ML20141H018
| ML20141H018 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 02/26/1985 |
| From: | Fraley R Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards |
| To: | James Shea NRC OFFICE OF INTERNATIONAL PROGRAMS (OIP) |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20140C992 | List:
|
| References | |
| FOIA-85-653 ACRS-GENERAL, NUDOCS 8601130297 | |
| Download: ML20141H018 (21) | |
Text
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/ o UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
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'd .I ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON REACTOR SAFEGUARDS k WASHINGTON, D. C. 20565
(( b . . . . . * '[ February 26, 1985 MEMORANDUM FOR: James R. Shea, Director Office of Internationa P gram FROM: Raymond 'F. Frale e t M irec r Advisory Comittee on Reactor Safeguards
SUBJECT:
CONSIDERATION OF EARTHQUAKES IN THE CONTEXT OF EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS During its 298th meeting, February 7-9, 1985 the Advisory Comittee on Reactor Safeguards discussed the above subject in connection with the recent publication for comment of a proposed rule change on this subject (Ref. 1, attached). As a result of its discussion, the ACRS requested information on the approach being taken in other countries. It would be most helpful to the committee if you would provide whatever information you may have on this matter. In addition, the Comittee has asked that you make in-f quiries as to what studies have been done in this area, and what ap-g proaches are taken, in those countries with major nuclear power pro-grams. The ACRS plans to address this issue at its April 11-13, 1985 meeting and thus would appreciate a timely response. Reference
- 1. 49 FR 49640, Emergency Planning and Preparedness for Production and Utilization Facilities 10 CFR Part 50, 50.47 and Appendix E, published December 21, 1984 (Note: The Public Coment period has subsequently been extended from January 22,1985, as stated in this reference, to February 27,1985).
cc: ACRS Members ACRS Staff: T. McCreless M. Libarkin J. McKinley G. Quittschreiber O. Merrill j S. Duraiswamy l R. Savio M. Jamgochian, RES 8601130297 851125 i BELLO f!$3 PDR l
l 49640 ; , Prepssad Rubs r* i a siae Vol. 49. No. 247 Friday. December 21.1est erws section of me FEDERAL REGISTER supptautNTARY lfePometATeost potential earthquake consequences and contains notices to the punc of the msponse are not part of this process proposed issuance of ndes and BackINund related to radiclogical emergencies, eegulat:ns The purpose of these notices On December 8.1981. the Commission Also. FEMA has coordinated planning o o g=e interested persons an ruled in a then pending adjudication that for the Federal response to radiological
" 'O P*"'c pate me, ,' its emergency planning regulations do emergencies including commercial g ,
not require consideration of potential nuclear power plant accidents.These
,, earthquake effects on emergency plans efforts have resulted in FEMA for nuclear power reactors. In the publishing the Federal Radiological Afotter of Southern Californio Edison Emergency Response Plan in the Federal
[ NUCLEAR REGULATORY Company, et of. (San Onofre Nuclear Reglster (49 FR 35896) on September 12. COMMISSION Generating Station. Units 2 and 3). CU- 1984. In addition,IT.MA has an active 81-33.14 NRC 1091 (1981). In so ruling program of earthquake prepartdAess
, 10 CFR Part 50 the Commission stated. which includes hazards and Emergency Planning and The Commission will consider on a generic vulnerabilit analysis estimates of Prep:rednesa for Production and basis whether regulations should be changed damage an casualties. planning for .
Utilisation Facilities to address the potentialimpacts of a sesere Federal response to a major earthquake, earthquake on emersency planning For the and assistante to State and local ASENcv: Nuclear Regulatory interim. the proximate occurrence of an governments in their esdqueke Commission. accidental radiological release and an earthquake that could disrupt normal Pl anning a,nd preparedness activities. ( ACTeosc Proposed rule' emergency planning appears sufficiently FT.MA beheves that all of these un!>kely that consideration in individual activities are sufficiently flexible to
, # suassa:RY:The Commission has ruled in complement each other in preparing for Heensing proceedings pendmg genene previius adjudications that its e nsidnahon oW manu ts not warund an ennt that may regulm a concurmnt regulations do not require the 14 NRC at to92. response to a major earthquake and a consideration of potential impacts of serious accident at a nuclear power The Commission recently affirmed this Cirthquakes on emergency planning for plant.
Position in the Diablo Canyon [ nuclear reactor sites.The Commission Proceeding In the Afolteroffocific Ces For general background on emergency now p poses to provide explicitly ondElectric Company (Diablo Canyon planning at nuclear facilities. the public cus amendment ofits regulationiin is referred to NUREG-0396. " Planning CFR Part 50 that such consideratic n Nuclear Power Plant. Units 1 and 2). CLI-44-12. 20 NRC (August 10.1964). Basis for the Development of State and eed not be given. Pending completio a Local Government Radiological petition for review in San Luis Obispo
} cf this rulemaking. the interpretation if Emergency Response Plans in Support of its rul;s set out in the adjudications Afothers forPeace v.NRC(DC Cir. No.
