ML20141G919

Advises That Commission Approved Fr Notice Publishing Proposed Regulation Re Emergency Preparedness.Commission Actions Should Be Implemented by Having Encl Proposed Regulation Published in Fr.Congressional Ltrs Also Encl

ML20141G919
Person / Time
Issue date:	12/14/1984
From:	Gillespie F NRC OFFICE OF NUCLEAR REGULATORY RESEARCH (RES)
To:	Felton J NRC OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATION (ADM)
Shared Package
ML20140C992	List: IA-85-563, Forwards Listed Info Re Consideration of Earthquakes in Emergency Planning ML20140C994 ML20140G689 ML20141G898 ML20141G903 ML20141G911 ML20141G914 ML20141G919 ML20141G924 ML20141G927 ML20141G932 ML20141G937 ML20141G942 ML20141G946 ML20141G956 ML20141G961 ML20141G968 ML20141G974 ML20141G978 ML20141H012 ML20141H018 ML20141H023 ML20141H029 ML20141H066 ML20141H071 ML20141H083 ML20141H087 ML20141H099 ML20141H108 ML20141H125 ML20141H137 ML20141H151 ML20141H159 ML20141H168 ML20141H176 ML20141H182
References
FOIA-85-653 NUDOCS 8601130171
Download: ML20141G919 (30)

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1 FWt: Joseph M. Felton, Director 4-

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• w Office of Administration p*.m; yEst: Frank P. Gillespie. Director

.,.- Division of Risk Analysis and Operations F Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research

SUBJECT:

IMPLEMENTATION OF COMMISSION ACTION The Comission has approved a Federal Register Notice publishing a proposed regulation relating to emergency preparedness.

Please implement the Comission's actions by having the enclosed proposed regu-lation published in the Federal Register.

Also enclosed are the letters to the appropriate Congressional comittees in-forming them of the Comission's action.

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, v V rank P. Gillespig, Director Division of Risk Analysis and Operations Dffice of Nuclear Regulatory Research

Enclosures:

1. Federal Register Notice

. 2. Congressional Letters ,

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SUBJECT:

IMPLEMENTATION OF ComISSION ACTION The Commission has approved a Federal Register Notice . publishing a propose regulation relating to emergency preparedness.

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Please insiement the Connission's actions by having the enclosed proposed reg

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lation published in the Federal Register.

Also enclosed are the letters to the appropriate Comgre'ssional 4 comittees in-forming them of the Cosnission's action. g

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h Trank P. Gillespi '.31nector Division of Risk Analysis and Operations Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research

Enclosures:

1. Federal Register Notice

2. Congressional Letters e

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MLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION 10 CFR Part 50 i

Emergency Planning And Preparedness for Production And Utilization Facilities i AGENCY: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

ACTION: Proposed rule.

SUMARY: The Commission has ruled in previous adjudications that its reguia-tions do not require the consideration of potential impacts of earthquakes on emergency planning for nuclear reactor sites. The Commission now proposes to provide explicitly through scendment of its regulations in 10 CFR Part 50 that such consideration need not be given. Pending completion of this rulemaking, the interpretation of its rules set out in the adjudications remains in effect.

It is not anticipated that this amendment will have significant impact on licensees, State, or local governments or on NRC or FEMA.

' DATES: Comment period expires (* ). Comments received after this date will be considered if it is practical to do so, but assurance of consideration can be given only for comments received on or before this date.

ADDRESSES: Mail comments to: Secretary of the Commission, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555, ATTN: Docketing and Service Branch. Deliver comments to: Room 1121, 1717 H Street W., Washington, DC between 8:15 a.m. and 5:00 p.m. weekdays. Copies of comments received may be i

examined at the NRC Public Document Room,1717 H Street W., Washington, DC.

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• Insert date 30 days after publication.

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FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Michael T. Jangochtan, Division of Risk Analysis and Operations, Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research, U.S. Nuclear l Regulatory Cosmission, Washington, DC 20555. Telephone: (301)443-7615.

$UPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: l t

Background l l

On December 8, 1981, the Commission ruled in a then pending adjudication that its emergency planning regulations do not require consideration of potential earthquake effects on emergency plans for nuclear power reactors. In the Matter of Southern California Edison Company, et al. (San Onofre Nuclear ~ Generating Station, Units 2 and 3), CLI-81-33, 14 NRC 1091 (1981). In so ruling the ,

Commission stated:

The Commission will consider on a generic basis whether regulations should be changed to address the potential impacts of a severe earthquake on emer-gency planning. For the interim, the proximate occurrence of an accidental radiological release and an earthquake that could disrupt normal emergency planning appears sufficiently unlikely that consideration in individual licensing proceedings pending generic consideration of the matter is not warranted. 14 NRC at 1092.

The Commission recently aYfirmed this position in the Diablo Canyon proceeding.

