ML20134L071
| ML20134L071 | |
| Person / Time | |
|---|---|
| Issue date: | 08/06/1985 |
| From: | Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards |
| To: | Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards |
| References | |
| ACRS-2332, NUDOCS 8509030043 | |
| Download: ML20134L071 (18) | |
Text
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/?CKS- 333 2.
CERTIFIED COPY , WN D .? F a DATE ISSUED: August 6,1985
SUMMARY
/ MINUTES OF THE ACRS REACTOR OPERATIONS SUBCOMMITTEE MEETING, ROOM 1046, WASHINGTON, D.C.
JULY 9, 1985 'i A meeting was held by the ACRS Reactor Operations Subcommittee. The purpose of the meeting was to discuss recent operating occurrences.
Notice of the meeting was published in the Federal Register on Friday, June 21, 1985 (attachment A). The schedule of items covered in the meeting is in Attachment B. The list of attendees is in Attachment C.
A list of handouts is in Attachment D. The handouts are filed with the office copy of this summary / minutes. Herman Alderman was the ACRS Staff member for this meeting. Chairman J. Ebersole convened the meeting at 1:00 p.m.
Principal Attendees:
ACRS Members ACRS Staff J. Ebersole, Chairman H. Alderman G. Reed C. Wylie NRC Staff D. Moeller R. Hernan D. Ward E. Jordan S. Miner D. Powell D. Holland J. Sullivan kok'OMjj3850806 G. Rivenbark 2332 D. Jaffe N V. Hodge E. Weiss A. W. DeAgazio J. Stolz J A. Dromeric
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DECIC::ATED CRICIPAL Certificd Pt,M
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Sumary/ Minutes / Reactor Operations 2 Mtg., July 9, 1985 l,- -
Hatch Unit 1 - Stuck Open Safety Relief Valve, May 15, 1985 - G.
f l Rivenbark 1
i On May 15, 1985 while the reactor was operating at full power, the control room emergency ventilation system charcoal filter deluge valve .
actuated. Prior to this event, an overhead crane passed over the control room. The licensee believes that the crane hook caused the
! deluge valve to actuate.
l Water leaked through ventilation ducts into a Hatch Unit 1 Analog Transmitter Trip system instrument panel causing the SRV to Open.
The reactor was manually scramed. The feedwater pump recovered reactor water level. The SRV closed without operator action.
The water followed a path through the charcoal filters, which had clogged water drains, and into the air intake from the control room.
Mr. Reed asked what type of relief valve was used? Mr. Rivenbark replied that it was a two-stage target rock relief valve that is operated electromagnet 1cally. Mr. Moeller pointed out that a control room HVAC system should not have a deluge system for the charcoal, and if this system had been properly designed without the presence of water, this incident would never have happened.
l Corrective action includes, replacement of analog transmitter trip system, checking and cleaning drains and adding procedures for checking drains.
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Summary / Minutes /R: actor Operations 3 Mtg., July 9, 1985 Oyster Creek, Uncontrolled Leakage of Reactor Coolant Outside Contain-ment, June 12, 1985 - D. Powell With Reactor at 99% power, failure of the electric pressure regulatory caused a turbine bypass valve to open resulting in a reactor pressure decrease, followed by MSIV closure and reactor scram. -
The scram discharge volume drain valves failed to fully shut causing reactor coolant to be discharged to the reactor building drain tank.
Release of steam from floor drains caused paint to blister and caused a portion of reactor building deluge system to activate.
The scram signal was not reset for 36 minutes allowing continuous reactor coolant flow to the drain tank. The reason the scram signal could not be reset was there is a 600 P.S.I. interlock on MSIV clo-sure/ loss of condenser vacuum.
The causes of the valve failure were determined to be an undersized spring, stroke distance insufficient to tightly seat the valve, and improper post-installation testing of valves.
Mr. Ebersole inquired if this plant had the two valve in series?
Mr. Powell replied that they did. Mr. Ebersole asked what the probabilistic number would be for the leakage of these two valves?
