ML20141H083
| ML20141H083 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 06/20/1985 |
| From: | Gillespie F NRC OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REGULATORY RESEARCH (RES) |
| To: | Dircks W NRC OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS (EDO) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20140C992 | List:
|
| References | |
| FOIA-85-653 NUDOCS 8601130410 | |
| Download: ML20141H083 (38) | |
Text
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UNITED ST ATES O
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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g MEMORANDUM FOR: William J. Dircks, Executive Director for Operations FROM:
Frank P. Gillespie, Director Division of Risk Analysis and Operations Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research
SUBJECT:
COMPLICATING EFFECTS OF EARTHQUAKES ON EMERGENCY PLANNING
[
On June 11, 1985, you directed that staff work on the subject Correnission paper be accelerated in order to assure that the paper would be in your office by June 24, 1985. A draft of the paper was sent for office review and comment on June 13, which resulted in limited office input.
The enclosed Comission paper has resolved all comments received and is forwarded for your review prior to an office director meeting in your office on Tuesday, June 25,1985, at 10:00 a.m., to discuss sending the subject paper for Comission consideration.
Frank P. Gillespie, Director Division of Risk Analysis and Operations Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research Enclos'ure:
As stated cc:
H. Denton D. Eisenhut F. Rowsome V. Stello W. Schwink J. Taylcr E. Jordan L. Chandler W. Olmstead G. Cunningham R. Minogue D. Ross
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For:
The Commissioners From:
William J. Dircks Executive Director for Operations
Subject:
FINAL AMENDMENTS TO 10 CFR PART 50, APPENDIX E; CONSIDERATION OF EARTHQUAKES IN THE CONTEXT OF EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS
Purpose:
~To obtain Commission approval for publication in the Federal Register of a final amendment to the regulations that would require limited consideration of the complicating effects of earthquakes in emergency planning.
Catego ry:
This paper covers a major policy matter.
Background:
On December 8, 1981, the Commission ruled in a then pending adjudication that its emergency planning regulations do not require consideration of potential earthquake effects on emer-gency plans for nuclear power reactors. Southern California Edison Company. et al.
(San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 and 3), CLI-81-33, 14 NRC 1091 (1981).
In so ruling the Commission stated:
The Commission will consider on a generic basis whether regulations should be changed to address the potential impacts of a severe earthquake on emergency planning. For the interim, the proximate occurrence of an accidental radiological release and an earthquake that could disrupt normal emergency planning appears sufficiently unlikely that consideration in individual licensing proceedings pending generic consideration of the matter is not warranted. 14 NRC at 1092.
The Commission affirmed this position in the Diablo Canyon proceeding. Pacific Gas and Electric Company (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), CLI-84-12, 20 NRC 249 (August 10, 1984).
In this decision the Commission stated that it would initiate rulemaking "to address whether the potential for seismic impacts on emergency planning is a significant enough concern for large portions of the nation to warrant the amendment
Contact:
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.2 of the regulations to specifically consider those impacts."
20 NRC at 254. The focus of this rulemaking is to "obtain additional information to determine whether, in spite of current indications to the contrary, cost-effective reductions in overall risk may be obtained by the explicit consideration
'of severe earthquakes in emergency response planning."
Id. at 254-255.
Discussion:
On December 21, 1984, the Commission published a proposed rule change to 10 CFR Part 50 that relates to Emergency Planning and Preparedness at Production and Utili7.ation Facilities (49 FR 49640). The proposed rule stated that neither emergency response plans nor evacuation time analyses need consider the impact of earthquakes which cause or occur proximate in time with an accidental release of. radioactive material from a nuclear power reactor. These amendments to 10 CFR 50.47 and 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix E proposed to explicitly incorporate in them the interpretation in the Commission San Onofre and Diablo Canyon rulings.
When the proposed rule was published in the Federal Register
'(49 FR 49640, dated December 21, 1984), it permitted a 30-day comment period. This was then extended until February 27, 1985 (see 50 FR 3797, dated January 28,1985).
In the proposed rule, the Commission requested that commentors
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address the merits of three possible alternative:
1.
Adoption of the proposed rule change which would explicitly incorporate the Commission interpretation in San Onofre and Diablo Canyon (not to consider the impacts of earthquakes in emergency planning).
2.
Leaving the issue open for adjudication on a case-by-case basis; or 3.
Requiring by rule that emergency plans specifically address the impacts of earthquakes.
The Cinamission was also considering whether to include in this rulemaking tornadoes and other low-frequency natural events.
To date, 61 comment letters have been received. Twenty five (25) letters favored the promulgation of the proposed rule. The majority of these letters were from utilities, consulting firms representing utilities, 2 private citizens and the Department of Energy.
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The Commissioners 3
Thirty-four (34) letters were received which were against promulgation of the proposed rule, many of which voicing strong displeasure, shock or disbelief as to the direction that-the Commission was leaning in the proposed rule change. The majority of these letters were from private citizens, interven-tion groups and environmental groups. Approximately 9 of these
' letters were in the signed petition form with approximately 94 signatures in. total.
Additional input was also received from the following foreign countries, all of which stated that the potential complicating effects of earthquakes was not specifically considered in their nuclear power reactor emergency planning: Japan, France, Sweden, Germany and Taiwan.
None of the commentors specifically took a position with the se-cond alternative which would leave the issue open for adjudication on a case-by-case basis.
4 All of the commentors that favored promulgation of the proposed rule into a final rule essentially agreed with the rationale that the Commission used in the Federal Register Notice and provided little amplification or additional conceptual logic which would further support the proposed rule change. Nonetheless, those commentors that were against the proposed rule change provided the Commission with argument that questioned the validity of the rationale in the Federal Register Notice and focused on addi-tional issues that are addressed in the proposed Federal Register Notice (Enclosure 1) of this rulemaking package.
Alternatives:
After careful review of both the San Onofre and Diablo Canyon decisions involving the complicating effects of earthquakes on emergency planning, as well as all public comment letters resulting from the proposed rule change that was published in L
the Federal Register on December 21, 1984, the staff perceives that there exists 5 fundamental alternative approaches which the Commission may wish to consider:
Alternative 1.
Adoption of the proposed rule inte a final rule- "neither emergency response plans nor evacuation time analysis need consider the impacts of earthquakes."
Pro: 1.
Forecloses litigation of the issue in individual licensing cases.
2.
Is consistent with what other countries are doing.
3.
Is consistent with the Commission's San Onofre and Diablo Canyon decisions, i
Con: 1.
Provokes significant negative input from the public because it is perceived that the Commission is attempting to " void" or " write-off" earthquakes.
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m The Commissioners 4
2.
Some PRA analyses have indicated that earthquakes may be an important contributor to risk.
It has been considered by some commentors irrational to not consider the effects of these same earthquakes on emergency response.
4:ternative 2.
Adoption of the proposed rule into a final rule with minor but important word changes, for example, "no additional emergency preparedness measures need be established to account for severe, low frequency natural phenomena than is already required in 10 CFR 50.47 and Appendix E."
Pro: 1.
Forecloses litigation of the issue in individual licensing cases.
2.
The modified wording does not arbitrarily focus on earthquakes.
3.
The modified wording gives the perception that reasonable plans for coping with severe natural phenomena are already in place.
Con: 1.
The public may perceive that the NRC is doing nothing as a result of their input, other than modifying words.
Alternative 3.
Leaving the issue open for adjudication on a case-by-case basis; accomplished by withdrawing the proposed rule or by requiring consideration of earthquakes.
Pro: Could limit consideration of earthquakes to hi-seismic areas.
Con: 1.
Unnecessarily prolongs the licensirg process.
2.
The opportunity for litigation has no bounds--e.g.,
strength of bridges and roads may be litigated.
Alternative 4.
Promulgate a final rule which might state that
" State earthquake preparedness planning should take into account all nuclear power plants within its boundaries. In so doing, the Commission finds that this would provide reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken."
Pro: 1.
Blends the nuclear power plant in with other industries.
2.
Provides comparable protection to the public relative to other industries throughout the State.
3.
May not require the State to establish additional preparedness around a nuclear power reactor.
The Commissioners 5
Con: 1.
Because each State's ability to deal with earthquakes is different, the generic finding of reasonable assurance may be inappropriate to make.
1 2.
The State's earthquake preparedness program would be open to litigation and possibly would be open to litige-tion and may cause more delay in the licensing process.
Alternative 5: Promulgate a final rule which clarify the original intent of the Commission and states that emergency response plans shall assure that the following decisionmaking preplanning capabilities exist relative to the complicating impacts of severe, low frequency natural phenomena that may be expected during the life of the plant. The intensity of the
_ ent shall be no greater than the design basis for that event.
j ev 1.
