ML20140G452

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Initial Decision Authorizing Applicant Proposal to Construct & Operate 20 Megawatt (Thermal) plutonia-urania- fueled,fast-spectrum,sodium-cooled Experimental Reactor in Fayetteville,Ak
ML20140G452
Person / Time
Site: 05000231
Issue date: 09/10/1965
From: Bond J, Callihan A, Pigford T
US ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (AEC)
To:
AFFILIATION NOT ASSIGNED, GENERAL ELECTRIC CO.
Shared Package
ML20140G249 List: ... further results
References
FOIA-97-34 NUDOCS 9705090141
Download: ML20140G452 (41)


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l* UNITED STATES OF AMERICA / tee'l 7/ f ATOMIC ENEE'Y COMMISSION l l

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In the matter of the, application by

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GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY  !

l SOUNWEST ATOMIC ENERGY /SSOCIATES ) DOCITI NO. 50-231 i

) i For a Provisional Construction Pemit )

for the Southwest Experimental Fast )

Oxide Beactor (SEFOR) )

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Appearances Jules Pearlman, Esq. g on bahalf of General Electric Company Mr. J. Robert Welsh, President 1] '

of Southwest Atomic Energy Associates Troy B. Conner, Jr., Esq. and Howard B. Helman, Esq.

l on behalf of the U. S. Atomic Energy Commission Regulatory Staff l

Lbnited Appearance Mr. Edward L. Wilson by limited appearance presented a statement of position as a representative of the Arkansas State Board of Health l

INITIAL DECISION A. PRELI!!INARY STATHENT

1. The Applicants propose to construct and operate a 20 mega-l vatt (themal) plutonia-urania-fueled, fast-spectrum, sodium-cooled, g The Applicant SAEA was not represented by counsel in these pro-ceedings. The attorney's notice of appearance as required by 10 CFR 2 713(a) identified only GE as the person on whose behalf he appears. SAEA has delegated to GE responsibility for prose-I cuting this application. The position of the GE attorney was 3 thus stated: p

! "I am an attorney representing General Electric and thereI i fore vill be the sole counsel for the Applicants." i I

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experiment &1 reactor to be located near Fayetteville, Arkansas. The ,

- course of events in the proceedin6s and the record indicate that'the

. Applicant, General Electric Company (hereinafter GE), has and vill l l

continue to have primary responsibility for designing, constructing and , ,

l operating the proposed facility; the Applicant, Southwest Atanic Energy l

!' Associates (hereinafter SAEA) has certain financial obligations in the design and construction program and thereafter vill have title to the facility.  ;

l 2. A hearing upon the application for a provisional. construction

_ permit under 10 CFR $ 50 35(a) was conducted in Fayetteville by this "

l Board whose members vere designated by the Ccumission in the hearing i

notice, published on May 28, 1965 at 30 Fed. Beg. 7199 The' issues for hearing are declaratively stated in the ultimate findings of this Initial l

j Decision. The oral hearing was concluded on July 2, 1965 and additional vritten evidence uns thereafter furnished and was made a part of the decisional record as shown by the Board order dated August 5, 1965,  :

upon which date the hearing record tas closed. Proposed findin6s of fact.and conclusions of lav vere submitted on behalf of the Applicants by counsel for GE; a response thereto, su6gesting some modifications, was submitted by counsel for the AEC Staff. In addition to these pleadin6s the Applicants have submitted a motion for expedited effec-tiveness of this Initial Decision in accordance with 10 CFR $ 2 764(a),

and AEC Staff counsel expressed consent to the granting of that motion.

The record demonstrates that at this time the technical plans and ,

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design for SEFOR are impressively thorough in most respects. Based ,

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3 on the fi,ndings set out hereinafter, it is the conclusion of the Board )

that, subject to specified conditions, a provisional construction per-mit should be issued at this time.

3 The published notice of hearing and announcements made on the hearing record invited public attention to the provisions of the Com- l mission's rules which pemit participation by intervention (10 CFR

$ 2 714) or by statements of position under the limited appearance pro-visions of 10 CFR $ 2 715 No person sought to intervene as a party.

However, a limited appearance was made on behalf of the Arkansas State Board of Health by Mr. Eduard L. Wilson. Certain matters of possible significance to the issues in this proceeding vere touched upon in W

Mr. Uilson's statement and in supplements submitted by him after the hearing. The State of Arkansas and the United States Atomic Ener67 Commission are parties to an agreement, effective July 1,1963, pursuant to which the State Board of Health is the responsible agency for dis-charging the State's functions relating to radiation control and surveil-lance. Mr. Wilson appeared as its representative. Although the general conclusion of the State Board of Health is that the Applicants' descrip-tion of the proposed facility affords reasonable assurance that it can 2] The dubious evidentiary status of limited participation statements pemitted by the cited rule is no impediment to the Board's con-dderation of the points presented on behalf of the State of Arkan-sar., in vieu of the special consideration expressed for State representatives in subparagraph (c) of 10 CFR 6 2 715 Moreover, counsel for the participants gave assurance that their evidence i

vould respond to the matters stated in Mr. Wilson's presentation which vas made at the comencement of the hearing.

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4 be constructed and operated without endangering the health and safety andprope5yofthepublic,yetadditionalclarificationandassur-ances in certain areas are desired by the State.

4. The State's position is su::nnarized in this paragraph. The 1

scope of the Applicants' proposed environnental surveillance program for soil, air, and water sampling and analyses needs clarification l

l the details and results of this progran should be made available to the State for its review. More consideration needs to be 61ven to the possible effects of radioactive vaste dischar6es and to the likeli-hood of reconcentration of radionuclides in relation to the rather sub-stantial dairy and agriculture activitics within a 10-mile radius of the facility. Sampling programs probably should include the milk-food chain contamination possibilities. The radioactive liquid waste manage-ment proposal, relying significantly on radionuclide retention by ion exchange in the soil, should be supported by confirming investigations of soil properties. Consideration should be given to the possibility of ground water contamination due to earth structure faults in the vicinity. The micrometeorological characteristics at the site need investigation to confinnthe assumed validity of application of data collected at relatively remote weather stations; localized observatione are needed to shou that proposed waste releases and the analysis of the maximum hypothetical accident are properly based. The State Board of Health vould like to have reasonable access to the plant site, records, data and analyses relating to the foregoing points of possible L: pact upon public health and safety considerations.

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. 5-5 The Applicants have submitted proposed findings of fact and con-t .

clusions'af law in 62* numbered paragraphs, together with an appended pro- ) 1 posed ford of provisional construction pemit. The AEC Staff has responded with proposed findings and conclusions which state agreement j

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vith the Applicants' proposals except for certain modifications suggested I

l in 13 numbered paragraphs; a substitute provisional construction pemit )

l 1 form is also proposed. Those pleading documents are part of the decisional

! record and, as hereinafter shown, they' have been accorded the considera-l 1 tion and disposition contemplated and required by $$ 7 and 8 of the Admin- l istrative Procedure Act. The numbered paragraphs of those pleadings are ,

referred to from time to time hereinafter. Findingc upon procedural mat-ters are proposed in paragraphs 1 throu6h 6 of the Applicants' pleading

( and para 6raphs 1 and 2 of the Staff's respondin8 submittal; the substance of those proposals which has been deemed material has been stated above 1

in this preliminary statement; to the extent that those findings are not here or hereinafter adopted they are rejected as being immaterial.