84-1410). In this decision the Light Water Nuclear Power Plants." and remains in effect. It is not erticipated Commission stated that it would initiate NUREG-0654 /FT.MA-REP-1. Rev.1. th:t this amendment will have rulemaking "to address whether the " Criteria for Preparation and Evaluation significant impact on licensees. State. or of Radiological Emergency Response l Potential for seismic impacts on
% ocal governments or on NRC or IT.MA. emergency planning is a significant Plans and Preparedness in Support of earts: Comment period expires January en ugh concern forlarge portions of the Nuc! car Power Plant. 8 The latter 22.1965. Comments received after 1his nation to warrant the amendment of the document, develo d iointly by the NRC date will be considered if it is practical regulations to specifically consider those and FEMA. forms e basis for both impacts e chief focus of the NRC and FEMA regulations on n be s'i e o for com en s ,
rulemaking will be to obtain additional emergency planning at nuclear power received on or b fore this date information to determine whether. In facihties. Also available for public Aoonesses: Mail comments to: spite of current indications to the inspection are the cornplete case records Secretary of the Commission.U S. contrary. cost. effective reductions in for the San Onofre and Diablo Canyon Nuclear Regulatory Commission, overall risk may be obtained by the proceedings. both of which deal Washington, DC 20555. ATTN: explicit consideration of severe specifically with the earthquake / Docketmg and Service Branch Deliver earthquakes in emergency response emergency planning interface. comments to: Room 1121,1717 H Street plannin ." Slip Opinion at 9. The Commission. In its review of the NW., Washington.DC between 815 a rn It sh Id be noted that the Federal record and consideration of arguments cnd 5 00 p m. weekdays. Copies of Emergency Management Agency in the Diablo Canyon proceedmg. , camments received may be examined at (FEMA) reviews offsite radiological reached the view that its previous San the NRC Public Document Room.1717 H emergency planning and preparedness Onofre holding was correct. i.e.. that t. Str:et NW., Washington. DC. to insure the adequacy of Federal. State. , Pom FustTwtm weronesarion coatAct: and local capabihties in such areas as , c,,,, ,,,hne documents m avaitable si ehe MichaelT.jamgochian, Division of Risk emergency organization. alert and comminion's Public Document Room.1rtr H street Nw.wnbneton.DC so6ss Copin of these Analysis and Operations. Office of notification. communications. me asure s C* ' Nuclear Regulatory Research. U.S. to protect the public. accident aga8FgP,"$"d
,, '**,j, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, assessment pubhc education and be ou.ined by nnns the u s Nuclear Resutatory Wohington. DC 20555. Telephone: (301) information, and medical support. commisi on wnbriston. DC sD5ss. AHention- l Detailed, specific assessment of Pubt.cenaae S In Maass't- l 13-7615 i
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, : esel Feder:1 Register / Vcl. 49. No. 247 / Friday. December 21, 1964 / Proposed Rasies (EPZ) could be hampered during he life Terhatral Relarensaise potential impact of earthquakes on of the plant by tamporary advarse Wn cmidningSe possWea d emergency plans need not be conditions reaulting frora natural plant damage from seismic events. it la onsidered.The tationale for this phenomena auch as rain, snow, flooding important to understand the severity of I olding was atsted in Diablo Conyon or by activities in the vicirrity of the seismic events.fheir range of Shp Opinion at 4-6), and may be summarized in part as followa: plant such as a major road repair, Probabilitiaa, and the potential for Existing NRC regulations require tha reactor accidents caused by selamic
. . . ITjhe wi.mse design of a maclear pcwer emergency plana be comprehensive and pt:nt was rewewed to rendas extrernefy events.Three classes of seismiceventa flexible enough to assure the capability are considered in this discusalon.The sman the probabsty that . . . am sar&p. ale to take appropriste protectim aclion to first classincludes ea'thquakea of (SSEl would resatt le e red.ologic mitigate the effccis of a nuclear release . . . IFor)t' cse risk.dominart . relatively low ground motian. up to the .
earthqvines wEch esure very severe damage emergenc) under auch conditions. Operating Basis Earthquake [QBE).The to both the ptant and the offsste area. Similar types of adeerse conditions OBE ground motion depends on plant eme response would have marginal could result from earthquakes below the location. Dese accelerationa eary in the de at has Safe Shutdown Earthquake (SSE) which range of about .05 g to 0.33 3. During an a ge . . . Sp occur proximate in time with as OBE, all safety related plant syslama given in this case to the effects of other unrelated accidental release of nuclear relativel) frequent naturalphenomena ne would be expected to ramala operating. material from the facility. The concern is evidence inctadn the capaShty of tte with seismic events in the region of the De second cleas of eventsinciodes emergency plea to resperd to drsmWons in earthquakes with yound motion higher commun.catior:s netweds and evacostion power plant which could impair offsite than the OBE but equal to er less than routes as a result of fog newre storms and emergency reapoose. However. the Safe Shutdown Earthquakes (SSE):
'**II'O'I. plans which meet the te c5pa .e of s .a g in a d atsndards in to CFR 50.47 and Appendix the ground motion of the SSE is typically disruptions sica!ar to some of the d.srupuona E provide reasonab!e assurance that about twice that of the OBE.5ecause which may resatt from an appropriate protective mammaes can probabihties of ocatrrence how laepe earthquake . . . %us. mMe no explicit uncertaisties for the SSE. typical consideration has been gv en to drtrupnens and will be taken under auch circumstances. estimatas are in the cedee of one in a caused by earthqwales the emergex) plaas thousand to one in ten thovaand per do have considerable flearbday to hand:e the The magnitude of the SSE and the adequacy of a plant's design to meet the year.NRC regulations require that e ea ch w far gre ter SSE are reviewed by NRC and may be plants be designed to achieve a safe frequency than do damagica ear:hquales controverted in adjudicatory shutdown aftee an SSE.Given an SSE.
