1 24 A (Witness W.1m) That's correct. i i
25 Q And, the instruction was given from the Road l
1 4N
lf .
) 00404 544 1b1. galsh i
I Logistics at, Coordinator to the Evacuation Support Communic according to Attachment B-8, 11:50 for that 2
roadcrewtoj 3 be dispatched; is that correct?
4 A That's correct.
3 Q And, according to your testimony, the road crew 6 actually left its field post and responded at 12 noon, '
7 right? l 3 A That's correct, t j
e Q Now, Mr. Wilm, yesterday we had a discussion i
l 10 about roadcrewsandwhentheyareattheirpositionsinthe!
I 1t field. They essentially sit waiting for orders to respond l 12 to impediments, with their radios on, ready to go. l 13 ; Do you recall that discussion? l l
l i4 A Yes, I do.
i3 Q Can you tell me then why it took 10 minutes from 13 the time the instruction was given to the road crew before l I
n the road crew actually left its post to respond to the l
ta impediment?
i; (Mr. Weismantle is conferring with Mr. Wilm.)
I 20 MR. MILLER: I am talking to Mr. Wilm right now, 21 Mr. Weismantle.
l 22 WITNESS WILM: It took 10 minutes to get to the l 23 road crew to dispatch -- as I read this message, to l 24 dispatch, to get the message to the crew to move from their 25 location over to the site.
l
! JL
1I i
ggf0606 564
,gysimons
, I way to the east side, correct?
)
2 WITNESS WILM: Yes, that's correct.
3 JUDGE PARIS: When did you communicate with them 4
and tell them to go north, or did you?
5
) WITNESS WILM: At the time I got involved I was
~
6 unaware of where the road crew was. I was trying to do 7
something with traffic rerouting because I felt that we I i
e ought to get fixed. I would have to consult my notes to see 9
what we did with the road crew. I don't believe that the to road crew was told that the accident was north, but they had il to report east to find the FEMA observer.
12 JUDGE FRYE: And they would have to report to 13 the FEMA observer to say yes, we're the road crew and we're !
14 here to clear this accident or whatever?
15 WITNESS WILM: Yes, sir. As it turns out, the 16 note they got which said that the accident is north, it 17 didn't specify where the FEMA observer would be. So, la the,refore, they missed the person. They found him at 12:45.
19 JUDGE FRYE: Excuse me?
l 20 WITNESS WILM: They eventually got there at !
21 12:45. !
22 JUDGE FRYE:
And by "there," that's to the north f 23 site on Yaphank Road? l 24 WITNESS WILM: No, that would be to the FEMA 25 observer site.
l l 01010 646 l 1. Walsh ,
m.
1 that's what we are talking about. {
) MR. MILLER:
2 Judge Frye, all I can say is that 3
it's a LILCO produced document.
4 JUDGE FRYE: We admitted it. l 5
MR. MILLER; Okay.
6 JLTGE FRYE: It's in.
7 BY MR. MILLER: (Continuing) 3 t
Q Now, at the top of Page 11 of your testimony, I 9
Mr. Wilm, you mentioned the fact that at 12:55 you asked !
10 your staff to see to it that an EBS message regarding the I Il gravel and fuel truck impediments was prepared.
12 j Do you see that? l l 13 A (Witness Wilm) Now, by the time that you made 14 this request to your staff, you had known of the gravel 15 truck impediment for about 40 minutes; is that right?
I 16 A That would be right.
17 Q Can you tell me why the delay in requesting the i i
'8 preparation of the EBS message? l 19 A I was more interested in getting the oraffic 20 rerouted and getting the situation fixed. The fact that 21 l there are traffic control point guides to guide traffic, 22 this EBS message I felt was a plus but it wasn't as j 23 important as getting all of the t raffic rerouted and getting {
l 24 the planning into place.
I 25 So, I did it in order -- I took care of the two l
l l
)
1010 647
. ;4,10,;ialsh r
1 impediments and then I thought that now we ought to get a
) -
2 message out on what we did.
3 Q Now, the message was finally prepared and d
approved for release at 1:45; is that right?
) 5 I'mlookingonPage12ofyourtestimony, midway l 6
down.
7 A Yes, I see that.
3 1
Q So, would you agree with me that it was approved i
at 1:4S?
'O A Yes, I agree.
O Do you know what time the message was actually
'2 released?
13 A I would like to confer.
id (The witnesses are conferring.)
15 (Witness Weismantle) The broadcast actually 16 started at 1346. In other words, it Was approved and
'7 immediately sent over the air once the sirens were sounded, la which happens almost instantaneously.
'9 Now, would you look, Mr. Wilm, at the message Q
1 20 itself which is Attachment B-17? The second page describes !
l 21 that part of the EBS message that was, according to Mr.
l 22 Weismantle, released at 1:46 with respect to the two 23 impediments; is that right?
24 A (Witness Wilm) That's right.
25 And, with respect to the gravel truck Q
1 l
1
1
)
f,;2101010 egalsh 648 l 1
impediment, it simply states that people utilizing Middle !
) 2 Country Road should not try using the Yaphank-Middle Island I
3 Road due to a multiple vehicle accident at the intersection d
of Yaphank-Middle Island Road and Main Street in the west
) 5 Yaphank area.
6 Do you see that statement?
7 A I do.
l 8
0 So, the message did not describe in any way the l
?
rerouting of traffic around the impediment, did it? !
10 A The purpose of the message was to -- i Q Mr. Wilm, my question is, the message did not 12 describe terouting around the impediment, did it?
13 A It didn't have to. No. l i
N '
Q Now, Mr. Wilm, in fact, during the exercise it 15 was reported at 1:30 by the road crew that had been 16 dispatched to the scene that the gravel truck had been l l
17 cleared from the roadway and that traffic had resumed in 18 both directions.
M Do you see that statement on page 12 of your 20 testimony? l 21 A Yes.
22 Q Why would you at 1:46 advise the public to stay 23 away from an area where at 1:30 you had been'given
. 24 information that said the impediment was removed and traffic 25 flow had resumed in both directions?
)
I 101010 649 NeWalsh e
I A I would like to defer the answer to your 2
question to Mr. Weismantle, who would be more familiar with '
3 l the preparation and the timeliness of the EBS message.
(Witness Weismantle) That EBS message I was 5
b involved in as well, and I was aware of the discussion -
6 between Mr. Wilm and the Coordinator of Public Informatio;;.
7 And, I had some discussions with the Director and the f 8
Coordinator of Public Information on it.
We felt, anc I felt and, as Mr. Wilm said, we j
'O "
felt it was a good idea to send something out but certainly l'
very much secondary to the prime focus of rerouting traffic.
12 Second, at the same time this message was being
'3 prepared, there was an analysis going on of what areas were l'
contaminated. We knew by then there was certain !
I 15 contamination out there. l 16 And, in the Rad Hecith area in particular, they l i
'7 were looking at which zones to direct people to the la Coliseum. And, if you look at the beginning of the first page of the EBS exhibit, which is B-17 I believe, you will l 20 see that that mesaage contains in the fourth paragraph a 21 recommendation that Zones A, B, F, G, K and Q should report 22 to the Coliseum for monitoring.
23 So, that analysis controlled when the message 28 came out. We felt it was much more important to identify I 25 that, the need for those residents to go to the Coliseum.
a
) I i
2101010 650 i t
' heWalsh 1
And the message was held up, i 2
That resulted in a delay in its issuance until, ;
3 in retrospect, the accident had actually been cleared. But, j d
there was no harm done by that. It wasn't, in our opinion, 5
really necessary that the EBS message go out in the first !
I 6
place because all of those residents tnat were effected by ;
7 the impediments were being handled through the rerouting. l 8
If they had never -- if they hadn't tuned their radios in, !
it wouldn't have made any difference. They would have seen 10 the traffic guides and been rerouted anyway. ;
il Q Well, my question has not been answered but I 12 will explore your answer some, Mr. Weismantle.
13 Why did you not just put out two EBS messages 14 rather than one rather than hold up the message?
15 A Because the way things happened, the attention 16 of the Director had to be primarily on the contamination i
17 issue, and a lot of my attention was on that, too. It ;
13 wasn't considered important.
19 And I still don't consider it important to have 20 gotten the EBS message out on the road impediment situation.
21 0 Since the exercise, Mr. Weismantle, have you !
22 changed the LILCO plan to essent ially require that an EBS f 23 message be issued in response to roadway impediments during i 24 an exercise?
25 A That's right.
o
3Y
)
010 827
.; pons 1
Q And the log that we have been looking at, Mr.
) 2 Wilm, C-9, says that your first response was the fire 3
department and to send the route alert driver with the d
dosimetry, right?
) 5 A That's what it says, yes.
6 0 Can you tell me when the route alert driver with 7
the dosimetry was actually dispatched?
8 A Well, on page 16 it shows that the route alert 9
driver was dispatched at 12:50, the last sentence of the 10 first paragraph.
Il Q And that refers to Attachment 'C-10 of your 12 testimony. So there was an instruction to dispatch the 13 route alert driver at 1237 and that person was actually Id dispatched at 1250, right?
15 A That's right.
16 Q The message itself, Mr. Wilm, does not mention 17 anything dosimetry equipment, does it?
18 JUDGE PARIS: Anything about what, Mr. Miller?
19 MR. MILLER: Dosimetry.
20 (Pause while the witness reviews documents.)
21 WITNESS WILM: It doesn't.
22 BY HR. MILLER:
23 Q Now again, Mr. h!1m, at 1255 there is the 2d reference where you instructed your staff to make cure that 25 an EBS message was prepared for the impediments. Do you see
.J L
)
gill 855 galsh 1 A It could be. I'm no: sure. I didn't keep track
) 2 of when we determined how we were going to do it. The logic i
3 evolved that we had an overturned : ruck and that we should 4 remove the fuel, i
) , 5 I'm not really -- I can't pinpoint that time, l 6 when we did decide that.
7 Q Well, isn't it true, in fact, Mr. Wilm, that 8 there is no documentation regarding the necessity for l 9
contacting a company to off-load the fuel from the to overturned tanker until this notation at 2 o' clock when 11 someone was instructed to contact Hess Oil Company?
12 A That's correct. Before we did that, we had to i
13 find out who the truck belonged to. And, that was an issue l 14 where we couldn't -- we thought we needed that information 15 as to whose truck it was and then we would contact them to is get a tanker.
17 So, that information, as I testified before, I la believe was supplied by a FEMA observer that was listening l l
19 to the discussion.
20 Q And, if I recall your testimony, Mr. Wilm, you l 21 can't find any documentation of that discussion with the 22 FEMA observer if, in fact, it took place; and, you don't ;
23 know what time that would have been, do you? !
I 24 A I can't recall, no.
25 Q Now, in the real world, Mr. Wilm, isn't it tree i
l J.
c
)
- 1pS03 s 879
.d,imon y
i participation and the verbal critique you get right at the I l
) 2 end of the drill by the controllers, the purpose being to 3
feed back immediately to people in general how they 4
performed so that they can reinforce certain points for the
> 5 purpose of improving performance in the future. I don't 6 recall any mistakes. I'm sure if you went back and 7
reconstructed everything there were probably areas of 3 improvement. But I can say on the essentials, the nature of
?
the response, the speed of the response, et cetera, I recall 10 we did very well, and that's what the controllers told us.
11 Q Let me ask you, Mr. Weismantle, following the 12 exercise there were -- and to make sure we have the correct 13 terminology, I always just say exercise to refer to the FEMA 14 exercise, and I will try to talk to you about training 15 drills to be these other training events that LERO to undergoes.
17 Following the exercise, Mr. Weismantle, there 18 are and have been periodic training drills of LERO 19 personnels is that correct?
20 A That's right. It's part of our annual program.
21 Q And in fact, Mr. Weismantle, do you recall the 22 initial training drill following the exercise was in June of 23 19867 I 24 MR. ZEUGIN: Objection. I believe the witness 25 has already testified that all he remembered was the one l
t l
l ad
)
l 0303 880 simons i drill he participated in.
2 MR. MILLER: Judge Frye, if you give me some 3
leeway I think I can set the foundation here and it will be d
relevant.
5 JUDGE FRYE That's not the objection.
6 Do you know the answer to the question?
7 WITNESS WEISMANTLE: Well, to the best of my 8
recollection, because some of my employees were involved in 9
other drills, I believe there were drills in June or July, 10 in the summer, and I would accept June subject to check, but 11 I don't have firsthand knowledge of the perform _ ace.
12 JUDGE FRYE: I think that clears up the answer.
13 That's the answer to that question.
14 BY MR MILLER:
15 Q Mr. Weismantle, isn't it true that during this 16 June drill that the scenario involved the exact same two 17 impediments, the fuel and the gravel truck impediments that 18 were used during the February 1986 exercise?
29 MR. ZEUGIN: Objection, Judge Frye. Again, the 20 witness at best tried to remember when his employees were at 21 a drill, and it seems to me he has no way of knowing.
22 JUDGE FRYE: Do you know?
23 WITNESS WEISMANTLE: I don't know what the
! 24 scenario was in June.
I i
25 MR. MILLER: Judge Frye, I am having handed out e
4
lI
)
00303 1
l fy d'simons 881 l
I a six-page document and if we could mark this for 2
identification as Suffolk County Exercise Exhibit 12. It is i
3 Bate stamped by my law firm as it was a document produced 4
during discovery with numbers 765720 through 765725 In the 5
bottom right-hand corner it's dated October 31, 1985, and 6
it's entitled "Drill Report For June 6, 1986 For LERO 7
Facilities, EOC, ENC and Riverhead Staging Area (Partial) ."
8 (The document referred to was 7
marked Suffolk County Eaercise 10 Exhibit No. 12 for 11
- identification.)
I 12 MR. ZEUGIN: Judge Frye, I know there isn't a I
o pending question. I would merely reiterate I think my 14 earlier objection, which is we are going into a document is that obviously from its title is a drill report from a June t
16 6th exercise that none of these witnesses were involved in 17 and obviously can't speak to. I don't see the purpose of 18 going through any of this.
19 As I said before, LILCO will address the 20 responses in its training testimony. I just don't see what 21 we gain by going through this exercise.
22 MR. MILLER: Judge Frye, may I just proffer what 23 we're looking at?
24 JUDGE FRYE: I have a question before you 25 proffer. What happened to Exhibit 117 Did I miss it ML
)
Ig100303 882
- rysimons I
I somewhere along the line?
2
) Okay, that's the transcript.
3 MR. MILLER: It's the Deposition of Saricks and d
we're pending a ruling on that.
5
) JUDGE FRYE: All right, and your proffer?
6 MR. MILLER: My proffer, Judge Frye, is 7
relatively simple. There is a statement in the testimony 8
which discusses the fact that LERO had not practiced handling impediments of the size and severity as they faced 10 during the exercise, and that in part was responsible for 31 the performance that was rendered. "nat's the second 12 sentence on page 19 of the testimony.
13 I will show through this document that the same 14 impediments, the fuel truck and the gravel truck impediments 15 were used in a training drill subsequent to the exercise by 16 some four months and that the LERO response to those 17 impediments in that June drill were at least equally as is poor.
'9 I think this goes to the statement made in the 20 testimony that somehow LERO should not be judged too harshly 21 given what they faced during the exercise.
22 MR. ZEUGIN: Judge Frye, I don't see any 23 relationship between the two. The statement refers to the 24 period prior to the exercise. The point of that statement i
25 was what went on and how LERO trained before the exercise.
l l I l l A
l
gg0303 883 Rgysimons r
1 This document relates to a drill that took place four months 2
after the exerciso, and I just don't see how it's relevant 3 to the testimony Mr. Miller cites.
4 JUDGE FRYE: What is the history of this 5
document and who preparec it?
6 MR. MILLER: The history of the document, Judge 7
Frye, it was prepared by Impe11 Corporation which I a
understand is a consultant contractor to LILCO that handles 9 training for LILCO.
10 JUDGE FRYE: Is that correct, Mr. Zeugin?
Il MR. ZEUGIN: That's correct.
12 MR. MILLER: It was provided to the governments i3 through discovery.
14 JUDGE FRYE: And the "To" and "From," was that 15 deleted for some reason, or was that just not there at all?
16 MR. ZEUGIN: My guess is it was redacted because 17 it was names I do not know because I've never seen this 18 document before myself.
19 JUDGE PRYE: Then how come it's dated October 20 31, '85?
21 MR. ZEUGIN: I think that's '86. I think it's 22 basically poor copying.
23 MR. MILLER: Judge Frye, my understanding, the 24 date of October 31, 1986, and it is '86, at that time Impe11 j 25 Corporation did drill reports for drills held also in
)
0303 884
) simons i' .i 1
September and October, and apparently they just combined and, 2
did the June drill at the same time they did the September 3
and October drills.
4 JUDGE FRYE All right. Now where does it say 5 they made the same mistakes?
6 MR. MILLER: Can I do this through the witnesses 7
or do you want the proffer to continue?
I a JUDGE FRYE: I want the proffer.
MR. MILLER: Do you want to do this in front of 10 the witnesses, Judge Frye?
II JUDGE FRYE: Well, if you want to approach the 12 bench.
i 13 (Bench conference off the record.)
14 BY MR. MILLER:
15 Q Mr. Weismantle, let me just ask you, have you 16 seen this document regarding the drill report for June 6th, 17 1986 before?
18 A (Witness Weismantle) I don't think so. I get a W lot of information. I don't think I've seen it. If I have 20 seen it, I certainly didn't review it or read it. ,
I 31 22 23 24 25 l
1414 885
{haish i Q Mr. Weismantle -- well, let me ask Mr. Wilm,
)
2 have you seen this document before, sir?
3 A (Witness Wilm) I have not.
4 Q Mr. Lieberman, have you seen this document 3
5 before?
6 A (Witness Lieberman) No, I have not seen the 7
document. I believe I recognized perhaps one or two a
excerpts in the County testimony.
9 Q Mr. Wilm?
10 A (Witness Wilm) That's the same for me, too.
11 The one or two excerpts in the County testimony.
12 Q Mr. Weismantle, I would like to ask you again if 13 you think you've seen this document before?
14 A (Witness Weismantle) I don't think so. As I 15 indicated before, I have not read the County testimony on 16 this issue or any other.
17 JUDGE FRYE I think that probably pretty well 18 means we are going to have to hold this document for now.
19 MR. MILLER: Well, Judge Frye, I would like to 20 explore that for a moment. This document was provided by 21 counsel for LILCO. It is written and prepared by a LILCO 22 consultant.
23 It addresses matters that are directly relevant 24 to their testimony. And, are you saying that because these 25 witnesses have not seen the document --
l l
s
)
11414
[f,walsh 886 1
JUDGE FRYE:
I think, before you go any further, 2
)
if I recall what Mr. Zeugin said, he will' have witnesses 3
available later with regard to Contention 50 who are 4
familiar with this document.
3 5 So, I think you are just going to have to wait 6
until you get them.
7 MR. ZEUGIN: That's correct, Judge Frye.
8 MR. MILLER: Well, Judge Frye, if we have to
?
wait until Contention 50, we will obviously do so. It's 10 just that this is very relevant to the issues now before the il Board.
12 And, there is not a question of authenticity 13 being raised here, as far as I understand it. I don't 14 believe that's Mr. Zeugin's objection. I think his 15 objection is one of relevance, to JUDGE FRYE: If it gets in, it gets in, you 17 know. I mean --
18 MR. ZEUGIN: Judge'Frye, I would merely note
'9 that it was Suffolk County who draf ted their contentions the 20 way they chose to draft them. They drafted an entirely 21 separate contention on training, and that's how LILCO has --
22 JUDGE FRYE: I don't, you know, intend to --
23 when the three of us sit down to write a decision -- ignore 24 this document if it's relevant to Contention 41 just because 25 it happened to be talked about in connection with Contention i
)
01'03 N3 230 gd/sw 1 , O Now you have a statement at the end of the t
2 paragraph about the drill scenarios that have been used 3 since the exercise, do you see that statement?
4 A Yes.
! 5 0 Are these the same drill scenarios you told me 6 yesterday you had not seen since the exercise?
7 A What I said yesterday is I did not have knowledge 8
of the precise scenarios other than the one I played in in 9
December, of course, that we used in the training drill, 10 since the exercise.
11 i That is right.
I didn't know the details of it.
12 I did, of course, know that impediments ,were going to be 13 .part of,the scenarios I didn't knew exactly what' type, and 14 the precise parameters of it.
15 . O And what was your knowledge based upon if you had i
16 ,
not seen the drill scenarios themselves?
17 A I knew that there were training program revisions 18 that we committed to shortly after the exercise to FEMA and 19 that part of the revisions were to include impediments in -
20 them.
21 In fact, I was involved in discussions within two 22 or three weeks of the exercise. Conceptual discussions as 23 to what our approach would be to handle what we knew because 24 of FEMA's verbal comments the day after, and the day after 25 that after the exercise, in the pub.lic meeting, they felt ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
l 202 347 3700 Nationwide Coverage 30433HMS A
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01 04 90 954 g /sw 1 j were areas of improvement.
2 0 l So, you were involved in deciding, at least in 3
fpart, the types of road impediments that would be used in 4
training drills following the exercise?
5 A Not the types, but the fact impediments and major 6
impediments would be included, yes. And in the decision to '
7 add the traffic engineer, for instance, to the LERO 8 organization.
9 i O And I gather, Mr. Weismantle, if you will follow i
10 l along with me into the next sentence of this page, that you 11 rely in part at least on these training drill scenarios and 12 9
their inclusion of roadway impediments to support your 13 statement that training since the exercise should eliminate 14 'l response delays observed during the exercise?
15 ,' A Yes.
16 MR. MILLER:
t Now, at this point, Judge Frye, I 17 l
would like to again go back to Suffolk County Exercise 18 Exhibit No. 12, and I think that is the right number, from 19 yesterday, which is the June 6, 1986 drill report.
20 JUDGE FRYE:
IMPELL Corporation.
21 MR. MILLER: The IMPELL Corporation, yes, sir.
22 We have additional copies if people did not bring them with l
23 them.
24 BY MR. MILLER: (Continuing) s 25 ,
O And one other background cuestion, Mr.
I i
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- o:.347 3700 Nationwide coverase soo.336-4M6 c.
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01 05 N i 230 1 Weismantle. 'I believe it was Wednesday of this week when I, '
gTd/sw ,
2 pursuant to the Board's instructions, with respect to -
3 possible exhibits,that may be used in this case, provided a 4 file to counsel and you and counsel reviewed that file, 5 isn't that correct?
6 A I looked over Lee's shoulder very briefly while 7 he was leafing through some of the materials, but that 8 didn't constitute a review by me.
9i 0 Did you see the June 6th drill report in that 10 file that I handed to Mr. Zeugin?
l 11 l A Not that I recall. I saw a lot of internal LERO 12 messages for that portion of.what he was leafing through. I 13 was looking over his shoulder.
14 0 Have you reviewad this drill r- set since we left 15 l the room yesterday?
16 ; A Not since we left the room, no.
I 17 l 0 It is still your testimony that you never seen it i
18 before?
19 A I think what I said was it may have passed my 20 desk. I may have physically seen it. I didn't review or 21 read it before.
22 O Is it still your testimony, Mr. Weismantle, that
! l l 23 based upon the performance of LERO in training drills since f
24 l the exercise, you believe that LERO can eliminate the l
25 ' response delays observed during the exercise by FEMA? l l
l !
l l l ACE. FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
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I go 01 06 956 MR. ZEUGIN: Objection, Judge Frye.
dd/sw 1
It seems to 2 l me we are wasting a lot of time going back over ground we I
3 covered yesterday. The witnesses yesterday, I think, 4 explained very clearly that they are unaware of the 5 specifics of results of drills that have taken place .
6 subsequent to the exsreise.
7 I think the language that Mr. Miller has seized 8 upon now on page 29, to attempt to go back and do that, in 9 i the sentence he just misquoted simply says, and it is a very 1
10 ' general conclusion, that viewed in their entirety, these 11 . ,
plan and training provisions should eliminate.
12 Mr. Miller has now changed the focus of that 13 statement to suggest a very sp,ecific conclusion by 14 Mr. Weismantle. I don't that is what that sentence says at i
15 !
all.
16 ;
MR. MILLER: Judge Frye, 1 am willing to explore 17 l that with Mr. Weismantle. But he has testimony here that 18 discusses drill scenarios since the exercise. He relies at 19 least in part, as I said, on those drill scenarios, '
20 according to his testimony, for his conclusions about how 21 LERO should be able to handle impediments in the future.
22 That is what I would like to explore with 23 Mr. Weisman'tle.
24 MR. 2EUGIN: Judge Frye, I don't think Mr.
l 25 ACE. FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
l 202 347 3*00 Nationwide Coverage $303)(HM46 h ..
l
01 07 957 230 qJg/sw 1 Weismantle has ever said anywhere that he relies on the 2 drill reports as the basis for those statements.
3 MR. MILLER: Well, I think it speaks for itself.
4 JUDGE FRYE: He says here relying on the plan and 5 training revisions. Isn't that included?
6 MR. 2EUGIN: I think he is referring to the 7 revisions in general. I think that is what he just answered 8 when he described the conceptual changes he just talked 9 about.
10 l JUDGE FRYE Well, I think I am going to permit I -
11 the question, and.we will go down this line a while and see 12 where we go.
j 13 M'R. MILLER: It will be brief, Judge Frye.
14 BY MR. MI'LLER: (Continuing) 15 0 Mr. Weismantle, we are looking at what has been
- 16 marked as Suffolk County Exercise Exhibit 12, which is ,
17 identified as the June 6, 1986 drill report for LERO, and ,
18 apparently was prepared by IMPELL Corporatic1.
l 19 Would you identify for me IMPELL Corporation?
20 A (Witness Weismantle) Well, they are a consulting 21 firm who have supplied people in the past, and I assume 22 continue to do so up to this day to help run our training l 23 program, either as instructors, or drill controllers, and l
l 24 that sort of thing. I 25 0 Is it fair to say that IMPELL is a long ACE. FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC, 202 347 3*00 Nationwide Coserage 900 3 S 66 4 1
EL:' ~ - .
i
958 01'08 1 standing LILCO consultant?
gp/sw 2 A Yes. They have been involved since the beginning 3 of LERO, that is correct.
L 4 0 And would you agree with me Mr. Weismantle, that 5 it appears that IMPELL Corporation prepared this drill 6 report? t 7 A '; ell, an individual from INPELL, I am sut.
8 ,
prepared it.
9 0 And, Mr. Weismantle, I direct your attention to 10 certain passages in this drill report, and then ask you your 11 opinion about* whether you still believe the training drill 12 since the exercise has demonstrated LERO's ability to 13 respond to roadway impediments? <
14 MR. ZEUGIN: I don't think that is what 15 1 Mr. Weismantle has previously testified to. I don't think' 16 he has said anything about whether any subsequent 17 performance is acceptable or not.
18 JUDGE FRYE: Let him answer. If that is the l'
19 case, I am sure he will tell us. ;
20 WITNESS WEISMANTLE: My testimony talks about the 21 plan and training revisions should eliminate the response i
22 delays. Yesterday, I testified to the performance in ,
23 December of Mr. Wilm, myself, Mr. Lieberman, and others. !
24 BY MR. MILLER: (Continuing) l 25 0 Let me back up, Mr. Weismantle.
l ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC,
! 202 347 3700 Nationwide Coverage 800 3XHM46 A
t 09 959 po 01 q g i A That is the only point I touched upon actual g /sv j
2 drills.
3 0 Is it your belief that in training drills since I 4 the exercise, LERO has demonstrated an ability to handle 5 simulated roadway impediments? l 6 A In the December drills, yes. As I said yesterday i
7 repeatedly, I am not knowledgeable about the performance in i
8 the other drills, with the other shifts. 2 I
9 J' I wasn't a participant. I wasn't responsible for !
10 running it.
ll 11 l 0 Now, Mr. Weismantle, are you, therefore, telling 12 me that it may be that in training drills from the exercise
'13 up through December LERO was not able to demonstrate ,the ,
14 I ability to respond to roadway impediments?
15 A As I repeatedly say, I am not knowledgeable of ,
16 h the --
17 I JUDGE FRYE: He doesn't know.
l l 18 WITNESS WEISMANTLE: I don't know.
19 BY MR. MILLER: (Continuing) 20 0 Mr. Weismantle, would you look please at the 21 first page of this exhibit? You see in the second paragraph 22 a statement that the scenario used in June was essentially l 23 the same as was used during the FEMA-graded exercise on l 24 February 13th?
25 A I see the sentence that says that.
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0 Now, do you see, Mr. Weismantle, at the bottom of syd/5" 2 : the page, various bullets, and you see the statement that as ,'
i ;
a result of the exercise on February 13th, the following 3l I
4 specific additional objectives and tests were added to the 5 drill scenario? ,
l l
A Yes, I see that statement.
6l 6 l
7 O Do you see the very first remark, two impediments j 8 to evacuation were simulated to test the communications l 9 within LERO and LERO's response to the impediments, namely ;
10 ,
rerouting of traffic and public notification of the ,
11 ; impediment? '
12 i A I see the statement, yes.
13 l 0' And at the bottom of the page, sir, doesn't it 14 state that the traffic engineer was tested'in his new !
15 position?
16 i A Yes. ;
17 0 Now, if you would go, Mr. Weismantle, to page 4 18 j of this document, we have a statement in paragraph 21 about 19 ' the two road impediments. I 20 It says that the handling of the first 21 impediment, the gravel truck, was generally done in a well 22 organized and expeditious manner. The second road I
23 impediment, tne fuel truck, was confused and response was 24 delayed. Do you see that statement? l 1 1 25 1 A That is correct; I see those two statements.
ACE FsoERAL REPORTERS, INC, l 202-347 3700 Nationwide Coverage 800 336 6646 k
11 go 01 !
gd/sv 1 0 And do you see a whole array of problems that l
2 were noted during the drill, Mr. Weismantle, relating to the 3 handling of the road impediments?
l 4 They start at the bottom of page 4 and go over to 5 page 5. i!.
6 A Yeah, I see statements about them. Not having l 7 j read this, not knowing if, in fact, they are supported by 8 the facts of the day of the exercise, I do not think I can characterize them.
9 ;
j 10 l 0 Let me just ask, Mr. Weismantle. Do you have !
i 11 l some reason to doubt the accuracy of' this drill report that !
i
, 12 was prepared by LILCO's consultant, IMPELL Corporation?
13
- MR. ZEUGIN: Objection.. Mr. Weismantle has 14 . testified numerous times now that he wasn't involved in the i
15 ! whole process, so I don't see how he can even begin to draw 16 any kind of such conclusion.
' i i I 17 ; JUDGE FRYE I agree. I don't see how he can l
18 l answer that question. This has been admitted, hasn't it?
19 MR. MILLER: It has not been admitted, Judge 20 Frye, because yesterday there were objections to it. I am 21 not seeking to admit this document.
22 MR. ZEUGIN: I guess, Judge Frye, I said !
23 yesterday, and I will say again today if it helps, LILCO i
24 will present a panel on Contention 50 that will be able to 25 i discuss this document and any other post-exercise drill l
i ACE. FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
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' L .. . . - - ._ _ _.
962 IN critique that Mr. Miller may want to talk about.
1
.$/sw
~
2 JUDGE FRYE: My recollection was that this was 3 admitted. l l
4 MR. MILLER: I don't believe so, Judge Frye. I i 5 don't believe it was admitted. I Would move it into the l l i 6 l record, now, Judge Frye, and we can come back to it in l l l 7 Contention 50, and it will be an exhibit already in the l
8 proceeding.
9 i
MR. CUMMING: Judge Frye, FEMA would object to 10 l its admission for a very specific reason. We think that ,
11 with respect to this exercise litigation as being l
precedential. We understand that all parties may wish to I 12 l
' 13 introduce post-exercise material, and we believe that the !
I l
14 f Board should focus on that, and to the extent possible, if ;
- i 15 l it decides to generically allow the admission of 16 l post-exercise material for whatever purpose, an example ,
17 ;
might be that FEMA has produced a guidance memorandum which i
18 ! might be favorable to the intervenors or it might be 19 favorable to the applicant. I 20 For example, that might be something that they 21 would want to introduce, depending on which party was 22 involved and the nature of the document. It would be 23 helpful to us r.o that we would understand how exercise 24 f litigation In Futuro would proceed, that we would, understand !
I
! 25 [ what the standards of admission of post exercise materials ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
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'P O
,, g5 02 ,
F' 1 A Okay.
. ,;/sv '
2 l O Isn't it true that two road crews showed up at 3 fthePortJeffersonstagingarea, having neglected to bring I
4 l their vehicles with them as they are required to do?
i 5 JUDGE FRYE Let's divide that into -- !
6l WITNESS WEISMANTLE: Yeah.
l' l
7 l JUDGE FRYE: Did two show up i.. :ng neglected to l l ,
8i bring their vehicles? ,
9l WITNESS WEISMANTLE: They didn't bring their i
10 l vehicles but that --
11 l JUDGE FRYE: Were they required to bring them?
l .
12 l WITNESS WEISMANTLE: .They personnaly, no, were 13 ; not required to.
14 JUDGE FRYE: Okay.
15 +
BY MR. MILLER: (Continuing) i 16 4l 0 Mr. Weismantle, under the LILCO plan are road -
17 crew personnel assigned to pick up the vehicles used in the 18 performance of their duties prior to reporting to staging 19 areas? !
20 A Generally, no. What happens at Port Jefferson is 21 during the call-out, the phone chain that calls these road 22 crews out, a certain number of them -- and it's done not by 23 individual name but by individual location relative to 24 vehicle location so, therefore, it could be different every f
i 25 time -- are supposed to be asked to bring vehicles.
l t
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,vsw 1 j Apparently, that part of the phone message was 2 lleftoutbythecaller,at least to the extent that he only 3 got two vehicles when he should have gotten four.
i 4 O Now, when those personnel -- there were four road 5 , crew members that showed up at Port Jefferson without !
i i
6 vehicles to put them in; is that correct? !
l 7 ; A There were a lot of road crew members that showed 8 ! up at Port Jefferson. Only two vehicles showed up. There 9 i i
should have been four vehicles, but I don't want to. assign 10 them to individual names because that's not the way the 11 l '
system works. '
i 12 f O Okay. Now, when only two vehicles were there, i
13 l what you are telling me is that four road crew memoers were' l l
14 i sent from the Port Jefferson staging area to Brentwood to 15 i pick up two vehicles?
i 16 A That's correct.
17 ; O And, in fact, Mr. Weismantle, if you will look at 18 l what we have marked for identification as Suffolk County 19 Exercise Exhibit 13 --
20 A We may not have marked that. Can you describe it 21 further?
22 0 It's the one that we had discussion about 23 yesterday regarding the Stone and Webster evaluation of the !
i i 24 .
Eoc duties of the traffic group on the day of the exercise, l
25 . A I think we have to search a bit before we can l
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.<//sw 1 find it. Okay. '
'2 ! MR. MILLER: Dees the Board still have the -- ,'
3 JUDGE FRYE Yes. -
4 BY MR. MILLER: (Continuing) 5 O row, Mr. Weismantle, if you will look at the last 6 page of that exhibit, the very first entry: "Two road crew !
7 l vehicles failed to be obtained on call-out and were not i j
8 brought to Port Jefferson staging area by arriving road '
9 I crews."
10 I Do you see that?
11 i A Yes. l i
12 ,
O This is what you were just deteribing to me, l 13 fisn't it?
l 14 , A That's correct. I I
' l 15 O Now, Mr. Weismantle, one of the road crews -- in 16 fact, I think both road crews that had to be sent to 17 : Brentwood, they were road crews 2011 and 2012; is that !
18 right?
19 A Subject to check, ! will accept that.
20 Q And, road crew 2011 is the road crew that 21 eventually was dispatched to the fuel truck impediment 22 during the exercise, correct?
23 l A That's correct. I 24 [ I I
O And, if I recall correctly, that dispatch to the !
i 25 j scere of the fuel truck impediment, actually deployment to '
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lT I sw 1 I the scene of the fuel truck impediment, was at about 1:50 on 2 the day of the exercise' .
3 ,. A That's correct.
4 Q Now, isn't it true, Mr. Weismantle, that the 5 reason that road crew was not deployed sooner to the scene 6 I of the fuel truck impediment is because the vehicle was not !
7 ; available until shortly before that time?
I 8l A I would like to confer for a second. ,
9 (The witnesses are conferring.) !
I 10 No. I don't agree with that, j l
11 Q Do you know, Mr. Weismantle, what time personnel
. I 12 l arrived at Brentwood to pick up the vehicles they used i 13 during the exercise, including this road crew 20117 i
14 ! A I can give an approximation. If they were l l I 15 l dispatched from Port Jefferson at 11:58, it probably took i 16 them about 25 minutes, i.alf an hour, to get to Brentwood. ;
17 l 0 So, your guess would be about '. 3 0 ? i 18 A That's my best estimate.
i 19 0_ Now, do you know what time they left Brentwood I 20 with their vehicles?
21 A I assume they left almost immediately. You know, 22 they obtained the vehicle, got in it, and they went towards l
23 their road crew locations in the field.
l l 24 f Q Do you know what time road crew 2011 arrived at 25 his deployment location in che field?
1 ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC-l 202 147 3700 Nationwide Coverase 800 33(H5646 4W - .. . .
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,w 1 l paragraph VI A. 5, at 21 NRC 759, and the Contention which is 2
reprintad at 21 NRC 999 to 1,000, you will find that they 3
l were dealing with a contention that asserted that backup 4 notification was due in 15 minutes.
5 I
We, therefore, view the rest of the holding there 6 l as being dicta, and not a holding.
7l Paragraph 2 raised a question with regard to l
8 l whether the 45 minute allegation of the Contention -- or of 9
the testimony was an after the fact attempt to expand the 10 ! contention, and we do not view it as such.
)
11 The rest of it, paragraphs 3 through 7, we think 12 are appropriate background information.
13 We also deny the motion to strike the portions of -
14 , the testimony on Contention 40, We viewed paragraphs 1 to 3 15 as essentially being frivolous. We viewed paragraph 4 as 16 providing background information, but I would note that we 17 will consider only the scenario that was exercised on 18 '
rebruary 13, and not some other scenario.
19 Paragraph 5, we believe that the testimony there l 20 is relevant to Contention 40, in that that contention 21 alleges that traffic guides were too late to provide 22 effective assistance to evacuees.
I i 23 l '
Paragraph 6, we view as appropriate background. ,
i i 24 l Paragraph 7, while the testimony there does allude to 1
25 matters which were previously litigated, it is necessary 1 i
l
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,bg 1 background to understand F'affolk's position. That it is 2l necessasry that traffic guides be promptly posted, and that 3 the exercise failed to demonstrate that this was l
4 ,
accomplished. i l
5 As I indicated, we are not going to review any 6! conclusions already reached concerning the adequacy of i 7 j LILCO's traffic control plans.
3 Paragraph 8, we believe that the testimony may 9 ,
properly take issue with FEMA's conclusions, and I might 10 , note parenthetically this morning we certainly reviewed 11 testimony of LILCO's that seemed to do the same, our 12 l decision will address the q'Jestion of what constitutes a !
13 l fundamental flaw.
14 In regard to the motion to strike portions of the 15 testimony on Contention 41, we grant the motion as to the 16 first -- as stated in the first paragraph. We view that 17 teltimony as being speculative, and dealing with matters 18 that have already been litigated, and not necessary
- I 19 background to understand the County's position. l
) e 20 l The rest of that we deny.