B. FINDINGS OF FACT l

l' Applicantc' Qualifications

6. Two of the issues specified in the notice for hearing require determinations as to whether the Applicants are technically and finan-cially qualified "to d_e_s_ip_ i and construct the proposed facility."

These issues do not reach to the operation of the plant. The Board's b findings and conclusions under these issuer are likewise so limited.

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} Basic findingd and conclusions regarding the technical and financial i

qualifications of GE and SAEA are proposed in paragraphs 8, 9, lo, 14, 15, 16 and 19 of the Applicants'. proposed findings and conclusions.

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The Board finds that, except for the nature and extent of participation t

by Gueilschaft (identified later) in the SENR project, the evidence support,- Ebose findings; accordingly they are approved and adopted, but subject to the minor modification suggested in the AEC Staff plead-ing that the last two sentences in para 6raph 19 be replaced by this conclusionary finding: the evidence shows GE to be technically quali-fled '.o desi6n and construct the proposed facility. Only the first sentc12ce of paragraph 18 is deemed naterial. Paragraph 20 is rejected because it is not material to the Applicants' qualifications to design and construct the facility. ,

T. The findings and conclusions adopted by reference in the preceding paragraph are herein briefly su=marized. GE is a large publicly ovned corporation with assets in excess of $3 billion and with extensive experience and competence in the atomic enerEy industry. It has the entire technical responsibility for the desi6 n and construction of SEFOR, and it has a financial responsibility for the costs thereof 2

in excess of $10 9 million. SAEA is a nonprofit and mutual benefit association of utility companies organized under the laws of the State of Arkansas. The agreement amon6 SAEA members to support SEFOR is prenised in substantial part upon references to existing and intended contractual arrangements with Gesellschaft (identified later) and GE and AEC. The SAEA contract obli6ation is to pay a sum not exceeding g The Applicanto estimated the cost to construct at $12 35 million; the Staff believes thic figure m16ht approach $15 million. The total cost of the facility, including research and development and fueling, vill be much Breater. The SEFOR project vill also involve substantial Atomic Energy Commission funding, the details of which are neither proved nor material here.

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$59mi1Iiontowardsconstructioncosts. Documents relating to the financial status of each of the SAEA members and the testimony of an AEC Staff vitness support the finding now made that the Applicant SAEA and its obligated mcabers are financially qualified to fulfill the com-mitments made by it and them toward defraying the costs of designing and constructing the propoced facility.

8. The design and construction of the proposed facility vill ful-fill in part a project cooperatively undertaken by the United States Atomic Energy Commission, the Applicants, and Gesellschaft fGr Kern-forschung m.b.H (Gesellschaft) with whom is associated the European Atomic EnerEy Comunity (EUIWIOM) uhich is an expected supplier of

$2milliontowardconstructioncosts. A multitude of statements in the evidence--which includes the application--unsystematically allude to a network of contracts which are said to unite these participants 1

and to define their individual and ceveral responsibilities to the l project and to each other. The only contract document in c:vidence is the basic agreement among 15 utility companies, and tuo individuals as utility company representatives, who comprise SAEA. The evidence shows I that this SEFOR project is the central theme of a series or group of i memorandum agreements and contracts between or among: SAEA and Gesell-l schaft; SAEA and AEC; and SAEA and GE. These contracts are not in 1 the record which thus lache the best evidence of the relationships among these participants. For the reasons pointed out later the Board l 1s unabic to make findings based upon the tems of the narratively l j

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.describedcontracts. - Proposed findin6 7 is hence r. ejected.

g g t 9 The Applicants' proposed findings 11, 12, 13, 17, 21 and a pre-viously excepted porbion of 14,' relate to the aspective parties' finan-cial and technical contributions to, and participat, ion in, the design and construction and operation of SEFOR. Those proposed findings are  ;

rejected because substantial and probative evidence--the best evidence--

! of their contractual obligations abides in the documents possessed but not exhibited by SAEA. However, the expected financial participation by Gesellschaft is adequately discernible. A document copy.in evidence, under seal and signature by the Federal Minister for Scientific Research

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for'the Federal Republic of Germany, describes Gesellschaft as a limited liability company--vith two shanholders who are the Federal Republic of Germany and the State of Baden-Mirttemberg--entitled to enter into contracts and a6reements which are enforceable at law. The document states that Gesellschaft contracted with EURATOM for develop-ment of a fast breeder reactor with 40fo of the costs to be contributed by EURATOM, and that $5 million has been provided for SEEOR. Also in the record are copies of letters from Gesellschaft's counsel in Gezzany, from SAEA's counsel in New York and from the Ccanptroller h/ The parties vere urged--in prehearin6, by a Board letter on June 17, 1965, and during the hearing--to assure that the final hearing record be not deficient of probative evidence upon these matters.

Repeated inquiries pointed to the possible decisional significance of assessing the mutual and respective obli ations 6 of GE, AEC, SAEA, Gesellschaft, and EURATOM under the several agreeuents referred to in the documents then on file. The Board's direct question, "What l are the relevant provisions . . ?" is unanswered, as is the invita-l tion to explain why the contracts were not exhibited.

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I g Proposed findings relating to the SEFOR experimental pror, ram, includ-ing AEC Staff proposal 3, are separately considered hereinafter at paragraphs 29-33

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General of the United States. Therein the private attorneys stated ,

i l opinions Yhat the SAEA-Gesellschaft contract tems are valid and )

binding, and the United States official expressed the view that the i AEC-SAEA agreement is within the contracting authority granted by l statute to AEC. By according probative value to all of the infoma- I tion of record the Board finds and infers that Gesellschaft is obli- l gated to contribute $5 million towards the cost of constructing the SEMR facility, that the 407 contribution by EURAT011 is likely to be forthcoming, and that the expected $5 million payment by Gesellschaft may reasonably be relied upon. Upon that finding, and relevant ante- .

cedent ones, it is concluded that the Applicants are financially quali-W fied to desi6n and construct the facility proposed herein. Their tech-nical qualifications to do so, i.e., those of GE, have been found hereinabove.

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10. An ultimate issue in this proceeding requires a detemination as to whether the issuance of the requested pemit vould be inimical to the cccmon defense and security. The fact, as found above, that p Although the basic SAEA agreement provides that its $5 9 million limit may be increased only with the unanimous consent of all mem-bers, the evidence does not chou what recourse m16 ht be had in the possible event of Gesellschaft's nonliability or breach or evasion with respect to its ascribed financial cat:mitment. If contractual assurances against such potential fund shortages exist, they are not in this record. It can not be detemined vbether, in such case, the respective obligations of SAEA, of GE, or of AEC might be significantly altered.

g Issue 4 requires this Board to detemine,

'Vaether the issuance of a pemit for the construction of the facility vill be ininical to the cacmon defense and security or to the hecith and safety of the public."

