ML20154H484

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Summary of 980918 Meeting W/Nei,Ucs & Other Util Groups in Rockville,Md Re Continuation of Discussions on Proposed Changes to NRC Enforcement Program.List of Attendees Encl
ML20154H484
Person / Time
Issue date: 10/06/1998
From:
NRC
To:
NRC
References
NUDOCS 9810140208
Download: ML20154H484 (11)


Text

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Y PUBLIC MEETING

SUMMARY

On September 18,1998, members of the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI), the Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS), and other utility groups and the public met with the Director, Office of Enforcement, and NRC staff in the NRC's Rockville office to continue discussions on proposed changes to the NRC's enforcement program. A previous public meeting on possible changes in the enforcement program was conducted on September 3,1998. The list of attendees from the September 18,1998 meeting is attached.

During the meeting, discussions continued on the appropriate level of detail to support Severity Level IV issues. Both NEl and UCS maintained that inspection report write-ups should be brief.

NEl proposed a simple " logging" approach. _ NRC took the position that a certain amount of detail was necessary because the inspection report serves as an input for the assessment process (Plant issues Matrix (PIM)).

NEl also made a presentation that addressed the (1) guiding principles for industry's enforcement proposal, and (2) industry's enforcement proposal. NEl's proposal proposed that escalated enforcement action would be based on actual consequences, potential consequences, and other defined categories, that as a matter of policy would be considered important. NEl indicated that they were still continuing to refine their proposal (especially the third factor for escalated enforcement, i.e., " defined categories"). NEl indicated that they would attempt to submit their recommendations later in October.

Meeting handouts distributed by NEl are attached.

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NEl ENFORCEMENT CHANGES SEPTEMBER 18,1998 NAME TITLE ORGANIZATION PHONE E-MAIL AltC C istArcK SATOIR I u s Assr De aama Fea P4% off af' CAF W- 2nr1 111 A S $ 9 o r .c.,ou '

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I. GUIDING PRINCIPLES FOR INDUSTRY ENFORCEMENT PROPOSAL  !

A. Enforcement Should Be One Part Of An Integrated Oversight Process i l

l The purpose of the NRC's enforcement program should be to encourage remediation of

individual discrepancies or non-compliances and to prevent their recurrence.

l It should not be used as a forum for wide ranging, subjective evaluations of plant or j management performance. The NRC's comprehensive performance assessment process is designed to more effectively provide an overall evaluation of safe plant performance.

l

, The enforcement program can rely on licensee corrective action programs for non-safety significant violations. The assessment process will evaluate the effectiveness of corrective action programs based upon the licensee's overall performance. If the licensee's

performance is good (i.e., performance indicators are predominantly in the " Green Zone"),

l the corrective action program is presumed to be effective. And, even with some minor l l imperfections in the corrective action program, if there is no impact on performance l

indicators, such imperfections are not likely to be important from a safety perspective.

i l If the quantity and severity level of enforcement actions are determined to be data l l appropriately included in the comprehensive assessment process, it will be critical for the l NRC to refocus its enforcement process on objective, safety significant violations. Without l l a properly focused enforcement process, enforcement data fed into the assessment process I

could be misleading. In addition, if enforcement data are included in the assessment I process, the assessment process should respond to that data in a manner proportionate l with their safety significance, i B. Enforcement Should Reflect The Move To Risk-Informed. Performance-l Based Regulation -

Both NRC and industry agree that enforcement action for each and every discrepancy or non-compliance-i.e., an enforcement approach based on a strict liability concept-will not i l advance safety. Such an approach is inefficient and diverts resources from more safety-significant matters. By rafocusing enforcement action on safety significant issues through a risk informed, performance based approach, additionallicensee and NRC inspection resources will be more effectively applied.

