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JUL 19 1983 MEMORANDUM FOR:
Edward L. Halman, Director Division of Contracts FROM:
Kellogg V. Morton, Chief Technical Contracts Branch
SUBJECT:
HILESTONE SCHEDULE DELAY (RES-83-169 FISSION PRODUCT RELEASE: TRANSPORT SABOTAGE)
The attached revision to subject requirement is required because Milestone Schedule Step 9 (Evaluation Report Issued) was missed. The delay is attributable to delayed Contracting Officer approval of the Sole Source Findings Determination (F&D).
M*ti sf;ned by Kellogg V. Morton, Chief Technical Contracts Branch Division of Contracts Office of Administration 8512120007 851112 PDR FOIA MILLAR 84-682 PDR g j..
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I:gotiator MILESTONES PROJECTED DATE ACTUAL DATE
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HILESTONES PROJECTED DATE ACTUAL DATE 1.
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AUG 2 5 C3 STATEMENT OF WORK 1
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FISSION PRODUCT RELEASE:
TRANSPORT SABOTAGE B&R NO.:
60190102 FIN: B8997 CONTRACTOR: Battelle Columbus Laboratories (BCL)
PRINCIPAL INVESTIGATOR: Dr. Audeen Walters SITE: BCL STATE: Ohio FY83 PROGRAM ASSUMPTION:
$85,000 FY84 PROGRAM ASSUMPTION:
$115,000
- 1. 0 BACKGROUND Since July 1979, interim requirements'for the protection of spent fuel shipments against sabotage have been in effect.
Issuance of the require-ments was prompted by a draft study (SAND 77-1927) which predicted that successful explosive sabotage of a spent power reactor fuel shipment in a heavily populated area had the potential for producing serious radio-logical consequences.
These consequences were acknowledged to be subject to a large uncertainty since little information was available to aid in predicting the release quantities and chemical and physical forms of any released radioactive material.
The NRC and DOE responded to this need for technical data by sponsoring separate but coordinated experimental programs.
These research programs have now been completed (see NUREG/CR-2472, " Final Report on Shipping Cask Sabotage Source Term Investigation" and SAND 82-2365, "An Assessment of the Safety of Spent Fuel Transportation in Urban Environs.") The results o'f these programs show that the likely release of respirable particles would be in the range of 6 to 10 grams, whereas the SAND 77-1927 estimates ranged up to 14,000 grams.
The calculated radiological health consequences of sabotage of a truck cask in a heavily populated area are correspondingly reduced to no early deaths and zero to few latent cancer fatalities.
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On the basis of these results, consideration is being given to revising the requirements for the protection of spent fuel.
In this proposed rule-making, consideration will be given to explicitly addressing shipments of spent fuel from gas-cooled power reactors (HTGRs) and non power reactors (NPRs), in addition to shipments of spent fuel from power reactors.
How-ever, there is essentially no information on the possible consequences of sabotage of shipments of spent fuel from HTGRs and NPRs.
Although the previous work done on spent power reactor fuel may be applicable in some respects, the results of that work are not directly applicable to the shipment of spent fuel from HIGRs and NPRs because of dif ferences in the shipping casks used, the radionuclide inventories, the physical structure of the fuel, and the interaction between the explosive and the fuel.
It is expected,.however, that the source terms for these spent fuels will be no higher than the source term for spent power reactor fuel and most probably will be much lower.
The purpose of this project, therefore, is to confirm that expectation by establishing an analytical and experimental quantification of the source term likely to result from sabotage of spent fuel shipments from HTGRs and reprcsentative NPRs.
In addition, a similar need in the area of shipment of high level radio-active waste has been identified.
The NRC has a technical assistance study underway to provide a detailed analysis of the potential need to safeguard high level radioactive waste during transport.
Preliminary results from this study indicate that the explosive sabotage of casks containing vitrified high level radioactive waste during transport could result in a release that would be comparable to that from sabotage of a spent fuel shipment.
The next task in this study is to estimate the consequences of radiological release as a result of sabotage of vitrified high level waste during transport.
This requires determination of the source term likely to result from sabotage of vitrified high level waste during transport be made either analytically or experimentally.
2.0 WORK REQUIRED:
The contractor shall provide the personnel, facilities, materials, equip-ment and services necessary to perform the following tasks:
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3 Task 1:
HTGR Spent Fuel (Fort St. Vrain Gas Cooled Reactor) a.