end t!.is impticitly lacludes seme fleubibt) to pr oceedings. but, once sett!ed, abould all seismically qualified equipment bandle disruptions from earthquakes na weil n t be reasidend in nviewins or would be expected to function to being Although the Cornmission's reroarks adjudicating emergency planningissues. the plant to safe shutdown. An I were directed to the D.ablo Canyon " ' d earthquake up to and includine an SSE w uld be'cause for an alert emergewq 4 i cmergency p!an. au naclear power rector emergency p!ans da address the f['"b'0 b d SE h' sidered to
**" " * " " **" "#I contingency that emergency actions may sma ! r an an SSE ere cause failures that would result in a need to be taken under less-than-ideal '
" " significant accidentai release from the t$e t) e p nb d i plant Hus, although such an event "
conditions and with leas.than maximum cmcrgency response capabihties. ha6e been cocrected Thus, emergency *" '" * " ' "***'I*"*I Nxlear power plants are required Io plans need not take tale into account och ns.n onsh mpmewou% be designed ta safely shut down for all earthquakes larger or smaller than an required. Only in the event of as carthqualtes up to and includmg the
- SSE. Nevertheless, the basis for accident attributable to multiple
" Safe Shutdown Earthquale." or SSE- emergency planning is not constrained . unrelated failures of safety related See 10 CML Part 50. Appenda A. by the design basis for a plant, and systems due to some undiscovered General Design Criterion 2; 10 CTR Part emergencj planning efforts ree nize common com fauure mechah M 100. Appenda A Accordingly,the the possibihty that events cons cred as a malor design error). coincident with probability ciearthquakes large enough be3 ond the design basia can occur. A an earthquake such as an SSE.would to cause major onsite damage that spectrum of potential consequences there be a situation which would require would resu!!in,a signihcant independeot of the particular causes are ensue mrgency mpom M them j analped in reaching deosions on (
radiolog2al release from the plant is was ex,4nsive oUske damage.De low, and for such large earthquakes- emergency planning provisions, and the Commisaion believes that because of i offsite damage could make prior offsite pl nning basis does not depend upon the Intmist continuing nvin of j emergency plans margir'a!!y useful at the paruular scenario which may lead nuclear safety conducted by NRC,there ' best In add; tion, the probabahty of the to significant offsite releases of la en extnaly low probability that any prostrrste occurren e cf an earthquake radioactivity.To expbcitly consider such failure mechaniama have been of substantial magnitude and a carthquakes as causes for radioactive DV'fIO0l'ed. radiologicai release from the plant for releases is inconsistent with the The final class of events tartwtaa aN reasoos unrelated to the earthquake emergency planning basis used by NRC earthquakes eth yound anotion levels itself is even lower. Therefore, there in adopting its regulations. above the SSE. Fragility analysis has does not appear to ex.ist a set of The Conmission intends to cons. der been used to estiinate the probabihty of circumstances at alllikely where the this issue carefully in this rulemaking failure as a function of ground smotion consideration of earthquake impacta and to weigh all argumenta before associated with these earthquakes.The would significantly improve the atate of reaching a Analdecision.In the Zion. Indian Point. and Umarick emergency planning at a naclear power meantime, this rulemaking should not be ProbabilisticRisk Asseeamesta construed to affect the continuing estimated that youed rootice am the reactor. vslidity of the Commission's ruling in The ability to tale protective actions order ofits 3 ot 0.75 g accelerstion [ throughout the plume egosure pathway Son Ono/rc and DeaNo Confon, ( .
P
', l Fed;ral RIgist:r / Vol. 49. No. 247 / Frid y. December 21, 1984 / Pr: posed Ruts
,49682
= .: different from other natural phenomena CFR 50 47 and a paragraph would be wuld be required to damage these that they need not be considered at all.
r power plants to the extent that added to the " Introduction" section of even in areas of high seismic risk. ! int release of radioactiuty could Appendix E.The Commission wants to examined the basis for the /(r. t Jome plants.in certain regions.
- signed to withstand earthquakes assure that it has the benefits of comments of allinterested persons on Commission's conclusion in triy separate views on CLI-84-12. the Diablo Canyon
- wim such ground motion. These plants the subject.The Commission therefore
- invites comment not only on the text of order, so l will not repeat here my cre cble to resist damage to still higher reasons for disagreeing with the levels cf ground motion because of the the proposed rule. but also on the fundamental question of the relationship Commission's condusion. Suffice it to design margin. !:is apparent that the between earthquakes and emergency say that I do not believe that therela pt:bability estimates for ground planning at nuclear power facihties. any reasonable basis for a rule which accelerstions which would be required would treat earthquakes differently from t3 d: mage these nuclear power plants to Commenters should. at a minimum. other natural phenomena for purposes of address the merits of three pos*.ible the catent that significant release of emergency planning.
redirectisity would occur are less than alternatives:
- 1. Adoption of the proposed rule In an attempt to counter my criticism the pr:bability estimates for the SSE for of their course of action in the Diablo explicitly incorporating the these plants. Commission's interpretation in San Canyon case, the Commission has just Bas:d upon the probabilistic risk recently decided to request comment on Onofre and Diablo Canyon; assessment results for these three 2. Leaving the isste open for a possible alternative rule which would plants the NRC staff considers that for adjudication on a case by. case basis, or also exclude from emergency planning most e:rthquakes (including some " tornadoes and otherlow frequency
- 3. Requiring by rule that emergency carthquakes more severe than the SSE) plans specifically address the impact of natural events." I do not believe that
- the power plant would generally not be such a rde would be in the public earthquakes.
tmpected to pose an offsite radiological interest. While hurricanes, tomadoes. hazard. For earthquakes which would The Commission would be most assisted by comments which offer and earthquakes may occur relatively ca:se plant damage leading to cause or occur immediate offsite radiological hazards specific policy and techmcal reasons for infrequently, should thedent or an but f r which there weuld be relatively preferring one alternative over the coincident with an acci " others. emergency at a nuclear plant they could min:r effsite damage. emergency The Commission is also considering sigmIicantIy dI'srupt emergency resp:nse capabilities around nuclear whether to include in this rulemaking ' ' power plants would not be seriously tornadoes and otherlow. frequency ','[P t n l s en to cff;cted for those earthquakes which natural events. In that possible case, require licensees to consider what kinds cause very severe damage to both the offsite. emergency response plans of effects these natural phenomena plant and the offsite area. emergency submitted to satisfy the applicable cnse would have marginal benefit cause and to determine whether their standards of to CFR 50.47 and Appendix ee eo use ofits impairment by offsite E would not need to specifically ggegegpans rge. Howeser. the expenditures of consider the impact on emergency been an onerous burden.Thus, with a
.aiti:nal resources to cope with seismically cause offsite damage may be response capability of earthquakes. minimal expenditure of resources, the "of d;ubtful value considering the tornadoes or any similar low probability licensees can prepare for what could be naturally occurnng phenomena which a senous emergency planning problem.