21 Paragraphs 3, 4, 6, 7, 10, 11, and 12 all appear '
22 to be appropriate background. Paragraph 5 states Suffolk's 23 ' opinion on the consequences of delays, and we view that as 24 being appropriate. We view the ratters stated in i
i 25 ;
i t
! l ACE. FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
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/ 1 incident, the patrol officer himself may very well make that 2 decision. If it's a major thoroughfare and involves the J
response of two or three units, it may very well be made by 4
a patrol sergeant.
5 But, it's made at a low level. It's made by --
6 WITNESS McGUIRE: Well, it also would depend on 7
how much advance warning we had. If it happened like now, B
it would be the PO and the Sergeant out there. If it was 9
going to be tomorrow at this time, we would hope a 10 Lieutenant or maybe a Captain would get involved in the
!! planning.
12 JUDGE FRYE: Let's assume that we have got the 13 gravel truck and three automobiles that FEMA postulatied, id what happens?
15 WITNESS MICHEL: Well, it's the kind of'. thing 16 that can't be predicted in advance so, therefore, I think it 17 would be made at the low level. It would be made by the
'8 responding police officer wi'o was initially on the scene.
Once he checked for injuries, the next thing he 20 would do is divert traffic. That would be part of his 21 responsibilities.
22 JUDGE FRYE: And, he would report to the 23 Sergeant that he had diverted --
24 WITNESS MICHEL: If he needed further 25 assistance. If it was a situation where it involved an i
I i
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1195
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impediment of this nature, he would probably call for y 2 additional assistance, have a. second sector unit respond, 3
perhaps a supervisor and set up some type of a traffic 4
scheme.
5 6
7 8
9 10 11 12 j 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 11 1 23 I
le 25 '
, w- -
1198 03 l sb f,d block three lanes of the expressway and would require that
, i
- it be shut down at the exist closest to that accident, we 3
might find, and this has happened many times, that by 4 diverting traffic off at the ramp just before that accident, 5 you create tremendous confusion right in that imnediate 1
1 6 vicinity, so it might be better to move back two uxists to 7 some place where you have a major north-south route crossing a the expressway, and divert traffic and that point rather l
i than the exist closest to the impediment itself, because
'O there is a major thoroughfare there that people can deal 11 with and are familiar with.
12 - Therefore, will move it under those 13 circumstances, and we will have the flexibility to do that, 14 ;)GE FRYE: But now at that point, if you are is making that kind of decision, that would be somewhat above 16 the responding officer.
17 WITNESS MICHEL: Chances are it will be made at la the patrol supervison level, which would either be a M
sergeant or a lieutenant.
20 JUDGE FRYE: Someone who is back in your police 21 headquarters?
22 WITNESS MICBEL: Not necessarily, no. Probably 23 a field supervisor, yes, sir.
2d WITNESS McGUIRE: I just wanted to add to give 25 you a flavor of what would be happening at that time, the 1
l 1
l ACm . _ . . . . . . - - --.-.- - - - - -
1 . ..
I 1199 303
/l
,f d field personnel would also be responsible to call out a 2
route for responding equipment to take.
3 In other words, they would know right there what 4 roads were blocked, what roads were passable, and we would 5 like them and encourage them to say that they need an 3 ambulance or a fire apparatus, tell them to take such and l 7 such a road north, and then turn onto another road. That is 1 1
a another of their responsibilities. l 1
o JUDGE FRYE: Same thing, I believe, will be true l 10 for wreckers or any sort of equipment you would need to~
11 clear the accident.
12 WITNESS MCGUIRE: Wreckers not as importantly, 13 because -- in other words, you call for a wrecker and he is 14 on his way.
15 JUDGE FRYE: He is not a police wrecker, he is a 16 commercial wrecker.
17 WITNESS MCGUIRE: Exactly. So, once he leaves 18 his barn, or whatever, he is on his own, and it is not that 19 important, usually, except maybe in the instance of the !
l 20 expressway to get the road cleared, but usually fire and 21 ambulance are primary concerns.
22 WITNESS MICHEL: What we have done on occasion, 23 if a very special piece of equipment is needed, such as a l
24 crane or something along that line, we will actually send i 25 police units to wherever that piece of equipment is located l
1 1 a, I
l )
107 1246
. a sh
? I implementing a response to an expected problem..." and the 2
answer goes on.
J What do you mean by the term "vertical
' hierarchy?"
5 JUDGE FRYE: Which page are you on?
6 MR. ZAHNLEUTER: 76.
7 WITNESS ROBERTS: Mr. Zahnleuter, I am 8
referencing that hierarchy, that guy who has to get the job done out in that field would have to go through in order to 30 get the information and guid:. ace in order to accomplish his task. Here, this position is established and it's 12 established in the EOC. It's another level of information --
13 it's another level that information must pass through before Id it gets to the function level.
15 BY MR. ZAHNLEUTER: (Contint.ing) 16 0 In responding to emergencies, docs the Suffolk II County Police Department utilize a vertical hierarchy?
'8 A (Witness Michel) I think in this issue, it goes
" back to what we said earlier, that we try to encourage our 20 lowar level people to make decisions that they are capable 21 of making and can make better than the hierarchy at their 22 level of execution.
23 And, we are talking here specifically about 28 traffic rerouting plans. People who are on the scene 25 certainly have a better idea of what's going on than we have l
2L
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000707 1247 g31sh I
back in Headquarters. We can have the Expressway shut down 2
for sometimes a full half hour before the Commanding Officer 4 3
of Highway Patrol would even be aware that it was shut down, 4
because the people in the field have been trained to do that 5
job and are doing it properly.
6 And, it really doesn't need to come to the 7
attention of Commanding Officers at a higher level. I'm not 8 sure if that answer is responsive to your question, but 9
that's --
30 (Witness Dormer) If I may, I would like to U
elaborate on that. The Police Department is structured 12 along the same lines as the military. And, when an 13 emergency decision has to be made, it's made at the lowest
" level.
15 The military makes it at the squad level. The 16 Police Department makes it on the street, just like the 17 squad level whether it be the police officer or the la sergeant. It doesn't go up the line to the Commanding 19 officer and then back down again with the decision.
20 It's too cumbersome. It takes too long. There 21 may not be time to go through that process.
22 Q Okay. Your question and answer deals with the 23 Traffic Engineer. Would a vertical hierarchy have an affect 24 on the ability of the Traffic Engineer to perform his or her 25 duties under the LILCO plan?
l r
l l
00707 1248
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A (Witness Michel) I'm not sure what you mean.
2 Q Well, the Traffic Engineer is part of the 3
vertical hierarchy; isn't that correct?
A Yes, I would agree.
5 0 And, would the fact that the Traffic Engineer is 6 1 within that vertical hierarchy have an impact on his or her 7
ability to carry out his functions effectively? l a
MR. ZEUGIN: Objection. That's a leading 9
question.
'O JUDGE FRYE: I think we will let him answer
'l that.
12 WITNESS MICHEL: I think from what we have 13 previously said, it would not have any helpful impact at all
'd to have it go through the Traffic Engineer.
15 The people who are closest to the neighborhood 16 are the people who are most likely to know what's best.
17 WITNESS McGUIRE: And, you would be putting is another box into the chain of communication which would slow I'
it and compound it, depending on how much authority he had.
20 And, apparently he would have a lot and not add 21 to the -- I mean, engineers are good for drawing plans.
22 But, when we talk about on-the-spot impediments, we don't 23 feel that he would have a useful impact on the plan, and it 24 would slow down communications.
25 BY MR. ZABNLEUTER: (Continuing)
Ak l_ _
g808 1265
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something that is res adjudicata.
2 l JUDGE SHON: That may be true. But I would like h 3 to say, though, partly in response to the things that Mr.
d Irwin said a few moments ago, that this Board is, of course, 5
in a difficult position with respect to certain predictions l 6 made by the earlier Board, in its judgments.
7 The earlier Board did decide that certain things 8 might be possible. That a plan was a good plan, or a
- workable plan.
' 10 However, the Commission has directed us il specifically to look at the plan and see whether, in fact,
{
12 the exercise shows that it works. And I would not -- I 13 think I expressed a very similar opinion a day or two ago, I Id would not feel us bound by a decision of the previous Board is as to the workability as demonstrated by the exercise.
16 It is a narrow line to make, a difficult thing 17 l to walk along, but we are now investigating whether in fact 18 that plan does work the way it was anticipated to work when 19 someone attempts to put it into practice.
20 MR. PIRFO: If the Staff may be heard, and then 21 I will defer to Mr. Zeugin. I am a little bit -- and I was 22 troubled by it a little bit before when you said that, Judge 23 Shon.
24 There is a case that has been decided, and 25 admittedly you were making -- the decisions made in that l
t k
g3 1452 h
y drills where route alert drivers covering their routes has
^ been practiced?
2 3
A (Witness Weismantle) Yes.
O Is it fair to say that the only training drill 3
where that has been done has been in December?
A I don't know. As I said, on Contention 41 I'm 7
just not familiar with the details of the drills prior to December.
, Q Mr. Daverio, do you have any additional
,o knowledge?
ii A (Witness Daverio) I believe they also may have 12 been done in some of the earlier drills, Mr. Miller, in the
,3 October time frame.
,, O If it was done in earlier drills, would it be
,3 reflected in the drill reports prepared by Impell?
A I think one of the Impell reports does reflect 37 it. I think the October 1st one does.
ig Q Let me ask you, is it fair, Mr. Daverio, to say that in post-exercise training drills LERO has still 20 Practiced dispatching only one route alert driver per siren 21 area?
22 MS. MONAGHAN: Judge Frye, there is an admitted contention on training. And, it seems to me that it would 23 24 be more appropriate to review what's in the context of the 25 training drills and what the training program entails in l
l
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g303 1453 py y;1sh y detail in connection with that particular contention.
2 JUDGE PRYE I agree, but I would like to get
[
3 the answer to that question.
, WITNESS DAVERIO: I could be mist' ken, but I 5
believe at least one staging area sent out more than one 6 route alert driver at one of those drills. I think that's y reflected in those reports. ,
l 3 BY MR. MILLER: (Continuing)
]
9 Q But, isn't it true that otherwise LERO has still io been practicing sending one route alert driver per siren in territory? l 12 A In the two reports that you have, I can only 1 1
33 think of one case where they did otherwise. l u Q I am going over to the last page of your i3 testimony, gentlemen. I want to explore these figures a 16 little bit.
i7 You state that under the plan there are more is than enough route alert drivers assigned to the siren backup 39 to permit LERO to assign multiple drivers to a single area.
20 And, then you tell me that 16 of the 60 route 21 alert drivers are needed to provide notification to the deaf 1 22 leaving 44 route alert drivers to cover 89 siren routes.
23 Is that correct?
l 24 A (Witness Daverio) You have read what we have l 25 said correctly. !
l l
l
'303 1470
. 1sh '
, MR. MILLER: Judge Frye, I have no further 2
questions. I would just simply -- I would like to move this 3 document, Exhibit 20, into the record at this point. '
I
, And, I would just invite the Board's attention 5 to other pages, Pages 22, 26, 33, 34, 37 and 38, which also
, address matters of route e.lert drivers. In those instances,,
7 only one driver was dispatched. And, given the testimony i g and their reliance on multiple drivers I don't see the need 1
, to cover those areas. j
,g JUDGE FRYE: Any objections?
l l
,, MS. MONAGHAN: Yes. I'm going to object to the l 12 admission of any pages other than those which he has cross I j
i o examined the witnesses on, j
,, MR. MILLER: That requires me to go through the is ther pages. If that's what the Board wants, I will do g that.
g MR. PIRFO: The Staff has no objection. l ig MR. ZABNLEUTER: No objection. '
,, JUDGE FRYE: Well, is this an internal document?;
MS, MONAGHAN: Yes, it is.
20 l.
i 21 JUDGE FRYE: So, you have no basis to, I would '
take it, question the accuracy of the figures that are 22 l i
23 given?
24 MS. MONAGHAN: No.
25 JUDGE FRYE: All right. I think we will admit i
I L
)
000606 1563 !
Walsh
't i O I take it then you are not talking about
) 2 whether, for example, they knew where the reception center
, 3 was located on the day of the exercise, and issues such as 4 that?
) 5 A I don't think that is within the scope of the 3 contention. We don't certainly touch upon it in our 7 testimony.
g Q Mr. Weismantle, I think that it would be helpful 2 to take a very brief time to define some of the terms we are ja going to be discussing over the next several days, and I it think we can go through this rapidly. I think it will be 12 productive, and the first term that I would like for you to i3 define for this Board is what is a traffic guide?
i4 A A traffic guide is an individual who helps i3 facilitate the traffic strategy outlined in the plan, and is .
16 available to perform other beneficial activities that fall i ,, outside the preplanned traffic stratecy should the occasion la arise.
,, Q What are some of these other beneficial 7g activities that could fall outside of the preplanned 21 activities?
22 A Determining the existence of road impediments, and communicating that back to their supervisors, and then l 23 24 to the EOC. ;
25 Q I take it that you think it is a valid function I
l l
q u 31000909 1608 suewalsh i Q And, in fact, it's your testimony, isn't it, 2 that 10 to 15 minutes after the order to evacuate, there 3 would be a substantial number of cars on the roadways?
l , A No. We estimated about 20 minutes.
5 0 About 10 minutes?
, 6 A About 20 minutes.
7 Q So, let me make sure that I have an 3
understanding of some definitional terms.
9 We agree, don't we, Mr. Lieberman, the order to .
I !
10 evacuate -- or, as you like to call it, the OTE -- was at ;
ij 10:24?
l 12 A I think Mr. Weismantle said it was about four l 33 minutes later. No? l j, (Witness Weismantle) To broadcast the message'. [
15 (Witness Lieberman) Okay. I stand corrected.
,, It was broadcast at 10:24.
g Q And your definition of the evacuation process I ig for the public would begin approximately 20 minutes ;
thereafter; is that correct?
A That is corre . .
i 20 21 Q or, the evacuation process would begin at 10:44 22 r ughly?
I A Appr ximately, l 23 j
! Q Now, Mr. Lieberman, isn't it true that it is 3 l 25 assumed in the LILCO plan the traffic guides, which are 1
1 PF
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i . 1665 .
$'g01
-Mr. Weismantle, would you please turn to Page 6 1 Q
? sd of Y '#- testimony? And, we are now going to focus on the '
2 3
time it took the traffic guides to get to their stations in 4 ; the field rather than the time it took to dispatch traffic l
. 5 guides.
6 Now, Mr. Weismantle,. do you see the statement in 7 the answer to Question 7 that, "LILCO presented data 8 gathered during earlier drills en the time necessary to 9 complete the mobilization process. See PID at 719. Based 10 upon these data, the Board held that LILCO could 11 ' substantially complete its mobilization in about three
- 12 hours. PID at 723."
13 Do you see that statement?
14 A (Nitness Weismantle) Yes.
4
- 15 , O Do you agree with that statement, Mr. Weismantle?
f :
l 16 ;
A Yes, I do.
1 17 0 Okay. New, I take it that previously in your la testimony there was a sentence following that statement 19 which you have now withdrawn from your testimony; is that 20 correct?
l 21 A That's correct.
22 0 Mr. Weismantle, do you have an understanding of l
23 how the PID defines r.obilization?
I t
l j 24 (The witness is looking at a document.)
25 l A I think on Page 716 they define it in i
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i
?y 2 , Q And, what is your understanding of that 3 definition?
, 4 A I think it's self-explanatory when one reads it. ;
51 Q For the benefit of those -- t i
6 JUDGE FRYE: For the benefit of the Board since I
7 1 we don't have --
i
- 8 q tiITNESS iiEISMANTLE
- Oh, I'm sorry, 9 JUDGE FRYE: -- that, would you read that?
10 tiITNESS tiEISMANTLE: I'm sorry. Okay.
I 11 ] Mobilization is defined as the activities that take place i
12 between the determination that particular off-site emergency 13 f response personnel should be notified and the reporting of
.i 14 t
I such personnel with necessary equipment- to the locations
'i 15 j where emergency functicns will be performed.
16 l 3Y MR. SUTKO: (Continuing) 17 "l Q And, I believe we have previously discussed that I
13 ] on February 13 traffic guides, to use the ?ID's words, I
19 l
should have been notified at tne declaration of a site area 20 l emergency; isn't that correct?
I 21 A (iiitness tieismantle ) No. I can't agree that il 22 anybody could reasonably expect a notification to traffic 23 guides simultaneous with the decision in the EOF to declare 24 i a site area emergency.
25 Q But, that's t.>e triggering event; isn't that
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A That --
3 JUDGE FRYE: It's what? -
4 MR. SUTKO: The triggering event. .
t 5 ! UITNESS UEISHANTLE: That triggers the i l l, 6 ,lnotificationto the EOC which then triggers the setting off i
i 7 l of the pagers which triggers the call-out.
8 SY MR. SUTKO: (Continuing) 9 Q Do you know when the EOC declared a site area
' ]
I i 10 emergency on the day of the exercise?
I 11 A The EOC doesn't declare a site area emergency.
I 12 1 That's declared at the EOF by the LILCO emergency response I
i 13 organization.
14 i 0 Do you know when it- was announced at the ECC, 15 , Mr. Weismantle?
16 A Uell, at 8 -- I'm not sure when it was announced 17 j or what you mean by announced, but at 8:24 a RECS message --
13 i COURT REPORTER: Excuse T.e, Mr. Ueismantle, what i
19 , message?
20 UITNESS UEISMANTLE: ' RECS, Radiolog ical Emergency i
21 y Communications System, message startad to be transmitted to
' !i
. 22 ! the EOC and to the other points on the RECS system.
I 23 3Y MR. SUTKO: (Continuing) l 24 Q Mr. Ueismantle, what is your understanding based 25 upon the definition of mobilization in the PID as to when ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
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1 1668 04 : 1
- '4 i mobilizations for traffic guides would be completed? ll 54
? '
A Uhen they are at their locations in the field, at 2
3 their traf fic posts or traf fic control points.
4 Q And, it's your testimony on Page 6 that that ,
5 should have been substantially completed in three hours; is 6 ; that correct?
4 7 A I'm quoting from the PID on Page 6.
I a O But you agree with that conclusion?
9 A I agree with that statement, that it could be 10 substantially complete in about three hcurs.
11 O Okay. Do you have a copy of the FEMA report, I
12 Mr. Weismantle?
I i
13 A The post-exercise assessment?
14 'O That's correct.
l 15 l A Is that what you are talking about?
. I 16 :
0 That's what I'm talking about.
l l 17 A I believe so.
13 l Q Uould you please look at Page 25? Do you see 19 4 there a table which is marked Table 1.1 and which is t
20 F entitled "Emergency Classification Time Line?"
4 21 A Yes.
il 22 ,ij Q And, do you see an emergency classification 23 titled "Site Area Emergency Notification?"
il 1 24 d A Yes.
1 1 25 >
Q Do you see another heading which is entitled
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phrase the question is, is it a linear process.
JUDGE PARIS: Yes.
WITNESS LIEBERMAN: Yeah. I think it's pretty .
close to linear. And the reason I say that is the '
3 following. It alludes back'to something I said earlier.
6 Whether you have one-lane outbound or two ' lane !
- i outbound, you are going to be moving traffic at capacity. !
8 And, that traffic will be moving at capacity levels I throughout the evacuation. And, therefore, on that basis I
'O '
think it's sufficiently close to linear t'> apply this 11 proportionality.
12 If there were fluctuations in demand, let's say
'3 that the demand fell off below capacity --
JUDGE PARIS: If the traffic guides had gotten 15 there 45 minutos earlier, how would they have affe~tedc --
p 16 !
or, how would they have achieved the shorter evacuation time?
'8 WITNESS LIEBERMAN: They would hhve doubled capacity along that route.
20 JUDGE PARIS: So, they would have increased 21 capacity?
22 l WITNESS LIEBERMAN: Right.
23 JUDGE PARIS: The proportionality or linear 2'
relationship bothers me because intuitively it seems to me --
25 l and you are the traffic expert and tell me whether my
(
l l .-
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35701515 1995
'gewalsh
, I i
s \
2 intuition is correct or not, from observing traffic at i
capacity service levels, that 3
if you have an accident early '
4 on in a commute hour and so you get the capacity reduced and the traffic level reaches service level F, then long after s
6 that accident is removed it remains at service level F --
WITNESS LIEBERMAN: Yes, that's known as a 7
\
historicist effect. And, I could describe it to you. It's a [
going to take some time. I'm willing to do it.
9 As a matter of fact -- I 10 JUDGE PARIS: Is that linear?
WITNESS LIEBERMAN: In terms of throughput, yes, 12 JUDGE PARIS: In terms of what?
WITNESS LIEBERMAN: Throughput.
14 JUDGE PARIS: Throughput?'
'3 WITNESS LIEBERMAN: Throughput. In other words, the number of vehicles that get through that bottleneck, the 17 answer is yes. t la i In terms of delay, no. It's quadratic. 1 JUDGE PARIS: Okay.
l WITNESS LIEBERMAN: Close to quadracic. _
JUDGE PARIS: Well, here you are calculating total evacuation time. That involves delay, doesn't it?
WITNESS LIEBERMAN: Only f rom the point of view 24 of -- yes. From the point of view of individual vehicles, 25 their delay will increase considerably.
L.
p701515
,gewalsh - 1996 '
JUDGE PARIS:
2 Isn't that what is important as !
far as exposure is concerned if you are in a plume?
3 i WITNESS LIEBERMAN: The only thing that matters
' l is what their dwell time is within the EPZ. And, what you 8
are asking is how fast can you get these guys out of there.
I And that's the measure of capacity.
7 What we are looking at is the aggregate effect 8
as opposed to the delay experienced by individuals. I know it seems kind of intuitive but the aggregate effect is a
'O function of how quickly you can move people out of an area.
That's all we are interested in here.
12 And, what I'm saying is that linearity does ;
'3 apply when you are looking at throughput or productivity of the system. And, rather than looking'at the delay 15 experienced by an individual.
16 JUDGE PARIS: But, if I'm sitting in a queue because of that accident that occurred an hour and a half 18 I ago and has long since been cleared, I'm suffering from j quadratic effect, right? ,
20 WITNESS LIEBERMAN: Well, you are also suffering 21 from an important difference between an evacuation scenario 22 and a situation that you have just described of normal l 23 traffic conditions. In an evacuation scenario, you have a 2'
certain number of cars you want to get out of here. No more 25 are being added.
9 701515 1997 hesalsh ,
In the real world, the normal conditions, when !
2 i
you come along an hour and a half later you have added to l 3
the demand at that section. And, that's why you still 4
experience the effects of the earlier congestion.
5 JUDGE PARIS: Well, is that all that different 6
from what you expect to occur in an evacuation? Everybody is not going to get out on the highway at the same time.
WITNESS LIEBERMAN: That's correct, but at the j end of three hours or so, they will be queued up trying to 10 get out.
11 The thing that you can't lose sight of is how 12 ;
much longer is it going to take that traffic flow from l
'3 getting passed that section of highway. And, it works out to be about linearity.
Let me explain why. Let's use round numbers so we can talk intelligently. Suppose you have a roadway with, 17 say, 2,000 vehicles per hour capacity and you have a demand i 18 1
of 8,000 vehicles and no more are waiting. You have a total j demand of 8,000 vehicles awaiting service.
f
- 0 And if all these vehicles flow at 2,000 vehicles 21 i !
m per hour, those 8,000 vehicles will get out in four hours.
JUDGE PARIS: Okay. !
3 WITNESS LIEBERMAN: Okay. Now, let's say that 24 for whatever reason capacity is reduced to 1,000 vehicles 25 per hour for the first hour and then increases to 2,000 1
- 5701515
- 1998 :
l pewalsh vehicles per hour subsequently. You can see the parallel 2
I'm drawing here.
3 Instead of having two lanes when congestion l 1
developed, we had only one lane for something less than 49 3 5
minutes. I'm rounding it up to an hour so we don't have to l 6
work with fractions. Okay. ,
JUDGE PARIS: So, at the end of the first hour 8 i you will have gotten out 1,000 and you will still have 7,000 vehicles that need to get out?
10 WITNESS LIEBEPRAN: Right. And, at the 2,000 I vehicle per hour rate, you are goir.g to get these 7,000 out 12 in three and a half hours. .
So, the total time to get them all out is now 33 l four and a half hours which is in the neighborhood of 20 15 percent of the four hours, actually less.
16 JUDGE PARIS: Okay. But, I still don't see that i you have demonstrated the linear relationship. ,
'8 WITNESS LIEBERMAN: I have two points. I have one point where I have five hours -- I'm sorry, it's four i 20 hours2.314815e-4 days <br />0.00556 hours <br />3.306878e-5 weeks <br />7.61e-6 months <br /> after congestion sets in and another point where I f 21 have five and a half hours under no traffic guides. And, I f 22 have a certain delay.
23 So, I have only two points. I can only draw one i 24 kind of line through them unless I have some other 25 information. And the reason it's linear is because -- the
"445 l l
101515 1999 l N Ue walsh l
i i I
reason it's close to linear, if you worked out the example I ii l just gave you, you will find that that point of four and a l
half hours lies on a line collecting the two ex?remes very l 4
close to a straight line.
5 JUDGE PARIS: Okay, But, you say the walting 6
time increases as quadratic?
7 WITNESS LIEBERMAN: Yeah. If you look at the 3
queuing theory, that's what happens. But, the impor tant :
9 thing is to recognize that even though you have halt the 1 10 capacity over one quarter of the time, the net effect is only half an hour longer.
12 I can draw it up for you tomorrow morning.
13 14 15 16
!?
l
!a l l
" l i
i 20 j I
21 6
22 24 25 l
35701616 parysimons 2000 1 1 i JUDGE SHON: You said I think you had the half i.
2 i the capacity over a quarter of the time and it lengthened 4 '
the time from four to four and a half hours, which is one-I ' l eighth, which is a half of a quarter. That demonstrates the 5
linearity for the rather stylized end square way sort of evacuation that you've postulated.
7 MR. LIEBERMAN: Right.
8 i JUDGE SHON: I think that is what you we- !
' l driving at.
10 MR. LIEBERMAN: Exactly.
JUDGE PARIS: Then, Mr. Lieberman, I will think 12 over my lesson tonight and come back with some more
'3 l
j questions tomorrow.
I' JUDGE SHON: I'm still'a J.ittle disturbed by the I5 fact that in a sense the traffic flow is sort of a flodd 16 flow. It's a fluid of with a rather peculiar equation to i state, but these things are often non-linear and I see non- '
18 linearities possible.
For example, intuitively, and I think Dr. Paris i 20 i felt this way also, there is a feeling that once a jam fixes I 21 it's hard co unfix, and I think much of Mr. Sutko's 22 i questioning has driven toward this, too, that having l 23 .
somebody there early on may well prevent it happening.
2' l I think it's your position that that just I 25 doesn't happen; is that right?
l
35701616 2001 carysimons 1
MR. LIEBERMAN: Not when the traffic environment 2
is congested anyway.
3 -
JUDGE SHON: I can think of other non-4 linearities. For example, on a hot day if traffic once 5
stalls, a lot of people are going to have their engines 6
overheat and they will stall and take additional lines of 7
traffic out of action. So that if you had kept it moving 8
early on, why they would never have stalled and you would 9
never would have lost the additional capacity.
10 That would introduce surely a non-linear factor 11 into your equations, would it not?
12 MR. LIEBERMAN: Well, you're bringing in other elements of course. Essentially what you're doing is 14 postulating a chain reaction type of response which exacerbates the situation.
What I'm saying is that you have congestion 17 anyway. The extent of the delay in this example of a half 18 hour2.083333e-4 days <br />0.005 hours <br />2.97619e-5 weeks <br />6.849e-6 months <br />, and here I think it's 19 minutes, is small relative to j io the total time it takes to evacuate the area anyway. So I question whether that chain reacticn will actually take !
21 place given the extent of the additional delay.
JUDGE SHON: Chain reactions are notably non-3 linear.
MR. LIEBERMAN: Absolutely.
JUDGE PARIS: Is mathematical modeling of
l 35701616 2002 i parysimons traffic raised essentially on linear models? '
2 MR. LIEBERMAN: No. The modeling is actually h non-linear. That's why I mentioned earlier that on an f
individual basis you don't use linearity. But in this 3
situation, as I've described, the linear behavior does 6
apply.
7 Again, we are focusing on throughput and not on 8
individual delay.
9 If you would like, I can elaborate on it.
JUDGE PARIS: Well, what I'm pondering is if Il delay means that I'm sitting in the traffic under a 12 radioactive plume, are we focusing on the right concern in l' I3 4 calculating just throughput?
MR. LIEBERMAN: But you can't infer from the is throughput argument how much longer they are goin~g to stay,
which is what we did. In the example it was a half hour here. It works out that because it's less than one out
'8 four, it works out to be about 20 minutes, and that's really the concern of course.-
20 JUDG0 PARIS: But that's not my delay, is it?
21 My time is increasing quite radically, isn't it?
22 MR. LIEBERMAN: When I say that the increase in 23 delay is quadratic I mean if you draw delay as a function of 24 V over C, where V is demand and C is capacity, within the 25 range of close to zero to unity, that curve is quadratic, i
i
2003 35701616
'sarysimonsi e
1 il Once you get to V over C of unity, which means 2
that demand is equal to or greater than capacity, then that 3
Curve becomes linear.
4 JUDGE PARIS: Are you looking at the total 5
traffic picture when you're talking about that delay or I 6
thought you said earlier for the individual.
7 MR. LIEBERMAN: Well, for the individual.
8 JUDGE PARIS: Okay.
9 MR. LIEBERMAN: But the linearity holds once 10 you're in that level of service "f".
11 JUDGE SHON: I'm still a little bothered by 12 this. I hate to interrupt your cross-examining any further,
'3 but now we have trend upon something that did not permit Mr.
14 Sutko to examine a while ago that I would like to examine a little bit further, and it is the nature and the shape of
the depletion curve inside the zone.
17 I think I'm going to have to go over to that blackboard.
(Judge Shon proceeds to the easel to draw.)
2 I certainly think I can ask Board questions.
(Laughter.)
22 This is not cross-examination because it is 3
clearly not antagonistic or adversarial. All right?
JUDGE PARIS: Are you testifying?
25 (Laughter.)
l
- 35701616 2004
! ptrysimons I
)
JUDGE SHON: No, I'm asking questions.
]
2 I going to draw curves of the sort that Mr.
f 3
Sutko "ried to introduce, but they are going to be different
-f ones, and I think you will agree with ma when we get through 5
they have several different characteristics and, ' i. rs t , they 8
are going to be inverted. They are going to show people
' remaining and not people that have gotten out.
8 And, secondly, they are going to be drawn in a way that I think you and I earlier agreed makes them look
'O like more sensible curves, that is curves that one would expect from this kind of calculation.
Here are the axes, and these are percent 13 remaining, and here is time, and I'm not going to give you
hours or anything like that.
15 I can visualize a curve that goes, let's see, 16 like this, one like this and one say like this.
They all have essentially the same total
'8 evacuation time. '
" MR. LIEBERMAN: Okay, except that the top curves ,
20 imply that there is no movement for some substantial amount 4
21 of time.
22 JUDGE SHON: Well, I could drop it faster. Thisl 23 is a rough sketch. I've exaggerated certain things.
24 Now I put it to you that it may be, and I don't 25 know whether it is or not ---
]
35701616 2005 parysimons 1 1 p JUDGE FRYE: Can I interrupt for a second. I 2 l think you're blocking the view. '
1 3
- JUDGE SHON
- I put it to you that it may be
- 4 that,.and I don't know whether it is or not true, that the 5
difference between this curve say and one of these that is shaped more'1'ko i that, although it is very small in total 1
evacuation time, that these curves may well represent the 8
case where the traffic guides get their early and hence the high slope occurs early, and the case where the traffic 10 guides get there late and hence the high slope occurs late.
Il Now it also occurs to me that if I call this 12 thing Phi, the total population does, and are you familiar
'3 with the term?
JUDGE PARIS: What is Phi?
JUDGE SHON: That's this function. It just this -
I "
thing.
17 JUDGE PARIS: Okay, fine.
18 JUDGE SHON: The total population does will at
, o jI d least in some measure look like the integral of 5 with 2
respect to time, and that's the area under the curve, and 71 the population does is what we're trying to conserve or keep 22 to a minimum. And it's clear here that although the total 23 evacuation time is very nearly identical and very close to
- the same for all three of these curves, the to'al c population 5
dose clearly isn't. You've got a lot more population does t
, -- ,n - - - - , - . n.---.-- - .,--- ,._-n - - , , - - , , . _ - - - , , ,
MF 35701616 2006 l grysimons 1
in the curve that we identified as being the one where the 2
traffic guides arrive late.
' Is this not the kind of thing you were driving
[
at, Mr. Sutko?
' MR. SUTKO: I did ask ask what the precise indications showed.
JUDGE SHON: roll, that's why I said it. It 8
itched at me a bit that we had not let you pursue this line of questioning when I suddenly realized thac it might be
'O pertinent.
What have you to say to that analysis? l MR. LIEBERMAN: Okay. I'm going to walk up to
'3 the easel.
JUDGE PARIS: What did you say?
15 MR. LIEBERMAN: That I'm going to walk up to the i
16 !
easel.
(Witness Lieberman proceeds to the easel.)
'8 To start with, you realize what the slope of the 1 l
" curve represents. It represents the rate of flow out of the i 20 area.
21 JUDGE SHON: Right, and that's why I
- 2 characterized the ones that had the late steep slope as 23 being the ones where the guides got there late assuming that i 24 they in some way steepen the slope or increase the rate 25 which is what they are to do as I understand it?
t d
~
i 35701616 3007 parysimons 1
MR. LIEBERMAN: Right. Let me draw the green 2
curve in a manner which more closely repres.ents what's I 3 taking place at Shoreham.
. t You will recall that when Mr. Sutko questioned 5
me about those links which became congested early, several 6
of them were en that path or downstream of that path. So 7
under that situation given that the traffic guides are out 8
there, you would have a curve ---
9 JULGE PARIS: Given that they are out there?
10 MR. LIEBERMAN: That they are out there, you 11 would have a curve that starts off at a rather shallow slope 12 representing the fact that you are undersaturated and you have relatively few people hitting the road, then that slope
't will increase and will obtain a constant rate. In other 15 words, they are flowing at capacity.
So what we are going to see here now for that 17 particular path is a curve that looks like that rather than 18 the one which showed as gradually increasing its rate to its
- 19 steepest part for only a small portion of the time frame.
2 That's an important distinction.
So I'm going to draw that, and then the 22 stragglers are going to cause this thing to shallow and you 23 are going to have something that looks like that. The only 24 reason I'm showing it with a shorter time is to make the 25 curves, distinct.
r
l -
. ? '
2008 l f@g .*1(16 r: s :. mons So let us say that this point now is 4:55. Now 2
what we actually had happen during the exercise is some 3
lateness on the part of the traffic guides to get out there, and let us say again for the sake of discussion that this is the point where this is our one-hour period when congestion
' 5 8
developed and corresponds to the steepest c'. ope where traffic is running at apacity. So we'll call this one 8
hour.
And now let's draw the line 49 minutes later and carry it up. Now during that period of time between 1 and 11 49 when the guides were not out there, the curve cetually would have looked like this. It would have had a shallower 52
'3 slope representing the one lane capacity instead of the two-
lane capacity. At this point the two-lane capacity is is What happens to the slope?
established.
16 The slope from this point is now going to be the
'# So what we get is a same es the slope here, is it not?
'8 curve that is actually going to be a discontinuous curve because the slopes change abruptly as you go from one lane 20 to ,so lanes.
21 The demand is always there. There is no 22 starving of this section of highway. So now we are going to .
23 get a curve that looks like this.
2' Now at this point the original curves started to 25 have a shallower slope because vf the stragglers. Because
r 35701616 2009 parysimons i
( l I of the fact that there is some lateness on the part of the 2
traffic guides getting there, the inventory of dernand at 3
this point in time is higher for the red curve than for the a
green curve because you've serviced that many fewer 5
evacuees.
6 So this slope is going to stay steep for a 7
longer period of time and then is going to flatten out and it's going to look like that. And going through the 9
calculations we made before we found that this is sbout 20 minutes or 19 minutes.
11 Now the difference between that I have drawn and 12 what you have drawn doesn't differ conceptually, but diffe s
'3 in extent. Your upper curve shows a much greater lag before 14 something happens before the slopes increase in magnitude, and also you curve shows a steeper slope than is possible by virtue of the capacity limitations of the road.
17 You see, whatever the effect is, you can't have l 13 I
a steeper slope than this. That's the best you can do when i i9 you open up that road to two lanes. The curve taat you drew
'o 3 ;
has a steeper slope which is impossible. '
21 I JLDGE SHON: 1 recognize that there are i 22 l peculiarities about the parameters governing these curves l 23 and about their ..hapes at various points. I was drawing 24 something freehand and merely meant to illustrate.
I think I did illustrate and I think you have e
I l
i i
35701616 golo garysimons i
( illustrated that clearly with the traffic guides arriving 2
late there is a greater integral and a greater total dose 3
potential under the curve and that it is not necessarily, or at least I don't think it is necessarily measured by the i 5 small difference in the zero intercept.
6 That is, it's not clear to me that the 7
difference between two curves integrals is related directly el or is proportional to or is linear in the difference in
?
their "X" intercepts.
JUDGE PARIS: We need to compare the area under 11 the red curve with the area under the green curve.
JUDGE SHON: And either your interpretation or
'3 indeed mine might be a gross distortion. I merely meant to show the direction in which it tends and yours tends in that same direction and it's hard to see what the difference is
quantitatively. The differences are quantitative and not qualitative.
'8 MR. LIEBERMAN: Right. Yes, there is no i
question if you multiply this additional time by people 20 you're going to get an area, and that's essentially what 1
21 I've drawn here.
22 JUDGE SHON: Roughly if tne dose rate were taken l
23 to be identical throughout the zone in time and sub-zero at l 2' the end of the zone, another sort of st.ep functi'n like the 25 sort that you've been generating, if the dose rate were i
i I
l
l!
1
[
35701616 2011 parysimons ,
i i linear, and perhaps I'm testifying now and I don't mean to, 1 I believe the total number of person rem would be roughly
)
proportional to the integral under that curve.
t That may not be true if someone wants to bring 5
in an expert in health physics to analyze it, but roughly 6
what we're trying to minimize is person rem, and I think 1
that's measured by the integral.
8 Do you agree that that seems reasonable?
9 MR. LIEBERMAN: The shaded area that's shown 10 there is some relation to potential exposure and whether in 11 fact this is a preemptive evacuation or not.
12 JUDGE SHON: And the-important part about it is
that that shaded area, the difference in the areas under the 14 two curves may be a better measure of the success or lack 15 thereof of the guides system when the guides are delayed, a 16 better measure, so to speak, of the shortcoming due "o guide i
17 delay than simply the difference in time represented ur the 18 intercepts of the two curves where the two curves hit zero.
19 MR. LIEBERMAN: Well, the difference -- you have a given population in both cases.
JUDGE PARIS: You have a what? l l
22 '
MR. LIEBERMAN: You have a given population in 23 both cases. It's the same population regardless of when the 2' So if you take the time difference and guides arrive.
25 multiply by that population you're going to get very close l -
i l
35701616 2012 enrysimons 8 ,
- to what that shaded area represents.
2 l
{ So know that the population is the same in
' either case, you therefore focus our attention on the variable which is time.