Use the experimental procedures previously developed for the deter-mination of the radiological source term from sabotage of LWR spent fuel during transport, and assume the appropriate scaled explosive, simulated cask (s), and HTGR spent fuel, to determine analytically the amount and the chemical and physical form associated with any material release.
Submit the results of this analysis in the form of a letter report to the NRC by December 1983.
Note:
The following subtasks lb, c and d shall be carried out only if the g
contractor can obtain the fuel at no cost except for transportation and
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b.
Obtain or prepare surrogate spent f 1 or unirradiated fuel and Ts perform the necessary cold tests to assess the determination made G.
analytically.
c.
Compare the results of Task Ib to the results for LWR spent fuel to establish the need for hot tests.
If the NRC project manager agrees that hot tests are needed, obtain or prepare representative HTGR spent fuel and perform a maximum of two hot tests to determine the chemical and physical form associated with any material release.
d.
On the basis of the results of Task Ib and/or Task Ic, determine the amount and form of the potential radiological release that would result from sabotage of HTGR spent fuel during transport.
Assess qualitatively and, to the extent possible, quantitatively the uncertainties associated with this determination.
Submit the results in the form of a letter report to the NRC by April 1984.
Task 2:
Non-Power Reactor Spent Fuel a.
Compile information on the spent fuel from the four major types of non power reactors (AGN, TRIGA, pool, and tank) needed to determine which type of fuel (s) should be tested to obtain quantitative data j
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This information should include, but not be limited to, the operating power level of the reactors, uranium -235 enrichment, burn-up and decay history, physical form of the fuel, frequency of spent fuel shipments, the status of reactors, (i.e., in operation or shutdown), etc.
Considering the relative probability of occurrence and the estimated potential consequences of i
a sabotage event involving explosives, evaluate the relative risk to the public of transporting spent fuel from each of the four major types of non power reactors.
Submit the results of this evaluation in the form of a letter report to the NRC by April 1984.
b.
Compare the results of Task 2a to the results for HTCR and LWR spent i
fuel to establish the need for an experimental program for NPR spent i
fuel.
c.
If the NRC project manager agrees that an experimental program is needed, perform work as outlined in Tasks Ib-d.
A letter report on the cold test results shall be submitted by June 1984.
A letter report on the source term estimate shall be submitted by August 1984.
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Hioh Level Waste
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Obtain or prepare borosilicate glass samples which simulate vitrified high le' vel radioactive waste.
'b b.
Perform the same subtasks as under Task 1 using representative samples of high level radioactive waste.
Submit the results in the form of letter reports as follows:
report on the cold tests by October 1984; report on the source term estimates by January 1985.
3.0 REPORTING REQUIREMENTS 3.1 Monthly Letter Status Report By the 20th of each month, three copies of a brief letter status report shall be submitted to the NRC project manager which summarizes:
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thewokperformedduring'thepreviousmonthanditsrelationship to the project goals;
- problems incurred and proposed solutions;
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activities planned for the ensuing month
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personnel time ekpsnditures during the previous month; costs genitated against the work effort during the previous month and cumulatively; and current. obligation status information.
The first montnly letter status report after project authorization shall inv ude the planned monthly rate of expenditures for the fiscal year, if not pio'vided with the. Form 189, and include any changes to prior schedules or estimated cd$ts.
Aln contained in cach monthly report will be a breakout of (1) manpower utilized, (2) costs incurred for direct salaries, material and sersices, ADP support, subcontracts, travel, general and administrative and other related items, and (3) current obligation status information for the project.
3.2 lechnical Reports TechniEal. lett'er reports will be provided as specified in paragraph 2,
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Work Required.
Thecontr)ctorshallsubmitadraftfinalreportonTasks1and2by October 1984.
If Task 3 is performed, the' draft final report shall be submitted by March 1985.
After the NdC review and comment, the con-trsctor shall submit a camera ready copy and two additional copies of a final report to the NRC project' manager.
4.0 MEETINGS AND TRAVEL
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4.1.: All travel requires prior approval of the NRC project manager.
.2 f An6ual Ligh't Water Safety Hisearch Meeting I,f.fe' quested by t5e NRC project'mana'ger, by August 15, 1984, a draft rq.
report summarizin'g the current year research re'::ults shall be prepared andsubmittedto$theNRCprojectmanagerforreviewandpossible
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presentation at-the NRC's Annual Light Water Reactor Safety Research (f
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meeting.