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Gesellschatistopay$5millionwhichis33-40%ofthetotalcapital cost cf SEFOR, and the record references to its pcrticipation in ,

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other respects, impel a more thorough evaluation of this alien corpora-tion's participation than can be accomplished with the evidence pre -

sented. The Board can not be unmindful of this prohibition in $ 104 d l l

of the Atomic Energy Act:

"No license under this section may be given to any person for activities which are not under or within the jurisdiction of i the Unitec. States, . . .. No license may be issued to an alien or any corporar, ion or other entity if the Cocnission knows or has reason to believe it is owned, controlled, or dominated by an alien, a foreign corporation, or a foreign government. . . ."

Moreover, the Board is .invillin6 to pass li 6htly over other possible relevant statutory safeguards of "the paramount objective of making the maximum contribution to the co= mon defense and security" as stated in 9 1 a of the Act.

11. The proposed SEFOR project vill be a major research and devel-opaent investigation into the capabilities and characteristics of a 8] Descriptions of the SAEA-Gesellschaft aBreement indicate that the latter contributes technical assistance in the design und construction and operation of the facility, that it la assured full access to the infomation developed in the SEFOR pro 6 ram, and that it vill have scientific and technical personnel partic-ipatids,. under GE supervision, at the facility in the conduct of the research program contemplated. The evidence emphasizes that this participation will be under the direct supervision of GE which has sole responsibility for conducting the design, construction and operation as required by the contracts which

, are said to specify in detail the program for use of SEFDR.

l Applicants and the AEC Staff say that Gesellschaft vill exer-cise no control over the facility or its use. The AEC Staff has not examined the governing contracts. Noted in passing here, but ignored in the hearin6 process, is this application's request for "such source, special nuclear,"and by-product material licenses as may be necessary . . .

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plutonium-fueled sodium-cooled fast reactor. It has been stated in the evidence that no Restricted Data are involved in the design and construction of the facility, and that GE and the AEC Staff do not el anticipate that the project will involve or lead to the development of_information which properly should be so classified. Nonetheless, the public interest considerations encompassed by the noted issue are I not put at rest by these assurances; nor are they muted by conclu-sionary declarations that Gesellschaft vill not exercise control of i SAEA or of GE or of SEPOR. Aloof disregard of contract documents fixing mutual obligations' denies to thist record basic facts relevant l

to a necessary judgment concerning "the common defense and security  ;

of the United States." ($ 11 g of the Act)

12. The Board's discussion of the Gesellschaft relationship to SEPOR is emphatically not intended to questiori the sincerity of the purposes or the soundness of the judgments manifested or likely to be  ;

manifested by the_ participants in categuarding national security. The

! Board's position has evolved with earnest regard for the Cconnission's statutory mandates to conduct and assist research and develotanent in the peaceful applications of atomic energy. Likewise abides an aware-

! ness that the Commission has an assigned role in programs of inter-national cooperation in expanding technical knowledge of the atczn's t

t p/ This is inferred from the first part of Staff proposal 5 The '

I second part of that proposal, which relates to the Gesellschaft l control matter, is rejected as being neither supported by the i

evidence nor explicitly responsive to the statute above quoted.

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, peaceful uses. Nevertheless, the Board's reluctance to peer into .the 1

rea k of these possibly hi6h policy matters yields to the inevitable  ;

! duty of making a detemination upon the issues assigned for hearing.

The Board must decide the issues on the basis of the record evidence.

Each cpecified issue must be so answered. Issue 4 raised the national I 1

cecurity questions and it uns notice to the hearing participants that  ;

l affimative evidence vould be required to ansver these questions. The gravamen of that issue forbids that its resolution be derived upon less than substantial probative evidence. This Board believes the solemn -

1 charge to it requires more infomation than has been offered to wrrant its finding that "the issuance of a pemit for the conctruction" of j SEFOR will not "be inimical to the common defense. and security". ,

l 13 Precedents forecast that construction pemits, even though  !

1 they are only provisional, ripen to operating authorizations, albeit l under Regulatory Staff scrutiny. Here, the Staff's scrutiny does not promise penetration of the serious questions under discussion. Upon Y

g The Regulatory Staff's evaluation of safety matters has been accorded full veight, but it provides less than convincing assurance in some areas. Part of the difficulty here'is that the Staff's technical and professional experts--including its accountant vitness and its lawyer spokesman--disclaimed direct knowledge of the tems of the SElmR contractual documents. It may be said that the AEC contractual participation assures that the project is free of doubt on the national security issue.

i Be that an ahost certain inference (AEC contracted only with SAEA, we are told) yet the Ccamission has stated the issue for i determination and that can not be viewed as an inadvertent or I meaningless invitation for the Board to accord superficial approval to what the parties would have us to conclude.

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a so veighTy matter the Board declines to speculate that all is well then available but unoffered evidence that such is the case might t

have proved it so. The parties vill be afforded an opportunity to l

present such evidence for further consideration and detemination by h this Board. Alternatively, the parties may offer such authoritative L

deteminations or persuasive legal argtunents as they may choose to  ;

rely upon to convince the Board that the demands of the national secu.-

rity issue are less exacting than they are herein construed to be.

The Facility Site l i  !

I 14. The SEPVR sit.e is located in Cove Creek Township, Washington County, in the State of Arkansas appro::imately 16 mile: 'j-SW of the l

City of Fayetteville and 29 miles N-NE of the City cf Fort Smith.

The site is comprised of 620 acres of rollin6-to-hilly terrain, with i

elevations varying from 1590 feet MSL to 1850 feet MSL. A small, vet-veather creek called Fall Creek flows through the cmall valley in which the facility vill be located. The reactor vill be located

near the center of the site about 0.4 mile from the nearest site boundary. The population density within a 15-mile radius of the site is about 10 persons per square mile. The lar6 cst population j centers of significant size in the vicinity are Fayetteville, with a population of approximately 25,000 including the enrollment of the  ;

University of Arkansas, and Fort Smith, with a population of about i

53,000. .

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15. ~The evidence shows that the geolo6y, hydrology and seismology of the site are suitable for the proposed facility. The seismic design criteria provide adequate nargins of safety. The United States Geolog-ical Survey has concluded that the clay soil vould tend to absorb radioactive materials which might be discharged to the tile field or accidentally leak from buried vaste storage tanks. However, further response should be made to the request by the State of Arhansas, noted in para 6raph 4 above, for confirming investigation of the ion exchange capacity of the local soil. The Applicants' proposed findings 22-25 are not adopted for the reason that many statements therein are not material and the significant facts therein proposed have been found above.

Site Meteorology

16. Meteorological data are not available for the site of the reactor. Because of the lack of data for the site, there is same question as to the meteorological parameters and diffusion models which should be applied to obtain limits on radioactive gas roatinely released from the facility. There is a more substantial question as to the appropriate diffusion parameters and models to be used in evalu-ating the effects of accidental releases of radioactivity. The Appli-cants and the Staff propose that the Board find to be adequate the pro-gram for securing and utilizing local meteoroloBical data as it uns described in the evidence: the record does not varrant the acquies-cense in that position taken by the parties. Instead, the Board I

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i.e., comments by the Environmental Meteorolo61 cal Research Branch Office of Meteorolo61 cal Research of the United States Weather Bureau.  ;

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i We note there these statements:

I "Except for a statement that a meteorological measure- j ment pmgram involving vind speed and direction frequency and vind direction variability is planned for the site, the l reports do not give,any justification as to the application ,

of Hanford diffusion parameters to the SEFOR site. Experi-ence with ground level smoke plumes . . .. has shoun that-durin6 surface inversions in a narrow valley . . ., the plume trajectory vill essentially follov topographic fea- 1 tures and be restricted below the ridge level and within the valley mils."

l "In summary, the atmospheric environmental analysis of the site can only be inferred at this time from general cli-matic data and from the distinctive topographical features l of the cite. Beliable and neaningful conclusions vill

! only be possible after pertinent.on-site data on local valley vind flows and surface inversion frequency are avail-able."

