ML20138A905
Text
. . .
gu ctg, ,
, r
- 8 t
'o o' q r . .....
E' "3 (
- 7. UNITED STATES h* $
NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION WASHINGTON. D. C. 20555
% ,* * * , +o [
.f
/
,";n.. -
NOV 2 9 1980 (A
MEMORANDUM FOR:
Edward L. Halman, Director Division of Contracts Office of Administration FROM:
Raymond J. Brady, Director Division of Security Office of Administratinn
SUBJECT:
NRC FORM 187, FOR RFP RS-NMS-81-030 AP ,
Security / Classification Requirements, s NRC Form 187,and acc pertaining to Request for Proposal RS-NMS-81-030, entitled "Aassifica nalysis of Safe-guards Needs for Transport of High Level Waste."
Based on our classification review of this proposal that the safeguards guide, " Classification Guide for Saf, it has been de with the Release this proposal. However and Dispersion of ,
Radioactive rmation Dealing e applicable to M
change it is the respon,sibility of the Contracting Office'sbecau Represe,ntative to this guide. to ensure that the contractor e is Authorized appris d of all changes made that procedures for granting facility on ofand Security personnelU in order The current average time frame for personnel securityclearances m access authorizations judged necessary in thisprocessing instance of NRC "L" l
of classified activity (SNSI or CRD , is 90 days. , based upon the level l
measurements which begin when is received by the Personnel Security Branch of the a comp)lete and orms NRC acceptab packet Di i i i
v s on of Security.
Any questions regarding this matters should be directed to L 74406.
ewis Robertson on
%{)L /;. ' pf l' !/
Q Eaymon. .;d J. Brady, Director r
Division of Security i
Office of Administration '
Enclosures:
As stated i
I g '
. e
. NRC *Oxu 187 U. S. NUCLE AR RE GULATORY COMMIS$lON 1. Ths pohcies, pecc edures end crittr63 WASHINGTON, D. C. 2?S55 sf N RCM 2101, N F.C Security Progreen, (2-76)
N5tCM 2101 tPend.ng lasuance)
- DP "" ' * * ' * * * ' " * * " " " * '
COMPL E TE CLASSIFIED ITEMS BY
, SECURITY / CLASSIFICATION REQUIREMENTS SEPARA TE CORRESPONDENCE.
.; 1 3. CONTRACT NUMBER OR OTHER IDENT4 DATE TO BE 4.
EF FE CTIVE
,J. - THIS SPECIFICATION FYING NUMBE R (Prime contracts must be COMPLETED THIS SPE CIFICATION IS DATE
. : ;:r f IS FOR: shown for all subcontracts) (Estimated) ISee note below)
. Qi
- s. INVITATION FOR e. INVITATION FOR BID, REQUEST FOR PROPOSAL OR REQUEST e SID OR REOUEST - FOR OUOTE NMS-81-030 , FIN B-6990 oa'o'N A' 9/22/80 FOR PROPOS AL
- b. b. PRIME b. R EVIS E D
, y PRIME CONTRACT (Supersedes att previous speci-
. c. c. FIRST TIER SUBCONTRACT f, cations)
SUBCONTRACT
- I #*'#'I **"'" '### YE
- 4. OTHE R(Specifvi
- 5. FOR FOLLOW-ON CONTRACT. ENTER PRECEDING CONTRACT NUMBER AND DATE COMPLETED. X DOES NOT APPLY
, CONTR ACT NUMBE R DATE COMPLETE D 6a. NAME AND ADDRESS OF PRIME CONTRACTOR, OFFEROR. b. NAME AND ADDRESS OF RESPONSIBLE COGNIZANT OTHER (Specify; include Zip Code) SECURITY OF FICE (Include Zip Code /
7a. NAME AND ADDRESS OF SUBCONTRACTOR (Include b. NAME AND ADDRESS OF RESPCNSIBLE COGNIZANT Ze Code) (If applicable) SECURITY OFFICE (include Zip Code)
) 8. PROJECT TITLE AND OTHER IDENTIFYING frJFORMATION Safeguards for High-Level Waste Transportation, FIN B-6990-1
- b. ACCESS TO CLASSIFIE D INFORM ATION OR MATTE R AT GOVERNMENT F ACILITIES ONLY. X X X
- c. RECEIPT. GENERATION. STORAGE OR SAF EGU ARDING OF CLAS$lFIED DOCUMENTS. X X X
- e. ACCESS TO CLASSIFIED COMSEC INFORM ATION OR .
