ML20141H023
| ML20141H023 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 03/28/1985 |
| From: | Merrill O Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards |
| To: | Moeller D Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards |
| Shared Package | |
| ML20140C992 | List:
|
| References | |
| FOIA-85-653 ACRS-GENERAL, NUDOCS 8601130305 | |
| Download: ML20141H023 (1) | |
Text
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[ o,, UNITED STATES l
. f ,I n NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION l
O ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON REACTOR SAFEGUARDS
- WASHINGTON, D. C. 20666
( 4...../ March 28, 1985 MEMORANDUM FOR: D. W. Moeller, Chainnan ACRS Site Evaluation Subcomittee FROM: 0. S. Merrill, Staff Engineer -
SUBJECT:
RESPONSE FROM OFFICE OF INTERNATIONAL PR GRAMS (IP)
REGARDING CONSIDERATION OF EARTHQUAKES IN THE CONTEXT OF EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS Attached are the two memoranda referenced below, the first of which summarizes IP's actions to date in response to R. Fraley's initial request for information from IP on this matter (Reference 2).
The deadline date of April 19 in the Telex of Reference 1 was agreed to between Hans Scherter of IP and myself in order to have pertinent material, if any, available to us for the combined Waste Management and Site Evaluation Subcommittees meeting on May 2-3, 1985.
( ,
References:
- 1. Memorandum from J.D. Lafleur to R. F. Fraley' (with attached telex) dated March 21, 1985.
- 2. Memorandum from R. F. Fraley to J. R. Shea (without attachment) dated February 26, 1985.
cc: With Attachments:
ACRS Members '
ACRS Staff: '
R. F. Fraley -
T. McCreless M. Libarkin J. McKinley G. Quittschreiber S. Duraiswamy R. Savio M. Jamgochian, RES
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- STANI.EY H. MENDES. IF.
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STRUCTURALEN0 SNEER 37$7 STATE STREET SutTE 201 SANTA SAMSARA. CALFORNIA S3105 '
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PHONE i005) e82 2500 I, I February 26, 1985 ,.
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Secretary of the Commission 3.
,[* [2f-i.. ijkhf.h U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission .
Washington, DC 20555 .9 A >
Attn: Docketing and Service Branch ,
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Subject:
NRC .
10 CFR Part 50 Emergency Planning and Preparedness for Production and Utilization Facilities Proposed Rule Gentlemen:
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission proposes to amend current regulations so as not to require consideration of an earthquake related radiologica.1 release on emergency planning for nuclear reactor sites in earthquake prone California.
Such a rule is irrational, illogical, and just plain stupid!
It jeopardizes the lives and futures of the people living near these plants. Why are you doing this?
The proposed rule change is an unthinkable abuse of lawful power to belatedly justify prior NRC actions in the Diablo Canyon and San onofre proceedings. The primary purpose of those actions was to get the plants operating BEFORE the people of California found out what was in store for them.
Your actions precluded all legitimate On the Record comments by experienced engineers and other persons who could easily prove you wrong.
The ccmmission's actions are clearly those of dishonest, scheming manipulative people.
In 1981, at the NRC's specific request, Pacific Gas and Electric had Tera Corporation prepare for Diablo Canyon a three volume report about probable earthquake damage to roads, bridges, communication systems, evacuation, etc. The Commis- ,
sion squelched the Tera Report and kept it out of the on the Record proceedings. The report made it quite clear to experi-enced engineers such as myself that in the event of an earth-quake related radiological release, early evacu*tien of the San Luis obispo area would be extremely difficult if not impossible. The people of San Luis Obispo will likely just have to seek shelter and accept what falls on them.
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. . STANLEY H. MENDES, INC.
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February 26, 1985 Average prevailing winds could bring radioactive m'aterials over
- my community in about four hours.
The Commission's actions, relying on the advice of staff, constitute the practice of civil engineering in California and are totally contrary to protection of the public health, -
safety, and welfare. Neither Commission nor staff is legally competent to practice. I assure you that charges will be filed against you.
The tragic part of this whole situation is that for all practical purposes, you cannot be properly held accountable for your actions, save a hand slap or two. It is sad that this great county and our legal system allow such things to occur. Such is our weakness and also perhaps our strength as a nation.
Sincerely yours, A . J 5 h W .a h R V
Stanley H. Mendes -
Structural Engineer California License No. 709 SHM:pm
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i io,e,o.ce Persippany,New Jersey 070541149 F. .. d P2:16 r.t mn 2s>ssm TELEX 136-482 Writer's Direct DialNumber van 5:arfdIhlh85 p p Mr. Samuel J. Chilk Secretary of the Cntinission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comissim - ,
Washington, DC 20555 l i
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Dear Mr. Chilk:
Subject:
1 Proposed Rule on Emergency Planning and Preparedness for Production and Utilization Facilities The staff on the subject of GPU Nuclear proposed rule. Corporation (GPUN) herewith submits comments 1984 Federal Register notice (49 FR 49640).Coments were requested in a Decem consider the potential impact of earthquakes, tornadoes or othe frequency natural events. !
regulations sufficiently addresses this issue. Compliance with current Emergency Planl Provisions are made in the i emergency classification scheme as well as the evacuation time studies to address such natural phenomena. Emergency Plans have an additional measure <
of safety through various redundancies and contingencies (e.g., '
comunications systems, evacuation routes...). These provisions are in place to respond to a number of different scenarios - such as earthquakes.
In addition, nuclear power plants, by design, are constructed to safely shut down in the event of a Safe Shutdown Earthquake. The probability of such an occurrence leading to radiological releases from a nuclear plant is extremely low. Therefore, it appeats_that little benefit 1 emergency planning process.can be derived from the specific consideration of ea Sincerely.
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- . SCIENTIsrs AND ENGINEERS FOR SECttRE ENERGY. INC.-
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U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission -
mifl'l7 """ Washington, DC 20555 .
lt N.:* 7* *"* ct, ATTN: Docketing and Service Branch
Dear Sir:
20$ll" I should like to comment on the proposed amendment of R",',0 *7%".' 10CFR50 that emergency planning need not consider the -
c"P,.Ju"."ll', . impact of a concurrent earthquake.
R':1.',,*'*.' , I am a member of Scientists and Engineers for Secure 2",,'L'..%, w Energy, Inc., am Professor Emeritus of Nuclear' Engineering 9.,*, " ,, at North Carolina State University, and am a member of the
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. ,,Y, North Carolina Radiation Protection Commission. However, my
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gg The amendment as proposed is very acceptable as me c c m consistent with earlier NRC rulings on existing reactors, and preferable to the alternatives mentioned in the Finderal g.) o -
a n oin. Register, page 49642, column 2.
U""J,"""* The first alternative, to include with the ruling the
- d'"' '".".'./.".'*"" Commission's interpretation in the cases of San Onofre and O"*" """"* Diablo Canyon, is not preferable since the simple statement l0ll",'f , of ruling is sufficient. However, the alternative is 8"**L-ll'"" acceptable.
7,,,",,,,, The second alternative, to leave the issue open for -
l2l ;';,*- legal settlement, would merely add still greater delay in glr,c,,,*;
,, ' getting new power plance started and thus impose an
--*--e unnecessary additional cost to the public.
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- -. a The third alternative is not desirable, since emergency planning and exercises are already very manpower intensive,
- 2llU.","*'::-, not only for the utilities but for state and local O'"'A"""c.- . agencies. Having participated in exercises as an evaluator, E"l""M:lL. s, , I am aware of the enormous time and effort involved-in the f- Blll'Mll'::', whole program. In light of new information that is -
'c."'" '.i :l'lll;,, appearing on radioactive material,.".,squrce terms,"isuch -
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. programs appear to be more extensfvai(jhan needed alreadyr. -
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. . , The added complexity of responding to a simulated seismic-
?ll ., _ , ,,, situation would be a burden without benefit.
- The Commission is to be commended on resisting the easy
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- solution--to require that every conceivable contingency- be addressed, no matter how remote. ' ' - -
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g.:.lllgc :- - Thank you for the opportunity *to comment. Best; wishes.
g.,,,.,,, , Yours truly,
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Thomas S. Elleman
- -- %ggyp /!Q MnchfguftreW Picricia Cogle Ross - Pubtle Affairs Director
- 2oit Eye Street NY- Suite ko Yoshington RC. 2 coo 6 - (2o2) 223 -33 8 R.Leslie Dugan.Ph.D - Western Representottic 64 Castro Street San Francisco, California 94114 *(4l5) 452 - 772s
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Harold Denton, Executive Director Vs
. a nav United States Nue:14ar Regulatory Commission Washing.on, D. C. 20555 J.