Ability to transport necessary personnel to the plant to cope with degraded modes of plant operation.
2.
Ability to communicate to the offsite authorities any plant damage.
3.
Ability to obtain damage estimates to the plant. This information should be available to factor into the decision-making process, including recommendations to offsite authorities for protective actions after severe, low frequency natural phenomena.
4.
Offsite authorities should consider decisionmaking preplanning that takes into account various degrees and locations of damage to the plant environs.
Pro: 1.
Defines scope of issues open to litigation.
2.
This would be a clarification rule change, thus the 1
Commission would not be seen as changing its decisions.
I 3.
This is a compromise position between not requiring consideration of earthquakes and requiring consideration.
4.
This includes all natural phenomena.
5.
This consideration has already been done at San Onofre and Diablo Canyon (although not litigated).
6.
This assessment is not that difficult or expensive to accomplish.
Con: 1.
May permit some litigation of the adequacy of assessment performed.
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The Commissioners 6
2.
May open litigation at operating reactors.
Having considered all of the above, as well as all comments received, past operating reactor and emergency preparedness experiences and the ACRS comments, the staff recommends that a final. rule be promulgated that would embrace the conce' pts of Alternative 5.
This final rule would:
1.
Clarify and articulate the Commission original concept of specifying what flexibility is required in emergency plans in order to assure that there exists..." reasonable assurance that appropriate protective actions can and will be taken..."
to mitigate (not eliminate) the consequences of a radio-logical accident.
- ~2 Assure the capability to transport necessary personnel to the plant to cope with the degraded modes of plant operation.
3.
Assure the capability to communicate to the offsite authorities any plant damage.
4.
Assure the capability to obtain plant damage estimates.
5.
Assure that offsite authorities consider decisionmaking preplanning that takes into account various degrees and locations of offsite damage resulting from severe, low frequency natural phenomena.
This staff recommendation would specifically not require:
1.
Evacuation time estimates that consider the complicating effects of severe, low frequency natural phenomena.
2.
That roads, bridges, buildings and other structures be reinforced to withstand the effects of severe, low frequency natural phenomena.
FEMA Coordination: Because FEMA is directly involved in the evaluation of offsite emergency preparedness and would be affected by the promulgation of these amendments, the NRC staff has kept the FEMA staff advised on the development of this paper. Based on this inter-action, FEMA does not concur in the staff recommended course of action, but would concur in proceeding with a final rule which embrasses alternative 2.
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The Commissioners 7
Cost Estimate:
The staff anticipates no significant cost impact on licensees, or State and local governments as a result of promulgation of this final rule change.
Recommendations:
1.
Approve for publication in the Federal Register a notice of final rulemaking (Enclosure 1) to 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix E to be effective 30 days after publication.
2.
Note:
(a) That appropriate Congressional committees will be,
notified of the rule change (Enclosure 2).
(b) That the ACRS is being informed of the rule change.
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(c) ThAt, pursuant to 10 CFR S 51.5(d)(3) of the Commission's regulations, an environmental impact statement, negative declaration, or environmental impact appraisal need not be prepared in connection with the subject final rule change because there is no substantive or significant environmental impact.
(d) That pursuant to the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980, the Federal Register Notice contains a statement that the Commission certifies that this final rule will not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities, and a copy of this certification will be forwarded to the Chief Counsel for Advocacy, SBA, by the Division of Rules and Records, ADB.
(e) That the Federal Register Notice contains a statement that, pursuant to the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980, the NRC has made a detern.ination that the rule change does not impose new recordkeeping, information collec-tion, or reporting requirements.
(f) That the Federal Register Notice will be sent by TIDC, ADM, to affected applicants, licensees, and persons that commented on the proposed rule.
(g) That a public announcement of the final rule change will be made.
(h) That the staff recommends this Commission paper be placed in the PDR.
(1) That a Regulatory Analysis is attached as Enclosure 3.
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- The Commissioners 3
Sunshine Act:
- Recommtnd corsideration at an open meeting.
Schedulina:
For early considerations.
William J. Dircks Executive Director for Operations
Enclosures:
Federal Register Notice of Final Rule Change to 10 CFR, Part 50, Appendix E a
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NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 10 CFR Part 50 Emergency Planning and Preparedness AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
ACTION: Final rule.
SUMMARY
- The Commission is amending its regulations in 10 CFR Part 50 in order to assure that decisionmaking preplanning capabilities exist relative to the complicating impacts of severe, low frequency, natural phenomena on emergency preparedness. The Commission anticipates that this final regulation will not have significant impact on emergency preparedness requirements established by the August 1980 emergency planning requirements (45 FR 55402) but will provide clarification as to the Commission's original intent in the San Onofre and Diablo Canyon full power licensing decision.
EFFECTIVE DATE:
[ Insert 30 days after publication in the Federal Register.]
FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Michael T. Jangochian, Division of Risk Analysis and Operations, Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research, U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555. Telephone (301)443-7615.
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[7590-01]
SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: On December 21, 1984, the Commission published a proposed rule change to 10 CFR Part 50 that relates to Emergency Plann-ing and Preparedness at Production and Utilities Facilities (49 FR 49640).
The proposed rule states that neither emergency response plans nor evacuation time analyses need consider the impact of earthquakes which cause an occur proximate in time with, an accidental release of radioac-tive material from a nuclear power reactor. These amendments to 10 CFR 50.47 and 10 CFR Part 50 Appendix E proposed to explicitly incorporate in them the interpretation in the Commission's San Onofre and Diablo Canyon rulings.-
On December 8, 1981, the Commission ruled in a then pending adjudica-tion that its emergency planning regulations do not require consideration of potential earthquake effects on emergency plans for nuclear power reactors. Southern California Edison Company, et al.
San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 and 3), CLI-81-33, 14 NRC 1091 (1981).
In so ruling the Commission stated:
The Commission will consider on a generic basis whether regulations should be changed to address the potential impacts of a severe earthquake on emergency planning. For the interim, the proximate occurrence of an accidental radiological release and an earth-quake that could disrupt normal emergency planning appears sufficiently unlikely that consideration in individual licensing proceedings pending generic consideration of the matter is not warranted. 14 NRC at 1092.
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q.-
J The' Commission recently affirmed this position in the Diablo Canyon proceeding. Pacific Gas and Electric Company (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), CLI-84-12, 20 NRC 249 (August 10, 1984),
. San Luis'0bispo Mothers for Peace v. NRC 751 F.2d 1287, (D.C. Cir. 1984);
i rehearina enhance granted.
In this decision the Commission stated that J
it would initiate rulemaking "to address whether the potential for seismic impacts on emergency planning is a significant enough concern for
?
large portions of the nation to warrant the amendment of the regulation *s to specifically consider those impacts. The chief focus of the rule-
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' makingwastoobtainadditionalinformationtodeterminewhether,in spite of' current indications to the contrary, cost-effective reductions N
in overall ris,k may be obtained by the exp' licit consideration of severe s
g earthquakes in emergency response planning." Id. at 254-255.
When the proposed rule was published in the Federal Register j
(49 FR 49640, dated December;21, 1984), it permitted a 30-day comment t
period, this was then extended until February 27, 1985 (see 50 FR 3797,
\\
.r dated January 28, 1985).,
r In the proposed rule, the Commission requested that comment' ors address the merits of-three possible alternative:
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e 1.
Adoption of the proposed rule change which would explicitly incorporate the Commission interpretation in San Onofre and Diablo Canyon (not to consider the impacts of earthquakes in emergency planning).
2.
Leaving the issue open for adjudication on a case-by-case basis; 1
or l.
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[7590-01) 3.
Requiring by rule that emergency plans specifically address the impacts of earthquakes.
The Commission was also considering whether to include in this rulemaking tornadoes and other low-frequency natural events.
To date, 61 comment letters have been received. Twenty five (25) letters favored the promulgation of the proposed rule. The majority of these letters were from utilities, consulting firms representing utilities, 2 private citizens a,d the Department of Energy.
Thirty-four (34) letters were received which were against promulgation of the proposed rule, many of which, voicing strong displeasure, shock or disbelief as to the direction that the Commission was leaning in the proposed rule change. The majority of these letters were from private citizens, intervenor groups and environmental groups.
Approximately 9 of these letters were in the signed petition form with approximately 94 signatures in total.
Additional input was also received from the following foreign countries, all of which stated that the potential complicating effects of earthquakes was not specifically considered in their nuclear power reactor emergency planning: Japan, France, Sweden, Germany and Taiwan None of the public commentors or foreign countries specifically took a position with the alternative to leave the issue open for adjudication on a case-by-case basis.