M AT E RI A L. .
K.
- f. ACCESS TO CLASSIFIED INFORMATidN OR MATERIAL CURRENTLY POSSESSED BY ANOTHER AGENCY.' .
X X X 9 USE OF AN AUTOMATIC DATA PROCESSING SYSTEM.
X (UNCLASS IFIE ))
- h. OTH E R (Specify)
X
- 10. INFORMATION PE RTAINING TO THfS REQUIREMENT OR PROJECT, EVEN THOUGH SUCH INFORMATION IS CONSIDERED UNCLASSIFIED,SHALL NOT BE RELEASED FOR DISSEMIN ATION EXCEPT AS APPROVED BELOW:
PROPOSED DISSEMINATION SHALL BE SUBMITTED FOR APPROVAL PRIOR TO RELE ASE $ DIRECT O THROUGH (Specify)
Director, Division of Safeguards, HMSS, NRC NRCFORM 187 12 76) s
& E
- 11. SECUT.lTY/ CLASSIFICATION REQUIREMENTS ARE SET FORTH BELOW(Check swhich are applicebAp) b CU1 DES ATTACHED (hireby made epart gf this reqzirement).
O DOCUME NTtS) LISTE D BE LOW (hereby made part of this requirement).
AS STATED BELOW:
^}. $
';t 4.
- 1. NRC Classification Guide for Safeguards Information.
, ::?. :
s-
- 2. Draft NRC Classification Guide for In. formation Dealing with the Release and Dispersion of Radioactive Materials.
J i
s f .
- 12. REQUIRED DISTFilBUTION OF NRC FORM 187 ADDITION AL DISTRIBUTION 0 SPONSORINO NRC OFFICE OR DIVISION D PRIME CONTRACTOR (/temdel E DIVISION OF SECURITY (/ fem fJe/ O SueCONTRACTOR Iitem re)
E DIVISION OF CONTRACTS (/ tem FJef) O RESFONSIBLE/COGN!ZANT SECURITY OFFICE (/tems /s and 76)
SECURITY /CLAS$1FICATION REQUIREMENTS FOR SU8 CONTRACTS RESULTING F ROM THIS CONTRACT WILL BE APPROVED BY THE OFFICIALS NAMED IN ITEM 13e AND d BELOW.
- 13. THis SECURITY / CLASSIFICATION REQUIREMENT AND ATTACHMENTS REFERENCED HEREIN WILL BE APPROVED BY THE FOLLOWING:WITH FINAL APPROVAL 8Y THE CONTRACTING OFFICER OR HIS REPRESENTATIVE NAMED IN ITEM 13d BE LOW.
, NAME _ SIGNATURE DATE
- e. OFFICE OR DIVISION AUTHORIZED CLAS$1FIER % - ,
b.
Robert F. Burnett DIRECTOR, OF FICE OR DIVISION h1g/'A- ] ._ Q ba r ; p.f / i.(
- r .. #
l c.
Dohert F! Ritrnatt DIRE CTOR, DIVISION OF SECURITY b ' ' 's 'O'.*
/ .
/j# i '
Raymond J. Brady 34 Ib/'vixe.' , , ' . < btf ///.K /i?
[ d. DIRECTOR. OlVISION OF CONTR ACTS g
/[6 i
! D. J. Dougherty whi, "
NRC F0 _ ,., . ,5, 6
v
-~_ . - - - -.
(Septe.ber 22, 198C.' j a
M h
v y Attachment 1
'g ,
Analysis of Safeguards Needs i' for Transport of High Level Waste B & R: 50-19-02-02 FIN: B-6990-1 -
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is now engaged in
1.0 BACKGROUND
or will soon undertake several related studies to provide detailed analyses of safeguards needs for specific nuclear materials in produc- These tion, transport or use by the commercial nuclear power industry.
studies address specific regulatory concerns, i.e., the need to confirm or refute current safeguards needs for High Level Waste in Repositories, for Pyproducts and Small Quantities of SNM, for High Enriched Uranium facilities, and for graded physical protection measures. This .
Statement of Work (50W) addresses still another area of regulatory con-cern, the potential need to safeguard High Level Waste (HLW) during transport. Taken together, these studies will establish regulatory needs, if any, and a technical basis for comprehensive and consistent safeguards regulations, as required. .
2.0 WORK REQUIRED _:
The contractor will provide the personnel, facilities, and materials necessary to accomplish the work specified in this state- /
ment of work.