! There are several ways to incorporate a risk informed and performance. based approach into the enforcement process. One is to define the lowest level at which a violation has a realistic likelihood of affecting safety, e.g., below Severity Level III. As a matter of policy, l any violation with a safety significance below Severity LevelIII should not be processed through the enforcement process, but rather, the matter should be closed based on the licensee's internal actions to resolve it and to prevent recurrence -

! Another way to incorporate risk information into enforcement is to define severity levels

based upon risk information. Individual enforcement actions should be considered for

^

. escalated treatment only for three well defined categories of violations: (1) those with 4

actual safety consequences; (2) those with only potential safety consequences, but where the potential is realistic and the consequences potentially severe based on objective, risk-7 _ .

. l

. informed criteria; and (3) certain defined violations of other requirements such as 10 1 1

C.F.R. 50.5,50.7, and 50.9 (with safety significance still used as a guide). '

O. Enforcement Policy Criteria Should Be Oblective And Easily Annlied Development of objective, easily applied criteria will assure consistency and predictability I

of enforcement action. Neither civil penalties nor escalation of enforcement should be

! based on " regulatory significance," " regulatory concern" or other undefined terms. '

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i l Enforcement should not provide an opportunity for the NRC to micromanage acensee 1 l

corrective actions based upon subjective judgments of what action is sufficiently prompt and comprehensive. Choosing and implementing corrective actions should be within the l discretion of the licensee. The standard for sufficiency of corrective actions is one of l reasonableness at the time, given the safety significance of the violation involved.

t D. Imnact of Distinctions Between Licensee-Identified And NRC-Identified Violations Should be Limited The enforcement analysis should be reoriented away from who found the violation to ensuring that the licensee remediates the problem and takes action to prevent recurrence.

The revised Enforcement Policy should, however, permit NRC to use discretion to adjust downward, or not issue, a civil penalty if a licensee identifies violations, including during an extended shutdown or as a result of a voluntary initiative. .

E. Enforcement Should Not Be Used To Imnose New Reauirements Enforcement should be premised upon clear and consistently applied requirements.

Enforcement should not be used as a vehicle to drive new NRC positions or to supplant the requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act or of the backfit rule.

F. The Enforcement Process Should Allow Meaningful Checks And Balances The enforcement process should provide an opportunity for a meaningful review of factual, backfit, and legal positions.

2

. II l@USTRY ENFORCEMENT PROPOSAL A. Enforcement Process Would Annly e

The revised enforcement process shcald apply only to those violations that meet a defined level of safety significance-e.g., Severity Level categories I, II, and III as redefined. (See Tables A, B and C.)

Determination of a violation should be based upon clear requirements oflaw. Specific 1

matters that would not be considered violations would include (1) random equipment failures; (2) vague or ambiguous regulatory positions; (3) procedure step violations that are not linked to a specific requirement other than Criterion V or Tech Spec 6.8.1 (i.e.,

the step was not necessary to meet the regulatory requirement, or was added to provide a regulatory margin of safety or additional guidance); and (4) individualisolated random errors in a program that contains multiple barriers (i.e., a reasonable expectation of compliance should be applied to programs which establish multiple barriers).

Enforcement action would be considered for Severity Levels I, II or III regardless of

performance assessment category.

A violation's severity level would be assigned based upon safety signi6cance as defined l

by actual consequences, potential consequences or other categories determined, as a ,

I matter of policy, to be important.

Table A focuses on an actual offsite release, or an onsite release or exposure.

Table B addresses issues with only the potential for consequences. Table B incorporates risk information through categories of high risk significant, risk significant and non risk significant systems, structures and components as defined by

' AEOD. Table B does notincorporate a quantitative risk value. The revised policy would permit the licensee, in the course of an information exchange on potential enforcement action, to provide the NRC with quantitative risk analyses (including consideration of reasonable operator actions) to more precisely quantify the actual plant specific incremental risk created by the event or circumstance. These plant specific risk insights would be used as part of the NRC's exercise of discretion to increase or decrease the severity level of a violation.