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Summary / Minutes / Reactor Operations 4 Mtg., July 9, 1985 Mr. Powell replied that he didn't have that number. Mr. Ebersole asked ,.
if they invoked what now call serriautomatic blowdown. Mr. Powell replied that is what they did.
Corrective Actions i o Replaced 400 lb. spring with 1000 lb. spring o Adjusted valve stroke distance o Checked CRD seals for damage o Checked equipment for damage o No damage found Westinghouse - Potential Seismic Interaction of the Incore Flux Mapping System, February 12, 1985 - D. Pcwell This is a potential generic problem at all Westinghouse reactors. The non-seismic portion of the flux mapping system may interact with incore guide tubes at the seal table during a seismic event. This has the potential for multiple failures of the guide tubes at the seal table and a potential LOCA. This problem was discovered at Shearon Harris. The NRC was notified of this potential problem on June 22, 1984.
Mr. Ebersole asked, did you say that severing of about four of the guide tubes means that you are in trouble? Mr. Powell replied that if you were to completely sever four or more guide tubes you would be in excess of the high pressure charging pump capacity. Mr. Ebersole noted that in order to get to low pressure, there is no real blowdown capability other than the secondary system and that is not safety, grade, so that you end
Sumary/Minut:s/ Reactor Op3 rations 5 Mtg., July 9, 1985 up leaking water out faster than you can put it in from the low point in
.the vessel.
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Corrective Actions:
I o Perform structural integrity analysis of the portion of the system above the seal table. .
o Make structural modifications as required o IE Information noted 85-45 issued on June 5, 1985 Water Hamer, HPCI Turbine Exhaust, Pilgrim, April 2,1985, May 18,1985
- V. Hodge The steam exhaust line (1 inch) from the HPCI turbine empties into the torus (below the water level) for condensation. There is a vacuum
! breaker on this line. On the two dates tested above, water hammer was experienced. Damage was exhibited on the piping and to the rupture disc.
Mr. Ebersole asked about the rupture disk. He noted that the disc is normally in the same room as the HPCI turbine. Mr. Hodge stated that it was. Mr. Ebersole asked that if the rupture disc should fail, would it rupture into the room proper? The answer was yes.
Mr. Ebersole pointed out that if the rupture disc failed, it would be fatal to anyone in that room.
Mr. Reed pointed out that the slide shows a check valve en a vertical line and this has the potential to hold water above it. Secondly he noted that the line under discussion was an exhaust discharge line which
m Sununary/ Minutes / Reactor Operations 6 Mtg., July 9, 1985 is sometimes hot and sometimes cold and the end is submerged in water.
He noted that this line will suck water back into the line. He asked if
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there was a drilled hole in the top of the line to act as a vacuum breaker? The response was no, ,
'i The suggested remedy is to possibly relocate the vacuum breaker to -
ensure its operation.
Calvert Cliffs Units 1 and 2, All Diesel Generators Inoperable on May 26, 1985 - D. H. Jaffe l
Unit I was in a refueling outage, and Unit 2 at full power. The Unit 1 i
diesel generator failed during testing on May 14th. The failure mode, l l
fracture of an interpoler connector, was discovered on May 26th 1985.
The cause was identified as high stress induced cracking.
Mr. Ebersole asked what function was lost by removing the interpoler connectors? Mr. Jaffe replied that the purpose of the interpoler connectors was important when dissimilar diesel generators are in use.
! Also they are important when the total three-phase unbalanced load is l excessive. The generator vendor determined that this was not the case for Calvert Cliffs. At Calvert Cliffs the interpoler connectors were I
removed and the diesel generators were found to perform fine.
Mr. Ward asked what was meant by dissimilar diesel generators being used? Mr. Jaffe responded that if you had 2 DIG',s of different sizes in
Summary / Minutes / Reactor Operations 7 Mtg. , July 9,1985 parallel, the interpoler connectors would dampen the voltage oscil-lations.