17 Applicants plan to collect meteorological data at the site for a period of at least one year prior to operation of the reactor. Instru-ments to measure wind velocity and direction vill be installed at a single location on the site at a height of 15 to 20 feet above the ground. The Applicants and Staff conclude that this program should be adequate to assure that the site has no unexpected meteorolo&d cal characteristics and to obtain a diffusivity factor presumed to be perti-nent to the estimate of atmospheric dispersion from an accidental release. The Board does not accept this conclusion for the reason that the Applicants have not demonstrated that the information so obtained j

can be reliably applied or extrapolated to the estimates of possible I

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(' - 16 exposure frEm extreme accidental conditions at various locations at or near the site bodndary.

18. The Board believes that a suitable meteorology program should provide that infomation necessary for meaningful and reliable esti-mates of the effects of various unfavorable weather conditions, and l

also the probability that such conditions vill occur. On the basis of the information and justification submitted, the Board concludes that the Applicants' proposed program is deficient in that it vill provide no infomation concerning the extent and frequency of inversion condi-tions. The Applicants have not demonstrated that measurement of vind velocity and direction at a single location vill provide sufficient pertinent data on vind conditions at various locations on the site, l

nor is it shown that other techniques which have been employed in the  !

detemination of atmospheric dispersion characteristics of ground i level releases over rugged and precipitous terrain are not necessary in this case. The record presents inadequate justification that the pro- .

l posed data vill properly identify and allow for possible effects of  !

channeling of released radioactivity in various directions due to local topographical features. It is not shown that the proposed duration of meteorological studies assures statistical significance for the proper detemination of the probability of unfavorable weather conditions pertinent to the safety analyses. The procran nov described vill not provide a meaningful basis for the detemination of allouable dilution l

l factors for controlled releases of radioactive material from the stack l

in the event that the Applicante =ay find it desirable to utilize such dilutions in nomal operation. 2berefore the Board rejects the Appli-cants' proposed findings 26, 27 and 28.

17 19 In'su:::=ary concernin6 the relation of site meteorology to the atmospheric dispersion of radioactivity, the Board expects that the site is likely to be favorable in this respect. However, the informa-tion presented is an insufficient basis for an assessment of the possi-bility and probability that atmospheric dispersion of radioactivity released in extreme accident conditions vill be less favorable than that estimated by Applicants and Staff. The Board is not convinced that a sufficient basis for such assessment vill result from the very limited meteorolo61 cal data which the Applicants propose to obtain.

The Board does not deem this shortcoming to be of such importance to "

safety evaluation as to varrant a withholding or a delay of the provi-sional construction permit, but it is concluded that the granting thereof should be made subject to a further review of additional evi-dence to be supplied.

20. For the foregoing reasons provisions vill be made hereinafter to permit the submission on behalf of the Applicants--and as well on behalf of the Staff--of additional evidence describing a supplemented meteorological survey program plan ubich vill include censurements of atmospheric conditions at a sufficient number of locations on and about the site to varrant inferences of probable meteorological conditions in all pertinent off-site locations. The overall radiation monitoring proBram, on-site and off-site, varrants further consideration in the context thus to be augmented. Moreover, because a considerable amount of uncertainty vas manifested in the extensive record discussions of this local meteorological question, the Board deems it necessary to l

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l 18 its prope'r evaluation of the question to require as part of the addi-

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tional sub;gission abo.ve indicated, evidence by one or more qualified expert vitneoses explaining and justifying the sufficiency of the supple-mented ueather survey program, the meaningfulness and usefulness of the l

data thus to be generated, and the reliability of the methods proposed to be employed in translating those data into safety analyses.

l Reactor Core, Control and Instmmentation l

l 21. The SEFOR reactor together with its control and safety devices and mechanisms, the operational and control instrumentation, and the design criteria intended to provide reliability of operation are described in the record, and summarized in proposed findings 33 43 which are hpproved. The Applicants propose to evaluate the reactivity value of the control and safety devices, the emergency shutdown margin, and to carry out an instrumentation development program. Provision is made for t

an alternate control method if the value of the proposed one is shoun

.. to be inadequate during the course of the research program. The Appli- ,

cants' calculated value of the shutdown margin is 7 4 dollars. The Applicants assert that safety requirements vill be met if the shutdown l margin is 2.0 dollars. The Staff and the ACBS have stated a desire to review the matter if the shutdown margin is shown by experiment to be significantly less than 7 4 dollars. In its report upon SEPDR the ACIE did not agree to the suitability of the lover margin of 2.0 donars.

1 The Board believes that the record and prudence support the views of the Staff and the ACBS. In other respects the Board finds reasonable assurance of the adequacy of the safety features of the proposed reactor.

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19 t Reactor Coolant System G-l

22. Proposed findings 29 and 30--and AEC Staff 7--are adopted in substantial part as shown in this paragraph. The maximum designed themal power of the SEER reactor is 20 megawatts. The reactor and portions of the coolant, system which may became radioactive are doubly J l

contained. Reactor heat is removed by tuo puallel forced-circulation flows of sodium to intemediate heat exchangers and secondary coolants, i also forced-circulation sodium, which in turn are cooled by forced J

circulation of atmospheric air. A constant sodium level vill be main-1 tained in the reactor vessel by a make-up system. One coolant system, ,

I designated the main one, has a capacity of 20 megawatts; the other, l 1

the auxiliary system, has a capacity of 1 megauatt. Operations of the tuo systems are sufficiently independent so that failure of one vill not interrupt operation of the other. Decay heat can be removed by natural convection in the main system. Energy stored in flyuheels in the prinaly system pump drives will protect a6ainst themal damage in the event of electripal power failure. The secondary coolant system is protected against themal shock resulting from power failure by a high natural circulation rate and by the absence of a high temperature source. All volumes of sodium vill be blanketed by purified argon of particularly lov oxygen and moisture content. Nitrogen containing no morethan5% oxygen,acompositionwhichvillnotsupportcombustion of sodium, vill be the coolant for the structure, equipment and other items within the containment. The nitrogen vill be cooled by refrigeration.

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20 t' The Reactor Vessel 23 PEoposed findings 31 and 32 describe the structure and design criteria of the SEFOR reactor vessel. The evidence supports those

! findings and they are approved and--for information purposes--are sum-marized herein. The stainless steel reactor vessel is designed in accordance with $ III of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code for a pressure of 75 psig and a temperature of 1050* F. 'In the region of  !

the core the vessel is double-walled. Applicants will carry out a material surveillancs program during reactor operation which is expected to provide assurance that any deterioration of the stainless steel prop-erties by reactor operating conditions will not proceed beyond safe limits. The Applicar.ts' design studies of the consequences of a vessel l

rupture have shown a high improbability of core meltdown and of loss of sodium beyond the reflector struc'ture.