Table C addresses those categories determined, as a matter of policy, to be important.

They would be well defined and would include many of the examples covered in the current supplements (e.g., licensed personnel attentiveness,50.59 violations for failure to apply for required NRC approval and "de facto" 50.59 violations; willful / deliberate violations; violations of 50.7; violations of 50.9; violations of reporting requirements; violations of emergency planning requirements; violations of security requirements; and violations of fitness for duty requirements.)

7 The revised Enforcement Policy would permit NRC discretion to adjust or not issue civil

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penalties under certain limited conditions: 1) licensee identification of a violation, including during an extended shutdown or as a result of a voluntary initiative; (2) 3

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mitigating circumstances in 50.7 cases; and (3) the licensee has been enforcement free for two years and its performance is in the " green zone."

The NRC is to bear the " burden of proof' to demonstrate the basis for enforcement action. The NRC should describe clearly the basis of a violation, including the nexus to

. the regulation or other requirement violated, providing the basis for further .

deliberation and application of discretion.

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l B. Enforcement Process Would Not Anulv l

l Current Severity Level IVs, NCVs, and minor violations would be characterized as non.

safety significant infractions (NSSIs).

1 l

  • NSSIs would not be processed through the enforcement process. The lack of safety L significance of NSSIs provides an adequate basis for the agency to conclude, as a matter l of policy, that they should not be subjected to the enforcement process.

Once identified, NSSIs similar to those currently documented in an inspection report would be captured in, for example, an attachment to the inspection report.

Documentation in the attachment would be in the form of a list rather than a narrative description, e.g., " inspector log".

NSSIs would be closed out based on the licensee's action to enter them into its corrective action ("CA") program.

  • The NRC's enforcement policy should reflect that the licensee's corrective action is not to be subjected to NRC evaluation for promptness and comprehensiveness in order to j close out a NSSI. The licensee is permitted to address NSSI corrective actions l according to its priority and schedule, as determined by the corrective action program.
  • The NRC can obtain insight into the licensee's corrective action program through '

regular and other inspections and evaluation of performance assessment indicators.

Identified problems initially would be addressed by an increase in inspection scope.

  • Should the NRC determine through the inspection or assessment process that the corrective action program is lacking in a significant way, greater NRC inspection or other regulatory tools could be applied. Should a more intensive inspection identify additional NSSIs or even repeated NSSIs, they would continue to be addressed through the corrective action program. If safety significant issues are identified, (SL I, II, III),

enforcement action would be considered.

l

. No enforcemant action would be taken even if NSSIs are repetitive. Repetitive instances of a non safety significant infraction do not necessarily represent a breakdown of the corrective action program. However, repetitive NSSIs and other indicators may prompt further inspections and/or action in the context of the performance assessment process.

  • The current practice of aggregating Severity LevelIV violations to impose an increased severity level based upon " programmatic" issues would be discontinued. NSSIs would not be evaluated-at least in the enforcement context-for " regulatory concerns" or

" regulatory significance."

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- s PROPOSED ENFORCEMENT PROCESS

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C Table A l 1

ACTUAL CONSEQUENCES I Offsite Release I I.

I Onsite Releases or Exposures I/II/III (Criteria to be developed)

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Table .B POTENTIAL CONSEQUENCES

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CONDITION HIGH RISK RISK NON RISK SIGNI'1 i CANT SIGNIFICANT SIGNIFICANT SSC SSC ,

SSC Both trains not functional II

  • t III
  • t N/A (in excess of AOT)

One tr^in not functional m a III

  • t NSSI NSSI

. multi-train systen .

' System functional but not operable NSSI NSSI NSSI System degraded from design basis

, NSSI NSSI NSSI or licensing basis but functional -

NOTES:

  • If a system is actually e- 11ed upon, raise one severity level.

f: If reasonable compensatory capability exists, or if compensatory action was taken, lower one severity level.

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