'kl', In the Matter of Pacific Gas and Electric Company (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), CLI-84-12, 20 NRC (August 10, 1984), petition r,t -

J. for review in. San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace v. NRC (D.C. Cir. No. 84-1410).

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- In this decision the Commission stated that it would initiate rulemaking "to address whether the potential for seismic impacts on emergency planning is a significant enough coricern for large portions of the nation to warrant the amendment of the regulations to specifically consider those impacts. The 2

,.. ,, [7590-01) chief focus of the rulemaking will be to obtain additional information to deter-eine whether, in spite of current indications to the contrary, cost-effective reductions in overall risk may be obtained by the explicit consideration of severe earthquakes in emergency response planning." Slip Opinion at 9.

It should be noted that the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) reviews offsite radiological emergency planning and preparedness to insure the adequacy of Federal, State, and local capabilities in such areas as emergency organization, alert and notification, communications, measures to protect the public, accident assessment, public education and information, and medical support. Detailed, specific assessment of potential earthquake consequences and response are not part of this process related to radiological emergencies. Also, FEMA has coordinated planning for the Federal response to radiological emergencias including commercial nuclear power plant accidents.

These efforts have resulted in FEMA publishing the Federal Radiological Emer-gency Response Plan in the Federal Register (49 FR 35896) on September 12, 1984.

In addition, FEMA has an active pryram of earthquake preparedness which includes hazards and vulnerability analysis, estimates of damage and casualties, planning for Federal response to a major earthquake, and assistance to State and local governments in their earthquake planning and preparedness activities. FEMA believes that all of thes'e activities are sufficiently flexible to complement i

each other in preparing for an event that may require a concurrent response to l a major earthquake and a serious accident at a nuclear power plant.

For general background on emergency planning at nuclear facilities, the public is referred to NUREG-0396, " Planning Basis for the Development of i

l State and Local Government Radiological Emergency Response Plans in Support l

l of Light Water Nuclear Power Plants," and NUREG-0654 / FEMA-REP-1, Rev.1, l " Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response 3

i

[7590-01) y Plans and Preparedness in S oport of Nuclear power Plant."8 The latter docu-i ment, developed jointly by the NRC and FEMA, forms the basis for both NRC and FEMA regulations on emergency planning at nuclear power facilities. Also avail-

able for public inspection are the complete case records for the San Onofre and Diablo Canyon proceedings, both of which deal specifically with the earth-quake / emergency planning interface.

j The Commission, in its review of the record and consideration of arguments in the Diablo Canyon proceeding, reached the view that its previous San Onofre holding was correct, i.e., that the potential impact of earthquakes on emer-gency plans need not be considered. The rationale for this holding was stated l 1

i in Diablo Canyon (Slip Opinion at 4-6), and may be summarized in part as follows:

...[T]he seismic design of a nuclear power plant was reviewed to render extremely small the probability that...an earthquake [SSE] would result in a radiologic release.... [For] those risk-dominant earthquakes which cause very severe damage to both the plant and the offsite area, emergency response would have marginal benefit because of its impairment by offsite damage.... Specific consideration has been given in this case to the effects of other relatively frequent natural phenomena. The evidence

. includes the capability of the emergency plan to respond to disruptions in communications networks and evacuation routes as a result of fog, ,

severe storms and heavy rain. In the extreme, these phenomena are capable 1

. of resulting in area'-wide disruptions similar to some of the disruptions 1 l which may result from an earthquake... Thus, while no explicit considera- I tion has been given to disruptions caused by earthquakes, the emergency plans do have considerable flexibility to handle the disruptions caused by l various natural phenomena which occur with far greater frequency than do l I

damaging earthquakes,iand this implicitly includes some flexibility to '

handle disruptions from earthquakes as well.

3 Copies of these documents are available at the Commission's Public Document Room, 1717 H Street NW.. Washington,.DC 20555. Copies of these documents may be purchased from the Government Printing Office. Inforettion on current prices may be obtained by writing the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555, Attention: Publications Sales Manager.

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. ,.. ,, _ [7590-01)

Although the Commission's remarks were directed to the Diablo Canyon emergency plan, all nuclear power reactor emergency plans do add,ress the contingency that emergency actions may need to be taken under less-than-ideal conditions and with less-than-maximum emergency response capabilities.

Nuclear power plants are requi' red to be designed to safely shut down for all earthquakes up to and including the " Safe Shutdown Earthquake," or SSE.

See 10 CFR Part 50, Appendix A, General Design Criterion 2; 10 CFR Part 100, Appendix A. Accordingly, the probability of earthquakes large enough to cause major onsite damage that would result in a significant radiological release from the plant is low, and for such large earthquakes, offsite damage could make prior offsite emergency plans marginally useful at best. In ' addition, the probability of the proximate occurrence of an earthquake of substantial magni-tude and a radiological release from the plant for reasons unrelated to the earthquake itself is even lower. Therefore, there does not appear to exist a set of circumstances at all likely where the consideration of earthquake impacts would significantly improve the state of emergency planning at a nuclear power reactor,

, The ability to take' protective actions throughout the plume exposure pathway (EPZ) could be hampered during the life of the plant by temporary adverse conditions resulting from natural phenomena such as rain, snow, flooding or by activities in the vicinity of the plant such as a major road reprir. Existing NRC regulations require that emergency plans be comprehensive and flexible enough to assure the capability to take appropriate protective  ;

action to mitigate the. effects of a nuclear emergency under such conditions.