Reactor Containment

24. The Applicants have presented in the record a description of the reactor containment structures and their capabilities. The salient j features are described in proposed findings 49-51 which are approved.

I The proposed design provides for double containment of the reactor vessel. The inner container is a steel-lined reinforced-concrete structure; the outer container is a conventional velded steel cylin-l l

drical vessel. The reactor is to be isolated by the inner container j during all reactor operations and by both containers during the transient tests referred to elsewhere.

i

_ . _ - . . . . - - - - - . . . - . . ---~ __ _ . - -

. l l

l i ,- ,

21 25 . N the design of the containment structures the Applicants i e  ;

have considered, in' addition to usual structural requirements, loads arising from seismic and tornadic disturbances and from the pressures and temperatures resulting frcxn the' postulated most severe nuclear accident and from other accidents including sodium fires occurring with the normal inert atmosphere in the inner container replaced by i

l. air. For example, the inner container'is designed to withstand an '

internal pressure of 10 psig and a temperature of 250' F. Blast pro-tection of the inner container vill be provided by the reactor vessel.

The design internal pressure of the outer container is 30 psig and ,

the design temperature is 370* F; the pee.h pressure in the outer con-tainer resulting from the most severe postulated accident is expected i

)

to be 1 psig. The design leah rates, uhich can be tested independently, are 1% per day for the inner container and 0 5% per day for the outer container. The " allowable" leak rates, on which estimates of radio-logicalexposuresarebased,are20%and25%respectively.

Other Plant Features

26. Proposed findings 52-54 are approved in substance and are here  !

summarized. Applicants have recognized the possibility, although remotely probable that a tornado could pass over the SEFOR site and have designed all structures containing facilities important to safety i to be capable of withstanding the forces that would be produced by vinds up to 370 mph. Reasonable assurance is provided that even if a

severe tornado should strike the SEFOR site, no undue radiological hazard to the public would result.

l

22 27 k ergency electrical power, to be provided by a diesel gen-erator and,batterie's,. Vill supply nuclear instrumentation and other critical plant leads to assure an orderly shutdown in the event of a loss of nomal power. Used fuel rods vill be stored in a sodium-filled, nitrogen-cooled tank. A second double-valled tank provides triple containment of the sodium to guard against an accidental uncovering of the irradiated fuel. Protection against inadvertent criti-cality is provided by neutron absorbers in the tank. Additional described plant features and plant desi6 n criteria include the reactor biological shield, the sodium service systems, and the argon- and nitrocen-atmorphere conditioning systems. It is found that the described desi6ns ,

l and criteria for these plant features are adequate from a safety stand- I point and that, where necessary, research and development programs have been proposed which vill provide infon:ation for developing final design details.

Design Research and Development

28. Proposed findings 55 and 56 are restated and supplemented in this paragraph. A research and development program was proposed, and will be carried out, by the Applicante to provide infornation for establishing as yet undefined design features and for preparing proce-dures for reactor operation which vere not or could not be ecmpletely cpecified at the time of filing the application for a construction per-mit. Structural and operations characteristics questioned by the ACBS vill also be investigated. Additional information deemed by this Board
l. i 23 s

ac necccchiy to cupport the application and to deceribe the cito vill-

+

extend the,research'a,nd development pro 6 ram. Nuclear properties of - '

l the core and'of the control system vill be derived frem experiments  :

at the ZPR-III Critical Facility of Argonne National Laboratory. The i

I ,

! research and development program supporting .the design and operation of '

i I

the reactor is expected either to investigate and evaluate a number of

j. features of the reactor. and auxiliary equipment or to provide infoma-l tion supporting the analyses fron which the descriptions and specifica- t l

t tiens can be infernd. Included in the research and developnent program -

are the following items having particul'ar significance to-the safety '

l l

anal'ses y of the pro. ject:

l l a. An acceptably comprehensive study of the meteorology of the site; 1

( b. The design, operation, total reactivity value, and rate of reactivity insertion of the Fast Reactivity Excursion Device (FRED);

l c. The value of the Doppler coefficient and other tempera-ture-dependent reactivity effects; i

d. The reactivity value of voids in the sodium coolant and of the control and safety devices; l i

_c. Comprehensive mechanical, hydraulic and themal tests to obtain data needed for final design of the core and reac-tor vessel intezuals; ,

f. Scale model experiments to determine the extent and l

j effects, if any, of 6as entrainment in sodium under accident conditions; j i <

__ --.m. . . _ . . . . . _ . . _ _. _ . _ . - - . . - . _ . - _ . _ . _ . _ . . _ . . _ . . . . . _ . _ _ . . . . _ _ . . . _

l

l ..

i* 24 l

Mock-up and engineering tests to provide the basis for ,

  • a reliable reflector rod and control drive' mechanism l

design; and-

h. Development of required reactor instrumentation, includ-l
ing temperature and flux monitors of fast nuclear transients.

l The Board finds ressonable assurance that the infomation obtained frca l

l the research and development progran es herein amended trill satisfac- >

l

., torily augment current knottled6 c to sufficiently resolve present ques-tions of safety before the completion of the SEPOR design.

Experimental Prograu 29 The Applicants have stated the objectives of the SEPVR experi-l mental program to be:  ;

l l

j (1) To investigate the operating characteristics of liquid-metal-cooled, PuC2-UO2 fast reactors; (2) To measure and investigate the Doppler effect dur-ing nomal reactor operating conditions; (3) To measure the reactor shutdown capability of the negative power coefficient due to the Doppler i

effect under transient conditions; and (4) To establish engineering design safety criteria L

l for large, economic fast ceramic power reactors.

i During the first three years of operation, the SEFOR facility trill be

used to explore the operatin5 cad safety characteristics of ceramic-i f fueled fast reactors, with particular attention to the role of the Doppler effect. The Applicants have described the characteristics of

- . -- , , - 4 .- - . , -

_.. w: - .,- --c-.--y p- . y

- j 2 ..

l l

. 25 t

i .

I i

the reactor core to be used durinE the first tuo years. During the t

} third year < tests will be repeated on a core of different nuclear char-acteristic$ containing % new fuel elements. The characteristics of 4

this new core and these neu fuel elements are not now known or described.

t

30. ~ Evidence is lacking to define a proposed use of the SEEUR' facility i

, beyond the three-year experimental program noted in the record, althou6h l an operating license for an initial tem of ten years is requested in

< 1

! the pending application. The Ocmmission's notice of hearing directed i

, consideration of "the application filed . . . for a provisional construc- l tion pemit for a . . . reactor desi ned 6 to operate at 20 megawatts ,

(themal) . " The safety judgnents made in this proceeding, except for those based on the analyses of hypothetical accidents hereinafter dis-cussed, necessarily relate only to a facility for use at this site as

+

l shown by the record evidence, i.e., a 20 megawatt (themal) reactor

! for carrying out a two-year experinental program using the particularly l 1 l

! described core. Possibilities of later uses of SEEOR are described

! only conjecturaIly by the Applicants, and infomation concerning these i

projected uses is insufficient for consideration by this. Board.