modest benefit in os erall risk reduction are presumed to occur proximate in time When I agreed to the publication of a which could be obtaHed." C1.!-64-12. with an accidental release of radioactive rule. I did so with the hope that the (Slip Opinion at 5). material from a licensed facility. Commission intended to carefully and
% sed Rule Comments on this possible alternative objectively examine the issue of in the Dichlo Canyon decision the are requested. whether and to what extent the Commission stated that it would initiate issiooer complicating effects of earthquakes rulemaking"to address whether the 8'P8.e Views of Comm. ought to be considered in emergency
^88*I*tm pot;ntial for seismic impacts on !! should be obvious that emergency planning I also hoped that the emergency planning is a sigmficant information gathered in the rulemaking planning is a site. specific exercise enough concern for large portions of the which is not amenable to a generic would convince the Commission that a nati:n to warrant the amendment of the rule excluding altogether the ;
rulemaking such as that proposed by the considerations of earthquakes was not a regulations to specifically consider those Commission. In carrying out their impacts.The chief focus of the wise thing to do. I find. however, that emergency planning responsibilities. that was a forlorn hope.The rul;ma) is will be to obtain additional inf;rmation to determine whether. in both the NRC staff and FEMA have Commission is instead intent merely on recognized this. When they consider codifying its Diablo Canyon decision. spite cf current indications to the whether the emergency plan for a contrary. cost. effective reductions in and is going through with rulemaking overall risk may be obtained by the particular site is flexible enough to procedures only so that it can say that it ens elop all eventualities, they consider is allowing comment on the issue. no cxplicit consideration of severe I c:rthquakes in emergency response the effects of whatever natural metter how meaningless that planning." Cll-64-12 (Slip Operation at phenomena are most likely to disrupt opportunity for comment turns out to be. , emergency planning at that site. Thus, I will not, therefore, agree to the . 9). they have considered snow in New The amendments to to CFR 50 47 and England, hurricanes in Florida, tornados publication of a rule with whichI 10 Cm Part 50 Appendix E which the disagree when the rulemaking C:mmission is proposing would in the Midwest, and earthquakes in procedures are not being used as they Gxplicitly incorporate in them the California. were intended. to meaningfully gather, , The Commission now tells us,
'terpretations in the Commissions Son information to be factored into the r however that the experts were wrong rulemaking decision. but instead are ofre and Diablo Canyon rulings. A
(< .w paragraph (e) would be added to lo and that earthquakes are somehow so I t
. L l l
p 48843 Federal Regist:r / Vol. 49, Ns. 247 / Friday. December 21, 1964 / Proposed Rules therefore is not subject ta the sectione so.too.ac.1st also issuoi ender sec. e ejng used solely to circumvent the ses.se Stat. ass (42 U3.C Esas). ( eating process in a particular licensing requirements of the Paperwork For the purpmes of mc. ass,se Sist, ma se pr:ceeding. Reduction Act of1980 (44 U.S.C. 3501 et amended (42 U.S C 2273). Il 50.10 (al. ibl. Chairman Palladino's AdditionalViews "9 I' and (c). 30.44, so.es, so es so.ne, and aman (al > are issued under 1 sib,es stat. set as Regulatory F1exibility Certification In its bare essentials, the amended (42 US C. SaDi(bl): il 30.10 (b) and i In accordance with the Regulatory (c) and 50 54 are luned under esc.1sti.es disagreement between the Commission majority and Commissioner Asselstine Flexibility Act of1980. 5 U.S.C.605(b). stat. sos, as amended (42 US.C. aset(i): and i the Commission hereby certifies that
- Il so.ss(e), so.selb). no.70, so.71. so.ra, sars, J seems to be that the majority currently believes earthquakes need not be this propesed rule will not,if . and to.7s are inued under sec.1sto.es stat. - '
eso, as amended (42 US C.saatto)). c:nsidered in emergency planning promulgated, have a significant economic impact on a substantial 2.In i 50.47 a new paragraph (e)is
- whereas Commissioner Asselstine believes that they should.1 have number of small entities.The p-oposed added to read as follows:
difficulty understanding why the rule clarifies requirements for the issuance of an operatinglicense for a I80.47 Emersoneyplans.