Similar types of adverse conditions could result from earthquakes below the i

Safe Shutdown Earthquake (SSE), which occur proximate in time with an unrelated

accidental release of nuclear material from the facility. The concern is with '

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seismic events in the region of the power plant which could impair offsite emergency response. However, grgency plans which meet the standards in 1

10 CFli 50.47 and Appendia E provide reasonable assurance that appropriate i protective measures can and will be taken under such circumstances.

The magnitude of the SSE and the adequacy of a plant's design to meet the SSE are reviewed by NRC and may be controverted in adjudicatory proceedings, i

but, once settled, should not be reconsidered in reviewing or adjudicating emergency planning issues. If a larger earthquake were considered feasible, L then a larger SSE would have been established. If an earthquake smaller than i an SSE were considered to be capable of damaging a plant's safety systems, then the plant's design would have been corrected. Thus, emergency plans need not take into account earthquakes larger or smaller than an SSE. Nevertheless, the basis for emergency planning is not constrained by the design basis for a plant, and emergency planning efforts recognize the possibility that events considered beyond the design basis can occur. A spectrum of potential consequences independent of the particular causes are analyzed in reaching 4

decisions on emergency planning provisions, and the planning basis does not depend upon the particular, scenario which may lead to significant offsite releases of radioactivity. To explicitly consider earthquakes as causes for radioactive releases is inconsistent with the emergency planning basis used by NRC is adopting its regulations.

The Commission intends to consider this issue carefully in this rulemaking In the meantime, I and to weigh all arguments before reaching a final decision.

this rulemaking should not be construed to affect the continuing validity of the Commission's ruling in San Onofre and Diablo Canyon.

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[75g0-01]

Technical Information When considering the possibilities of plant damage from seismic events, it is important to understand the severity of seismic events, their range of probabilities, and the potential for reactor accidents caused by seismic event.

Three classes of seismic events are considered in this discussion. The first class includes earthquakes of relatively low ground motion, up to the Operating

Basis Earthquake (08E). The 08E ground motion depends on plant location.

These accelerations vary in the range of about .05g to 0.33g. During an OBE,

! all safety related plant systems would be expected to remain operating.

i The second class of events includes earthquakes with ground motion higher than the 08E but equal to or less than the Safe Shutdown Earthquak'es (55E);

I the ground motion of the SSE is typically about twice that of the 08E. Because

! probabilities of occurrence have large uncertainties for the SSE, typical ,

estimates are in the order of one in a thousand to one in ten thousand per year.  ;

NRC regulations require that plants be designed to achieve a safe shutdown after an $$E. Given an SSE, als seismically qualified equipment would be expected to l function to bring the plant to safe shutdown. An earthquake up to and including an SSE would be cause for.an alert emergency action level classification, but would not cause failures that would result in a significant accidental release i

from the plant. Thus, although such an event would initiate certain emergency l

i plan actions, no offsite response would be required. Only in the event of an l

accident attributable to multiple unrelated failures of safety related systems due to some undiscovered common cause failure mechanism (such as a major design f

error), coincident with a earthquake such as an SSE, would there be a situation which would require offsite emergency response when there was extensive offsite

! damage. The commission believes that, because of the intensive, continuing review of nuclear safety conducted by NRC, there is an extremely low probability

that any such failure mechanisms have been overlooked.

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The final class of events includes all earthquakes with ground motion levelt above the SSE. Fragility analysis has been used to estimate the proba- ,

bility of failure as a function of ground motion associated with these earth-quakes. The Zion, Indian Point, and Limerick Probabilistic Risk Assessments estimated that ground motion on the order of 0.5g to 0.75g acceleration would be required to damage these nuclear power plants to the extent that s,ignificant i release of radioactivity could occur. Some plants, in certain regions, are designed to withstand earthquakes with such ground motion. These plants are able to resist damage to still higher levels of ground motion because of the design margin. It is apparent that the probability estimates for ground accel-erations which would be required to damage these nuclear power plahts to the extent that significant release of radioactivity would occur are less than the probability estimates for the $$E for these plants.

Based upon the probabilistic risk assessment results for these three plants, the NRC staff considers that for most earthquakes (including some earthquakes more severe than the SSE) the power plant would generally not be expected to pose an offsite radiological hazard. For earthquakes which would cause plant damage leading to immedikte offsite radiological hazards but for which there would be relatively minor offsite damage, emergency response capabilities around nuclear power plants would ,not be seriously affected. For those earthquakes which cause very severe damage to both the plant and the offsite area, emergency I response would have marginal benefit because of its impairment by offsite damage.

l However, the expenditure of additional resources to cope with seismically caused offsite damage may be ."of doubtful value considering the modest benefit in over-all risk reduction which could be obtained." CLI-84-12, (Slip Opinion at 5).