'l

31. The Applicants plan to initiate the experimental program with 1 a general system chech-out, dry and vet critical tests, and detemina-tion of the static nuclear behavior of the system. This vill be fol-loved by investigations of the reactor transfer functions at various  ;

power levels using rod oscillation techniques. The static and oscilla-tor tests vill proceed from lou power to 20 megawatt (themal) operation.

Following analysis of the results of these tests, sub-prept critical

.. - . . ~ .. . . - . - _ . - . - . - . . . . - . . ~ - - . - . - - . . - . - - . - -

t ..

l f '. . g transient testing vill be initiated. Super-prompt critical transient u I testing is* expected,to proceed following analysis of, and within'the I

limits established by, the results of the sub-prompt critical transient

[

tests. Reactivity inputs for these transient experiments vill be speci-fied and limited so that predicted power and temperature excursions vill not be so severe as to cause fuel cladding failure. The transient testing progran vill accordingly be carried out in steps of graduated i

! severity with frequent inspections of fuel for incipient damage.

32. To carry out these transient tests the Applicants plan to

. design and develop a Fast Reactivity Dteursion Device (FRED) capable ,,

l of inserting reactivity up to approximately 15 dollars, by removal of f neutron absorbers from the core, at a maximum rate of 50 dollars per ,

second. The record clearly shows that a major purpose for constructing the SEFOR facility is to carry out the FRED transient testing, and the L

vorst of the extreme accident conditions hypothesized by the Applicants t

and discussed elsewhere in this finding involve, in part, a hypothe-l sized malfunction of the FRED. Hence, a careful review of the FRED design and perfomance potential is of great importance in making -

safety judgments concerning utilization of the SEFOR facility.

33 It is noted that the ACBS explicitly pointed out that it had ll not reviewed the transient test program " mentioned by the Applicants",

and the AEC Staff safety evaluation has considered the FRED only .a relation to its possible contribution to the maximum hypothetical acci-dent which was postulated and analyzed. Specific review of the desiCn i

criteria and details of the FRED will be made by both ACRS and the AEC

! Staff prior to the issuance of authorization for its operation. Whether i

i

4 l

t

~

27 l or not a procrnu v

of transient tccting vill be authorized by AEC uill l .

l depend upon. satisfactory demonstration that the reactor has character-l istics which will pemit transient testing with little or no chance of damage. This Boarti likewise emphasizes that its consideration of the FRED is accorded only in the context of site-facility deteminations 1

i ccanitted at this time to its judgment in relation to the provisional i i '

construction pemit applicaaion. In doing so the Board has relied upon  !

the operating inviolability of the design criterion of the FRED that its maximum rate of reactivity insertion vill be 50 dollars per second and

~

l that its possible malfunctions can in no other way increase the severity l of the Applicants' postulated mavimum hypothetical accident for this

facility. Applicants' proposed findings 57 and 58 are rejected to'the l

extent that they are not set out in this and the preceding four para 6raphs. I Hadioactive Waste Management i

i I

34. The Applicants proposed a radioactive vaste management and dis- l posal program which is described in their proposed findings and conclu-sions. The record supports the findings substantially as proposed and, subject to a specific modification and to the supplemental findings i

stated in the ensuing paragraph, findings 45-47 are adopted with this change; the penultimate sentence of paragraph 45 is stricken and the sentence proposed in Staff finding 9 is substituted therefor.

l 35 The State of Arkansas has a legitimate concern about rudioactive i

j waste plans as noted in paragraphs 3 and 4 hereinabove. Although the  !

i record includes' a generally stated intention on the part of the Appli-cants to be a cooperatively good neighbor with the State authority,

. _ _. _ . . ~ _.._._._.._._ _ _ _ . ~ . . . . _ . _ _ _ _ _ . . . _ . _ . _ _ _ _ . .

I . '. '

28 l

l there am do' direct cannitments by the Applicants to extend the measuns e

of cooperation whicli were suggested in Mr. Wilson's statement. The-1

. findings and conclusions as proposed by the parties accord no explicit neognition to. the requests stated by Mr. Wilson. The findings approved in the preceding pangraph fall short of responding fully to i i

the State's contentions. Hence the Board declines to approve conclu- l 1

sion 48 proposed by the Applicants for the reason tt 4. the evidence j

which would provide adequate and reasonable assurance of protection to the health and safety of the public should include, but does not now l l

~

detail: (1) a description of the sampling procedures and analytical j

t; approach to be followed in the environmental surveillance program; l (2)ashouingoftheextenttowhichplansinthisrespectandthe results thereof will be made available and acceptable to the Arkansas State Board of Health; (3) the adequacy of the milk-food chain sampling

! pmgram; (4) a progam for confirming by tests the asserted ion exchange capacity cf the local soil; (5) the nature and extent of further investi-l gations, if any, to confim that water table contamination is not

- pmbable; and (6) details concerning the extent to which the foregoing 1

and similar health-related matters will be accessible to and coordinated l 1

with the State Board of Health. An additional ite:a here is the local l

meteorological program discussed in paragraphs 16-20 above.

36. Upon the matters noted immediately above, the Board is unable l

to conclude that sufficient evidence is available to afford the reason-able assurance of safety which could have been, and yet can be, pro-I vided in the record. Those areas a n within the compass of m asonably .

i' fonsighted plans ubich require administrative attention and evaluation l

., y ,. -- . ~ - -, .,,. , ., .. , _ -

I i

D 1

! l of their possible impact upon facility design and engineering. The failure of'the Applicants to respond adequately to these points, l ..

most of which vere advancef. in 11r. Wilson's statement .at the camence-I ment of the hearing, is persuasive that this record needs supplemental  ;

l l evidence and proposed findings and conclusions for further considera-l tion by the Board. Uithout delaying the issuance of a provisional con-1 struction pemit, the Board vill retain jurisdiction in this proceeding to afford to the Applicants an opportunity to tender for further review j additional evidence and pleadings upon these matters.

l Safety Evaluation 37 Considerations of the safety features of SEPOR are divided l

t between those related to nomal and expected operation of the facility

! and those related to accidental occurrences. The Board's review of 1

the proposed design of the facility and of its nomal and expected I i

operations as nov described discloses no cause for concem about safety of the public. A vide spectrum of potential accidents and of abnomal operating conditions of varying severity has been analyzed to assess i.

I their importance and to test the effectiveness of various safeguards.

The Applicants' safety analyses of those accidents, with vhich the j AEC Staff concurs in substance, conclude that the consequences within the realm of reasonable credibility would not be so severe as to con-stitute a threat to the health and safety of the public.

38. In order to evaluate the proposed containment system and site suitability, Applicants have hypothesized accident situations involv-ing a large number of operator errors and equipnent malfunctions, l

l l

. _ .- - - . _ - . - . .- . . --. _ - - . . ~ . . -. --. -. -

30 including the t accidental malfunction of the FRED. The accidents so considered tre based upon postulated chains of events whose sequential and coincidental occurrences are hi6 hly inprobable. The Applicants' calculations predict that none of these accidents will result in the l

violation of the integrity of the inner and outer containment structures and that released radioactivity vill leave the facility confines only by leakage throu6h these containment structures at a rate cocnensurate with the design criteria of these structures. The evidence shows that l .

the most severe of these hypothesized accidents indicates reasonably l foreseeable outer limits of adverse consequences of a major accident ..

l l at the proposed SEFOR facility. This conclusion is based upon the i Board's reliance on the premise that the possible malfunctions of the FRED will not result in reactivity insertion at a rate greater than 50 dollars per cecond and that such malfunctions will not in any other l

vay increase the severity of the postulated hypothetical accidents.