Corrective Action:
1:
o The two remaining diesel generators (Unit 2 and swing) were removed from service to inspect interpolor connectors on May .
26th, 1985.
o A crack was found on the swing diesel generator.
o The refurbished Unit 1 diesel generator was realigned for Unit 2 service.
o The interpoler connectors were removed from the Unit 2 and swing diesel generator o All diesel generators were declared operable by May 27, 2985.
Rancho Seco, Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) Circuit Design Error, Jdhe 1, 1985 - S. Miner l
This is a potential generic problem in all plants with similar G. M. I set. This potential problem was discovered while the plant was shutdown for a refueling outage. The maintenance shutdown mode consists of the following:
o EDG output breaker opens o EDG idles down from 900 to 600 RPM o EDG idles at 600 RPM for 15 minutes o EDG shutdown and coasts to rest While EDG is in the maintenance shutdown mode, tlye emergency bus was de-energized due to pre-planned work on new parallel bus.
Summary / Minutes / Reactor Operations 8 Mtg., July 9, 1985
,' The undervoltage signal brings the EDG up to 900 Rpm. The EDG output I
breaker closes and the U.V. signal drops out. The maintenance shutdown mode does not drop out for 30 seconds and automatically opens the EDG output breaker. The UV signal recurs and the EDG control circuit ,
repeats the cycle.
Mr. Ebersole questioned why this particular maintenance shutdown mode was used instead of a straight manual maintenance shutdown.
Mr. Miner replied he didn't know, perhaps the time is needed to burn off carbon.
Mr. Ebersole noted that it could easily be done under manual supervision and this seems like a degree of automation which is excessive.
This design deficiency has existed for the life of the plant. The corrective action is, the licensee is installing a relay to de-energize the maintenance shutdown mode on a undervoltage signal.
Rancho Seco, Reactor Trip Breaker Trip Failure, June 5, 2985 - S. Miner l
Rancho Seco uses G. E. AK-2-25 reactor trip breakers. During the refueling outage, all TB's were refurbished in accordance with B&W l owners group program in response to generic letter G.L. 83-28 of July 8, l l
1983. l 1
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Summary / Minutes /R: actor Operatiens 9 Mtg., July 9, 1985 Prior to plant startup, one reactor trip breaker failed during post-maintenance operability testing.
The cause of the RTB failure was the undervoltage trip paddle Jamed against the amature with the armature in the energized position. The shunt trip' remained operable. The licensee evaluation indicates that -
the UV trip assembly armature / roller-rivet measurement was grossly out of specification.
Mr. Wylie asked if a similar occurrence happened in any of the other regions? Mr. Miner replied not to his knowledge. Mr. Ebersole asked that since the shunt trip will obscure the fact that this trip didn't work in a normal scram, how long would it be that this condition would exist in the plants before it would discover that you weren't getting the trip? Mr. Miner replied that you would probably catch it during surveillance testing.
Corrective Actions:
o All RTB's reinstalled after passing revised post-maintenance test procedures.
o The failed breaker is to be evaluated by the B&W owners group o An I.E. Information Notice is in preparation.
Rancho Seco - Reactor Coolant System High Point Vent Leak, June 23, 1985
- S. Miner
l Summary / Minutes /R; actor Operations 10 Mtg., July 9, 1985 i.-
The event occurred while the plant was in hot standby restarting from a .
refueling outage. A 20 gpm non-isolable primary coolant leak was
-discovered on the high point vent on the B steam generator hot leg. The leak was in piping installed as part of a TMI modification during a 1985 refueling outage. This is a thru wall leak at a weld. The cause of the
! leak appears to be caused by fatigue failure created by missing sup-l ports.
l Mr. Ebersole asked if the attachment had been subjected to the usual stress analysis?
Mr. Miner replied that it was analyzed. The problem is that some of the support sections that were supposed to be there were missing. Mr. Reed 1
questioned what the metallurgical examination showed, whether it was fatigue failure or stress corrosion cracking. Mr. Miner replied that it
, was fatigue failure.