- opportunity to comment on the * * * *
- m:jority's proposal should be viewed as nuclear power plant. licensed pursuant to Section 103 and 104b of the Atomic (e) Emergency response plans i
" meaningless " or solely to circumvent the hearing process." but an opportunity Energy Act of1954,as amended,42 to comment on some other proposal. . U.S.C. 2133,2134b. The efectric utility submitted to satisfy the standards set forth in this section need not consider
/ )
j such as a proposal to ennsider companies which own and operate the impact on emergency planning of 1 earthquakes which cause, or occur ) earthquakes, should not. I would hope nuclear power plants are dominant in that the Commission's proposal will their service areas and do not fallwithin proximate in time with, an accidental j stimut.te public comments both pro and the definition of a small business found release of radioactive material from the**j con, and I believe that the Commission in Section 3 of the Small Business Act, facility. == i has plainly indicated its desire to obtain 15 U.S.C. 632. or within the Small Appendix E -{Amsodad) cnd consider all pertinent comments Business Size Standards set forth in 13 CB Part 121. Accordingly,there is no 3. A new sentence is arided as an cnd facts. additional paragraph at the end of the significant economic impact on a, Proposed Finding of No Significant introduction section of Appendix E to substantial number of small entities p EnvironmentalImpact under the Regulatory Flexibility Act of read as follows: The Commission proposes to 1980' l.tntroduction determine under the National I.ist of Subjects in 10 CFR Part 50 * * * *
- i Enviromental Pohey Act of 1969. as Neither emergency repsonee plane nor
( amended, and the Commission's Antitrust, Cla ssified information. Fire evacuation time analyses need consider the regulations in Subpart A of 10 CFR Part prevention Inco poration by reference, 3*P'.C' *f th 4
"'I *hi'h **" '**"'
81,that this proposed rule,if adopted. Intergovernmentat relations, Nuclear would not be a major Federal action power plants and reactors. Penalty, Q,*,'Q'i*'['h'g',",'N'j["I' ,, ,3 significantly affecting the quality of the Radiation protection, Reactor siting
- hington DC.thuisth day of ,
human environment and therefore an criteria. Reporting and recordkeeping D r cnvironmentalimpact statement is not requirements' For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. required. See 10 CR 51.20(a)(1). This Pursuant to the Atomic Energy Act of g,,,,3 y, cugg, determination has been made because 1954, as amended, the Energy secretaryof AeCommission. the Commission cannot identify any 0" ^ ' d'd p Docm227 Filed 13-3444.8.45 am) Impaet on the human environment 'j'['g",*;*,"f553 ! bhe U ed cssociated with not requiring euma caos ma om States Code, notice is hereby given that consideration of earthquakes in . adoption of the following amendmente emergency planning and because it is an ' 1' ' Code i F'd'r'I DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION l interpretation of existing regulation. R tio P is emump!ated. Regulatory Analysis Federal Aviation Administretfort PAR SMOMESTIC UCENSING OF The Commission has prepared a PRODUCTION AND UTIUZATION 14 CFR Port 91 regulatory analysis of this proposed FACILITIES regulation.The analysis examines the met No.249ed$PRM e4-34) 1.The authority citation for Part 50 costs and benefits of the rule as Special Flight Authorisation for Noise i considered by the Commission. A copy continues to read as follows: I of the draft regulatory analysis is Authority: Secs. 103.104.161.182.183. s es. Restricted Aircraft ava!!able forinspection er.d copyir.g for 189. 68 Stat 936,937.948 953. 954. 955. 956, as astucy: Federal Aviation
)
a fee, at the NRC Public Document ar...nded. sec. 234. sa Stat.1244. es amended Administration (FAA). DOT. , ; Room.1717 H Street.NW Washir.gton. (42 U S C. 2133,2134. 22o1. 2232. 2233. 2236. 2239. 22821. secs. 201. 202,2o6. a8 St t.1242. action: Notice of proposed rulemaking DC.Singte copies of the analysis may be 1244.1246. ei emended 142 U.S C. 5641, Sa42. ) obtained from Michael Jamgochian. (NPRM). _ Se el is d under Pub.1.35 401. This proposed Special l uct er e8u atorY omm ssion- sec.10.92 Siet.2951(42U.S C.5astl Sections , outsedany: Federal Aviation Regula) ' 1 Washington. D ' 20555. Telephone (301) So 5rld). 50 58. so 91. and so 92 elso issued 433-7615. under Pub. I. 97-415. 96 Stat. 2071. 2073 (42 [rovides ght authorizations for timited issuance to conduct certain of specia t u nontevenue operations that would Paperwork Reduction Act Statement $5C der ec 22 g cuon9)e 2 U 152l otherwise be prohibited by the Part 91. j This proposed rule contains no Sections 50 ao-50 et etso issued under sec. Subpart E noise restrictions after i information collection requirements and 144. as Stat. 954. as amended (42 U.S C. 2234). l i
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EARTHQUAKE EMER NCY PLAPNING AT DIABLO CANYON submmed to: Mr. Steven M. Skidmore
. Pacific Gas and Electric Company i 77 Beale Street Son Francisco, California 94106 September 2,1981 h TERA CORPORATION 2150 Shattuck Avenue Berkeley, Collfornia 94704 415 845 5200 ,
se* * . c o mernia Daka Te=cs Bethesda. Mcrykmd noton Rouge Louisiono - Der Mar. CoWomio
' New York. New Wk ' San Antonio.Temos Derwer Colorado Los Angelet Comomio .