All of the commentors that favored promulgation of the proposed rule into a final rule essentially agreed with the rational that the Commission used in the Federal Register Notice and provided little amplification or additional conceptual logic which would further support 4
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I the proposed rule change. Nonetheless, those commentors that were against the proposed rule change provided the Commission with arguments that questioned the validity of the rational in the Fsderal Register Notice and focused on additional issues that will be addressed iii this Federal Register Notice.
s A compilation of these. issues with an accompanying Commission response follows:
s i
Issue 1.
There exists lim {ted or no record (or Data) concerning the flexibility of emergency plans to support the proposed rule, therefore, the Commissior, cannot make a generic finding that effects of below-SSE earthquakes on emergency planning are always resolved by the general flexibility of emergency plans.
Commission Response:
3 The Commission's emergency planning regulations require that emergency response plans be prepared and implemented by the 1,icensee to cope with the onsite consequences of accidents, and the State and local i
governments to cope with offsite consequences of accidents. While the major thrust of the NRC's r.quiremen d is intended to co w r radiological accidents originating at the licensee's facility, the basic p1anning necessary to fulfill those reqcirements results in a broad base of 4
emergency planning and preparedness which can be used by all organiza-tions to respond to other, types of accidents, regardit(s of their origin.
Good emergency.plann'ing and preparedness results in the solidifica-tion of a number of key elements including: preestablished division of 5
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[7590-01)
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responsibilities and authorities; preestablished management controls; provisions for timely and informed decisionmaking; coordination of response organizations; adequate primary and backup communications systems; written procedures to guide emergency response personnel; and training for emergency response personnel. Good emergency planning and' preparedness is realistic, not abstract.
It results in a heightened awareness of emergency workers to the complex nature of emergency response.
It also results in an improved general state of mind or
" confidence" by those personnel due to their increased understanding of the multitude o'f relatively simple tasks which combine to form complex, diverse response capabilities. The training emergency workers have received relative to their specific duties fosters rapid and accurate response to emergency situations.
An 1,ntegral part of emergency planning and preparedness is the use of exercises and drills to give emergency workers an opportunity to fine tune their individual skills, and to develop the individual, team, and organizational interfaces and skills necessary to enhance timely and appropriate response to a wide variety of potential accident conditions.
Since August 1980, more than 200 exercises have been conducted in the U.S. related to nuclear power plants. A review of 135 of the more recent exercises, revealed that 36 exercises had natural disasters as major initiating events including: earthquakes (10) tornados (5): lightning strikes (6 with one offsite fire); bomb threats (4 one with two simulated explosions); and plane crashes (5). Further, ammonia spills, ice storms, thunderstorms, truck cra -hes, hurricanes, high winds, hail, and fires have been used as major complicating events in exercises.
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In addition to exercises, actual or potential events have occurred which have caused the activation of emergency response plans around U.S.
nuclear power plant sites. Between August 1982 and March 1985, the USNRC's Incident Response Center recorded 29 licensee emergency notifications based on natural events. These actual or potential natural events included seismic events (2), tornadoes (5), hot weather (1), cold weather (3), hurricanes (2), lightning strikes (4), offsite fires (2), flooding (2), high winds (1), and severe storms (2). Beyond natural events which have caused activation of emergency response plans around nuclear power plant sites, mechanical problems at the plants have resulted in almost 600 activations.
The Commission believes that the overall emergency response has been greatly enhanced by participation in the emergency planning at the nuclear power plants and by participation in drills and exercises associated with the planning.
Based on the above information, and extensive interviews and discussions held between NRC emergency preparedness reviewers and representatives of offsite response organizations during exercises and inspections, the staff believes that there has been a substantial increase in the flexibility of basic emergency response planning around U.S. nuclear power plants sites. This flexibility demonstrates that response organization can appropriately respond to a wide range of potential accidents, with all of their inherent complicating effects, without the promulgation of additional regulatory requirements.
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Issue 2.
The proposed rule violates the NRC's emergency planning principle of planning for accidents ranging from design basis accidents to core-melt accidents, with the capacity to reduce the consequences of even the most severe accidents.
Commission Response:
The Commission does not agree. With the continued planning base required by the NRC emergency planning regulations as well as the obvious flexibility illustrated by the Commission's response to Issue #1 the Commission finds that the final rule change will continue to provide for the public health and safety.
Issue 3.
Emergency planning should focus on accident consequences and accident initiators not just the consequences of potential accidents.
Commission Response:
Flexibility to accommodate a wide spectrum of potential impediments to emergency response actions is provided by the NRC's regulations and guidance which require consideration of adverse conditions irrespective of cause.
In the joint FEMA /NRC document entitled " Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants (NUREG-0654, FEMA-REP-1, Rev. 1) the Commission's philosophy of assuring both a broad and flexible preparedness in response to a wide spectrum of events is articulated.
In this Commission document it is stated at pp. 6, 7:
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"No single specific accident sequence should be isolated as the one for which to plan because each accident could have different consequences, both in nature and degree. Further, the range of possible selection for a planning basis is very large, starting with a zero point of requiring no planning at all because significant offsite radiological accident consequences are unlikely to occur, to planning for the worst possible accident, regardless of its extremely low likelihood. The NRC/ EPA Task Force did not attempt to define a single accident sequence or even a limited number of sequences. Rather, it identified the bounds of the parameters for which planning is recommended...."
Issue 4.
Like all other safety systems, seismically qualified equip-ment must also be assumed to fail for purposes of emergency planning.
Commission Response:
The Commission disagrees. All safety systems are not assumed to fail for purposes of the emergency planning regulations.
Issue 5.
Emergency Planning must include the complicating effects of earthquakes up to and beyond SSE levels.
Commission Response:
The magnitude of the SSE and the adequacy of a plant's design to meet the SSE are reviewed by NRC and may be challenged in adjudicatory pro-ceedings, but, once settled, should not be reconsidered in reviewing or i
adjudicating emergency planning issues. Consistant with the Commission's 9
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[7590-01]
regulations, if a larger varthquake were considered appropriate to provide reasonable assurance that a nuclear power plant can be constructed and operated at a given site without undue risk to the health and safety of the public than a larger SSE would be established. Thus, emergency plans need not take into account earthquakes larger or smaller than an SSE.
Nevertheless, the basis for emergency planning is not constrained by the design basis for a plant and emergency planning efforts recognize the possibility that events considered beyond the design basis can occur. A spectrum of potential consequences independent of the particular causes are anaTyzed in reaching decisions on emergency planning provisions, and the planning basis does not depend upon the particular scenario which may lead to significant offsite releases of radioactivity.
Issue 6.
The Commission's fundamental obligation, is to determine whether " adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency." 10 CFR 5 50.47(a).
If circumstances pre-vent the NRC from finding that emergency plans can provide that assurance, it must deny the license.
Commission Response:
The Commission agrees that if the NRC cannot make the finding that i
"...there is reasonable assurance that adequate protective measures can and will be taken in the event of a radiological emergency" to mitigate (not eliminate) the consequences of an accident, the operating license must be denied. Various governmental authorities, consultants, and members 5
of the public have argued that an emergency plan cannot be developed that would eliminate public health risk from all of the possible reactor j
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accidents including those which occur in conjunction with severe, low frequency natural phenomena. However, since complete elimination of all risk is not even theoretically possible, it is the objective of the NRC emergency preparedness regulations is to reduce the risk to the public health and safety by planning in advance how to respond to nuclear power plant accidents, it is recognized that the NRC's emergency preparedness regulations cannot ensure that no one in the public would receive a dose in excess of the EPA protective action guidelines (PAGs) for every accidental release, regardless of timing, severity or likelihood. Based
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on experience,'the NRC has noted that there are many uncertainties asso-ciated with potential accidents and that emergency preparedness is not a panacea for eliminating all risk to the public.
The NRC would not license a plant if the radiological risk posed by possible accidents wera not very small - even in the absence of emergency preparedness. Nevertheless, the NRC has chosen to require emergency pre-paredness as another level of " defense-in-depth," the principle that a variety of independent and diverse level of protection should be afforded the public from the hazard of radiation exposure. The NRC believes that reasonable efforts to anticipate and plan for public protective actions in the vicinity of a commercial nuclear plant can substantially reduce, though not eliminate, the already small offsite radiological risk, and is, therefore, a prudent if not essential requirement.
Issue 7.
Inasmuch as seismic PRA analysis has indicated that earth-quakes are among dominant causes of core melt accidents, it is irrational to ignore the effects that these same earthquakes can have on emergency response.