Mr. Moeller inquired if a 20 gallon per minute leak was detectable by the temperature rising in the containment? Mr. Miner replied that he didn't think so.
l l Corrective Actions:
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0 Stress analysis to identify over-stressed areas.
o Repair systems o Install supports .
o Walkdown to inspect and evaluate other systems.
w _. - _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ - _ - _ - _ _ _ _ _ - _ - - _ - _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - _ - _
Summary /Minut s/R actor Operations 11 Mtg., July 9,1985 Turkey Point, Forest Fires Lead to Loss of Offsite Power, May 17, 1985 -
1 Henry Bailey Fire shorted out three 500 KV transmission lines. The loss of the 500 ,
KV caused southea*,t Florida to electrically isolate from the grid.
Voltage immediately dropped in the isolated area and caused the loss of-of offsite power, There is no special safety significance to this particular event, other than the challenge to the safety systems associated with a loss of offsite power and reactor trip.
Davis-Besse, Loss of All Main Feedwater and Auxiliary Feedwater, June 9, 2985 - A. DeAgazio The Davis-Besse plant was operating at 90% power with main feedwater pump 2 in manual control because of problems with automatic control. A control problem with main feedwater pump 1 occurred, and the pump tripped on overspeed. About 30 seconds later the reactor tripped on high pressure in the reactor coolant system.
The main steam isolation valves closed, cutting off motive power to the feedwater pumps.
This incident was compounded by an operator pushing the low steam generator pressure buttons instead of low steam generator level buttons.
This served to isolate the steam generators. The valves could not be
Summary / Minutes /Reactsr Operations 12 Mtg., July 9, 1985 c.
realigned from the control room so operators had to be sent out to manually realign the valves, and to manually start the auxiliary feedwater pumps. About 16 minutes after the reactor trip, the operators had the startup and auxiliary feedwater pumps running and valves ,.
aligned.
Mr. Ebersole pointed out that the two turbine driven auxiliary feed pumps are located in the basement with electric coolers and electric valves. He noted that there was a number of ways that the system could fail. The system was justified by a PRA. He asked, will there be a reconsideration of that aspect of prior justification? Mr. Jordan replied that he was sure that it would be reconsidered.
Mr. Reed asked what was the function of the low pressure trip system that apparently it effected both steam generators.
Mr. DeAgazio replied that the isolation of the steam generators is there to prevent a rapid cooldown of the reactor coolant system.
This was a complex event involving multiple equipment failure and human error. Following the incident, a confirmatory action letter was issued and the plant will not be allowed to startup until the incident is understood. A final report from the incident investigation team is expected about July 24, 1985.
Following discussion of the above events the following events were picked for full Committee discussion on July 11, 1985. j
Summary / Minutes /R: actor Operatiens 13
- Mtg., July 9, 1985
- 1. Hatch 1 stuck open SRV - May 15, 1985.
- 2. Oyster Creek Scram Discharge Volume isolation valves failure
- June 12, 1985.
- 3. Westinghouse - Potential seismic interaction of the incore 1 l flux mapping system - February 12, 1985.
- 4. Rancho Seco - RCS high point vent leak - June 23, 1985. .
The meeting was adjourned at 4:30 p.m.
NOTE: A complete transcript of the meeting is on file at the NRC Public Document Room at 1717 H St., NW., Washington, D. C.or can be obtained at cost from Ann Riley & Associates, 1625 I St., N.W., Suite 921, Washington, D. C. 20006, Phone:
(202)293-3950
)
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21, 1985 / Notices .
Sh801 hb Fed:r:1 Register / V 1. 50. N2.120 / I'riday, jun]
ing will be open W .