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, [7590-01) prooosed Rule In the Diab 1o Canyon decision the Commission stated that it would initiate rulemaking "to address whether the potential for seismic impacts on emergency planning is a significant enough concern for large portions of the nation to warrant the amendment of the regulations to specifically consider those impacts. The chief focus of the rulemaking will be to obtain additional information to determine whether, in spite of current indications to the contrary, cost-effective reductions in overall risk may be obtained by the explicit co'nsideration of severe earthquakes in emergency response planning."

CL1-84-12 (Slip Opinion at 9).

The amendments to 10 CFR 50.47 and 10 CFR part 50 Appendix E which the Commission is proposing wo'uld explicitly incorporate in them the interpretations in the Commissions San Onofre and Diablo Canyon rulings. A new paragraph (e) would be added to 10 CFR 50.47 and a paragraph would be added to the " Introduction" section of Appendix E. The Commission wants to assure that it has the benefits of comments of all interested persons on the subject. The Commission therefore invites comment not only on the text of the proposed rule, but also on the fundamental question of the relationship between i

earthquakes and emergency planning at nuclear power facilities. Commenters should, at a minimum, address the serits of three possible alternatives:

1. Adoption of the proposed rule explicitly incorporating the Commission's interpretation in San Onofre and Diablo Canyon;

2. Leaving the issue open for adjudication on a case-by-case basis; or

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3. Requiring by rule that emergency plans specifically address the tapact of earthquakes.

1 .e Commissiain would be most assisted by comments which offer specific policy and technical reasons for preferring one alternative over the others. ,

The Commission is also considering whether to include in this rulemaking tornadoes and other low-frequency natural events. In that possible case, offsite emergency response plans submitted to satisfy the applicable standards of 10 CFR S 50.47 and Appendix E would not need to specifically consider the impact on emergency response capability of earthquakes, tornadoes or any similar low-probability naturally occurring phenomena which are presumed to occur proximate in time with an accidental release of radioactive material from a licensed facility. Comments on this possible alternative are requested.

Separate Views of' Commissioner Asselstine It should be obvious that emergency planning is a site-specific exercise which is not amenable to a generic rulemaking such as that proposed by the Commission. In carrying out their emergency planning responsibilities, both the NRC staff and FDE have recognized this. When they consider whether the emergency plan for a particular site is flexible enough to e.velope all eventualities, they consider the effects of whatever natural phenomena are most likely to disrupt emergency planning at that site. Thus, they have considered snow in New England, hurricanes in Florida, tornados in the Midwest, and earthquakes in California.

The Commission now tells us, however, that the experts were wrong and that earthquakes are somehow so different from other natural phenomena that they need not be considered at all, even in areas of high seismic risk. I 10

,% p [7590-01]

examined the basis for the Commission's conclusion in my separate views on CLI-84-12, the Diablo Canyon order, so I will not mpeat here my reasons for disagreeing with the Commission's conclusion. Suffice it to say that I do not i

believe that there is any reasonable basis for a rule which would treat i

earthquakes differently from other natural phenomena for purposes of emergency planning.

In an attempt to counter my criticism of their course of action in the Diablo Canyon case, the Commission has just recently decided to request comment on a possible alternative rule which would also exclude from emergency planning " tornados and other low-frequency natural events." I do not believe that such a rule would be in the public interest. While hurricanes, tornados, and earthquakes may occur relatively infrequently, should they cause or occur 1 coincident with an accident or an emergency at a nuclear plant they could i

i significantly disrupt emergency response capabilities. The staff's solution l to this problem has been to require licensees to consider what kinds of

, effects these natural phenomena cause and to determine whether their emergency i

plans are flexible enough to deal with these effects. This has hardly been an onerous burden. Thus, with a minimal expenditure of resources, the licensees can prepare for what could be a serious emergency planning problem.

When I agreed to the publication of a rule, I did so with the hope that the Commission intended to carefully and objectively examine the issue of whether

! and to what extent the complicating effects of earthquakes ought to be

considered in emergency planning. I also hoped that the infomation gathered in the rulemaking would convince the Commission that a rule excluding altogether the considerations of earthquakes was not a wise thing to do. I I

find, however, that that was a forlorn hope. The Commission is instead intent merely on codifying its Diablo Canyon decision, and is going through with rulemaking procedures only so that it can say that it is allowing comment on '

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[7590-01]

l the issue, no matter how meaningless that opportunity for comment turns out to be. Iwillnot,therefore,agrektothepublicationofarulewithwht'ch1 -

I disagree when the rulemaking procedures are not being used .as they were l

' intended, to meaningfully gather information to be factored into the rulemaking decision, but instead are being used solely to circumvent the hearing process I in a particular licensing proceeding.

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PROPOSED FINDING OF NO 51GNIFICANT ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT i l

' The Commission proposes to determine under the National Environmental  !

Policy Act of 1969, as amended, and the Commission's regulations th Subpart A l of 10 CFR Par 51, that this proposed rule, if adopted, would not be a major I Federal action significantly affecting the quality of the human environment and ,

4 See 10 CFR l

therefore an environmental impact statement is not required.

51.20(a)(1). This determination has been made because the Commission cann identify any impact on the human environment associated with not requiring consideration of earthquakes in emergency planning and because it is an inter-pretation of existing regulation. .