Dear Mr. Denton:
One of our ci't y councilmen told me of the notice which our City of San Clemente received about the proposed rule change to relieve the '
utilities from advance planninC of the scope necessary for evacuation of the nearby populace in event of an accident at San Onofre caused by an earthquake ( I believe the . wording is" simultaneous").
I am advocate for GUARD, which for 14 years has been active in opposition to the nuclear installations at San Onofre, most recently, formal inter-venors, and still active. Our attorney Charles McClung Jr. testified 19 December in our continuing action. I did not receive notice of the proposed rule change, and do believe that I am no longer receiving any notices. May we be returned to you mailing list?
Re the proposed earthqu'ageruling: GUARD has always held the position that the ability to protect the public should be the standard of all requirements of emergency planning. As you know, we continue to protest that the US Government assures the public that it can be protected, yet!
has no difinitive standard against which emergency planning may be
( measured; any attempt to provide some protection for the public in any of the areas of emergency planning is deemed sufficient, le "the item ,
has,been addressed". Ua oppose change .in the rules to eliminate the planning.
Therefore, reasoning tt:st minimal protection could be afforde'd- for an accident occasioned by an earthquake is not acceptable to us. California la earthquake country, and the respected geologists are saying that we can expect earthquakes providing ground motion in excess of 1 G on the ;
Inglewood-Rose Canyon faalt sone. We had a small guake on the off-shore
- extension of that fault out from San Clemente within the last six months. l The utility companies and the local authorities should plan to protect the j public. The fact that they are unable to do so at San Onofre should be reason for at least early retirement of the hazardoas Unit I. Our position l' 'i has been that none of the units should be allowed to operate due to the
, close dense populations.
l One more point....The Nuclear Regulatory Commission's continued disregard'
. g g- for the influx of populations into the low population sone af ter the QMgA plants are licensed is a disgrace. It speaks loudly to all who have the j "R , - vision to see and hear the truth that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission )
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E5 and the US covernment are only concerned with licen' sing the plants, not with protecting the public.
Case in point...The US Government is in process of grading the hills within .
half / mile of San Onofre for expansion of the San Onofre base housing commun-n' ity. Large family homes will go in there. Young families will move in.
(<g M The fathers will go off each day to#other parts of the base,. perhaps 10-15 Ma.2 miles away, and leave their wives and small children in those houses waiting for an accident at San Onofre, which , if the winds are blowing their direction will contaminate them before =n alert could be sounded.
Sincerely, Lyn {tarris icks, GUARD ADVOCATE ty - l __ I ' c l o,
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Atomis infu strirl Forum. inc.
7 ?ot Wisconsin Ave 9ue [ g Betnesca fc 20814 4805 Te!eonone .3311654 9260 ,
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January 22, 1985 Mr. Samuel J. Chilk U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comission Washington, D.C. 20555 Attention: Docketing and Service Branch
Subject:
Coments on the Proposed Rule Change Regarding Consideration of Potential Impacts of Earthquakes on Emergency Planning (49 F.R. 49649; December 21,1984)
Dear Sir:
ne AIF Subcomittee on Emergency Planning and Siting of the AIF Comittee on Reactor Licensing and Safety has reviewed the subject notice in the Federal Register of December 21, 1984. We appreciate this opportunity and offer for*your consideration the following comments.
De Comission should adopt a proposed rule explicitly incorporating its interpre-tation provided in the San Onofre and Diablo Canyon decisions. The technical basis for the decision published in the Federal Register Notice is technically sound and can be supported by previously published PRAs and studies.
Additionally, related work supports the proposed rule change. De studies on .
radionuclide releases during an accident (source terms issue) and the conservative asstznptions used in making regulatory decisions today are directly related to this issue. De American Nuclear Society's Special Comittee on Source Terms concluded that " reductions in the source term from esti.utes reported in the 1975 pioneering Reactor Safety Study (HASH-1400) could range from more than a factor of ten to several factors of ten for the critical fission products in most of the accident ,
scenarios that have been recently considered."
he Industry Degraded Core Rulemaking Program (IDCla) has completed an intensive technical evaluation of nuclear power plant risk. ICG)R has concluded that the fission product source terms--quantities and types of radioactive material released in the event of severe accidents--are likely to be much less than had been calcu-lated in previous studies.
Additionally, an industry group sponsored a program to collect and evaluate' data on the performance of conventional wwer plant equipment in comercial facilities that have experienced actual earthquaies. It worked closely with the NIC staff and also funded an independent review of the collected data by a panel of seismic experts, b ,t nt A t .',M I.L , ' / 36 0 C
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ne overall conclusion of this effort is that the equipment evaluated is represen-tative of a large majority of mechanical and electrical equipment in nuclear power plants and that the functional and structural adequacy of properly anchored nuclear power plant equipment in earthquakes is not a significant safety concern.
These programs are representative of existing detailed technical studies that further support the Comissions' position that consideration of potentisi impacts cf earthquakes do not warrant consideration in regard to emergency planning. The present design requirements addressing potential earthquakes, the studi.es on severe accidents and source tems, and other related technical reviews, such as seismic qualification of equipment, support this position. Additionally, shnilar programs support the position that potential impacts of tornadoes and other low frequency natural events on emergency planning need not be specifically considered.
Sincerely, k
Murray Edelnen Otairman Committee on Reactor Licensing and Safety ME:tfm Enclosure .
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Secretary of the enmd<sion U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Ccumission .
Wasidngtcn, D.C. 20555 ATIN: Docketing and Service Branch -
Dear Mr. Secretary:
100, Inc. , on behalf of itself and twenty six utilities who form the Coordinating Group on Baerg Preparedness Implementation, is planced to comment on the proposed rule e contained in the Federal Register on Dececber 21, 1984. A listing of the utilities is enclosed. 'Ihe proposed rule change, through amenchent o.t; the ennniasion's regulation in 10 CER Part 50, ecplicitly states that emergency plans need not specifically consider the -
potential inpact of a coincident earthquake. The Coordinating Group on h g,ency Preparedness Inplementation supports the proposed rule change. We would also reccumend the inclusion of tornadoes, and otwr icw frequency natural events, in this rule change.
The issue of whether emergency p nust specifically consider the ecmplicating effects of coincident s has been addressed by the Comnission in tuo recent licensing cases, involving the San Onofre and Diablo Canyon nuclear power plants. In bcth cases the enedasion determined that its regulations d!d not require such specific consideration. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Coltabia Circuit has held that the enmdssion was within its discretion whm it made these detenninations. The prox > sed rule change would merely codify those decisions. We further believe tut the rationale that led to this determination can be used to just Lan=nd%g the decisions to other low frequency events such as tornadoes and .
Present regulations and guidance require that emergency preparedness plans have sufficient flexibility to acccarodate a variety of disruptions to normal connunication channels and evacuation routes. No consideration of the specific scenarios which generate these disruptions is required. Disruptions that could be caused by earthquakes, tornadoes and other low frecuency natural events would be similar to those for which contingency plans alreacy exist. Hence, there is no need to conduct a review for these specific events.
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, . i Present emergency preparedness plans require that emergency action level schemes include actions to be taken in the event tornadoes, hurricanes, or other low frequency natural events are inminent or are occurring. Hence, management will take actions to ud.tigate their effects and to assure that facilities are riaintained in a safe condition.
We also concur with the sqlementary background information of the Federal Register notice which cites FEFA s coordinated planning for the federal response to radiological emergencies, its assistance to state and local go w .-uts in their earthquake pre:eredness activities, and its belief that all of its activities are flexiale enough to couplement each other in responding to a highly inlikely, but theoretically possible, concurrent major earthquake and serious nuclear plant accident.
We appreciate the vyyctanity to comment on the proposed rule change.
Sincerely, Paul F. Collins Senior Associate Ehcl.
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s COORDINATING GROUP ON EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS IMPLEMENTATION Arkansas Power & Light Co.
Baltimore Gas & Electric Co.
Boston Edison Co.
Carolina Power & Light Co.
Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co.
Commonwealth Edison Co.
Consolidated Edison Co.
Detroit Edison Co.
Edison Electric Institute Florida Power & Light Co.
GPU Service Co.
Long Island Lighting Co.
Maine Yankee Atomic Power Co.
Mississippi Power & Light Co.
Nebraska Public Power District New York Power Authority Northeast Utilities Service Corp.