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Commission Response:
Past seismic PRA analyses have indicated that very large earth-quakes (2 to 4 times SSE) may be among the important or dominant contributors to the probability of core-melt accidents or public risk.
However, these PRA studies (including the NRC sponsored Seismic Safety Margins Research Program _(SSMRP) which calculated the seismic risk at the Zion Nuclear Power Plant) found that the risk of a core-melt accident is caused only by very improbable earthquakes with ground motions (in terms of peak ground acceleration) several times the already severe design basis ground motions. In addition, the failure levels used in seismic PRA studies for structures, components and equipment are based, in general, on very conservative assumptions. For example many equipment failure levels were based on qualification tests and do not reflect the true capacity to sustain vibratory motion beyond the design levels. It would be expected that when more realistic failure levels are used the significance of the earthquake threat will diminish. NRC efforts are currently urderway to better define the needed failure data to provide more realistic inputs to seismic PRA studies. It should be noted that the current seismic PRAs, with their generally conservative bias, have not shown unacceptably high core-melt probabilities. For example, the NRC sponsored seismic PRA of the Zion plant shows a core melt probability of 3 x 10 5 per year.
With these studies in mind, the Commission nonetheless never intended to give the preception that it was " ignoring" the complicating effects of earthquakes on emergency response. Therefore, the enclosed final rule is to clarify and articulate the Commission's original intent of specifying what flexibility is required in emergency plans in order to 12
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assure that there exists reasonable assurance that appropriate protec-tive actions can and will be taken to mitigate (not eliminate) the consequences of a radiological accident.
Issue 8.
Defects in seismic design and quality assurance in construc-tion have consistently undermined the seismic strength of plant systems and structures.
It is thus irrational for the NRC to write off earthquakes as an emergency planning issue at the same time it is exhibiting growing concern regarding the effects of earthquakes on nuclear power plant site.
Commission Response The assertion in this issue that there is a growing concern about the ability of nuclear power plants to withstand the effects of large earthquakes is, simply, incorrect.
If anything, recent work by the Seismic Qualification Utility Group (SQUG), based on actual behavior of industrial facilities and their equipment in large earthquakes, leads to the conclusion that more margin against earthquakes larger than included in the design basis than was previously thought.
Earthquakes simultaneously affect all plant safety systems and do tend to " search out" design, construction and maintenance errors which could degrade plant safety.
In a general way, only very gross errors are of concern since NRC standards and industry codes provide margins against minor to moderate errors. The comments tend to confuse the regulatory issue of a plant not being butit in accordance with the commitments in the utility license application with the safety issue of 4
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[7590-01]
earthquake resistance of the plant as built. A discrepancy between as-built and as designed does not, of itself, imply significant degrada-tion in seismic resistance. However, the burden of justifying that the as-built plant is adequate rests with the licensee. One cannot assume, a priori, that resistance is either better or worse.
Issue 9.
The use of unreliable seismic design bases is flawed and therefore its use as a basis for rulemaking is inappropriate.
Commissi~on Response:
While uncertainties do exist in estimating the behavior of structures, systems and components subjected to seismic effects, these uncertainties are explicitly treated in the design process through the introduction of conservatisms in the procedures. The end product tends to reflect an over design against earthquakes. Current NRC research activities in seismic design of nuclear power plants is directed towards achieving greater realism through the removal of unneeded and undesirable seismic conservatism when it reduces overall plant reliability. For example the excessive use of snubbers to resit earthquake loads may lead to an unbalance in overall safety because some of the snubbers may not function properly and lead to high thermal stresses during normal operation.
Issue 10.
Even if a reactor is designed to withstand earthquakes of a certain magnitude, an earthquake can indirectly lead to an accident by causing operator error. Thus, operators may react to the trauma of an earthquake and the distraction of fluctuating instruments by making mistakes that lead to serious accidents.
14
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Commission Response:
The NRC has conducted extensive research relative to this issue, the purpose of which was to determine if conditions of psychological stress induced by emergency conditions in a nuclear power plant have a signifi-cant adverse effect on operator performance of typical tasks required during plant emergencies. To this end, three technical tasks were under-taken: (1) the technical findings from prior research studies of human performance under stress were reviewed and evaluated, (2) an experiment was performed with 24 trained reactor operators under varying conditions of psychological stress to measure the effectiveness of their decision-making and responses for different reactor operational requirements, and (3) review of post-earthquake procedures and reactor operator training programs used by six licensed operating reactors which are f
geographically near seismically sensitive areas on the East and West Coasts.
Analysis of these findings from the literature and from the operator experiments identified general measures for decreasino the effects of stress. These are: (1) training programs geared to develop operator knowledge, characteristics, and coping mechanisms which will enhance operator performance under stressful conditions; (2) training programs and procedures which are compatible with the response characteristics of operators experiencing stress; and (3) awareness by supervisors, manage-ment and operating personnel of operator characteristics which are related to decisionmaking performance under stress. The six plants responded to the request for documentation of their post-earthquake operating procedures and operator training. Procedures were found to have different levels of details regarding the tasks of the operator.
15
[7590-01]
Sensors and systems for earthquake detection varied considerably between plants, as did the type and amount of information provided by instrumentation to the operating crew. However, not withstanding the differences among plants in terms of systems, training, and detail of procedures, all the plants reviewed have adopted a very similar approach concerning what actions to take following on earthquake.
Issue 11. Emergency Plans are unique, for example, a rural and sparsely populated area may pose fewer evacuation problems, and thus
~
require 1ess flexibility, than an urban and densely populated plant site.
Thus, emergency plans cannot be found to possess the same degree of
" flexibility" in every case.
Commission Response:
The Commission does not agree, please note the Commission response to Issue #1.
Issue 12. Earthquakes are distinct phenomena the following distinct features of earthquakes are:
eSirens and broadcasting systems could be knocked down and roads could be severely obstructed in an earthquhke.
--Although sheltering may be presumed to be available in almost any other type of natural event, it could be rendered useless by an earthquake.
--An earthquake is likely to disrupt the distribution of water, natural gas, and gasoline, thus causing fires &nd impeding the efforts of firefighters.
16
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--An earthquake is likely to impair or destroy the ability to monitor potential radiation releases and meteorological conditions.
--An earthquake can damage transportation routes by collapse of
(
bridges and overpasses, liquefaction of roads, and landslides.
--An earthquake can cause the collapse of structures (including those housing personnel directing the emergency planning effort, l'
relocation and decontamination facilities, and local agency services) or render sheltering useless due to damage.
--An earthquake is likely to cause a loss of offsite power, with its f
attendant effect on. communications, as well as to potentially render
~
useless other (backup) methods of communication such as radio transmissions.
--An earthquake is likely to cause physical and fright-induced
-(e.g., heart attack) injuries, thereby overloading medical facilities and ambulance and rescue services.
Commission Response:
The Commission disagrees. All of the consequences listed above could also result from other severe, low frequency natural phenomena such tornadoes hurricanes, floods, etc.
1 l
Issue 13. FEMA's emergency plans do not adequately provide for earthquake response in a radiological emergency.
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Commission Response:
The Commission disagrees. FEMA conducts two planning programs, the Radiological Emergency Preparedness (REP) program and the Earthquake Hazard Reduction program that, when completed, tested and exercised for the areas around nuclear power plants, will provide the basis for adequate Federal, State and local governmental response to protect the public in the very unlikely event of a coincident major earthquake and radiological emergency.
The objective of FEMA's Radiological Emergency Preparedness (REP)
~
program is to assure that an integrated capability exists for State and local governments, together with utilities, to implement protective measures to protect public health and safety in the event of an emer-gency. FEMA cocrdinates the activities of 10 Federal agencies in reviewing and evaluating State and local government planning and preparedness around nuclear power plants through its 10 Regional Assistance Committees (RAC's). These evaluations are effected through assessment of emergency plans, and observation and evaluations of i
l exercises designed to test the capabilities of government entities.
Also, FEMA has developed and published the Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan (49 FR 34896) for radiological emergencies including commercial nuclear power plant accidents on September 12, 1984.
FEMA has an active program of earthquake hazard reduction that l
coordinates Federal preparedness and mitigation activities and provides technical and financial assistance to States and local communities in all segments of emergency management. This includes hazard awareness, assessment, preparedness, mitigation, response, and recovery. The t
Federal response planning provides for the supplemental help and recovery.
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The Federal response planning provides for the supplemental help to State and local governments required to save lives and provide for basic human needs after a major earthquake. FEMA expects to publish the National Plan for Federal Response to a catastrophic earthquake in December 1985. Drafts of the plan serve as an interim operating guide for Federal agencies to use in the event of an earthquake prior to completion of the follow-on regional planning.