REGULATORY ANALYSIS i

l

! The Commission has prepared a regulatory analysis of this proposed regula-tion.

The analysis examines the costs and benefits of the rule as considered i

by the Commission. A copy of the draf t regulatory analysis is available for l

inspection and copying, for a fee, at the NRC Public Document Room,1717 H 5treet NW., Washington, DC. Single copies of the analysis may be obtained from Nichael T. Jangochian, Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 Telephone (301)443-7615.

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5 PAPERWDRK REDUCTION ACT STATEMENT This proposed rule contains no information collection requirements and therefore is not subject to the requirements of the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980 (44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq.).

j REGULATORY FLEXIBILITY CERTIFICATION In accordance with the Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980, 5 U.S.C. 605(b),

3 the Commission hereby certifies that this proposed rule will not, if promulgated, j have a s19nificant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities.

The proposed rule clarifies requirements for the issuance of an operating license for a nuclear power plant, licensed pursuant to Section 103 and 104b of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, 42 U.S.C. 2133, 2134b. The electric utility companies which own and operate nuclear power plants are I dominant in their service areas and do not fall within the definition of a small business found in Section 3 of the small Business Act,15 U.S.C. 632, or I within the Small Business Size Standards set forth in 13 CFR Part 121.

Accordingly, there is no significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities under the Regulatory Flexability Act of 1980.

J LIST OF SUBJECTS IN 10 CFR PART 50 Part 50 - Antitrust, Classified information, Fire prevention, Incorporation by reference, Intergovernmental relations, Nuclear power plants and reactors, i

Penalty, Radiation protection, Reactor siting criteria, Reporting and record-keeping requirements.

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[7590-01)

Pursuant to the Atomic Ener8y Act of 1954, as amended, the Energy Reorgant-setton Act of 1974, as amended, and Section 553 of Title 5 of the United States Code, notice is hereby given that adoption of the following amendments to Title 10 Chapter I, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 50 is contemplated..

PART 50 - DOMESTIC LICENSING OF PRODUCTION 8 AND UTILIZATION FACILITIE5

1. The authority citation for Part 50 continues to read as follows:

) AUTHORITY: Sections 103,104,161,182,183,186,189, 68 Stat. 936, 937, 948, 953, 954, 955, 956, as amended, sec. 234, ,83 Stat.1244, as amended j (42 U.S.C. 2133, 2134, 2201, 2232, 2233, 2236, 2239, 2282); secs. 201, 202, 206, 88 Stat.1242,1244,1246, as amended (42 U.S.C. 5841, 5842, 5846), unless otherwise noted.

Section 50.7 also issued under Pub. L.95-601, sec.10, 92 Stat. 2951

! (42 U.S.C. 5851). Sections 50.57(d), 50.58, 50.91, and 50.92 also issued under Pub. L.97-415, 96 Stat. 2071, 2073 (42 U.S.C. 2133, 2239). Sec-tion 50.78 also issued under sec.122, 68 Stat. 939 (42 U.S.C. 2152).

Sections 50.80-50.81 also issued under sec.184, 68 Stat. 954, as amended '

l (42 U.S.C. 2234). Sections 50.100-50.102 also issued under sec.186, 68 Stat.  !

l 955 (42 U.S.C. 2236).

For the purposes of sec. 223, 68 Stat. 958, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2273),

SS 50.10(a), (b), and (c), 50.44, 50.46, 50.48, 50.54, and 50.80(a) are issued under 161b, 68 Stat. 944, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2201(b)); ll 50.10(b) and (c) and 50.54 are issued under sec. 1611, 68 Stat. 949, as amended (42 U.S.C.

l

, 2201(1); and ll 50.55(e), 50.59(b), 50.70, 50.71, 50.72, 50.73, and 50.78 are j issued under sec.161o, 68 Stat. 950, as amended (42 U.S.C. 2201(o)).

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[7590-01)

2. In 5 50.47 a new paragraph (e) is added to read as follows:

5 50.47 Emereency slans.

I (e) Emergency response plans submitted to satisfy the standards set forth in this section need not consider the impact on emergency planning of ,

earthquakes which cause, or occur proximate in time with, an accidental release of radioactive material from the facility.

3. A new sentence is added as an additional paragraph at the end of the Introduction section of Appendix E to read as follows:

1. Introduction Neither emergency response plans nor evacuation time analyses need consider the impact of earthquakes which cause, or occur proximate in time with, an accidental release of radioa:tive material from the facility.

Dated at Washington DC, this _ day of 1984. .

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Samual J. Chilk, Secretary of the Commission.

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Regulatory Analysis for proposed Rulemaking to 10 CFR Part 50.47 and Appendix E Emergency Planning and Preparedness for Production and Utilization Facilities Statement of the Problem On December 8,1981, the Caumiission ruled in a then pending adjudication that its emergency planning regulations do not require consideration of potential earthquake effects on emergency plans for nuclear power reactors.