5 JUDGE SHON: Yes, but I'm sure that just the fractional difference in the two intercepts and the time that it takes for all of them to get out is anywhere near a a
measure of that integral which is the integrated exposure of all of the people inside the zone.
10 MR. LISBERMAN: I think it is because the two curves are parallel to one another throughout most of the 12 time range. There are some differences at the top and some !
'3 at the bottom, but effectively what you have there is
something very close to a rectangle.
15 JUDGE SHON: That may be, but it's not obvious
quantitatively from this seat over here.
" Take it from there, Mr. Sutko, JUDGE PARIS:
r (Laughter.)
4 MR. SUTKO: Thank you, Judge Paris.
20 With the Board's permission, I think it would be 21 appropriate to mark this chart as an exhibit for purposes of 22 clarity of the record and I would like to make it ar.d move i 23 it into evidence, Judge Frye?
24 25 i
i i
-- _. . .,_. - . _. _ - _ _ _ _ - - _ _ _ _ _ .-. _J
} hI J
40$07 vaish 2117 l 1
Q And I take it, Mr. Weismantle, then that you l 2
believe these fixes we have discuss substantially solve your
! 3 mobilization problems as you experienced them on February 4
13th, 1986, correct?
5 A (Witness Weismantle) Well, they will improve 6
the mobilization time. i 7
MR. SUTKO: I would like to have marked as a
Suffolk County Exercise Exhibit 36 portions of a December 9
2nd and December 10, 1986 LERO drill report.
10 (The document referred to is marked it as Suffolk County Exercise Exhibit 12 Number 35 for identification.)
13 BY MR. SUTKO: (Continuing) 14 0 If you are familiar with this document, Mr.
is Weismantle, we may be able to short-circuit the questions.
16 So, I ask you to please review it.
17 A The whole document?
18 MR. ZEUGIN: I guess I need a point of 19 clarification. I'm not aware that there was an Exercise 20 Exhibit 35. Maybe I lost track.
21 MR. SUTKO: It is 35. I'm sorry.
22 BY MR. SUTKO: (Continuing) 23 Q And, Exercise Exhibit 35 represents portions of 24 I
the December 2nd and December 10th drill that deal with 25 traffic guides, Mr. Weismantle.
- m
2118 Of S
1 Are you familiar with this document?
2 A Well, what you have given me is not the complete 3
document. You have given me the cover page, or the first 4
page, and you have given me other pages. I would have to 5
review the whole document before I could agree that gj' 6 necessarily these pages were from that document. ;
36 7 Q Okay. Fere is the entire document for your 8 review, Mr. Weismantle. Now, please keep the Exhibit 35 as 9
.o well, Mr. Weismantle, because we are going to be referring 7[ 10 to it.
l
- 11 JUDGE PARIS: We need you to verify for us that 2
12 these pages are from the document, the pages on the exhibit.
13 WITNESS WEISMANTLE: Okay.
! 14 (The witness is looking at the documents.)
15 WITNESS WEISMANTLE: Okay.
16 BY MR. SUTKO: (Continuing) 17 0 Mr. Weismantle, does that Exhibit 35 represent 18 portions of the December 2nd and December 10th dril2 reports l -
'9 which is dated March 4, 19877 20 4
A Yes.
21 Q Okay. And, in fact, two full-scale LILCO drills 22 were held in December of 198t.; isn't that correct?
23 A Well, they were -- the scope of the drill was 24 described on the first page.
l 25 Q That's fine.
1 I
UC _ _ _ _ __ _
2119 fac i 1 A Not full-scale, you know, meaning everything was 2 exercised or all field workers reported.
3 Q And, one of the areas that was drilled, both on 4 December 2nd and December 10th, was mobilization of traffic 5 guides; isn't that correct?
6 A Yeah.
7 Q And, you mobilized from all three staging areas 8 on the 2nd, and then you mobilized from all three staging 9 areas on the 10th; isn't that correct?
s 10 A I think that's correct.
Il Q And, the people you mobilized on both days were, 12 according to the next to the last paragraph on Page 1 of the 4
13 document, pre-staged; is that correct?
14 A Yeah, they were pre-staged. That is, told to is report to their scaging areas or to their work locations at 16 a preassigned time, then called out by the pager system and 17 ,'... n e s y s t e m .
18 Q And, before the exercise actually took place 19 they were briefed on procedure changes and were reinforced 20 about earlier training on CPIP revisions; isn't that i
21 correct?
l 22 A I can't remember if that was just on the 2nd or l
i 23 if it was on both days.
24 0 It may refresh your recollection that the first 25 sentence of this page appears to apply to both December 2nd l
l l
m i.
I j 0010? 2120
- gvalsh i l
1 and December 10th, doesn't it?
2 MR. ZEUGIN: Judge Frye, I'm not sure that I 3
believe that Mr. Sutko has ever gotten an answer to the d
first question he asked Mr. Wo.smantle which makes it kind 5
of hard for me to see whether this line of questioning is 6
even fruitful at this point, which is Mr. Weismantle's 7
familiarity with all of these documents, a
I myself remember from Contention EX-41 Mr.
9 Weismantle basically saying that he no longer was really 10 involved in the training program at LERO. He may have been il a participant in these two drills. I'm not sure he is going 12 to be the person to ask questions about later performance.
13 I know it's covered in the training testimony, ld but just because Mr. Weismantle is a member of that panel 15 doesn't mean that he is sponsoring testimony on these 16 issues.
17 I frankly know it is covered in the Contention 18 50 testimony that LILCO hus filed. I fear that we are going
'9 to go over duplicative matters here with perhaps a witness 20 not best qualified to answer questions about this document.
21 JUDGE FRYE: Let's find out if the witness is 22 qualified.
23 MR. SUTKO: In fact, I believe he is sponsored 24 on those portions of Contention EX-50 testimony. But, we 25 are going to get the testimony, Judge Frye. '
J,
M alsh 2121 1
JUDGE FRYE: Ask him if he is qualified on this 2 particular document.
3 MR. SUTKO Okay.
4 BY MR. SUTKO: (Continuing) 5 Q You are familiar with this document, aren't you, 6 Mr. Weismantle?
7 A I'm generally familiar with the document, yes.-
8 Q Okay. Thank you, Mr. Weismantle. Now, going 9
back to the pending quest'on that I have before you, it 10 appears from the first sentence, does it not, that this i
l 11 background material on Page 1 applied to both the Deceeber 12 2nd and the December 10th drills?
13 JUDGE FRYE: Let me interrupt. Mr. Weismantle, 14 were you involved in the December 2nd and December 10th 15 ,
drills?
16 WITNESS WEISMANTLE: Yes. I was involved in 11 both of them.
18 JUDGE FRYE: All right.
19 WITNESS WEISMANTLE: Well, you are referring to 20 the first sentence under background?
21 BY MR. SUTKO: (Continuing) 22 O Yes, sir.
l 23 A Yeah, this document covers both those drills.
l l
24 That isn't to say that every word in the document covers 25 both drills, though.
l l
l l
fa
< 1 Q No, but that's not my question, Mr. Weismantle.
, 2 I'm sorry.
3 s
My question is, doesn't this background material d
apply to both the December 2nd and the December 10th drill?
5 A In general, but you have to read it at a 6
particular sentence to determine whether it applies to both 7
or not. I mean, there are certain distinctions made between 8
the two drills.
0 Referring to the next to last paragraph on Page 10 1 of the exhibit, it's true, isn't it, that LERO members 11 were pre-staged both on December 2nd and December 10th?
'. 12 A That's correct.
e 13 0 And, that means that they were not, for example, 14 at their home in Queens and called out to report to the 15 staging area; isn't that correct?
16 A It means they reported to the staging area no 17 matter where they lived or where they worked, the normal is work location was. They weren't called out by a pager or a
'9 telephone.
20 Q And the drill began when they got to the staging 21 area, correct?
22 A The drill began when the Controller started the 23 drill.
24 Q And, the Controllers are to start the drill 25 under pre-staging, Mr. Weismantle, when people get to the i
l
0@f 2123 31s
~
i drill, correct, sir?
2 A No. They start it when their instructions say N t they should start it.
, I mean, maybe not everybody was 4 there.
5 0 Okay. What does pre-staging mean, Mr.
6 Weismantla?
7 A In this context, as pre-staging is used in
,' s different ways in the plan, such as pre-staging of buses, it 9
simply means what it says. They went to their LERO work
- 10 locations on -- at a preassigned time. They were asked to 11 report -- I don't remember if it was 8 or 8:30 or 9 12 o' clock. And I think it. made a difference as to what their 13 LERO Work location was, as a matter of fact. But, rather la than go about their normal business and be called out eithat is by pager or by telephone. That's what it means.
16 0 okay, so, that if the drill was to start at 8 1
17 l for a field worker, the field worker was told to be at his 18 preassigned location at 8 o' clock; is that a fair statement?
19 , A That's right --
1 20 0 Okay.
21 l A -- in that hypothetical case.
I; 22 Q Okay. Now, Mr. Weismantle, it's true, isn't it, 1
23 that there were six mobilizations over the two drilla, two 24 for each of the three staging aress?
25 A I would have to refresh my memory. There may I
l \
\
l
\
1
t poy 2124 1sh I have been changes in protective action during the drill, in *
- 2 which case --
i 3 Q Okay.
4 A -- there was a part for mobilization at one
> E 5 point, and the balance might have been mobilized at a 6 different point.
- ,hg '
7 Q Let's take them one at a time now, Mr.
8 Weismantle. Would you please turn to Page 19 of the j 9 exhibit?
10 This discusses the December 2nd mobilization of 11 traffic guides at the Port Jefferson staging area. And, it 12 states that six traffic guides were preassigned; isn't that 13 correct?
Id MR. ZEUGIN: Judge Frye, again I guess I will 15 renew my objection to this whole line of questioning. I 16 think it is going to prove wastefully duplicative of later 17 testimony on Contention 50.
18 LILCO has addressed it there. To the extent
'i that Mr. Weismantle may or may not be sponsoring it, ks can 20 clearly address it with the panel that has been designated 21 by LILCO to discuss post-e::ercise training.
22 I just don't see why we should waste --
23 JUDGE FRYE: Why is this relevant now?
24 MR SUTKO: Because in their testimony, they 25 claim that the fix of preassigning has solved, or at least
t goof 0/
g*evalSh 3125 I
helped solve, their mobilization problems. In five of the 2 1 six drills that were done on December 2nd and December 10th, 3
they didn't get all the people out within the one hour which 4
is their self-established goal.
5 My questioning will be limited. It will be 6
directed solely to the fix, and it's similar to what we've 7
done in Contention 41 and 34, and it will not be repeated in 8
this type of detail in any other contention.
9
.o JUDGE FRYE: Where are you referring to -- to 10 what portion of their testimony are you referring when you ti say --
12 HR. SUTKO: I'm referring to the entire answer o
to Question 17, but particularly to the first full paragraph 14 on Page 20 where they discuss preassignment. And, in fact, is in December they preassigned six times and five times they 16 failed.
17 MR, ZEUGIN: Judge Frye, I would merely note that 18 in relation to earlier litigation on Contention 41, the 19 Board correctly noted that findings will be based on the 20 entire record in this proceeding.
21 Certainly to the extent the fixes may or may not 22 .
have resulted in faster mobilization times is an area that 23 will be explored in the context of Contention EX-50 with the 24 panel there that was designated by LILCO to discuss that 25 topic. I just don't see the benefit of going over those l
l l2 <
I
\
a l
issues now when we are going to go over them again, I'm 2
sure, in great detail later with the panel that was assigned' 3
to discuss this.
d JUDGE FRYE: I don't think that -- certainly, we 5
won't go over it twice. But, I do think it's relevant to 6
this testimony, as Mr. Sutko has pointed out.
7 MR. SUTKO: [willtryandkoopitveryshort, 8
Judge Frye.
JUDGE FRYE: So, overruled.
10 BY MR. SUTKO: (Continuing) 13 0 It's true, isn't it, Mr. Weismantle, that on 12 December 2nd not a.11 of the preassigned traffic guides from 13 Port Jefferson were at their posts an hour after the public 14 was notified of the order to evacuate?
A 15 I think what's indicated is that three were 16 there within an hour and the other two were there three li ' minutes later.
18 0 It's true, isn't it --
'9 JUDGE FRYE: How many minutes later?
20 WITNESS WEISMANTLE: Three minutes.
21 JUDGE FRYE Three minutes later?
22 BY MR. SUTKO (Continuing) 23 0 So, it's true then that all were there within an 24 hour, correct, Mr. Weismantle?
25 A It's true that three were there within an hour i
l m
--m -m-.
0/0%
)f alsh 3127 9 .
~
i i
and two more three minutes later.
2 0 Thank you, Mr. Weismantle. Would you please 3
turn to the Patchogue staging area, December 2nd 4
mobilization of traffic guides, which is found on Page 23 5
and 247 6
And, in fact, not all traffic guides that were I 1
preassigned from the Patchogue staging area were at their a
stations within an hour after an order to evacuate was 9
e broadcast to the public, were they?
to (The witness is looking at a document.)
11 A
Well, it looks like they also were all there 12 within 63 minutes.
13 0 So, they weren't there within an hour, correct, 14 Mr. Weismantle?
15 A Evidently not all of them.
16 0 would you please turn to Page 27 where we 17 discuss mobilization at Riverhead on December 2nd?
18 And, it's also true for Riverhead, isn't it, 19 that some traffic control posts were not manned within one 20 hour2.314815e-4 days <br />0.00556 hours <br />3.306878e-5 weeks <br />7.61e-6 months <br /> of the time the EBS message was aired?
21 (The witness is looking at a document.)
22 A Well, the wording is a little confusing here but 23 it appears as though they were all manned within an hour and 24 15 minutes, the 26 posts in question.
25 0 I believe for the remainder of this line of m
p -,- ---, .,
f0f0% 2128 valsh
, i 4 questioning, you can simply answer with a yes or no, Mr.
2 Weismantle.
3 It's true, isn't it, Mr. Weismantle, some 4
traffic control posts for Riverhead in the December 2nd 5
drill were not manned within one hour of the time the EBS 6
message was aired with an order to evacuate; isn't that 7
correct?
8 t
A I think I've answered the question.
JUDGE FRYE It's a yes or no. I think you said 10 yes.
11 WITNESS WEISMANTLE: Yes, that's true.
12 MR. SUTKO: Thank you, Mr. Weismantle.
13 BY MR. SUTKO: (Continuing) 14 0 Now, would you please turn to Page 32 which 15 discusses the mobilization of traffic guides at Port to Jefferson on December 10th.
17 JUDGE FRYE I think you micspoke. Isn't that 18 Patchogue?
'9 MR. SUTXO: I'm sorry. Well, actually I'm 20 sorry. If you turn to Page 29 you will note at the top it 21 begins discussing --
22 JUDGE FRYE: Oh, I see.
23 MR. SUTKO: -- Port Jefferson and then the 24 reference at the top of Page 32 is to mobilizution of 25 traffic guides at Port Jefferson.
m
. g(0( 2129 j sish I
BY MR. SUTKO: (Continuing) i 2
Q And, in fact, on December 10th all traffic 3
guides were mobilized within one hour from pre-staging at 4
Port Jefferson 2 isn't that correct, Mr. Weismantle?
5 A Yeah, that's right. It looks like about 49 6 minutes.
7 0 would you please refer to Page 35 of the drill a
report which discusses mobilization of traffic guides at the 9
Patchogue staging area on Decerter 10th.
10 And, it's true, isn't it, Mr. Weismantle, that il not all preassigned critical traffic guides were at their 12 posts within one hour after an order tc evacuate was 13 broadcast to the public?
14 l 15l 16l 17 18 19 1
20 21I 22 l 23 l l 24 25 t
l l
-m-mummy -
u q tr
.T '01010 1 alsh 2130 )
A (Witness Weismantle) This indicates all except one were within one hour, although it looks like maybe one 4 or more was like 64 minutes. There was one that didn't 5
arrive until about an hour and 15 minutes later.
, O So, they all didn't make it?
A
, They all didn't make it.
Q Now, would you please turn to Page 39 and 40 of the drill report which discusses mobilization of Riverhead 4
traffic guides on December 10th? And, it's true for them as well that not all Riverhead traffic guides were mobilized 12 within one hour after an order to evacuate was issued to the public.
13 14 (The witness is looking at the document.)
15 A It appears that's correct. It appears they all 16 arrived by 77 minutes.
0 17 Now, the data that we have just been discussing, Mr. Weismantle, informs us only about preassigned traffic t J '
'9 guides; isn't that correct?
A That's right.
20 21 Q It doesn't discuss how long it took other 22 traffic guides, does it? '
A 23 That's correct.
Q 24 And the preassigned traffic guides would have 25 been the critical traffic guides that's marked on Page 11 of 1
your testimony; is that correct?
l l
l l
l l
010 Ish 2131 !
2 (The witness is looking at the document.)
3 A No, not necessarily. I would like to confer a
with Mr. Lieberman though before I answer that.
5 Q That's fine.
' ' 6 (Mr. Weismantle and Mr. Lieberman are conferring.) .
1 A You are correct. It doesn't include all of them
a
?
that are listed on Page 11.
10 O It does or does not?
' A Does not.
tt Q
12 It includes some subset of those that are listed on Page 11, is that correct?
13 14 A Yeah. The -- well, that's correct.
15 Q Why is it that not all of the criticals were i
16 preassigned on December 2nd and December 10th?
17 Perhaps Mr. Lieberman can address that rather than you.
Is A
19 (Witness Lieberman) Because they may not all be necessary. It depends upon the accident scenario.
20 21 0 Thank you, Mr. Lieberman. Mr. t smantle, I 22 believe over lunch you are going to look for Node 6 that 23 relates to TCP 74; is that correct?
A 2t (Witness Weismantle) Well, somebody was asked 25 during the break to look for it. So, it's being, or has l been, looked for.
l If it's available, we will bring it back im ,
l.
10 2132 :
sh , I with us.
2 MR. SUTKO: Thank you. Judge Frye, at this time 4 I would like to move Suffolk County Exercise Exhibit 35 into 4 '
'. evidence.
8
. k e
JUDGE FRYE: Any objections?
6
, MR. 2AHNLEUTER: No objection.
8 MR. PIRFO: The Staff has none.
1
, MR. ZEUGIN: I guess my only question is, I ,
e believe all of these drill reports were attached to the Suffolk County testimony on the training issues. I think we may be including this entire report.
I don't know why we want to now admit select 13 pages.
14 JUDGE FRYE: Yeah, but he has questioned on 15 these pages. I think it would be helpful to have it in the 16 record at this point.
11 MR. ZEUGIN: Fine. No objection.
18 JUDGE FRYE: So, it will be admitted.
19 (The document previously marked as 20 Suffolk County Exercise Exhibit 21 Number 35 for identification is 22 23 admitted into evidence.)
MR. SUTKO: Judge Frye, I rec 11y only have one 24 other thing for these witnesses. I first want to thank Mr.
25 Lieberman and Mr. Weismantle for providing their time.
1 L _ _ _
l
) E E t.h~"~;o10
{ valsh , 2133 But, 2
I think as we have done before, we have
)
asked the witnesses to inform us as to what materials the t
have before them and then counsel represents either that 5 those are all materials we have previously been provided or 6
identify as ones that have not.
7 JUDGE FRYE:
.Did'we do that at the outset or at I 8
the close?
9 MR. PIRPO: At the end.
4 JUDGE FRYE:
10 k
Could you indicate the materials 11 you have been relying on?
WITNESS LIEBERMAN:
12 I think what we did last 13 time was to list them in writing and then hand it to them .
It MR. SUTKO No, that's not correct, Mr.
Lieberman.
15 JUDGE FRYE:
16 I don't think so, Mr. Lieberman.
17 MR. ZEUGIN: I know what we did. We essentially 18 prepared a list and then Mr. Weismantle read it into the record.
19 20 JUDGE FRYE Oh, I see.
MR. ZEUGIN: I will be glad to do that over the lunch break, too.
22 That's the most efficient way, to simply 23 list the documents.
JUDGE FRYE:
24 Also, does the Staff have very many 25 questions of these witnesses?
MR. PIRFO: I don't have any questions.
l Il l l ' --..m .n., . - - - _
i .
35801414 prysim:ns 2202 i Q Then I guess I'm confused.
2 you use? Whichdefinitiondidf l
3
} A (Witness McGuire) We'll give you the benefit of 3
the doubt and say from the order of evacuation it was still too long.
0 7
I'm not asking that, Inspector McGuire. I'm 8
asking when you drafted this particular sentence or it was drafted under your supervision what it was you intended by 30 the phrase, or what you meant when you said "until long
after evacuees would be on the roads attempting to evacuate"?
12 13 My question is when would those evacuees in your l'
view have started to evacuate in the context of this sentence?
i: 15 A
(Witness Michel) Both before and certainly 16 after 10:24 a.m.
Q
'8 Gentlemen, let me have you turn to page 30.
(Witnesses comply.)
I' On the bottom of that page again you use the 20 phrase "until long after evacuees have been on the roads 21 attempting to evacuate."
22 In that phrase are you again referring to the 23 fact that evacuees may be evacuating both subsequent to the 2'
order to evacuate as well as some evacuating prior to that 25 time?
E
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ - _ - - - - - - - - _ _ _ _ _ . - ~ - - ' - _
I '
- ?$ f601414 Q .13fgysimons 5 t 2203 9 ]"p I '
A 2
(Witness Michel) Well, I think we answer right J >:
1 3 up in the beginning of that where we say no, even assuming
,f '
that no one would have attempted to evacuate prior to 10:24.
5 So in this particular answer we're narrowing it just a little bit more. But we have never agreed that people 7 would wait until an order to evacuate in order to begin ovacuating.
$ 8 We have never agreed with that from day one.
Q
' Let me have you turn to page 05 of your
., testimony.
'O (Witnesses comply.)
11
l
'# In the third line carrying over onto the fourth
'3 line you are beginning to talk about when certain traffic
control treatments are establish, and you state "even if
'8 established after the outset of the evacuation process."
Could you define for me the time at which you were referring when you say "at the outset of the evacuation process? Is
'8 that at the time the order to evacuate was given or at some <
earlier point in time? 1 i
A (Witness Michel) Where are you referring us to, 20 Mr. Zeugin?
O Lines 3 and 4 on page 35.
22 A
23 7 think what we are referring to here is what we '
2.s have testified to in the past, that we would have 25 substantial pre-evacuation traffic, mobilizatiors tuffic, people uniting their families and people coming home from
~~
~
,?B c '
l
- 9) 301414
.j /d prysimons 2204
'N[ 2 work that would interfere with the beginning of the
.l }[ evacuation traffic.
J.3 3:
3
), 5 We are talking about the concurrent continuous flow treatments and various other traffic strategies that
- f. 3 i
6 are provided for in the plan in this particular sentence, f and I think that is the t,hrust of what we are speaking about here. ,
8 !
Q I understand that, Inspector Michel, and what I'm focusing on is your use of the phrase "at the outset of i 10 i the evacuation process." I'm simply asking you to define
t t for me at what point in time is the outset of the evacuation 12 i process in your view when you drafted this sentence? Is it !
) 13 when the order to evacuate was given or was it at some f
i earlier point in time when evacuees may as a result of some '
15 earlier public announcement have in your view started to 16 evacuate?
A We be).ieve that people would evacuate before the ,'
'8 official announcement to evacuate was issued,
" i Q And that's how you've used the phrase "the !
20 outset of evacuation process" in this sentence?
21 A Yes.
22 0
23 Finally,letmehaveyouturntopage41ofyourf testimony.
2' (Witnesses comply.)
25 And have you look at the next to last line of r
f
.l
%l$$ k M F'go1414 2206 A4AMrysimons l'
'i 3 I
EBS messages used during the exercise call for traffic l 4 l.
4
) 2 guides to be in place to assist evacuees, LILCO during the 3
- ( exercise failed to have such traffic guides in place in a d
[ ;I, timely manner."
5 Gentlemen, I would like to have you define for 6
me what you mean by a timely manner, and how many minutes 7
1 following whatever action that you choose to define would 8
you think to be a "timely manner"?
,' A (Witness Roberts) I don't have a precise time, 10 minutes or hourd, but it would have been in a more timely I'
and a better organized manner than what was disclosed by the 12 LERC parties on February 13th.
13 Q Gentlemen, I guess I'm trying to figure out what Id would have satisfied you as being timely, and let's use as a 3 15 starting point the order to evacuate.
J 16 How long after the order to evacuate, or what II period of time following the order to evacuate would be
'8 timely had LERO traffic guides arrived at their posts within l'
that period?
20 A (Witness Michel) I think we've said in the past 21 that we think that they should be in place at the time that 22 1
the ordo- is given or, if not, within minutes afterwards.
23 A (Witness Roberts) Preferably before.
2' Q So essentially what you're saying is if I use as 25 a starting point the order to evacuate, then your answer is I
(
i
%I '801515
/ kegalSh 2208 l
)j 'j I Q Inspector Michel, I take it that long answer was 1
3 t 2 really a yes to my question, that for mobilization to be 3
qj $, s timely in your view, following the order to evacuate traffic
.) g$ guides would have had to be in place almost instantaneously?
l 5 A
(Nitness McGuire) Not instantaneously. They 6
should have been there.
7 A
(Witness Micliel) I think we probably have a
- 8 little disagreement here among ourselves as to exactly 9
, what, ' timely' means.
10 Certainly, the sooner the better. Before would be ideal, if not before, simultaneous with the order. Or 12 very shortly thereafter, but not hours later.
13 Q Gentlemen, let rae have you put to the side for Id this next question any assumptions about the speed of the I5 accident. Let's. assume whatever speed of accident you want, 16 but I don't want that to really be the fccus of my question.
37 My question is:
How much time following an a
initial call-out of traffic guides, the initial calls made to traffic guides, to the time when they arrive at their i 20 post, what period of time in there bet! ween those two end 23 points would you consider to be timely, if that whole 22 process took place within that time?
23 A (Witness McGuire) If they were there at the 24 l time of the evacuation was ordered, that could be considered 25 timely, l
- 911
-s
- '.'y801616 lsuevalsh 2224 2
sentence you had used the term "until after the evacuation process had begun" to refer to a process thau :ccurred 3
before an order to evacuate was given; is that correct?
4 A
We said that certainly we believed that there 5
a would be evacuation traffic and that the evacuation process would begin before an order to evacuate was given. But, I 7
think this particular paragraph goes to the heart of our 8
criticism that the guides aren't even dispatched until after
' 9
'O the order to evacuate or recommendation to evacuate is given.
11 So, therefore, the fix can't work.
12 0 All right.
I guess that gets pretty much to my
'3 question.
My original question was perhaps not as clear as
'd it could have been, which is, I take it then no fix short of 15 dispatching and sending traffic guides into the field before 16 an order to evacuate is given would satisfy your is that correct, for the purposes of this testimony?
'8 A (Witness McGuire) No. We already said if they got there at that time or shortly thereafter and they were 20 trained and equipped, which you wanted us to assume they 21 were -- and I'm having trouble with that -- that would be 22 satisfactory.
23 MR. ZEUGIN: I have no furthu questions, Judge 24 Frye.
25 JUDGE PRYE: Mr. Zahnleuter?
4
l i 757~~~
t 3600o303 2267 joevalsh i
, JUDGE SHON: I have about two questions. The 1 2 first is just something that is probably quite evident from 3 the evidence that we have before us, but just to fix it in l
4 my mind at any rate, your list of critical intersections can 5 be compared with the list of critical intersections that 6 Messrs. Weismantle and Lieberman gave us in their testimony, '
7 and unless I am mistaken,' the only one that corresponds a between the two of them is the Long Island Expressway and 9 William Floyd Parkway, is that right?
io The others are all ones that they don't list as i ti critical, is that right?
12 WITNESS ROBERTS: We Jooked at a lidt of those 33 last evening before we left very briefly, and yes, you are u right, Judge.
15 JUDGE SHON: That is what I thought.- Tne other i 16 thing is something that Mr. Lieberman has told us about the t
17 presence or absence of traffic guides and the influence that is that presence or absence would have on the evacuation time.
19 He has said that if the guides are there, it 20 shortens the evacuation time a given amount. The number was 21 I think an hour and a half or something like that.
22 Then, he has gone further and said that if they 23 are there for a fraction of the time, you get that same 24 fraction of *.he shcrtening; that is, if they get there too 25 late, but they are there for the last half of the
y FN' 1
~
% 6000303 2268 avalsh j
evacuation, then you shorten it half of an hour and a half, 2 or three quarters of an hour.
3 If they get there only a few minutes late after l 4
the beginning of the evacuation, they still shorten it just l 5 about the same amount. It doesn't matter that they are 6
twenty minutes or half an hour late, because that only ;
7 knocks off fifteen percen't, or twenty-five percent of the g effect that they have.
9 d
Do you believe that their presence or absence to affects the shortening of the evacuation in this kind of n
linear fashion; so if they are there half the time, they do 12 half the good, do you think that is true?
,3 WITNESS McGUIRE:
I am familiar with that blind i,
extrapolation that they use, and I don't agree with it.
15 There would be no point in trying to get the guards there in 16 a timely fashion if . hat was true, for one thing. I didn't 37 see any logic in that, frankly.
is JUDGE SHON: Secondly, do you think that there iy are situations in which if the guide arrives in a manner 20 such as you have called timely, that is, is there before 21 anything happens, he has a vastly different effect than if 22 he arrives, say, after a traffic jam has started to build 23 up. Does it affect his aoility to perform. Do you form 24 knots you can't untie, so to speak?
25 WITNESS McGUIRE: I don't think there is any l
l l
o j 1
36000303 2269 joevalsh !
i question of that, Judge. The sooner you get there, the 2 easier it is. We have a term, we don't want to lose a 3 street. Once you lose the street, getting it back is 4 sometimes close to impossible.
5 JUDGE PARIS: What do you mean by, ' losing the 6 street?'
7 WITNESS McGUI'RE: Losing control of the area, a
whether it is vehicle traffic or pedestrian traffic, you 9 have to keep control from the outset.
e io Once there is confusion and -- sometimes you 11 can't get a handle on it until it subsides.
12 JUDGE SHON: In other words, you truly feel that i3 there is a sort of non-linearity in this thing. That if you u get there a little too late it might do a lot more damage to is your cause, ic that right?
16 FITNESS MICHEL: I would agree with Inspector 17 McGuire, is In fact, yesterday I cited son e examples where i9 we bad special events that we bad to plan for, and unless l
20 you get a very early start you are not successful.
21 JUDGE SHON: Once you have lost it, you have 1
l 22 lost it. I I
23 WITNESS MICHEL: I completely concur with that.
24 WITNESS McGUIRE: Now, we are talking about
, 25 trained people, trained police officers, not LILCO guides.
H
=
fI .
' 36000303 joewnish .
2270 i It would be even more important for them.
2 JUDGE SHON: I see. Thank you.
have.
That is all I 3
MR. MILLER: I just have a point of 5 clarification, Judge Shon. Chief Roberts may have 6
something, but I just Want to make sure, Judge Shon, it is 7 understood, I think the t'estimony is clear, the listing of a
intersections given by the police witnesses on pages 41 and 42 is merely a sampling.
io In fact, it says these are a few examples in whereas Mr. Lieberman's list I think was a complete list.
So, I don't want 12 it construed by the Board that these were i3 i all the intersections that the police witnesses thought were a important.
15 These are just some examples that they cite in 16 their testimony.
p JUDGE SHON: I understood that the policemen's is list was not exhaustive. I just noted that they seemed not i, to corr'espond at all.
CS 20 MR. MILLER: I made the same notation, Judge l
21 Shon.
22 WITNESS MICHEL: I alss think it is important to 23 note that these intersections are some that we are citing a that are not within that two mile area.
25 JUDGE SHON: Yes, I realize that.
l
1
- 808 2338 3600 W s8fYsimons l i and this morning we had a traffic light out on 347 and we h 2 had traffic delays. Ne have all had experience with special events that have occurred in and around the county in our 3
law enforcement careers, some of which have drawn 5 substantial numbers of people to particularly confined ' areas 6 and we have had to deal with those.
t 7
I think that our experience speaks for itself, a and I would like to say that I think it is relevant and would be relevant in a radiological emergency.
to WITNESS McGUIRE: In some of these operations we ii have also learned are kind of philosophically opposed to 12 what Mr. Lieberman says. The best information is in the i3 field. You can't do a "near-a-wolf" in an operation like i, that, if you know what I'm referring to, i3 JUDGE PARIS: You can't do what?
16 WITNESS McGUIRE: There can't be somebody back 17 at the base calling all the shots because he would like to a ht.ve the information and maybe in a FEMA exercise he does 19 because he's handed a complete explicit message, but in the j i
,f 20 real world it doesn't happen and they have to have I 21 flexibility.
22 Any plan that is too rigid will break down to an 23 alarming degree because of its rigidity, if there is one 24 mistake in the planning or something changes in the field, 25 and we go more by field commanders, not because we like to,
S'
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,y@gsiD0D p
- ' 2339 l 1
.* i )
/* .
but because over a long period of time we've found it to be l 1 ;..
^~ 2 more effective. \
.. I 4 -
3 As bosses you don't always like that. You give
)
p.
4 people orders and develop a plan and then you find out it ;
\
-; 5 wasn't followed the way you wanted it, but there is usually '
6 good reasons, or there are almost always good reasons and !
7 they get through because'they did what they had to do at the 1
- e time. If you held them to strict accountability, you would 9
be doing a disservice to the public.
s 10 11 12 13
, 14 6
16 !'
18 i
!9 20 l l
21 i 22 !
23 l 24 25 I
l J
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s 3112 501010 I .,walsh I proposition thr.t Ms. Letsche has set forth, that the 4
2 rejection of the shadow phenomenon in the partial initial 3 decision which you cite was a very qualified rejection,,
' indeed, and that it noted that a substantial voluntary 5 evacuation might indead occur if the EBS messages and the 6 communication with the public ,a was not clear and reliable and 7 that sort of thing?
8 As I understand their present position, the 9
present position of Suffolk County, it is, indeed, that 10 looking with analytical tools used by sociologists at the
" EBS messages and the order in which they are presented, 12 these people have come to the conclusion that these messages 13 and the communications with the public were confusing. They l
" violated the very condition'that the PID seti forth.
15 Can they not present such material as evidence 16 that that happened?
Yes, sir, they can. And, I have 37 MS. McCLESKEY:
la .very carefully gone through the testimony which is why there
" are these lengthy lists of Page Number 2, Paragraph 4. And, 20 I have not moved to strike any testimony from the Suffolk l
21 County witnesses that goes to the words used in the EBS 22 messages on the day of the exercise or any theoretical l 23 analyses of how the words would have been confusing or 24 conflicting.
25 I am not moving to strike the discussions of the h .
i l
1
- '}
'iS001010 3113
,g;;walsh l EBS messages, although I think a good argument can be made that since those EBS messages are almost word for word the messages that were in Revision 6 of the plan and that we litigated previously, that the language of the EBS messages 5
are not allowed to be relitigated.
But, I did not move to strike that.
What I'm
/
striking -- what I Nould like t.o strike is the use of the a
surveys and the focus group interviews which rely in part upon condensed versions in the aurveys and upon a playing of 10 the EBS message and the focus groups to go to the point of how people will respond in an actual emergency, because I do 12 think that was previously litigated.
I3 And, your decision -- you are right -- was 6, I' limited. And it did say we have to look at how LILc0 15 implements its plan, and the best predictor that we will have of that next is the exercise. And, we want to see how LILCO is going to use its EBS messages, and we want to see
'8 what information is going to be disseminated.
I' And, that is the proper focus of Contentions 38 i.
' 20 and 39. But you also found that polls did not -- the I.olls 21 that were already admitted and litigated did not and could 22 not supply respondents with urgent tone and situation-23 j specific information that would be publicly available in a 24 real emergency.
25 5
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j, I 1 LERO or LILCO. They were there as independent r representatives, as scientists.
2 They were not members of 3 LERO.
4 MS. LETSCHE: It is true, isn't it, during one of 5 the press conferences, and I will direct your attention to 6 the transcript pages 58 and 59, that Dr. Brill announced that 7 although he lived within two miles of the plant, he probably 8 would not evacuate, at a time when people in that area were 9 being told to evacuate that area.
10 HITNESShCCAFFREY: Yes, Dr. Brill said that.
11 That was immediately corrected by the news manager, who 12 indicated that the EBS recommendation should be followed and l) 13 Dr. Brill's opinion was that, his independent opinion.
14 MS. LETSCHE: Where in the transcript.is that 15 reflected, Mr. McCaffrey?
16 WITNESS MC CAFFREY: Direct me to the page again, 17 please.
18 MS. LETSCHE: ,
58 and 59. When you get to the 19 bottom of 58 you will note your name there, and I think you 20 wi31 probably want to make the correction that that 21 Mr. McCaffrey reference on line 20 on page 58 should be Dr.
22 Bril).
23 WITNESS MC CAFFREY: That's correct. That's not 24 me speaking at that point. Will you just give me a moment?
25 I don't see i t in the transcript, but I can testify here ACE. FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
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2 MS. LETSCHE: During this actual news conference, g
7 3 though, no such correction was made, right? By you or by 2
/ 4 Ms. Robi nson?
+
5 (Panel conferring.) *#
6 WITNESS ROBINSON: If you mean did we directly 7 contradict Dr. Brill, no, we had -- I had at leas t given the 8 protective action recommendations as they came from LERO.
9 The purpose of the news center, I think as we all understand, 10 it is not to prevent people frem saying things that are 11 contradictory, but rather to have them in a place so you knos 12 w h a t. they are saying and can cope with it.
13 WITNESS MC CAFFREY: My recollection from the time 14 is that I suspect that our person who was filming the press 15 conferences stopped because it was kind of winding down, and 16 it was at the very tail ena of it that Mr. Langford reminded 17 people that they should follow the protective action 18 recommendations, so I suspect the tape is simply off at that 19 point.
20 MS. LETSCHE: In fact, if you turn to page 61, 21 which is the end of that press conference, Mr. McCaffrey, 22 there's a statement identified as "voice," which I think you l 23 will agree with me is Mr. Langford, saying, "Okay, ladies and
\ .
24 gentlemen, I appreciate your cooperation. We'll be back with l
25 you as socn as we have any updated information, and Dr. Brill ACE. FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
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, 4 WITNESS MC CAFFREY: That's what the pages say.
5 I'm telling you what I heard.
6 (Panel conferring.)
k 7 MS. LETSCHE: Mr. McCaffrey, would you turn, 8 please, to page 54 of the transcript? In this section 9 there's a question here to you on line 10 of the transcript, 10 "I'm interested in knowing how dangerous to the pubJic is the 11 level of radiation that has been released to this point," and 12 so we're on the same. wavelength here, this is at press 13 conference number 4, which is taking place roughly 1:00 time 14 frame, I believe. You refer that question to Dr. Brill, 15 right?
16 WITNESS MC CAFFREY: Yes.
17 MS. LETSCHE: Dr. Brill is with Brookhaven 18 National Labs; in that right?
19 WITNESS MC CAFFREY: Yes.
20 MS. LETSCHE: He has participated in LERO training 21 programs with respect to exactly this function, being a 22 supp]ement to the public information activities at the ENC, 23 correct?
24 WITNESS MC CAFFREY: Dr. Brill has not 25 participated in any training. He has from time to time ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
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I believe I agree essentially with the Staff's 2
arguments that there has to and should be a nexus between 3
the organization of LERO and the training program. I submit d
there is that nexus in the testimony. I will let it go at 5
that.