Task l__ - The contractor shall review and screen recycle studies and pro-cesses to determine the types and amounts of HLU generated and the various waste handlina technioues that might be applied to each (e.g., vitrificatior calcination,etc.). In addition, the contractor shall consider other possible operations (e.g., decontamination, decommissioning, etc.) in the nuclear fuel cycle that would generate waste products having high radio-activity (comparable to HLW) which might need to be transported from fixed sites for disposal.
Task 2_ - The contractor shall review and screen available and ongoing ship-ment cask design and cask utilization studies on transport of HLW or other j waste products of high specific radioactivity to characterize the type, i capacity, and major design features of each cask, the applicability to the various transport modes, the projected type, form, and amount of material per cask and per shipment, and pertinent conditions of shipment affecting use of these cask designs.
Tasks 1 and 2 will focus on the detailed search and careful screening of The existing DOE and NRC in-house reports and sponsored tion of these tasks, a list of the reports and studies to be reviewed.
For each task the contractor will prepare and submit an interim report summarizing findings and conclusions.
l Task 3 - The contractor will utilize the results of Tasks 1 and 2 ate and determine which types of waste material, if dispersed r.alevolen would produce consequences of sufficient severity to public health an safety as to warrant consideration of safeguards regulations and reasu
P""~~, - .-
. / O O l
The desired products to be sumitted in a report to URC are twofold. first, the coatractor will prepare a rank ordering of the waste types in terms of the relative' potential consequences to public health and safety associ-ated with sabotage during transport operations. The contractor shall doqument the factors and rationale supporting these conclusions. Second, the contractor will prepare a plan which outlines the approach for com-pletion of subsequent tasks, the impact of findings from related NitSS sponsored projects (such as the Cask Vulnerability Study) on this effort, data needs and gaps, if any. The plan will include recormendations on which of the HLW types defined in Task 1 and ranked in Task 3 warrant detailed consequence evaluation in light of their potential for adversely affecting public health and safety.
Option Upon receipt of the Task 3 report above, NRC will review the results of Task 1, 2, and 3, to determine if the contract will be terminated at that time or continued through completion of Tasks 4 r.id 5 below. NRC will inform the contractor of the results of this r. new within 30 days after receipt of the report. The contractor will no . initiate any work on Tasks l
i 4 or 5 until receipt of appropriate contract modification from the NRC contracting officer. The NRC contracting officer will issue appropriate l contract modification within 45 days after receipt of the Task 3 report, i Option Task 4 - On NRC modification and approval of the plan developed in
' ' Task 3, the contractor will perform a detailed analysis, and estimate of the consequences of radiological release during transport from dispersal i
af ter thef t or sabotage of selected HLW materials. The contractor will consider and describe such factors as adversary modes of attack, required capabilities and resources and impact of meteorological conditions. The contractor will utilize, to the extent appropriate and feasible, the methodologies, data bases and/or findings from related NRC sponsored studie:
{ (e.g. , the Spent Fuel Cask Vulnerability Studies, the transport of Radio-nuclides in Urban Environs, the Sa feguards for HLW Repositories, Calcula-tions of Radiological Consequences from Sabotage of Shipping Casks for Spent Fuel and HLW, etc.). ~ The desired products are reliable estimates of the extent and impact of public health consequences, contamination, use denial and cleanup costs that might result from radiological dispursion of HLW in both urban and rural environments. These data must be of the type and quality to serve as a basis for a NRC policy decision on the need for safeguards regulations and measures for HLW.
Option Task 5_ - The contractor will identify example safeguards measures for reduction of consequences for sabotage of HLW during transport operations, consistent with established NRC policy. These examples will include, but not a limited to consideration of currently employed transport safeguard!
measures. The desired product will include a comparative analysis of example HLW safeguards measures with respect to potential public health consequences, measure effectiveness and cost / benefit for each type of HLW involved.
f
,7 8 3 3.0 TASK REPORTS: The schedule f or completion of each task is set forth below, The contractor will provide three copies of interim task reports which thoroughly document findings, problems and specific recou:endations resulting from work performed in accordance with this schedule.
Talk.1 within 90 days af ter contract award Ta.sk 2 within 180 days after contract award Ta'sk 3 within 360 days af ter contract award
- Task 4 within 630 days af ter contract award Interim task reports will be prepared in accordance with format require-ments set forth in NRC Manual Chapter 3202, a copy of which will be pro-vided to the contractor by the NMSS Project Manager (PM) within 10 days of contract award. Distribution of these reports by the contractor will be as follows:
Carl B. Sawyer, SGRI/NMSS PM 1 copy Contracting Officer, NRC 1 cony (xerox)
Office of the Director, NMSS (Attn: Program Support) 1 copy (xerox)
The tiMSS PM will furnish comments on each interim task report within i 30 days (1 month) af ter receipt of the report.