In the Matter of Southern California Edison Company et al. (San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station Units *2 and 3), CLI-81-33, 14 NRC 10g1 (1381). In so ruling the Commission stated:

The Cannission will consider on a generic basis whether regu-

lations should be changed to address the potential impacts of a i -- eevere 4arthquake .an mergency planning._Jor_the _ inter.is._the _ _ . . , _ _

i proximate occurrence of an accidental radiological release and an

earthquake that could disrupt nomal emergency planning appears

sufficiently unlikely that consideration <n iedividual licensing proceedings pending generic consideration of the matter is not

' warranted. 14 NRC at 10g2.

l The Commission recently afffreed this position in the Diablo Canyon proceed-ing. In the Matter of Pacific Gas and Electric Company (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units 1 and 2), CLI-84-12, 20 NRC (August 10,1984). In l

this decision the Commission stated that it would initiate rulemaking "to I

l address whether the potential for seismic impacts on emergency planning is a significant enough concern for large portions of the nation to warrant the amendment of the regulations to specifically consider those impacts." Slip l

Opinion at g. The focus of this rulemaking is to "obtain additional 4 O 6 W6. 2

.. .. 1 2 l information to detemine whether, in spite of current indications to the contrary, cost effective reductions in overall risk may be obtained by the explicit consideration of severe earthquakes in emergency response planning." }

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06.iective l The objective of the proposed rule change is: to not consider the impact of earthquakes on,emergenc,y preparedness.

The Commission has decided that its previous San Onofre decision was correct. i.e., that the potential impact of earthquakes on emergency plans  !

need not be considered.  ;

The rationale for this decision was restated in the Diablo Canyon (Slip Opinion at 4-6), and may be summarized as fo11cus. Nuclear power plants are

-required-to be designed-to. safely-shut-down for all-earthquakes _sp to and . _

including the " Safe Shutdown Earthquake." or $5E. ,jg,10 CFR part 50 Appendix A. General Design Critarion 2; 10 CFR part 100. Appendix A. Acccrd-ingly, the probability of earthquakes large enough to cause major onsite damage that would result in a significant radiological release from the plant is extremely low, and for such large earthquakes, offsite damage could make prior offsite emergency plans premised on nomal conditions marginally useful at best. In addition, the probability of the proximate occurrence of an earthquake of substantial magnitude and a radiological release from the plant

! - for reasons unrelated to the earthquake itself is even lower. Therefore.

l there does mt ,w tr to exist a set of circumstances at all likely where the consideratioh of earthquake impacts would significantly improve the state of l

emergency planning at a nuclear power reactor.

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) In addition, as the Commission noted in its Diablo Canyon decision (511p Opinion at 5-6), emergency plans are not rigid documents which became useless if offsite conditions are less than ideal: ,

' r Specific consideration has been given in this case to the effects

! of other relatively frequent natural phenomena. The evidence

includes the capability of the emergency plan to respond to disruptions in ceumunications networks and evacuation routes as a result of fog, severe storms and heavy rain. In the extreme.

these phenomena are capable of resulting in aree-wide disruptions

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! similar to some of the disruptions which may result from an earthquake.... Thus, while no explicit consideratisn has been

. given to disruptions caused by earthquakes, the emergency plans do l

have considerable flexibility to handle the disruptions caused by r

various natural phenomena which occur with far greater frequency j than do damaging earthquakes, and this implicitly includes some 4

flexibility to handle disruptions from earthquakes as well.

Although the Cennission's remarks were directed to the Diablo Caewon emergency

! plan, the noted flexibility is found in all nuclear power reactor emergency plans. Such plans do address the contingency that emergency actions may need

- - - - -- - -to -4e --taken -ander less-than-ideal _ conditions and _with- less .than-maximum __..

I emergency response capabilities.

The ability to take protective actions throughout the plume exposure ,

pathway (EPZ) could be hampered during the life.of the plant by temporary I adverse conditions resulting frem. natural phenomena such as rain, snow. .

flooding or by activities in the vicinity of the plant such as major road j repair. Existing NRC regulations require that emergency plans be comprehen-sive and flexible enough to assure the capability to take appropriate protec-I tive action to mitigate the effects of a nuclear emergency under such conditions. Similar types of adverse conditions could result from earthquakes below the Safe Shutdown Earthquake (55E), which occur proximate in time with l i

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! an unrelated accidental release of nuclear material from the facility.

However, emergency plans which meet the standards in 10 CFR 50.47 and

, I l Appendix E provide masonable assurance that appropriate protective measures f can and will be taken under such circumstances.

While the Cennission intends to consider this issue carefully in this rulemaking and to weigh all arguments before reaching a final decision to be embodied in the regulations. it should be clear from the San Onofre and Diablo Canyon decisions that the existing rule established by precedent is not l

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to consider the effects of earthquakes in emergency planning. This interpre-

tation of the Ceemission's regulations must be considered binding unless altered by the outcome of this proceeding. All, Commission adjudicatory panels j

) should follow the rule of these cases pending its modification if any, as a t

i result of the rulemaking, parties to adjudicatory proceedings.any attempt .to

. . . . -_show. ".special _mircumstances?._ pursuant _to _10.CFR _2.758 .1 f_they_believe_thi s . . _ . . _ _

interpretation of the Commission's rules should not be applied in a particular case. .