6 I disagree with the suggestion that there is 7
much in our testimony which goes to the issue of what should 8
have been encompassed within the confines of LERO's 9
training. We do offer examples of other kinds of training.
'O I hope the Board appreciates that those examples are offered in the context of comparisons between what we consider 7
12 effective,' appropriate and adequate training and the 13 training that was demonstrated by LILCO during the
)
Id exercise. It's not offered in the context of saying LILCO 15 should have done it this way.
16 Now, with response to Ms. Monaghan's comments, I 17 think there are really three responses. Ms. Monaghan
'8 complains th'at LILCO has not been on notice of what was set
'9 forth in our testimony regarding the organizational 20 structure. That's frankly an absurd statement on her part.
21 The deposition of Dr. Perrow was taken. There 22 is no way you could come away from Dr. Perrow's deposition 23 without having an understanding that this was exactly what 24 he was going to talk about in his testimony, the exact 25 precise matters that Dr. Perrow talks about where he is l
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- AFTERNOON SESSION
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2 '
?U,' D (1:50 p.m.)
.h 3 Whereupon, f '
DENNIS M. BEHR
$ 5 CHARLES A. DAVERIO Ju s >
3 6
MARY E. GOODKIND d~
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>. MICHAEL K. LINDELL
$f [ ' 8 ELLIOTT D. PURSELL
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and m .
[_,,s to JOHN A. WEISMANTLE 11
]$ resumed their places at the witness table and, having been
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. 12 previously' duly sworn, were further examined and testified R.
- $; .V. 13 as follows
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% lu' 15 gg .,. ' , , . JUDGE FRYE: Let's go back on the record, p,g y.f , 16 please.
- s. ...
dli '~ 17 With regard to the motion to strike, we arant wt .
, w ff ' 18 the motion with regard to the Footnote 50 on page 110, and M
with regard to testimony on the organizational structure 20
~ Yf insofar as it raises _ matters revealed by the exercise which 1
21 bear on tha -- excuse me, I'm stating it wrong. ,
22 i We will strike this testimony on organizational 23 i
" structure, but we will admit it to the extent that it raises l
2d matters revealed by the exercise which bear on the efficacy 25 of the training program. 1 V
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1 In other words, if it does not raise matters f
2 2
- revealed by the exercise which bear on the efficacy of the .
$ W ', '~ 3 training program, it's stricken.
\
8 MR. tiILLER: Judge Frye, I think I understand 1 3
< 5
, your ruling. Can I assume that the testimony as submitted 6
, to the court reporters ---
~
7 7 JUDGE FRYE: I wasn't going to suggest that j
- ' 8 people go through and try to strike ---
} .
MR. MILLER: Strike it.
to
] JUDGE FRYE: To physically go through and line n
?
out portions of it. I think we can all keep tnat ruling in
?
O 12 mind as we'go along. I think t._,
c% to do that would w
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13 probably involved somewhat of an editing job.
m ,
- M fy r -. i4R. MILLER: So the Bc'rd wf11 just make that f 15 i
determination in the course of preparing its opinion I I;; 16 assume?
ds yo I7 JUDGE FRYE: That's right.
'- '8 MR. MILLER: That's fine. Thank you.
9 "
ft c JUDGE FRYE: Now as to the qualifications of the k
'O witnesses to testify as to various portions of the .
21 I testimony, as we indicated, we wanted the witnesses to be l 22 l prepared to indicate what their inv.lvement was in the i 23 preparation of the specific answers to the questions.
24 Otherwise, the motion is denied.
25 As to the schedule, Mr. Zahnleuter, I checked --
I a.
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I I A No, I have not.
l 2
. Q Have you read in its entirety the FEMA report?
" k 3 fes, I have.
- A
^ d Q Now on page 3 of the testimony, Mr. Daverio, you 5
make mention of the training program for LERO. Is it fair 6
to say, Mr. Daverio, that from a conceptual standpoint that 7
LERO's training program has really not changed since LERO's 8
inception in 1983?
A (Witness Daverio) The basic components of the 10 training program are still the same as they were in 19P3; I'
that's correct.
.f 12 Q ' Mr. Behr, would you agree with that statement?
'3 A (Witness Behr) Yes, I would agree with that,
'd the basic components. There are specifics to the training
@ 15 program that have changed, but the basic components are the 16 same.
'7 To make sure we understand, is it fair to say 0
+
'8 that conceptually and with respect to basic methodology the
" LFRO training program is much the same today as it was in 20 1983 when LERO was founded? l 21 A It's much the same. It has, however, been i
22 expanded in some areas. For example, we probably have much 23 more in the way of practical exercise type training to date 2d than we have had in the past. With the advert of the bus 25 rallies, now it's fair to say that along with decon l
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'f [ 2 JUDGE FRYE: What is the relevance of the 350 1
3 certification inquiry?
i j.,
- t] 'I 4 MR. MILLER: Well, I feel I am compelled to make
.T; 5 the inquiry, Judge Frye, because we have this discussion in 6 the testimony.
7 Frankly, I am confused as to the relevance of 8 it.
9 JUDGE FRYE: They have said earlier that it was 10 in there because they read the contention as demanding 11 perfect performance.
12 MR. MILLER: I find that hard to believe that is 13 how they read the testimony.
14 JUDGE FRYE: Well., I was going to just suggest 15 to you would it help if the Board indicated that it does not 16 read the contention as demanding perfect performance.
17 MR. MILLER: I certainly appreciate that from 18 the Board.
19 JUDGE FRYE: Maybe we can move on to the next 20 topic. Because I have a feeling we are kind of spinnir.g 21 wheels at this point.
22 MS. MONAGHAN: Judge Frye, if I may just note 23 for a moment here. Since this seems to really deal with the l
24 legal question of how one interprets the contention, if you 1
l{} 25 look at the contention, which is Attachment A to LILCO's AcEJPEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
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4544 09 l9 testimony, the last paragraph on the first page says, and valch 1 j
2 this is what the Interveners have submitted as the issues 3 for litigation under this contention here Every instance 4
of a LILCO training deficiency revealed during the exercise 5 is not described at length in this contention, because they 6 are so numerous.
And here is the significant part: Virtually 7
8 every error made by a LILCO player during the exercise 9 involved to some degree a failure of the LILCO training 10 program to prepare personnel adequately to perform necessary 11 actions.
12 I think it is f rom that basis that one could 13 interpret that interveners may be alleging that perfect l l 14 performance is necessary, since they are alleging that every 15 single error made indicates a failure of the training 16 program, 17 MR. MILLER: That is ridiculous.
18 JUDGE FRYE: Hold on one second.
19 (Board confers.)
20 JUDGE FRYE: We do not view this contention as 21 requiring perfect performance.
22 MR. MILLER: Judge Frye, I am more than happy to 23 move on. If the Board has represented that this section of 24 the testimony, from Pages 9 to 10, that paragraph is 25 basically irrelevant --
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' 09 4548 1hp? 0 i: people driving their cars. I assume they would have
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- Q 2 evaluated those driving buses.
I 3 JUDGE FRYE: Is that so, Mr. Daverio? '
4 WITNESS DAVERIO: The only problem I have with 5 evaluation, if you -- they would have evaluated them within 6 the staging area, going through briefings, going through 7 dosimetry, getting out.
8 But once they are dispatched into the field, 9 they would have only seen the ones driving real buses, 10 except when a real bus was at the transfer points where they 11 could have seen other bus drivers and the activities at a 12 transfer point, but not when they were driving the routes.
13 JUDGE FRYE: Okay.
}
14 BY MR. MILLER: (Continuing) 15 0 Now, with respect to -- could you just give me 16 the roughest estimate that you can, Mr. Daverio, of the 17 number of bus drivers who drove the buses, actually drove 18 buses?
19 A (Witness Daverio) General population?
20 0 Yes.
21 MS. MONAGHAN: Judge Frye, this is all covered 22 in Contention 21. I am not sure why we are doing it here.
23 JUDGE FRYE: Do you have it? Do you know it?
24 WITNESS DAVERIO: It is about eight.
j 25 MR. MILLER: About eight.
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. '/ t 31sh 1 BY MR. MILLER: (Continuing)
'l /
'j 2 O Now, of the eight that were observed by FEMA --
3 let me back up. You are telling me Mr. Daverio that there 4 were eight actual bus drivers per general population, is 5 that carrect?
6 A (Witness Daverio) To the best of my 7 recollection, sitting here now, that is right.
5 8
9 1
l 10 11 12 13 II 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 l
21 22 l
l 23 24 ll 25 1
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- ,9 4550 gcons 1 0 Now of the eight that actually drove buses, FEMA 2
identified three or four problems with the performance of 3 those bus drivers; is that correct?
4 A (Witness Daverio) I can only think of three.
5 0 Were they all out of the.Patchogue staging area?
6 A Yes.
7 0 So three of the eight had problems, and in each 8
case were all three of those problems identified as a 9
deficiency by FEMA, Mr. Daverio, to your knowledge?
10 (Witness Daverio confers with Witness Behr.)
11 MR. MILLER: I'm looking at page 66 of the 12 report. These may be the three that you're referring to.
13 One took two hours and ten minutes to proceed from the 1.4 staging area to the transfer point. Another driver went to 15 the wrong transfer point and his mistake was not recognized 16 by the transfer point coordinator. A third driver missed a 17 segment of an assigned evacuation route.
18 WITNESS DAVERIO: Those are the three I was 19 thinking of when I answered your question. That is 20 correct.
21 BY MR. MILLER:
22 0 And of course as part of its recommendation for 23 that deficiency, Mr. Daverio, FEMA recommended that there 24 should be additional training provided; is that correct?
25 A (Witness Daverio) Yes.
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" 4551 g10 ns 1 O Not withstanding that of the eight observed
, 2 three had these kinds of problems referenced in the report, 3 Mr. Daverio. Is it your opinion that LERO's bus drivers, 4 the performance of bus drivers did not constitute a 5 deficiency at the exercise?
6 A Given the organization and the other means that 7 that could have been performed and the types of failures, I 8 would not have rated that a deficiency.
9 O And could you tell me, Mr. Daverio, why you find 10 it relevant that approximately 500 bus drivers immobilized 11 and approximately 300 bus drivers were sent into the field 12 when FEMA only observed eight and of those eight observed 13 three were found to have performed inadequately by FEMA?
I 14 A Yes. It has to do with mobilization of all 15 emergency workers above what anyone else that I'm aware of 16 has ever done. It's to the point of having to provide 17 dosimetry and the activities required to dispatching them 18 into the field and the concept of setting up all the 19 transfer points. Whether it be with a bus or a real car, 20 the transfer point coordinators had to handle a large 21 volume of vehicles. There may be others, but those are 22 three that I can think of off the top of my head why I 23 would think that it was reference it.
24 MR. MILLER: Judge Frye, the logical follow up i l 25 here is the extrapolation which I think can be drawn, but I l
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WITNESS ' LINDELL: It's clearly in my-experience 2
3 it's clee.rly the case that people are less highly motivated 3
h in emergency exercises than they are in emergencies.
dl Similarly, they tend to be less highly motivated in drills 1
5l than they are in emergency exercises.
6l I think though that in emergency exercises 7
people have a high enough degree of motivation because there 3
are important job consequences for most of the actors. The;
'l are being evaluated and their organization as a whole is 10 being assessed by FEMA or the Nuclear Regulatory "i Commission.
} If they do not perform adequately, I think most 12I l people presume there are going to be personal consequences
'3 i for them. So they do have a fair degree of motivation in an l'
emergency exercise.
15 JUDGE SHON: Thank you.
16 BY MR. MILLER:
"I Q I Now in about the middle of the page, gentlemen, I3 there is a statement about the numbers of ARCAs and deficiencies that were identified by FEMA during the 20 '
Shoreham exercise, and yon stated about half of them had 2'
little or nothing to do with training, but rather concerning 22 equipment or procedures. Do you see that statement?
22 '
A (Witness Lindell) Yes.
A 2' l (Witness Mileti) I do, too.
~
, O Are you telling us that about half of the APCAs I
l
- i
i 7 ef jl4 -
5136 i nf, iDons
.2 ii normativeness?
1 A
k.[ 2 A This is a general concept that has emerged from 2.." 4
, 3 p '
research over several decades in the social sciences about
.j' -
4 how it is easier for organizations when they respond to 0
5 emergencies to do things that are more in line with what e
they do normally. In other words, in the generic sense it's 7
better in emergency planning to have police do police work
.y .
, 3 rather than fire work.
+. o Q Now given that definition, Dr. Mileti, I assume to you would agree with me that with respect to normativeness b 1:
LERO does not typically perform -- well, LILCO personnel in 12 LERO do not typically perform the kinds of emergency f l
13 responsibilities they hold in LERO during their normal daily !
u jobs; is that a fair statement? I A
15 There are actually two responses to your ,
16 question. In genera'l absolutely yes, and I think that is i u i one of the fundamental issues here and always has been, and -
18 I even remember speaking out on this several years ago i
'9 during the other hearings, and it was in reference to
- o normativeness is relevant in the sense that it makes it 21 ,
easier for people to learn how tc do what they need to do in 22 an emergency. It doesn 't mean that you can 't take people 22
, and teach them'how to do those saae things successfully 24 through other means.
25 Normativeness generically as a concept is good i
I i
I I
av "gg4 5137 l .hb simons jf.
a i to design into an emergency plan, but that doesn't mean that
'-t you can't have an effective emergency response when it
,th} 2 J,hh l y doesn't exist. At the-same time, there was some attempt
- 4 when LERO was being put together to take this notion into
. 4 5
account, that is to take advantage of it to the extent that i
3 it could be taxen advantage of.
7 And, therefore, people who were ascribed roles
, 3 of driving buses were people who as a routine drive big things, and I'm sorry, I don't know more explicitly what big r.a to things are. They are not little.
n Q Dr. Mileti, would you agree with me that given 1; l the composition of LEKO in terms of the numbers and kinds of nl people that make up that organization that it is at least u more difficult for LERO to satisfy the normativeness factor?
15 A More difficult than what?
16 Q More difficult than the typical emergency u response organization?
18 A Yes, of cource.
19 0 Now at the bottom of page 15 you set forth a
- o i i
number of subfactors which comprise the I guess the overall
- i factor of having an underttanding about interorganizational
- emergency response. These subfactors go on over to page 16.
23 A Yes.
- ;l 0 Is it your opinion, Dr. Mileti, that each of the n
- j' subfactors listed by you is necessary if you are to have an i
i l
l M -- - - ,
l 170 01 01 5248 (ewalsh 1 JUDGE FRYE: Well, I would certainly think we I , 2 should be through today.
3 MR. MILLER: Maybe we --
4 MS. MONAGHAN: Perhaps a two to three hour time 5 limit might be appropriate on this if the Board feels it has 6 heard most of what it needs to hear.
7 I just believe the County ought to be given an 8 opportunity to conduct what cross-examination they feel they 9 need to do.
10 JUDGE FRYE: Let me tell you what I'm focusing 11 on here, because this goes to the weight of your testimony.
12 If you look at Question and Answer 37 on Page 31, it says:
13 "What do these analyses tell you about the ef ficacy of the 14 LERO training program?"
15 And, the Answer says, in essence, that the 16 program is as good or better than training prcgrams for of f-17 site organizations at other plants in Region II; they 18 demonstrate that there is nothing unique about the problems i
i 19 identified; almost half of the citations govern dosimetry; i
20 and, in Shoreham's case the task of improving performance is 21 facilitated by the limited areas in which improvement is 22 needed.
23 None of that, in my opinion, goes directly to 24 the issue of whether there is a fundamental flaw in the 25 training program. I mean, it's useful background but it ACE. FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
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i 70 01 01 5249 g31sh 1 simply, in my opinion, doesn' t go to the question of whether 2 there is a fundamental flaw in the training p rog ram .
3 And, that's why i don't see apending ,esst 4 amount of time on it.
5 6
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"N "0 10 5356 nfg p 1 y 1 MS. MC CLESKEY: My understanding is that we had f)sj fi *3 1
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2 allotted three days for the issue based on page and other 3 items and that Mr. Miller had already announced a week and a 4 half ago that Mr. Lanpher wanted an additional day at least.
5 JUDGE FRYE: Yeah. I think it was probably 6 something like that. It's about 50 pages, as I recall.
7 Isn't it 50 pages?
8 MS. MC CLESKEY: Yes, sir, that's right.
.s.
9 JUDGE FRYE: So, it's abaat two days.
10 MR. MILLER: Judge Frye, it's 50 pages and four '
11 to five or maybe six inches of attachments and 38 other 12 exercise reports.
q} 13 JUDGE FRYE: Yeah, right. I'm not quarreling 14 with that. You know, all I'm saying is that I want the 15 outline, okay.
16 MR. MILLER: Fine.
17 JUDGE FRYE: Understood?
18 MR. MILLER: I will pass on the message t( Mr.
19 Lanpher.
20 MR. SUTK0: As to the other problem, Judge Frye, l
21 -
maybe I can make a suggestion. If Ms. Goodkitid would like 22 now to select one of these exercises, list training problems 23 and ther go 'chrough the body of the ARCAs and ARFI's during 24 lunch, I thinx she would be able to corroborate that these 25 numbers are correct, or any one of them she wishes to pick.
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.'f sh Or, I would be very glad to do that in cross-examination for 2 one or for all 19 exercises.
m 3 MS, MONAGHAN:
That won't solve the problem, 4 Judge Frye.
5 JUDGE FRYE:
} Well, we need to confer on that.
6 And, it will give counsel an opportunity to study it. And, 7 I want to confer with my fellow Board members with regard to l
8 it.
9
.J So, we will adjourn for lunch at this point.
10 MR. SUTKO: Judge Frye, before we adjourn could 11 I move the othe post-exercise assessments into evidence at 12 this time?
13 MS. MONAGHAN:
l I haven't had --
14 JUDGE FRYE Just hold all of that until we can 15 confer.
i 16 (Whereupon, the hearing is recessed for the 17 luncheon break at 11:30 a.m., to reconvene at 1: 00 p.m.,
18 this same day.)
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5358 !
t y AFTERNOON SESS ION 2 (1:00 p.m.)
- ji JUDGE FRYE
., W 3 Can w,e go back on the record, 7 4 please?
l
,' 5 We conferred again over lunch, and it appears to ,
d 6 us based on what has transpired so far this morning that we 9..
7,. 7 would be well advised to return to the ruling that we
^
8 announced first thing this morning. We cannot envision this j
9 particular testimony, this particular portion of the e
10 testimony, supporting a finding with regard to whether there 11 is a fundamental flaw in the training program.
12 We view it as background information, which is 13 sharply contested.
We have got obviously a situat, ion where
^
14 if we allow this to go on I think the parties are going to 15 be wasting a great deal of their time and effort towards 16 something that really probably isn't deserving of quite that 17 much effort.
18 So, what we propose to do is to stop the cross-19 examination now, permit Mr. Sutko to make an offer of proof 20 for the record so he will have that in the record for a 21 future reference if it's needed. And, we will only plan to i
22 treat this particular information, if at all, as background 23 information, noting that it is subject to a considerable 24 dispute.
25 MR. MILLER: Judge Frye, I just want some ACE. FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC, n 202 347 3700 Nationwide Coserage l 800-336-6M6
! 4
/
s .e/S 5359 jl P 9 'g clarification if I could get it. Is it the Board's ruling I
[
n
[ 2 that there will be no further cross-examination of Ms.
3 Goodkind on this testimony?
4 4 JUDGE FRYE: That's correct.
MR. MILLER: And,'I take it that that ruling is 5
4 6 based upon the fact that the Board effectively is striking 4
7 tho testimony at Pages 27 through 32 and also Attachments C gg 8 and D of the testimony?
- JUDGE FRYE: We are not striking it. Lut, I 9
4 10 think for your purposes it probably amounts to the same 11 thing, in that we are saying that we won't base a finding on 12 it.
13 If we use it at all, we would use only as 14 background information. But, we woulo not base a finding on 15 it.
16 MR. 2AHNLEUTER: May I ask, what would you use 17 background information for if you don't use it for a 18 finding?
19 JUDGE FRYE: We would not use it to datermine 20 that there was or was not a fundamental flaw in the training 21 i program. We might simply refer to it as saying that LILCO's 22 position is that they are about average with respect to other emergency plans that they exainined. And, that's 23 24 subject to dispute.
25 MR. SUTK0: Judge Frye, as that is the Borvd's ACE. FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
Nationwide Coserage 800 336 6M6 202 347 3700
i 14 14 fA simons 1 5423 i isolated casen where one individual might need something, i
2 and then we do these kind of isolated training sessions 3
where we talk to one person, and I gave you the example.
4 O Now, Mr. Daverio, at the time of the exercise 5
LERO had been in existence for about three years and there 6
had been about three years of training 'of LERO personnel; 7 is that correct?
8 (Witnesses conferring.)
9 A In general I would agree. I don't know if it's I
10 exactly three or a little more or a little less, but in 11 that range.
12 0 And what you're suggesting to me is that when 13 FEMA identified problems at the exercise and recommended 14 additional training, it's LERO's opinion that they will 15 give LERO personnel more of the same training?
I
- 16 A No.
17 0 How does LERO in':erpret the recommendations by 18 FEMA to provide additional training?
19 A On an ind.vidual basis. We take a look at not 20 only the training, but every comment FEMA made and decide 21 which is the most appropriate fix. Is it a procedure 27 change, is it a plan change, a facility change, an 23 equipment change or a training change. You make the 24 appropriate change. If it's a procedure change, that
{ ) 25 reg. tires a training change.
ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202-347 3700 Nationwide Coverage 800-336-6M6
'91101515 5671 jeawalsh ,
I MS. MONAGHAN: I don't think so.
2 JUDGE FKyE: --
of actions taken after an 3
accident to show negligence? I think that's essentially d
what you are saying.
5 MS. MONAGHAN: That's part of what I'm saying.
6 Also, the other aspect of it is that this is part of an 7
ongoing training program, and to use an ongoing training 8
program and the self-critique process of an ongoing training 9
program in a fashion that is used to supplement what 10 happened the day of the exercise and to try to establish a
'I fundamental flaw we believe is inappropriate.
12 "And, I think that position has already been 13 stated by FEMA also on the record.
Id J MR. MILLER: Judge Frye, I --
15 JUDGE FRYE: Well, I --
16 MR. MILLER: -- think we should wait until we 17 come to my questions. But, I will be using the post-18 exercise. drill reports as they have been used on a limited M basis in th( past to show that LERO's training program has i
20 , not f.ixed anything, which is relevant to Contenticr. 50.I.
I 21 But, I think objections to my questienc, if they i
22 are going to be made, should be made when my questions have 23 been asked.
24 JUDGE FRYE: Well, it's awfully hard to reake an 25 objection without the question, I agree. But, I wantad to l l
~ - - ~ - , . . < . ,. , y- ., -
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l 71101515 5672 i jo walsh l 1
l
( get some better feel for what their position was so that I l l
2 can have a little bit of background'when and if the !
l 3 objection arises.
4 MS MONAGHAN: That was the sole point in 5 raising it, Your Honor.
6 JUDGE FRYE: All right. We will be adjourned 7
until 9 tomorrow. And, let me say also that I think we have 8
two motions to strike on Contentions 15 and 16, one from
?
LILCO and one from Suffolk County.
10 And, we have a motion to limit cross-examination i
11 l from LILCO which pertains principally, as I read it, to I
12 l Contentions'15 and 16.
13 So, we will take up all those three on Wednesday 14 morning. I just wanted everybody to be aware of it.
15 MR. MILLER: Judge Frye, the last motion you
!o mentioned, the motion to limit cross-examination, I'm not 17 very familiar with that motion. I will check with my IB office. I suppose some --
19 JUDGE FRYE: Well, Mr. Lanpher should be aware
- o I of it. If he isn't, tell him to get it because it does i
- ' ? pcrtain principally to Contentions 15 and 16. :
22 MS. MONAGHAN: The filing date on that, for your f
23 i information, Mr. Miller, was May 5th. !
i 24 l JUDGE FRYE: All right. l l
2f (Whereupon, the hearing is adjourned at 5:06 j
d P
N 91200202 ptysimons 1I WITNESS DAVERIO: As I recall our contracts with 2
the ambulance companies, it's their responsibility to 3
provide the vehicle and a trained person. What we have done because we found that they have this attrition problem if we 5
are giving them more opportunities to have training 6
available to their people so that we can maintain them 7
current.
8 JUDGE FRYE: So it's up to them to identify the people who haven't had the training and get them to the
'O training session?
WITNESS DAVERIO: Well, we know who has had the 12 training. We don't know who has employment from their
'3 company. That's the problem we have with it. We don't monitor who is leaving their company. We just require that 15 they provide us an ambulance and a trained person and we 4
give them monthly opportunities to get people that are new
'7 to their company trained.
I8 BY MR. MILLER:
'9 0 Mr. Daverio, the scope of the training that is 2', being provided on a monthly basis to these ambulance and 22 ambulette drivers, is that the full training program which 23 lwouldordinarilybeofferedtosuchdrivers,forexample, in 2'
your quarterly program?
25
- A Yes, it's the same training.
I a
o.
y Rwe 1
5710
' 200505
'gysimons 1
indicated to LILCO that the proposed modifications to )
I .
1 2 training must be evaluated at some future exercise? I 3i A (Witness Daverio) I believe that's the 4
definition of an ARCA. If they give you an ARCA they want 5
to evaluate the next exercise. So, yes.
6 Q I'm referring to the proposed modifications to 7 the training program.
8 A Yes, and what I'm saying is it is consistent 9
with their definition of how they handle issues like this.
10 They want to see the closure at the next exercise.
II 0 Whether that next exercise be a fcture schedule 12 exercise under the regulations or a remedial exercise?
13 A I assume that's FEh4's decision. That is not I
IJ mine.
15 0 And I take it that it's your opinion, Mr.-
16 Daverio, that in the exercise review, that overall LERO's 17 training program was adequate and therefore major changes to 18 the training program need not be made?
19 A I think you're quoting es somewhere in the 1
20 testimony. We say something very similar to that.
21 0 So you agree with my statement? ;
?? A Yes, and if you look at the top of page 65 we 23 have not restructured the basis training regiment that's i 24 been approved. I think we have those words there, i I
I 25 0 And I take it then, Mr. Daverio, that you would II
y i
5711 900505
,imons 1
agree with me that none of the post-exetcise changes or 2
modifications that have been instituted by LERO in its 3
training program constitute a major change, in your opinion?
d A We have to be a little careful, and let me 1
5 explain it. When I talk about training regiment, I'm 6
talking about the basic concepts of training. We have 7
classrcom training, we htve tabletops, we have drills and a
exercises and practicals during classroom sessions.
That does not mean that I did not feel that
, i 10 there were specific new types of training, i.e., for bus 11 drivers that we had to do which we have outlined in this 12 testimony. 'So I'm not sure I can agree or disagree exactly 13 with you, but when I used the word "regiment" I'm talking I
id about the big, broad concepts of training and not the 15 details.
16 Q I'm looking at the sentence that starts on page 17 64 where you say that IILCO felt major changes in the LERO 18 training program were unwarranted and wou]d actually be ,
l 19 counterproductive. So I'm assuming, Mr. Daverio, that in 20 your opinion none of the changes that have been made since i 2' the exercise constitutes a major change. Is that fair 22 statement? j 23 (Witnesses conferring.) l 24 A The only one I have that I have t1at I would t i
25 i like to define as c major addition was the bua driver road I
l
.2
&f-J/ E f. 505 5712
$ sons
! i rallies that we did. I don't think it changed the basic
! 2 thrust of our program. It was just an addition to the 1 r l 3 program.
1 4
JUDGE PARIS: The bus drivers' what?
WITNESS DAVERIO: The bus driver road rallies 6
that are discussed on page 72 and 73 of our testimony which l
7 I assume I'll get qubstioned on later.
R BY MR. MILLER:
?
4 Now, Mr. Daverio, as the contention, Contention 10 50 points out, and I'm looking at the first page of your l Attachment A, the previous Licensing Board in this 12 proceeding (endered its conclusions regarding the adequacy 1 13 of LILCO's training program subject to confirmation by a 14 finding to be made by FEMA after a graded exercise; is that 15 correct?
16 A (Witness Daverio) That's what your quote says, 17 and I assume it's right.
IB Q And it 's f air to say, is it not, Mr. Daverio, 19 that FEMA made no finding with respect to the adequacy of I
20 LILCO's training program based upon the results of the i l
2' exercise in February 1986? ,
22 MS. MONAGHAN: Objection. This is all in the l 23 record and it's not part of this training contention. So 2d it's a legal argument that's being made here. ,
{ 25 JUDGE FR"E: Sustained.
i l
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, ?ggnS 5729 1sh i f
1 Q Mr. Behr mayne should answer first, Mr. Daverio.
2 A (Witness Behr) Well, I think Mr. Daverio i
) .
3 explained what we considered to be a major format or program l I 4 change. These do not constitute n.ajor progra n changes, j 5
These constitute changee in planning concepts which resulted 6
in changes in procedures which resulted in changes in l 7
training that had to be provided in order to support those 8
f new procedures.
O Do you classify the changes since the exercise, 10 Mr. Behr, as major changes in the training program?
A Not programmatic changes, no.
12
' JUDGE FRYE: You are making a distinction there 13 which I'm not sure I grasp entirely. Can you alaborate a Id little bit on it between the program and --
15 WITNESS BEHR: The training procram, for all ,
16 intents and purposes, consists of classroom training 17 sessions, table-top exercises or drills and practical l 18 l training drills and exercises, all right. ^
'9 l JUDGE FRYE That's the program? ,
20 WITNESS BEHR: That is the program. And, those 21 three major components have been in existence far the better 22 part of the last three years.
23 JLOGE FRYE: So, when you say --
2d i UITNESS BEHR: Wu have not changed that.
25 JLTGE FRYE: I see. So, that has not been i
I l
A
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3,17
't i
5730 I changed. But, you have changed elements within -- training g , swr
, ... . 2 elements within the program?
e 3 WITNESS BEHR: Yes, to reflect changes that we 4 have made in the LERO plan.
5i JUDGE FRYE: I think I understand now.
6 BY MR. MILLER: (Continuing) 7 Q But, Mr. Behr, with respect to the changes that j
' i s have been made within the elements of the program, you would !
9 not charactcrize those changes as major changes, would you? l 10 A I think with the one exception that Mr. Daverio l 11 l pointed out earlier, and that being the bus rallies that we i
12 are running.' !
) JUDGE PARIS: You mean the road rallies? I 14 WITNESS BEHR: The road rallies. l l
15 JUDGE EARIS: Okay.
16 BY HR. MIL 2'R: (Continuing) 17 Q How long -- let me just back up. In June of j 18 1986, there was a training drill held for LERO personnel, I i
19 t rtle ?
20 A That's true.
2' Q And, that was the first training drill that had 22 been held for LERO personnel since the exercise; is that 2] true?
l 24 i A To the best of my knowledge, that is true. Yes.
l 25 ' O And it had been approximately one year since I
i
7503 Locus 1.L~0808 a
^
I 2
didn't even exist then, did it?
A A
That 's correc t .
(Witness Keller) y 3
That 's correc t.
4 A (Witness Baldwin) That's correct.
. 5 Q Now, gentlemen, I would like to turn your 6 attention to the FEMA report, page 8, your evaluation 7 c ri e.eria .
8 (Witnesses comply. )
- That report states, and I quote, ' Deficiencies
$ 10 are demonstrated and observed inadequacies that would cause 11 a finding that offsite emergency preparedness was not 12 adequate to provide reasonable as?.urance that apprcpri. ate 13 protective measures can be taken to protect the health and y 14 safety of the public living in the vicinity of a nuclear
- s power facility in the event of a radiological emergency."
6 Do you see that statement, gentlemen?
17 A (Witness Kowieski) Yes, I do.
18 A (Witness Keller) Yeu, I dc.
19 A (Witness Baldwin,\ Yes.
20 Q And in connection with your evaluation of the 21 Sht reham exercise FEMA identi.!ied a number of deficiencies 22 as defined on page 8; isn't that correct?
23 A (Witness Kowieski) T!. t's correct.
24 Q And by definition, therefore, FEMA was not in a
'l 25 position af ter the exercise to make a reasonable assurance
<J', _ _ _
1 )
- 0808 7504' icons I finding; isn't that correct?
t 2 A That 's also correc t.
3 A (Witness Keller) Also, prior to the exercise d
FEMA had stated that they would not make a reasonable 5
assurance finding as part of the negotiations under the MOU, 6
the NRC/ FEMA MOU as to whether we would hold this exercise 7 or not.
8 Q You 're referring to Mr. Speck 's letter?
?
A That's right.
10 A (Witness Kowieski) That is correct.
Il Q Mr. Keller, cssume for a moment that that Speck 12 letter had not existed. The fact that you identified 'ou r 13 or five deficiencies during the Shoreham exercise, that 14 would have precluded FEMA Region 2 from making a reasonable 15 assurance finding on the basis of that exercise, wouldn't 16 it?
17 MS. McCLESKEY: Objection. His question is not la related to any of the contentions before this Board.
19 MR. LANPHER: It's related directly to the 20 question of whether assurance findings could be made, and '
21 that's the whole purpose of this proceeding.
l I
22 MS. McCLESKEY: My understanding of h.is question l 23 is that if it were a dif ferent kind of exercise would they 24 have made a finding of reasonable assurance.
3 JUDGE FRYE Is that your question?
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1 MR. LANPHER: That wasn't my question.
l 2 JUDGE FRYE: Overruled.
3 MR. LANPHER: Mr. Keller, do you recall my
} 4 question, or would you like me to repeat it?
, 5 WITNESS KELLEn I think I remember whht you 6 said I believe.
7 Generally speaking in a normal exercise, and a clearly this is not a normal exercise, when deficiencies are 9 identified the Regional Director does not make a reasonable 10 assurance finding.
11 BY MR. LANPHER:
12 Q In fact, you 're aware of no situation where 13 deficiencies were found and a reasonable assurance finding 14 was issued with those deficiencies; isn't that correct?
15 A As a bottom line I would agree with you.
16 However, the particular Regional Director in question did 17 make a statement at a public meeting immediately after an 18 exercise that there were no problems and in fact there was a 19 deficiency.
20 A (Witness Keller) He would have been incorrect?
21 A He had been incorrect.
22 Q But that was because he made an error, correct?
23 A I wouldn't characterize it that way, but that's 24 all right, yes.
25 Q The general rule, Mr. Keller, is if FEMA Region
[ :' 00808 7506 Lyons 1
. 2 idertifies deficiencies in an exercise the Region is not 2 in a position to make a positive reasonable assurance 3 finding; isn't that correct?
d A The other thing that I would like to add ---
5 Q Could you answer the question first, and if you 6 to qualify your answer, fine.
7 A Okay. The Region does not make a finding. FDIA 8 healquarters makes a finding. The finding becomes a FDIA 9
finding when it is transmitted from FDiA headquarters to the 10 NRC. With that clarification, the Region has not, after all 11 the' dust had settled -- if deficiencies were identified, the 12 Region has not recommer'ed t_o FDiA headquarters that a 13 reasonable assurance finding be made when deficiencies are 14 identified in an exercise.
15 Q And Washington D.C. headquarters has not made 16 such a reasonable assurance finding when deficiencies are 17 identified; is that correct?
18 A (Witness Kowieski) As far as FDiA Region 2 is 19 c onc erned ; that 's correc t.
20 Q I don ' t want you to r.p ecula te abou t other j 21 situations.
22 And isn't it true that the normal practice where 23 deficiencies are identified and it has gone through the 24 review process so you 've decided there are deficiencies, 25 that the next step is to schedule remedial actions or a l
l f
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[ . p' 0 8 7507
_ ppns i remedial exercise to deal with those deficiencies?
N w
,, .t 2 A (Witness Kowieski) That 's correc t.
G 3 A (Witness Keller) For a plant which has an L
4 operating license, that is correct.
5 Q Well, for any plant in order to remove 6 deficiencies don't you require e remedial exercise?
7 A That is correct. However, the timing, and I
- e think you said schedule immediately, or I thought I heard a
you, and it may not.
10 Q Well, let me come at it a different way then, 11 Mr. Keller.
12 In order to remove a deficiency, you have to 13 have a remedial exercise, don't you?
14 A Or a drill .
15 Q Or a drill, but some sort of a demonstration; 16 isn't that correct?
17 A That is correc t.
18 Q And not just a paper plan fix?
19 A That is correct.
20 A (Witness Kowieski) The paper fix comes first 21 and it is followed by a remedial exercise.
22 O And in the RAC review which has been marked as 23 FEMA Exhibit 3 in evidence, in some of the tables at the end 24 of that RAC review on the far side where there were 25 deficiencies identified, there is an "I" for incocplete.
1 IE!f
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- ' 0308 7508 gr im0D*
1 A That 's correct.
4$I 2 Q And am I correct that that indicates that the i
f 3
remedial action will not be deemed to be acceptable and d
complete until a drill or an exercise occurs to demonstrate 5
that the so-called fix in fact would be properly 6 implemented?
/ A (Witness Keller) Let's clarify. You're talking 8 about the far right-hand column?
^
9 Q Yes.
10 A Yes, that 's correct. There are two columns 13 there, and sometimes there are "I's" in the next to the last 12 column also.
13 Q Why don't you look, so we are all on the same 14 wavelength, at Table 3.1 on page 1 of 16, and this is in 15 FEMA Exhibit 3.
16 (Witnesses comply.)
17 Am I correct that this page as well as the 18 following page deals with a deficiency identified by FEMA in 19 LERO's response to the evacuation impediment free-play 20 messages?
21 A (Witness Kowieski) That it correct.
22 A (Witness Keller) That 's correc t.
23 Q And in the far right-hand corner, Mr. Keller, 24 there is an "I" which indicates the need, dces it not, to 25 demonstrate the adequacy of the fix at a remedial drill or
1 .
u 2
....c 3?."308 7509
.: / $sens j- I exercise?
@; 2 A That is correct.
> N 3 A (Witness Kowieski) Correct.
4 A (Witness Keller) Now if you will turn to page 2 5 of .16, which is all part of this table, I think every time 6 we have done this, there is a statement in the column which 7 is labeled "FEMA Evaluation of LERO Response," and there
) s will be a statement at the end of that which says to the 9 effect, as this one says, effective use of these plan 10 modifications should be evaluated at a future exercise.
11 So there will not only be an "I" in the column 12 labeled "Remedial Action Either Company er Incomplete," but 13 there should be a verbal ' statement that this has to be 14 demonstrated in a future exercise or drill.
15 Q That verbal statement is really almost a 16 reminder to FEMA to make sure that in the next drill or 17 exercise this has to be looked at specifically because there 18 is an "I" in ehat other column, correct? i 19 A That is correct.
20 A (Witness Kowieski) Correc t .
21 Q And those "I's" in the far right-hand column 22 apply to ARCAs as well as deficiencies; is that correct?
23 A That's correct.
24 A (Witnens Keller) That is correct.
25 Q To your knowledge, genclemen, has any remedial
6 7914 34900404 suewalsh
"" l Q Yeah, let's talk abou t Page 1. Now, Page 1 lh 2 relates to the deficiency that we have discussed a little 3 bit already. And, the way you-all did it in your report, d
your evaluation of the exercise, you identified two problems 5 related to the hard copy communication issue, with respect 6* to the EBS messages and with respect to getting documents to 7
rumor control, right? EBS messages to the media and 8 information to the rumor control, right?