In addition, the contractor will provide to the f4 MSS PM a list of reports and studies to be reviewed under Tasks 1 and 2. This list will be sub-mitted within 30 days of the effective date of the contract award. The fiMSS PM will provide comments on these lists within 10 working days af ter their receipt. The NMSS PM will assist the contractor in the event some of the documents are not readily available. It is the responsibility of the contractor, however, to assure that all necessary reports, and design studies a re obtained in a timely manner to meet the task schedule.
- 3.1 FINAL REPORT: Within 870 days (29 months) after the effective date of f this contract, the contractor shall furnish to the NMSS PM a draft copy of the final report. This draft final report will be prepared in the format specified in NRC Manual Chapter 3202 and will include thorough documentation of findings, problems, and recommendations for all tasks.
The draf t final report will include revision of Tasks 1 through 4 based on review and comments from the NRC staff provided by the NMSS PM. This draft final report will also include thorough documentation of findings, problems, and recommendations resulting from work performed on Task 5, specifically addressing:
a) definition of candidate safeguards systems for protection of HLW during transport operations, and b) a comparative analysis of candidate HLW transportation safe-guard systems relative to potential public health and safety consequences resulting from malevolent dispersal, system effectiveness, and cost / benefit.
l
- Projected schedule assumes that option for task 4 and 5 is exercised by NRC Contracting Officer. l
p .
p
\
, .. c ,-
.~ -
G The NMSS PM will furnish connents on the draf t final report within 30 days af ter receipt of the draf t. P,ased on these connents, the contractor will revise the draft and submit the final report in 11 copies to the INSs PM and I copy to the NRC Division of Contracts not later than 930 days >
(q months) after the effective date of this contract.
3.2 MEETINGS
The contractor may deem it necessary to visit NRC, DOE, DOE National Laboratories, and other sources to perform the literature search' obtain and review HLW cask design information, and confer on HLW safe.
guard analyses. The contractor will meet with the INSS PM at the con-clusion of each task to discuss the work results. These meetings shall be of one day duration and shall be held at the NRC offices in Washington, DC or suburban Maryland, as appropriate. The contractor will conduct briefings on study results for the NRC staff at these meetings, in addition, it is anticipated that the NMSS PM will meet with the con-tractor at his business location up to three times per year. These visits will be of two days duration, or less as required, and will focus on definition of project direction, problems, and status.
3.3 MONTHLY LETTER REPORTS: See Special Requirements.
4.0 NRC FURNISHED MATERIAL: See Section 3.0, Task Reports.
5.0 KEY PERSONNEL - Not applicable.
6.0 PERIOD OF PERFORMANCE: The period of performance of teork described in Te~ction 2.0, Work Required will commence as of the effective date of this contract and shall continue for 930 days (31 months) contingent upon con-tract continuation after NRC review of Tasks 1, 2 and 3 results.
6.1 DEllVERABLES and SCHEDULING - The following summarizes project milestones and deliverable products:
Milestones and Products SCHEDULE ,
4
- 1. Initiation of Contract day 1 (Contract Award)
- 2. Literature Search List-Tasks 1 & 2 day 30
- 3. NRC Comments on Literature Search List day 45
- 4. Interim Report - Task 1 day 90
- 5. f1RC Comments Task 1 Report day 120
- 6. Interim Report - Task 2 day 180
- 7. NRC Comments in Task 2 Report day 210
- 8. Interim Report - Task 3 day 360 l
~
(v) (3 p'
5 l
l
- 9. NRC Connents in Task 3 day 390 i l
- 10. Interim Report - Task 4 day E30
- 11. NRC Comments in Task 4 day 660 IL 12.. Draf t Final Report ,
day 870
- 13. NRC Comments on Draft Final Report day 900
- 14. Submission of Final Report day 930 7.0 LEVEL OF EFFORT: It is estimated that the contractor shall be required to expend approximately 2.2 man years of effort to complete the work specified in this s tatement of work.