Alternatives t one alternative would be to revise 10 CFR 50.47 to require that emergency i

l plans specifically address the impact of earthquakes. The staff believes this

! to be an @ appropriate alternative because of the flexibility of existing i emergency plans as well as the very low probability of the occurrence of an earthquake of substantial magnitude and a radiological release from the plant.

Another alternative would be to adjudicate the issue on a case-by-case basis.

j The staff believes this to be an inappropriate alternative because it would be i

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5 extremely time consuming and at the same time would necessitate the unwarranted expenditure of extensive NRC staff resources. The proposed rule change is the best alternative available for achieving the specific regulatory objective.

Consequences WRC The staff believes that the consideration of earthquake would not improve the state of emergency planning at a nuclear power reactor.

Other Government Agencies The proposed rule change does not have a significant impact on othe'r ,'

. government agencies because it is an interpretation of existing regulations.

Industry

-The-proposed -amenhnt-will -act-greatly-affect the industry since _ . .

licenses are required to have approved emergency response' plans which are flexible enough to assure that appropriate protective measures can be taken to mitigate the consequences of a nuclear emergency.

Public .

The proposed amendment will have no affect on the public as adequate emergency preparedness at nuclear reactors will still be assured.

Impact on Other Requirements The proposed ru.a change has no impact on other NRC requirements.

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6 Constraints No constraints have been identified that affect the implementation of the proposed rule.

Decision Rationale The technical decision rationale that the staff used is based on techni-cal information,.regarding seismic events.

khen considering the possibilities of plant damage from seismic events.

it is important to understand the severity of seismic events, their range of probabilities and potential for such events. Three classes of seismic events are considered in this discussion. h first class includes earthquakes of relatively low ground motion, up to the Operating Basis Earthquake (OSE). The OBE ground motion depends, en plant location. These accelerations very in the sage of-ebout,05g to rieg 4 higher-in 4reas-ef-high seismicity). aurjag .an . _.

OBE all safety related plant systems would be espected to remain operating.

The second class of events includes earthquakes with ground motion higher than the OBE but equal to or less than the Safe Shutdown Earthquake ($$E): the ground motion of the SSE is typically about twice that of the OBE. Because probabilities of occurrence have large uncertainties for the $$E. typical estimates are in the order. of one in a thousand to one in ten thousand per year. NRC regulations require that plants be designed to achieve a safe shutdown after an $$E. Given an $5E. all seismically qualified equipment would be expected to function to bring the plant to safe shutdown. An earthquake up to and including an $$E would be cause for en alert emergency action level classification, but would not cause failures that would result in t

h','..,

7 a significant accidental release from the plant. Thus, although such an event would initiate certain emergency plan actions, no offsite response would be required. Only in the event of multiple unrelated failures of safety related systems due to some undiscovered common cause failure mechanism (such as a majordesignerror),coincidentwithasevereearthquakesuchasan55E.would there be a chance of an accident which would require offsite emergency response when there was extensive offsite damage. The probability of .these two events occurring proximately in time is very much lower than the probability of either one, perhaps on the order of one in a million per year.

The final class of events includes all earthquakes with ground motion levels above the $5E. Fragility analysis has been used to estimate the probability of failure as a function of ground motion associated with these

--- sarthquakes;-The Zion;-indian foint.4ad-Limerick Jrobabilistic._Aisk. Assess-ments estimated that. in general, ground motion en the order of 0.5g to 0.75g acceleration would be required to damage a nuclear power plant to the extent that significant release af radioactivity could occur. Of course, some plants, such as those in high seismic regions, are designed to withstand earthquakes with ground motion this high; they woule resist damage to still higher levels of ground motion. The probability estimates for such ground accelerations are significantly less than the probability estimates for the

$$E for these plants (the Zion. Ip, and Limerick SSEs are .17g ;15g. and .15g respectively).

Based upon the probabilistic risk assessment results for these three plants, the NRC staff considers that for most earthquakes (including some

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l earthquakes more severe than the SSE) the power plant would generally not be

! espected to pose an offsite redislogical hasard. For earthquakes which would l cause plant damage leading to ismediate offsite radiological hazards but for I which there would be relatively minor offsite damage, emergency response

! capabilities around nuclear power plants would not be seriously affected. For

earthquakes which cause mere severe offsite damage, such as disabling a siren l alerting system, the earthquake itself acts as an alerting system. For those' earthquakes which cause very severe damage to both the plant and the offsite i

! area, emergency response would have marginal benefit because of its impatruent l

by offsite damage. Newever, the expenditure of additional resources to cope  ;

with seismically caused offsite damage may be of doubtful value considering l l the modest benefit in overall risk reduction which could be obtained.

It should be noted that the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA)

- . --fevf ews *ffatta fedtelegical mergency-planning and preparedness .to_lasure_the _

adequacy of Federal. State, atd local capabilities in such areas as emergency organisation, alert and notification, caemunications, measures to protect the  !

public, accident assessment, pubite education and information, and medical

! support. Detailed, specific assessment of potential earthquake consequences and response are not part of this process related to radiological emergencies.