Northern States Power Cc.
Omaha Public Power District -
Pacific Gas & Electric Co.
Pennsylvania Power & Light Co.
- Public Service Electric & Gas Co.
Sacramento Municipal Utility District Southern California Edison Co.
Toledo Edison Co.
Yankee Atomic Electric Co.
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- Sun:g Mr. Samuel J. Chilk Secretary of the Commission Nuclear Regulatory Commission ,
Washington, D.C. 20555 . - - -
Dear Mr. Chilk:
The Departrrent of Energy (D0E) is pleased to submit comments on the proposed ru?emaking change of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) entitled " Emergency Planning and Preparedness for Production and Utilization F6cilities," 49 Federal Register 49640 (December 21, 1984) and 50 Federal Regi:ter 3797 (January 28, 1985), regarding consideration of potential impacts of earthquakes.
The DOE believes that the Commission should adopt the proposed rule with the modifications to 10 CFR 50 presented below that, in addition to earthquakes, would exclude other low-probability natural events.
In Section 50.47, the new paragraph (e) should read: " Emergency response plans submitted to satisfy the standards set forth in this section need not consider the impact on emergency planning of low-probability earthquakes, tornadoes, and any similar low-probability natural events." In Appendix E the additional paragraph added to the end of the Introductory section should read: "Neither emergency response plans nor evacuation time analyses need consider the impact of low-probability earthquakes, tornadoes, and any similar low-probability natural events."
As the Commission stated in the referenced notices, nuclear powerplants are designed to safely shut down for earthquakes of an intensity equal to or less than the Safe Shutdown Earthouake for the geographical area in question. They are also designed to safely withstand all tornadoes and similarly low-probability natural events of an intensity up to a specific design basis value. Therefore, a nuclear powerplant that meets NRC regulations is designed to survive such natural events without the release of any fission products. As stated in the referenced notices, the independent occurrence of an accident leading to severe core damage and fission product release is also a very low-probability event. Therefore ,
consideration of these two low-probability events occurring at the same time should not be required.
Comments were requested on the alternative of " Leaving the issue open for adjudication on a case-by-case basis." The alternative of leaving this issue open for adjudication on a case-by-case basis would perpetuate uncertainty and instaoility in the licensing process. Therefore, we
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recomend that the rule be applied generically and not on a case-by-case basis.
In sumary, DOE recomends that the NRC adopt the proposed rule, as modified above, and that this should be done on the basis of the NRC's current policy with respect to low-probability events. The DOE welcomes this opportunity to provide its coments on this important issue.
Sincerely.
2%
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-s James W. Vaughan, Jr.
Acting Assistant Secretary for Nuclear Energy O
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& SERvic-(202)328*3500 witu AM s. sonoAN. m otANE CURRAN SRANCH otAN a. Toustcy February 28, 1985 Mr. Michael Jamgochian .
Div i s i on o f Ri s k An a ly s i s a nd Op er a4Mtit&"4 - -
Of fice of Nuclear Regulatory Research U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Wa shing t on , D.C. 20555 SUB JECT : Rulemaking on earthquakes and emergency planning
Dear Mr. Jamgochian:
I am enclosing the Union of Concerned Scientists' and Nuclear Information and Resource Service's comments on the Commission's proposed rulemaking concerning the ef fects of earthquakes on emergency planning for radiological accidents. As I informed you over the telephone this morning, UCS was unable to file the comments yesterday, which was the due date. Thank you for agreeing to accept the comments a day late.
Sincerely, G_ _
Diane Curran q'i&(N m,a.jb..:kr
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i Union of Concerned Scientists' and Nuclear Information and Resource Service's Joint Comments ,
on NRC's Proposal to Bar From Licensing Proceedings '
the Consideration of Earthquake Effects on Emergency Planning e
Introduction The Nuclear Regulatory Commission ("NRC" or " Commission") has published a proposed rule that would eliminate f rom licensing proceedings the consideration of earthquake ef fects on emergency planning. 49 Fed. Reg . 4 964 0, December 21, 1985. By this rulemaking, the Commission is apparently attempting to legitimize its refusal to consider the issue in licensing hearings for the San Onofre and Diablo Canyon nuclear power plants, both of which are potentially subject to high-acceleration earthquakes.
The Commission's effort to validate in a rulemaking these two arbitrary operating license decisions fails utterly. The rulemaking is irrational, and lacks any supporting f actual record. The Commission supplies no justification for its decision to carve out this exception to the fundamental principle that emergency plans must anticipate a wide spectrum of accidents that "might have an impact on public health and safety."
NUREG-0654 at 2. Moreover, the probability of an earthquake-caused accident is well within the range of accidents that must be considered in emergency plans.
The Commission provides no support for its blanket assertion that the ef fects of earthquakes on emergency plans are w _ _ m.,--, - ,, - . - - -
l i either resolved by other aspects of emergency planning or are so unlikely as to be immaterial. There may be some plants for which an NRC Licensing Board could find that an earthquake would not affect' emergency planning. However, the likelihood, severity, scope, and timing of e6rthquakes vary significantly between different plants and sites. Because earthquake characteristics are unique to each site, the Commission must examine the relevance of earthquakes to emergency planning on a case-by-case basis. Where earthquakes are found to have an impact on emergency planning for a plant, they cannot be excluded from licensing proceedings. Union of Concerned Scientists v. U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 735 F.2d 1437 (D.C. Ci r . 1983)
The Commission's decision to promulgate this rule reverses the longstanding position of the NEC staf f that earthquakes must be considered in emergency planning. The Commission has also ignored recent advice by its legal and technical staf f that there is no support for a blanket exclusion of earthquakes f rom emergency planning proceedings. The Commission pursued this rulemaking, even though the Chairman of the Commission acknowledged his " feeling" that "the generic situation [will]
come down to a case-by-case anyhow." Transcript of August 3, 1984, Commission, meeting a t 81.
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' The Commission's decision to disregard its staff's advice and its own better judgment demonstrates that this rulemaking may be motivated by a, wish to avoid judicial review of two untenable licensing decisions rather than an intention to seriously consider the effects of earthquakes on emergency planning. UCS shares Commissioner Asselstine's concern that this rulemaking is being used " solely to circumvent the hearing process in a particular licensing proceeding."
I. Factual Ba ckg round A. History of the Proceeding This rulemaking stems from the Commission's previous refusal to consider earthquake effects on emergency planning in the San Onofre and. Diablo Canyon operating license proceedings. Both of those plants are located near earthquake faults having a potential for high-acceleration earthquakes. In Southern California Edison Co. (San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station, Units 2 and 3), CLI-81-33, 14 NRC 1091 (1981), the Commission tentatively concluded that its current regulations do not require consideration of the impacts on emergency planning of earthquakes which cause or occur during an accidental radiological release.
The Commission based this conclusion on an " interim" finding that the proximate occurrence of an accidental radiological release and an earthquake that could disrupt normal emergency planning appears sufficiently unlikely that consideration in individual licensing proceedings pending generic consideration of the matter is not warranted.
Id . a t 1092. The Commission promised " generic" consideration of
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. "whether regulations should be changed to address the potential impacts of a severe earthquake on emergency planning." Id,.
Two and a half years later, the Commission again refused to consider the effects of earthquakes on emergency planning at the Diablo Canyon nuclear power plant, and again announced that it would institute a rulemaking to consider "whether the potential for seismic impacts on emergency planning is a significant enough concern for large portions of the nation to warrant the amendment of the regulations to specifically consider those impacts."
Pacific Gas & Electric Co. ((Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant, Units'l and 2), CLI-84-12 (August 10, 1984), Slip op. a t 9.
Be fore voting to issue the Diablo Canyon operating license, the Commission met several times in closed session to discuss whether it should provide a hearing on the effects of earthquakes on emergency planning at that site, or alternatively institute some type of generic proceeding that would ostensibly resolve the issue.1 The transcripts of those meetings demonstrate that the Commission had no record basis for excluding consideration of earthquakes from emergency planning hearings at Diablo Canyon or San Onofre. According to Commission counsel, there is no statement in the Diablo Canyon record -- or even in of f-the-record Diablo Canyon studies -- that earthquakes are encompassed in the same envelope" as other 1
These meetings took place on July 25, July 30, and August 3, 1984.
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natural phenomena already considered in emergency plans.
Transcript of July 30, 1984, Commission meeting at 22-23.
Similarly, the, San Onofre record reflects only the Commission's
" feeling" that earthquakes and accidents were unlikely to occur simul ta neou sly . Id. at 20, statement of Sheldon Trubatch, Office of General Counsel.