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; -d TABLE OF CONTENTS Section Pm
1.0 INTRODUCTION
AND EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-1 1.1 In troduc t ion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . l-I l.2 Execu t ive Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-3 2.0 STUDY AR E AS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-1 4
3.0 E ARTHQUAKE EFFECTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-1 3.1 General Earthquake Effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-1 3.1.1 Earthquake Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-1 3.1.2 Eart hquake Hozords . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-3 3.l.3 Chorocteristics and Prediction ! of Strong Ground Motion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-5 3.2 Earthquake Ef fects on Transportation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-9 3.2.1 Background ...................................... 3-9 3.2.2 Road Network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-45 4.0 EVACUATION TIME ESTIMATES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-1 4.1 Main Evocuation Route Transportation Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-4 4.2 Simulation Approoch . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-6
. 4.2.1 Preparation Time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-7 i5 4.2.2 Transit Time Between Residences and Main Evocuation Routes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-7 L 4.2.3 Merging Time Onto Main Evocuation Routes . . . . . . . . . . 4-8 4.2.4 Transit Time On Main Evocuation Routes . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-10 4.3 Tr a f f ic Con t ro l . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-13 4.4 Modeling Earthquake Domoge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-14 4.5 Summary of Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-14 5.0 CO MMUN ICATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-1 5.1 Earthquake Ef fects on Communications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-1 5.2 PGondE Communications Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-1 5.2.1 Power Plant Private Unified Telephone System........ 5-1 5.2.2 PGondE UFF and VHF Radio Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-10 5.2.3 Critical Elements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-13 5.3 Pocific Telephone Company . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-16 5.3.1 General Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-16 5.3.2 Redundancy and Seismic Criteria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-17 5.3.3 Crit ical Elements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-18 5.4 Son Luis Obispo County Communications Systeni . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-19 5.4.1 General Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-19 5.4.2 Critical Elements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-20 i l
< s. i B-81-269 . TERACORPORATION l 1
* + - . - - . . - , . - , _ . . ~ , , , - _ _ . . _ _ , , _ _ , , _ _ _ _ _ . _ _ . . , _ _ - . _ . __ _ _ _ _ _
TABLE OF CONTENTS - (CONT.) Section Pm 5.5 Emergency Broadcast System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-21 5.5.1 General Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-21 5.5.2 Cr i t ic a l E l e men t s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-21 5.6 Early Warnirig System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-25 5.& I General Description . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-25 5.&2 Critical Elements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-26
&O DI ABLO CANYON EARTHQUAKE RESPONSE PLAN . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-1
~
&I In t rodoc t ion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-1
&l.I Purpose.......................................... 6-I
& l.2 Relationship to Other Plans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-1 6.l.3 S t at e-of-t he- Art . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-4 6.2 Operational Concepts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-4
&2.1 Gene r a l . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-4
&2.2 Reporting of the Emergencies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-6 ,
&2.3 Emergency Periods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-6 l
&2.4 Concept of Local Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-7
&2.5 Earthquake Domoge Assessment Center (EDAC)....... 6-11
&2.6 Additional Interfaces with State Earthquake .
Response Plan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-12
- &3 Specia l Task s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-13 Task A Domoge Assessment of Transportation Routes and Communications . 6-13 Task B Resources and Support (Repairs) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-37
- Task C Tro f fic Con t ro l . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-39
& Task D Protective Actions for Nonessential Plant Personnel ............. 6-41 Task E Protective Actions for the Public . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-43 References for Section &O . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-48 7.0 REF ERENCES C ITED . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7-1 i b
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B-81-269 TERACORPORATION
i. ^ LIST OF TABLES Table No. P_gg
- 3-1 Expected Landslide Assessment Criteria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-25 3-2 Landslides Potential Summary by Roads . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-26 3-3 Expected Liquefaction Assessment Criteria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-28 3-4 Repair Time Estimates for Liquefaction (Two Lones) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-29 3-5 Liquefaction Potential Summary (By Roads) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-30 3-o Best Estimate Bridge Performance Summary (By Roads) . . . . . . . . . . . 3-43 4-1 Repair Time for Seismic Domoge Used in Network Analysis ........ 4-19 !
4-2 Summary of Estimated Evocuation Times (Hours) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-22 4-3A Availability of Crews Assumed in Evocuation Scenarios ........... 4-23 4-3B Reduced Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-24 4-3C Reduced Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .'. . . . 4-25 5-1 Major Components of the Diablo Canyon Power Plant Communications Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-5 ; 5-2 PGondE Communications Capabilities by Location . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-6 l 1 5-3 Avallobility of Communications System Bockup Power Supplies..... 5-9 l 5-4 PGondE Radio Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-12 5-5 Alternate Links for the Communications Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-15 ; 1 i 5-6 Son Luis Obispo County EBS Stations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-23 5-7 San Luis Obispo County Emergency Broadcast System . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-24 6-1 Bridge Performance Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-27 6-2 Summary of Estimated Evocuation Times (Hours) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-47 l O 9
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B-81-269 . l ERACORPORADON
LIST OF FIGURES Figure No. pg 2-1 Genera l Road Ne t work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-6 3-1 Median Peak Ground Acceleration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-11 3-2 Areas of Potential Landslide . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-23 3-3 Areos of Potent 101 Liquefaction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-24 3-4 S t a t e Br idges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-39 3-5 County and City Bridges t. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-41 4-1 Location of Entrance Nodes Used in Network Simulation Model ..... 4-3 4-2 Car Speed vs. Densi t y . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-5 4-3 Volume o f Cars vs. Density . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-5 6-1 Earthquake Emergency Plan Response Schematic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-10 6-2 Protective Action Decision Matrix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6-46 6-3 Son Luis Obispo Area ....................................... 6-19 f 8 B-81-269 TERACORPORATION
7 l.0 INTRODUCTION APOEXECUTIVE
SUMMARY
1.1 INTRODUCTION
Traditionally the emergency planning process has focused on singular events or categories of evenis to develop and organize appropriate emergency response activities. The exigencies of each event. class challenge the applicable emergen-cy plan in unique ways--the resources required, the organizations responsible, the time frame of interest, the geographical region impacted. But it has always been recognized that, first, every emergency plan represents a base that can be exponded or contracted in response to the octual emergency and second, that each emergency plan establishes a response copobility with a significant degree of transferobility to events other than those specifically the subject of the plan. In fact, a fundamental premise of planning is to avoid narrowly addressing j specific scenarios and thereby to provide the most effective overall capability. This report expands the envelope of current emergency planning by considering the potential interactions of a severe natural event, a large earthquake, with the ( functioning of emergency plans for a radiological emergency at a nuclear power plant. Earthquakes and radiological emergencies are individually addressed by local, state, and federal plans and pionning requirements. In addition, earth-quakes are considered initiatory events for nuclear plant radiological plans. Not coincidentally, the separate plans addressing each event provide a considerable response copobility for the combined events. Thus, it is expected that these separate, " specialty" plans should remain the basic planning tools. This report examines some of the detailed Interactions of a combined event, and establishes a framework for coordination and optimization of emergency response capa-bility. , Several natural phenomeno, including earthquakes, are specified as initiating events for nuclear power plant emergency plans in NUREG-0654/ FEMA-REP-1,