FEMA technical and financial assistance to State and local earth-quake hazard reduction programs focuses upon preparedness and response plannin(, and provides for implementation and t.aining exercises. The planning includes such activities as: hazards identification, vulnerabil-ity analysis, casualty and property loss estimates, and potential impacts resulting from damage to critical and special facilities (such as nuclear power plants) and lifelines. FEMA estimates that sufficient earthquake response planning (annexes to State and local emergency operation plans) will be in place for the thirteen high-risk, high population areas currently being studied by the year 1996.
Both the earthquake and radiological preparedness programs are carried out in a manner that addresses the integration of common func-tions such as communication, alert and notification, protective actions and decisionmaking, while recognizing unique management requirements such as radiological measurement and earthquake resistant design and con-struction techniques. The ultimate goal in both program efforts is to facilitate the development of management and operational capabilities to I
analyze the need for protective action, make protective action decisions l
and implement appropriate operations. They are complimentary in that the capabilities developed under the radiological program provide the means 19 r
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(7590-01]
for coping with the various hazards that might present themselves during a major earthquake.
Issue 14.
Has the Commission considered the contribution to risk that seismic events, up to an SSE, pose.
Commission Resoonse:
The Commission has considered this contribution. This analysis estimates the increment of core damage Ilkelihood given the occurrence of a Safe Shutdown Earthquake (SSE). This evaluation assumes the plant design meets NRC regulations requiring it be able to reach a safe shutdown state given an $$E (or less) earthquake. At the SSE intensity level, the factor expected to have greatest effect on safe plant shutdown is whether or not offsite power is available. Because of a lack of adequate seismic operational experience data--a bounding analysis is made by assuming that offsite power is lost as a result of 1
the $$E. The plant and plant safety systems are designed to safely cope I
with the SSE without external grid power. However, some flexibility and ability to improvise is lost when offsite power is lost, and this is primarily what causes the increase in potential core damage given a shutdown following an $$E versus a " normal" shutdown.
Two plant safety systems contribute the most to $$E core damage scenarios. The first in the onsite emergency AC power (Diesel i
j Generators) failing and not being recovered before battery depletion.
l The second is the emergency coolant system Auxiliary Feedwater System I
(AFWS) er High Coolant Injection / Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (HPL!/RCIC) failing to supply cooling water. Given failure of these 20
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[7590-01]
cooling systems, there is possible recovery either thru Feed and Bleed (PWR) or depressurization and low pressure injection (BWR). However, even if these alternate cooling means became effective the reduction in core damage likelihood is estimated to be at most a factor of two. No credit is taken for the possible recovery of lost systems in the analysis on which this estimate is based.
As indicated, this analysis assumes offsite power is lost due to the seismic event. Loss of offsite power in turn causes loss of Main Feedwater System (MFWS), and results in turbine trip, and reactor trip.
The Diesel Generators (DG) would be automatically commanded on along with AFWS (PWR), or HPCI/RCIC (BWR). The AFWS and HPCI/RCIC will still operate even if DGs fail because they are steam driven and they use plant emergency DC Power (batteries) for instrumentation and control.
The batteries should last a nominal 4 to 8 hours9.259259e-5 days <br />0.00222 hours <br />1.322751e-5 weeks <br />3.044e-6 months <br /> at which time either a DG must be recovered or offsite power must be restored.
If the offsite power or DGs are not recovered before battery depletion, then core damage is expected to occur. Note that short du'c U on" interruptions of cooling water could be tolerated after approximately one hour when the decay heat rate reduces to approximately 1% power.
The differences between the core melt probability given an SSE versus a " normal" shutdown is primarily due to offsite power being available in the normal shutdown. Even assuming that the normal shutdown is initiated by a loss of offsite power event, still the likelihood of relatively rapid recovery of offsite power is higher than I
would be expected if the loss of offsite power were accompanied by physical damage to grid or grid equipment which might be expected given a seismic event.
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The estimation for the above core damage frequency are made by multiplying the likelihood of emergency power failure,gr coolant system failure by the postulated frequency of SSEs as follows:
CD freq/yr = $55E (DG fail + AFWS fail]
PWRs CD freq/yr = g5SE (DG fail + RCIC/HPCI fail]
gWRs This analysis assumes an $$E initiating event frequency of 3 E-4/RY.
Note that typical value of SSE are.in the range of 10.a to 10 4/ year.
Nominal values for equipment failure quantification are taken from the precursor report, NUREG/CR-35g1 providing the following " generic" estimation of core damage frequency per reactor year due to SSE events.
CD freq/yr a 3 E-4 [3.7 E-4 + 2.7 E-4] a 2 E PWRs CD freq/yr = 3 E-4 (2.2 E-3 + 2.2 E-3] a 1 E 6 gWRs Note that each new seismic analysis (PRA) has discovered particular seismic susceptibility for the plant analyzed. These plant differences may preclude much meaning for a " generic seismic estimation." Seismic analyses performed in some recent PRA's have estimated seismic contribu-tion to core damage frequency of from approximately 1 E-7 to approximately 6 E-5/RY, but the centribution is mainly from seismic levels 2 to 3 times to 55E.
Note that there could be a spectrum of earthquakes up to the SSE which could result in damage to electrical grid er grid structures.
These lesser earthquakes would have an increased frequency, and the integrated effect of these lessor earthquakes would tend to increase the care damage frequency estimates. We note however that the core damage frequency estimated herein is only a fraction of the espected core 22
.o' (7590-01]
damage frequency due to other random equipment failures or initiating events affecting plants. Recent PRA's have estimated core damage frequency of from 10
- to 10.s/RY due to all causes excluding seismic.
Having considered all of the above, as well as all comments received, past operating reactor and emergency preparedness experiences, and the i
ACR$ comments, the Commission has determined that a final rule be promul-gated that would:
1.
Clarify and articulate the Commission's original concept of specifyi'ng what flegibility is required in emergency plans in order to assure that there exists "... reasonable assurance that appropriate protec-tive actions can and will be taken..." to mitigate (not eliminate) the consequences of a radiological accident.
i 2.
Assure the capability to transport necessary personnel to the plant to cope with the degraded modes of plant operation.
3.
Assure the capability to communicate to the offsite authorities any plant damage.
4.
Assure the capability to obtain plant damage estimates.
5.
Assure that offsite authorities consider decisionmaking preplanning that takes into account various degrees and locations of offsite damage resulting from severe, low frequency natural phenomena, This staff recosmondation would specifically not requires i
1.
Evacuation time estimates that censider the complicating effects of severe, low frequency natural phenomena, i
23
(7590-01]
2.
That roads, bridges, buildings and other structures be reinforced to withstand the effects of severe. Iow frequency natural phenomena.
Because FEMA is dire 9tly involved in the evaluation of offsite emer-gency preparedness exercises and is affected by the promulgation of these amendments, the NRC consulted extensively with FEMA during the development of this rule and as a result has concurred in the rule change.
'~
FIN 0!NG 0F N0 SIGNIFICANT ENVIRONNENT IMPACT The Commission has determined under the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, as amended, and the Commission's regulations in Subpart A of 10 CFR Part 51, that this rule, is not a major Federal action significantly affecting the quality of the human environment and therefore an environ-mental impact statement is not required. See 10 CFR 50.22(a)(1). More-2 over, the Commission has determined, pursuant to 10 CFR 51.32, that the 1-final rule has no significantly environmental impact. This determination i
has been made because the Commission cannot identify any impact on the i
human environment associated with limited decistenmaking preplanning
?
relating to the complicating effects of severe, low frequencies natural i
phenomena en emergency preparedness.
The alternative approaches that were considered in this rulemaking proceedings were:
1.
Not to consider the complicating effects of earthquakes en emergency plans er evacuation time estimates.
j 24 inclosure 1 l
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[7590-01]
2.
To not require additional emergency preparedness measures to cope with the complicating effects of earthquakes.
3.
Leave the complicating effects of earthquakes on emergency planning open to consideration on a case-by-case basis.
4.
Requiring that State Earthquake Preparedness take into account all nuclear power plants within their boundaries.
5.
Promulgate a clarification rule change which would limit the assessment of the complicating effects of severe, low frequency natural phenomena to certain decisionmaking preplanning capabilities.
PAPERWORK REDUCTION ACT STATEMENT The final rule contains no information collection requirements and therefore is not subject to the requirements of the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980 (44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.).
REGULATORY ANALYSIS The Commission has prepared a regulatory analysis of this regulation.