- Projected schedule assumes that option for task 4 and 5 is exercised by ,
NRC Contracting Officer. ]
l i
f ( -
CLASSIFICATION GUIDE FOR INFORMATION DEALING WITH THE RELEASE AND DISPERSION OF RADI0 ACTIVE MATERIALS United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission Division of Security Washington, DC 20555 y h-.p -$
. ( (
CLASSIFICATION GUIDE FOR INFORMATION DEALING WITH THE RELEASE AND DISPERSION OF RADI0 ACTIVE MATERIALS TABLE OF CONTENTS Page INTRODUCTION..................................................... I CLASSIFICATION GUIDANCE 100 GENERAL FACTS............................................ . 8 110 Effects of the Release and Dispersion of Radioactive Ma te ri al s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 120 Nuclear Facility or Shipping Package Design Descriptions.......................................... 9 130 Means or Methods for Intentionally Releasing and Dispersing Radioactive Materia 1. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 140 Description of Tests, or Analytic Studies Performed to Define Such Tests, of Radioactive Material Release and Dispersion Methods................................ 9 150 Results of Tests or Analytic Studies Performed to Predict Such Test Results, of Radioactive Material Release and Dispersion Methods........................ 10 200 RELEASE AND DISPERSION OF RADI0 ACTIVE MATERIAL FROM NUCLEAR FACILITIES................................................. 10 21 0 Controlled Release and Dispersion of Radioactive Materia 1.............................................. 10 220 Accidental Release and Dispersion of Radioactive Materia 1.............................................. 11 230 Release and Dispersion of Radioactive Material as a Result of Sabotage.................................... .
11 300 RELEASE AND DISPERSION OF RADI0 ACTIVE MATERIAL DURING TRANSP0RT.................................................. 11 310 General Facts......................................... 11 320 Accidental Release and Dispersion of Radioactive Materials............................................. 12 330 Release and Dispersion of Radioactive Material as a Res ul t o f Sa bo ta ge . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 400 RELEASE AND DISPERSION OF RADI0 ACTIVE MATERIAL USING MALEVOLENT DEVICES OR METHODS SUITABLE TO MALEFACTOR OBJECTIVES................................................. 12 410 G en e r al Fa c ts .l! . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 420 Design and Method of Using a Malevolent Device........ 12
f >~
. ?
(- - t' i Q' ' N ( ;
s .
. .s . . ;
s Cl.ASSIFICATION,G..UIDE FOR INFORMATION DEALING WITH THE RELEASEANb?DISPERSIONOFRADI0ACTIVEMATERIAL s
..A w
INTRODUCTION ,
\ \
. u w
A. PURPOSE "- i N
, y It is the intent of this guide to provide security classification guidance for the safeguarding of information pertaining to tihe release and disper-y .
sion of radioactive material. Of specific interest is that information s
\
which could assist malevolent activities to the extent that identifiable damage to the national security would result.
B. SCOPE
{b.%-
This guide considers three primary scenarios for thelpotential malevolent release and dispersion of radioactive material. These scenarios include releases from facilities in which such materials are normally available; releases from shipping packages used to transport radioactive.paterials; and releases resulting from the use of specially adapted dispersion devices or methods. The guide is therefore divided into the following sections:
(1) General Facts; (2) Release and Dispersion of Radioactive Materials from Nuclear Facilities; (3) Release and Disperdion of Radioactive Material t during Transport; and (4) Release and Dispersion of Radioactive Meterial
- s. - ,
using Malevolent Devices or Methods suitable to Malefactorj0bjectives. This J Q guide addresses only those releases -af radioactive material which'are capable '
e t w.s s iy of causing identifiable damage to national security. .
d 4 4 ,
e ese. e n %
\
'u
. c :
1 2
Guidance for the classification of related safeguards information can be found in the "NRC Classification Guide for Safeguards Information."
C. BASIC POLICY The policy governing the classification of information dealing with the release and dispersion of radioactive material is to provide the maximum possible information to the public, while at the same time protecting against unauthorized disclosure of information which could cause identifiable damage to the national security. Such information includes:
(1) Information which could reasonably be expected to make the intentional release and dispersion of radioactive material a feasible objective, whenever such action could cause identifiable damage to the national security as a result of irradiation and/or contamination (e.g., disrupting the orderly function of facilities, activities, resources or programs of importance to national security).
(2) Information that could reasonably be expected to enhance the credibility of hoaxes which pertain to the release and disper-sion of radioactive material, to such an extent that they are indistinguishable from an actual threat to national security or information which could enhance the frequency of such hoaxes.
This guide is approved for authorized classifiers of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), for the purpose of classifying national security informa-tion which deals with the intentional release and dispersion of radioactive 6-4 ' -
-L
h L...: a material . It also provides guidance for NRC contractors and licensees, as well as other U.S. government personnel who need to identify such information.