The transcripts also demonstrate that the Commission placed the speedy licensing of Diablo Canyon above any concerns for the legality of its position. In response to OGC's warning that the Commission lacked a f actual basis for'its refusal to grant a hearing on the ef fects of earthquakes on emergency planning at Diablo Canyon, Commissioner Palladino replied:
I do feel at this late stage requiring a delay while we wait for a hearing is not in the best national interest. I know I'm drawing on information that may not be in the record. But I don't want to pretend not to have information tht I do have, and that is that there is some consideration given to earthquakes.
Id . a t 25. The Commission also ignored OGC's advice that there was "no generic problem" that could be-resolved in a rulemaking because only two plants -- Diablo Canyon and San Onofre -- are
" involved." Id. at 27.
In spite of its counsel's advice that it had no record support for its decision to generically exclude earthquake effects from emergency planning considerations, the Commission proposed the instant rule on December 21, 1984. 4 9 Fed . Reg . 49640. The only basis for the proposal consisted of two emergency planning NUREG's and the San Onofre and Diablo Canyon P
O
.~ - --
operating license proceeding records that had been discredited by the 'NRC staf f counsel.
B. Descri_ption of the Rule The Commission proposes the following addition to 10 C.F.R. S 50.47:
Emergency response plans submitted to satisfy the standards set forth in this section need not consider the impact on emergency planning of earthquakes which cause, or occur proximate in time'with, an accidengal release of radioactive material from the facility.
49 Fed. Re g . a t 49643, Col. 3. The Commission attempts to justify this proposal by dividing earthquakes into two categories. The first category consists of earthquakes up to and including the
" Safe Shutdown Earthquake," or "SSE." The Commission does not deny that the effects of.such earthquakes on emergency planning are material to licensing determinations. But it attempts to resolve the issue generically. The other category comprises earthquakes more severe than an SSE. The Commission It is not. possible to ascertain f rom this proposal how the Commission proposes to treat earthquakes that accompany or cause a radiological accident but do not cause a radiological release.
Such accidents are clearly contemplated by NUREG-0654. See, e.g. , 5 II.D. and Appendix 1, requiring of fsite responses to non-release incidents. UCS and NIRS request clarification on this point.
3 The Sa fe Shutdown Ea rthquake in defined in 10 C.F.R. Part 100, Appendix A III(c) as that earthquake which is based upon the evaluation of the maximum earthquake potential considering the regional and local geology and seismology and specific characteristics of local subsurface material. It is that earthquake which proceduces the maximum vibratory ground motion for which certain structures, systems, and components are designed to remain functional.
. ~
considers these earthquakes to be too improbable to warrant consideration. Thus, according to the Commission, they are not material to a licensing decision.4
~
The Commission relies on the following propositions for its conclusion that earthquakes are either immaterial or already
.esolved:
- 1) SSE earthquakes are already anticipated by plant design, so they will not cause accidents. Thus, there is no need to plan for SSE earthquakes in emergency plans.
- 2) The coincidence of an earthquake and an unrelated accident is sufficiently unlikely that it is not necessery to plan for earthquake accidents.
- 3) Earthquakes are enough like other natural phenomena that they are already accounted for in emergency planning.
Therefore there is no need to examine earthquakes specifically.
- 4) NRC only has to consider consequences, not causes, of accidents. Hence, consideration of earthquakes ger se is not i required.
- 5) Radiolohical emergency plans odo not need to anticipate earthquakes because FEMA already makes provision for 4
As an apparent af terthought to this proposal, the Commission notes briefly that it is also considering whether to include
" tornadoes and other low-frequency events in this rulemaking."
4 9 Fe d . Re g . a t 49642, Col. 2. The Commission offers no further discussion or documentation on the issue. Absent the presentation of some explanation of the basis for that proposal, it is invalid. Connecticut Light and Power Co. v. NRC, 673 F.2d 525, 528 (D.C. Cir. 1952) , cert. denied, 103 S.Ct. 79.
earthquakes in its own planning process.
- 6) In any event, if a severe earthquake did occur, emergency plans wouldn't work.
As discussed below, these rationales are invalid.
II. The Rule is Invalid.
A. There is no record support for the rule.
The only record that NRC relies on for the rule consists of NUREG-0396, NUREG-0654, the records of the San Onofre and Diablo Canyon operating license proceedings, and probabilistic risk assessments ("PRA's") for the Zion, Indian Point, and Limerick nuclear power plants. None of these documents support the NRC's attempt to exclude earthquakes from the scope of emergency planning proceedings. ,
- 1) NUREG-0654 and NUREG-0396 Ra ther than support the Commission, NUREG-0654 contradicts the Commission's position in a number of respects. NUREG-0654 does not confine the scope of emergency planning to a narrow category of events, but requires planning for a broad spectrum of accidents:
No single specific accident sequence should be isolated as the one for which to plan because each accident could have different consequences, both in nature and degree.
Further, the range of possible selection for a planning basis is very large, starting with a zero point of requiring no planning at all because significant offsite radiological accident consequences are unlikely to occur, to planning for the worst possible accident, regardless of its extremely low likelihood.
NUREG-0654 at 6-7. The drafters of NUREG-0654 " identified
- - . - = . = _ - .- .- .
the bounds of the parameters for which planning is recommended, based upon knowledge of the potential consequences, timing, and '
release characteristics of a spectrum of accidents," and considered "a number of accident descriptions." Id,. at 7. Thus, NUREG-0654 does not exclude consideration of accident sequences on the basis that they are unlikely.
In fact, NUREG-0654 specifically requires consideration of earthquakes. For example, the " emergency classification system" that establishes the proper responses to various types of plant accidents or events, must include consideration of "all postulated accidents in the Final Sa fety Analysis Report (FSAR) for the nuclear facility," such as earthquakes up to and including SSE level. Emergency action levels must also include those initiating conditions listed in Appendix 1 to NUREG-0654. Under Appendix 1, even a mild earthquake requires offsite authorities to stand by, and possibly to provide fire or security assistance. Id. at 1-5.
~
Earthquakes above OBE level require further of fsite response capability (Id. at 1-9), and earthquakes above SSE levels trigger a " site area emergency," requiring offsite authorities to assist the utility, notify the public, monitor releases, and prepare for evacuation or sheltering. Id. at 1-13.
Moreover, other important aspects of emergency plans depend on site' features. For example, determination of the boundaries of the Emergency Planning Zone ("EPZ") must' reflect consideration of "such conditions as demography, topography, land characteristics,
, ~
. . , 1 access roads, and jurisdictional boundaries." 10 C .F.R. $
4 .. -50. 47 (c) (2 ) . . Evacuation time estimates for the EPz must demonstrate consideration of " adverse conditions [that] would
- s. i depend on the characteristics of a specific site," includ ing flooding, snow, ice, fog or rain." l Like NUREG-0654, NUREG-0396 requires tha't emergency plans must anticipate a spectrum of accidents, including both design basis
~
accidents and the less severe of the core melt accidents. .I.d . a t I-9. . NUREG-0396 mandates planning for core melt accidents in
-spite of their relatively low probability of 5 x 10 -5 per reactor year. Id, . EI t is well-established that earthquake-induced
- . accidents fall within the same probability range as core melts.
See discussion, infra, at 14-19.
- 2) San Onofre and Diablo Canyon records The -NRC also relies for its proposed rule on the case records for the San Onofre and Diablo Canyon licensing proceedings.
However, no record concerning the complicating effects of Learthquakes on emergency planning or.the flexibility of emergency plans was established in either of those proceedings. The Commission cannot bootstrap this rule by reference to those
- unsupported decisions.
'3) Probabilistic Risk Assessments
, Finally, the~ Commission bases this proposal in.part on
- Probabilistic Risk Assessments done for the Limerick, zion, and Indian Point nuclear reactors. Those PRA's found that the plants could withstand significant ground motion before permitting a radiological release. The NRC cites them for the pro, position that for most-earthquakes, a plant would not be expected to cause-4
, e ~ . - . . ." , , - .,
~
. i .,
an offsite radiological hazard. 4 9 Fe d . Re g . a t 49642, Col. 1.
However, as discussed above, this is beside the point. The Commission must assume design failure in planning for emergencies. If it could assume that all safety systems would function properly in an accident, there would be no need for emergency planning at all. Moreover, there is no basis to believe that PRA's done for three plants are applicable to all plants of all designs at all sites. It is not enough even to conclude that "most" plants would survive "most" earthquakes. Emergency planning is intended to anticipate precisely these events of low probability but potentially catastrophic consequences.