The analysis examines the costs and benefits of the rule as considered by the commission. A copy of the regulatory analysis is available for inspec-tion and copying, for a fee, at the NRC Public Document Room, 1717 H Street NW., Washington, DC. Single copies of the analysis may be obtained from Nichael T. Jangochian, Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Washington, DC 20555, Telephone (301)443 7615.
25
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[7590-01) i REGULATORY FLEXI8ILITY CERTIFICATION In accordance with the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980, 5 U.S.C.
5 605(b), the Commission hereby certifies that this final rule will not, if promulgated, have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities. The final rule clarifies certain elements and findings necessary for the issuance of an operating license for a nuclear power plant licensed pursuant to Section 103 and 104b of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended 42 U.S.C. 2133, 2134b. The electric utility companies
~
which own and operate nuclear power plants are dominant in their service areas and do not fall within the definition of a small business found in l
Section 3 of the Small Business Act, 15 U.S.C. 632, or within the Small Business Size Standards set forth in 13 CFR Part 121. Accordingly, there is no significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities under the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980.
LIST OF SUBJECTS IN 10 CFR PART 50 Part 50 - Antitrust, Classified information, Fire prevention, i
Incorporation by reference, Intergovernmental relations, Nuclear power plants and reactors, Penalty, Radiation protection, Reactor siting criteria, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements.
Pursuant to the Atomic Energy Act of 1964, as amended, the Energy Reorganlaation Act of 1974, as amended, and Section 552 and 533 of Title 5 of the United States Code, notice is hereby given that the following amendments to Title 10 Chapter I, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 50 is published as a document subject to codf fication.
26 L._ _ _
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PART 50 - DOMESTIC LICENSING 0F PRODUCTION ANO UTILIZATION FACILITIES t
1.
The authority citation for Part 50 continues to read as follows:
AUTHORITY: Sections 103, 104, 161, 182, 143, 186, 149, 64 Stat. 936, 937, 944, 953, 954, 955, 9M, as amended, sec. 234, 83 Stat. 1244, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2133, 2134, 2201, 2232, 2233, 2236, 2239, 2282); secs. 201, 202, 206, 88 Stat. 1242, 1244, 1246, as amended (42 U.S.C. 5441, 5842, 5844), unless otherwise noted.
)
Section 50.7 also issued under Pub. L 95-601, sec. 10, 92 Stat. 2951
(
(42 U.S.C. 5451). Sections 50.57(d), 50.58, 50.91, and 50.92 also issued under Pet,. L.97-415, M Stat. 2071, 2073 (42 U.S.C. 2133, 2239).
Section 50.78 also issued under sec. 122, M Stat. 939 (42 U.S.C. 2152).
Sections 50.40-50.41 also issued under sec. 184, 64 Stat. 9M, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2234). Sections 50.100-50.102 also issued under sec. 186,'
64 Stat. 955 (42 U.S.C. 2234).
For the purposes of Sec. 223,-64 Stat. 958, as amended (42 U.S.C.-
I i
2273), $$ 50.10(a), (b), and (c), 50.44, 50.46, 50.44, and 50.00(a) are issued under leib, 64 Stat. M8, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2201(b));
H 50.10(b) and (c) and 50.54 are issued under sec. 1611, et stat. M t.
l as amended (42 U.S.C. 2201(1)); and H M.55(e), 50.59(b) H.70, 50.71, M.72, H.73, and M.78 are issued N r sec. 161e, 88 Stat. 9M as amended (42 U.S.C. 2201(e)).
In Appendix t.Section IV " Content of Emergency Plans" is revised to read as follows:
f
=
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[7590-01]
IV. Content of Emergency Plans i
The applicant's emergency plans shall contain, but not necessarily be limited to, information needed to demonstrate compliance with the elements set forth below, 'i.e., organization for coping with radiation emergencies, assessment action, activation of emergency organization, notification proceaeres, emergency facilities and equipment, training, maintaining emergency preparedness, and recovery.
In addition, the emergency response plans submitted by an applicant for a nuclear power
~
reactor operating license shall contain information needed to demonstrate compliance with the standards described in 5 50.47(b), and they will be evaluated against those standards. The nuclear power reactor operating license applicant shall also provide an analysis of the time required to evacuate and for taking other protective actions for various sectors and distances within the plume exposure pathway EPZ for transient and permanent populations.
- Likewise, the nuclear power reactor operatina licensee and acclicant eneraency response plans shall assure that the followinn decisionmakina preolannina capabilities exist relative to the conclicatino impacts of severe. Iow frequency natural phenomena that could be ennected durina the life of the olant.
The intensity of the event shall be no areater than the desian basis for that event.
1.
Ability to transoort necessary norsonnel to the slant t2.5221 with dearaded modes of olent operation.
l "This rule change it typed in comparative text in order to assist review.
28
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[7590-01) t j
2.
Ability to communicate to the offsite authorities any plant damage.
3.
Ability to obtain damage estimates to the plant. This informa-tion should be available to factor into the decisionmakinc process, includina recommendations to offsite authorities for protective actions i
after an earthauake.
[
4.
Offsite authorities shall consider decisionmakina preolennina that takes into account various decrees and locations of danaos to the plant environs.
a a
a a
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Dated at this _ day of
, 1985.
For the Nsclear Regulatory Commission.
Samuel J. Chilk Secretary of the Commission 29
/ o nee.
'o UNITED STATES
~,,
l' 3 NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION e
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JUL 03 W M.E TO: William J. Dircks
'hRU:
Harold R. Dent Themis P. Sp FROM:
Frank H. Rowsome
SUBJECT:
EARTHQUAKE CONSIDERATIONS IN EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS For your infomation, I have come up with three other ways a rule might be fomulated to deal with this issue that are dissimilar to the five options suggested to you by ORA /RES. These appear in attachment 1.
Also, for your infomation and as background material, ! am enclosing a memo I wrote some months back on the evidence that emergency planning accomplishes no signif-icant risk reduction.
It discusses some policy options suggested by this evidence. RES, IE, and NRR have seen this material before, but to my know.
Iedge no one has passed it on to you. Neither set of suggestions has, to my knowledge, been carefully evaluated.
I do not wish to make a big issue of either attachmont, but I think it would be worth the investment of your time to read them as background infomation for your future decisions on EP matters.
z Frank H. Rowsome Attachments:
1.
Options for Rulemaking to Scope the Consideration of Earthquakes in EP 2.
Memo to H. Denton, et al, Re: Emergency Preparedness dated April 11, 1985 cc:
G. Cunningham, ELO
,,, f Ob f 121 p1MNhg.
M
'6
ENCLOSURE 1 Options for Rulemaking to Scope the Consideration of Earthquakes in Emergency Preparedness Some alternatives in addition to those proposed by RES are these:
A.
Relocation planning for accidents triggered by non nuclear environmental disturbances.
The evidence suggests that any region wide environmental disturbance that is of sufficient magnitude to trigger a reactor accident would also interfere with anticipatory evacuation and place competing demands upon emergency response personnel. Thus, planning for offsite emergency response to reactor accidents triggered by severe environmental phenomena should be limited to planning for relocation from hot spots of residual radiological contamination after plume passage. This approach to emergency response is generally expected to be more effective in limiting casualties under such conditions.
Licensees are required to have the capability to project and evaluate the health hazard in the affected offsite areas due to the reactor and to transmit this infomation to appropriate state and local authorities for their use in apportioning their resources among the competing demands for rescue work.
Pros (1) MakesEmergencyPreparedness(EP)moreeffectiveby, concentrating on the one potentially effective tactic.
(2) There is no need to sustain the awkward feature of limiting the consideration of earthquakes to the SSE.
j l
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I Con: (1) Might require renotification and coment.
(2) Would not pass a cost-benefit test.
B.
Exclusion of Evacuation Planning in Favor of Relocation Planning for all reactor accidents.
I In light of the evidence that anticipatory evacuation is ineffectual in i
reducing early casualties and does not significantly reduce the
[j societal risk of latent casualties of reactor accidents, the NRC mandates that EP focus on relocation after plume passage rather than anticipatory evacuation. Priorities for relocation from contaminated areas should be based on realistic estimates of the local hazard and other competing demands on emergency response capabilities of responsible state and local authorities to protect public health and safety. Licensees are responsible for providing realistic prognoses and/or measurements of the radiation hazard offsite, and to inform local emergency response authorities of the contaminated areas and the urgency for relocation. That capacity alone is necessary and sufficient for compliance.
Pro: (1) Makes Emergency Planning more effective at early fatality risk limitation.
(2) There is no need to single out reactor accidents triggered by regional non nuclear disasters such as earthquakes, floods, or hurricanes.
(3) EP would be far less burdensome under this rule. An OL would no longer. require an evaluation of state and local capabilities under this alternative, so the " Catch 22" features would disappear.