- D. USE OF THIS GUIDE ,
- 1. Information designated as either " CONFIDENTIAL" or " SECRET" in this guide will be classified accordingly by users of the guide. This guide constitutes a record of an original'cla,ssification decision :
by the approving authority and directs the derivative classification of information which the guide indica 1.es is classified. Any questions concerning the applicability of this guide should be directed to the '
Director, Division of Security, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C. 20555.
- 2. Certain topics in this guide apply to subjects addressed more fully in other guides (e.g., naval nuclear propulsion, nuclear material production, uranium enrichment, safeguards and nuclear weapons).
Such guides take precedence when they are more restrictive. Questions pertaining to such subjects should, be forwarded to the Director,
. Division of Security, Nuclear Regulatory'Comission, Washington, DIC.
20555.
- 3. Certain topics indicate that information to which they apply may be either CONFIDENTIAL or SECRET. Application of these topics requires informed judgment based on knowledge,of the overall context of the information.
,} /^
. 4
. 4. Compilations of unclassified information are generally considered to be unclassified unless some additional factor is added in the process of compilation. For example: (a) the fact that the information is
, complete for its intended purposes may be classified; or (b) sometines raw data from the open literature is also classified government f information, the compromise of which is mitigated by refraining from officially ccnfirming public expressions for it. Thus,the fact that information is available to the public in the open literature is not necessarily a sufficient basis for asserting that certain information is unclassified. Furthermore, an NRC employee, contractor or other individual who had prior access to classified information on a subject will, by his selection of open literature information on that subject, give credibility to the information selected. This amounts to an implied ~ official confirmation.
- 5. Care should be taken that the declassification or downgrading of a document does not violate provisions of this guide when evaluated in connection with information known to be unclassified.
- 6. If classified information can be discerned from the use, presence, or capabilities of any equipment, the equipment will be classified and protected in accordance with the procedures established for the highest level of classified information which is currently revealed by such equipment.
l l
l
. . . _a a 5
E. , DEFINITIONS USED IN THIS GUIDE
- l. Byproduct Material - Any radioactive material yielded in or made radioactive by exposure to the radiation incident to the process of producing or utilizing special nuclear material.
- 2. Consequences of Release and Dispersion of Radioactive Material -
Events and conditions caused by tne release and dispersion of radioactive material. Consequences of interest include impacts which can cause identifiable damage to national security.
- 3. Dispersion of Radioactive Material - The mixf ng of radioactive material with the environment (e.g., land, atmosphere, surface or ground waters), subsequent to its release from its container.
It can be described by the spatial distribution of the released radioactive material as it varies with time.
- 4. Malevolent Device - A device used to release anc' disperse radioactive material for the purpose of damaging national security (e.g. , explosive, pyrotechnics , nebulizers, etc.).
- 5. National Security Information (NSI) - Information or material collectively termed information, that is owned by, produced for or by, under the control of, or regulated by, the United States Government, and that has been determined pursuant to Executive Order 12065 or prior Executive Orders to require protection against unauthorized disclosure, and that is so designated.
--- ,y.- - * ,e
.. . , l 1
........ a 6
- 6. Nebulizer - A device which can reduce radioactive material to an aerosol form.
- 7. Nuclear Facility - Any facility which mines, mills, converts to other forms, processes, produces, fabricates, stores, recycles or uses radioactive materials that are licensed under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended.
- 8. Pyrotechnic Device - A combustible substance used for the ignition of materials (e.g., white phosphorus incendiary grenades).
- 9. Radioactive Aerosol - A suspension of fine solid or liquid radio-active particles in a single gas or mixture of gases.
- 10. Radioactive Material - A solid, liquid or gas which exhibits the property of emitting alpha particles, beta particles, gamma rays or neutrons by spontaneously transforming from one nuclide into a different nuclide, or into a different energy state of the same nuclide. This includes Byproduct Material, Source Material and Special Nuclear Material.
- 11. Radioactive Release and Dispersion Methods - Methods or actions used to intentionally release and disperse radioactive materials for the purpose of damaging national security (e.g., shipping package explosive attack modes, methods using malevolent devices, nuclear facility sabotage,etc.).
- 12. Released Quantities of Radioactive Material - The total amount of radioactive material that has escaped from its containment into the environment.
. -~ .
a 3.....