B. The rule is irrational.
The proposed rule not only lacks a supporting record, but it is irrational and inconsistent with established principlbs of emergency planning. The rule is invalid in the following respects:
- 1) The rule vi{olates NRC's emergency planning principles.
This rule undermines the fundamental principle of emergency I
1 planning that NRC must consider a wide spectrum of accidents in evaluating the adequacy of emergency plans. NUREG-0654 at 7. The Commission must assume design failure, and plan for accidents ranging from desi,gn basis accidents to core-melt accidents, with capability "to reduce the consequences of even the most severe accidents." NUREG-0396 at I-9.
The Commission acknowledgas that "the basis for emergency planning is not constrained by the design basis for a plant, and
emergency planning efforts recognize the possibility that events considered beyond the design basis can occur." 49 Fed. Re g . a t 49641, Col. 2., But the Commission says planning bases don't depend on a "particular scenario." This twists the guidance of NUREG-0654, which uses consequences to establish the scope of emergency plans, but does not exclude consideration of accident characteristics or of characteristics of the surrounding area.
Thus, while the scope of accidents to be considered is estabished by accident consequences, NUREG-0654 requires planning for accident " initiators" that include earthquakes and other natural
_ phenomena such as fog, rain, and snow. See $ II.D. Similarly, site characteristics are extremely important factors in establishing EPZ 's and developing evacuation time estimates and emer'gencj action levels. See discussion, supra, at 9-10.
This rulemaking excludes consideration of earthquakes as
" initiators" of accidents. The Commission bases that exclusion in part on the assertion that Given an SSE, all seismically qualified equipment would be expected to function to bring the plant to safe shutdown. An earthquake up to and including an SSE would be cause for an alert emergency action level classification, but would not cause failures that would result in a significant accide'tal n release from the plant. Thus, although such an event would initiate certain emergency glan actions, no offsite response would be required.
4 9 Fe d . Re g . a t 49641, Col. 3. This premise is invalid. The entire purpose of emergency planning is to assure preparedness 5
This assertion is incorrect. In an " alert," NUREG-0654 ;
requires offsite authorities to assist the utility where i requested and to perform radiological monitoring. .
i
in the event that safety systems fail. Like all other safety systems, seismically qualified equipment must also be assumed to fail-for purpo,ses of emergency planning. The NRC gives no basis for distinguishing earthquakes from other accident initiators.
If the Commission assumed that all safety systems functioned properly in an emergency, it.could conceivably eliminate emergency planning requirements. However, it has not taken that course. Instead, it bases its emergency planning requirement on an assumption that plants will fail during accidents. Thus, emergency action levels must include earthquakes up to and beyond SSE levels.6 The Commission has provided no rational basis for eliminating earthquakes as accident initiators.
- 2) The Commission's reliance on seismic design to eliminate the need for emergency planning is irrational.
Even if the Commission could legally establish an exception to the principle that it must assume design failure in emergency planning, there is no basis for finding that seismic design is somehow invincible, as opposed to other aspects of reactor design. A number of factors make earthquakes an immediate concern in emergency planning.
1 6
The Commission bases its refusal to consider severe, beyond design basis earthquakes on the ground that an emergency response in such a case would have a " marginal benefit." 49 Fed. Re g .
49642. The NRC has shown no basis for this assertion. Moreover, l it misstates the Commission's fundamental obligation, which is to l determine whether " adequate protective measures can and will be '
taken in the event of a radiological emergency." 10 C .F.R. S 50.47(a). If circumstances prevent the NRC from finding that emergency plans can provide that assurance, it must deny the license.
- gP* 7
. . ~ . . - . . - . . _ _ _ _ m. , _- .
l l
l
- a. Seismic Risk is Significant' Earthquakes have' been demonstrated to be major contributors to the risk of accidents at nuclear power plants.
WASH-1400 estimated the average probability of seismically-initiated core melt accident sequences to be 5 x 10 -7 per reactor year
[ WASH-14 00, Ma in Repor t , October 1975]. However, correction of a numerical error in that analysis results in an estimate of 2 x 10 -6 per reactor year P. Moieni, G. Apostolakis, & G.E.
Cummings, " Interim Report on Systematic Errors in Nuclear Power Plants: Seismic Sa fety Ma rgins Research Program," Lawr ence Livermore Na tional La boratory, NUREG/CR-1722, October, 1980.
When this corrected value is compared with the estimated
- probabilities of internally-initiated accident sequences for Surry Unit 1 and Peach Bottom Unit 2 as estimated in WASH-1400,
-which range from 1 x 10 -6 to 2 x 10 -5 per reactor year [N.G.
Ca they, et al. , Ca talogue of PRA Dominant Accident Sequence Information (Draf t) , EG&G Idaho, Inc., NUREG/CR-3301, EGG-2259, August 1984], there.is no substantial difference in probabilty between core melt accidents initiated by earthquakes and accidents initiated by other causes. Moreover, it is worth noting that essentially all of the WASH-1400 seismically-initiated core melt probability estimate is due to earthquake ground acceleration values ranging from 0.59 to 1.0g.
More recent seismic risk estimates also tend to confirm the importance of earthquakes as causes of core melt accidents. For example, two independent seismic PRA's of the Zion nuclear plant
, - - - - - - - , ,- ,. -, , a
- . = - -
have been performed. In the Zion PRA [ Commonwealth Edison Company, Zion Probabilistic Sa fety Study, Septecber 1981] , it wa s
, estaimated that a seismically-initiated station blackout sequence had a probabilty of 5.6 x 10 -6 per reactor year, and was ranked as the second most likley cause of a core melt accident. It
.should be noted that this accident has a 60% chance of affecting both Zion units simultaneously. Sandia National Laboratories reviewed the Zion PRA and concurred with its probability estimate for the seismic station blackout ' sequence, although Sandia identified other accident sequences which caused the seismic station blackout sequence to be ranked eigth in likelihood. D.L.
Eerry, et al. , " Review and Evaluation of the Zion Probabilistic Safety Study: Plant Analysis," Sandia National La boratories, NUREG/CR-3300, S AND8 3-1118, Vol . 1, Ma y 19 8 4 ] .
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory also performed a detailed seismic PRA of Zion. This analysis estimated the y
seismicall'-initiated core melt probability to be 3.6 x 10 -6 per reactor year. It should be noted that the Livermore analysis identified a containment failure mode (involving shearing of pipes between the containment'and auxiliary-fuel handling-turbine or AFT complex) that could result in containment failure at the time of the initiating event. M.P. Bohn, et al. , " Application of the SSMRP Methodology to the Seismic Risk at the Zion Nuclear Power Plant," Lawrence Livermore LNational Laboratory, NUREG/CR-3428, UCRL-53483, January 1984. The seven .
l
' most likely seismic core melt accidents as assessed by LLNL include all 'LOCA sizes (including reactor vessel rupture) with no containmene colling available (i.e., both the containment sprays
'~
and the f an coolers are predicted to f ail) . G.E. Cummings, " The seismic Safety Margins Research Program: A Conclud ing Look," in
, Proceedings of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission Twelf th Wa ter Reactor Sa f ety Re search Informa tion Meeting, NUREG/CP-0058, January 1985].
None of the-seismic PRA's to date appears to have considered .
the impact of aftershocks (earthquakes following the main -
shock). Aftershocks are.likely within a few hours of an earthquake, and it is not infrequent that the aftershocks are nearly equal in severity to the initial earthquake. Both the Zion PRA and a report in the Livermore Seismic Safety Margins Research Program series raise the possibility that an accident
. initiated by an earthquake could pressurize the containment withint a few hours, and that the containment might fail,in an af tershock event because of the combination of internal overpressure and seismic locating. D. A. We sley , et al. ,
" Conditional Probabilities of Seismic Induced Failures for Structures and Components for the Zion Nuclear Generating " -
Station," Structural Mechanics Associates, Inc., Appendix 7.9.2 in Zion PRA; and R.D. Campbell & D. A. Wesley, " Potential Seismic
~ Structural Failure Modes Associated with the Zion Nuclear Power Plant: Seismic Sa fety Ma rgins Research Program," uawrence Livermore National Laboratory, NUREG/CR-1704, UCRL-15140, Ma rch l
- ~ ..
___=_
'~
F
)
,-1981. If such a -f ailure should occur at a time of heavy in-containment aerosol loading, the source term resulting from
'sich an accident could be quite large.