9 A (Witness Kowieski) That 's correc t.
10 Q Now, there are two separate functions, are there 11 not, that are involved here? One is communication to the 12 media and one is rumor control. Those are separate 13 functions, ri.g ht ?
Id A (Witness Keller) Yes.
15 (Witness Kowieski) Yes.
16 Q But, you nonetheless identified just one 17 deficiency rather than two, right?
18 A That is correct.
(Witness Keller) 19 Q And, I believe we already established that in 20 order to -- that in addition to reviewing whatever plan 21 responses LILCO comes up with that there aill have to be an 22 exercise to determine the adequacy of whatever plan fixes l
23 there are; is that right?
24 A (Witness Kowieski) That is our pcsition.
25 O Now, would ycu turn to Page 3 of this table, iB
tp (*o
- 7915 24900404 suewalsh I please?
2 (The witnesses are cceplying.)
3 Now, this relates to one of the ARCAs identified 4 during the exercise relating to maps and displays in the 5 media briefing room. This goes to the adequacy of LILCO's 6 ability to brief the media; is that right?
7 A That 's correc t.
8 Q And, I note on here that the NUREG element 9 ref erenc e is J.10.B. Shou?dn't that be NUREG Element G.4 10 rather than J.10.B?
11 J.10.B doesn ' t relate to the news media, does --
12 A (Witness Keller) But, it does rt ste to maps 13 and population zones and evacuation areas. I think probably I 14 a more pertinent reference would be to the G, or to both.
15 But, I think the more pertinent would be to the G, because 16 we are talking about media relations. J generally talks 17 abou t the EOC; and, generally the ENC and the EOC are not in 18 the same place.
19 0 Right. And, in fact, this was a problem which 20 Ms. Jackson identified in her evaluation of ENC Objective 3, 21 correct?
22 A And, Table 3.4 is clearly labeled Emergency New 23 Center.
24 Q And, with respect to this problem identified in 25 the brie fing of the media capability the "I" in the final l
!dI o.
B 0? l I
24900404 7916 i suevalsh I
column again indicates that there must be an exercise to 2
evaluate whatever plan fix is proposed; is that --
3 A (Witness Kowieski) That's what I said I believe d
two minutes ago.
5 O Well, that was with respect to the deficiency.
6 I wanted to make sure it was also true with respect to this 7
ARCA.
8 A (Witness Keller) It's stated in the third 9
column or in the FEMA evaluation of the LERO response.
10 Q Okay. Would you turn to Page 4 please of Table 11 3.47 12 (The witnesses are complying.)
13 Now, on this one I notice that there is an "NR" l
I- Id in the NUREG element column. What does that mesn?
15 (The witnesses are conferring.)
16 A It's either not reported or not -- I think it's 37 not reported.
18 0 What does that mean, not reported?
19 A The 35 standard FEMA cbjectives and hence our 20 subset which are breakdcwns of those individual ones were. I I
l 21 cross-referenced when attached to the August '83 mero that 22 promulga ted thes e 35 s tandard obj ec tives . Each one of the ,
23 objectives was cross-referenced to at least cne, and l 24 sometimes multiple, planning eierents in NUREG 0654 in most 25 cases.
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1 Q And, in the FEMA report, based upon Mr.
.d'
. 2 Giardina 's observation, FEMA found that objective only 3 partly met, correct?
1' 4 A (Witness Keller) That is correct.
5 Q And, in the RAC review which is FEMA Exhibit 6
Nucber 3- that item is -- give me just a second.
7 (Pause.)
8 A 6, 7 and 8 of --
9 Q Right. And, those items are --
to A Page 6, 7 and 8 of Table 3.1.
Il Q Well, it actually begins on Page 5, docsn't it, 12 Mr. Keller?
13 A That 's correc t, yes.
Id So, it's 5 through 8, and those items, based on Q
15 Mr. Giardina's observation, are still incomplete because 16 they require an exercise; is that right?
17 A I -- yes, that is correct. I think we might 18 save time. We would stipulate chat all corrective actions 19 arising from the exercise are st'ill incomplete, because they 20 require some verification that the correction has been 21 made. No verification has been made. To ay kncwledge, no i
22 verification at this time is planned. All of those are 23 incomplete.
t 24 JUDGE FRYE: So, new they require some 1
25 verification at an --
~
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i 7951 7 f49007073,walsh
' ', 1 WITNES3 KELLER: An exercise.
2 JUDGE FRYE -- exercise?
3 WITNESS KELLER: That's correct.
4 JUDGE FRYE: Is this a full 5 participation / integrated exercise?
i 6 WITNESS KELLER: Based on Mr. Husar's statement.
7 JUDGE FRYE: Okay. You don't really know the 8 answer?
9 WITNESS KELLER: Well, he told me personally l
10 that he feels that it ought to be -- he told me that he I
Il feels it ought to be an integrated exercise; that's correct.
12 JUDGE FRYE: So far as you know at this point, 13 all of the deficiencies and ARCAs that were identified in 14 the February 13 exercise before the remedial actions may be 15 accepted they must be demonstrated at a full participation 16 exercise?
17 WITNESS KELLER: That 's right . The plan changes 18 may or may not be accepted. That 's documented in Exhibit 3.
19 But, everything is incomplete at this point in 20 time to my recollection.
21 JUDGE PARIS: Including the deficiencies?
22 WITNESS KELLER: Yes, sir.
! 23 JUDGE PARIS: I thought there was a 120-day time 24 limit?
25 WITNESS KELLER: For an operating plant, l
l l
l
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02 02 A (Witness Kowieski) The specific time frame that pipons 1 2 FEMA Region 2 has been using? No, we don't have any 3 specific time frame as long as traffic guides or any other 4 emergency workers are in a proper location at a time when 5 they are needed.
6 0 How does FEMA Region 2 determine that time frame 7 when traffic guides are needed?
8 A To respond to your question, first of all, you 9 have to see how a plan is designed.
L i 10 0 I'm talking about the LILCO plan.
11 A Right, and when evacuation starts it's 12 reasonable to expect if the plan calls for it that the 13 traffic guides should be there.
14 0 So it's your uaderstanding and your testimony 15 that the traffic should be at their posts in the field when 16 evacuation starts; is that correct?
17 A If the plan has a statement to this effect, yes, 18 it's an accurate characterization on your part.
19 0 And if the evacuation process starts prior to 20 the time that LILCO would recommend an evacuation order to 21 the public, therefore traffic guides should be in the field 1 22 in place at their traffic control posts; is that correct?
23 A No, I don't understand your question. If you're 24 asking me whether there is an early or volunteer 25 evacuation, is that what you're asking me for to respond to l ACE.FEDuRAL REPORTERS, INC.02-347 3700 Nationwide Coverage 500-3.16-6 4 6 3 _
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,imons 1 complete first shift for purposes of an exercise."
l 2 Would you explain that statement to me?
3 .A (Witness Keller) For example, there are 333 bus 4
routes to be run and we never evaluate 333 bus routes in 5 any one exercise, 6 0 I Let's stick with the road crews.
7 A Okay. If we leave the gas trucks in, right, 8
there are 19 road crew vehicles staffed by 58 people. In 9
any one exercise we would never evaluate 19 road crews.
10 A (Witness Baldwin) I know this isn't a test, but 11 I'm going to clarify something. Mr. Keller just said 333 12 bus routes I believe.
It's 333 bus drivers and there are 13 40 some routes.
14 A (Witness Keller) Sorry.
15 (Laughter.)
16 0 Let me back off. Looking at the sentence that I 17 was referring you to, gentlemen, on page 16, you are just 18 simply saying there that FEMA would not have required LERO 19 to have mobilized all of its road crew personnel?
20 A (Witness Keller) That's correct.
21 0 FEMA did not require LERO to do that, did it?
22 A That's correct.
23 JUDGE PARIS: Is this a matter that would be 24 evaluated at some exercise in the next six years or in a l) 25 six year period?
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4 Y alsh 1 Well, let me ask you, Mr. Keller, from your 2
knowledge of other exercises with respect to the road 3 ;
impediments, simulated road impediments, of other 4
exercises, have you ever seen a response as poor as LERO's 5
response to the two simulated impediments on the day of 6 February 13, 1986?
7 MR. PIRPO: Staff counsel objects to that.
8 JUDGE FRYE: Why?
9 MR. PIRFO: I'm not sure it points out a 10 fundamental flaw in this plan. I mean, we are comparing --
11 JUDGE FRYE Overruled.
12
(>,
WITNESS KELLER: I'm trying to remember. I 13 don't believe we've had in Region II a dediciency 14 previously on impediments to evacuation.
15 BY MR. MILLER: (Continuing) 16 O So, you --
17 A (Witness Keller) Therefore, since deficiency is 18 the worst category that we can evaluate, therefore, aside 19 from some quibbling about your words, this is as bad a 20 grading as we can give. I don't believe we -- this is 21 based on recall of about 10 exercises, I don't believe we 22 have ever given this bad rating previously.
23 So, this would be in that regard the worst one
>{f 24 we have ever given.
I 25 0 i
And, I don't want you to quibble with my words, l ACE. FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
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30 10 8235 h1 Mr. Keller. Your words in the past, under oath, have 4
/vals fI 2 described the response by LERO to the simulated impediments
~
3 as terribly done, just terrible; is that correct?
4 A I recall saying something like that.
5 0 And, you still believe that, I assume, Mr.
6 Keller?
7 A I said that it was -- as far as I'm concerned, 8 and I think I can speak for my colleagues here, the 9 performance in the LERO EOC was not good. It was a 10 deficiency.
11 We do not rate things deficient lightly. It was 12 not a good performance; it was terrible.
13 MR. MILLER: Now, Judge Frye, I think in another 14 five minutes or so we can wrap up this contention and maybe 15 take the lunch break then if we could -- I would like to 16 finish up this traffic issue.
17 BY MR. MILLER: (Continuing) 18 0 Mr. Kowieski, I want to explore a little bit 19 your discussion with Judge Frye and Judge Paris regarding 20 the reason you have injected the free-play message at the 21 f EOC rather than in the field.
22 Is it fair to say, Mr. Kowieski, that prior to 23 the exercise considecation was given by yourself, Rogion 24 II, to injecting the free-play messages regarding the l
l[ 25 impedir.ents at locations other than the EOC?
l l
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- 13 13 I That's the only caveat.
jwalsh 1 Brookhaven people by LILCO.
2 0 Just the Brookhaven caveat, that's it?
3 A Yes. Yeah.
4 0 Now, on Page 73 of your testimony, gentlemen, 5 when I read your testimony it appears to me that insofar as 6 Contention 50 accurately states the facts expressed in the 7 FEMA report, FEMA agrees with Contentions 50.A through 50.H 8 and Contentions 23, 27 and 28; is that correct?
9 A The factual part of the contentions, that is 10 correct. We don't necessarily agree with the conclusions, 11 with the same -- that's all.
12 O Well, would you agree with me, gentlemen, that
, 13 the ex.;ecise for shoreham demonstrated that LERO personnel 14 were unable to carry out effectively or accurately the 15 LILCO plan because of inadequate training?
16 A (Witness Kowieski) Some. Some of the LERO l
17 personnel demonstrated that the training was not really 18 adequate.
19 Q And, with respect to those personnel, Mr.
20 Kowieski, who were unable to carry out effectively or 21 accurately the LILCo plan because of inadequate training, 22 those personnel would be identified in the FEMA report, in 23 your view, and to that extent you would agree with
{j 24 Contentions 50.A through H, Contentions 23, 27 and 28?
25 A That's correct.
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powalsh 1 (Witness Baldwin) We have tried to respond to 2 this in writing where we say it's FEMA's position that the 3 effectiveness of the training program must be enhanced to 4 ensure that the emergency response personnel will be able 5 to carry out their assigned roles within'the framework of
.f 6 the plan.
7 0 Okay. We are going to come to that, Dr.
8 Baldwin.
l 9 Now, the beginning of your answer on Page 73 10 states that most of the exercise inadequacies that were 11 identified and evaluated as either deficiencies or ARCAs q
12 were attributed to breakdowns in the training program.
13 Do you see that statement?
l 4
i 14 A (Witness Keller) Yes.
- 15 (Witness Baldwin) Yes, 16 0 Did you attempt to make or conduct the same kind 17 of analysis with respect to the areas recommended for
! 18 improvement, whether or not those were related to the 19 training program?
4 20 A (Witness Keller) I didn't.
. 21 (Witness Baldwin) No, not specifically.
22 O Mr. Kowieski?
23 A (Witness Kowieski) I did not.
24 0 Okay. Now, when you state that most of the 25 ARCAs and deficiencies were attributable to breakdowns in ACE.FaDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
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e valsh 1 the LILCO training program, could you tell me what you mean 2 by breakdowns in the training program?
3 A (Witness Keller) That training needs to be 4 enhanced. We were not satisfied with the performance of 5 the individuals in some portion of the plan, implementation 6 of the plan.
7 An issue was identified that was either rated as 8 an ARCA or as a deficiency. And, we said this has to be 9 fixed. If it's deficient, under normal circumstances it 10 will be done in a remedial exercise or an expeditious 11 basis. For the ARCAs, it would be in the biennial 12 exercise.
13 And, generally speaking, the recommendation is 14 to improve the training. I think, to the best of my 15 recollection, that -- I tabulated these at one time but it 16 was a long time ago -- the only one that comes to mind 17 offhand that was not a training issue was the copy machine 18 breakdown. That was an equipment issue.
19 I think -- I would hazard a guess that greater 20 than 95 percent of the rest involved training.
21 Q Okay. Now, let me ask you this question, 22 gentlemen, because I think we are all looking for the 23 bottom line in a serise here, when do breakdowns in a R 24 training program lead you to conclude that there is an 25 inadequate training program?
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8297 g) 00 00 ryOimons 1 that no such finding was made by FEMA following the 2 February 13th exercise?
3 A (Witness Kowieski) That's correct.
4 0 It is also true, gentlemen, that FEMA did 5 identify a significant number of training problems and 6 inadequacies following the February 13th exercise?
7 A That's correct as identified in the post-8 exercise assessment.
9 ,0 Therefore, gentlemen, if a finding were to be 10 made by FEMA with respect to the adequacy of the LERO 11 training program, is it not the case that that finding 12 would be that LERO's training program has been, is and 13 remains inadequate?
14 A (Witness Keller) No. 1, I am not aware that 15 FEMA has ever made a finding on a training program as we 16 stated previously. The performance of the training program 17 is evaluated as part of the other objectives. An overall 18 finding which was precluded going into this exercise by the 19 letters between Mr. Speck and the NRC is not the same 20 thing.
21 When you put your question together you said 22 was, is not now, hasn't been, wasn't and isn't. All I can 23 is based on car evaluation of the February 13th oxercise as
, 24 you had stated in your previous question, we observed many 25 areas where the training needs to be improved and was not h
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- 1 g00 00 8298 dsimons 1 completely adequate.
I 2 What it is now, we have no way of knowing. We l 3 have not evaluated that, and I think you had the future in 4 there also I believe.
. l 5 0 What about at the time of the exercise? l 1
6 A At the time of the exerciae, as we have stated 7
several times, there were a number of issues raised by the 8 performance of the individuals participating in the 9 exercise which indicated that the training program needs to 10 be enhanced and it was not completely adequate at that 11 time.
12 A (Witness Baldwin) Could you be a little bit 13 more s'pecific when you say at the time of the exercise.
Is 14 that the day before the exercise or the day of the 15 exercise? It makes a difference to me because in answering 16 it FEMA did not evaluate the effectiveness of that training 17 program before the exercise. It did it at the exercise.
18 Q We understand, Dr. Baldwin.
19 Gentlemen, let's go to Contention 42.
20 A (Witness Kowieski) What page?
21 O It's page 59 of your testimony.
l 22 Q One little follow-up to this last line of l 23 questions, gentlemen. I take it from your answers that t 24 FEMA has not reviewed any post-exercise training materials ;
jg 25 such as drill reports and training logs and other records; I
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a! M mens No.
I A The second part, the offsite, the offsite 2
considerations were properly addressed, yes. The onsite 2
considerations were the responsibility of NRC and not FEMA.
I d O FEMA had some responsibility, didn't it, for i
5 providing for a technically sound exercise upon which an 6
assessment of preparedness capabilities can be based?
7 A Yes, we did, and as far as coordination of NRC, 8
this was accorplished through the NRC RAC merber who was 9
provided with the proposed exercise objectives and he was 10 provided with a copy of the exercise scenario.
Il Q On page 105 of your testimony in fact you state 12 "It is FEMA's position that the above exercise objective 13 required mobilization of LILCO's local emergency response 14 o rgan iza tion, L'ERO, its personnel and resources in 15 sufficient number to verify the capability to respond to an 16 accident scenario."
17 l Now I direct your attention to the second 13 paragraph under the heading "Preparation For an Evaluation I? of Joint Exercises in the MOU," which is where we were jus t 20 talking abou t.
21 The second sentence says "Exercise evaluations 22 will identify one of the following conditions:
22 "1) There is reasonable assurance that the plans 24 are adequate and can be implemented as deconstrated in the 25 exerciser
.. . . v.
1500404 . 8%0 fggsimons
' I I
"2) There are deficiencies that may adversely 2
impact public health and safety that must be corrected by 3
the af fected State and local governments in order to provide d
reasonable assurance that the plan can be ir.plerented; or 5
"3) F EMA is undecided and will provide a 6
schedule of actions leading to a decision."
7 My question is which one of these three 8
conditions did FEMA identify in its post-exercise evaluation for Shoreham?
10 (Witnesses confer.)
II A Well, I believe that part of 2 would be 12 appropriate, the first few lines, I would say two lines, 13 that we identify deficiencies in the exercise.
1 Id Q Which part of No. 2 are you discounting?
15 A To provide reasonable assurance that a plan can 16 be implemented . We did not provide reasonable assurance 17 whether the public health and safety can be protected or 18 whether the plan can be implemented or not.
" O Is it your tes timony that this portion of the 20 MOU which says exercise evaluations will identify one of the l 21 following conditions gives you that latitude to ignore that l i
22 part of No. 2? i 23 A That's right, but I must go back L. Mr. Speck's 2' letter to NRC to Mr. Dircks of October 29. The letter dated l'
25 Oc tober 29th f rom Mr. Speck to Mr. Dircks outlined FEMA's l
l l
l l
1 f iu
}V
\ l 7
500404 8365 n$ipons 1
particular was tasked with getting the job done, and in the process of getting the jcb done we had to deal with sorecne, 3
and in this case it was LILCO. So GM-8 was modified, if ycu 4
will, Lor FEMA to discuss directly with the utilit, on the 5
operational details of how the exercise could be put 6
together, how the evaluation process kould go, what the 7
objectives would be and what the scenario would be.
8 I see a clear distinction in the philosophic
?
decisions of how the exercise was going to be structured on 10 the grand scale and no bottom line that NRC has got to Il decide the value. And if NRC decides it 's valuable to have 12 the exercise, which they ultimately did, we now move into an 13 operational phase, how do we get the job done. And then you
) 14 would easily substitute the utility for the State and 15 locals.
16 Q Mr. Keller, why is it not possible for FEMA to
'7 read this portion, No. 2, of the MOU to be there are 18 deficiencies that may adversely impact public health and 19 safety that must be corrected by the utility in order to 20 provide reasonable assurance tr at the plan can be
! i 21 implemented?
22 A FEMA could do that, but going into the exercise 22 FEMA said there would be no bottom line. That wa s F EMA 's 24 position and to my kncwledge it hasn ' t been chang ed . We 25 have identified deficiencies within the exercise repert, I
~
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g . . , .
)
8366 F50040, i
W r.c nl s which are part of the record, but this is a bottom-line
. i 2
, statement.
3 A (Witness Kowieski) Let me add. Ycu know, I didn't finish the second point you cited, the portion 5
dealing with the public health and safety, but you omitted 6
the last part, that cust be corrected by the affected State 7
and local governments in order to provide reasonable 8
as suranc e . If refers to the State and local governments and not to the utility plans.
10 Well, Mr. Kowieski, GM-8 refers to the 0
development of exercise objectives and scenarios with State 12 and local governments and you ignored that and substituted 13 utilities.
l Id Now why can ' t you include utilities when you 15 talk about corrections of deficiencies shown by the scenario 16 and the objectives?
17 A I call your attention to the fact again that la Roger Kcwieski did not make a decision whether to include or 19 not to include or substitute the State for the utility, or 20 vice versa. The decision was made by Mr. Sam Speck.
Il Q Mr. Kowieski, I think we need to clear scrething I
22 up right now. Are you tes tifying as Ecger Ecwieski er are 23 you testifying on behalf of FEMA?
2d A I'm testifying on behalf cf FEMA.
25 And Mr. Keller and Mr. Baldwin, the sare is t:ue Q
I i .
37901515 8534 suswalsh 1 I exercises.
2 And, I'm glad to ask these witnesses if they 3
have participated in any first evaluated exercises other 4
than --
5 JUDGE FRYE: Why don't ycu do that?
6 BY MS. McCLESKEY: (Continuing) 7 0 Have you?
8 A (Witness Keller) In New York or --
Q Anywhere?
10 A Yes.
II (Witness Baldwin) Yes.
12 Q And , Mr . Kowiesk i .'
f 13 A (Witness Kowieski) Yes.
I id Q Okay. Now, how does LERO's overall 15 effectiveness as evaluated in the post-exercise assessment 16 compare to other first evaluated exercises?
17 MR. LANPHER: I cbject to the question. It's 18 just far too broad to be meaningful.
~
19 JUDGE FRYE Let's get the answer.
20 WITNESS KONIESKI: I would say that LILCO 21 derenstration was an average or better than any other first 22 FEMA evaluated exercises in the State of New York.
23 BY MS. McCLESK EY : (Ccntinuing) 24 0 And, is it f air to say, Mr. Kowieski, that the 25 Shoreham post-exercise asscssne.nt r.otes abcut an average t
1 4 - _ . . . . . . ~ . -
37501515 8535 '
suowalsh
\
I I nurber of training problems when corrpared with other post- ,
2 exercise assessrents? l l
3 A (Witness Kowieski) It would be hard to pass a judgrent without really scing back to other post-exercise !
3
-assesscents. The category of problems that we identify 6
during the Shoreham exercise are similar in nature to those 7
identified at other sites, like issue of training, training 8
of emergency response personnel, the use of KI or dosimetry.
This is, you know, consistently, from exercise 30 to exercise, at every single site this type of problem you Il see over and over again. And, I-haven't seen any -- one 12 single exercise in the State of New Jersey, in the State of 13 New Jersey or New York State that would not reveal this type 3d of problem.
13 The bus drivers, route alert drivers, 'a lot of f
16
! , field personnel wouldn't have sore kind of problem with the 37 knowledge, the use of KI, administration of KI, or 18 i dosimetry. There is always some kind of problems revealed U during the FDtA evaluation.
X JUDGE FRYE: What you are saying essentially 1
21 ' then is that the problen.s revealed in LERO's training i
- 2 program are typical of those that are revealed --
22 WITNESS KOWIESKI: With respect to KI and f desimetry. In. pedi:' ents -- we already tes tif ied , impediments t
24 l .
45 it wasn't a typical one. Generally speaking, counties in
( 37508515 ssuewalsh 1 8536 I
l
( the State of New York handle impedirents to evacuation very 2
well. There are scme prob 1ccs, but we never identified 3
problers of this significance like at the Shoreham exercise.
4 WITNESS KELLFR: In the earlier system of 5
exercise evaluations prior to what we have now, prior to the 6
3 5 s tandard objec tives and the r.icdules , the evaluator was 7
required to place -- when an inadequacy was identified of 8
any magnitude, whatever magnitude, it was either a procedural problem, an equipment problem or a training 10 p roblem.
11 In the earlier exercises, '81 and '82, earlier 12 ones, you saw more procedure problems and you saw more 13 equipment problers, okay. As the exercise cycle has gone
(
14 on, the procedure problems and the equipment problems have 15 all pretty well been resolved, so that the bulk of what's I
16 left are training problems. So, in that regard it 's about 17 the same, i
18 i
We have not done a statistical 86 percent here li and 65 percent there, no. But, it's in general the sare 1
- 0
,1 sort of thing. .
I 21 BY MS. McCLESKEY: (Ccntinuing) 22 0 Q It's true then, isn't it, that wnen FEMA 23 cvaluates an exercise it evaluates the overall perforrance 24 f of tre crganiza tion and not of individuals, right? l 25 A 1
(Witness Saldwin) That's correct. [
l t !
?37501616 jcewalsh 8539 I
Q Dr. Baldwin, you answered a series of questions 2
today ebeut what yeu considered -- from Mr. Zahnleuter, 3
about what you considered in placing the impediment where you did, and how you chose those and that sort of thing.
5
,Did you also consider in putting these 6
iepedirnents in this exercise whether they were within the 7
realm of reasonable possibility, given the traffic 8
conditions on Long Island?
9 MR. LANPHER: I object to the question. Whet 30 does she mean by, 'the realm of reasonable possibility?' ;
11 JUDGE FRYE: Do you understand the question.
12 MR. LANPHER: I object. I don't understand it.
13 JUDGE FRYE: I know you don't, but I want to know ~~
13 WITNESS BALDWIN: Yes, I do.
16 JUDGE FRYE I think we will permit it. ,
D WITNESS BALDWIN: Well, as we said in the i
is prefiled tes timony, they were designed to be rea'listic, and we felt collegially that they represented a realistic 20 t problem involving a blockage of an irpedimen't route.
21 1 JUDGE FRYE: What do ycu eean by. ' realistic?'
22 l WITNESS BALDWIN: That this could really 23 happen. That you could get --
2' JUDGE FRYE In the situation of an evacuation, ,
25 this could happen? ,
I ii t
dh - . - - . -
~{ ,,
37501616 !
jeewalsh 8540 '
I WITNESS BAIDWIN: Right.
j . 2 BY MS . McCLESK EY : (Continuing)
-3 Q Mr. Keller, do you agree with what Dr. Baldwin 4
just said?
5 A (Witness Keller) Yes. I would add we did not 6
do a probabilistic analysis of the likelihood of this 7 1 happening, but I -- it was something that was not 8
impossible, we thought.
JUDGE FRYE Not so improbable as to be 10 unrealistic?
II WITNESS XELLER: Yeah. It was not beyond all 12 credibility when you insert a nessage that -- we could have 13 i
crashed a 747 on that route, and that is possible, too.
i Id .
There are airports around here. There are I 15 planes flying over, but I think that was a little further 16 than we wanted to go to strain realism. !
17 l
WITNESS BALDvCN: These are the kinds of -- and :
is .t I I would say similar to the types of impediment messages we !
19 have used in the past.
20 WITNESS KOWIESKI: At other sites. '
21 BY MS. McCLESKEY: (Continuing) !
22 Q Is it fair to say that your main concern was .
23 getting an impediment tFat blocked the read so that ycu 24
}
could see a response of rerou ting?
I 25 A (Witness Baldwin) Yes. I i
i l !
l !
L-
- g600:02 '
8569 3cewalsh i i: were not at their posts when evacuatien was in progress.
I
.I Trat's what we are re fe rrinc to. !
2' O Ar.d , se tbe statetent, "ycu will be directed,"
l l
4, is misleading hecaus.- cere tecple ricFt not have rcen all t i
5, tre troffic ctides cut; is taat your position? :
i i
e! A Taat's correct.
i
- l 0 You didn't find that senteace misleading when s you reviewed the plan and the EBS messages, did you?
9 A No, we did not, to (Witness Keller) We didn't knew at that time in 11 the paper review cf the plan when the traf fic guides would 12 be on station vis-a-vis when an evacuation nessage would be 13 aired. That's why you have exercises.
L I
14 (Witness Kowieski) We anticipated when we i3 reviewed the plan that the traffic guides would be to dispatched and would be present at their posts when u evacuation will start, when evacuation will be in progress.
is It happened that sone of the traf fic guides d:d' n net arrive at their pests in tirely canner.
t
- i O Kculd ycu Icek at Cententicn 44, please? Ir.ry
,i
- . set cf the ccntentiens, it's en Page SS If that gives ycu a I
! ball park.
- I
- 3 l! (The witnesses are 1 coking at decurents.)
' h
- 4 Ncw, ycu will prehably recollect that ycu 1
1
- tes tified previcusly that leaving aside tPo scrds "the l I 1
l l
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8645
,e ggos0g l y I palsh l dI ;l assurance finding on the basis of those three deficiencies I ,
,! if you had nade any finding? !
3 MR. CU:! MING: Objection to this lire of 5
questioning. The FEMA ef ficial position has been stated by 3
Mr. Kowieski. Is he asking a personal cpinion?
7 MR. LANPHER: Excuse me. The FEMA position is j in their testimony.
JUDGE FRYE: Yeah, it is. And, I think it's 6 ,
legitimate question.
10 Overruled.
11 WITNESS KOWIESKI: Would you be kind enough to 12 restate your question again?
13 BY MR. LANPHER: (Continuing)
O Mr. Kowieski, I --
let's go back a second. I 15 understand from your previous testimony that FEMA's initial 16 caveat abou t not making a finding was it's concern about how 17 to judge an exercise where there was no state and local 18 gcVernment participation, correc t?
19 A (Witness Ecwieski) That's correct.
- ^ i i O But, after the Shoreham exercise ycu found I
deficiencies that vere entirely independent cf trat caveat, ccrrect?
- 3 I ,
l A That's also correct. ,
- 4 l Q And, given that fact that ycu found ttcse ,
25 l deficiencies, isn't it true that there was no reason that l
l lh l
t I
i
e 8646 q
l
- # Ngges ich i FEMA cculd nct have issucc a negative finding on the basis
- i I j of this exercise?
3I l A There is -- there was a reason. There was an 4I i
- agreeter.
- r e ac hed b e tt c e n U7.C ar.d F E::A .
5i i
O But, that had r.cthing to de with the merits of
,1 the exercise review, did it?
A Tha t 's correc t.
O That was a policy decision having nothing to do with the exercise?
A Nothing to do with the results of the exercise, that's correct.
12 O Okay. And, the results of the exercise, the 3,
three independent deficiencies, wculd have required a no reasonable assurance finding under the MOU in any other exercise?
g A By definitien of deficiency, that's correct.
g C In any other exercise, it would have led to a no reasonable assurance finding, correct?
g t
..L (The witresses are ccnferring.)
.. q
,,l A (Mitness Kowieski) If -- again, big "if." If UF.C would request interin firding cn the status of plans and ?
i
.l p repa redr.e s t , most likely FEMA wculd have te ccnclude that FEMA cannct give a reascr.ahle assurance that public realth l
and safety can be p ctected; that's correct.
JUDGE FEYE: Mr. Kowieski, let me put this --
l l
l l
l 6650 6C06C6 1 halsh 2 WITNESS KELLEF : That's correct. We just scnt
- I . through this after Mr. Kewieski was relieved cf his FAC i
i d Chair anship du ties.
5l Bu t, Guidanc e Menorandum EV-2 --
I'm scr:y, EX-6 1, excuse re. Guidance Merorandun EX-1, which I'm not su:e 7 is an exhibit or not --
8 MR. LANPHER: It's an exhibit.
9 WITNESS KELLER: Okay. And, I don't reverb er 10 which exhibit it is, but on Page 4 of EX-1 there is a 11 section which is titled "Action on Inadequately Perforced 12 Reredial Exercises." Okay. And, you only get into recedial 13 exercises if you have a deficiency.
(
I 14 JUDGE FRYE: Okay.
15 WITNESS KELLER: There are two ac tions 16 basically. One, if there isn't a formal 350 -- nas not been 17 approved, okay, you haven't gone through a 350 process which 18 is the FEMA finding that reasoneble assurance can Le 19 assured; that's the f orral proc ess , the public hearing, the
- _ whcie thing, if ycu dcn't have that, ycu do not have the 350 1
21 i' in place, FE"A cay, in ccrs,1tatien with NEC, require
- another reredial exercise and UEC ray consjde: e r. f o r c er e r.:
22 acticns, which is exactly what Mr. Yc..ieski just said.
2d 4 And, that was the cace at Ind ian Fcint last
!i
!' Eurrer. Ckay.
If a 350 process has been finalized and the site
l -
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- has been certified by FC:A, ycu initiate '(ps to withdrau I
t the 350. And, those are tne too cpticna fer operating 4i; plants.
5, We have no --
JUDGE FRYE But, the point of it, if I 6
7 understand you correc tly, is that if you have deficiencies, is 8 you know, that have been derenstrated, whether the plant
' cperating -- if the plant is cperating, a process is going 10 to be started to correct the deficier.eies or take 11 enforcerent action?
12 WITNESS KELLER: That's correct.
JUDGE FRYE:
If the plant is not operating, FEMA 13 I 14 would not take steps that would permit it to operate under 15 those circumstances, would it?
WIT!ESS KELLER:
FEMA makes its position, its 16 17 opinion, known to the NRC.
JUDGE FRYE: That's right.
13 WITNESS KELLEE:
The NEC is the cnly entity I 17 ;
p'. int to cperate or deny the --
which can either allow tPe I understand that. Eut, if FEMA i
21 JUDGE FEYE: i 1 there are deficienciec, FEMA
- ii has ccnducted an exercise and c
isn't going to say to tiEC, yes, there is reascnable f
- , l
' Id ,
assurance that the health and safety of the public can be i
- 5 J y
- c. t ec t e d , is it?
' WIT!ESS KELLER:
That's a true statorent in my 1
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F#v31sh 2 opinion.
3 BY MR. LANPHER: (Ccntinuing)
O And, in fact, given the deficiencies the cnly 3
finding that could have been rade was that there are deficiencies that may adversely impact the public health and safety that cust be corrected, right?
8 A (Witness Keller) If a finding were to be made, that is the only finding that could be made; that's correct.
'O Q And, that's a negative finding, isn't it?
11 A Yes.
12 JUDGE FRYE: We will take a five minute break.
'3
( (Short recess.)
BY MR. LANPHER: (Continuing)
'8 Q Gentlenen, you testified yesterday that on only one occasion had you actually evaluated an EBS radio 17 station's performance during an exercise.
15 Do you recall that testimony?
19 A (Witness Kowieski) Yes, I do.
0 0 And, I believe ycu identified that as the August 21 lith, 1982 Fitzpatrick exercise? Maybe it wasn't clear on i yesterday's transcript which it was, e.nd that's what I want
- 3 to clsrify.
' l (The witnesscs are ccnfe: ring.)
MR. PI RF C: Cculd we have a transcript cite, Mr.
4 Lanpher?
A L
l p13 13 8917 evalsh 1 you, and I think that LILCO might owe you, some of f ers of 2 proof. And, I'm wondering --
3 -
JUDGE FRYE: Well, I don't know that we need to
, 4 have --
t 5 JUDGE PARIS: LILCO Exhibit what?
6 MS. McCLESKEY: 22.
7 JUDGE PARIS: Thank you.
8 JUDGE FRYE So, who would like to go first with 9 regard to definitions?
10 MR. LANPHER: I'm not of f ering to go first. I 11 don't think wo should be doing it. I told you that 12 yesterday.
13 JUDGE FRYE We will take LILCO first.
14 MS. McCLESKEY: Fine.
15 JUDGE FRYE And, all we really want is your 16 definition. We don't -- you don't need to argue it at this 17 point.
t .
18 MS. McCLESKEY: Right. A fundamental flaw is a 19 pervasive, systemic, conceptual flaw in a plan that has been 20 revealed by an exercise which, if not fixed, prevents the 21 issuance of a license because it affects the public health 22 and safety.
23 It is not readily correctable by equipment er 24 training but requires far-reaching changes to the plan 25 because it is a fundamental def ect in the way an emergency i
ACE. FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC,
_ . _ _A M M M _ _____ _ _____ @ tion $_C@ygcgo .M
a y l-8918 g 13 .
i gish I plan is conceived.
.( Now, the term is not a regulatory requirement 2
3 and it's not defined in judicial decisions. It's used 4 rather as a pleading threshold. And, the legal etymology of 5 it, if you will, comes from the NRC's use of it in the Union 6 of Concerned Scientists case. They use the term "fundamental flaw" to explain to the D.C. Circuit what the NRC uses an exercise for.
9 They said they use it to identify fundamental 10 flaws. The D.C Circuit picked the term up and used it in 11 dicta in its o;r s' in ih the Union of Ccacerned Scientists 12 case. The Shearen-Harris Board picked it up and used it as I 13 a pleading requirement for the contentions filed in that 14 proceeding and applied it to all of the contentions, denied 15 all but two of them and disposed of the other two on summary 16 disposition.
17 And, then the Commission picked it up in this t 18 proceeding in CLI 86-11 in ordering these hearings to go 19 forward on the Shoreham exercise. And that, if you will, is 20 the legal etymology.
21 ,
Now, there are five definitional observations 22 that I would like to make. First, thi.5 Board, of course, 23 can order changes to the plan as a result of this litigation 24 without finding any fundamental flaw.
25 Second, a licensee always gets an opportunity to i ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC, 1 ! n.m rm s.none, cos er.n samm
13 8919 g3 1
palch I correct a fundamental flaw. That's the meaning of due
! 2 process in the context of this sort of hearing.
3 Third, a finding of fundamental flaw does not 4 necessarily require a remedial exercise.
5 Fourth, the deficiency definition by FEMA is not 6 necessarily a fundamental flaw.
7 And, fifth, the use of the term shouldn't divert 8 us from the NRC regulation's mandate which is, of course, 9 reasonable assurance.
10 That's our definition.
11 JUDGE FRYE: Thank you. Does Suffolk County 12 have a definition?
i 13' MR. LANPHER: Judge, I took to heart what you 14 said yesterday, that you wanted something very brief. Mine 15 is very brief. ,
16 JUDGE FRYE: That 's right. That's fine.
17 MR. LANPHER: And, our conception is that 18 fundamental flaws are exercise results events -- fundamental 19 flaws in the context of an exercise proceeding, I should 20 say, are exercise results, events or omissions and/or 21 omissions which singularly or with other results, events or 22 omissions preclude a finding of reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken on the 23 24 basis of the LERO plan.
25 Thus, they reflect problems in the plan and/or ACE FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
202 347 3700 Nationwide Coverage 200 336-66 4 3
i 8920
, 13 13 e wsish 1 its implementation which would preclude'a reasonable i I 2 assurance finding.
3 JUDGE FRYE: Does New York have a definition?
4 MR. ZAHNLEUTER: The State concurs with that 5 definition so that the governments have one definition.
I 6 JUDGE FRYE: All right.
7 MR. PIRFO: Judge Frye, we really didn't 8 understand all of Mr. Lanpher's definition. If he could j 9 just read it again slowly for us on the record so we might 10 pick it up.
11 MR. LANPHER: In the context of an exercise 12 proceeding, fundamental flaws are exercise results, events, 13 and/or omissions which singularly or with other resulta, 1 14 events or omissions preclude a finding of reasonable 15 assurance tha.t adequate protective measures can and will be 16 taken on the basis of the LERO plan.
17 Thus, they reflect problems in the plan and/or 18 its implementation which preclude a reasonable assurance 19 finding. ,
20 MR. PIRFO: Thank you.
21 JUDGE FRYE: Does the Staff want to offer a
' 22 definition?
23 MR. JOHNSON: The Staff's definition is the 24 Commission's definition as found in CLI 86-11 and cited in l l 1 25 the Shearon-Harris case, as counsel for LILCO has stated.
/\CEJFEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
- l. > > _
g 13 13 3921 pe welsh 1 JUDGE PARIS: I can't hear you.