7
- 13. Restricted Data (RD)_ - Defined in the Atomic Energy 'Act of 1954, as amended, as "all data concerning (1) design, manufacture, or utilization of atomic weapons; (2) the production of special nuclear material; or (3) the use of special nuclear material in the produc-tion of energy; but shall not include data declassified or removed from the Restricted Data category pursuant to Section 142."
- 14. Source Material _ (1) Uranium, thorium, or any combination thereof in any physical or chemical form, or (2) ores which contain by weight one-twentieth of one percent (0.05%) or more of uranium, thorium or any combination thereof.
- 15. Special Nuclear Material (SNM) - (1) Plutonium, uranium-233, uranium enriched in the isotope-233 or in the isotope-235, and any other material which the Commission, pursuant to the provisions of Section 51 of the Atomic Energy Act, as amended, determines to be special nuclear material, but does not include source material; or (2) any material artificially enriched by any of the foregoing but does not include source material.
F. Declassification and Review for Declassification - E.0.12065 National Security Information identified in this guide will be marked for declassification or review for declassification as specified by the applicable topics of this guide. A date for declassification or for review for declassification will not be used for Restricted Data. This guide has been approved by an original Top Secret classification authority. ,
All classification durations in this guide beyond six years have been used
_%M A
L. . .. L e d 8
~
only when it was determined that identifiable damage to ' national security, such as that stated in Section C, above, could still be expected to result throughout the entire period the classification will be in effect.
G. ABBREVIATIONS The following abbreviations are used ih this guide:
S - Secret C - Confidential l
l U - Unclassified RD - Restricted Data NSI - National Security Information SNM - Special Nuclear Material CLASSIFICATION GUIDANCE 1
100 GENERAL FACTS l
NOTE: See Sections D.2 and D.3 of this guide, as well as the NRC Classification Guide for Safeguards Information.
110 EFFECTS OF THE RELEASE AND DISPERSION OF RADI0 ACTIVE MATERIALS 111 Fact that radioactive materials released to U the environment in sufficiently large quantities can contaminate geographic areas, facilities and expose the public to harmful levels of radiation.
112 Estimates of the consequences, including U doses, property damages and health effects arising from an actual event or safety study which pertains to the release and dispersion of radioactive material. This topic does not apoly to Armed Forces Installations.
%Ag
\. 9 p , _ ,, ;
120 NUCLEAR FACILITY OR SHIPPING PACKAGE DESIGN DESCRIPTIONS 121 Design information associated with the containment U functions of shipping packages. This topic does not apply to classified naval fuel shipping packages and weapons containers.
122 Description of equipment or methods used to control U-CNSI a radioactive release. Review for declassifi-CONFIDENTIAL, if a workable sabotage scenario can be cation at the developed. end of 7 years 130 MEANS OR METHODS FOR INTENTIONALLY RELEASING AND DISPERSING RADI0 ACTIVE MATERIAL 131 Fact that explosives, nebulizers or pyrotechnics U can be used to disperse radioactive materials.
132 Details of a release and dispersion method or C-SNSI means when related to a nuclear facility, Review for shipping package or radioactive material form. declassifi-cation at the SECRET, only if the information is of sufficient detail of 20 years to be directly utilized to accomplish such a release or dispersion of radioactive material.
133 Techniques that can reasonably be expected to CNSI-maximize the consequences of a release and Review for dispersion of radioactive material. declassifi-cation at the end of 20 years 140 DESCRIPTION OF TESTS, OR ANALYTIC STUDIES PERFORMED TO DEFINE SUCH TESTS, OR RADI0 ACTIVE RELEASE AND DISPERSION METHODS SEE TOPIC 132 141 Description of a planned test provided no classified U-CNSI*
information about tests results or analytic studies is revealed.
142 Identity and quantity of an explosive device (e.g., MA23 U-C N'S'I*
Demolition charge), used in a test or analytic study.
- CONFIDENTIAL, only if the test cn study parameters (e.g.,
explosive types and quantities, explosive devices, and/or 4
test conditions) are so few, that the test or study results can be used to make the intentional release and dispersion of radioactive material a feasible objective. ,
5
. 't
- i. ,.'
ba.__ .A 150 RESULTS OF TESTS, OR ANALYTIC STUDIES PERFORMED TO PREDICT SUCH TEST RESULTS, OF RADI0 ACTIVE RELEASE AND DISPERSION ~ METHODS.
151 Test or Study results that were confidently V expected by virtue of the established unclassified performance characteristics of the malevolent device used (e.g., size of a hole that a cormion shaped change will make in target material).