Also. FIMA has coordinated planning for the Federal response to radiological ,

soorgencies including commercial nuclear power plant accidents. These efforts l i

have resulted in FEMA publishing the Federal Radiological Emergency Response i

Plan in the Federal Register (43FR35436) en Septem6er it. 1984. In j

I addition. FEMA has an active program of earthquake preparedness which includes hasards and vulnerability analysis, estimates of damage and casualties.

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f j planning for Federal response to a major earthquake, and assistance to State and local governments in their earthquake planning end preparedness

! activities. FEMA believes that all of these activities are sufficiently 1

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} flexible to complement each other in preparing for an event that may require a concurrent response to a major earthquake and a serious accident at a nuclear power plant.

! For general background on emergency planning at nuclear facilities, the i

public is referred to NUREG-0336. " Planning Basis for the Development of State  ;

and Local Government Radiological Emergency Response Plans in support of Light Water Nuclear Power Plants.' and NUREG-06541/ FEMA-REP-1. Rev.1. " Criteria for i Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and I

l Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants" The latter document, devel-eped jointly by the NRC and FINA. foms the basis for both NRC and FEMA l l - ----regulations en amargency-planning.at auclear *powerJacilities. Also available .

,l for public inspection are the completa case records for the San Onofre and l

i Diablo Canyon proceedings, both of whir.h deal specifically with the earth-i

quake / emergency planning interface.

I r p laplementation L In order to be responsive to Commission direction, the staff has estab-lished the follouing schedule for publication of the proposed rule change.

j Proposed Rule Published in Federal Register -10/20/84 r l l

30 Day Coment Period - 11/30/84 l

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- danual office Review ,

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i i The Commission is proposinq amendments to 10 CFR 50.47 and 10 CFR Part 50 Ap-l pendix E which will explic<tly incorporate into the regulations the Commission

! interpretations in the San Onofre and Diablo Canyon rulings. ,

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The Issue To Se Addressed 1he Commission has ruled in previous adjudications (Diablo Canyon and San Onofre) that its regulations do not require the consideration of potential in-1 pacts of earthquakes on emergency planning for nuclear reactor sites. The i Commission now proposes to provide explicitly through amendment of its regu-

! 1ations in 10 CFR Part 50 that auch consideration need not be given. Pendong ,

i completion of this rulemaking, the interpretation of its rules set out in the 1 adjudications remains in effect.

i i The Necessity and Urgency For Addressing the Issue l

! This proposed amendment to 10 CFR part 50 responds directly to the Com-l mission's Order CLI S412.' In the Matter of Pacific Gas and Electric Company (Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power riant. Units 1 and zJ. cated August 10 1954 Moreover, this rule change will codify the Commission's San Onofre and Diablo l Canyon decisions relating to the considerations of the effects of earthquakes

on emergency planning.

l Alternatives to Rulemaking one alternative would be to revise 10 CFR 50.47 to require that emergency

plans specifically address the impact of earthquakes. The staff believes this to be an unappropriate alternative because of the flexibility of existing emergency plans as well as the very low probability of the occurrence of an earthquake of substantial magnitude and a radiological release from the plant.

Another alternative would be to adjudicate the issue on a case-by-case basis.

! The staff believes this to be an inappropriate alternative because it would be  :

! extremely time consuming and at the same time would necessitate,the unwarrant-i ed expenditure of extensive NRC staff resources. The proposed rule change is j the best alternative available for achieving the specific regulatory objec-

tive. '

i i How The Issue will be Addressed Through Rulemaking i

i This rulemaking will not permit consideration of earthquakes in emergency

! planning. A new subsection (c) would be added to 10 CFR 50.47 and a sentence would be added to be " Introduction" section of Appendix E. i l How the Pubite. Industry, and NRC will be Affected as a Result of Rulemaking

! FEMA is directly involved in the evaluation of offsite emergency preparedness and, therefore, would be affected by the promulgation of this proposed rule ,

I change. Therefore, the NRC staff consulted with the FEMA staff during the l development of this paper. FEMA concurs in the proposed rule change. '

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RES TASK LEADER EVALUATION w .

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The staff anticipates that there will be no decrease or increase in cost to I the NRC, State and local governments and to licensees associated with the proposed rule change because it is interpretative in nature. l NRC Resources And Scheduling Needed For The Rulemaking l

It is not known of further resources will be needed at this time.

Thefollowingschedu(hasbeenaccomplishejd o Proposed Rule Published in Federal Register 12/21/84  !

Consent Period Extended M Days 2/27/85 I

'o Final Rule Pub 11shed,5/1/8 g geh\gs

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Compliance Assessment The following is a quality control review of the proposed rulemaking that would not permit consideration of earthquakes in emergency planning. The

. proposed amendment contains:

o Draft Cocunission Paper o Draft text of Rule o Draft Regulatory Analysis o Draft Congressional Letters o Copy has been sent to the Committee to Review Generic Requirements (CRGR) on 12/28/84.

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