The parties estimated off-site radiological doses that could result from the vorst of these hypothetical accidents, assuming an inventory of fis-l sion products which could reasonably accumulate during the described experimental program; these doses are within the guidelines stated in

, 10 GR hn 1@.

I 39 The Board concludes that the foregoing estimates of potential off-site exposures represent a conservative upper limit to the public hazard incident to operation of the SEPT)R facility and that the radio-logical hazard is acceptable. Houever, as elseuhere pointed out, our 4

l

1. - _-

. i l

31 l examination of this conclusion is to be made in the light of the supple-mented evid$nce concerning local meteorological conditions; this is necessary because the analyses otherwise approved herein rest on an l

assumption of local meteoroloB i cal conditions ubich are not yet adequately substantiated, The Applicants' proposed findings 59-61 and paragraphs 10-11 in the Staff pleading are not adopted for the reason that many statements therein are not material and the significant facts therein proposed, subject to the Board's reservations as noted above, have been found here.

h0. Although the foregoing conclusions on safety are necessarily limited to the facility and described reactor core to be used during the first tuo years, the Board feels an obligation to extend its con-siderations of safety to a period of operation more nearly cccmensurate with the probable useful life of this facility. The Applicants have indicated that after the completion of the third year of their experi-mental pro 6rsm, the facility vill probably be used as a fuel test reac-

, tor if there is need for fuel irradiation tests at that time. No tran-sient tests involving rapid reactivity insertion are contemplated for that fuel irradiation test pro 6 ram. The reactor vill be designed to operate initially at a steady power up to 20 meCavatts (thermal) with provision for subsequent installation of additional equipment to operate at 50 megavatts (thermal). The Applicants' declarations and speculations about what may be done with SEFOR after the initial three-i year period were made in expressed recognition of the proposition that l

l

,~ _- .

_ . . . ~ - -

l..

  • l l-32 l

they vill hgve to secure separate or addltional authorization from the i

Comissione

41. TEeBoardhasconfidenceintheApplicants'abilitytoexercise responsibility in establishing design criteria and operating procedures whereby utilization of SEmR can be extended beyond the initial two-year period with reasonable assurance that it vill not impose undue i

risk to the health and safety of the public. The Board believes the Applicants recognize those features of SENR, important to safety, which are unique and/or untried and vill consider their initial func-tion as though they too were part of a research and developnent program.

Similarly, the Board does not entertain or imply doubts as to the ccm-petence or thoroughness of the AEC Regulatory Staff's technical reviews of possible uses of SEN R. Nevertheless, because the Board's present review horizon is limited by the evidence and issues as above pointed  !

out, and because this SEFOR facility embodies both an experimental l reactor and reactor.use techniques of unproved possibilities, the Board l expresses its belief that a hearing upon proposals for other or future uses of SENR vould enhance the public's assurance that health and i safety and common defense and security considerations are being dili- l l

6ently safeCuarded.

11]

1 The application includes thebd'etatements:

l

". . . In the event that it is decided to uprate the pouer level of SEER to 50 IW, and (sic] application for a new construction pemit vill be filed. It is, therefore, requested that the present application be evaluated on the basis of the 20 MU operation and the three-year experimental program which fom the only present comitments for opera-i tion of SEFOR."

33 g

C. CONCIUSIONS g.

42. In the conclusions above indicated reservations have been expressed about the sufficiency of the evidentiary shoving concerning:

(1) the environmental surveillance program and coordination with the Arkansas State Board of Health, (paragraphs 4 and 35-36); (2) the national security issue and alien control implications, (paragraphs 8-13);

and (3) the local meteorological survey and analyses, (parasraphs 16-20).

Upon weighing carefully the specified issue deteminations and safety judgnents required to be made by the Board at this time, it is con-cluded that the foregoing shortcomings are not of such immediate signi-ficance as to warrant either denying a conditional authorization for construction or delaying the issuance thereof to avait the outccme of l a further hearing. 'Instead, it is deemed appropriate to pemit further submissions by the parties upon these questions and provisions therefor are described in the paragraph below.

43 This Initial Decision is based on a consideration of the entire record which has heretofore been closed. The needs for additional infor-mation identified above make it necessary to the Board's full and final action that the proceeding continue within the Board's jurisdiction for the limited time and purposes herein specified. The hearing record vill be reopened for the reception of additional evidence by way of verified written stateuents of or on behalf of the participants. Such statements shall include supplemental infomation upon items (1), (2) and (3) as categorized and referenced in the preceding paragraph. They shall be filed with the Secretary of the Commission on or before October 15, 1965 Copies thereof shall be served on all participants,

< . 2

.. j

- 34 t h

including the Arkansas State Board of Health. Each arai any of the parti-cifonts maf file, on or before November 1,1965, supplemental proposed i

findingsaNdconclusionsorcommentsupontheadditionalevidence.

Thereafter this Board trill reconsider the matters reserved and its ulti-mate conclusions in the light of the conplete record as supplemented

( and vill issue an appropriate decision or order. The presently stated determination that the requested provisional construction permit should  !

be conditionally authorized is expressly subject to such reconsidera-tion. Alternatively to the foregoing procedural steps and schedule, I the Board vill give prompt consideration to'such substantiated request ,

[

for an expedited further hearing and order as the parties or any of i

then e :..t cg propriate to this Board's final disposition of all pend-  :

1P/

ing me.1 tee.

44. The Applicants' motion for expedited effectiveness of this  ;

L Initial Decision is considered in the light cf the terms of 10 CFR -

$ 2 764. It is there provided in pertinent part that such a motion may j be granted upon finding that:

". . . (1) no significant question of fact, law, or discretion has been presented; (2) that the record clearly varrants such action and shows that denial cf the motion vill result in substantial economic injury or be detrimental to the public interest."

The record supports the requisite findings notwithstanding the reserva-tions hereinabove noted because those matters for this Board's future evaluation are not deemed to involve fact, law or discretion questions of such significant uncertainty as to warrant delaying for administra-tive reasons the construction to be conditionally authorized by this t

12] The Board vill soon issue an order ruling on proposed transcript corrections.

a 35 decision. The Board finds reasonable assurance that subsequent proce-t dures probably vill lead to a satisfactory resolution of all safety-related questions which need to be answered in the provisional construc-tion pemit stage of the licensing process; however, the Applicants may elect to proceed with construction at the rish attendant upon Board reconsideration. Substantial economic injury and detrimental delay to the Applicants' interests in the SEFOR project can be avoided by granting the motion under discussion upon the conditions stated, and the order herein so provides.