152 Generalized results of a group of tests, or U-CNSI*
analytical studies, of radioactive release and Review for dispersion methods, declassifi-cation at the end of 7 years
- CONFIDENTIAL, only if the test or study parameters (e.g., explosive types and quantities, explosive devices, and/or test conditions) are so few, that the test or study results can be used to make the intentional release and dispersion of radioactive material a feasible objective.
153 Ra9. ordering of radioactive release and dispersion CNSI-methods (e.g., shipping package explosive attack Review for mode) according to relative effectiveness which is declassifi-based on classified results of government, or cation at the government sponsored contractor, studies or tests. end of 20 years 154 Correlations describing the quantity of radioactive CNSI-material released or dispersed with respect to Review for conditions which may result through the use of a declassi fi-specific radioactive release and dispersion method cation at the (e.g., damage to shipping packages as the result end of 20 years of an explosive attack).
200 RELEASE AND DISPERSION OF RADI0 ACTIVE MATERIAL FROM NUCLEAR FACILITIES Note: See Sections D.2 and D.3 of .this guide, as well as Section 400 of the NRC Classification Guide for Safeguards Information. Also see Sections 120 through 150 of this guide.
210 CONTROLLED RELEASE AND DISPERSION OF RADI0 ACTIVE MATENIAL SEE TOPIC 122 - ,
211. Fact that nuclear facilities can periodically have U controlled releases of radioactive materials due to normal operations.
s
( .
31 ;
. ...2 212 Quantities and types of-radioactive materials U released. -
220 ACCIDENTAL RELEASES AND DISPERSION OF RADI0 ACTIVE MATERIAL 221 Quantities and types of radioactive material U released due to abnormal operations (e.g.,
223 Description of safety features used to prevent U or mitigate accidental releases, other than safeguards features.
230 RELEASE AND DISPERSION OF RADI0 ACTIVE MATERIAL AS A RESULT OF SAB0TAGE 231 Sabotage scenarios which can reasonably be expected C-SNSI to make the intentional release and dispersion of Review for radioactive material a feasible objective. declassifi-cation at the SECRET, only if the information is of sufficient detail to end of 20 years be directly utilized to accomplish such a release or dispersion.
300 RELEASE AND DISPERSION OF RADI0 ACTIVE MATERIAL DURING TRANSPORT Note: See Sections D.2 and D.3 of this guide, as well as Section 300 of the NRC Classification Guide for Safeguards Informa-tion. Also see Sections 120 through 150 of this guide.
310 GENERAL FACTS SEE TOPIC 121 311 - Fact that explosives may breach shipping packages U 312 Fact that a breached shipping package will release U some of its radioactive contents.
313 Identification of an explosive attack mode that might U be used to breach a shipping package (e.g., air shaped charge, breaching charge, etc.) without
' elaboration.
320 ACCIDENTAL RELEASE AND DISPERSION OF RADI0 ACTIVE MATERIAL SEE TOPIC 112 321 Quantities and types of radioactive material released U due to an accident.
1
.'- ( -lt y.--..
12 330 RELEASE AND DISPERSION OF RADI0 ACTIVE MATERIAL AS A RESULT OF SAB0TAGE 331 Sabotage scenarios which can reasonably be expected C-SNSI-to make the intentional release and dispersion of Review for radioactive material a feasible objective. declassifi-cation at the end of 20 years SECRET, only if the information is of sufficient detail to be directly utilized to accomplish such a release or dispersion.
400 RELEASE AND DISPERSION OF RADI0 ACTIVE MATERIAL USING MALEVOLENT DEVICES OR METHODS SUITABLE TO MALEFACTOR OBJECTIVES Note: See Sections D.2 and D.3 of this guide, as well as the NRC Classification Guide for Safeguards Information. Also see Sections 130 through 150 of this guide.
410 GENERAL FACTS 411 Fact that solid, liquid, (aerosols) and gaseous U forns of radioactive material can be utilized as a health hazard and containment.
412 Generalized statements about the production of U radioactive aerosols which represent relatively wide ranges of explosives, pyrotechnics and radioactive material types and quantities and conditions.
Note: Quantity includes all measures of dsss, volume disintegration rates (e.g.,
curies) and dose.
413 Generalized statements about methods of contamina- U tion which represent relatively wide ranges of radioactive material quantities.and types as well as estimated damages.
Note: Damage includes measures expressed in dollars, area and length of time unfit for use.
, .420 DESIGN AND METHOD OF USING A MALEVOLENT DEVICE. SNSI-Review for
- Note
- See definition of malevolent device declassifi-l cation at the end of 20 years i
- -