2 MR. JOHNSON: A fundamental flaw means a .
3 deficiency which precludes a finding of reasonable assurance 4 that protective measures can and will be taken.
5 JUDGE FRYE: Does FEMA have any views on this?
I 6 I'm not requiring --
7 MR. COMMING: FEMA has no views on this for the 8 record.
9 JUDGE FRYE: Okay. Thank you. Now, we need to 10 talk about schedules for findings. Who wants to lead off?
( 11 Ms. McCleskey?
l l
12 MS. McCLESKEY: I will be glad to. Judge Frye, l l .
13 LILCO proposes the following findings schedule. Noe, when I 14 made the dates up I was assuming the record was going to 15 close tomorrow and I've counted all of my days from then.
16 And, I think for simplicity I will just leave it that way 17 for now.
18 That in 30 days from tomorrow that the Applicant 19 file proposed findings. That would be on Monday, July 20 20 which is actually 31 days because 30 days is a Sunday. That 21 in 40 days from tomorrow, the Intervenors file their l
22 proposed findings which would put them at Thursday, July 23 30. That in 50' days, the NRC Staff file which would put t 24 them at Monday, August 10 which also is 11 days from the l
25 Intervenors' filing because 10 days puts us on a Sunday.
l i
l /\CE. FEDERAL REPORTERS, INC.
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'0630-031-tN-015 TO:
From
Subject:
Drill geport 12I. LEA 1 is. 11fLG IQI Ljl2Q Faelities - m g g g Riverhead Stagina h Martial)
Baekeroundr 1986 to exercisa portions of A drill was held on June 6, the LERO. Those portions that were exercised on this date werestaff, EOC, the EUC and the Riverhead Staging Area !!anagement cdministrative other support staff, dosimetry staff and the traffic guides. All groups within the LERO were si2ulated. Shift 2 was the team that participated.
Emergency Preparedness Drill Scenario 8A Rev. 0 (attachment
- 1) was used. This scenario was essentially the sane as was ussd 1933 uith the during the FE:1A graded exercise on February 13, following major e=ceptions:
o The length of the drill was shortened from 12 to 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br />; o The start time was changed from 5:30 AM to 8:00 AH; o The length of time between the events for the Unusual Event and the Alert was shortened; o The LERO staff was prestaged at their respective facilities rather than being called out.
o Proposed Revision 7 to the LERO plan and procedures were tested; in particular the assignment of traffic guides for the 2 - mile evacuation, and the neu position of Traffic Engineer.
the FE!!A evaluation of -tbe February 13 As a result of exercise the following specific additional objectives and tests were added to the scenarios o Two impediments to evacuation were simulated to test response the communications within LERO and LERO's to the impediment; namely rerouting of traffic and public notification of the impediment; o The performance of traffic guides dispatched out of the Riverhead Staging Area was specifically lockad att namely all traffic guides stationed for remainder, a 2 - mile vere evacuation and the majority of the verified to be on station; within o Use of the Traffic Engineer as a new position the LEno was exercised; 225 BRCAD MOU.0W ROAD e MLW1U.L NCW YORK 11747 *(Sl6) 420 3200 L765720
. . , s Demonstrate cdequets repecduction cababilities (E"C) o throughout the duration of tho exerciso.
Scenario Obiectivan t Attached Maior observer / Controller cot unenta r Seargency Onorations Cantar (Ecc)
- 1. Set-up of the f acility was adequate. The Eoc was declared activated 49 minutes after the participants were told to report.
notification for early dismissal of It took 43 the schocis
- 2. The efficiently.
within the EP3 was not done message following the minutes to issue an ESS was not declaration of the Alert. Eventhough the EOC activated, the Director and the Public Information
- declared Coordinator could have expedited this process.
- 3. A simulator was used to simulate the presence of Suffolk County. He was not to assume command and control of'the EOC, might be but rather to offer any assistance to LORO which asked for, and which might bo available from the County. The Director simulator proved to be a slight distraction to the of Local Response. EOC management personnelnot must be cognizant lose sight of of outside parties in the EOC but should assumed their prime responsibility unless that function is by that outaide party.
! 4. The preparation of ESS messages took too long. The Public Information Coordinator was which getting involved in minute details of the message i.e.,
parsons were consulted of the messages to by the Diractor. This caused several miss the 15 minute deadline.
- 5. The E3s message for the General Emergency took 25 minutes the decision to initiets protective issue following was due to the reasons stated above.
to actions. This and the Public Personnel, particularly the Director Information Coordinator, must be aware of the 15 minute time limit with regards to the issuance of EDS message's.
to
- 6. It took between 10 to 15 minutes to getPersonnel the word out the in the Staging Areas about the evacuation.
responsible for passing this word out are relying too ,
EOC forms and the EOC much on the use of written message phones on the Communicator. The use of the commercial I_765721 t.------
a mocns individuale deWas should 60 cmphasized as of communicating to tho Staging Arcas and then follouod up with the written messago.
scraps of
- 7. Written messages were frequently written on for=,
j paper and then transcribedtook onto the standard message place. Uhen the supply of Often, no transcription messages were not l
massage forms was depleted in the EOC, written down at all.
- 8. Updating of the status boards in the EOC was not very I times entries were 30 to 45 minutes behind the a
timely. At l catual events.
Public Information staff did inform the EUC theyof the
- 9. The However did l presence of the Suffolk County simulator. had relieved as
! not inform them that Director.
l
- 10. There was a coussunications problem between the dose casessment staffs in the EOC and EOF. The problem was one of i
I a lack of cooperation between the two organizations. This j
is an area to be emphasized during future training sessions.
c
- 11. The EOC staff must talk to the TSC when the EOF is not staffed. Delays were encountered in the 20C becausetha the 20?
ECC was not ready to assume contnand and control while staff was EOC was. (This was due to the way that the easier, prestaged). In order to make contact with the TSCshould ba l l tolephone numbers of key individuals inTelephone the TSC numbers of j placed in the LEF.O phone directory.
the control Room would also be helpful. The L::20 staff must that contact should only be with the facility l be reminded which has co::ssand :-A control.
dose 12 . . In order to assist the done assessment staff inService the telephone nu:aber for Usather projections, Corporation should be included in the L:30 phone boo;c.
the J
- 13. No comparison between the DOE field team data and SUPS field taas data was observed to be made by the R3C.
- 14. There is a diff erence between the R2CS f orms used by the This caused l
on site organization and the one in the OPIP's. III a lot of confusion especially in transmittal of the Part the data.- This will be corrected in a future revision to l
Plan and procedures. l l
- 15. The nuclear Engineer did a good job of assessing plant l conditions and conveying to the Director the various . ;
possibilities of core f ailure and release paths.
l.765722 l
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- 15. Tho special Pacilities Evacuatio that the one-hour delay in the startn Coordinatorof the evacuation thought process from the time the word is conveyad to the public applies to all LEno assisted evacuation processes. He wantad ,
to wait the one hour order to to evacuate the mobility impaired following evacuate. All persons should be reminded through training buses leaving that the one-hour delay only applies to the the transfer points for general puslic cvacuation.
- 17. The special Facilities Evacuation Coordinator delayed in proceeding with the deaf notification process until he had a copy of the EB3 message for the evacuation. The only reason he needed the EBS message vas for the zones to be evacuated.
This information was readily available from other sources, namely the status board which w desk. This delay was unnessary as directly in front of his
- 18. The ambulance group did a fine job in dispatching of the drivers. ambulances and in briefing the simulated a=bulance simulatsd 19.
was her The first bus coordinator time in thisdid a very good job considering position. it
- 20. The Traffic Control Coordinator delayed in getting traffic guides out after the word to evacuate was given. It scok approximately 40 minutes to transmit the message to the Staging Area from the time the General Emergency condition was known in the EOC.
NOTTi This is a special objective item.
- 21. The handling of the first impediment to evacuation ( the gravel truck) was generally done in a well organized and expeditious manner. The second road impediment (the fuel truck) was confused and the response was delayed. Specific comments on these two impediments are listed below:
Mo??t_ These are special objective items, o
The Transportation Support Coordinator should have done a better job of keeping control and managing his group during was the road i= pediment scenarios. Mo one individual assigned to be in charge of handling these tmpediments. Because practically all groups in the ICC need to be made that one individual aware of such a problem it is important be responsible for coordinating this effort. '
o The RSC was not made aware evacuation of the impodiment to until 2:15 PM; I hour and 30 minutes after kb 1/765723
t tha event had occurred.
=33 message telling of the road impediment ,vas o The evant issued at 1:29 P3; almost 45 minutes after the had occurred. In addition this important piece of sssage ,
information was includad with tha general public. A ndira T :
and might hava bean missal by the special ESS message should have been issued.
o The message for the second road impediment was called into the Zoc and was properly logged on a message form, however when the information was relayed to the field, the wrong road was mentioned; Route 25-A vs. Route 25.
simulating a The word came back f rem the controller, e
l there was no impediment at the route spotter, that a
that I location indicated. At that time it was assumed had been
- the impediment was either a false alarm or It was not
> cleared, and no follow up action was taken. the players until the controller in the BOC prompted that any three times to review the original message l
action was taken.
for
- 22. The position of the Traffic Engineer was utilised the first time. Their exact responsibilities was not very too involved in clear in their own minds. They became traffic engineering details, i.e. extent ofrather the crown than quickly on the road and its effect on traffic flow, advising the Evacuation group of alternate evacuation roures and their effect on evacuation time estimatos. .
EE
- 1. The dedicated telaphone line between the Eoc and talephona 2MC was lackup commercial not available for the drill. Repairs to the dodicated lines were used satisfactorily.
line have subsequently baan made.
- 2. Of the two copier machines in the Enc, one failed during the drill. The repair technician was called tuice and shoved this problem, press up two hours later. As a result of The total releases were not distributed in a timelyveri manner. 1429 and 501 copies made by the two machines tha respectively. The Emergency Prepraredness Group is in <
process of obtaining new reproduction equipment.
M0?Ti This is a special objective item. ,
seneina h:ssg i i
Rivarhead gave 4 clear and
- 1. The lead traffic guide in ,
thorough briefing to the traffic guides. ,
l l
765724 l
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..- ,- - .-. __.____.__,.-_.___,________m.___
______m. _ . . _ _ _ _ _ , , _ _ _ , , _ _ _ _ . _ _ , _ , . - _ _ , . - . _ , . _ . _ , . ,
- 2. The Traffic Guides woro dispatched approuimately 13 minutes aftor the massage to do so was transmitted from the ECC. This is an adequate ti=e f rame.
- 3. The Patchogue communicator in the EOC did not transmit the message to dispatch buses until pro =pted by the controller in Patchogues 1-1/2 hours after the massage was given to .kim by the bus coordinator.
- 4. When iasuing revised or amended evacuation instructions to the Staging Areas, entirely new forms should be filled out and transmitted. The Patchogue Staging Area received a modified form for bus dispatching and this created a lot of confusion in the staging area.
- 5. of those Traffic Guides questioned, all were very familiar with their traffic guide duties. Several however were still not clear on the procedure regarding reaching certain exposares, i.e. 3.5 Rem and 5 Rom. This will continue to be stressad in future training sessions.
l summarvt This is the first LERO drill held since the F ebruary 13 exercise and the first drill with Shift 2 since the Fall. Many of the participants were new to LERO and unfamiliar with their procedures and job functions. Several new concepts were also exercise 3 for the first time, overall response by the participants can be classified as poor, however due to the nature l
of the drill and the participants, this was not totally unexpected.
During the post drill critique, emphasis was placed upon rapid and accurate communications flow within the EOC and to outside facilities, i.e. Staging Areas, EMC and the general public. This is especially tree during an evacuation when the evacuation process is impeded and a radioactive release is imminent or in progress.
This is the first time since the exercise that a traffic the impediment was simulated during a drill. The response to two impediments was generally good for the first one and somewhat poorer for the second one. The response by the public information group in getting the information out to the general public was not as rapid as it should have been. Information flow to other groups within the EOC, i.e. the Radiological group was almost non-existent.
LERIO vill continue to emphasize the response 'to traffic impediments in all futura drills and training sessions.
l r e
_765725 i
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- l O
L%PELL coeca^noN October 31, 1986 0630-031-NY-017 To:
PROM:
SUBJECT:
Drill Reoort iqg, Seotember 1.0, Sectember 12, and October h 12a.5.f.QI LIEQ Backcround As part of the quarterly Emergency Preparedness drill l program, drills were held on September 10, September 17 and October 1, 1986 to test the response of the Local Emergency R3sponse Organization's (LERO) to a simulated emergency at the Shoreham Nuclear Power Station (SNPS) . The purpose of the drills was to exercise LERO's ability to implement the Offsite Radiological Emergency Response Plan Implementing Procedures (OPIP's) and to train new personnel to improve their ability to rcspond to an emergency, make appropriate recommendations to the public and implement those recommendations. All sections of LERO pcrticipated in the drills with the exception of the Emergency N3ws Center on September 17, LERO Relucation Center and Family Tracking on September 10. The facilities which did participate included the Local Emergency Operations Center (EOC), the Emergency Worker Decontamination Facility (EWDF), Patchogue Staging Area (PSA), Port Jefferson Staging Area (PJSA) and Riverhead Staging Area (RSA) . Due to the revisions being made in the plan, the Relocation Center was not tested at all. Only 1/3 of the field personnel were exercised during each of the three drills. All field workers performed their normal emergency duties with the exception of the bus drivers who were involved in a special training session to familiarize them with all bus yards cnd tran'sfer points.-
Emergency Preparedness Drill Scenario 7A Revision 0 (objectives attached) was used for all three drills. Shift 3 participated on September 10 and 17, and Shift 2 participated on October 1. Shift 3 had not drilled as a team since late in 1985, cnd Shift 2 was last drilled in June 1986. The purpose of drilling Shift 3 on two consecutive weeks was to allow the
- participants to use the first week as a learning process, and to cllow the new members of the organization to become familiar with their new positions; and the second week would be conducted as a more normal "hands off" drill.
All LERO members were pre-staged, i.e. told to report to their work locations at preassigned time, rather than exercise the normal notification and call out procedures. To vary the scenario seen by Shift 3 personnel the EOC staff was told to roport at 9:30 AM on September 17, rather than 8:00 AM. In 225 BROAD HOLLOW ROAD
- MELVILLL NEW YORK 11747 *(516) 420 32x 765726
h .[ ' . ,
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cddition the type and location of the traffic impediments were chenged for the September 17 drill. Response Revision 7 to the Of f site Radiological Emergency and Plcn and Procedures was in effect at the Specific time of the drills objectives to all persons were tested to that revision.
dcmonstrate the response to this revision were as follows:
o Demonstrate the ability to assess the effect of road develop and impediments upon evacuation traffic and may implement timely response actions. These actions associated include rerouting and the broadcast of an EBS' message, as necessary, l Demonstrate the ability to pre-assign Traffic Guides to t o an to Traffic Control Posts within the two mile EPZ I
dispatch ~the Traffic Guides in an exp2ditious manner at the appropriate time.
o continue the bus driver training to ensure bus drivers are familiar with all bus yards and transfer points.
o Reinforce the concepts of dosimetry and KI.
l Scenario Obiectives t f Attached .
1 comments generated by the l Bolow is a summary of the major observer /Conrollers during the series of drills.
Sectember 124 1111 Emeroency oeerations center of
- 1. The EOC was staffed and activated within This 45 minutes very the time the players were told to report. is a good response. All personnel were actively helping to set up the facility.
- 2. The Coordinator of Public Information was participating in his first drill, as were many of the people on his staff.
As such the controller assigned to that area was forced to through their procedures. The walk the players EBS messages for the traffic impediments were slow in being generated. The wording was ambiguous and not concise.
One EBS message out of approximately 7 was broadcast 3.
without the sounding of the sirens. Better coordination is between the Director of Local Response and the l needed Coordinator of Public Information.
I 4. Several communications problems occurred during the day l but were attended to and were repaired; the TSO in the public information area, the dedicated line between the EOC and PJSA and the radios ot PSA and PJSA. The staff was able ,
i IMP,EJL@ ,
! 765727
i, 8 )
to make use of the backup systems available.
- 5. The Radiation Health Coordinator (RSC) ordered the ingestion of KI prior to performing the calculations necessary for the technical justification. This omission was pointed out at the post drill critique.
- 6. Security was not observed to perform accountability checks of the EOC and a sweep of the facility to check for improper or non-existant identifications. What security did do was have each person sign out as they left the facility and sign back in as they returned, however this procedure was not strictly adhered to.
- 7. The dose assessment staff,in the EOC had difficulties in obtaining data from the dose assessment staff in the EOF.
Only one (1) Part II RECS message was recieved during the drill. In addition, the lines of communication for technical data was almost non-existant. This matter was brought to the attention of the Emergency Preparedness group and will be an item for furthur discussion and training.
- 8. Response to the traffic impediments was generally good.
The Traffic Engineer was instrumental in developing rerouting schemes and there was good lines of communication smong all groups in the EOC relative to the problems.
S. There was approximately a 1/2 hour delay at the Road Crew Comunicator's desk in getting the message transmitted to respond to one of the road impediments. It was stressed during the critique the importance of transmitting messages in a timely manner.
- 10. The use of message forms needs to be improved. It was observed that many people are using scraps of paper to transmit messages and therefore the appropriate copies are not being distributed, or that messages are being written on scraps of paper and then being incorrectly transcribed on the message forms.
Emercency Worker Decontamination Facility
- 1. The normal Brentwood Security was not prepared for the arrival of the emergency workers from the field and the workers were given different directions upon their arrival at Brentwood. In addition, the direction given the workers at the staging areas, was not correct and the workers did not report to the correct gate. The Emergency Preparedness group is aware of the problems and has ensured that Brentwood will be aware of the arrival of the emergency l
workers in future drills, and has revised the maps from the bb 765728
q: )
staging areas to the to the EWDF.
- 2. The personnel reporting to establish the EUDF were not familiar with their jobs, and took no action until prompted )
by the controller.
- 3. The personnel were unfamiliar with the location of the storage rooms for EWDF equipment. The equipment checklist was not used per the procedure. The correct setup of the facility was demonstrated by the controller,
- 4. No check sources were available testing the survey instruments; several of the instruments had more than one calibration sticker with conflicting 'informatiott; one instrument's cable and detector failed due to a short; two instruments went into continuous alarm; one instrument was completely dead. All equipment problems and shortages were brought to the attention of the Emergency Preparedness group and have been corrected.
Patchoaue Stacina Ar.gg
- 1. Due to the lack of experience of the participants, the set up of the facility was slow and undirected. No priority was given to the activation activities. The establishment of security and issuing of badges was also slow. These issues were discussed during the post drill critique.
- 2. Briefings conducted by staging area management were not very frequent. This led to a lack of information regarding the emergency withing the staging area. The need to periodice.11y conduct staff meeting and the need to keep the emergency workers informed of the status of the emergency was emphasized at the critique.
- 3. Due to the problem mentioned earlier concerning commt.tications, personnel dispatched into the field were provided telephone numbers during the briefings. This showed good foresight on the part of the Lead Traffic Guide.
- 4. The dispatch of the Traffic Guides from the Staging Area was done in an efficient and timely manner. The Traffic Guides necessary for the two mile evacuation were preassigned and were issued their equipment. Upon the order to evacuate, they were dispatched and the average time to arrive at their posts was approximately 30 minutes.
- 5. In all cases the Traffic Guides who were questioned were knowledgeable in their individual tasks relative to traffic guidance, however of the 9 Traffic Guides questioned most of them were not aware of the maximum allowable dose, and the lh1PR:@l 765729
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proper procedures governing the use of KI. This will continue to be stressed in all future training.
The performance of the eme,rgency field workers relative
- 6. satisfactory. They to the traffic impedim~ent was communicated the situation properly to the Staging Area and responded well to the direction of the Staging Area.
M Jefferson Stacino M Due to a turbine maintenance outage at. Port Jefferson, 1.
As a the turbine floor was not available for the drill.
accomodate result temporary arrangements had to be made to the large number of participants. A tent was erected outside compounded the the Staging Area. This additional problem lack of experience of the drill team and as a result This the controllers provided direction to the participants.
situation e'xisted during the September 17 and October 1
drills.
- 2. The Traffic Guides for the two-mile evacuation were preassigned and were standing by prior to the evacuation Once the message to evacuate was recieved from the order.
EOC, they were dispatched within minutes.
- 3. The response to the traffic impediment at Traffic Control from Post 645 was very slow. There were repeated requests the Traffic Guide as to the status of the road crew. The Road Crew never did arrive.
Riverhead Stacine h
- 1. Similar to the other Stgaing Areas, thefacility. personnel at The Riverhead were slow to activate the controllers had to prompt and train the personnel during the drill as to their duties.
- 2. Several P.A. announcements were made during the day, however no staff briefings were conducted by the Staging Area Coordinator. It was pointed out during the critique that it is important to keep key coordinators apprised of emergency conditions on a regular basis.
- 3. The packets for the deaf notifications were missing from Riverhead and as a result this portion of the drill was not able to be demonstrated. This was pointed out to the
' Emergency Preparedness group and has been corrected.
because
- 4. The dispatch of the Route Spotters was delayed the message from the Eoc took 20 minutes to go from the Administrative Support Staff to the Lead Traffic Guide. The IN1PR @
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importance of prompt handling of messages was stressed at the post drill critique.
- 5. The Road crews which were dispatched from Riverhead arrived at their locations in a timely manner. They had a
. good general knowledge of road-clearing procedures, and maintained good communications with the EOC and other road crews.
- 6. Two Road Crews questioned were not aware of the proper procedures regarding the use of dosimetry and maximum exposure allowances. They were also not properly informed to take their KI tablets.
Sectember & lagft, -
Emeroency Ooerations Center
- 1. The participants were prestaged so that notifiation was not demonstrated. The setup and activation of the facility from the time the participants were told to arrive was approximately 1 hour1.157407e-5 days <br />2.777778e-4 hours <br />1.653439e-6 weeks <br />3.805e-7 months <br />. The activation of the facility was orderly and well coordinated.
! 2. The Command and Control of the Eoc was handled well by the Director and the !!anager.
- 3. The Coordinator of Public Information did a very good job in working with the Director in issuing E3S messages. The CPI anticipated well and there was no delay in issuing the messages.
- 4. The EBS message which was issued for the traffic impediment gave too specific information relative to the new . traffic directions and rerouting. The messages should have been more general and should only have instructed the evacuees to follow the directions of the Traffic Guides.
This was pointed out at the post drill critique.
- 5. The Radiation Health Coordinator did an excellent job in performing dose projections and assisting the Director in making the proper action recommendations. The posting of the DOE /RAP protective team field data was a little slow and tnis was pointed out to the RBC.
- 6. The overall response to the traffic impediment was good.
Improvement could be made in generating the rerouting information and arriving at new evacuation time estimates.
- 7. Information flow from the Staging Area to the EOC needs improvement. At times messages were left on the 765731 t
i
I communicators desk for 10 to 15 minutes before it was transmitted to the proper individual in the Eoc. In addition the flow from the EOC to the Staging Area could also be improved. The message indicating that an Alert had been declated was sent at 1038. The announcement was made at 1014.
- 8. At times when the key coordinators were at staff meetings, their phones would go unanswered. It was pointed )
out at the critique that all phones should be monitored and answered if the person is not at his desk. l l
- 9. The Special Facilities group performed well in carrying out their duties. All procedures were followed.
Emercency Worker Decontamination Facility l
- 1. The set up of the EWDF was done in an efficient manner and quickly. The Decon. Leaders took charge of the personnel arriving and began assigning tasks. The status of the emergency was known to the staff by periodic briefings.
- 2. Several pieces of equipment had conflicting calibration stickers on them. This was pointed out to the Emergency Preparedness group for resolution.
- 3. There were several pieces of faulty equipment which were not recognized by the participants and were used to monitor the emergency workers. The equipment problem waa pointed out the Emergency Preparedness group and the error in not checking the equipment properly vas pointed out to- the participants at the post drill critJ.que.
Entchocue stacine Agga
- 1. In general, command and control of the facility was very good. The Staging Area Coordinator made good use of the personnel available to him.
- 2. The documentation of messages in the Staging Area was not done on the standard message form. Many messages were being written on blank pieces of paper and then later transcribed on the message form. This caused delays in delivering the message to the appropriate party and caused transcription errors and erroneous information being transmitted. The proper use of the approved message forms was reiterated at the post drill critique.
- 3. The preassigning of Traffic Guides for the two mile evacuation was done in a timely manner.
IMPR:()
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- 4. The Traffic Guides which were observed demonstrated adequate knowledge in their duties and responsibilities and also were knowledgeable in proper radiation and exposure control.
M Jefferson Stacinc Arga
- 1. The set-up and activation of the facility went very smoothly and was better organized that the drill on September 10 with the same crew.
2'. The command and control of the facility by the Staging Area Coordinator was very good. He utilized the P.A. system effectively for general announcements and conducted briefings with his key coordinators as the need arose.
- 3. The preassignment of the Traffic Guides for a two mile evacuacien was done promptly. The Lead Traffic Guides parformed properly and knew their procedures well.
- 4. Response to the traffic impediments by the field workers was very good. The information flow to the staging area was timely and accurate. The Road Crew arrived within 17 minutes of the request for help from the scene of the accident at Oakland Ave. and Rte. 25A.
Riverhead Stacina Area
- 1. The setup and activation of the facility proceeded smoothly and was accomplished in a timely manner.
- 2. The conduct of operations within the Staging Area were much improved over the previous week. Briefings were better conducted and were more complete. Communications between staging area personnal were improved.
- 3. The distribution of dosimetry was observed to be not well controlled. Emergency workers were arriving at the briefings near the completion of the session and were not afforded the benefit of a complete briefing. A better coordinated dosimetry briefing and issuing session was pointed out at the post drill critique.
- 4. The response by the Road Crew to the traffic impediment ,'
was timely. He arrived within 10 minutes of being requested.
There was a problem however in the area of communications; several of the vehicles which are used for the road crew l simulation do not have cigarette lighter receptacles for the
- radio power supply. This however is only of a concern during I a drill when actual road crew vehicles are not used.
l lh\PRQ 765733
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- 5. The Traffic Guides which were observed performed satisfactorily. Each arrived at his location in a timely manner and were knowledgable in their procedures. They periodically updated the EOC of traffic conditions. The ,
redirection of traffic following the traffic impediment was handled well. The Traffic Guides were cbserved to periodically check their dosimetry per the procedure. I
- 6. The performance of the Route Spotter was very aood. He ,
was familiar with his procedures and was in contact with the l EOC. His response to the simulated accident was prompt. He l was observed to check his dosimetry periodically and was knowledgeable as to as to maximum exposure. allowances.
October h 19.3,5, -
Emercency Doerations Center
- 1. The participants.were prostaged. The facility was fully staffed and set-up within 45 minutes of the time the participants were told to report.
- 1. Only 2 general staff meetings were held by the Manager of Local Response.'Several more general announcements were made to the EOC floor. It was pointed out at the critique that the information flow to the staff either through staff meetings or general status meetings could be improved.
- 3. The distribution of RECS messages to the ECC staff was very slow. This was due to the number of copies being dist ributed. It was pointed out at the critique that' the distribution should be reduced to expedite that process.
- 4. The broadcast of the ESS messages was well coordinated with the sounding of the sirens and all messages were aired within 15 minutes of the decision to do so.
- 5. The handling of the traffic impediments in the EOC was done very well. All persons concerned exhibited a high level of concern and urgency. There was good coordination among all groups. The Traffic Engineer however, had to be prompted to develop revised evacuation time estimates based upon the rerouted traffic. The information flow into the public information office could have been improved so that they would have information immediately available to them to generate the EBS messages. These shortcomings were pointed out during the post drill critique.
- 6. The information flow between the EOF and the EOC in the dose assessment area was very good. Both organizations were comparing data and field team deployment was well kb 765734
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coordinated.
- 7. The information flow from the EOC to the Staging Area was slow and as a result the field personnel were working with information and data that was up to 30 minutes old. The rapid and accurate transmission of information to the field was emphasized during the critique.
- 8. The generation of EBS Messages, Press Releases and Summary Sheets by the Public Information Staff in the EOC was very good. However the information flow from the EOC to the ENC was poor. Due to a malfunction of the TSO, and no alternate means of transmitting information to the ENC explored, the LERO Spokesperson in the ENC was not in "sync" with the SNPS Spokesperson during press briefings and press conferences. It was pointed out during the critique that it it is i'm perative that both organizations represented at the News Center have the same information in the same time frame.
Emercency Worker Decontamination Pacility l
- 1. There were several pieces of equipment which were used i during the drill which were not functioning properly or were l
used improperly; bad or dead batteries, broken connectors, t
wrong probe, open vs. closed window etc. The proper use and checking of the equipment was stressed , at the critique.
Equipment deficiencies were reported to the Emergency
. Preparedness group for resolution.
- 2. The status of the emergency was not regularly announced to the EWDF staff. The importance of timely information flow was pointed out during the critique.
- 3. The controller conducted several contamination scenarios which were presented to the participants for their resolution. In one instance the contamination was not found
- due to poor monitoring techniques, in another the monitoring personnel cross-contaminated the area by improper controls.
These discrepancies were pointed out to the personnel during the critique.
Patchocue Stacino M gA
- 1. Bri~efings given by the coordinators to the Staging Area personnel were few in number and not specific enough.
l Dosimetry information was not repeated during the briefings to the field workers. During the critique it was pointed out that the staff must be kept up to date with respect to the l status of the emergency and this is done by frequent and l
timely briefings. It was also pointed out that dosimetry kb:
765735 I
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and exposure control procedures and criteria should be repeated as often as possible.
- 2. The Lead Traffic Guides needed guidance to perform their function and implement their procedures. This was due to the fact that they were relatively new to the position.
- 3. The message concerning the failed sirens was transmitted to the Staging Area by the EOC at 9:48 A.M. It was not until 10:25 A.M. that the Route Alert Drivers were dispatched. At drill critique it was stressed that message the post handling must be expedited especially when the Bispatch of field personnel is involved.
- 4. The issuir.g of dosimetry and the dosimetry briefings got off to a slow start. However as the drill progressed, the dosimetry briefings improved as the personnel gained experience.
- 5. Information for transmittal was frequently given to the communicator verbally instead of written. The use of written i messages and the procedure governing the handling of messages was discussed at the post drill critique.
- 6. Of the 5 Traffic Guides questioned, all were unclear as to the maximum allowable doses.
- 7. The Route Spotter questioned in the field was knowledgeable in his job function and was knowledgeable in
! dosimetry and exposure control.
- 8. The Route Alert Drivers questioned were knowledgeable in their job function and were knowledgeable in dosimetry and exposure control.
M Jefferson Staaina h
- 1. Many personnel at the facility were new to LERO and were part'cipating in their first drill. As such the more experienced personnel had to perform many of the tasks which otherwise could have oeen delegated. This detracted from the success of the drill. ,
- 2. inte message'to dispatch the preassigned traffic guides arrived in the Staging Area at 1245. This was approximately 13 minutes after the information relative to the evacuation protective action recommendation was known to the evacuation group in the EOC. This time could be reduced. The traffic guides were dispatched from the Staging Area slower than previously due to confusion arrising when three seperate dispatch messages arrived in the Staging Area within a few IMPlQ@
765736
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minutes of each other. There was also confusion relative to the , procedure for one-way traffic flow.
- 3. The briefing of the players and the issuing of dosimetry by the Dosimetry Record Keepers was good. The briefings were clear and concise. The DRK's displayed a good knowledge of their procedures.
- 4. Several prompts were issued by the Communications Controller to the 3taging Area Coordinator to issue updates to the. EOC relative to f acility status and to request status reports from the EOC. During the post drill critique it was stressed that the information flow is a "two-way street" and that the lines of communication must continually be open.
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Riverhead Stacinc & Igg the
- 1. Similar to the situation at Port Jefferson many of walked players were new to their position and had to be by through their jobs either by more experienced people or the controllers.
I
- 2. The message to dispatch the bus drivers following the to recommodation by the EOC to do so was veryP.M. late getting this the Staging Area. It was not until 1:30 that information was available in the staging Area and onlyAnother af ter the Bus Dispatcher requested it from the EOC.
message recieved in the Staging Area at 1:40 P.M. indicated that a release had occured at 12:35 P.M. The bus drivers were dispatched into the plume without prior knowledge. At the critique it was pointed out that this type of delay in message transmission and working with information which is very old can have negative results as was demonstrated in this case.
l
- 3. The dispatch of the Traffic Guides for the 2 mile evacuation was done promptly following the instructions to do so by the EOC.
Summary ,
The concept of conducting drills on consecutive weeks with Staging the same team proved to be beneficial especially cope in the with the Areas.- Shift 3 personnel were better able to cmergency on September 17 than they were on Septembar 10. Shift j 2 on October 1, did not perform as well overall primarily due to the fact that they had not drilled since June. special objectives l The assessment of the response to the as itemized in the "Background" section of this report is follows: i i
1 IMPAM 765737
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o The ability of the EOC staff to recognize and to develop a plan to counteract impediments to traffic were generally good. Communications within the EOC relative to the impediment and the cooperation of the various groups involved were good'. The use of the Traffic Engineer proved to be very valuable in developing reccmmendations for alternate evacuation routes, however more emphasis should be placed on rapidly generating new evacuation time estimates, '
even if they are first order approximations, so thatemphasis a more informed decision can be made. In addition more needs be placed on the roll of the Public Information group.
EBS messages need to be streamlined concerning the impediment information and what the general public need know. The flow of information into the Public Information Office needs to be improved so that the messages can be generated in more expeditious manner.
The response of the Staging Area to traffic impediments was also generally good. The flow of information within the Staging Area and between the Staging Area and the field needs to be improved. There is considerable delay caused by the handling of messages. The response of the field forces to the impediment was good. Generally, most'of the field
. personnel were knowledgeable in their procedures and would have been able to handle the situation in the field without too much difficulty.
o The procedure to pre-assign Traffic Guides for the tuo mile evacuation was demonstrated very well. The staff at the Staging Areas knew the procedures and were able to car ry them out. The dispatch of the Traffic Guides to the field was once the order to do so was recieved from the EOC good. Some improvement could be attained in the generally area of establishing one-way traffic flow per the procedures. Once dispatched, the Traffic Guides were able toa their positions and establish the post in locate reasonable amount of time.
The continuation of the bus driver training did o
occur during this drill series. The results of that training is included in a seperate report.
o The concepts of dosimetry and KI were reinforced by the controllers and the players during the briefings held by the Dosimetry Record Keepers. However, when questioned in the field by controllers, responses still showed a lack of understanding by some of the players. Continued education in this area is needed.
One of the major areas of concern during this drill series continues to be the communications between the EOC and the Stcging Areas. Long delays in getting information to the Staging
! N 765738
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Areas were experienced throughout the drills. Much more emphasis nceds be placed on communications, both in accuracy and timeliness. Delays in the response by the staging Areas can be traced back to delays in transmitting information or instructions by the EOC. The information flow from the ECC to the ENC also proved to be major deficiency noted in one particular drill. It appears that the common denominator in communications delays is the EOC, and emphasis must be placed in training that f acility.
The information available to the staff at a particular fccility, i.e. the EOC of the Staging Area is a function of how wall, how of ten and how accurate the staff briefings are. One of the major reasons for a lack of available accurate information was the lack of proper staff briefings. During future training sossions this area o'f communication will be stressed.
Another area of communications that has been a problem in the past, and is still a problem with certain shifts, is the communications link between the EOC and the EOF in the area of
, dose assessment. The exchange of information from the EOF to the
! EOC needs to be improved. This will continue to be examined in
! future drills where the EOF and the EOC are both participating.
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lh\PffQ 765739
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March 4, 1987 i
D.M. Crocker Drill Report for December 2 and December 10, 1985 for LERO Backaround
~
As part of the quarterly Emergency Preparedness drill program, drills were conducted on December 2 and December 10, 1986 to practice the '
response of the Local Emergency Response Organizstion (LERO) to a ,
simulated emergency at the Shoreham Nuclear Power Station (SNPS). The l purpose of the drills was to exercise LERO's ability to implement the Offsite Radiological Emergency Response Plan Implementing Procedures (OPIP's) to. improve their ability to respond to an emergency, make appropriate recommendations to the public and implement those recommendations. All sections of LERO participated in the drills with
, the exception of the LERO Relocation Center and the Evacuee Reception Centers. The facilities which did participate 1.)cluded the Local Emergency Operations Center (EOC), the Emergency Worker Decontamination i Facility (ENDF), Patchogue Staging Area (PSA), Port Jefferson Staging j
. area (PJSA), Riverhead Staging Area (RSA), Family Tracking and the Emergency News Center (ENC).- Only 1/2 of the field personnel were exercised during each of the two drills. All field workers perforneo -
their normal emergency duties with the exception of a few bus drivers who were involved in a make-up session to familiariza them with bus yards and '
transfer points.
Emergency Preparedness Driil Scenario 8A Revistor. I was used for the December 2 drill and Scenario 7A Revision 1 for *.he December 10 drill.
Shift 1 participated in both drills. They were last drilled in the February 13, 1986 exercise. The purpose of drilling Shift 1 on two ;
i consecutive weeks was to allow the participants to use the first week as .
, a learning process to become familiar with the latest procedures and the !
second week to reinforce their knowledge gained during the first drill.
All LERO members were pre-staged, i.e. told to rep' ort to their work l locations at preassigned time, rather than exerciss the normal
- notification and call-out procedures. This prov;ded the opportunity to brief LERO personnel on procedure changes and reinforce earlier training on OPIP revisions.
Revision 8 to the Offsite Radiological Emergency Response Plan and Procedures was in effect at thw time of the drills. All persons were l drilled to that revision. l 1
l l
i 1
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.- Scenario Obiectives The following is a summary of how well LERO performed the scenario )
objectives. The LERO objectives were the same for both scenarios and are ~~ I listed in Attachment 1.
EOC Obiective 1 December 2 &
December 10: Initial and follow-up communications were accurately and timely received. RECS messages from the TSC and EOF were telecopied to tha EOC to prevent any misinformation. l This objective was met for both drills.
EOC Obiective 2 December 2: LERO EOC members were told to report at 0800. The EOC was fully staffed and operational at 0845. However, the facility was not declared activated until 0910 because l
the TSC/ EOF staff were not pre-staged and were thus, not available. The Manager informed the Lead Controller of l
this and it was deemed acceptable to him.
December 10: LERO EOC members were told to report at 0800 with the EOC being declared activated at 0848.
EOC activation for both drills was adequate. This objective was met.
During the February 13th exercise, LERO EOC members began arriving at 0707 with the EOC being declared activated at 0810.
EOC Obiective 3 ,
December 2: Rosters could not be found by the Lead Communicator.
The Equipment Controller for the EOC claims the rosters i were on the cart but must have been misplaced during
! set-up. This objective was not met. The critique emphasized the importance of these rosters.
! December 10: Rosters were available to the Lead Communicator ~snd he verified the ability to maintain 24 hour2.777778e-4 days <br />0.00667 hours <br />3.968254e-5 weeks <br />9.132e-6 months <br /> staffing. This fulfilled the objective.
E0C Obiective 4 December 2 &
December 10: No shortage of space, equipment or supplies was observed during these drills. This objective was met.
4 EOC Obiective 5 -
December 2 &
December 10: As stated in the objective, the RECS communicationsbetween the state and county were simulated. In addition, communications with FEMA, EBS station, local schools, hospitals and ambulance companies were simulated. For December 10, communications with the radiological monitoring teams were also simulated (this was not practiced on December 2). All other communications were practiced and found satisfactory. On December 2, the EOC had minor difficulty receiving data from the EOF via the dedicated line due to background noise by personnel in the room.