The Limerick PRA also included a seismic analysis. This assessment-of a BWR Mark II nuclear hower plant identified two mechanisms for causing containment failure at"the time 6f the initiating event. First, severing of the Residual Hea't Removal System suction lines would drain the suppression pool. Second, mechanical damage resulting from seismic failure of'the reactor vessel and pedastel could fail the containment above the suppression pool. In both cases,' a large source term would be predicted to result. The combined probability cf accident sequences involving these two containment failure modes was estimated to be about 2 x 10 -6 per reactor year.
The Limerick PRA estimated the overall probability of core melt to be 4.4 x
^ 10 -5 per reactor year. Seismic sequences ccatribute about 10% .
of this;overall probability, and seismic vessel failure and seismic ATWS sequences were estimated (together with non-seismic' ATUS sequences) to dominate the risk of early f atalities. ~
Seismic sequences were ranked numbers 6, 8, 9, and 13 among the 15 most likely sequences. It should be noted that sequences ranked 8 and 9 involve the direct seismic containment failure modes discussed above. NUC Corporation, " Severe Accident Risk
! Assessment: Limerick Generating Sta' tion," NUS Report No. 4161, Vol. 1, April 1983.
Other recent PRA's have considered earthquakes. The Seabrook l
l I
i
, 2, -
PRA found that seismic sequences contributed more than 10% of the total estimated core melt probability (seismic contribution of
-5 2.8 x 10 per reactor year) B.J. Ga r r i,c k , el a l . , " Se a brook Station Probabilistic Safety Assessment: Ma in Repor t," Picka rd, N
- Lowe a nd Ga r r ick , Inc., PLG-0300, De cem ber , 198 3. The Millstone Unit 3 PRA estimated a seismic core melt probabilty of 1.7 x 10-5 .per reactor year, dominated by seismic station blackout
, and seismic ATWS sequences. Northest Nuclear Energy Company, Millstone Unit - 3 Probabilistic Sa fety Study, Amendment No. 2, April, 1984. The Midland PRA estimated a seismic core melt probabilityof 1.5 x 10 ~0 per reactor year.
^
F.R. Hu b ba rd , III, et al. , " Midland Nuclear Plant Probabilistic Risk Assessment,"
Pickard, Lowe and Garrick, Inc., Ma y 1984. The Indian Point PRA ,
assessed a seismic sequence as the most likely cause of core melt
.for Indian Pcint Unit 2 at 1.4 x 10 -4 pre reactor year, although this estimate has since been lowered due to a "fix" applied to the structures involved. Indian Point Unit 2 was e, found to have a seismic sequence ranked number eight in
' likelihood at 2.4 x 10 -6 per reactor year. Power Au thority of the State of New York and Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Inc. , " Indian Point Probabilstic Sa fety Study ," Ma rch,
, 1982.
In sum, these result suggest, given appropriate consideration of the undertainties involved, that accidents initiated by earthquakes are potentially significant contributors to the
, overall likelihood of accidents. This is true for-a variety of sites and plant types. Indeed, as the ~
former ~ hSad'of NRC's 'Of fice of Nuclear Regulatorty Research has observed, "Several insights have emerged from the PRA's with seismic analysis that have been completed to date. Perhpas the most important in most of these PRA's, the seismic part of the overall core-melt frequency and risk has been an important contributor.- The earlier conclusion of WASH-1400 that
-earthquakes are probably not an important accident initiator is
-generally not' borne out." R.J. Budnitz, " Lessons Learned from PRA Analysis: External Events Analysis," in Proceedings of the U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission Eleventh Wa ter Reactor Safety Research Informa tion Meeting, NUREG/CP-0048, January,1984.
-Inacmuch as seismic PRA analysis has indicated that earthquakes are among dominant causes of core melt accidents, it
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is irrt11onal to ignore the effects that these same earthquakes can have-on emergency response.7 '
- b. Seismic design, construction, and qualification defects E
Defects in seismic design and quality assurance in construction have consistently undermined the seismic strength of plant systems and structures. In numerous instances, NRC has found that plants were operating with less than proper earthquake standards incorporated into the design and the construction of the plant. At the Trojan plant, for example, the NRC discovered only by! accident in 1978 that the Control 7
It she,uld be noted that there is no published seismic PRA analysis. for BWR Ma rk I, BWR Ma rk III, or FWR ' ice condensor plants.
4 , . . . , _ ,,-.--.. ~ -,, _ - . . - - - - , _ . , - , - - - . - - . . , - . - . , + - - , .
,. s, 4
Building was.not seismically qualified to NRC standards, a matter serious enough to warrant an extended shutdown. At Trojan NRC also,found~QA problems in construction, which could only have exacerbated the problem had a seismically induced accident occurred.
San onofre Unit 1 was also shut down for its failure to meet current seismic design criteria. During the many
-previous years in which it operated with a substandard design, an earthquake: could have caused a serious radiological emergency.
The seismic safety of nuclear power plants has been the subject of serious concern for over a decade. In Congressional
- testimony presented in 1979, the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards ("ACRS") concluded that the high priority it had '
placed on earthquakes wasLappropriate in view of the much greater uncertainties associated.with the frequency and magnitude of earthquakes [as opposed to other natural. ,
phenomena) and their effects on the structures and
- components of a nuclear power plant, .and because of the potential for earthquakes to. seek out inadequacies or mistakes in de ..ign or construction in all portions of a
' plant.
Testimony of ACRS Chairman Dr. M.W. .Ca rbon before House
. Subcommittee on Energy and the Environment, Fe bruary 21, 197 9, a t
- 11. ACRS continues to emphasize the need to address and resolve its extensive concerns about seismic safety margins in design and the contributors to overall light water reactor risk arising from earthquakes. In a January 18, 1984,- letter to Chairman Palladino, the ACRS stated that despite some small proposed j
O i
4& .satrem a +a 6 4-projects on seicmic margins, seismic risk assessment and seismic resistance (fragility), no integrated, focused and timely plan of i research had yet been established.
UCS filed a "show cause petition" in 1979 that challenged whether nuclear power plants were designed to adequate seismic standards. " Union of Concerned Scientists' Emergency Petition for !
Reanalysis of the Capacity of Operating U.S. Nuclear Power Plants to Wi thstand Ea r thqua kes," Pa rch 28, 1979. UCS charged that a recent shutdown of 5 operating plants for a seismic design error had revealed that many plants were allowed to operate based on antiquated and inadequate seismic analyses. UCS requested the Commission to impose state-of-the-art methods on all plants to determine whether their designs met current seismic standards.
The NRC denied the petition. The Commission did not, however, 1
claim that the issue was resolved. Ra the r , it asserted that it was in the process of reanalyzing the need for seismic upgrading of the nation's plants. Presumably, the NRC is still not sure that industry-wide seismic designs are adequate, because it has never confirmed this to UCS. Moreover, the capability of equipment to survive an earthquake has been an unresolved safety-issue (Ta sk A-4 6) since December, 1980. NUREG-0606, Vol. 6, No.
4, Novembe r 16, 1984.
Recent actions by the NRC and and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) show their continuing concern over the
' adequacy of the seismic design basis for the nation's nuclear reactors. Last year, NRC let a contract to study the
_ ~- v --
implications of the Charleston earthquake of 1886 on nuclear power plants in the eastern United States. RS-RES-8 4-128, "Ch arleston Ea r thquake Research Program." The NRC also contracted a study on seismic considerations in siting plants in the Northwest.
RS-RES-84-ll6, " Nor thwe ste rn U. S. Neotectonic Research." FEMA has announced the development of a plan for a major catastrophic earthquake that it anticipates will occur sometime in the next 25
. years. " National Plan for Federal Response to a Catastrophic Earthquake," Draft No. 2, February 8, 1984. In its draft plan, FEMA identifies a number of high population areas at high risk, many of which are near existing nuclear power plant sites. They include San Diego and Los Angeles, California; the Puget Sound area, Wa shington; Charleston, South Ca rolina ; Boston, Ma ssachusetts; Bu f f alo and Rochester, Ne w Yo r k ; a nd the-seven-state area of the central United States, includ ing Missouri, Kentucky, Tennessee, Mississipp, Arkansas, Indiana, and Illinois.
Draft Report at 9. It is thus irrational for the NRC to write off earthquakes as an emergency planning issue at the same time it is exhibiting growing concern regarding the ef fects of earthquakes on nuclear power plant sites.