45 Upon the basis of all of the findings and discussions herein-above set out, and subject to cuch modifications, if any, as may be ordered by this Board upon its further consideration as herein provided for, this Board concludes, in confomity with the premise of the appli-cable regulation and responsively to the issues stated in the notice of hearing that:

(1) In accordance with the provisions of $ 50 35(a),

Title 10, Part 50 of the Code of Federal Re6uhtions, (a) The Applicants have not supplied initially all of the technical infomation required to conplete the application and support the issuance of a construc-tion pemit which approves all proposed design features;

(b) The Applicants have described the proposed design of the facility, including, but not limited to, l the principal architectural and engineering criteria for the design, and have identified the major features or components on ubich further technical infomation is required;

> _ , > _ _ . - . _ - - _ m _ . - _ _ _ - . . . _ . . - _ . - _ _ _ ~ . . _ . _ . . ...

\. .

36 (c) The omitted technical.infomation vill be t

supplied; g* <

l

.. (d) The Applicants have proposed, and there trill be )

conducted a research and developent program reasonably designed to resolve safety questions with respect to those features or components which require research and developent; and (e) On the basis of the foregoing, there is reason- -]

l able assurance that: '

(1) such safety questions vill be satisfac-l torily resolved at or before the latest date stated I

in the application for completion of construction l I

of the proposed facility, and, (ii) taking into consideration the site criteria contained in 10 CFR Part 100, the proposed facility l l

can be constructed and operated at the proposed I location without undue risk to the health and safety of the public; (2) The Applicants collectively are technically qualified l 1

l to design and construct the proposed facility.

l j (3) The Applicants are financially qualified to design and construct the proposed facility.

(l+) The issuance of a provisional pemit for the construc-

, tion of the facility upon the conditions stated in this Initial  :

Decision vill not be inimical to the ccamon defense and security or to the health and safety of the public.

l l

~

. )

37  !
46. In ultimate sucanaryg it is concluded that pursuant to 10 CFR

$ 50 35, the Applicants should be conditionally granted a provisional t

constructio,n pemit which authorizes them to proceed with construction of i

the facility as proposed, but which vill be subject to such affirmation '

or modification as may be deemed appropriate by the Board upon its further consideration of the record, including the supplemental infomation that is to be supplied by the Applicants as provided hereinabove. WHEREFORE, subject to this condition, and pursuant to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, l

l as amended, particularly $$ 101, 104, 181, 183, 185, 189 and 191 thereof, '

and the Rales and Regulations of the Atomic Energy Commission, including

$ 50 35 and Part 2 thereof, IT IS ORDERED this 10th day of September 1965 that the hearing record l

in this proceeding is reopened and the parties are authorized to submit i

l additional infomation and pleadings upon the matters and within the l l

limits specified in paragraph 43 hereinabove, and l

l IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, subject to further order of this Board upon j the reconsideration provided for above, and subject to review by the l

Commiccion upon its own motion or upon a petition for review if any is filed, that General Electric Company and Southwest Atomic Energy Asso-l ciates be and hereby are authorized to construct the nuclear facility l described in their application and amendments thereto and in accordance vith the evidence and representations presented and made on the record at the hearing, all in accordance with the architectural and engineering criteria set forth therein; and IT IS Fum:m:;n ORDERED, that the Directo2; Division of Reactor Licens-

ing (or the duly cuthorized Canaission official) is directed to issue to General Electric ComIany and Southwest Atomic Energy Associates a conditional and provisional construction pcmit in accordance with l

. 1 38 l

$ 1016 of the Act, as amended, and the regulations of the Cccmission issued

~

s i

in confomity thereto, substantially in the fom and content and subject j to the stated conditions set out in Attachment A which is made a part hereof, and IT IS Funnitat ORDEIED, in accordance with $ 2 76+ of the Commission's Rules of Practice that this Initial Decision shall become effective ten days after the date of issuance hereof and that, subject to the Board I reconsideration provided for above and in the absence of any further I i

order from the Commission, it shall constitute the final decision of the Commission forty-five days after the date of issuance hereof subject to:

(a) Such order as the Board may issue upon reconsideration as hereinabove provided; )

(b) The filing and consideration of a petition for review, if any is filed within tventy days pursuant to 2 762 of the i Con: mission's Rules of Practice; and (c) Such order as the Commission may enter upon such peti-tion, if any, or upon its own motion within forty-five days from the issuance of this Initial Decision.

N1PMIC SAFETY AND LICENSING BOARD hhA/p. L '-

bQ Attachment A A. Dixon Callihan Issued: s '

September 10, 1965 d M ,o Gemantown, Maryland Tbcnas H. Pigford /

c1j D.~ Bon'd/' Chaiman

I i .

i  ;

' . . . 3 i

9 i

k1TACHMENT A i

' GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY'

. ud

. . SOUTHWEST A' IONIC ENERGY ASSOCIATES-l  :

l DOCKET NO. 50-231 l' PROVISIONAL CONSTRUCTION PEPMIT '

?

[ Construction Pemit No.

L

1. Pursuantto$104oftheAtmicEnergyActof1954,asamended,(theAct), ,

and Title 10, Chapter 1, Code of Federal Regulations, Part 50,

" Licensing of Production and Utilization Facilities," and as' authorized i .

j and limited by the c d er of the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board

.(theBoard)datedSeptember 10, 1965, the Atmic Energy Ccrmission i

(the Commission) hereby issues a provisional construction pemit to -

General Electrie Company and Southwest Atomic Energy ' Associates (the 1

, Applicants) oc r a utilization facility (the facility) as described in I l l l .the application and amendments thereto filed in this matter by the Applicants and as more fully described in the evidence received at L the public. hearing upon the application. The utilization facility is l a 20 m'egavatt (themal) plutonia-urania-ftelei, fast-spectrum, sodium-cooled, experimental reactor which is to be located in Cove Creek Township, Washington County, Arkansas.

2. This pemit shall be deemed to contain and be subject to the conditions specified in $$ 50 54 and 50 55 of said regulations; is subject to all applicable provisions of the Act, the rules, regulations, and orders of

! i

' the Commission now or hereafter in effect; and is subject to the condi- l
i

! tions specified or incorporated below: l i

o - . o

i.

l ', i

c. j s 2 A. The earliest date for the completion of the facility is Septem-
  • 9 ber 1, 1967, and the latest date for completion of the facility

's i March 1, 1968' .

B. The facility shall be constructed and located at the site as i

{

described in the application, as amended, in Cove Creek Town-ship, Washington County, Arkansas.

l C. This exstruction pemit authorizes the Applicants to construct '

the facility described in the application and in the hearing record in accordance with the architectural and engineering criteria, set fe,rth therein. ,,

D. This construction pemit is subject to the condition that it may be either affimed or modified by further order of the Board which will be issued after its review of supplemental infoma-tion to be supplied by the Applicants in confomity with the Board's order pursuant to which this pemit is issued.

3 This pemit is provisional to the extent that a license authorizing

operation of the facility vill not be issued by the Commission unless (a) the Applicants submit to the Commission, by amendment to the appli-cation, the complete final hazards summary report, portions of which may be submitted and evaluated from time to time, and (b) the Cem-mission finds'that the final design provides reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public vill not be endangered by the operation of the facility in accordance with procedures approved t

by the Commission in connection with the issuance of caid license, l

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and(c)theApplicantssubmitproofoffinancialprotectionandtheexecu-1 tion of an indemnity a,greement as required by 5170 of the Act.  !

. i POR HE ATOMIC ENEICY COMMISSION Director

i. Division of Reactor Licensing Date of Issuance:

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