However, this did not hinder any response to the scenario and did not recur during the December 10 drill. This objective was adequately met.
l EOC Obiective 6 December 2: Security was unable to locate their box of procedures l
for 20 minutes during the drill due to it being misplaced during set-up. However, Security was familiar i enough with the procedures to do.without them. They also obtained pertinent procedures from the Hanager and
. Director. Therefore, their inability to locate their l own procedures for 10 minutes did not hinder their parformance.
1 Finally, Security did not maintain a log-in/ log-out policy during the course of the drill. Th's should be
- done per procedure to maintain accountabilLty in the EOC.
The need to maintain accountability with the log-in/ log-out procedure was stressed in the Critique and a form will be provided to Security in a later '
revision of the OPIPs to assist them in this matter.
This objective was partially met.
December 10: No problems were observed during the drill. This objective was met.
EOC Obiective 7 December 2: Six staff meetings were held during the course of the drill which is adequate. All messages were properly logged by the Laad Communicator; however, some persons (approximately 201, estimated by the EOC Lead Controller) wrote messages on a scrap sheet of paper rather than
! standard LERO message forms. Status boards were observed to be kept up-to-date and communications were observed to be transmitted accurately. Proper use of message forms was discussed in the critique.
l
Status updates from the EOC contained conflicting .
L' information. For example, at 1215 an EOC message was sent to the Riverhead Staging Area instructing field personnel to don their protective clothing and injest KI. At 1307, a status update was sent to Riverh6ad indicating no change in status with no recommendation to don protective clothing or injest KI. This problem was addressed and corrected for the December 10 drill.
l This objective was partially met.
! December 10: Five staff meetings were held during the course of the l drill which is fewer than December 2 but is still ,
adequate. Two general status updates were made by the i Lead Coordinators. All messages were properly logged by the Lead Cosununicator.
The information contained in the communications relative i to the brush fire on the Long Island Expressway changed as the message was transmitted through the LERO Organization. The message stated that a brush fire was causing a complete blockage of the east and westbound I lanes of the Long Island Expressway and also tne north and southbound lanes of Patchogue-Mt. Stani Road.
(Refer to LERO Message Nos. 14 and 14A). The Lead l Controller at the EOC decided to initiate the message at the ENC rather than at the EOC as the message dictates.
In the transmittal of the information from LERO ENC personnel to the EOC, the information on which roads were blocked was left out. This information was given
. to the Traffic Group at 0934. The Traffic Group attempted to determine which roads were blocked by-seeking information from the Patchogue Staging Area.
The Public Information Group was prompted by the Public Information Controller to re-contact the ENC for the
- road blockages. This complete information was given to the Traffic Group at 0942. However, the Traffic Group continued its efforts to verify the road blockages.
Ultimately, at 1025, through information provided by the
- Patchogue Staging Area (Patchogue Traffic Controller
! simulating a Route Spotter per the scenario) the
! information was that only the westbound lanes of the Long Island Expressway were blocked. However, the EOC
- began investigating re-routing, if necessary, and the fire's affects on the evac.uation time estimates at 1008.
The imoortance of obtaining all information was discussed with the Public Information staff. In addition, the necessity of verifying reliable information (i.e. radio broadcast) was discussed at the critique.
l l
In an announcement to the E0C, the phrase "10-mile
', keyhole" was used to describe the area to pre-stage buses which led to some confusion by the Transpcrtation r
( Group. However, this did not slow their response since i
these players are well verseo in determining zones based on wind direction. Still, the exact zone letters should ,
be used and was mentioned in the critique.
The Emergency Planning Group developed a new method to improve the speed and accuracy in which status updates are transmitted to the Staging Areas. This new method was tested by LERO members in this drill. Instead of ;
4 being given to the Evacuation Support Communicators for transmission to the Staging Areas, the Lead Communicator, with help from.the Administrative Support Staff, talephoned status updates directly. In addition, the Manager reviewed and approved all messages prior to their transmittal to ensure accuracy. This process worked well. This change will be reflected in a later revision to the procedures. :
This objective was partially met.
EOC Obiective 8 i December 2: The Director of Local Response was in control throughout the drill and decisions were handled in a proper and expeditious manner. This objective was met. .
December 10: The Director of Local Response was in control throughout the drill; however, the PAR decision took from 1220 to 1250. The Director was trying to obtain information from the EOF relative to the declaration of the Genefal i Emergency and the rationale for their protective action recommendations. The EOF recommended evacuation of zones A-J at 1225. The RHC and the Nuclear Engineer tried to obtain data from the EOF to make their 1 independent assessment of the potential for containment !
failure. Since the persons in the EOF were in a meeting at the time, the RHC and the Nuclear Engineer were content to wait. At 1250, the Lead Controller prompted l the Director to call for an evacuation of the affs:ted ,
zones so as not to irpact the remainder of the l scenario. This objective was not adequately fulfilled.
In the critique, the RHC and the Nuclear Engineer were '
informed that they weren't forceful enough in trying to obtain the data and they should have informed the t Director so that he might try to obtain the information
, from another source.
l
EOC Obiective 9 December 2: The Alert was declared at 0842. The Director decided to recommend early school dismissal at 0908. Sirens were activated at 0913 and an EBS message with early dismissal of schools was sent at 0914. The Public and Private School Coordinators obtained a copy of the EBS message and contacted simulated schools.
December 10: The Alert was declared at 0808. The Director decided on an early dismissal of schools and sent an EBS message at 0828. Sirens were activated at 0834 and EBS message with early dismissal of schools sent at 0833-0836. The Public and Private School Coordinators obtained a copy of the EBS Message and contacted simulatad schools.
Response at both drills' was adequate; this objective was met.
i EOC Obiective 10 December 2: EBS Message 1 - Alert declared at 0842.
Director decides on PARS at 0908.
Sirens sounded at 0913 (simulated).
. EBS aired at 0914 (sic:ulated).
E35 Message 2 - Site Area Emergency declared at 1010.
Director decides ^n PARS at 1027.
Sirens sounded at 1030 (simulated).
EBS aired at 1031 (simulated).
The section referring to placing animals on stored feed was deleted *and a follow-up message had to be issued.
This item was discussed at the December 9 critique with the Lead Controllers and the problem did not recur at the Dece'absr 10 drill.
EBS Message 3 - General Emer'gency declared at 1137..
Director decides on PARS at 1149.
Sirens sounded at 1154 (simulated).
EBS aired at 1155 (simulated).
EBS Message 4 - This is a Traffic Impediment message and doesn't fall into the 15 minute criteria. Refer to EOC Objective 11 for further information.
EBS Message 5 - This is a Traffic Impediment message and doesn't fall into the 15 minute
. criteria. Refer to EOC Objective 11 for further information.
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December 10: EBS Message 1 - Alert declared a't 0808.
?
Director decides on PARS at 0828.
Sirens sounded-at 0834 (simulated). 1 EBS aired at 0833-0836 (simulatei). l EBS Message 2 - Site Area Emergency declared.at 0953. !
Director decides on PARS at approx. 0955.
Sirens Sounded at 1002 (simulated).
EBS aired at 1003-1006 (simulated).
EBS Message 3 - General Emergency declared at 1202.
Director decides on PARS at 1205.
Sirens sounded at 1219 (simulated).
EBS aired at 1218 (simulated). ,
EBS Message 4 - Director decides on PARS at 1248. !
Siren sounded at 1255 (simulated).
- EBS aired at 1257-1302 (simulated).
EBS Message 5 - This is a Traffic Impediment message and doesn't fall into the 15 minute criteria. Refer to EOC Objective 11 for further information. '
EBS Message 6 - Director decides on PARS at 1355.
Sirens sounded at 1407 (simulated).
EBS aired at 1408-1415 (simulated). -
i EBS Message 7 - This is a Traffic Impediment message and doesn't fall into the 15 minute criteria. Refer to EOC Objective 11 for further information.
All EBS Messages with protective actions met the objectives for both drills.
l EOC Obiective 11 December 2: The Traffic Group expeditiously handled two evacuation free play impediment messages that were introduced per the scenario in the field. Specifically, the first i impediment, a gravel truck and three passenger cars was introduced at 1315 from a Road Crew on location. The message was recorded accurately and completely by the :
Evacuation Support Communicator and by 1320 the t Evacuation Coordinator and the rest of the Traffic Group were informed of the impediment. Immediately the Traffic Engineer started evaluating the problem under direction of the Evacuation Coordinator and additional .
Road Crews were dispatched to the scene. By 1328 the !
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, Manager, Coordinator of Public Information and Transportation Support Coordinator were informed. At 1334 the Road Crew informed the EOC that removal of.the i
impediment would take more than two hours. Previously at 1328, the Traffic Group followed procedures and had obtained approvals on the proposed re-routing and had contacted TCP 10 by radio (as per procedures). A total of 13 minutes elapsed from notification of the impediment and the impler.antation of re-routing. The !
t Director decided to issue EBS Message No. 4 with traffic '
l impediment information at 1330 and the EBS message was broadcast at 1341 (simulated). The sirens were sounded l
at 1340 (simulated). By 1337 the Manager briefed the -
EOC on the impediment and stated that an EBS message was being broadcast to alert motorists of the situation. By 1349 an approved bus re-routing scheme was developed by l the Traffic Engineer and the Transportation Support Coordinator. The Evacuation Support Communicator transmitted this information at 1402. Special r Population Coordinators, whose functions may have been impeded by the accident, were informed at 1358. This exhibited very good control and coordination by the Evacuation Coordinator and all other functional groups.
At 1404 Route Spotter 1005 called in a fuel truck impediment. The Evacuation Support Communicator quickly and accurately transcribed the message and gave it to the Traffic Centrol Coordinator immediately. By 1410 the entire Traffic Group was informed. By 1412 the Traffic Engineer started working on re-routing because the Evacuation Coordinator realized it would be -
difficult to remove a leaking fuel truck. After following all procedures, at 1425 re-routing information was given to the Lead Traffic Guides at the Staging Areas. A total of 21 minutes elapsed from the impediment notification to transmission of re-routing instructions. The Traffic Control Point Coordinator was infored by the Traffic Controller that response may !
have been faster if the Traffic Control Points were radioed from the EOC with re-routing instructions as was done in the first impediment. . Also, at 1425 the Mt.
Siant Fire Department was called (simulated) and was asked to respond as was the owner of the fuel truck.
Bus re-routing was completed by'the Traffic Engineer by 1450 and was transmitted to the Bus Dispatcher by 1455.
EBS Message No. 5 describing re-routing was approved by the Director at 1418, broadcast (simulated) at 1437 and sirens were sounded (simulated) at 1436.
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,- Response to the road impediments was organized and efficient due to good communication between and within .
the Traffic Group and other groups and upper EOC l management. This objective was met for both impediments. ;
i The EBS Messages for these Traffic Impediments contained -
specific re-routing information. Contents of EBS :
- Message issued for Traffic Impediments was discussed in !
the December 9 critique with the Lead Controllers. The l
- Emergency Preparedners Group is in the process of
- developing general guidelines of what should be included in these messages. There are no Federal requirements.
In the December 10 drill, the EBS Messages for Traffic 4
Impediments were improved over those for previous drills.
December 10: Four impediments were introduced per the scenario. The first impediment, a brush fire, was designed to test
- only the EOC's response to an impediment that blocked a major artery (LIE) and might possibly affect the evacuation time estimates.. No field workers were dispatched and the fire was extinguished before the ;
evacuation per the scenario. The second impediment was removable and its intent was to pre-occupy the EOC while
,' an evacuation was in progress and when the third and fourth immovable impediment were introduced. The third i and fourth impediments were designed to test LERO's re-routing abilities.
Brush Fire fmeediment - LIE & CR 83 i
The.EOC was informed of the fire by the ENC at 0930.
The Public Affairs group gave the message to the' Traffic Group and the Evacuation Coordinator was informed as of '
0942. By 0954 the Evacuation Coordinator instructed the ,
t Evacuation Route Coordinator to get a Route Spotter out to check out the fire. The Traffic Engineer started
' working on potential re-routing, should it be
, necessary. At 0955 the Site Area Emergency was i declared. The Route Spotter responded as of 1025 (Controller via radio at Patchogue, no personnel j actually were dispatched to the fire per the scenario).
, The Traffic Engineer discussed the impact on the -
l evacuation time estimates (roughly double) with the I Radiation Health Coordinator and discussions took place on the possible effect on PARS. After questioned by the .
Traffic Controller, they indicated that this may sway a '
PAR toward sheltering if conditions degraded further.
The objective of this impediment was adequately fulfilled by EOC members. Further details on problems ,
with connunications on the brush fire are included in EOC Objective 7.
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Qgdt, Truck Imoediment
--This was introduced at the ENC at 1200. An EOC Public Information staff member gave the message to the Evacuation Coordinator at 1223. This delay was because the ENC Controller had transmitted the message incorrectly indicating the EOC was already aware of the incident. The Public Information Controller corrected the response. At 1226 a Route Spotter was dispatched to report on the accident.. Note that this was prior to an evacuation order. Previously the Traffic Control Coordinator and the Evacuation Route Coordinator had decided to dispatch the Evacuation Route Spotters because some were already at the Staging Areas. This was done without consulting with the Evacuation Coordinator. By 1249 the Route Spotter reported the extent of the accident (T - 23 min.). By 1252 the Evacuation Coordinator wanted a tow truck sent to the scene even though there was not an evacuation yet. By 1353 this Road Crew reported to the scene (T = 61 min.
(Note that evacuation order came at 1254). By 1400 the duck truck had been cleared. The reasons for the delay was discussed with the Traffic Group at the drill critique.
Cement Mixer Immediment This was introduced at the desk of the Evacuation Support Communicator at 1303. By.1314 the Evacuation Coordinator ordered the Road Logistics Coordinator to send out two Road Crews while the Traffic Engineer developed alternatives. Re-routing was presented at 1317 and was approved. At 1327 the Traffic Control Coordinator relayed modifications to the Riverhead Lead Traffic Guides because the Traffic Control Points were not 7et manned. The appropriate Traffic Control Points -
wer6 contacted by the Staging Area at 1331. Very good response by the Traffic Engineer (T = 14 min.). Bus re-routing was developed in 13 minutes (1330). The total time for the entire response was 28 minutes. This time was very good. EBS Message No. 5 with this traffic information was approved at 1330 and was broadcast between 1334-1339 (simulated). Sirens were sounded at 1333 (simulated).
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Cessnoel Truck Imendiment This was introduced at 1400 to an Evacuation Support
. Communicator. Information was correctly disseminated and by 1412 the Traffic Engineer developed a re-routing scheme (T - 12 min., very good response). After approval was made, the Traffic Control Point Coordinator transmitted re-routing information directly to Traffic .
Control Points 63 and 64 via radio at 1417. Total response time was T = 17 min. (good response. time). Bus l operations were not affected by this impediment. EBS Message No. 7 with this traffic information was approved at 1432 and broadcast at 1437 (simulated). Sirens were sounded at 1436 (simulated).
This objective was partially met with the exception of
- the Duck Truck accident. As stated previously, the !
reasons for the delayed response was discussed at the i drill critique.
EOC General Comments December 2: The procedure for the periodic estimation of total ;
population exposure was not demonstrated. However, the i procedure allows for tiais estimation to be completed after the initial crisis is over' and, due to the compact nature of the scenario, time would not permit this to occur.
For the pre-staging of buses, the Manager and Evacuation l'
Coordinator wanted to wait until all of the required Bus ,
Drivers were at the Staging Areas. In fact by '
procedure, the order to pre-stage should be issued !
regardless of the number of drivers available and the !
. Staging Area should assume the responsibility for 4
dispatching the Bus Drivers at the proper time. This was discussed at a critique held on December 9,1986 t
with the Lead Coordinators.
! At the ENDF, two of the twelve RM-14s (#5253 and #5230) j used during the drill were nearly discharged at the start of the drill. The Decontamination Leader directed j the monitoring personnel to check battery levels .every l 15 minutes and change any that were below the acceptable level in anticipation of this problem. This was 1
excellent guidance on the part of the Decontamination l Leader. This equipment maintenance problem was brought to the attention of the Emergency Preparedness Group and l has been resolved. .
The Record Keepers at the ENDF were confused on the correct serial numbers to use for the TLD's. LERIO is i in the process of highlighting the serial numbers to l avoid this confusion in the future. :
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l December 10: Again, estimation of total population exposure was not performed; however, it was considered. The procedure was not demonstrated because the drill was terminated prior to its. implementation. The practice of this procedure will be emphasized.in future drills.
At the ENDF, a field worker simulated to be contaminated walked approximately 20 feet in a clean area before l being stopped by an EHOF person. This was discussed at '
the drill critique.
One problem was encountered with Family Tracking which concerned the EOC at Brentwood. The people receiving the calls in Brentwood were'not returning the confirmations of delivery of the message to Family Tracking, they were returning them to the original caller instead. Procedures call for them to call back to Family Tracking when the message has been delivered to the LERO worker. Family Tracking would then call the original caller to confirm that the LERO worker had been reached. This item will be stressed at future training sessions and drills.
The Special Facilities group and the Ambulance Coordinator did a very good job in performing their duties. The Home Coordinator however did not get a l listing of the Reception Hospitals prior to calling the '
homebound when the evacuation of additional zones P and S were called for. This was discussed at the critique and will be stressed in future training sessions and f drills.
l A message was received from the ' field that an individual had received 4 Rem and was requesting authorization for additional exposure. The location of this individual wn outside the radioactive plume and his reported exposure was never questioned. In addition the Director authorized exposure up to 10 Rem and the RHC was not consulted. This is a direct violation of the procedure and was discussed at the critique.
The RHC assumed that no release was in progress at 1245, yet the Assistant RHC had information which was obtained 10 minutes earlier that field readings indicated 25-30 mr/hr near the site boundary. This was due to contradictory data being given to the Assistant RHC by the Lead Controller. The data supplied by the Controller was lower then the data supplied by the EOF.
This was a problem with the scenario and not a problem with the players.
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Stacina Areas Obiective 1
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December 2 &
December 10: Port Jefferson. Patchocue and Riverhead Emergency notifications were received in a timely manner. This objective was met.
Staaina Areas Obiective 2 December 2: Port Jefferson LERO Group 1 and 2 members were told to report at 0800, i
The Port Jefferson Staging Area was declared activated at 0845. The Staging Area was ready at 0830, but they i delayed stating that the Staging Area was activated until the EOC was ready to receive messages at 0845.
Patchocue LERO Group 1 and 2 members were told to report at 0800.
The Patchogue Staging Area was declared activated at 0830.
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.Riverhead l
LERO Group 1 and 2 members were told to report at 0800.
The Riverhead Staging Area was declared activated at 0815.
These times were adequate; this objective was met for all Staging Areas.
December 10: Port Jefferson LERO Group 1 and 2 members were told to report at 0800.
The Patchogue Staging Area was declared activated at.
0820.
Patchoaue LERO Group 1 and 2 members were told to report at 0800.
The Patchogue Staging Area was declared activated at 0822.
Riverhead LERO Group 1 and 2 members were told to report at 0800.
The Riverhead Staging Area was declared activated at 0825.
These times were adequate; this objective was met for all Staging Areas.
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Staaina Areat Obiective 3 December 2&
December 10: Port Jefferson. Patchoaus and Riverhead Rosters were available to the Staging Area Coordinators to fulfill this objective.
Staaina Areas Obiective 4 December 2: Port Jefferson i Sufficient space, parking, equipment and supplies were available to activate and support the Staging Area activities. One ninor problem with equipment was that l not enough magnetic-type antennas were available. Three Traffic Guides had to use the clip-tyne antennas and
, attach these to their windows since their cars did not have raingutters. This did not prevent the Traffic Guides from performing their duties, however, the Emergency Preparedness Group is addressing the concern.
Patchoaue and Riverhead Sufficient space, parking, equipment and supplies were available to activate and support the Staging Area activities.
December'10: Port Jefferson. Patcheaue and Riverhead t
Sufficient space, parking, equipment and supplies were ,
available to activate and support the staging area '
- activities. The concern about antennus for Port i
Jefferson was not resolved for this drill and is being ,
i addressed by the Emergency Preparedness Group. '
i This objective was met for both drills, i
Stacina Areat Obiective 5
{ December 2: Riverhead l The radio at Riverhead used to communicate to the field was inoperable at 1125. The Riverhead Staging Area called for a radio repair technician and the radio was back in service at 1215. Due to the problems with the Riverhead radio the Eastport Substation Transfer Point Coordinator phoned in to the Bus Dispatcher at Riverhead informed him that both he and the Brookhaven Substation and could not radio Riverhead. He stated he would call in every 1/2 hour. As stated previously this problem was resolved at 1215. This did not affect field operations and demonstrated a resourceful approach to .
problems.
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Port Jefferson and Patchoaue All communication links with these Staging Areas and the LER0 EOC and field personnel were established and operated adequately.
his objective was met.
December 10: Port Jefferson. Patcheaua and Riverhead All comunication links with these staging areas and the LERO EOC and field personnel were established and operated adequately. This objective was met.
Stacina Areas Obiective 6 December 2 &
December 10: Port Jefferson. Patchoaue and Riverhead I
Security was adequately maintained at these Staging Areas. It should be noted that only 1/2 of the field personnel were instructed to report per drill. This caused some problems with staffing security however
- security was maintained with available personnel. This objective was set.
Staaina Areas Obiective 7 Decemb6r 2: Port Jefferson All messages were accurately transmitted and put on the proper message forms. Updating of the status boards were not consistently kept up-to-date. Three updates '
, from the EOC were received but on one, only some of the I changes were reflected on the status board. Upon prompting, the status boards were corrected. The updating of status boards was stressed in the drill critique.
The PA system was regularly used to brief staging area personnel.
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Patchogue l The entire communication staff was well trained in all l aspects of their responsibilities, however, some 1 messages were not formally documented on a message form l (i.e., Bus Dispatcher to radio operator to inform
- Transfer Points to begin evacuation at 1250 was done verbally). Use of message forms was discussed at the drill critique.
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l Status boards were adequately kept up-to-date and briefings were held frequently. However, the Bus Driver briefings held by the Bus Dispatchers were not well -
organized. Bus Drivers came out of the briefings not knowing of their assignments or status of the emergency. This item was thoroughly discussed in the drill critique. There was no such problem in this I group's subsequent drill of December 10.
The Staging Area Coordinator did not fill-out OPIP 4.1.4, Attachment 4 per his procedures and the Lead Coordinators did not document their critical actions / decisions. This was discussed in the drill critique and did not recur in the December 10 drill. .
Riverhead Hessages were transmitted and recorded in an accurate and timely manner and were properly logged. However, status boards were not consistently maintained (i.e., at 1055 and 1115 the Staging Area rermived a status update but did not update board). In adostion, status update announcements were lacking information and infrequent.
This was discussed at the drill critique.
December 10: Port Jefferson. Patchoaue and Riverhead All three Staging Areas performed well in fulfilling this objective. However, stating and writing "THIS IS A DRILL" was sometimes omitted from communications. The
. use of this phrase was emphasized in the drill critique.
Staaina Area Obiective 8
- December 2&
December 10: Port Jefferson. Patchoaue and Riverhead The Staging Area Coordinators demonstrated that they were in charge and control of the overall response assigned to their Staging Areas. This objective was met j for both drills.
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staainir Area Obiectives 9.10 and 11 December 2: Port Jefferson Transportation - Bus Dispatcher received message from EOC to dispatch Bus Drivers at 1110 for Miller Place Shopping Center to pre-stage and 1210 for Norwood Avenue for evacuation of all zones. 'The Bus Drivers were dispatched by 1130 for Miller Place and at 1210 for Norwood Avenue. (Note: Norwood Avenue Bus Drivers were assigned and ready to be dispatched at 1200. So, as soon as the order came in, they were dispatched.)
All were at the Transfer Points in time to support the evacuation.
Pre-staged Transfer Points were contacted at 1211 by the Staging Area
, and directed to begin dispatching of buses on their routes at 1300. This fulfills the requirements of the
- procedures. -
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- Curbside Pick-up was simulated for this i drill and the controllers provided -
names of individuals to the Transfer Point Coordinators at Miller Place and
~ Norwood Avenue. They were instructed to radio in these names between 1330 and 1430 (Refer to LERO Messages Nos.
34-38). The rgdioing of the names was performed at 1411 for Norwood Avenue and.1416 for Miller Place.
Connunication between the curbside Bus Drivers and Staging areas was
, established for curbside pickup and was adequate.
1 The Bus Dispatcher received message from EOC at 1509 to re-route buses due
- to fuel truck accident for Routes K5-6
- and K4-5. At 1510, the Bus Dispatcher l
contacted the Norwood Avenue Transfer Point to inform him of the re-routing.
He was inforneo that these routes were complete. This shows good
, communications.
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Transfer Point Coordinators were l
. dispatched to their points earlier (at 1015) prior to the dispatching order to support the Bus Driver Road Rally.
(Refer to Staging Areas Objectives 13
. and 14).
Staging Area objectives 9 and 10 were met for the Transportation Group.
Route Alert l Drivers - Lead Traffic Guides received message of i siren failures (Sirens #50 and #33) at ,
1025. The route for siren 50 was )
divided among 2 drivers; those drivers were dispatched at 1045. The route for siren 33 was divided among 3 drivers; those drivers were dispatched at 1046.
These routes were completed by 1330. A slight delay in dispatching was a result of it taking 8 minutes to make copies of the' zone maps for dividing up the routes. Note that no time frame for completing a route is required.
In addition, the Lead Traffic Guides received message to dispatch Route Alert Drivers for deaf notification at 1208. Dispatching began at 1215 and was completed by 1225. This time is adequate.
All Route Alert-Drivers phoned in upon completion of their routes to rc:eive direction from the Lead Traffic Guides. This fulfills the requirements of the procedures.
Road Crews - Lead Traffic Guides received message to dispatch Road Crews at 1208. Road Crews.were dispatched at 1217. This time is adequate.
Road Crew 2011 was informed of the fuel truck accident at 1430. He was not asked to respond to accident; informed that fuel company would handle.
These objectives were met for the Road Crews.
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Evacuation Route Spotters - Lead Traffic Guides received message to dispatch. Route Spotters at 1208. All Route Spotters were dispatched by 1225. This time is adequate.
Route Spotter 1005 radioed in the fuel truck accident at 1405 (Refer to LERO Message No. 42). The EOC contacted Route Spotter 1005 at 1414 to obttin further information and received it at 1415. The EOC contacted the Route Spotter at 1430 to provide dosimetry protection to Fire Department and 011 ,
Company personnel responding (simulated) to accident. The EOC again contacted Route Spotter 1005 for update on accident at 1512, 3
As evidenced above, communications were
, established with Route Spotters and the EOC was able to provide directives.
These objectives were met for the Route Spotters. l Traffic Guides - The General Emergency declared at 1132. PAR of Evacuation of Zones A-S decided at 1149. Traffic Guide posts ;
to be manned sent to Port Jefferson at '
1206 and received at 1208. Preassigned Traffic Guides required for a 0-2 mile evacuation (6) was dispatched at 1222.
Remaining Traffic Guides were dispatched by 1247. The six preassigned Traffic Guides for a 0-2 mile evacuation arrived at their posts ;
as follows: (Note that although 6 Traffic Guides are needed only 5 TCPS are required to be preassigned. 2 r Traffic Guides report to TCP #5),
i TCP #4 1244 1 Traffic Guide TCP #86 1243 1 Traffic Guide TCP #6 1258 1 Traffic Guide
! . TCP #5 1257 2 Traffic Guides 1 Traffic Guide TCP #38 1246 1
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This time frame is less than adequate because only 3 of the 5 Traffic Control 3 Points were manned within 1-hour of the time the EBS Hessage was aired (1155).
The inadequacy was not serious however, ,
because the two remaining Traffic l Control Points were manned within 63 l minutes. Objective 11 was partially '
met for Port Jefferson.
1 Only 3 TCPs out of the 38 activated for this drill were unable to communicate with the Staging Area. These were TCPs 74, 113 and 50. Two of these radios (2100 used by TCP 74 and 1056 used by TCP 113) were used on December 10 and were operating well. Radio 2111 (used by TCP 50) was brought to the attention of the Emergency Planning Group and the problem will be resolved by the next drills.
. During re-routing for the fuel truck impediment (at 1502-1510) TCP 56 could not be reached via radio by either the EOC. Fort Jefferson Staging Area, or by TCP 15. These Traffic Guides were needed to implement the re-routing plan. Initial communication between the Port Jefferson Staging Area and TCP 56 was established at 1255 and TCP 56 radioed in at 1313 upon arrival at TCP. After interviewing a Traffic Guide at TCP 56, he informed me that he tried to reach the Staging Area to verify his re-routing responsibilities but the frequency was being used by others. He eventually did get through to the Staging Area at approximately 1320. At this time, he was told to report to the ENDF. During the time that TCP 56 was unreachable by his radio, the Lead Traffic Guide used good initiative by employing TCP 55 as an available means to contact TCP 56 directly. TCP 56 was aware of his responsibilities and would have i assisted in the re-routing scheme (if time parmitted) to ensure adequate l
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, evacuation flow. TCP 55 was contacted and given the appropriate instructions for re-routing. The performance of these instructions by the Traffic Guides at TCP 55, however, were not <
observed as time did not allow for the -
performance.
Communications were established and maintained throughout the drill and the Staging Area and EOC were able to issue directives for re-routing. Objectives 9 and 10 were met by the Traffic Guides.
One of the 7 TCPs that the Port Jefferson Field Controller visited was not manned. This was TCP #40 and was visited by the Controller at 1335. TCP
- 40 did not arrive until 1351. This was because the Traffic Guide assigned i to TCP #40 was last to receive dosimetry and briefing. The lateness of dispatch for this and four other TCPs were discussed during the critique to emphasize to the Lead Traffic Guide the importance of making sure these
, posts are manned in a timely manner.
These problems did not recur in the December 10 drill.
Patchoaue Transportation - Staging Area received message from EOC ,
to dispatch Bus Drivers at 1055 for >
pre-stage of zones A-J and at 1207 for evacuation of all zones. By 1145 the '
required General Population Bus Drivers '
were dispatched for pre-stage and by i 1225 for the additional zones. Special Population Bus Drivers were dispatched by 1110 for pre-stage. No additional :
Spectal Population Bus. Drivers were i dispatched for additional zones since ;
no Bus Drivers were available because -
only 1/2 of the required field members '
were participating per the scenario.
, All General Population Bus Drivers were at the Transfer Points in time to .
support the evacuation and all Special Population Bus Drivers returned to the ;
Staging Area in time to receive their '
assignments to support the evacuation. t Special Population Bus Drivers were '
dispatched on their assignments at 1245.
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Pre-staged Transfer Points core.
contacted at 1237 and dirceted to oegin dispatching of buses on their routes at 1250. This fulfills the requirements of the procedures. -
Curbside Pick-up was simulated for this !
drill and the controllers provided names of individuals to the Transfer Point Coordinators at Brookhaven National Laboratory and Coram Plaza Shopping Center (Refer to LERO Message Nos. 34-38). This was performed at 1320 for Brookhaven National Laboratory and at 1355 for C ram Plaza.
Communications w6.e established for curbside purposes and were adequate.
In addition, Special Population Bus Drivers assigned to Health Facilities notified the Health Facilities Coordinator upon completing their assignment.
Trant*er Point Coordinators were .
- dispatched to their points at 1120 and were at their Transfer Points by 1145.
These objectives 9 and 10 were met for the Transportation Group. ,
Route Alert Drivers - Lead Traffic Guides received message of siren failures (Sirens #19 and #45) at 1018. Both Route Alert Drivers were dispatched at 1025.
In addition, the Lead Traffic Guides
- received message to dispatch Route Alert Drivers for Deaf Notification at 1212. Dispatching was completed by +
- 1219.
These time frames were adequate.
i The Route Alert Drivers phoned in upon completion of their routes to receive I
directions from the Lead Traffic Guides. Deaf Notification was completed by 1414 and notification because of siren failure was completed by 1400. No tisPe frame for completing i
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a route is required. Lead Traffic Guides will be encouraged to dispatch multiple Route Alert Drivers, when they are available, to expedite the Route Alerting Process.
Road Crews - Lead Traffic Guides received message to dispatch Road Crews at 1155. Road Crews wore dispatched at 1200'. This time is adequate.
Communications were established with the Road Crews by the EOC. Road Crews from Patchogue were not needed for this drill's Traffic Impediments.
These objectives were met for,the Road Crews.
Evacuation Route Spotters - Lead Traffic Guides received a message to dispatch Route Spotters at 1158.
Route Spotters were dispatched at 1205. This time is excellent.
Communications were established with the' Evacuation Route Spotters by the EOC. Route Spotters from Patchogue were not needed for this drill's Traffic Impediments.
These objectives were met for the Evacuation Route Spotters.
Traffic Guides - The General Emergency was declared at 1132. PARS of evacuation of zones A-S decided at 1149. Traffic Guide posts to be ranned sent to Patchogue at 1200. Preassigned Traffic Guides
, required for a 0-2 alle evacuation (18 of the 21 required) were dispatched by 1213. 18 Traffic Guides were used since only 1/2 of the field personnel
, were invited per the scenario. This l
did not adversely affect the drill.
Remaining Traffic Guides were i
dispatched by 1218 also.
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The 18 preassigned Traffic Guides for 0-2 Gile evacuation arrived at their posts (13 posts; some posts required more than one TG) between 1230 and 1258. (Note that the Traffic Guide for TCP 75 - one of the TCPs required for a 0-2 mile evacuation - was sent home because of illness. He was not replaced since no other Traffic Guides were available at the Staging Area and it was not necessary to call someone out). This time frame is less than adequate because some Traffic Control '
Posts were not manned within 1-hour of
'the time the EBS Message was aired (1155). The inadequacy was not serious however, because the posts were manned within 63 minutes, objective 11 was partially met for Patchogue.
No controller was sent to observe the times of arrivals for the Traffic Guides since no Patchogue Traffic Guides were needed for this drill's Traffic Impediments per the scenario.
Communications were established and maintained for the Traffic Guides. All Traffic. Guides reported in by radio of their arrival at their TCP.= by 1258.
These objectives were met by the Traffic Guides.
Riverhead Transportation - Staging Area received message from EOC to dispatch Bus Drivers at 1115 for pre-stage of zones A-J and at 1200 for evacuation of all zones. By 1119 all required Bus Drivers for pre-staging were dispatched and by 1235 for evacuation of remaining zones. All Bus Drivers were at the Transfer Points in time to support the evacuation.
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The pre-staged Transfer Points tere not
. contacted per procedures to begin I dispatching of buses on their routes I hour after General Public notified. As L a result of this, the Brookhaven
. Substation Transfer Point began dispatching Bus' Drivers at 1200. The critique stressed the need to follow the procedure and wait I hour before dispatching buses. This waiting requirement stated in the procedures will be stressed in future training sessions and drills. Note that proper notification of Transfer Points
. occurred in the December 10 drill.
Curbside pick-up was simulated for this drill and the controllers provided names of individuals to the Transfer Point Coordinators at Shirley Hall (Refer to LERO Message Nos. 34-38).
The curbside pick-ups were radioed in to the Staging Area. This was successfully completed at 1350.
The Bus Dispatcher received message
- from EOC at 1400 to re-route Buses on routes H-1. I-1, and J-1. This '
information was not relayed to the
- Brookhaven Substation. The importance of transmitting this information will be stressed in future Training Sessions and drills. Re-routing information was properly transmitted at the December 10
. drill. .
Transfer Point Coordinators were dispatched to their points prior to the l dispatching order (at 1100) to support i' the Bus Driver Road Rally (Refer to Staging Area Objectives 13 and 14).
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Route Alert
, Drivers - Lead Traffic Guides received message of stren failure (Sirens #60 and #89) at 1024. Two Route Alert Drivers were dispatched at 1040.
In additt'on, the Lead Traffic Guides received message to dispatch Route Alert Drivers for Deaf Notification at 1204. Dispatching was completed by 1230.
These dispatching times were adequate.
The Route Alert Drivers phoned in upon completion of their routes to receive direction from the Lead Traffic Guides. Deaf Notification was completed by 1330 and siren failure notification was completed by 1130 for
, siren #89 and by 1210 for siren #60.
No time frame for completing a route is required. Lead Traffic Guides will be encouraged to dispatch multiple Route Alert Drivers when they are available, to expedite the Route Alerting Process.
Road Crews - Lead Traffic Guides received' messages to dispatch Road Crews at 1158. Road Crews were dispatched at 1205. This is a good time frame.
Road Crew #2004 vent to his location with a Traffic Guide Radio rather then with a Road Crew radio. A Traffic Guide was dispatched to location #2004 I with the proper radio at 1230. This showed good response by the Staging
! Area.
l Road Crew #2002 radioed in at 1315 to ,
i inform of Gravel Truck Accident. At 1320. EOC contacts Road Crews 2002, ,
.- 2003 and 2001 to respond to accident. 1 Road Crew 2002 asks for heavy duty wrecker and indicates clearing of accident will take greater then 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />. At 1342. EOC contacts Road Crew !
2002 for status of impediment, Road Crew 2002 indicates no change and EOC c :
i ,
l
contacts again at 13550 At 1356 Road
' Crew 2002 informs EOC that the 3 cars are cleared but road still blocked by gravel truck. At 1435, EOC contacts i Road Crew 2002 to ask if heavy wrecker arrived. Road Crew 2002 indicated he will contact when it does. Road Crew 2002 contacts EOC at 1503 to inform accident has been cleared.
Communications and response by the Road Crew were good. Objectives were met.
Evacuation . .
Route Spotters - Lead Traffic Guides received message to dispatch Route Spotters at 1155. All Route Spotters were dispatched by 1205. This time is excellent; Route Spotter 1007 contacts EOC to inform them of Traffic build-up on Route 25. EOC contacts Route Spotter 1007 at 1326 to proceed to the accident i scene. Route Spotter arrives at accident at 1329. The EOC contacted Route Spotter 1007 at 1400 to travel South on Grumman Boulevard to inform residents of new Bus Pick-up location.
- The Route Spotter observed (1007) made frequent contact with the EOC ,
(approximately every 15 minutes). This '
- is good use of the Route Spotters and demonstrated good communications.
1 Objectives were met for the Route l Spotters.
4 T.raffic Guides - The General Emergency was declared at ,
l 1132. PARS of Evacuation of Zones A-S .
decided at 1149. Traffic Guide Posts to be manned sent to Riverhead at i 1155. Pre-assigned Traffic Guides
, required for a 0-2 alle evacuation (32 of the 36 required) were dispatched by 1222. Note that TCPs 39, 34, 36 and i 115 required for a 0-2 mile evacuation i were going to be manned however, due to l the requirements of the scenario, the Traffic Guides were reassigned to other l
e
,,g y x, w,e--w - - - - - - - e----- w---w-w- - - - - - - - --- e ~w, -w~, - - ~ ~ -
7 TCPs. (Refer to LER0 Message No.
~ 26R). Remaining Traffic Guides were also dispatched by 1222. The 32 Pre-assigned Traffic Guides required '
for a 0-2 mile evacuation arrived at their posts (26 posts, excluding the
, four TCPs mentioned above. Also more than one Traffic Guide required at some posts) by 1310. This time frame is less than adequate because some Traffic Control Posts were not manned within 1-hour of the time the EBS Message was aired (1155). Objective 11 was partially met for Riverhead.