- c. Widespread use of unreliable seismic design bases Analysts have also raised serious questions with regard to the adequacy of the NRC's methods for identification of potential seismic events at specific sites. Although the NRC has developed a fairly scientific set of OBE's and SSE's for Western sites,
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-less information has been available regarding Eastern sites. The lack of historical and geologic information in the Eastern United '
States- has lef t NRC unsure of the degree to which seismic safety margins exist in the majority of the country's plants.
Consultants to the Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards "have recommended that, in view of the uncerta'inties ofknowledge
.concerning the sources of earthquakes in the Eastern United
~ States, a minimum safe shutdown earthquake (SSE) of 0.29 acceleration should be utilized for new plants for which
- construction permit applications are submitted in the future."
. Letter to M.A. Rowd e n , NRC Chairman from M. Bender, ACRS Chairman, January 17, 19 77 a t 3.
Others have challenged the use of historical seismicity as a basis for projecting the' future risks of earthquake, a method designed to project the maximum credible earthquake at a particular site.- The 10 ' C . F . R . Part 100 Appendix A procedure for determining the SSE, intended to provide an adequate -- though
-indeterminate -- level of conservatism, was assailed by H.
, Denton
.in a February 26, 1975, memorandum (to Dr. Long Sun Tong, Assistant' Director for Wa ter Reactor Sa fety Research) as flawed due to the inabilty to quantify the level of conservatism, the
^
significant variation between regions in the United States and the fact that an SSE derived from that procedure "cannot be shown to be the maximum credible. earthquake for the site." Denton cites the papers of Ambraseys, Ecwell and Allen to challenge the
.usefulness of historical seismicity as an accurate tool for w , - - , , - - - - , - - , - < . . . , -
l projecting future occurence (including time, space, and size) of earthquakes.
l
.Moreover, the previous wide-spread use of correlations, such as the practice of converting Modified Mercalli scale intensities to design acceleration based on the Gutenberg-Richter correlation, are now considered unacceptable. For example, in a April 29, 1975 memorandum, J.C. Stepp, Section leader of the Seismology and Geology Branch to H. Denton, recommeds that this Gutenberg-Richter correlation no longer be used because it yeilds the least conservative results. Stepp states that using the Neumann relationship., which he supports in the memo, for an intensity VIII earthquake, results in an SSE value cf .279 which otherwise would have resulted in a 0.17 to 0.18g value. Thus, previous calculational methods of establishing the SSE, used for example to license the Ma ine Yankee plant in 1972 with a 0.19 SSE, have been discarded and discredited by the agency. To our knowledge, the Commission never reanalyzed the existing plants which were the subject of Stepp's memo regarding the use of the Gutenberg-Richter correlation in the " folded Appalachian region" (i.e. Wa tts Ba r ,
Bellefonte, and Sequoyah) . The Commission has apparently taken no steps to verify that the SSE's for many plants do, in fact, represent the maximta credible earthquake that can be expected at the ' site and thus be anticipated by the design and as-built plant.
Even if a reactor is designed to withstand earthquakes of a certain magnitude, an earthquake can indirectly lead to an i
a e
accident by causing operator error. In general nuclear power ;
plant operation, approximately 70% of total losses of safety system functions are attributable to human error.
AEOD/S405, AEOD Semiannual Report for January - June, 1984 (September 1984 at 9.)
The ACRS suggests that approximately 40% of LER's at nuclear power plants involve adverse human actions. "ACRS Comments and Recommendations on the NRC Safety Research Program Budget for Fiscal Year 1985 and & 1986," at 13. Psychological stress and plant conditions requiring operators to use controls and displays not frequently used can lead to a greater chance of operator error. Sheridan, " Human Error in Nuclear Power Plants,"
Technology Review, Fe br ua ry , 19 8 0, at 27.
Thus, operators may react to the trauma of an earthquake and the distraction of fluctuating instruments by making mistakes that lead to serious accidents.
In addition to asserting that earthquakes are unlikely to cause accidents, the NRC also maintains that the simultaneous occurrence of an earthquake and an unrelated plant failure is extremely unlikely. However, recent NRC studies show multiple independent f ailures, although rare, can in f act occur. Moreover, they can have extremely serious consequences that warrant consideration in. emergency planning. Summarizing five separate s tud ie s , the NRC's Of fice for Analysis and Evaluation of Operational Da ta ("AEOD") concuded:
While [ multiple independent failures] are extremely rare, when they do occur they can pose an unanticpated and heavy burden on the operating staff tr correctly diagnose the faiJnre and initiate the proper corrective SCtion.
V'
AEOD/S405, supra, at 12. Interestingly, one of the five studies identified three independent failures following a loss of offsite power event due to a tornado at an Arkansas reactor. AEOD/C003,
" Loss of Of f site Power Event at Arkansas Units 1 & 2." Moreover, operating experience indicates that a total loss of a safety system is not a rare event. Over the past 3 years, a total of more than 120 total losses of safety system functions have been identified by AEOD. AEOD/S405 at 9.8 .
This wealth of information challenging the adequacy of seismic design at nuclear power plants throughout the country contradicts the Commission's blithe assurances that earthquakes are'unlikely to cause or occur concurrently with radiological accidents.
- 3) The Commission cannot make a generic finding that effects of below-SSE earthquakes on emergency planning are always resolved by the general flexibility of emergency plans.
The Commission asserts that the ef fects of below-SSE earthquakes on emergency planning are accomodated by the general
" flexibility" of emergency plans. According to the Commission, earthquakes are "similar" to other natural phenomena that are already considered in the emergency planning process, such as
" rain, snow, flooding, or ... activities in the vicinity of the plant such as major road repairs." 4 9 Fed. Re g . a t 49641, Col.
- 2. ,
The Commission is incorrect. First, it is irrational to make 8
See also AEOD/S401, " Human Error Involving Wrong Unit on Wrong Train," which implicates human error as a " major contributor" to loss of safety system events.
4
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sweeping generalizations about the characteristics of emergency plans, each of which is designed to meet the unique circumstances of a plant site. ,
Second, there are great dif ferences between the characteristics of earth. quakes and other natural phenomena that cannot' be accomodated through the general flexibility of emergency plans.
- a. Emergency plans are unique.
As Commissioner Asselstine noted in his dissenting view, "it
. should be obvious that emergency planning is a site-specific exercise which is not amenable to a generic rulemaking such as 1
that proposed- by the Commission." 4 9 Fe d . Reg . a t 49642, Col. 2.
Commission regulations and-NUREG-0654 require that each emergency plan must be designed to accomodate the unique features of a particular site and plant. Thus, for example, the Seabrook emergency plan must anticipate snowstorms and summer rainstorms, but not tsunamis or tornadoes. A r ural and sparsely populated
' area may pose fewer evacuation problems, and thus require less flexibility, than an urban and densely populated plant site.
Thus, emergency plans cannot be found to possess the same degree of " flexibility" in every case.
Moreover, earthquake characteristics are highly site-specific, and could require more specific responses than mere plan flexibility. For example, a particular' site could have a number of bridges vulnerable to collapse in an earthquake. At Diablo Canyon, earthquakes have caused bridges to f ail at 0.29
. acceleration. Transcript of August 3, 1984, Commission meeting t
P , - - _ . _ . _ , , _ , - _ _ - , . - - , - _ . - - . , , - - - - , _ _ . , . _ _ _ - . _ - . - - , _ _ -..
-at 9-10. Evacuation time estimates that demonstrated consideration of traffic delays due to fog would not necessarily be adequate to account for the loss of entire evacuation routes due to landslides or loss of bridges. Other sites might be more or less vulnerable to disruption of evacuation by an earthquake.
The Commission has offered no basis, nor is there one, for concluding that all emergency plans possess the requisite flexibility to accomodate earthquake effects,
- b. Earthquakes are distinct phenomena.
The Commission offers no support for assertion that below-SSE earthquakes'are much like other natural phenomena. In fact, they are different in significant respects. First, below-SSE earthquakes may do considerably more damage than that caused by other natural phenomena normally considered in emergency plans.
As NRC counsel explained to the Commission during its deliberations on Diablo Canyon, bridges can fail at vibrations as low as-0.19 Transcript of August 3, 1984, Commission meeting at
. 9-10.
Second, while rain, snow, and flooding would probably af fect only transportation, ' earthquakes could severely curtail or eliminate both transportation and communication. In damaging infrastructure and preventing access of repair crews, earthquakes may also cause more long-lasting or even permanent effects. The following distinct features of earthquakes come quickly to mind:
--Sirens and broadcasting systems could be knocked down and roads could be severely obstructed in an earthquake. j
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--Although sheltering may be presumed to be available in almost any other type of natural event, it could be rendered useless by an, earthquake.