If accepted, a final versio,n of the report will be presented at the October 1984 meeting in Gaithersburg, Maryland, by either the project's principal investigator or a mutually satisfactory alternate.
5.0 NRC FURNISHED MATERIAL None.
6.0 CAPITAL EQUIPMENT All capital equipment expenditures require the prior written approval of the NRC project manager.
7.0 SUBCONTRACTS Subcontracts require the prior written approval of the NRC project manager.
8.0 PERIOD OF PERFORMANCE The period of performance for the work described in this Statement of Work is September 1983 to December 1984.
(To March 1985 if Task 3 is performed).
9.0 TECHNICAL DIRECTION The NRC project manager is Andrea K. Barnold, FTS~443-7976, Human Factors &
Safeguards Branch, Division of Facility Operations, RES.
10.0 CONTACTS WITH NRC LICENSEES Any contacts with NRC licensees require prior written approval of the NRC project manager.
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i JUSTIFICATION FOR PLACEMENT OF WORK WIT,H B TTELLE C0!.ONBUS In preparing a proposed rulemaking on the protection v'equirements for shipments
- of spent fuel, the Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards (NMSS)\\has identified a need to estimate'the consequences of radiological release as a result of sabotage of shi'pments of spent fuel from gas-cooled power reactors (HTGR) and non power reactors.
This requires that an analytical and/or experi-
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mental determination of a source term (i.e., the magnitude and chemical / physical
'E I ) form of any released radioactive material) likely to result from sabotage of
[',[a v]s such shipments be made.A similar need'in the area of shipment of high level O ff waste.has also been identified by NME.S. %
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' h' Battelle Columbus Laboratories (BCL) recently completed a study for the Office
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of Nuclear Reguiatory Research (RES) that resulted in a source term character-g
.? ; ization for sabotage of power reactor spent fuel casks durin'g transport.
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study was conducted in three phases:
(1) Definition o'f the reference basis
,- jthreat, design of the experiments, and design of equipment; (2) construction
..,, and testing of the system; and (3) conduct of the experiments and data analysis.
g. s' The proposed new work will require the same equipment, expertise, and experi-
-s ff,mentalsetupasthespentfuelsabotagesourceterm.
BCL has the unique capa-
'$.',bilitytoconducttheproposedstudyinthatitistheonlyorganizationthat
,cl has the required equipment, expertise, and experimental design already available.
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Y The equipment was designed and fabricated by BCL specifically for the experiments to determine-the power reactor spent fuel sabotage source term. The equipment is still in place and is readily available for use in the propor.ed experiments.
It would be extremely cost inefficient lto duplicate the equipment in terms of 1
both material and personnel resources.
BCL is also u,nique id that they have a 3
i hot cell facility that is available for conducting the necess'ary explosive testing.
The experimental..and analytical procedures that were developed for the power reactor spent fuel work will be directly applicable to the proposed work.
BCL also completed validation tests on parts of the experimental design that would have to be duplicated by any other organization perfordiing the work.
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addition, BCL developed a computer program and test control system that would have to be duplicated by any other organization.
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Finally, the proposed work will provide a techn,ical basis for the proposed rulemaking on protection requirements for spent fuel shipments.
NM55 plans to specifically address tach. type of spent fuel shipment and will need the information from the proposed study to respond to public comment.
The proposed rule is scheduled for publication by the end of ca endar year 1983.
Because BCL n h eh tuel esign already in pface,futhey are Zs 4 ~ A.
cat, 4 has the equipment, expertise,' and ex,c.perime5ta au the only organization that could meet the necessary schedule.
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s SEP 2 S E3 JUSTIFICATION FOR PLACEMENT OF WORK WITH BATTELLE COLUMBUS In preparing a proposed rulemaking on the protection requirements for shipments of spent fuel, the Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards (NMSS) has identified a need to estimate the consequences of radiological release as a result of explosive sabotage of shipments of spent fuel from gas-cooled power reactors and non-power reactors. This requires that an analytical and/or exper-imental determination of a source term (i.e., the magnitude and chemical / physical form of any released radioactive material) likely to result from explosive sabotage of such shipments be made. A similar need in the area of shipment of high level waste has also been identified by NMSS.