Thursday. July II. 1965-8:30P.m. uztil e c tire cctric's long term seismic progrcm I pt:n for Diablo Canyon. NP.m. The agenda for the subject meeting Oral statements may be presented by The Subcommittee will continue shall be as follows: ,
members of the public with the discussions on developing comments on gg ,
i a long range plan for the NRC. Topics J .
concurrence of the Subcommittee under discussion are primarily technical conc sion of business I, f Ch:frman; written statements will be i accepted and made available to the issues related to the regulation of ne Subcommittee will discuss recent '
Committee. Recordings will be permitted nuclear power plant safety and safety operating occurences. . e Oral statements may be presented by only during those portions of the regulation over the next 5 to to years.
' ' Oral statements may be presented by members of the public with the
- m:eting when a transcript is being kept.
and questions may be asked only by members of the public with the concurrence of the Subcommittce Chairman; written statements willbe members of the Subcommittee. Its concurrence of the Subcommittee Chairman; written statements will be accepted and made available to the
' consultants, and Staff. Persons desirins Committee. Recordings will be permitted to make oral statements should notify accepted and made available to the
- th2 ACRS staff member named below as Committee. Recordings will be permitted only during those portions of the fer in ads ance as is practicable so that only during those portions of the meeting when a transcript is being kept.
meeting when a transcript is being kept. and questions may be asked only by cppropriate arrangements can be made, -
During the initial portion of the and questions may be asked only by members of the Subcommittee. its consultants, and Staff. Persons desiring meeting. the Subccmmittee, along with members of Subcommittee.its consultants, and Staff. Persons desiring to make oral statements should notify cny ofits consultants who may be present, may eschange preliminary to make oral statements should notify the ACRS staff member named below as siews regarding matters to be the ACRS staff member named below as far in advance as is practicable so that
- considered during the balance of the far in advance as is practicable so that appropriate arrangements can be made.
meetmg. , appropriate arangements can be made. During the initial portion of the During the initial portion of the meeting, the Subcommittee, along with The Subcommittee will then hear presentations by and hold discussions meeting. the Subcommittee, along with any of its consultants who may be with representatives of the Pacific Gas any ofits consultants who may be present. may exchange preliminary cnd Electric Company, the NRC Staff,its present, may exchange preliminary views regarding matters to be consultants. and other interested views regarding matters to be rensidere 1 during the balance of the persons regarding this review. considered during the balance of the meeting.
Further information regarding topics meeting 'The Subcommittee will then hear to be discussed. whether the meetina The Subcommittee will then hear presentations by and hold discussions has been cancelled or resheduled, the presentations by and hold discussions with representatives of the NRC Staff.
Chairman's ruling on requests for the with representatives of the NRC StafL tte consultants, and other interested cpportunity to present oral statements its consultants, and other interested persons regarding this review,
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and the time allotted therefore can be persons regarding this review. Further information regarding topics obtained by a prepaid telephone call to Further information regarding topics t: be discussed. whether the meeting the cognizant ACRS staff member.Mr. to be discussed, whether the meetinA has been cancelled or rescheduled. the Elpidio C. Igne (telephone 202/634-1414) has been cancelled or rescheduled, the Chairman's ruling on requests for the between 815 a m. and 5 00 p m. persons Chairrnan's ruling on requests for the opportunity to present oral statements planning to attend this meeting are opportunity to present oral statements and the time allotted therefor can be urged to contact the abos e named and the time allotted therefor can be obtained by a prepaid telephonetall to individual one or two de)s before the obtained by a prepaid telephone call to the cognizant ACRS staff member Mr.
scheduled meeting to be advised of any the cognizant ACRS staff member Mr. lierman Alderman (telephone 202/634-changes in schedule. etc., which may John C. McKinley (telephone 202/634- 1414) between 8:15 a.m. arid 5.00 p.m.
i have occurred. 1414) between 815 a.m. and 5 00 p m- Persons planning to attend this meeting Dated june 18.1985 Persons planning to attend this meeting are urged to contact the above named Morton W. UbarMn. are urged to contact the above named individual one of two days before the individual one or two days before the scheduled meeting to the advised of any Assistant fa ccutive D recterfor fracct Review. scheduled meeting to be advised of any changes in schedule etc which may changes in schedule, etc., which may have occurred. .