--An earthquake is likely to disrupt the distribution of wa ter, ~ natural gas, and gasoline, thus causing fires and impeding the efforts of firefighters.
--An earthquake is likely to impair or destroy the ability to monitor potential radiation releases and meteorological conditions.
An earthquake _can damage transportation routes by collapse of bridges and overpasses, liquefaction of roads, and landslides.
--An earthquake can cause the collapse of structuras (including those housing personnel directing the emergency planning effort, relocation and decontamination faciliti'es, and local agency services) or render sheltering useless due to damage.
--An earthquake is likely to cause a loss of of f site power, with its attendant effect on communications, as well as to potentially render useless other (back'up) ~ methods of communication
.such as radio transmissions.
8
--An earthquake is likely to cause physical and fright-induced (e.g. heart attack) injuries, thereby overloading medica'l facilties and ambulence andrescue services; None of these problems is necessarily anticipate'd in the course of ordinary emergency planning. Taken together, they could lead to .a straining of emergency resources and severe hampering of communications and transportation.
Decision-makers could easily be left with too little information on the passability of roads, the actual radiological hazard, and an impaired ability to direct the emergency effort.
Many of the complications caused by earthquakes could easily be anticipated by emergency plans. In the San Onofre proceeding, ror example, the NRC staf f suggested a number of actions that the licensee-and offsite authoritics should take to prepare for an earthquake. For example, the staff recommended assurance of the availability of transportation to the site, continued communication between the site and offsite agencies, location of a backup Emergency Operation Center suitably distant from the site, and capability to obtain damage estimates to the plant and transportation and communication facilities. "NRC Staff Views Wi th Respect to Questions Posed by the Atcmic Sa fety and Licensing Board in the Area of Emergency Planning," June 22, 1981.
- c. FEMA's emergency plans do not adequately provide for earthquake response in a radiological emergency.
The Commission argues that for the purposes of anticipating and planning for an accident occurring during or following an earthquake, the Federal Emergency Management Agency's (FEMA's) general ear thquake preparedness program, combined with radiological emergency plans, would be sufficient. The Commission provides no factual basis to support this contention. Indeed, a general earthquake preparedness program would not provide for the l unique problems of a radiological emergency. A 4
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J general plan would not anticipate the key problem of an earthquake coinciding with a radiological event, which is the need to e evacuate people as quickly as possible without exposing rescue workers to undue radiological hazards. That problem requires the excensive use of radiological monitoring equipment, as well as protective equipment for emergency workers. Emergency plans must make special provision to assure that such equipment is available and functional in spite of an earthquake. Moreover, a general earthquake response plan for an entire state or county vould not focus the necessary personnal and equipment on a single nuclear power plant site. In any event, the NRC, not FEMA, is the agency ultimately responsible for assuring protection of the public in a radiological emergency.
Conc 1usion The Commission has no basis for excluding earthquakes from the scope of issues considered in emergency planning proceedings.
Severe earthquakes pose the same magnitude of risk as other accidents considered in the emergency planning process, and the Commission has provided no ground for excepting them from consideration. Moreover, the effects of earthquakes on emergency plans are not susceptible to resolution on a generic basis. The Commission' must consider the characteristics of each site and nuclear. power plant in determining what steps must be taken to !
1 Provide adequate protective measures when an earthquake l accompanies a radiological emergency. Finally, since the Commission has no basis for this rulemaking, it must. return to i
the San Onofre and Diablo Canyon proceedings and offer the requisite opportunities to litigate the effects of earthquakes on emergency planning at those sites.
Respectfully submitted, nWQAg,f5 '
Diane Curran Ellyn R. We iss HARMON, WEISS & JORDAN 2001 S Street N.W.
Suite 430 Washington, D.C. 20009 Dated: February 28, 1985 (202) 328-3500 O
onesseen my -
R g Pennsylvania Power & Ught Company G M pt.. m . m tT PP&L Two North Ninth Street
- Allentown, PA 18101 = 2151 Tg. 51 g,
Bruce D. Kenyon Vice President Nucleat Operations *0 b. 73 P 2M 215/770-7502 M
JAN 2 / 1985 QEk. -gh.M"' W Secretary of the Commission U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Cossaission Washington, D.C. ,
20555 Attn: Docketing and Service Branch SUSQUEHANNA STEAM ELECTRIC STATION PROPOSED EMERGENCY PLANNING AND PREPAREDNESS RULE ER 100450 FILE NO. 841-11 PLA-2395
Dear Secretary:
The following is in response to the request for comunent regarding the proposed rule change on consideration of potential impacts of earthquakes on Emergency Planning (Federal Register Notice 49 FR 49640).
o Pennsylvania Power and Light Company (Susquehanna Steam Electric Station) supports the proposed rule change as written on page 49643 .- , __
column 3. In addition we support inclusion -of-tornadoes as impft-t's -
that can reasonably be deleted for impact consideration in Emergency Planning. The basis for this position is as follows: .. ,
- ~ ~.
As mentioned in the background information in the Federal Regfeter 1.
Notice, FEMA has established the Federal Radiological Emergency Response Plan for Federal response to radiological emergencies including commercial nuclear power plant accidents. In adrHtion, t g FEMA has an extensive program of earthquake preparedness which fu n. includes. Federal response to assist State and local governments in
- their planning and response activities. This capability
- O o encompasses preparedness and response to earthquake and other
' 8' e natural emergencies, such as tornadoes, that may occur anywhere in l $ the nation thus providing an assured response espability at Nuclear g power planc facilities as well.
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Eh, 2. Per NRC regulations in 10 CFR Part 50 and NRC and FEMA guidance pgg established in NUREG-0654/ FEMA-R'2-1. Aav. 1 "Criterie for l
no.c Preparation and Evaluation of Radiological Emergency Response Plans I and Preparedness in Support of Light Water Nuclear Power Plants,"
\ extensive evacuation studies have been developed for nucle.ar power plant facilities. These evacuation studies, completed in cooperation with State and local government agencies, provide detailed analyses and guidance for evacuating the population of the EPZ's around nuclear facilities. As part of the analyses evaluated S
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JAN 2 41995 Page 2 SSES PLA-2395 ER 100450 File 841-11 Secretary of the Commission' in these studies, adverse weather conditions'are.t'aken into-consideration - the type of analyses performed under these conditions provides evacuation planning guidance to state and local authorities for any abnormal type condition that might arise during i the process of implementing public protective actions during 'an- )
emergency at nuclear power plant facilities. These conditions ~~s~uch ~; '
as the removal of an evacuation route are the types of conditions that could reasonably be expected as a result of an earthquake, tornado,' hurricane, flooding, etc. during or prior to public" evacuation.
- 3. Public protective action decision making during 's nticlea'r- power "
plant accident provides for a number of checks and bilsncis with ~ ~
input to the decision maker from: Federal agencies State and local agencies, Licensees, thus assuring that all fact; ors _.
influencing that decision are taken into account. Although the probability of simultaneous earthquake, tornado and power plant accident are remote, preplanning at the Federal, State and local level adequately covers all possible contingencies. Therefore, special consideration for any single or multiple natural phenoment "- ~
. , , is totally unnecessary. .
Raspectfully submitted. .
2.: .
.'. . . -Bruce.D. K .-- es'- - - ;# - '
.. ' 'Vice Presi -Nuclear Operations ? . rc . . ..
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00CIE EDHEER
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Dear Secretary of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission:
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We the undersigned are diamet~ri'cally opposed to the NRC proposal.'to rkbf t . "f,flbIh' their policy of not considering the effects of earthquakes in emergency planning for nuclear power ' plants. ,,
Furthermore, we feel it patently absurd and grossly neg!! gent of the Commission to argue that while hundreds of millions of dollars had to be spent to modify Diablo Canyon to withstand the effects of the nearby and active Hosgri Fault,
' no consideration need now be given to the effects of a major earthquake on emergency planning.
We are adamant in our conviction that earthquakes must be ccinsidered in the '
emergency planning and are not so naive as to think that some malfunction could not occur at Diablo during a major temblor that might necessitate evacuation.
The foreshortened deadline of January 22, 1985 should be extended to March 15, 1985 in order to allow sufficient public comment. -
Thereafter, public hearings must be scheduled in order for those affected to have input into an upgraded and more rational emergency plan. :
NAME ADDREShi
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