" Criteria for Preparation and Evoluotion of Radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Power Plants." The PGondE Emergency Plan currently considers the spectrum of possible earthquakes by B-81269 l-l TERACORPORATION
their inclusicn as initiating cvents fer the four classes of Emergency Action Levels. The PGandE plan also includes onsite instrumentation for monitoring of ' seismic activity. Additionally, a general capability exists to respond to the most . likely and frequent levels of seismic activity (e.g., earthquakes of magnitude 5 or 6) through basic emergency planning performed by the 'public sector. For example, the San Luis Obispo Seismic Elements of 1974 provide basic technical information to describe and respond to' potential earthquake damage. For larger earthquakes discussed herein, much of the preparedness that currently exists due to radiological emergency planning should allow response by extension of the basic planning. Additionally, state and federal earthquake response plans (e.g., State of California " Earthquake Response Plan" reprinted April 1981 and FEMA Region IX Federal Earthquake Plan,1979), provide a level of preparedness to respond to the effects of the large (magnitude 7.5) earthquake postulated for the design of the Diablo Canyon Power Plant (DCPP). Such a large earthquake, regardless of whether a coincident radiological emergency exists, might exhaust the resources of local authorities, thus requiring action by both state and federal authorities. The study described herein was specifically prepared to respond t'o the NRC request of December 16, 1980 for evaluation of the potential complications in
- emergency planning resulting from an earthquake which could either initiate or follow the initiation of occidents at the Diablo Canyon site. As such, we oddressed three principal subject areas identified in the NRC letter. The first area involves estimating the potential ground motion within the evacuation planning area and the resultant likely earthquake domoge to transportation and I communication systems. This effort relied upon the extensive seismological studies presented in the Diablo Canyon seismic hearings (Atomic Safety and t
Licensing Board and Atomic Licensing Appeal Board) as well as additional investigations conducted to estimate the structural damage to transportation and communication systems that might be used in an emergency. Decisions regarding evacuations after an earthquake would likely require consideration of l conditions differing from those presented in the PGancE Emergency Plan. Thus, the .econd area involves on evaluation of the impact of a spectrum of potential l i B-81-269 l-2 - TERACORPORATION
I - ' corthquake domoge 1:vals on svacuation time estimates. This sffort utilized e rzolistic simulatinn model of the evoeuation route network including the dynamic effects of traffic congestion and control. The third area identifies revised planning concepts intended to facilitate the response of local authorities to the complicating effects of a large earthquake on 4 o radiological emergency. As with all planning, periodic review and upgrading of these concepts is required to assure o dynamic planning status. In this case, we have identified a major revision to response dictated by the combined seismic and radiological emergencies; however, the continued development of earthquake response plans by federal, state and local authorities will necessitate revision and cross-reference to their respective radiological emergency preparedness plans. Annual review and updating of radiological planning is assured by federal requirements. 1.2 EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY
The study focused on two creas where the most significant earthquake interac- [ tions would be manifested: transportation and communications. The study also establishes a conceptual framework for on " earthquake response plan" which oddresses both the response to the complicating effects of domoge os well as advanced planning concepts to deal . with the duality of a radiological and l earthquake emergency. The specific evaluations rest on the assumption of a l 7.5 magnitude surface wave located on the Hosgri fault. The specific earthquake postulated is not considered to be particularly crucial as for the most part the study proceeded and, in fact, endeavored to generalize the initiating events. Due to the complexity of a combined emergency, it was important to develop a detailed data base on earthquake-generated damage. In doing so, it is not contended that such damage con be deterministically predicted; rather, it is to amplify our understanding of the likely nature and extent of damage os a basis { for rational planning decisions. In recognition of the range of possible earth- , quake ground motion, the range of effects over a geographical area due to that ground motion, and the vorloble response of individual structures and geologic ,s B-81-269 l-3 e TERACORPORATION i
t formations with respect to a given earthquake input, the data base was actually triplicated to encompass three defined domoge levels. These are Level I as an optimistic evaluation, Level 2 as a best estimate, and Level 3 as a pessimistic evaluation. The terms minor, expected, and maior are also used interetpngeably I to characterize these levels. Again, the value of this tiered approach is not to be viewed in terms of a predictive capability but in the achievement of a generalized and odoptive dato base to be used in planning and in responding to the event octually encountered. For road systems the data base considered two principal domoge mechanisms: ground failure resulting in soil liquefaction underneath the rood beds or landslid-Ing onto the roadways, and structural or settlement domoge to bridges and j overpasses. Eoch bridge in the evocuation routes was evoluoted as to its design and the types of domoge likely to be sustained. For landsliding and liquefoetion, ! the full traverse of each highway was surveyed to locate potential liquefaction sites, and to assess the likelihood of such liquefaction and the extent of encroachment of slide material on the highway or domoge to the highway due to ground subsidence, in addition, estimates were mode of the expected times and required resources to repair each item of domoge and restore the road to service. t The dato base for earthquake domoge also included information on the suscepti-bility of essential communications equipment to earthquake forces. The types of domoge that could interrupt communications include loss of electrical power, loss of telephone lines, loss of buildings housing the eouipment, loss of equipment within the building and loss of ontennae towers. From a planning perspective, domoge to transportation and communications
- systems reflects rnost directly on the selection and implementation of protective actions. Protective action decisions for the combined radiological / earthquake emergency would benefit from a pre-analysis of evacuation times representative of the degraded conditions likel'y to be encountered. Therefore, analyses were undertaken using a computer simulation technique that dynamically modeled the flow of cars through the evocuation network. A flexible menu of evacuation f
, options and strategies were considered to minimize the impacts of domoge to the B-81-20 l-4
~
I
s ; road system. Evocuatirn times wtra cornputed fer the range cf damage I;vels contained in the data base. A matrix was then prepared (Table 4-2) correlating evacuation times, domoge levels and extent of evacuation (i.e., portial versus total). This matrix represents a distillation of the detailed analyses perforrned in the study and effectively coalesces the decision-making process for protective action. The final step in the study was to design a planning structure that would have at its core the modified protective action matrix and which would implement the various survey, assessment, and coordination functions necessory to sustain the decision process. The plan has been formulated such that emergency functions related to each type of event (i.e., radiological and earthquake) proceed largely in parallel, with provisions made for (1) prioritizing actions where necessary, (2) coordinating key organizations, and (3) synthesizing dato and decisions to w adequately reflect the contingencies of each emergency. In addition to the development of the domoge dato base, evacuation matrix, and response plan, this study provided more refined insights into emergency planning for these combined events. The conclusions able to be reached are perhaps as (or more)important than the specific results. They are as follows:
~
j
- 1. Even on a pessimistic basis, a Iorge earthquake in the study area would not be expected to result in total neutralization of emergency response capabilities. This is
- attributable to the inherent resistance of much of the physical equipment and structures involved and the diver-l sity of copobilities provided by redundant and separate 4 means of transport and communications.