^
Con: (1) Relocation planning, though more nearly cost effective than evacuation planning, still does not pass a benefit / cost test. Some licensee costs would be entailed in the switchover from the present EP rules, though no more than the RES, Alternative 5, currently under development.
(2). Would require renotification and comment.
C.
Good Neighbor Rule In light of the: evidence that nuclear power plants pose very low
- risks of early casualties in the event of severe reactor accidents, and in light of the evidence that anticipatory evacuation is ineffective in reducing the risk of fatalities in any case, the NRC repeals its EP rules. In their stead, the NRC will pursue its Severe Accident. Policy so as to further assure that nuclear power plants are safe enough to pose no undue risk without the assumption of offsite emergency preparedness or unusually prompt emergency response offsite.
Pro: Solves all the problems with over-regulation in the EP rules and regulations.
Con: This bets on the outcome of the Severe Accident Policy. Onsite accident management requirements and the screening of ors for l
l:
outlier vulnerabilities are not yet in place or ready for l'
rulemaking'.
1.
^
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o M r. '. A 5 2.
MEMORANDUM FOR:
Harold P. ' Denton, Director
~
Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulatien Darrell G. Eisenhut, Deputy Director Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation James M. Taylor, Director Office of Inspection & Enforcerent Edward L. Jordar, Director Division of Emergency Preparedness and Engineering Response Robert M. Bernero, Director Division of Systems Integration Themis P. Speis, Director Division of Safety Technology Office of Nuclear P.eactor Regulation Joseph F. Scinto, Deputy Director of the Hearing Division Office of the Executive Legal Director FROM:
Frank.H. Rowsome, Assistant Director for Technology Division of Sefety Technology Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
SUBJECT:
EMERGEPCY PREPAREDNESS There are a number of reasons to look at reform of the troublesome emergency oreparedness (EP) regulatiers that do not depend upon source-tern reductiens.
In nu. view, the case shapes up as follows:
1.
The emergency preparedness rules and implemente. tion under the NRC/ FEMA agreementaof NUREG-0654 have failed to reduce offsite radiological risk.
This was first documented in the Indian Point hearing. Many of the redundant reasons for this conclusion are generic. Reexamination of the bases for this conclusion suggests that it can be extended to all plants. The technical basis for this argument is sketched in the attachment. As a result, emergency preparedness fails as a final layer omes >
suoneset >
Oatt )
.: eoa= sie ec so. acu one, OFFICIAL RECORD COPY uscac 'm-n.
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2 f.F'2'E of defense-in-depth; it does not enhance the safety of the public around nuclear power plants.
2.
The erergency preparedness regulations are fatally flawed as examples
~ f sound regulation..They place responsibility with those who have no o
authcrity insofar as they mardate participation by offsite state and local governments.
It offers a tempting legal gambit for local authorities te balk in the face of rate shock, something it was never intended to do. The " graded emergency response" proposals initially developed by ASTP0 a year ago (and advocated by 10COR today) do nothing to cure this vicious " Catch 22" aspect.
3.
The vagueness as well as the " Catch 22" features of the regulations constitute a fertilizer for litigation, delay, controversy, and bad public relations that has a legal nexus - thanks to the regulations -
but no technical relevance to public health and safety. The result unnecessarily involves the courts, attenuates NRC control, ard damages the institutional fabric of reactor safety regulation, as well as costing massive amounts of money.
4.
Even if emergency preparedness could eliminate early casualties, as projected with WASH-1400 source terms, the value of doing so would be many orders of magnitude less than the costs of compliance, under the regulatory analysis conventions employed in generic standards development, backfit policy, in the proposed safety goals, or those suggested in the Indian Point Hearings on risk. Since we intend to use the same conventions in our effort to scrub the rules of unproductive feetures, emergency preparedness is a natural application of this policy.
Note that none of these arguments that the emergency preparedness regulations warrant overhaul depend upon reductions in WASH-1400 source terms. Should we regard source-term reductions as ripe for use in techni. cal standards development, the reductions would constitute e fifth reason for refom of the EP regulations.
I see a route out of this dileme that might be called the " Good Neighbor" policy. Since evacuation planning is virtually worthless as a risk reduction tactic, I propose that we abandon the EP rules in favor of a recognition that nuclear power plants can and must be made safe enough to be " good neighbors" in the absence of offsite emergency planning. The new rule would not require any state nr local participation in emergency planning or drills, although these local authorities would be kept infonned. The rule would pair the abandonment of NUREG-0654 planning with the imposition of the further severe accident safety analysis, called for in the draft Severe Accident Policy, to debug the cperating plants of outliers, and with the accident management
-initiatives to extend emergency operating procedures from the prevention of core damage into the realm of managing core melt accidents or site. We could truly portray the new rule as providing better limitation of offsite m ep kmeneest )
se S uma oc so. **cw ono OFFICIAL RECORD COPY uwe' si-n.,
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- 3'-
APR 111985 radiological risk than the current regulations de, thus blunting the argument thet we appear to be relaxing the rules. The attachment sketches sone
. alternatives for the new rule.
~
I hope you give this propesal serious consideration and pass it on - as food for thought - to'Vic Stello and Bill Dircks.
Original signed by Frank H. Howsome Frank H. Rowsone, Assistant Director for Technology Division of Safety Technology Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation
Attachment:
Pisk Reduction from Emergency Preparedness cc:
F. Gillespie S. Schwartz A. Thadani D. Muller P. Minners M. Jamgochian S. Acharya Distribution Copies:
Central Files AD/T r/f DST c/f
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AITACHMENT RISK REDUCTION FROM EMERGENCY PREPAREDf!ESS Realistic analyses of t'be consecuences of severe radiological releases free nuclear power plants have always shown that the number of latent casualties are largely unaffected by the speed or timing of evacuation or relocation.
Thus, it is widely acknowledged that short-tem emergency response is motivated by the desire to limit early casualties.
I will not go into the reasons why short-term emergency response does not influence latent casualties here, but the reasons are well known.
In the Indian Point hearings on risk, a number of pieces of evidence demonstrated that eraergency planning - as currently conceived - has little or.no effec,t on early casualty projections.
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First, PRA always employs data in preference to judgment in assessing the reliability or perfomance of safety functions. There is some data on the influence of emergency planning upon the effectiveness of emergency response.
It shows that unplanned evacuations proceed as rapidly as planned evacuations. 1he data originate in chemical spills, floods, storms, and other non-nuclear contexts. The data are not so extensive as one might prefer. Nonetheless, the message of the data is clear: spontaneous, unplanned evacuations work very well. The historical record supports the conclusion that.once a hazard is recogni:ed and a decision to evacuate is rade, state and local authorities can carry it out quickly and effectively without elaborate prior planning. This, alone, would have sufficed to support a PRA ascissment that emergency planning doesn't make a difference to risk.
Note that this conclus, ion is generic; it is not limited to Indian Point.
However, the testimony went on to assess the effect of emereency response variables on risk.
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For each releese category event, it was found that early casualties are 1
no more numerous when evacuation fails than they are when evacuation works as planned. The default scenario, developed to model cases in
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which a'nticipetory evacuation fails to take place, was defined as relocation from hot spots of offsite radiological contemination'eight to twelve hours after plune passage. The " successful" evacuation scenarios with which it was compared assumed a delay time, which was a function of the in-plant accident scenario, followed by anticipatory evacuation at a pace chcsen to match the evacuation time estimates developed by specialist consultants on the' speed of evacuation. The surprising result that anticipatory evacuation works no better than relocation was traced to its origins in the calculation of reactor accident consecuences. The results of this detective work reveal why we obtained this surprising result. Accidents that take long enough to evolve into a release to enable the people to get out ahead of the plume would not have yielded early' casualties even if the people had stayed home. Slowly developing accidents simply pose negligible threats of early casualties. Note that WASH-1400 source terms were used in this assessment.
For the rapidly developing accidents that give rise to virtually all the projected early casualties, many evacuees fail to best the plume. Houses and work places tend to provide better shielding than cars or busses. Therefore the attendant risks of exposing evacuees to the plume while in transit generally compensated for any advantage to those escaping the plume or getting farther away before the plume reached them. Some specifics of this analysis are site dependent.
For example, the expert estimates of evacuation rates for the Indian Point site may be longer than those for some other sites. However, the basic finding is generic to any appli-cation of WASH-1400 source terms: accidents that develop slowly enough for evacuation to clear the EPZ ahead of the plume do not yield appre-ciable early casualties in any event. The attendant risks of exposure
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in-trar. sit tend to counterbalance the berefits of anticipatory evacu-ation for the rapidly developing accidents that give rise to the bulk of the a wly cisualties. The conclusion is inescapable: anticipatory
evacuation carret be expected to lower early casualties reliably or effectively from severe reactor accidents. Since this conclusion applies to the full spectrum of WASH-1400 release categories, it can be expected te remain true if source terms increase a little or decrease a good deal.