Battelle Columbus Laboratories (BCL) recently completed a study for the Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research (RES) that resulted in a source term characterization for explosive sabotage of power reactor spent fuel casks during transport.
The study was conducted in three phases:
(1) Definition of the reference basis threat, design of the experiments, and design of equipment; (2) construction and testing of the system; and (3) conduct of the experiments and data analysis.
The proposed new work will require the same equipment, expertise, and experi-mental setup as the power reactor spent fuel sabotage source tem.
BCL has the unique capability to conduct the proposed study in that it is the only organization that has the required equipment, expertise, and experimental design already available.
The proposed work requires the use of a hot cell facility. BCL is unique in that they have a hot cell facility available and are willing to perform explosive tests inside it. Other organizations contacted in regard to the power reactor j
spent fuel work were unwilling to make such a commitment. Those industry organ-izations who have hot cells have their time fully scheduled and are unwilling i
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of the explosive testing.
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The experimental setup availableaat BCL was designed and fabricated by BCL for the experiments to determine the power reactor spent fuel sabotage source term.
The same setup would be used for the proposed work.
It is readily available for the proposed experiments.
It would be extremely cost ineffective to duplicate the setup in terms of both material and personnel resources. Of primary importance are a detonation sphere to contain the blast, and a sampling chamber to confine and allow measurement of the radioactive material. The detonation sphere used by BCL was obtained from the Los Alamos National Laboratory.
Any organization other than BCL would have to either move the detonation sphere or obtain another one and arrange to have it moved. This would be time consuming and costly.
More importantly, the sampling chamber used by BCL would have to be duplicated or transported to any other organization's site. BCL designed and built the sampling chamber specifically for the experiments for power reactor spent fuel sabotage.
In order to operate safely at the anticipated experimental pressures, the sampling chamber had to meet the ASME pressure vessel code as required by the State of Ohio. The process of designing and building the sampling chamber, redesigning it to meet the ASME code, and obtaining certification that it met the code took approximately eight months.
If another organization had to duplicate the sampling chamber, this process would have to be repeated until it met the appropriate code (s).
If the BCL sampling chamber were to be moved to another organization's site it would have to be shipped as a radioactive shipment, since it is contaminated with radioactive materials from the power reactor spent
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fuel sabotage experiments. This would require certification of the packaging by the NRC, which is also a time consuming process.
Each of the experimental components used in the previous study was subjected to validation tests to assure that the experiments using the whole system could be conducted as planned.
In addition, the entire experimental system was subjected to an extensive safety review before any of the experiments could be conducted. This entire process would have to be repeated by any other organization resulting in further expenditure of time and resources.
Because the process has already been completed by BCL, they would not have to repeat it.
The experimental and analytical procedures that were developed for the previous study will be directly applicable to the proposed work.
In addition, BCL developed a computer program and test control system that will be directly applicable. All of this information would have to be duplicated and transferred from BCL to another organization.
BCL was selected for the power reactor spent fuel sabotage study partially because they had expertise in assessing production and dissemination of aerosols using explosives, structural damage created by explosives, and scaling laws applicable to explosive testing.
This expertise still exists at BCL. Because of their experience with the previous experiments, BCL would be able to begin work without having to go through long preparatory stages, and might be able to foresee and prevent problems that other organizations would not be prepared for.
Although the appropriate combinations of expertise might possibly be obtained by another organization, this would take time.
In addition, the experts employed by an organization other than BCL would need additional time to become familiar with the techniques and procedures-used
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Finally, the proposed work will provide a technical basis for the proposed rulemaking on protection requirements for spent fuel shipments. This is a major rulemaking, action, requiring a strong technichl basis. NMSS plans to specifically address each type of spent fuel shipment and will need the information from the proposed study to respond to public coment.
The proposed rule is scheduled for publication by the end of calendar year 1983, with a ninety day public comment period. This makes the timeliness of the availability of results from the proposed expbriments an important factor.
Because BCL has the facilities, equipment, expertise, and experimental design already in place, they are the only organization that could meet the necessary schedule.
In summary, BCL is unique in that they have the necessary facilities, equipment, and expertise on hand and readily available for use. In addition, with time being such an important factor in the support of a major rulemaking activity, BCL is most suited to NRC's needs because they can start the proposed analytical and experimental work immediately, whereas any other organization would have to expend time, money, and personnel resources in duplicating the preparatory work already done by BCL.