- 2. Evocuation, as a protective action option, is available within a reasonable time for most geographic areas under
- most domoge conditions. The avollobility of evocuation is 4 enhanced considerably by pre-onalyses of potential dom-age and repair resources, and the establishment of plans to survey, assess and repair domoge and to utilize avail-able evacuation routes in a maximum manner.
- 3. Emergency planning must be considered as an evolving process and in the context of other related plans and events. The detailed assessment of earthquake effects f.
B-81-269 l-5 1 - l TERACORPORATION
+ ond conceptual plan provided in this study are at perhaps the leading edge of planning for these types of emergencies. Planning resources and attention should be distributed such that local, state and federal emergency planning is conducted in on integrated,and horrnonious manner. 4 4 B-81-269 l-6 . TERACORPORATION
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AYMCMMENT DC 2-
i YoL X h APPEFOlX GROUto FAILURE TABLE OF CONTENTS Section g I.0 OVERVIEW OF CRITICAL ROUTES . . .'. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-1 1.1 In t roduc t ion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-1 1.2 Field Reconnaissance Maps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-2 o Table of Roads Surveyed . . . . . . . . . . . '. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-3 o Map of Roads Surveyed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-5 o Quadrangle Names vs. Map Numbers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-6 o Field Reconnoissance Mops . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I-7 1.3 Road Summary Sheets of Landslide and Liquefaction Hozords . 1-17 2.0 LANDSLIDE POTENTI AL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-1 2.1 Overview and Me thodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-1 2.2 Summary of Lundslide Potential by Road . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-14
<- 2.3 Summary of Landslide Potential by Site . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
( 2.4 De tailed Field Survey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-22 2-26 o Reference Table - Landslide Site Numbers for Critical Routes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-27 o Pictures of Potential Landslide Sites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-29 o Fie ld Da t o Shee ts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-42 3.0 LIQUEF ACTION POTENTI AL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-1 3.1 Overview and Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-1 3.2 Summary of Liquefaction Potential by Road . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-13 3.3 Summary of Liquefaction Potential by Site . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-17 I w. B-81-227 - TERACORPORA110N
hL. f APPEtolX BRIDGES APO EVACUATION TABLE OF CONTENTS Section Pm 1.0 GUIDELINES FOR EVALUATING THE PROBABLE SEISMIC DAMAGE TO HIGHWAY BRIDGES IN THE SAN LUIS OBISPO AREA......... 1-1 1.I in t r oduc t ion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-1 1.2 Be a r i n g s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-2 1.3 P ie rs and Co lu mns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-3 1.4 Ab u t m en t s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-4 1.5 Fou nda t i ons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1-5 2.0 TESTING OF BRIDGE EVALUATION GUIDELINES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2-1 3.0 SEISMIC EVALUATION OF BRIDGG COLUMNS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-1 3.I in t roduc t ion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-1 3.2 Development of Column Vulnerability Factor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-2 ( 4.0 SUMM ARY DATA OF BRIDGES SURVEYED . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-1 4.1 Bridge Performance Summary Sheets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-2 4.2 Pictures ............................................... 4-13 4.3 Bridge Seismic Data Forms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-32 4.4 Summary of Evoluotion of Bridges for which No Plans Were Available . . . . . . . . . . . . : . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . : . 4- 191 4.5 Behavior of Bridges During Post Earthquakes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4-194 5.0 EVACUATION NETWORK . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-1 5.1 Evocuot ion Ne t work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-2 5.2 Formulae for Traf fic Flow Quantities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-6 5.3 Access to Evocuation Route.s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-8 5.4 Routing of Vehic les . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-11 5.5 Pictures - Communications Elements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5-44 L B-81-227 TERACORPORATION
TAB 5 _ .3 _ FOREIGN EARTHQUAKE EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS CONSIDERATIONS During its 298th meeting, February 7-9, 1985, the ACRS requested
- informatica on the. approach being taken in other countries regarding this subject.
Attached are the following documents pertaining to actions taken to date.
- 1. Memo from R. Fraley to J. Shea (IP) requesting information (including attached original FR notice with two proposed changes identified by 1 and 2 on page 4964), dated February 26, 1985 (Attachment F-1).
- 2. IP's response to the preceding memo from J. Lafleur, Jr. to R.
Fraley, (including attached copy of telegram sent to France, FRG, Italy, Japan (2 sources), Korea, and Sweden), dated March 21, 1985 (Attachment F-2).
- 3. Meme from 0. Merrill to D. Moeller reporting Response (to date of memo) from IP, dated March 28, 1985 (Attachment F-3).
- 4. Three reponses (via IP) received to date (May 2 (1985) from France, Sweden and Japan, each of which concurs that no consideration need be given for earthquakes in Emergency Preparedness / Planning (Attachment F-4).
ITEM 3 W}}