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At Indian Point, the bulk of the risk was attributed by the staff to accidents triggered by earthquakes or hurricanes.
Initiators of this kind will only trigger reactor releases if they are of extraordinary severity. They can be expected to preclude ground transportation and interfere with communication throughout the EPZ. Many people might also be deprived of shelter by such an initiator. This is a plant-specific conclusion which is probably not unique to Indian Point, but is far from 1
a universal pattern among nuclear plants.
PRA has been used as a basis for the development of the emergency prepared-ness rules a'nd NUREG-0654. For example, NUREG-0396 employed sensitivity studies on.the WASH-1400 consequence model to provide a technical basis for the development of emergency preparedness guidelines. Theretore, it is useful to examine why such insights as those developed at the Indian Point Hearing did not surface earlier.
The historicel data suggesting that unplanned evacuations work as well as planned evacuetions has been available since the early 70's and is con-sistentwithU.S.experiencesjncethen. This information is well known in the PRA community.
It appears to have had little influence on the development of the rules and regulations, though.
The sensitivity studies in NUREG-0396 and comparable, more recent work are technically correct but misleading. They show, as one might expect, that fast evacuation yields lower casualties than sloy evacuation. They tend to assume that the alternative to evacuation is no evacuation at all or very slow evacuation. They have not used relocation as the default case for
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these situations in which anticipatory evacuatien fails and have not compared the potential to improve relocation times compared with evacuation rates.
'The accident at Three Mile Island demonstrates the viability of relocation as the " default" scenario. Within hours of the time that TMI was recognized to have the pctential to be radiologically severe, the environs of the plant were crawling with health physicists monitoring the environment. They came from the licensee, from the NRC, DOE, EPA, FEMA, and the Defense Department, I an told.
It can be assumed that if there had been hot spots of residual ground contamination in the surrounding counties' after a severe release, these het spots would have been mapped and the residents relocated within a few hours of plume passage. Thus, the most accurate model of pre-1980 emergency response and a good " default" model to portray the failure of evacuation plans today, is to assume that the population is relocated from hot spots of residual contamination within a few hours of plume passage.
When such models of relocation after plume passage are compared with the spectrum of evacuation models, it is found that the default cause yields fewer early casualties than the models of slow or no anticipetory evacuation.
They yield roughly the same casualty estimates as do the models of antici-patory evacuation with realistic evacuation rates, as the Indian Point' record suggests. Very fast anticipatory evacuation looks better than relocation.
However, fast relocation looks nearly as good as fast evacuation, and the difference in the logistical problems between the two approaches to emergency response may well indicate that the speed of selective relocation is more perfectible than the speed of bulk population movement. The singular advantaae held by anticipatory evacuation over relocation is that it supports an ALARA principle for exposures.
In the slowly developing accidents that would not cause early casualties in any event, successful anticipatory evacuation does evoid modest doses for those beating the plume.
The logistics of relocation after plume passage are quite different frer those of anticipatory evacuation.
In anticipatory evacuation, laroe numbers of people fron broad areas are moved considerable distances.
Ir relocation,
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.only the small numbers of people in hot spots of residual contamination warrant prompt relocation. This entails moving only small numbers of peop,le short distances in order to be successful. High levels of residual contam-ination - at a level that could threaten early casualties in a few. days of i
exposure - cannot cover much territory.
If the contamination were more dilute, prompt relocation would not be necessary to avert early cesualties.
Relocation presumes tha't the residual contamination has been measured and mapped within hours of plume passage. Thus it must be guided by a coord-inated group of health physicists who infom state and local authorities on what areas to relocate first, which second, and so forth. Should one wish to mandate preplanning for speedy relocation after plume passage, the essential element would be to coordinate the roles of licensee and federal health physicists in mapping contamination and prioritizing, locales for relocation, since speedy diagnosis of the situation requires a high level of team work among these federal and utility personnel. As both a legal and practical matter, state and local authorities should physically cenduct the relocation,- as planned by the health physicist team.
In light of the good record of. unplanned evacuations, the only essential element of state and local participation in reactor emergency preparedness is a clear understanding of the source from whom they can expect to get authoritative infomation on the hazard and relocation priorities. The utility and federal health physicists (Pp) who map the contaminetion and set relocation priorities need more knowledge of severe reactor accident risk than is comon among certified PPs.
If their effort to prioritize a relocation sequence is to be most efficient, they need to be able to project accident sequences, source terms, understand the effect of weather upon consecuences and appreciate the thresholds of contamination, te be expected of accident releases, at which early casualties mignt be expected. They should also be familiar with the shielding factors to be expected of structures and vehicles. Much of this information is not well known to either utility or federal HPs. Therefore, if we mean to take emergency preparedness seriously as a risk reduction tactic, whether in its current form or in modified fom, there is much to be done to accompid.sh the relevant training.
-The foregoing assessmert cf emergency plannina for relocation presures that the risk warrants some planning. The evidence suggests otherwise. The prefected number of early casualties fron reactor accidents are always dwarfed by the projected number of latent casualtles, with any plausible source-term model, not to mention the preponderance of offsite and onsite property damage in the risk prefile of nuclear power plants.
If a plant poses an acceptable risk with respect to property denage and latent casualties, a case can be made that early casualties will be a non-problem, even with WASH-1400 source terms. All of the ways of conducting benefit / cost analysis that have been suggested would indicate that the
-benefit of even something as radical as the total elimination of early casualties from the risk profile of a nuclear power plant would be worth very small expenditures. An essessment for Indian Point suggested that the costs of actually conducting evacuations, even if they took place only for genuine core melt accidents, would be larger than their value, not to mention additional costs for preplanning.
I conclude that if a plant has bee'n adequately debugged of prominent severe accident vulnerabilities to be acceptable with respect to property damage risks, then the early casualty risk will be acceptable with ample margin. The plan suggested by the draft Severe Accident Policy cal.ls for further decision making on the adequacy of containment performance of reference plants and further severe accident safety analysis for each operating plant in order to meet two objectives:
to verify that the generic decision made on the reference plant applies, and to debug the operating plants of outlier vulnerabilities.
If this is done, a convincing case can be made, I believe, that nothing further needs to be done to limit early casualty risk.
It is worth noting here that the proposed Commission Sefety goals are ill suited to make this case. One characteristic of the safety goals in MUPEG-0880, Rev.1, is that they are effectively very stringent for early fatelities and very lenient fer latent casualties. Therefore, a plant can trip the early fatelity guideline and pass the cancer fatality guideline, l
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-7 even though the projected latent casur.ities per unit year outnumber the projected early casualties by thousands to one. This remains true of the safety goal recommendations of the staff Safety Goal Evaluation Steering Corrittee.
In addition, the algorithm for assigning a value to risk reduction for use in benefit / cost analysis ooes not value the reduction of early ca:ualties apart from societal dose reduction. The stringent early fatality guideline will~suggest that enough has been done without creditirg emergency planning. On the other hand, the perspective on the comparative importance of early and latent casualties and a more discriminating
' valuation of worth of early casualty risk reduction will not be found in the safety goals. As a result, the safety goals will be of much less value in putting emergency preparedness issues into perspective than one might hope.
Thus, it may be desirable to make the safety goals more comprehensive and discriminating.
A case that current emergency plannirg accomplishes no risk reduction could be' made today.
It would require a little research to flesh out the documen-tatier, but it would require no assumptions about source-tenn changes or the ultimate implementation of forthcoming policy initiatives such as those on severe accidents or safety.. goals.' It would support dropping the emergency preparedness rule, or replacing evacuation planning with federal-licensee relocation planning, and so eliminate the need for state or local participa-tien in planning and drills. That would solve the " Catch 22" problems in the existing regulatiors.
The abanconment of energency planning, beyerd the imposition of a reouf rement for onsite accident management planning, is, I think, the preferable answer.
It more accurately reflects the realities of severe accident risk and deals with all of the defects of-the current EP regulations. However, coupline Ep reform with the debugging of operating reactors of their outlier vulner-ebilities in a " good neighbor" policy would take longer.
Such a rulemaking would require that our thinking be more mature than it is now about severe accident management and the further severe accident safety analysis to debug l
Operating reactors. Still, these are tractable problems.
Such a rule could take shape in abnut e year or less if we put our rind to it.
I recommend it.
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