[FR Doc. 85-1509 File J f40-45. 8 45 am]
have occurred. ' .
sumo coor tsmi-as Dated June 18.19a5.
Dated June 18.1985. Morton W. UbarMn, a M "
- W' UbU** A s sis tant Es ecuuve Directorfor Project Advisory Committee on Reactor "" A"#"
Safeguards Subcommittee on Long #"'##I##D"' 1 Range Plan for NRC; Meeting [' tmocooets
- h. 85-15053 u w Filed 6-2045. a 45 am}
o goog , l The ACRS Subcommittce on Long '
Range Plan for NRC will hold a meetmg on July 10 and 11.1985. Room 1167,1717 1Dockat No. 50-400) 11 Street NW., Washington, DC. Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards Subcommittee on Reactor Carolina Power and ught Co. and The entire meeting will be open to Operations; Meeting North Carotina Eastern Municipal public attendance. . .. .
I'*"*"C' d The agenda for subject meeting shall The ACRS Subcommittee en Reactor be as follows: Operations will hold a meeting on july 9.
An#9'"'Y
nt 2 Cuskuchn Permn Wednesdo . July 10. IG3h9 00 a.m. 1985. Room 1046.171711 Street. NW, e The U.S. Nuclear Reguletory
. untili e conclusion of business Washington. DC. Commission (the Commission) has O $
s
&E TENTATIVE SCHEDULE FOR ACRS SUBCOMMITTEE MEETING (REVISED 7/9/8 ON REACTOR OPERATIONS, JULY 9, 1985 1:00 P.M., ROOM 1046. H STREET l
l 1:00 p.m. ~ Opening Statement - Subcomittee Chairman RECENT SIGNIFICANT EVENTS 1:10 p.m. 1. Rancho Seco - EDG control June 1, 1985 S. Miner circuit design error 1:30 p.m. 2. Rancho Seco - Reactor June 5, 1985 S. Miner l
Trip breaker test failure 1:50 p.m. 3. Rancho Seco - Unisolable June 23, 1985 S. Miner 20 gpm Leak from RCS Vent Line 1
- 4. Hatch 1 Stuck May 15, 1985 G. Rivanbark 2:10 Open SRV.
2:30 p.m. 5. Oyster Creek Scram June 13, 1985 D. Powell i
Discharge Volume l Isolation Valves Failure l ****** ******
t 2:50 p.m. BREAK 3:00 p.m. 6. Westinghouse - Potential February 12, 1985 D. Powell seismic interaction of the incore flux mapping system
- 7. Pilgrim - water hamer May 18, 1985 V. Hodge 3:20 p.m.
in HPCI steam turbine >
exhaust line 3:40 p.m. 8. Calvert Cliff Units 1 and May 26, 1985 Y. Thomas 2 emergency D/G inoperable 4:10 p.m. 9. Turkey Point Units 3/5 May 17, 1985 H. Bailey loss of off/ site power due to fire offsite 4:30 p.m. 10. Sequyoyah Unit 2 May 22, 1985 E. Weiss Reactor Trip due to Improper use of test instrument l 4:50 p.m. 11. Davis-Besse loss of June 9, 1985 E. Jordan l MFW and AFW l (OutlineGO-TeamEfforts)*
5:20 p.m. Subcomittee Discussion .
f 5:30 p.m. ADJOURN
- GO-Team will discuss this event in detail at a later meeting.
l l
H. ALDERMAN Aac REACTOR OPERATIONS ,
ACPS SUBCOMMITTEE MEETING ON LOCATION Roem 1046,1717 H St., NW . Washington, D.C.
DATE July 9,1985 - 1:00 p.m.
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July 9.1985 - 1 :00 p.m.
DATE:
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l ATTACHMENT D 4*
APPENDIX D - LIST OF HANDOUTS
- 1. Handout package of recent sig nificant events.
I 1
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