All Traffic Guides were able to establish communication with the Staging Area and radioed in upon their arrival at their TCP.
TCP 10 radioed in the Gravel Truck Accident to the Riverhead Staging Area at 1307. He was given re-routing instructions from the E0C at 1328.
Procedures for re-routing were verbally demonstrated to the Riverhead Field Controller and were adequate.
The Traffic Guides at TCPs 13 and 14 were contacted at 1430 to determine -
traffic flow at their posts since they were near the Gravel Truck Accident.
The response to the Gravel Truck traffic impediment was good.
Two of the 11 TCPs observed had no Traffic Guides present. TCP 73 radioed in at 1240 that he was at the post but was not there at 1435 and TCP 15 radioed in at 1235 that he was at his post but was not there at 1440. After interviewing the Controller and the Traffic Guides at those posts, it was determined that the Traffic Guides were there parked at a location where the
~
Field Controller could not see them (i.e., Traffic Guide for TCP 73 was parked in a driveway).
These objectives were met by the Traffic Guides.
. It should be pointed out that later on in the. drill, the E0C decided to
. extend the evacuation to include zones P and 5. Since only 1/2 of the field personnel were invited to this drill per the scenario, no i
i additional personnel were available to respond to this extension. The responses to this extension were therefore simulated.
?
) . December 10: Port Jefferson (
i j Transportation-StagingAreareceivedamessabefrom i EOC to dispatch Bus Drivers at 1025 for l
pre-staging of zones A-J. K. L, M. N. (
- 0, R and at 1258 to evacuate the above r zones. By 1115 all required Bus j Drivers for pre-staging were 1
dispatched. No additional Bus Drivers [
i' were required to be dispktched for [
evacuation purposes. All Bus Drivers 3 I
were at the Transfer Points in time to ,
support the evacuation. t 1 The Pre-staged Transfer Points were {
3 contacted at 1300 to inform when to !
- J begin the evacuation. This is adequate l per procedures. }
Curbside pick-up was simulated for this !
! drill and the controllers provided -
i names of individuals to the Transfer ;
i Point Coordinators at Miller Place and l Norwood Avenues (Refer to LERO Messages i 42-46). Miller Place radioed in their ,
curbside pick-ups at 1400 for Van F1 !
1430 for Van F2 and 1450 for Van F3. .
This was imediately transmitted to the i Bus Coordinator at the EOC at 1410 j
! 1440 and 1450 respectively and given to i 1
the Home Coordinator. Norwood Avenue i j radioed in their Curbside pick-ups at l
! 1315 for Van F4, Bus G and Van Q were 1 j not radioed in. This information for !
Van F4 was immediately transmitted to i the Bus Coordinator at the E0C at 1320
- . and given to the Home Coordinator.
1 d
Although Norwood Avenue did not radio ,
i in for Bus G and Van Q this portion of j
! the drill was simulated. The purpose j of this portion was to check the connunication links which were adequate. ,
i l Re-routing for buses was not necessary.
I
- ts -
)!
- o. ,
Transfer Point Coordinators tore i dispatched to their points prior to the dispatching order (at 0940 and 0943) to -
support the Bus Driver Road Rally (Refer to Staging Area Objectives 13 -
and 14). !
Objectives 9 and 10 were met by the I Port Jefferson Transportation Group.
Route Alert ;
Driver -
Lead Traffic Guides received message of Siren Failures (Sirens #9 and #29) at 0938. Six Route Alert Drivers were dispatched on these two routes (routes divided among the Drivers) at 1003. ,
In addition, the Lead Traffic Guides received a message to dispatch Route '
Alert Drivers for Deaf Notification at 1305. Dispatching was completed by i 1330.
The Route Alert Drivers phoned in upon completion of their routes to receive direction from the Lead Traffic Guides. Deaf notification was completed at 1420 for zone K and 1500 for zone F. Siren failure notification was completed at 1210 for siren #9 and ;
1350 for siren #29. No time frame for completing a route is required. .
At 1245, the EOC notified the Staging Area to have the Route Alert Drivers !
re-notify th6 public for Siren Failures "
- 9 and #29. This was not performed due !
to a lack of field personnel (only 1/2 i of the required field workers were invited per the scenario). hat would i be done was discussed with the L controller. I L
These objectives were met. l Road Crews - Staging Area received message to !'
dispatch Road Crews 1250 for Road Crews 2009, 2011, 2012 and all tankers and 1255 for Road Crew 2010. .11 Road Crews were dispatched by 1325. This i time frame is adequate.
l l
-u-
l . i
~
Road Crew 2010 was initially dispatched by the Staging Area at 1255 to the Duck Truck Accident. He was contacted at 1300 by the EOC and told to report to )
accident. Road Crew 2010 arrived at l the accident at 1352 and reported to the EOC at 1400 that the accident had i been cleared. This time is less than l adequate. It should be noted that the -
EOC did not dispatch a Road Crew when !
first notified of accident (at 1245) i bccause at that time evacuation was not the PAR. The E0C assumed that prior to an evacuation recommendation, County ;
Police would handle this situation as part of their normal duties. Once the ,
evacuation PAR was made at 1248 LERO responded to the accident by dispatching Road Crews at 1255.
Communications were established.
Objectives were partially met by the ;
Road Crews. Reporting to an accident quickly, will be stressed in future training and drills. ,
Evacuation
- l Route Spotters - Lead Traffic Guides ~ received message to !
dispatch Route Spotter 1001 at 1030 and !
restining Route Spotters at 1315.
Route Spotter 1001 was dispatched at
- 1045 and the others were dispatched by i 1348. These tim'es are adequate, t EOC contacts Route Spotters 1001 at ;
! - approximately 1230 to have his respond !
! to Duck Truck accident. Route Spotter r arrives at scene at approximately 1245 I and relays status of accident and [
, requests a Road Crew. Continuous communication occurred between the EOC i
I and Route Spotter 1001 until 1400 (when !
accident was cleared). Communications *
- were good.
l Objectives were met for Route Spotters. f
, j i
_ . _ . _ _ _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ . . _ _ _ . _ _ . _ _ _ ._ _ _ ,_ _ _ ... J
l Traffic Guides - The General Emergency was declared at )
1202. PARS of evacuation of zones A-J, ;
K, L, M, N, 0, R made-at 1248. Traffic i Guide Posts to be manned sent to Port ,
i Jefferson at 1258. Pre-assigned i Traffic Guides required for a 0-2 mile
! evacuation (6) were dispatched by i 1314. Remaining Traffic Guides were ;
dispatched by 1345. The six ;
preassigned Traffic Guides required for ,
the 0-2 mile evacuation arrived at ,
their 5 posts (TCP 5 requires 2 Traffic Guides) by 1346. This time frame is !
adequate as it falls within 1-hour of the time the EBS Message was aired ;
(1257). Objective 11 was met for Port l Jefferson. -
l All Traffic Guides established communications with the Staging Area. ;
- All TCPs observed by the Port Jefferson
, Field Controller had Traffic Guides at i their posts when visited. f No re-routing was required for Port '
Jefferson Traffic Guides.
) Patchogue .
l l Transportation - Sta'ging Area received message from EOC
- to dispatch Bus Drivers at 1029 for i Pre-stage of zones A-0, R and at 1257 L to evacuate above zones. All Bus Drivers (Special and General
- Population) were dispatched by 1100 for j pre-staging. No additional Bus Drivers !
a were recuired to be dispatched for evacuation purposes. All Bus Drivers i were at their Transfer Points in time !
to support the evacuation. ;
i i '
i Pre-staged Special Population Bus
- Drivers returned to the Staging Area by
1 1120. They were dispatched on their ;
1 assignments by 1300,- l t
)
i
The pre-staged Transfer Points wore contacted at 1300 to inform when to begin evacuation. This is adequate per procedures.
Curbside Pickup was simulated for the drill and the controllers provided names of individuals to the Transfer Point Coordinators at Brookhaven National Laboratory and Coran Plaza Shopping Center ' Refer to LERO Message Nos. 42-46). The Brookhaven National Laboratory radioed in their curbside pick-ups at 1440 for Bu: 8, C, O and at 1445 for Van E. Coran Plaza radioed in their Curbside Pick-ups at 1455.
Patchogue Bus Dispatcher simulated this information being sent to the EOC due to it being near end of drill. The following through with information to the proper positions will be stressed and observed in future drills.
Re-routing of Buses was not necessary for Patchogue.
Transfer Point Coordinator were dispatched to the points by 1030 and declared their Transfer Points cperational by 1105.
. These objectjves were met by the' Transportatibn Group.
Route Alert Drivers - Lead Traffic Guides received .'aessage of stren failures (Strens #19 ano #40) at 0940. Two Route Alert Drivers aere dispatched on these two routes at 0950.
In addition, the Lead Traffic Guides receivedmessagetodispatchRoute Alert Drivers .or Deaf Notification at
, 1313. Dispatching was completed by 13i5.
These dispatching times are excellent.
i
Routs Alert Driv ~ers phoned in upon completion of their routes to receive direction from the Lead Traffic Guides. Deaf Notification was completed by 1422. Siren failure notification was completed at 1118 for Siren #19 and 1130 for Siren #40. No time frame for completing a route is required. Leaa Traffic Guides will be encouraged to dispatch multiple Route Alert Drivers, when they are available, to expedite the Route Alerting Process.
At 1254, the EOC requested that Routes for Sirens #19 and #40 be re-run. Two otner Route Alert Drivers were immediately dispatched (dispatch form indicates 1254). These routes were not completed by drill termination.
Objectives 9 and 10 were met by the Patchogue Route Alert Drivers.
Road Crews - Staging Area rcceived message to dispatch Road Crews at 1310. All Road Crews were dispatched by 1312. This time frame is excellent.
Road Crew 2005 was contacted by the EOC at 1410 to report to the Cesspool Truck
, accident. They arrived at the accident at 1440 and reported per the scenario that accident would take over 3 hours3.472222e-5 days <br />8.333333e-4 hours <br />4.960317e-6 weeks <br />1.1415e-6 months <br /> to clear. They were instructed by the EOC to remain at the location.
l Communications were established with all Road Crews. Objectives 9 and 10 were met by the Road Crews.
Evacuation Route Spotters - Lead Traffic Guides received message to dispatch Route Spotters at 1020 and were dispatched by 1025. This time was adequate.
l The EOC requested at 1305 that routes
, 1010 and 1011 were also to be l patrolled. This was simulated by the
! Staging Area since no personnel were available (only 1/2 of the field workers were invited for this drill per the scenario).
I
No Rou%e Spo%%ers eere requested to
. respond to the traffic impediments.
~
Communications with the EOC was maintained by the Route Spotters.
These objectives were met for the Route Spotters.
Traffic Guides - The General Emergency was declared at 1202. PARS of evacuation of zones A-0, R made at 1250. The Traffic Guide Posts to be manned sent to Patchogue at 1311. Pre-assigned Traffic Guides required for a 0-2 mile evacuation (21) were dispatched by 1325. Remaining Traffic Guides were dispatched by 1325 also. The 21 pre-assigned Traffic Guides required for a 0-2 mile evacuation arrived at their posts (13 posts; more than one Traffic Guide
~
required at some posts) between 1324 and 1401 (TCP 77 did not arrive until 1447). Other than TCP 77, this time was adequate as they. fall within 1-hour of the time the EBS Hessage was aired (1257). Objective 11 was partially met for Patchogue. The importance of arriving in a. timely manner will be stressed to the Traffic Guide at TCP 77 at future training sessions and drills. In addition TCP 126 did not radio in their time of arrival. The importance of transmitting arrival times will be stressed in future drills and training sessions.
The field controller did not observe the times of arrival of Traffic Guides '
due to the lateness of the evacuation order and his requirements per the scenario, he observed TCP 64 only.
The Traffic Guide at TCP 64 radioed in the Cesspool Truck Accident to the Staging Area at 1353. This information was relayed to the EOC at 1400.
Re-routing information was transmitted .
to TCPs 63 and 64 from the EOC at 1417. .This response time is adequr.te.
/
Communications tere established and maintained for all Traffic Guides and all transmitted tileir arrival at their TCPs by 1447, except for TCP 126 mentioned earlier. (1 TCP out of 23 TCPs manned).
These objectives were met by the Traffic Guides.
Riverhead Transportation - Bus Dispatcher received message from EOC to dispatch Bus Drivers at 1040 for pre-stage of zones A-0. R and at 1257
- for evacuation of the above zones. By i 1116 all required Bus Drivers for l pre-staging were dispatched. No i additional Bus Drivers were required to l
be dispatched for evacuation purposes.
All Bus Drivers were at the Transfer Points in time to support the evacuation. -
l The pre-staged Transfer Points were contacted at 1257 to inform when to begin evacuation. This is adequate per-procedures.
Curbside pick-up was simulated for this drill and the controllers provided
, names of individuals to the Transfer Point Coordinator at Shirley Hall (Refer to LERO Hessage Nos. 42-46).
The names were radioed in to the Staging Area at 1400. This information was promptly relayed to the EOC at 1415. This time frame is adequate.
The Brookhaven Substation Transfer Point Coordinator received a message from EOC at 1345 to re-route Bus Route J-1 due to the Cement Truck traffic impediment. This information was adequately relayed to the Bus Drivers.
This is good communications and response.
Transfer Point Coo'dinators r were dispatched to their points prior to the dispatching order (at 1030) to support the Bus Driver Road Rally (Refer to Staging Area Objectives 13 and 14).
All Transfer Points.were operational by 1103. ,
These objectives were met by the ~
Transportation Group.
Route Alert Drivers - Staging Area received siren failure message at 0937. Lead Traffic Guides received message of siren failure (Sirens #99 and #107) at 1011. Two l Route Alert Drivers were dispatched at 1018. The time delay between'the timeliness the Staging Area received the message and the time given to the Lead Traffic Guide is not adequate. !
j The importance of the timeliness of j distributing information will be stressed in future training sessions and drills.
In addition, the Lead Traffic Guides received message to dispatch Route Alert Drivers for Deaf notification at-1315 for zones E, J N and at 1400 for zones P and S. Route Alert Drivers were dispatched at 1326 for zones E, J, N and at 1415 for zones P and S. This time frame is adequate.
The Route Alert Drivers phoned in upon completion of their routes to receive dirsction from the Lead Traffic Guides. Deaf Notification was completed at 1440 for zone E and 1418 for zone J. Ti.no did not permit for zones N, P and S to be completed.
Siren failure notification tas completed at 1050 for Siren #99 and 1130 for siren #107. In addition, the EOC requested at approximately 1259 that the routes be run again for sirens
- 99 and #107. These new Route Alert Drivers were dispatched at 1258 and phoned in upon. completion of their routes at 1405 for siren #99 and 1406 -
for siren #107. No time frame for ccmpleting a route is required. Lead Traffic Guides wil* be encouraged to dispatch multiple Route Alert Drivers, when they are available, to expedito the Route Alerting Process.
All Route Alert Driver information was relayed to the Special Facility -
Evacuation Coordinator.
These objectives were met by the Route Alert Drivers.
Road Crews - Staging Area received message to dispatch Road Crews at 1309. All Road Crews were dispatched by 1315. This ,
time frame is adequate. -
The EOC contacted Road Crew 2004 at 1342 and Road Crew 2003 at 1328 to *
, proceed to Cement Truck accident. Road Crew 2004 arrived at accident at 1345.
At 1350, Road Crew 2004 radioed in to the EOC that removal of impediment would take over 2 hours2.314815e-5 days <br />5.555556e-4 hours <br />3.306878e-6 weeks <br />7.61e-7 months <br />. He also requested another Road Crew. At 1405, ,
Road Crew 2003 calls in to EOC, he had problems with his radio and went to Road Crew 2002 and radioed in from there. He is instructed to proceed to accident. Road Crew 2003 arrives at accident at 1423 and radios in to EOC.
At .1400, the EOC contacts Road Crew '
2001 to proceed to accident. At 1450, EOC contacts Road Crew 2004 to contact .
Road Crew 2001. At 1455, Road Crew 2004 contacts EOC to inform that he could not reach Road Crew 2001. .
e 1,-
I
P =
j At 1500 EOC contacts Road Crew 2004 l- for status. Road Crew 2004 indicates l clearing of accident will take another hour.
Communic _.'ons with Road Crews were established and adequately maintained with the EOC with the exception of Road Crews 2001 and 2003. However, Road Crew 2001 responded at 1339 to injest KI. The non-communication of Road Crews 2001 and 2003 was brought to the attention of the Emergency Preparedness
. . group and will be observed in future drills.
Evacuation Route Spotters - Lead Traffic Guides received message to dispatch Route Spotters at 1021 and were dispatched at 1025. This time frame is excellent.
Route Spotter 1009 called in Cement Truck accident at 1305 to the EOC.
Route Spotter 1007 contacted the EOC at 1357 to report on his traffic conditions. At 1404, Route Spotter 1009 contacts the EOC to inform of Road Crew 2004 arrival.
Communications was maintained by the Route Spotters and EOC on a regular basis. These objectives were met.
Traffic Guides - The General Emergency was declared at 1202. PARS of evacuation of zones A-0, R made at 1250. The Traffic Guide Posts to be manned sent to Riverhead at 1309. Pre-assigned Traffic Guides required for 0-2 mile evacuation (26 of the 36 required) were dispatched by 1327. Note that TCPs 3, 7, 128, 115, 127, 73,108, 39, 36 and 62 required for a 022 mile evacuation were going to be manned, however, due to the requirements of the scenario, were re-assigned to other TCPs. (Refer to LERO Hessage No. 30R). Remaining Traffic Guides were also dispatched by 1327. The 26 preassigaed Traffic
~
Guides required for a 0-2 eile evacuation arrived at their posts (20 Posts, excluding the 10 TCPs mentioned above. Also, more than one Traffic Guide required at soma posts) by 1415.
This time frame is less than adequate because some Traffic Control Posts were not manned within 1-hour of the time the EBS Hessage was aired (1257).
Objective 11 was partially met for l Riverhead. !
All Traffic Guides were able to establish communications with the Staging Area and radioed in upon their arrival at the TCP, with the exception of TCP 87. His radio is being checked by the Emergency Preparedness Group and will be observed in future drills.
The two TCPs observed by the Field Controller had Traffic Guides at their I posts when visited.
TCPs 16, 15, 29 and 19 were contacted by the Staging Area on re-routing at 1331 due to the Cement Truck accident.
The implementation of the re-routing was simulated by the Traffic Guide at TCP 16 and. proved adequate. -
Objectives 9 and 10 were met by.the Traffic Guides.
Stacina Area Obiective 12 December 2 &
December 10: Port Jefferson. Patchocue and Riverhead Field Controllers observing various locations (i.e.,
Transfer Points. TCPs) reported field workers reading their dosimeters every 15 minutes and aware of their usage and limits. New LERO Badges were distributed to field workers containing pertinent radiological information. Field workers were briefed on the use of these badges and field workers were urged to refer to these badges when necessary.
All field workers were notified when to injest KI and don protective clothing.
This objective was adequately met.
December 2: Port Jefferson l'
A controller initiated LERO Message No. 46 at .
approximately 1430 stating that TCPs 4: 5, 6 ced 8C were reporting 4 Rem readings. The EOC responded quickly reportir.g at 1437 to have these Traffic Guides proceed to the ENDF. No replacements were dispatched because it was late in the scenario nor were higher doses authorized. The response time was adequate. '
December 10: Port Jefferson A controller initiated LERO Message No. 40 at 1405 to the Bus Dispatcher simulating that personnel at the Miller Place Transfer Point were reporting 4 Rem readings. The EOC responded quickly and by 1430 reported that the Director of Local Response has authorized readings to 10 Rem. This response time is adequate and proper procedures were followed. (Refer tc EOC General Comments for December 10 on the EOCs response to this message).
Patchoaue O'ne road crew member of the two man crew for Road Crew 2005 was not observed to read his dosimeters every 15 minutes. The importance of reading his dosimeters was .
stressed at the location.
Staaina Area Obiectives 13 and 14 December 2 &
December 10: EQIf Jefferson. Patthroue and Riverhead Make-up sessions for Phase II of the Bus Driver Driving Instruction Training were held at both drills. These make-up sessions were Phase II of LILCO's response to a deficiency cited in the FEMA Po:t Exercise Assessment for the February 13, 1986 Exercise regarding Bus Drivers who were unable to find their assigned locations. The purpose of these sessions was to familiarize LERO Bus Drivers with their appropriate Transfer Points and the new Bus Company yard - Suburbia Bus Corp. in Bohemia.
In addition, Bus Drivers from the Riverhead Staging Area were required to travel to Baumann and Sons Buses, Inc.
in Hesthampton.
- As you may recall, Phase I of the Bus Driver Driving Instruction Training required the Bus Drivers to travel '
to seventeen (17) Bus Company yards. Upon the conclusion of Phase II, our response will be completed since LERO Bus Drivers will have visited all LER0-contracted Bus Company yards and their appropriate Transfer Points by following driving instructions similar to those to be used in an actual emergency.
Refer to Section 4.4 of both scenarios for further details. For both drills, thirty-eight (38) Bus Drivers participated out of the 66 Bus Drivers scheduled resulting in a 587. attendance rate.
The sessions were incorporated as part of the LERO drills scheduled for these days. The Bus Drivers involved in the make-up Road Rallies, instead of performing their normal LERO functions, were di.spatched to travel to all Transfer Points coinciding with their Staging Areas and to the Suburbia Bus Corporation in Bohemia. As mentioned above, Riverhead Bus Drivers ,
additionally had to travel to the Baumann & Sons Buses, .
Inc. in Westhampton. Only Riverhead Bus Drivers were required to travel to this yard since only five (5) buses are contracted at this yard and will most often be assigned to the Riverhead Staging Area in an emergency.
Upon arrival at their Staging Areas Bus Drivers signed-in and received their dosimetry. At their drill >
briefings, Bus Dispatchers briefed the Bus Drivers on the specifics of their assignments and assigned a drill deadline time of 1500 whereby all Bus Drivers were .
instructed to proceed to the ENDF to hand in their "
equipment, driving instructions and verification cover sheets.
Make-up Bus Drivers were dispatched by the '
Transportation Controllers (one per car) from their Staging Area. Before leaving, the Bus Drivers received -
the Session's Driving Instructions II, the Session's Verification Cover Sheet II (inserted into the Driving Instruction Book), and a box lunch.
Transfer Point Coordinators were assigned to their Transfer Points to perform as controllers for the session. The Transfer Point Coordinators were briefed by the Bus Dispatchers of their responsibilities. Two other controllers were assigned to the two Bus Company yards.
Transfer Point Coordinators / Controllers set up at their l Transfer Points as normal and the Bus
- Company i controllers set up outside the Bus Company yard at an area void of any complications. All placed orange cones near their location. Upon arrival of the Bus Drivers, the controllers hole-punched, initialed and wrote the i time of the Bus Driver's arrival on each Bus Driver's
. Session Verification Cover Sheet II. Note that each
. controller had either a heart, diamond, club or spade-shaped hole-punch to avoid unauthorized marking of the cover sheet.
After traveling to all of their assigned locations, Bus Drivers then traveled to the ENDF for monitoring and possible decontamination. Also at the EHDF, Bus Drivers handed-in their driving instructions and verification cover sheets.
For the December 10 drill, one (1) Bus Driver from the Patchogue Staging Area failed to locate the Suburbia Bus Corp. in Bohemia and arrived at the EHDF with Suburbia not verified.
In addition, the Bus Controller at Baumann & Sons Buses, Inc. in Westhampton was not permitted to remain at the location since the yard is located on Suffolk County property. All Riverhead Bus Drivers participating in the.. December 10 make-up session will be credited for this location as all indicated they traveled to the location, but no controller was there. Refer to memorandum from Bruce P.M. Kobel, dated 12/11/86, "Baumer,n Situation" for further details.
These sessions were the last to be held and concludes LILCO's initial response to the Bus Driver deficiency sited by FEMA. A final report summarizing this entire effort will be issued at a later date.
For the bus drivers who had already completed Road Rally training, the_ final response to this deficiency was initiated for these drills. All Bus Drivers who previously participated in the Bus Driver Driving Instruction Training Sessions were involved in the Bus Driver Maintenance System as described below.
LER$0 institu%ed a maintenance system to ensure that Bus Drivers are assigned to different Bus Company yards and l Transfer Points during these and future drills and are not assigned to the same locations each time. This maintenance system consisted of the four steps outlined below:
- 1. During pre-drill preparation, LERIO arranged for buses to be available at only a few of the Bus Company yards per drill. For these drills, Suburbia Bus Corp. in Middle Island, Baumann & Sons in Bohemia and Hesthampton, and United Bus Corp. in Coram. The yards will be rotated for each subsequent drill to ensure that Bus Drivers have the ,
opportunity to visit all the yards and will not be driving to the same yard each drill.
- 2. Bus Dispatchers were told not to call for volunteers for assignment to a specific Bus Company yard or Transfer Point. This eliminated the problem of Bus Drivers familiar with a certain location volunteering for assignment to that location.
- 3. A computer program is being developed to track the progress and validity of the Maintenance System.
After each drill, LERIO collected the Bus / Van Dispatching Forms (Attachment 7 of OPIP 3.6.4) which were initialed and hole-punched by controllers at the above Bus Company yards. This data will be input into a spreadsheet program.
- 4. This computer repcrt will be reviewed periodically to ensure the effectiveness of the system and to allow for immediate resolution of any problems, should they occur.
ENC Obiective 1 (LERO Oniv)
December 2: LERO ENC members were told to report at 0800 with all required staff present by 0845. Clerical assistance normally supplied by the EOC was not provided per the drill requirements.
December 10: LERO ENC members were told tc report at 0800 with all required staff present by 0830. Clerical assistance normally supplied by the EOC was not provided per the drill requirements.
ENC Obiective 2 (LERO Oniv)
December 2 &
December 10: The ENC would contact the EOC and the EOC would maintain staffing of the ENC through rosters. This was performed at both drills. This objective was met.
ENC Obiective 3 (LERO Oniv)
December 2: Six simulated media briefings were held and were adequate and timely. Presentations were understandable and clear.
Haps and other visual aids were available. It should be noted that the briefing of 1155 was not actually held because of non-LERO related problems with the briefing room and was merely stated.as being held. This objective was met.
December 10: Four of the five simulated media briefings were held and were adequate and timely. One exception is the first briefing which was not held until 1000 while the Alert was declared at 0808. This delay was a result of LILCO personnel (onsite) not arriving until later since they were not pre-staged. LERO, however, was ready sooner. This objective was met.
ENC Obiective 4 (LERO Oniv)
December 2 &
December 10: This function was adequately simulated as no other agencies participated in these drills per the scenario. This objective was met.
ENC Obiective 5 (LERO Oniv)
December 2 &
December 10: Rumor control was established and performed adequately for both drills. The response to questions was performed in a timely manner (average of 15 minutes).
ENC Obiective 6 (LERO Oniv)
December 2 &
December 10: For both drills, only a portion of the ENC was activated due to outside commitments of the Holiday Inn. However, space was adequate for the area activated. Because of -
this, the telecopier was located in the hallway making the telecopying of information inconvenient. However, this did not hinder ENC operations.
LERO News Release Paper ran out during the drills. This was brought to the~ attention of the Emergency Preparedness Staff and an adequate supply of this paper will be I available.
ENC Obiective 7 (LERO Oniv)
December 2 &
December 10: This objective was not observed by the ENC LERO Controller. This is not a LERO concern but an onsite 'I concern and will be removed as a LERO objective for further drills.
ENC Obiective 8 (LERO Oniv)
December 2 &
December 10: The ENC copying capabilities were adequate for both -
drills. No problems were observed. This objective was met.
ENC Obiective 9 (LER0_Oniv)
December 2 & <
December 10: Two LERO Spokespersons were used for both drills. The reason was that one was being trained by the other for this position as this was the first drill for this LERO -
Spokesperson. In light of this, the new LERO Spokesperson ,
performed his job adequately and effectively.
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e u, u
Areas Recuirina Corrective Action (ARCA)
The following is a summary of LERO's response to the.ARCAs cited by FEMA' for the February 13,.1986 Exercise. Refer to Part I of Attachment 1 of SNRC-1276 for details on the ARCAs.
EOC-2 December 2: Notification of FEMA was performed to a simulated' phone number by the Director. Refer to LERO Message No. 4 for the simulated phone number.
December 10: Notification of FEMA was performed to a simulated phone number by the Director. Refer to LERO Message No. 5 for the simulated phone number.
EOC-3 December 2: Notification of the LIRR was performed to a simulated phone number for this drill by the Evacuation Coordinator. Refer to LERO Hessage No. 4 for the simulated phone number.
December 10: Notification of the LIRR was performed to a simulated phone number for this drill by the Evacuation Coordinator. Refer to LERO Message No. 5 for the simulated phone number.
EOC-4 December 2 &
December 10: Hodifications were corapleted and reviewed with DOE prior to these drills. The new status boards were used in both drills. (Refer to r.emorandum to LERO File from D.
Dreikorn, dated 1/9/87, "Heeting with DOEd for Status Board discussions).
EOC-5 December 2 &
December 10: The reperting of this data was net observed fcr these drills as DOE was not participating.
EQC:1 December 2 &
December 10: The DOE did not participate in these drills thus no field data was extrapolated. During a meeting with the DOE (Refer to memorandum from D. Dreikorn, dated 1/9/87, "Heeting with DOE") this matter was discussed and it was agreed that any extrapolated field data by DOE RAP will be indicated as such when reported to the EOC. Simulated field data (actual) was presented to the RHC by the controller and doses were projected based on this data.
These projected doses were placed in the appropriate columns.
EQC=2 December 2 & I December 10: No observation was made at either drill regarding the misstating of PAGs by the Health Services Coordinator. The corrective actions taken last spring was effective.
EQC H Not-Applicable EQC=1 December 2 &
December 10: The expedited dispatching of field persont.el to respond to ' i,~ '
traffic impediments was not part of these scent.rios. It -
will be practi:ed in future scenarios.
EOC-10 a O
Not-Applicable .,
EOC-11 Throu1h_15 6
'."]
Not-Applicable. Neither School Bus Drivers nor Ambulance /Ambulette ,
Drivers participated in these drills. '
EEC:1 _
December 2 & -
December 10: Both the EPZ Map and ECL Status Board were available at the ENC and were utilized in both drills.
s . .
1 ELC-1 December 2: News Releases #1 and #2 were posted with minor cross-outs indicated on the releaser. This was due to the computer not being in operation at the beginning of the drill. The remaining press releases were properly issued using the computer.
December 10: All press releases were issued by the computer and did not contain any marks which could add to confusion. .
Port Jefferson-1 December 2 &
December 10: New LERO badges containing radiological and dosimetry information were given to field personnel for both drills.
Field members were instructed on the use of these badges.
Field members observed by controllers were aware of their dosimetry and radiological requirements.
Patchocue-2 Throuch 5 l December 2 &
December 10:. The new security procedure was implemented for these drills and security was observed to be adequate.
Patchoaue-7 l December 2 &
l December 10: The new LERO badges issued to field workers contain job specific information as well as the radiological and dosimetry information mentioned earlier. The Traffic Cuice
( badges state that the Traffic Guide should inform evacuees l to listen to the EBS station for latest information on the l
emergancy. All field personnel were adequately briefed on l
the use of these badges. ,
Patchoaue-8 December 2 &
December 10: Field personnel responding to the road impediments for both drills maintained adequate communication with the EOC regarding the impediment. Any requests for additional support was transmitted to the EOC from the field. An example of this is evidenced by, on December 2. Road Crew 2002 out of Riverhcad radioing in to the EOC at 1335 requesting a heavy wrecker to assist in removal of the gravel truck impediment.
Patchocuo-9 December 2 &
The proper and accurate relaying of information from the December 10:
Staging Area by the Transfer Point Coordinator to the Bus Drivers was observed during both drills. This was evidenced by the relaying to Bus Drivers to don protective clothing, take KI and when to begin the evacuation routes.
A specific example to illustrate this was the Brookhaven Substation Transfer Point Coordinator accurately explaining the rerouting of zone J-1 to the Bus Drivers during the December 10 drill. The re-routing instructions were given to the Transfer Point Coordinator by the EOC.
Patchocue-10 December 2 &
December 10: As of the date of this report, more detailed maps for the non-institutionalized mobility-impaired pick-ups have not been developed. The same maps were used for these drills that were used for the exercise. More detailed maps will be developed in the near future.
Patchocue-11 December 2 &
December 10: Adt:iinistrative Support personnel assisted in the dispatching of Special Population Bus Drivers for both drills. For the December 10 drill, a request came in from the EOC to the Special Population Bus Dispatcher at 1034 to pre-stage an additicnal bus for the evacuation of the Hillcrest Adult llome. This Bus Driver was dispatched at 1120 to the hem 1. The Bus Dispatcher waited for the~ return of pre-staged Special Population Bus Drivers who were dispatched at 1030. This is a good response for two reasons: 1) For the ARCA (resulting from February 13 Exercise), it took 40 minutes for a bus to be dispatched to a Bus Company, pick-up a bus, then proceed to the school.
For December 10, the Bus Driver preceeded directly to the Hillcrest Adult Home because he already had the bus. Even though it took 46 minutes to dispatch the bus, it would arrive at the home well before the bus which wasn't pre-staged. 2) An evacuation wasn't declared until 1250, therefore this bus would already be at the home to usist if an evacuation was called.
i Patchocue-12 c
December 2 &
December 10: The briefings hold by the Bus Dispatchers at Patchogue did not contain any misleading information. As stated 't.
previously, new LERO badges containing radiological and i dosimetry information'were used for both drills. The Bus Dispatchers adequately and correctly briefed Bus Drivers on i
the use of these badges and the information on them.
l l Patchocue-13-16 -
December 2.&
December 10: New LERO badges containing radiological and dosimetry information, including the use of KI and authorization of higher dose limits, were given to field personnel for both drills. Field members were adequately briefed on the use of these badges. Those field members questioned by controllers were aware of these requirements.
- Riverhead-1 December 2 &
December 10: Times of the update were properly placed on the statur -
boards during both drills. (Refer to Staging Areas Objective 7 for further information). ,
Riverheqd-1 ,
1 December 2 & L.
December 10: The Brookhaven Substation Transfer Point was used at both drills. No problems were observed," although weather was not inclement during the drills. -
/
ELirhnd-4 Throuch 6 December 2 &
December 10: New LERO badges containing radiological and dosimetry information, including the use of KI and authorization of higher dose limits, were given to field personnel for both drills. Field members were adequately briefed on the use of these badges. 'Those field members observed by controllers were aware of these requirements.
2
~
Receotion Center-1 Not Applicable. The new Reception Centers were not activated for these drills as they are still in the construction phase.
Concrecate Care-1 Not Applicable. Congregate Care Facilities did not participate in these drills per the scenario.
~n . Markovich Attachment cc: B. R. McCaffrey w/ Attachment C. A. Daverio w/ Attachment V. H. Palmiotto w/ Attachment LERO File w/ Attachment i
. ATTACHMENT 1 LILCO Emergency Preparedness Orill Scenario Scenario flo. 8A - Rev. I 1.2. LERO OBJECTINS A. Emergency Operations Center (EOC)
- 1. Demonstrate the ability to receive initial and follow-up emergency notifications.
- 2. Demonstrate the ability to activate the Local Emergency Responsc Organization (LERO) EOC in a timely manner.
- 3. Demonstrate through rosters, the ability to maintain staffing in the LERO EOC on a 24-hour basis.
- 4. Demonstrate that the LERO EOC has adequate space, equipment, and supplies to support emergency operattuns.
- 5. Demonstrate that the LERO can establish appropriate communication links, both primary and backup systens (comunication with the State and county via RECS to be simulated).
- 6. Demonstrate that the LERO EOC hcs adequate access control and that security can be maintained.
- 7. Demonstrate that messraes are transmitted in an accur4te and timely manner, mes ages are properly logged, that status boards are accurately maintained and updated, that frequent and appropriate briefings are held, and that incoming personnel are briefed.
- 8. Demonstrate that the appropriate official is in charge and in control of an overall coordinated response including decisions on protective action recomendations.
- 9. Demonstrate the organizational ability necessary to effect an early dismissal of schools within the 10-mile EPZ.
- 10. Demonstrata the ability to prepare and implement EBS in a timely manner (i.e., within 15 minutes after command and control decision for implementation of protective action recocnendations).
- 11. Demonstrate the ability to assess the effect of road impediments upon evacuation traffic and develop and implement timely response actions. These actions may include rerouting and the broadcast of an associated EDS message, as necessary.
1-6 ,
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LILCO Emergency Preparedness Drill Scenario Scenario No. 8A - Rev. 1 B. Emergency News Center (ENC)
- 1. Demonstrate the ability to activate LERO functions at the ENC in a timely manner.
- 2. Demonstrate through rosters the ability to maintain staffing of LERO functions at the ENC on a 24-hour basis.
- 3. Demonstrate the ability to brief the media in a clear accurate, and timely manner.
- 4. Demonstrate the ability to share information with otner agencies at the ENC prior to its release.
S. Demonstrate the ability to establish and operate rumor control in a coordinated manner.
- 6. Demonstrate that the ENC llas adequate space, equipment, and supplies to support emergency operations.
- 7. Demonstrate that the ENC has adequate access control and that secur'ty can be maintained.
- 8. Demonstrate that the ENC nas adequate reproduction capabilities to support runor control and media briefing activities.
- 9. Demonstrate the effective use of the LERO spokesperson to preset.t timely and accurate information to the media.
C. Staging Areas _
- 1. Demonstrate the ability to receive emergency notifications.
- 2. Demonstrate the ability'to activate the staging areas in a timely manner.
- 3. Demonstration through rosters, the ability to maintain staffing at the staging areas on a 24-hour basis.
1-7
ATTAC10ENT 1 _ . _ . . _ ,
L* ~ LILCO f- Emergency Preparedness Drill Scenario Scenario No.- 8A - Rev.1
- 4. Demonstrate that the staging areas have adequate space, -
, parking area, equipment, and supplies to support energency operations.
- 5. Demonstrate that the staging areas can establish appropriate comunication links with the LERO EOC and field personnel using both primary and backup systems.
- 6. Demonstrate that the staging areas have adequate access l control and that security can be maintained. l
- 7. Demonstrate that messages are transmitted in an accurate and timely manner, messages are properly logged, that status boards are accurately maintained and updated, that appropriate briefings are held, and that incoming personnel are briefed.
- 8. Demonstrate that the appropriate official is in charge and in control of an overall response assigned to the staging a rea.
- 9. Demonstrate the ability to dispatch to and direct emergency -
workers in the field.
- 10. Demonstrate the ability to comunicate with all appropriate locations, organizaticns, and field personnel.
- 11. Demonstrate the ability to assign Traffic Guides to Traffic Control posts within the two mile EPZ and to dispatch traffic guides to Traffic Contrci Posts in a timely manner at the appropriate. time.
- 12. Demonstrate knowledge on the part of emergency workers of dosimetry and Potassium Iodide usage procedures and the
' procedures for authorization of radiation exposures above permissable limits.
- 13. Continue bus driver training to ensure bus drivers are familiar with all' bus yards and transfer points.
- 14. Institute the Bus Driver Maintenance System to ensure LERO Bus Drivers do not continually travel to the same Bus Company yards and Transfer Points. In addition, these drills will serve as a make-up for Phase II of the Bus Drivers Driving Instruction Manuals.
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